The Issue The issue is whether the Department’s intended award allowing Metro to proceed to licensure for a methadone Medication-Assisted Treatment (“MAT”) facility in Lake County violated Florida Administrative Code Rule 65D- 30.0141, was arbitrary or capricious, or was otherwise unlawful as alleged in LifeStream’s Petition for Administrative Hearing (“Petition”).
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: PARTIES Petitioner LifeStream is a Florida not-for-profit corporation and provider of substance abuse treatment. LifeStream applied for the ability to proceed to licensure to provide methadone MAT services in Lake County. The Department is the agency with regulatory authority over the provision of substance abuse services. § 397.321(1), Fla. Stat. The Department’s duties include, but are not limited to, the licensing and regulation of the delivery of substance abuse services, including clinical treatment and clinical treatment services such as “medication-assisted treatment for opiate disorder.” §§ 397.321(1) and (6); and 397.311(26)(a)7., Fla. Stat. The Department also promulgates rules governing substance abuse providers. § 397.321(5), Fla. Stat. Metro is a provider of care for opioid use disorder treatment and operates methadone medication treatment centers nationwide, including in the state of Florida. Metro applied for the ability to proceed to licensure to provide methadone MAT services in Lake County. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK AND NEEDS ASSESSMENTS The substance abuse regulatory scheme in Florida is designed to provide a statewide system of care for the prevention, treatment, and recovery of children and adults with serious substance abuse disorders. Substance abuse providers, which include methadone MAT clinics, are subject to a strict statutory, regulatory, and licensing scheme, which provides direction for a continuum of community-based services including prevention, treatment, and detoxification services. See chs. 394 and 397, Fla. Stat. MAT is “the use of medications approved by the United States Food and Drug Administration, in combination with counseling and behavioral therapies, to provide a holistic approach to the treatment of substance abuse.” § 397.311(27), Fla. Stat. The Department is responsible for the licensure and oversight of all MAT providers in the state. See § 397.321, Fla. Stat. Further, the Department is required to “determine the need for establishing providers of [MAT]” on an annual basis. New MAT providers may only be established in the state in response to a determination and publication of such need by the Department. § 397.427(2), Fla. Stat. Rule 65D-30.0141 provides the process for determining the need for MAT providers, as follows, in relevant part: Determination of Need. The Department shall annually perform the assessment detailed in the “Methodology of Determination of Need Methadone Medication- Assisted Treatment,” CF-MH 4038, May 2019, incorporated by reference and available at http://www.flrules.org/Gateway/reference.asp?No= Ref-11993. The Department shall publish the results of the assessment in the Florida Administrative Register by June 30. Facilities owned and operated by the Florida Department of Corrections are exempt from the needs assessment process. However, these facilities must apply for a license to deliver this service. The publication shall direct interested parties to submit a letter of intent to apply for licensure to provide medication-assisted treatment for opioid use disorders to the Regional Office of Substance Abuse and Mental Health where need has been demonstrated. The publication shall provide a closing date for submission of letters of intent. Interested parties must identify the fiscal year of the needs assessment to which they are responding and the number of awards they are applying for per county identified in the assessment in their letter of intent. Within seven (7) business days of the closing date, the Regional Office shall notify parties who submitted a letter of intent on how to proceed. If the number of letters of intent equals or is less than the determined need, parties shall be awarded the opportunity to proceed to licensure by completing an “Application for Licensure to Provide Substance Abuse Services” form, C&F-SA Form 4024, May 2019, incorporated by reference and available at http://www.flrules.org/Gateway/reference.asp?No= Ref-11996. If the number of letters of intent exceeds the determined need, parties shall be invited to submit a “Methadone Medication-Assisted Treatment (MAT) Application to Proceed to Licensure Application” form, CF-MH 4041, May 2019, incorporated by reference and available at http://www.flrules.org/Gateway/reference.asp?No= Ref-11995. Applications may not be rolled over for consideration in response to a needs assessment published in a different year and may only be submitted for a current fiscal year needs assessment. The Department shall utilize an evaluation team made up of industry experts to conduct a formal rating of applications as stipulated in the “Methadone Medication-Assisted Treatment (MAT) Application Evaluation” form, CF-MH 4040, May 2019, incorporated by reference and available at http://www.flrules.org/Gateway/reference.asp?No= Ref-11994. The evaluation team members shall not be affiliated with the Department, current methadone medication-assisted treatment providers operating in Florida, or the applicants. The selection of a provider shall be based on the following criteria: Capability to Serve Selected Area(s) of Need and Priority Populations. Area(s) of Need are the counties identified as having a need for additional clinics. Priority Populations are pregnant women, women with young children, and individuals with financial hardships; Patient Safety and Quality Assurance/Improvement; Scope of Methadone Medication-Assisted Treatment Services; Capability and Experience; and Revenue Sources. Applicants with the highest-scored applications in each county shall be awarded the opportunity to apply for licensure for the number of programs specified in their letter of intent to meet the need of that county. If there is unmet need, the next highest scored applicant(s) will receive an award(s) based on the remaining need and the number of programs specified in their letter of intent. This process will continue until the stated need is met. Regional offices shall inform the highest-scoring applicant(s) in writing of the award. All awarded applicants must submit a letter of intent to apply for licensure to the appropriate regional office within 30 calendar days after the award. If an applicant declines an award or fails to submit the letter of intent within the specified time, the Department shall rescind the award. After the Department rescinds the original award for that selected area of need, the applicant with the next highest score shall receive the award. Awarded applicants must receive at least a probationary license within two (2) years of receipt of an award letter connected to their “Methadone Medication-Assisted Treatment (MAT) Application to Proceed to Licensure Application” form, CF-MH 4041. If an applicant fails to obtain a probationary license within the specified time, the Department shall rescind the award. See Rule 65D-30.0036, F.A.C. for licensure application requirements. Applicants may submit a request to the State Authority and Substance Abuse and Mental Health Program Office for an exception if unable to meet timeframes due to a natural disaster that causes physical damage to the applicant’s building(s). Proof of natural disaster and impact on physical property must accompany the request. Upon receipt of the request for exception and accompanying proof, a one-time extension shall be granted for six (6) months. Providers who are delayed for a reason other than a natural disaster may petition the Department for a rule waiver pursuant to Section 120.542, F.S…. In brief, potential applicants are directed to submit letters of intent to apply for a methadone MAT services license for any county in which the Department’s process demonstrates a need. Should the number of letters of intent received for a certain county be less than or equal to the need found in that county, the potential applicants may proceed directly to licensure. In the event the number of letters of intent is greater than the need found in a particular county, then potential applicants must submit an application form to the Department. The application form is adopted by reference in the rule as Form CF-MH 4041. The rule requires the Department to “utilize an evaluation team made up of industry experts to conduct a formal rating of applications” to determine which applicant, or applicants, may proceed to licensure in a particular county. Such evaluators “shall not be affiliated with the Department, current methadone [MAT] providers operating in Florida, or the applicants.” The scoring form that the evaluators must use is incorporated by reference in the rule as Form CF-MH 4040 (“Scoring Form”). The Scoring Form requires that each application be “independently scored by each member of the evaluation team.” It also mandates that the “same scoring principles must be applied to every application received.” The Scoring Form expressly states that “no attempt by Department personnel, or other evaluators or other persons to influence an evaluator’s scoring shall be tolerated.” There are five general “Criteria” in the Scoring Form upon which applicants are scored, with a number of subsections within each criterion. An application could be awarded a maximum of 220 points. The evaluators were to assign a score ranging from zero to five for each subsection, with some subsections receiving an additional “weighted value” (in which the score given would be multiplied by two). The Department gave the weighted values to provisions upon which it placed a “premium.” The “General Instructions” section of the Scoring Form provides what an applicant must demonstrate to earn a particular score: Superior (5 points): the application demonstrates or describes extensive competency, proven capabilities, an outstanding approach to the subject area, innovative, practical and effective solutions, full responsiveness to the question, a clear and comprehensive understanding of the requirements and planning for the unforeseen. Good (4 points): the application demonstrates or describes clear competency, consistent capability, a reasoned approach to the subject area, feasible solutions, extensive but incomplete responsiveness to the question, and a sound understanding of the requirements. Adequate (3 points): the application demonstrates or describes fundamental competency, adequate capability, a basic approach to the subject area, apparently feasible but somewhat unclear solutions, partial responsiveness to the question, a fair understanding of the requirements and a lack of staff experience and skills in some areas. Poor (2 points): the application demonstrates or describes little competency, minimal capability, an inadequate approach to the subject area, infeasible or ineffective solutions, somewhat unclear, incomplete or non-responsive to the question, a lack of understanding of the requirements and a lack of demonstrated experience and skills. Insufficient (1 point): the application demonstrates or describes a significant or complete lack of understanding, an incomprehensible approach, a significant or complete lack of skill and experience and extensive non-responsiveness to the question. Not Addressed (0 points): the application demonstrates or describes [that the] criteria is not addressed, approach is not described, complete non- responsiveness to the question. Criterion Five of the Scoring Form concerns “Revenue Sources.” It contains two subsections, each worth zero to five points and each given “weighted value,” meaning that a perfect score for each subsection would earn 10 points, or a total of 20 points for Criterion Five. Subsection one asked the following question: 1. How well did the organization detail its accepted forms of payment for treatment services? At a minimum, the response should describe the procedure for each payment method offered: Assess a point for each accepted form of payment (5 maximum points) Self-Pay (1 point) One form of Private Insurance (1 point) Multiple forms of Private Insurance (1 point) Medicaid (1 point) Scholarship or Sliding Fee Scale (1 point) While other sections of the Scoring Form permit the evaluator to subjectively evaluate the responsiveness of the answer, subsection one of Criterion Five is manifestly objective. It directs the evaluator to award one point for each of the five accepted forms of payment addressed by the applicant, up to the maximum of five points. Subsection two of Criterion Five asks, “How well does the application detail how the organization will determine if its pricing is competitive?” This subsection was also worth five points and allowed the evaluator to subjectively address the quality of the applicant’s response. Christopher Weller, Manager of the Licensure and Designation Unit within the Department’s Office of Substance Abuse and Mental Health, testified that Florida MAT providers historically have accepted only out-of- pocket payments for their services, meaning that those who could not afford to pay cash or credit were often left untreated. The Department wanted to ensure that the need for MAT services would be met and that no one needing such services would be priced out of treatment. Therefore, the Department included Criterion Five in the application and gave it weighted value to encourage providers to accept multiple forms of payment. The Department completed a needs assessment and published it in the June 20, 2020, edition of the Florida Administrative Register. The Department then announced that it would begin accepting applications to proceed to licensure. The needs assessment indicated a need for one new MAT clinic in Lake County. Pursuant to rule 65D-30.041(1)(c)2.a., the Department contracted with an outside provider to evaluate the applications received for counties throughout the state, including Lake County. That provider, iSF, established four teams of three evaluators to score the applications and divided the counties with need among the teams. Each evaluation team consisted of a medical professional, a public health policy professional, and an academic professional. Applicant names were redacted so evaluators would not know the identity of the applicant they were scoring. Each iSF evaluator independently evaluated the various applications. THE LAKE COUNTY APPLICATIONS LifeStream and Metro both timely submitted letters of intent and applications for the new methadone MAT clinic needed in Lake County. Four other entities also applied for the one available license in Lake County. LifeStream’s response to subsection one of Criterion Five provided as follows: Our organization has developed a detailed Financial Assistance Policy (FAP) that provides assistance to all individuals served, including insured, uninsured and underinsured individuals whose family income is less than or equal to 240% of the Federal Poverty Level without discrimination on grounds of race, sex, national origin, disability, sexual orientation, immigration status, religious preference, or any other grounds unrelated to an individual’s need for the service or the availability of the service needed for emergency and medically necessary care. Furthermore, all individuals served receive a financial screening by staff knowledgeable of the various funding mechanisms in an effort to identify the best form of payment. No one is turned away for services due to their inability to pay. As a comprehensive provider with a sound financial infrastructure, our organization is able to accept several forms of payment for any of the services provided. This includes self-pay, private insurance (both one form and multiple forms), Medicaid and scholarship or sliding scale fee. All the individuals served are charged based upon a board of directors approved charge master which ensures that all individuals are charged the same fees for the same services. Discounts are available for individuals who qualify for financial assistance using a sliding fee discount. Our organization provides payment flexibility, including payment plans/options. In addition, our staff are trained to assist individuals in obtaining benefits and coverage as appropriate to meet any ongoing needs for treatment. Self-Pay: The proposed clinic will conduct a financial screening in order to determine if an individual qualifies for any of the organization’s accepted forms of payment for treatment services. Individuals will be offered two payment options, by the day or by the week. The fee will include dosing, treatment services and ancillary services. Individuals will be offered the ability to pay using cash or credit card. The organization also has a mechanism to bill the individual if that is his/her preference. This allows the individual to pay for services in a manner that meets his/her current ability and timeframe. Private Insurance (One or Multiple Forms): Our organization has numerous contracts with private insurance providers. This includes major providers such as Aetna, Blue Cross/Blue Shiled, Cigna, Magellan, Tricare, PsycCare, United Health Care and Value Options to name a few. In order to ensure that our organization has the ability to bill private insurance for these services, staff will possess the appropriate credentials, training and experience to allow them to be paneled by the insurance providers. In addition, our organization has staff that conduct financial assessments in order to determine the best funding source for the services provided. They are experienced and knowledgeable about the various private insurance plans and have the ability to determine if one or multiple forms of insurance will be utilized. Medicaid: Our organization is an established Medicaid provider and has the ability to bill Multiple Medicaid Associations (MMAs) as a result of having contracts with several of the organizations such as Prestige, Wellcare, United Healthcare and Sunshine. All of our sites and appropriate staff have the proper credentials to bill for Medicaid services. In addition, the treatment services and ancillary services we propose to offer will be Medicaid credentialed in order to bill for those services as well. Scholarship or Sliding Fee Scale: As stated earlier, our organization has extensive experience working with indigent individuals. As a result of a financial assessment, the level of discount for which an individual is eligible is determined based upon the individual’s family income and family size as a percentage of the FPL. Our developed policies and procedures define the meaning of “uninsured,” “underinsured,” “family income,” and “Federal Poverty Level.” All of our financial policies are listed on our website that address payment for treatment services and are provided in detail for the people we serve. Metro’s response to subsection one of Criterion Five provided as follows: To facilitate the ease of payment by individuals in need of treatment and to minimize financial barriers to treatment, we offer a wide array of payment options that include: Self-Pay—Patients with the financial capacity to pay for their own treatment may pay using cash, credit card, Apple Pay, and/or debit card. Upon receiving the medication portion of their treatment, self-pay patients either tender cash to clinic staff for the cost of treatment or, alternatively, provide a credit card, Apple Pay, or debit card that is entered into a card processing terminal for verification and transaction authorization. Private Insurance—We accept multiple forms of private insurance as we are in network with many private insurers (including, but not limited to, Beacon Health, Triwest, United/Optum, and Aetna). Also, we have established single case agreements with private insurers with whom we are not yet in-network so that the cost to each patient is minimized and keeps the patient in treatment. Procedurally, patients present their private insurance information to clinic staff who verify eligibility, benefits, and individual financial responsibility (e.g., deductibles, co-pays, co- insurance). A patient’s financial responsibility, if any, is collected from the patient pursuant to their insurer’s benefit design, and the treatment services are billed to their health insurer. An assignment of benefits is signed by the patient to permit us to bill and collect directly from their health insurer. Medicaid—Opioid Use Disorder treatment is a covered benefit under Florida Medicaid. As a result, all of our existing clinics are enrolled in the Florida Medicaid network. If our organization is awarded the clinic for this county, we would immediately enroll this clinic in the Florida Medicaid program. Patients covered by Florida Medicaid simply present their Medicaid card to clinic personnel who are able to immediately verify active coverage. Upon verification of coverage, the patient completes an assignment of benefits and is treated without any financial outlay. Treatment services received by the patient are then billed to Florida Medicaid directly for as long as the individual remains Medicaid eligible. Sliding Fee Scale—Patients without the financial capacity to pay for their own treatment, or are without Florida Medicaid or private health insurance coverage, may qualify for our Sliding Fee Scale. The Sliding Fee Scale offers discounted fees to patients in need of treatment. Eligibility is determined based on Federal poverty guidelines, household income, and the number of people in the patient’s household. Patients who are eligible for the Sliding Fee Scale must simply provide the following financial data as a part of their application: Pay stubs for at least the last six months; A copy of their most recent federal income tax return; Proof of current living situation (such as lease documents, or utility bills in the patient’s name); A financial attestation signed by the patient, which our clinic will provide. Upon the establishment of a patient’s eligibility, the patient’s cost of treatment is reduced to the discounted fee per the Sliding Fee Scale. In the event that a patient’s financial status changes, the patient must inform clinic staff of the changes. At a minimum, the clinic staff will review financial status with the patient every six (6) months. Financial status may be reviewed at the request of the patient or clinic at any time. Grants—Our organization routinely pursues, and has secured, grant funding to cover the cost of treatment for patient who are [sic] unable to pay for their treatment and who do not have insurance. Grant finds are awarded through regional Managing Entities. Available grant funds are sought to cover [the] cost of care for eligible patients receiving treatment at our clinics. As mentioned, our organization is currently the recipient of grant funds from multiple Managing Entities in the State of Florida. Eligible patients must simply provide the following financial data as a part of their application: Pay stubs for at least the last six months; A copy of their most recent federal income tax return; Proof of current living situation (such as lease documents, or utility bills in the patient’s name); A financial attestation signed by the patient, which our clinic will provide. Upon the establishment of a patient’s eligibility, the patient’s cost of treatment is reduced in accordance with the grant guidelines. In the event that a patient’s financial status changes, the patient must inform clinic staff of the changes. At a minimum, the clinic staff will review financial status with the patient every six (6) months. Financial status may be reviewed at the request of the patient or clinic at any time. Credit—Patients with the financial capacity to pay for their own treatment via cash, credit card, and/or debit card occasionally find themselves in need of treatment but, for a variety of reasons, are unable to pay. Our organization empowers its clinic Program Directors (i.e., the on-site clinic managers) to extend credit to patients in such situations for a short period (typically one day) with the understanding that the patient will repay the credit amount extended in short order. Upon receiving credit authorization, the patient receives all medically necessary treatment as may be required. Both the LifeStream and Metro proposals appear to have described the procedure for each of the five payment methods listed and appear to be entitled to the maximum score of five points according to the objective standards set forth in subsection one of Criterion Five. At the very least, it would be impossible to justify giving either proposal a score of zero, which is reserved for “complete nonresponsiveness” to the question. LifeStream’s response to subsection two of Criterion Five provided as follows: In order to ensure that pricing is competitive, our organization will review the current environment using several data sources on a regular basis. This will include the Department of Children and Families, our state trade association, Florida Behavioral Health association and discussions with other providers. We also propose to conduct focus groups with the individuals that we serve and our stakeholders to collect input that will be part of this review. On an annual basis, our organization will conduct a pricing study to ensure that the pricing is competitive. As a safety net provider and an organization committed to serving individuals regardless of their ability to pay, we feel that the input from those we serve and our stakeholders is a critical piece in determining if pricing is competitive. Our organization will identify and provide solutions to ensure that those that need care are able to receive the care. We are dedicated to ensuring that the pricing will be reasonable and that options are identified and offered for low income/indigent individuals. More importantly, our organization will commit to supporting the people we serve through a continuum of services that not only addresses their opioid disorders, but also the social determinants that may affect their successful recovery. Our organization is a Medicaid provider and also has access to other funds to ensure that individuals who need this service will receive it regardless of their ability to pay. Metro’s response to subsection two of Criterion Five provided as follows: As a longstanding provider of Opioid Use Disorder treatment services in the State of Florida, our organization is keenly aware of the need to properly price our services given the circumstances typically facing patients battling opioid addiction which include, but are not limited to, financial hardship. Consequently, we recognize that appropriate pricing of our services is critical so as to ensure that individuals in need of care do not perceive that treatment for their disease is unattainable. While a material and increasing number of patients have their treatment paid by Medicaid, private health insurance, and grants (as fully discussed in question 1 of Criteria 5), those patients who pay for treatment out of their own pockets routinely encounter financial barriers which, unfortunately, result in them not seeking treatment, or leaving treatment prematurely. Given our experience operating outpatient clinics in Florida, our organization has developed a substantial amount of year-by-year internal pricing data, which includes specific market economic data, that guides us in pricing our services within a particular Florida region. This data, which is updated annually, is measured against other payer rates (such as Medicaid and private health insurance), and compared to the rates we are paid for opioid addiction treatment services provided by our clinics in other states. Taken together, this data allows us to develop regional benchmarks that we use to price our services fairly and competitively, bearing in mind the financial challenges typically encountered by opioid addicted patients. To be clear, this is a fluid process that takes into account changing market conditions, both inside and outside of Florida, regarding the pricing of opioid addiction treatment. This allows our organization to maintain a current view of what patients can realistically afford to pay and, when necessary, immediately adjust our pricing expectations when the market data indicates that such adjustments are needed to ensure continuity of patient care. In addition to our routine pricing analysis using our historical internal data, we will, prior to opening a new clinic in a particular area, conduct a survey of other opioid treatment clinics within the region (if any). This survey process not only allows us to gain a better understanding of what the pricing for services is in that region, but helps us identify any additional services that should be offered to patients as part of our pricing structure. Once these surveys are completed, we then use this information, along with our internal analysis of historical data, to price our treatment services according to our planned treatment protocol (e.g., timely delivery of service, having the clinic open seven (7) days per week, maintaining a Call Center that is open and available to assist existing and prospective patients 24 hours per day, 7 days a week, etc.) and our analysis of specific market dynamics (e.g., quality of care indicators, availability of qualified clinical professionals, attendant costs of support services in the particular market, etc.). Finally, to ensure our pricing remains competitive, we repeat our outpatient treatment clinic surveys at least annually for each and every market in which our clinics operate, and use this information, along with routine feedback voluntarily provided by our existing patients, to determine if our pricing remains appropriate given the market where the clinic is located. To be clear, we believe that our practice of conducting outpatient clinic surveys relieve patients of having to make pricing and service comparisons while trying to manage their disease. Stated differently, patients can take comfort in knowing that when they inquire as to our treatment pricing, they will receive the identical type and number of services that would typically be offered by all similarly-situated outpatient treatment programs within their geographic region at comparable prices. While this particular process can be burdensome, we have found time and again that the effort is worthwhile given the positive patient feedback we routinely receive regarding the value of services offered at our clinics. If awarded the clinic license for this particular county, we will deploy each of the aforementioned pricing techniques (i.e., internal analysis of historical pricing data, benchmarking using public and private payer rates from within and outside of Florida, and regional pricing surveys) to develop pricing for our services that will not only be competitive, but affordable for the people within the community in need of treatment. These processes have proved tremendously effective for us thus far, and we fully expect them to be successful within this particular county. As noted above, subsection two allowed for a more subjective evaluation of the applications. LifeStream’s response was shorter and more general than Metro’s, but both responses addressed similar themes and procedures for ensuring competitive pricing at their clinics. Both proposals showed the applicants’ understanding of the need for competitive pricing and outlined their plans for setting their prices accordingly. Even allowing for the subjectivity permitted by subsection two, it would be impossible to justify giving either proposal a score of zero, which is reserved for “complete nonresponsiveness” to the question. SCORING OF THE LAKE COUNTY APPLICATIONS As explained above, the applications were given to the four teams of iSF evaluators for scoring. After the evaluators completed their review, iSF provided the Department with a final report that explained the evaluation process and provided a series of tables for each county that identified each applicant’s scores. The Lake County applications were scored by “Team Two” of the iSF evaluators. Team Two also reviewed applications for five other counties. Team Two gave LifeStream a total score of 633.5 for Lake County and gave Metro a total score of 619 for Lake County. Mr. Weller testified that one of his employees found a typographical error in a spreadsheet that iSF produced for the Department. This error prompted Mr. Weller to take a look at the scoring of the proposals by the iSF evaluators. Mr. Weller noted what appeared to be an anomaly. He found a series of scores in Lake County that went “5, 5, 5, zero, 5, 5, which caught my eye as unusual, and we discovered that the answers for both [subsections one and two of Criterion Five] were different in Lake County compared to all of the other ones that the particular evaluator scored for the other counties.” A closer review of the scores revealed that each of the three Team Two evaluators gave LifeStream scores of five in both subsections of Criterion Five in its Lake County application. Two of the three evaluators gave Metro scores of five for both subsections of Criterion Five. However, the medical professional on Team Two gave Metro zeros in both subsections of Criterion Five of its Lake County application. The Criterion Five responses of LifeStream and Metro were essentially identical in all of the six county applications reviewed by Team Two. In the five counties other than Lake County, all of the evaluators, including the medical professional, gave both LifeStream and Metro scores of five for both subsections of Criterion Five. It was only in Lake County that the medical professional decided that Metro’s identical response was completely nonresponsive and deserving of zero points. As found above, it is impossible to justify scores of zero for Metro’s responses to Criterion Five. It was also extremely unusual for the same evaluator to give such radically different scores to the same response made in different applications. Mr. Weller wanted an explanation. He asked iSF to ask the medical evaluator to explain her reasoning for the inconsistency in her scoring of Metro’s Lake County application and to ask whether she wished to amend her score for Metro’s application. On April 27, 2020, iSF’s contract manager, Roger Balettie, sent an email to the Team Two medical evaluator, Linda Saucier. The email requested Ms. Saucier’s response as to four scoring questions raised by the Department’s review, including the following: You have two applicant response questions (Criteria 5 Questions 1 and 2) where an applicant (DCF 12) has two different scores for the same answer across six counties (one with 0s for each question and five with 5s for each question, and your notes are identical). DCF would like for you to review the applicant’s C5Q1 and C5Q2 response (I will provide that section for you) and confirm either that you intended the 6 counties to be different, or that you intended the 6 counties to have consistent scores for those two questions (and provide those scores). On May 1, 2020, Ms. Saucier responded as follows: I just saw your email. It went to my spam folder. I am extremely busy with work. But, I can tell you that the scores are different because of the county or vicinity in which the clinic would be housed and clinicians/service availability. It’s not a cookie cutter process. Later on May 1, 2020, Mr. Balettie sent an email asking Ms. Saucier to confirm that she did not wish to consider changing her scores for any of the four questions raised in his initial email, including Criterion Five in Lake County. Ms. Saucier responded: Correct. Roger, there are so many variables when looking at the submissions. I have written and reviewed grants and similar documents in my position. I realized the proposals were the same for each county, unfortunately not all of the counties share the same similarities. Read in the context of Criterion Five, it is clear that Ms. Saucier did not bother even to look again at her work on these applications before responding to Mr. Balettie. Her response is vague and defensive nonsense. Lake County possesses no unique quality that would render Metro’s pricing strategy and accepted forms of payment completely nonresponsive to Criterion Five, particularly when Ms. Saucier herself found the same responses “superior” in five other counties. Moreover, subsection one of Criterion Five did not give Ms. Saucier the discretion to award zero points to an application that addressed the five listed forms of payment as Metro’s application manifestly did. She violated the instructions of the Scoring Form and offered no real justification for doing so. The Department reasonably believed that it was not possible to rationalize the zeros that were given to Metro’s Lake County response. The Department reasonably believed there were no differences between counties that would have any impact on pricing or payment methods. William Sutton, General Counsel for Metro’s parent entity, Colonial Management Group, LP, testified that he personally worked on the applications Metro filed for the 2018-2019 licensure process. Mr. Sutton testified that the “forms of payment and the process [that Metro uses] to determine whether our pricing is competitive is consistent throughout the state of Florida.” He noted that Metro currently has 80 clinics operating throughout the country and that it is “critical” for the company “to have processes in place to deal with those [payment and pricing] issues consistently.” After digesting the response from iSF, the Department concluded that Ms. Saucier’s scores of zero for Criterion Five of Metro’s Lake County application “could not be justified.” Department personnel met to discuss what action to take regarding the scoring discrepancy. Eventually, the Department decided to override Ms. Saucier’s scores and to assign a score of five to both Criterion Five subsections in Metro’s Lake County application. The score of five was chosen because it was the same score that Ms. Saucier assigned to all of Metro’s other substantively identical Criterion Five responses in the other five counties she reviewed. The Department took this action “in the interests of fairness.” The Department also believed that Metro would challenge any intended award if the scores of zero were left unchanged and that Metro would likely prevail in such a challenge.2 The Department’s adjustment of the score gave Metro a total score of 639 points, reflecting two double-weighted scores of five instead of two scores 2 Mr. Sutton testified that Metro indeed would have raised such a challenge. of zero in the Criterion Five subsections. LifeStream’s total score in Lake County remained 633.5 points.3 On July 10, 2020, the Department published the Notice, which declared its intention to award the new MAT license in Lake County to Metro. The Notice explained the adjustment as follows: During the review of the evaluators scoring process by the Department, it was discovered that the medical evaluator for Team Two provided scores of zero for both responses in Criteria Five for [Metro’s] Lake County application. The two questions responded to pertained to types of payments accepted and competitive pricing. The responses to these questions were identical to Metro’s responses in the other six applications reviewed by the same medical evaluator. Each of the responses in the other six applications were awarded the full point values (5 points each) by the medical evaluator. In addition, the same responses were awarded either 4 or 5 points by both the other Team Two evaluators and by all the evaluators in the other teams. The scoring inconsistency resulted in Metro’s Lake County application losing 20 points (5 points for 2 questions, which were weighted by a factor of 2). Correction of the inconsistency results in Metro having the highest scoring application. Upon the Department learning of the scoring discrepancy, the medical evaluator declined to amend the scores and participate in the public meeting of the evaluators. The responses provided by Metro’s Lake County application were identical to its six non-Lake County applications assigned to Team Two, which were awarded five points each, and identical to all other responses provided by Metro. Thus, the 3 Metro could have received five fewer points through this correction and still received the intended award. Based on the scores possible and the double-weighting of this criterion, any combination of (a) two scores of five, (b) one score of five and one score of four, (c) one score of five and one score of three, or (d) two scores of four would have caused Metro to jump past LifeStream as the successful applicant. recommendation is to override the scores and award the licensure opportunity to Metro. The Department’s actions in reviewing the scores awarded and making the changes to Metro’s Criterion Five scores were reasonable under the facts and circumstances presented. LifeStream was unable to mount a serious defense of Ms. Saucier’s scoring or to offer any tangible evidence that the Department was biased either against LifeStream or in favor of Metro.4 LifeStream’s chief argument is that the Department deviated from its own rule by reviewing the scores submitted by iSF, by asking iSF to inquire as to aspects of the scores and suggesting the evaluator change them, and most egregiously by changing Metro’s score after the iSF evaluator declined to amend her evaluation. This legal argument is discussed below.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the undersigned hereby RECOMMENDS that the Department of Children and Families enter a final order awarding the right to proceed to licensure for a methadone MAT facility in Lake County to Metro Treatment of Florida, L.P., and dismissing the Petition for Administrative Hearing filed by LifeStream Behavioral Center, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of February, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of February, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel Ryan Russell, Esquire Dean Mead and Hall Suite 1200 106 East College Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mia L. McKown, Esquire Holland & Knight, LLP Suite 600 315 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 William D. Hall, Esquire Dean Mead and Dunbar Suite 1200 106 East College Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Chad Poppell, Secretary Department of Children and Families Building 1, Room 202 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Javier Enriquez, General Counsel Department of Children and Families Building 2, Room 204F 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Brittany Adams Long, Esquire Radey Law Firm, P.A. Suite 200 301 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 John L. Wharton, Esquire Dean Mead and Dunbar Suite 1200 106 East College Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Eddie Williams, III, Esquire Holland & Knight, LLP Suite 600 315 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Lacey Kantor, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Families Building 2, Room 204Z 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Whether respondent, a licensed physician, violated provisions of Chapter 458, Florida Statutes, by allegedly (1) failing to keep medical records justifying her course of treatment; (2) prescribing controlled substances (Methaqualone) other than in the scope of her professional practice; (3) prescribing a Scheduled II controlled substance (Methaqualone) for a purpose not allowed by statutes; (4) engaging in gross or repeated malpractice or failing to practice medicine in accordance with medical standards recognized as acceptable by reasonably prudent similar physicians under similar conditions; (5) failing to perform a statutory obligation; (6) making untrue or fraudulent representations or employing a trick or scheme in the practice of medicine, and exploiting patients for financial gain.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, 54, is a female medical doctor licensed to practice medicine in the State of Florida. From August through December 1981, she was the sole physician employed by Northeast Medical Services, Inc. ("the clinic"), a clinic located at 4600 North Federal Highway, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. The clinic also employed a nurse, a psychologist, and a receptionist. Clinic patients were processed under a standardized office procedure. First, they would fill out personal information and medical history forms, then answer a written "Stress Questioanaire," and sign a "drug potency warning." Next, they would be screened by a psychologist and physically examined by a nurse and respondent. Most patients came to the clinic complaining of stress or stress related symptoms. 1/ Most patients were diagnosed as suffering from stress. The treatment usually consisted of prescribing stress (vitamin) tablets and 45 tablets of 300 mg. Methaqualone, for which patients paid $75 to $100 in cash. During the several months she was employed by the clinic, respondent saw 15 to 20 patients a day, sometimes many more. From August 13, 1981, through October 30, 1981, she wrote at least 378 separate prescriptions for Methaualone (45 tablets, 300 mg.) totaling 17,010 tablets. (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2) II. Barbara Bennett: Counts 1-24 On September 9, 1981, Barbara Ann Bennett visited respondent at the clinic. She completed the personal information and medical history forms, was screened by the psychologist, and physically examined by respondent. The physical examination included taking her weight, height, pulse, respiration, and blood pressure. Respondent checked her general appearance, skin, head, eyes, ears, nose, throat, heart, lymph nodes and neurological responses. Respondent spoke with her and noted in her progress report that the patient did not like her job as a bartender and did not sleep well. The Stress Questionnaire completed by Ms. Bennett indicated that she came to the clinic for the sole purpose of reducing stress. She checked-off items reflected that, among other symptoms, she had experienced poor sleep, was under a great deal of stress, and was unable to relax. Respondent rendered an initial impression or diagnosis of stress and prescribed stress (vitamin) tablets, 600, No. 30, 30 tablets and Methaqualone, 300 mg., 45 tablets, with directions to take one tablet at bedtime and one-quarter tablet twice a day, as needed. At that time, Chapter 893, Florida Statutes, identified Methaqualone as a Schedule II controlled substance, a substance with a high potential for abuse but which had an accepted but severely restricted medical use and treatment in the United States. This statute recognized that it could be abused and result in severe psychological and physical dependency. In 1981, Methaqualone--a non-barbiturate--was known as a highly potent hypnotic drug which was subject to widespread and growing abuse. It was gaining a reputation as a street drug, and was referred to as quaaludes. For patients diagnosed as suffering from stress, prevailing medical standards (in the area where respondent practiced) dictated the prescription of a mild tranquilizer for daytime use, not a potent hypnotic such as Methaqualone. Generalized complaints of stress, including checked-off items such as contained on the Stress Questionnaire used by respondent, were insufficient to justify prescribing a powerful drug such as Methaqualone, for either night or daytime use. As Dr. Warren Zundell, a qualified physician, testified at hearing: If 100 people were taken off the street and asked if they had stress--100 would say "yes." Prescribing Methaqualone for such patients was, in Dr. Zundell's opinion "like hunting ants with an elephant gun." (TR.-250) For sleeping problems, a milder hypnotic--of which there were several--was the appropriate treatment. Although respondent's initial diagnosis of stress was justified, her prescription of Methaqualone for night and daytime use (though with a lesser dosage) was inappropriate, medically unjustified, and constituted a failure to practice medicine with that level of care which is recognized by reasonably prudent similar physicians as acceptable under similar conditions. Under prevailing medical standards of practice then in effect, the diagnosis of stress did not justify more than the prescription of a mild tranquilizer or sedative. Ms. Bennett's alluded to sleeping problem did not justify the prescribing of Methaqualone when there were many other hypnotics available which were less potent and less subject to abuse. The medical records kept by respondent did not justify her prescribing Methaqualone to Ms. Bennett. The Methaqualone was thus prescribed other than in the course of respondent's professional practice and for other than a legitimate medical purpose. On September 11, 1981, Ms. Bennett was hospitalized at Hollywood Memorial Hospital for a drug overdose. The hospital staff contacted respondent who confirmed that she had issued the September 9, 1981 prescription for Methaqualone. Notation of this call was made in Ms. Bennett's patient records. On or about November 17, 1981, respondent issued Ms. Bennett another prescription for stress tablets and Methaqualone, identical in amount to the September 9, 1981, prescription. Presumably, this prescription was for the purpose of treating the same symptom--stress. It was not medically justified, inappropriate, and outside the scope of her professional practice. The patient's medical records did not justify this prescription. In fact, there are no records of Ms. Bennett's having visited the clinic on November 17, 1981. The prescribing of Methaqualone to Ms. Bennett, especially in light of her prior hospitalization for a drug overdose, constituted a gross failure to practice medicine with that level of care recognized by reasonably prudent similar physicians as accepted under similar conditions. Adrienne Gampel: Counts 25-48 On August 28, 1981, Ms. Adrienne Gampel visited respondent at the clinic. Personal and medical history were taken and the Stress Questionnaire was completed. She acknowledged that she came to the clinic for the sole purpose of reducing stress, and checked off descriptors on the questionnaire indicating that she was under a great deal of pressure at home and had experienced poor sleep. After seeing the psychologist she was given a complete physical examination, similar to that given Ms. Bennett. Respondent rendered a diagnosis of stress and prescribed stress tablets and Methaqualone, 300 mg., 45 tablets. For the reasons stated in paragraphs 6 and 7 above, the prescription of Methaqualone to Ms. Gampel was inappropriate, not medically justified, and not justified by respondent's medical records. It was outside the scope of her professional practice and constituted a failure to practice medicine with that level of care recognized by reasonably prudent similar physicians as acceptable under similar conditions. In October and November 1981, Ms. Gample revisited respondent at the clinic. It has not been shown, however, that a new Methaqualone prescription was issued on either occasion. Robert Distillator: Counts 49-81 On September 3, 1981, Robert Distillator visited the respondent at the clinic. His personal and medical history were taken, and the Stress Questionnaire was completed. He acknowledged that he came for the sole purpose of reducing stress and checked-off descriptors on the questionnaire indicating that he had experienced loss of appetite, poor sleep, boredom on weekends, difficulty in making decisions, inability to have a good time, and a great deal of pressure. He also indicated he felt tense, depressed, unable to relax, and had more problems than he could handle. A complete physical examination was given him and his blood was analyzed. Respondent rendered an initial diagnosis of stress and prescribed stress tablets and Methaqualone, 300 mg. 45 tablets, with directions identical to those given Ms. Bennett. For the reasons provided in paragraphs 6 and 7 above, respondent's prescribing of Methaqualone for night and daytime use was medically unjustified, inappropriate, not justified by the records, and outside the scope of her professional practice. It constituted a failure to practice medicine with that level of care recognized by reasonably prudent similar physicians as acceptable under similar circumstances. Furthermore, it was inappropriate to prescribe Methaqualone to a patient, such as Mr. Distillator, who indicated depression, since such a symptom would increase the likelihood of self-abuse. On or about October 7, 1981, Mr. Distillator revisited respondent at the clinic. However, it has not been shown that he was issued another Methaqualone prescription on that occasion. On or about November 5, 1981, he revisited respondent at the clinic. His blood was analyzed and he was then issued another prescription for stress tablets and Methaqualone--identical in all respects to his first prescription. This prescription was not even noted by respondent in the patient's medical records. For the reasons stated in paragraphs 6 and 7 above, her prescription of Methaqualone was inappropriate, not medically justified, outside the scope of her professional practice, and constituted a failure to practice medicine with that level of care recognized as acceptable by reasonably prudent similar physicians under similar conditions. On December 14, 1981, respondent issued Mr. Distillator another prescription of stress tablets and Methaqualone, in like amount. The prescription was not noted in his patient records. Presumably, it was given for the continued treatment of stress. For the reasons specified in paragraphs 6 and 7 above, this prescription was inappropriate, medically unjustified, not justified--or even noted--in the patient's medical records, and was outside the scope of professional practice. It constituted a failure to practice medicine with that level of care recognized as acceptable by reasonably prudent similar physicians under similar conditions. Joe Morreale: Counts 81-96 On October 12, 1981, Joe Morreale visited respondent at the clinic. His personal and medical history were taken, the Stress Questionnaire was completed, and a physical was given. He acknowledged on the questionnaire that his sole purpose for coming was to reduce stress, and checked-off descriptors indicating that he had experienced pressure at home and at work, headaches, nightmares, and poor sleep. Respondent rendered an initial diagnosis of stress and prescribed stress tablets and Methaqualone 300 mg., 45 tablets, with her standard instructions--one daily at bedtime and one-quarter tablet, twice a day, as needed. For the reasons specified in paragraphs 6 and 7 above, the prescribing of Methaqualone to Mr. Morreale was inappropriate, medically unjustified, not justified by the records, outside the scope of professional practice, and constituted a failure to practice medicine with that level of care recognized as acceptable by reasonably prudent similar physicians under similar circumstances. On December 11, 1981, Mr. Morreale revisited respondent at the clinic. However, it has not been shown that she issued him another prescription for Methaqualone at that time. Joani Levi: Counts 97-104 On September 30, 1981, Ms. Joani Levi visited respondent at the clinic. A personal medical history was taken, the questionnaire was completed, and a physical was given. On the questionnaire, she indicated that the sole purpose of her visit was to reduce stress, and checked-off descriptors indicating she had experienced poor sleep, marital problems, and pressure at work. Respondent noted in her records that the patient was confused, nervous, and suffering extreme anxiety. Respondent rendered an initial diagnosis of stress and prescribed stress tablets and Methaqualone, 300 mg., 45 tablets, with her standard instructions for night and daytime use. For the reasons provided in paragraphs 6 and 7 above, this prescription was inappropriate, not medically justified, not justified by the patient's medical records, and outside the scope of professional practice. It constituted a failure to practice medicine with that level of care which is recognized by reasonably similar prudent physicians as acceptable under similar conditions. Rachel Mack: Counts 105-112 On September 28, 1981, Ms. Rachel Mack visited Respondent at the clinic. Her medical history was taken and the Stress Questionnaire was completed; then she was given a physical. On the questionnaire, she indicated her sole reason for coming was to reduce stress. She checked-off descriptors indicating that she had experienced poor sleep, difficulty in making decisions, disturbing thoughts or fears, pressure at work and at home, and inability to have a good time. Respondent rendered an initial diagnosis of stress and prescribed stress tablets and Methaqualone, 300 mg., 45 tablets, with her usual instructions. For the reasons stated in paragraphs 6 and 7 above, the prescribing of Methaqualone to Ms. Mack was inappropriate, medically unjustified, not justified by her patient records, and beyond the scope of professional practice. It constituted a failure to practice medicine with that level of care recognized as acceptable by reasonably prudent similar physicians under similar conditions. Robin Millman: Counts 113-128 On September 14 and 23, 1981, respondent issued Ms. Robin Millman, an employee at the clinic, a prescription for Methaqualone, 300 mg., 45 tablets. The purpose of this prescription was to relieve stress. There are no medical records justifying this treatment. Indeed, there were no patient records for Ms. Millman. For the reasons stated in paragraphs 6 and 7 above, this prescription was medically unjustified, inappropriate, outside the scope of professional practice, and constituted a failure to practice medicine with that level of care recognized as acceptable by reasonably prudent similar physicians under similar circumstances. Brenda Villa: Counts 127-161 On September 5, 9, 14, October 22, and November 12, 1981, respondent issued Ms. Brenda Villa, another employee of the clinic, a prescription for Methaqualone, 300 mg., 45 tablets, for the purpose of treating stress. There were no patient records for Miss Villa, and there were no medical records justifying this prescription. For the reasons stated in paragraphs 6 and 7 above, the prescription was inappropriate, medically unjustified, outside the scope of professional practice, and constituted a failure to practice medicine with that level of care recognized as acceptable by reasonably similar prudent physicians under similar conditions. Michael Bransfield: Counts 162-169 On September 24, 1981, Michael Bransfield visited respondent at the clinic. A personal and medical history was taken, the Stress Questionnaire was completed, and a physical was given. On the questionnaire, he indicated that the sole purpose of his visit was to reduce stress. He checked off descriptors indicating he had experienced poor sleep, pressure at home and at work, and inability to relax. Respondent rendered a diagnosis of stress and prescribed stress tablets and Methaqualone, 300 mg., 45 tablets, with her usual instructions for night and daytime use. For the reasons provided in paragraphs 6 and 7 above, this prescription was inappropriate, not medically justified, not justified by the patient's medical records, and outside the scope of professional practice. It also constituted a failure to practice medicine with that level of care recognized as acceptable by reasonably prudent similar physicians under similar conditions.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That respondent's license to practice medicine be revoked for multiple violations of the Medical Practice Act. DONE and ENTERED this 5th day of April 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of April 1984.
Findings Of Fact Rainbow (herein sometimes Respondent) began operations as a methadone treatment center (outpatient methadone program) on May 15, 1988, with a probationary license for 90 days granted by the Petitioner, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. All methadone treatment programs begin operations with a probationary license. Methadone is a classified Schedule II narcotic drug, a synthetic opiate, manufactured in a pharmaceutical laboratory. It is highly addictive and for that reason, it is closely monitored and controlled by the Federal Drug Enforcement Administration, can only be dispensed and administered by authorized medical personnel and the authorized dispensers of methadone are required to maintain strict security of access to methadone. Respondent's operation is a drug abuse treatment and prevention program (DATAP) and is defined as such and governed by Chapter 397, Florida Statutes. Respondent's program is designed to assist its clients, particularly the heroin addict or someone who is taking the synthetic opiate Dilaudid, a popular street drug, to take the client "off the street," and give them a stabilizing dose of methadone so that they can return to a more fully functional and responsible life style. That is accomplished by first stabilizing the client on a dose of methadone which is acceptable to them physically and provide treatment planning and auxillary services to assist them in restructuring their life style. The goal of the program is to reduce the methadone a client receives with the ultimate idea of making the addict drug free. On July 13-14, 1988, Petitioner dispatched a technical team to inspect Respondent's program. The inspection team consisted of Phil Highman, Sr., Human Services Program Specialist, Anton Krone, M. D., Mark Engelhardt, Program Supervisor - HRS District VI, and Gail Potter, Senior Human Services Program Analyst. Respondent's President, Angela Duncan, was present along with Lois Knoffler, R. N., Nursing Supervisor and Barbara Reszac, L. P. N. Following the inspection, an exit conference was held on July 14, at which time the inspection team advised Duncan of numerous clinical and medical standard deficiencies which were not being complied with. The inspection team found that Respondent's problems were due principally to a lack of knowledge regarding addiction and methadone treatment and a general laxness in implementing and documenting service provisions. On the clinical side there was no evidence to suggest that charts were being reviewed on a consistent, regular basis to ensure that specific treatment activities were in compliance with Chapter 10E-7, Florida Administrative Code, and on the medical side, the Medical Director exhibited little experience in the addiction field and the services provided were minimal at best. Also, the Medical Director was not spending adequate time at the clinic. The following programmatic elements were in noncompliance with regulations and required corrective action. In the clinical area these were: An absence of a psycho-social assessment including a clinical summary of each record within 10 days of admission to out-patient maintenance treatment as required by Section 10E-7.039 (a)(g), Florida Administrative Code. Respondent's failure to provide signed credentialed and dated, psycho-social assessments for each client as required by Section 10E-7.032(18)(g), Florida Administrative Code. An absence of individualized treatment plans developed for each patient within 30 days of admission to include measurable goals and objectives and the type and frequency of services required and properly signed, credentialed and dated. Sections 10E- 7.032(28)(b) and 10E-7.039(3)(j)2., Florida Administrative Code. An absence of recorded progress notes in the case records in accordance with the frequency of counseling. Sections 10E- 7.039(3)(j)1 and 3, Florida Administrative Code. A failure to place on phase one, all persons admitted, readmitted or transferred to maintenance treatment absent an authorized exception. Sections 10E-7.039(3)(d)6. and 10E-7.039(3)(e), Florida Administrative Code. Failure to document that clients who violated clinical rules such as illicit drug use and absenteeism had received disciplinary actions appropriate to the nature of the violation. Section 10E-7.039(3)(h), Florida Administrative Code and Sections 291.505 (d)(8)(v), (b) and (1), Code of Federal Regulations. In the medical area the following deficiencies were noted: A failure to document that the program physician conducted a physical exam prior to administration of the initial dose of methadone absent a documentable emergency. Section 10E-7.039(2)(f)2., Florida Administrative Code. A failure to document that all physical exams con formed to the medical services requirements prescribed under Sections 10E- 7.034(1)(a) and 10E-7.039(2)(F), Florida Administrative Code. A failure to provide results of a laboratory test which is required on each patient at the time of admission. Section 10E-7.039 (f)(1), Florida Administrative Code. Failure to document that the program physician thoroughly documented each patient's current addiction and history of addiction before administering the initial dose of methadone. Sections 10E-7.039(2)(f) 5.A. and 10E-7.039(3)(a)1.-3., Florida Administrative Code. Failure to document that each patient had signed the "consent to methadone treatment" form prior to being administered the initial methadone dose. Section 291.505(d)(1)(ii), Code of Federal Regulations. A failure to document that the program physician signed or countersigned, within 72 hours, all orders relative to medication and take-home privileges. Sections 10E- 7.039(2)(f)5.d-f, Florida Administrative Code. On August 15, 1988, Petitioner advised Respondent of the non- compliance of the above-referred clinical and medical standards and by that notification, extended Respondent's first probationary license 45 days through September 27, 1988 to allow Respondent an opportunity to correct the deficiencies; placed a moratorium on admissions of new clients beginning August 14, 1988, and advised of its serious concern with the deficiencies with Petitioner's then consideration of denying Respondent a regular license. Respondent was further advised that Petitioner would continue to monitor Respondent's activities during the probationary period. Petitioner's moratorium limited Respondent to 49 clients. On August 30, 1988, Petitioner again dispatched an inspection team to Respondent's facility to monitor compliance. Petitioner's attendees were the same attendees who made up the earlier inspection on July 13-14, 1988. Administrator Duncan was present along with clinical supervisor, Bob Brouck and Clifford Frost, counselor. On the day of inspection there were 49 clients in treatment in keeping with the moratorium and current staff/client ratio was within acceptable standards. In the clinical area, the team reviewed 14 clinical records and while there were psycho-social assessments available in all case records, in 11 of 14 cases assessments had not been completed within the required 10 days of admission. In the area of treatment plans, plans were available in 13 of 14 cases. In two cases, plans were not completed within the required 30 days of admission and in none of the cases reviewed, was the information provided delineating the type and frequency of services to be provided. In the area of progress notes, improvement was shown in terms of content but in 12 of 14 cases, notes were not recorded with the proper frequency according to client phase level. Also, in 5 of 14 cases, urine drug screens indicated that the clients in question were involved in illicit drug use and no reference to these incidents were made in the progress notes. In the medical area, a total of 7 medical charts were reviewed. In the area of physical exams, in only 2 of 7 cases were physicals completed prior to administering the initial dose of methadone. In the remaining cases, physicals were either unavailable, undated or not completed within the required time frame. Laboratory tests were available in 6 of 7 cases. However, in only one of the six cases was the test completed upon admission. In one case the lab was unable to draw blood from the client because of difficulty in locating a vein. In all cases reviewed, there was adequate documentation of the client's current addiction. In the phasing and take-out privileges area, it was difficult to determine each client's phase level from the clinical records; however, an examination of dosing records indicated that patients were participating on the proper phase level according to time and treatment. Respondent's program was out of compliance in the following clinical areas: Psycho-social assessments were not completed within 10 days of admission as required. Individualized treatment plans were not developed within 30 days of admission and no reference was made to the type and frequency of services to be provided. Progress notes were not recorded in case records with proper frequency according to phase level and, Illicit drug use had not been addressed relative to appropriate disciplinary action. In the medical area, the following deficiencies were noted: Physical exams had not been conducted prior to the administration of the initial dose of methadone. Physical exams did not conform to the medical service requirements prescribed under Sections 10E-7.034(1)(a) and 10E-7.039(2)(f)1 Florida Administrative Code. Laboratory tests had not been conducted at the time of admission. See Section 10E- 7.039(2)(f)1, Florida Administrative Code. At that time, Petitioner extended Respondent's second probationary period for a full 90 days, i.e. from August 14, to November 11, 1988, to allow Respondent time to correct the noted program deficiencies and items of non- compliance with rules and regulations which were cited by the inspection team. On September 29, 1988, Petitioner's agents Emenheiser and Moffett again inspected Respondent's program to determine compliance with the moratorium on new clients. At approximately 9:30 a.m. on September 29, Emenheiser and Moffett went to Rainbow, knocked on the door and were admitted by Respondent's counselor, Clifford Frost whom Emenheiser met at the previous inspection visit. Respondent's operating hours were 6 o'clock a.m. to 2 o'clock p.m., seven days a week. Rainbow was open for business to administer and dispense methadone. At the time of their arrival, there was a client in Respondent's waiting area talking with Frost. Inspectors Emenheiser and Moffett asked Frost for entry into the methadone dispensing area and inquired as to the whereabouts of Administrator Duncan and the dispensing nurse. Neither were at the clinic. Frost left the area and obtained the key to the dispensing area and unlocked the dispensing room. At the time, there were no medical personnel in the facility. Counselor Frost is not a medical person nor is he authorized to enter the dispensing room or to dispense methadone. The inspectors, after gaining entry to the dispensing area by Frost, found the dispensing room safe open with a telephone cord draped between the safe door and the body of the safe. In the open safe they found a full bottle of methadone and a box with 4 full bottles next to it. On the dispensing room counter, the inspectors found a bottle with about two inches of methadone in it and a pipette dispenser in its top and a take-out bottle with a small amount of methadone. Emenheiser and Moffett observed the medication record which contained signed entries initial led in advance. While in the dispensing room, Inspectors Emenheiser and Moffett observed another client come into the facility and Frost administered the take- out bottle of methadone to the client in the dispensing room. The take-out bottle was prepared in advance by Frost. In this regard, Frost stated that he did not do that sort of thing very often. Based on the inspectors observance of the access by an unauthorized person to obtain entry into the storage area where the liquid methadone was stored, the absence of medical personnel at Respondent's premises during the period of time when the facility was open for business to dispense and administer methadone, the dispensing and administration of methadone to a patient by an unauthorized employee, and the general lack of security in the area where the methadone was stored, Petitioner's agents called the Federal Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to report their findings and the events they had witnessed. After confirming that these were security violations, the inspectors left the facility immediately to consult with their superiors. The inspectors later provided affidavits detailing their findings and provided assistance in drafting the administrative complaint and the emergency final order. Respondent was ordered to cease and desist all operations of its DATAP program effective at 5 o'clock p.m. on October 10, 1988. Clifford Frost, Respondent's counselor, gave testimony and maintained, via deposition, that he allowed Petitioner's agents access to the storage area where methadone was kept based on prior conversations that he had with Emenheiser to the effect that if he (Frost) would help him close down Respondent's program, he (Emenheiser) would help Frost get another job. Frost maintains that he was being led by Emenheiser to shut down Respondent's facility and that he did so in an effort to go along with Emenheiser's wishes. Emenheiser denied having any motivation to shut down Respondent's program and as a long term career veteran with Petitioner's DATAP programs, the absence of any bias having been shown by Respondent, Emenheiser's testimony is credited. Frost's testimony is not credited to the extent that his testimony differs from the versions of events found herein and as testified to by employees Phillip Emenheiser, Harry Moffett and Gail Potter.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order revoking Petitioner's probationary license to operate a methadone treatment center. DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of July, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of July, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 88-5518 Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Paragraph 9, rejected as conclusionary. Paragraphs 10 and 11, adopted as modified, last sentence in paragraph 23, Recommended Order. Paragraph 12, adopted as modified, paragraphs 11 and 15, Recommended Order. Paragraph 13, adopted as modified, paragraph 23, Recommended Order. Paragraph 14, adopted as modified, paragraph 10, Recommended Order. Paragraphs 15, 16, 17 and 18, adopted as relevant, paragraphs 11-14 and 24, Recommended Order. The remainder rejected as irrelevant and/or unnecessary. Paragraph 19, adopted as modified, paragraph 14, Recommended Order. Paragraph 20, adopted as relevant, paragraphs 15-17, Recommended Order. Paragraph 21, rejected, irrelevant. Paragraph 22, adopted as modified, paragraphs 19 and 20, Recommended Order. Paragraph 28, rejected, irrelevant. Paragraph 29, adopted as modified, paragraph 23, lines 16-21, Recommended Order. Rulings on Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Paragraph 1, adopted, paragraph 1, stipulated facts and paragraphs 1 and 18, Recommended Order. Paragraph 2, adopted, paragraph 4, stipulated facts. Paragraph 3, adopted as modified, paragraph 19, Recommended Order. Paragraph 4, first sentence, adopted and second sentence rejected based on contrary findings in paragraph 20, Recommended Order. Paragraph 5, rejected based on contrary findings in paragraph 24, Recommended Order. Paragraph 6, rejected as unnecessary to resolve the issues posed. Paragraphs 8-12, rejected based on contrary credibility resolutions stated in paragraph 24, Recommended Order. Paragraph 13, adopted as modified, paragraph 23, Recommended Order. Paragraph 14, rejected based on contrary findings in paragraph 23 to the effect that Frost was unauthorized to dispense and administer methadone. Paragraph 15, rejected as argument. Paragraph 16, rejected as irrelevant based on the determination in paragraph 23 to the extent there was a general lack of security in the storage of methadone and that such lack of security was in violation of the security requirements of a scheduled, highly addictive drug. Paragraph 17, rejected as argument. Paragraph 18, rejected based on contrary findings in paragraph 23 and the general lack of security by Respondent at the treatment center. Paragraph 19, rejected as irrelevant. Paragraphs 21 through 23, rejected, irrelevant and not probative of the issues posed. COPIES FURNISHED: Jack Farley, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 400 W. Buffalo Avenue 5th Floor, Room 500 Tampa, Florida 3361 Amelia M. Park, Esquire and William M. Park, Esquire 8001 North Dale Mabry Highway Building 601, Suite B Tampa, Florida 33614 Sam Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Suite 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John Miller, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issues presented herein are whether or not Respondent's incense to practice medicine should be suspended, revoked or the licensee otherwise disciplined for alleged violation of Chapters 458 and 893, Florida Statutes, as set forth in the Administrative Complaint filed herein signed May 31, 1983.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received, stipulations of the parties and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following relevant factual findings. Respondent is a medical doctor and has been issued license number ME 0017825. Respondent's last known address is 2361 N.W. 24 Terrace, Miami, Florida 33172. (Stipulation of the parties) Respondent has been licensed as a medical doctor in Florida since 1971. Respondent studied at Havana University School of Medicine and graduated in 1957. He practiced in Cuba from 1957 through 1966. During that period, he was engaged in a general practice and was also a psychiatrist at Clinica Dependiente. While at Clinica Dependiente, Respondent served as a medical director for the rehabilitation of minors and as medical director for Santa Clinica Psiquiatria. Respondent relocated from Cuba and came to Miami on or about February 15, 1967. Respondent sat for the Federation of State and Medical Boards of the United States during September of 1968, the standardized test for graduates of foreign medical schools. During 1968 and 1969, Respondent was engaged as a psychiatrist at Halifax District Hospital in Daytona Beach, Florida. During 1969, he served a rotating internship at Mount Sinai Hospital for one year. Thereafter, he served rotating internships at Doctors, Victoria, Parkway and one other hospital in the Dade County area until approximately 1974. During his tenure at Halifax Hospital, Respondent treated some parties who were drug addicts. Respondent admits to having treated the patients referred to in the Administrative Complaint filed herein. Additionally, pursuant to Petitioner's Request for Admissions filed herein, Respondent has admitted the allegations set forth in paragraphs 3, 10, 17, 24, 31, 38, 45, 52 and 59 of the Administrative Complaint, to wit: Between the dates of approximately January 5, 1981 and December 15, 1981, Respondent prescribed 360 Dilaudid 2/ (Hydromorphone), a controlled substance, pursuant to Chapter 893, Florida Statutes, for Patrick Golden. Between the dates of approximately March 26, 1981 and January 15, 1982, Respondent prescribed 1425 Dilaudid (Hydromorphone) for Ellen Henderson. Between the dates of approximately March 2, 1981 and November 11, 1982, Respondent prescribed 855 Dilaudid (Hydromorphone) for Ronald Chica. Between the dates of approximately May 12, 1981 and January 9, 1982, Respondent prescribed 132 Dilaudid (Hydromorphone) for James Brannigan. Between the dates of approximately February 19, 1981 and February 2, 1982, Respondent prescribed 965 Dilaudid (Hydromorphone) for Gilbert Fernandez. Between the dates of approximately November 21, 1981 and December 12, 1981, Respondent prescribed 180 Dilaudid (Hydromorphone) for Patsy Gamlin. Between the dates of approximately January 7, 1981 and January 14, 1982, Respondent prescribed 820 Dilaudid (Hydromorphone) for Rudolph Ferguson. Between the dates of approximately February 24, 1981 and February 15, 1982, Respondent prescribed 2220 Dilaudid (Hydromorphone) for Michael Salle. Between the dates of approximately February 24, 1981 and February 15, 1982, Respondent prescribed 2190 Dilaudid (Hydromorphone) for Ronald Weatherington. Dale K. Lindberg, M.D., was tendered and received as an expert in these proceedings in the area of Family Practice, Methadone and Drug Addiction. Dr. Lindberg has been instrumental in establishing a methadone detoxification program at Memorial Hospital in Hollywood, Florida. Methadone is the only legally recognized Schedule II controlled substance used in this country for the treatment of drug addiction. Private practitioners, pursuant to specific federal law, cannot legally administer methadone or any other Schedule II controlled substance for the treatment of drug addition. In order to qualify or be certified to treat drug addicts, application must be made simultaneously with the Federal Food and Drug Administration (to their Methadone Monitor Division), to the Federal Drug Enforcement Agency and to the Federal Department of Mental Health and Drug Abuse. Upon certification with these governmental departments, only then can a physician prescribe methadone to a drug addict to be ingested in oral form, once a day. (21 C.F.R. 291.505) Dr. Lindberg received and reviewed the nine (9) patients' records listed in the Administrative Complaint as well as the prescriptions written for those patients by Respondent. (Petitioner's Exhibit 2-19). Dr. Lindberg, after review, concluded that Respondent inappropriately and excessively prescribed Dilaudid to said patients. Dr. Lindberg opined that Respondent prescribed Dilaudid for those patients for "very little indication" and continued over long periods of time prescribing Dilaudid to those patients. He considered that Respondent was maintaining the patients on Dilaudid in violation of the law. (TR 148, 239). Dr. John Handwerker, M.D., testified as an expert herein on behalf of Petitioner. He has served as the first Chairman of the Department of Family Practice at the University of Florida Family and Community Medicine Programs. He is Chairman of the Family Practice Department of Mercy Hospital in Miami and is Assistant Professor of Pharmacology at the University of Miami. Dr. Handwerker is knowledgeable regarding generally prevailing and accepted standards of family practice in Dade County and was accepted, without challenge, as an expert in the field of Family Practice. Dr. Handwerker reviewed the nine (9) patients' records listed in the Administrative Complaint as well as the prescriptions written for each patient. Based upon Dr. Handwerker's review of those records and prescriptions, Respondent committed gross and repeated malpractice. This opinion stems from Respondent's "inappropriately and excessively prescribing Dilaudid to patient for chronic" while the Physicians Desk Reference clearly stated that Dilaudid should not be prescribed for patients with chronic pain. (Testimony of Dr. Handwerker) SPECIFIC PATIENTS A. Patrick Golden first visited Respondent's office on October 7, 1981. Golden complained of chronic pain arising from trauma suffered while he was involved in an industrial accident. His diagnosis was a compression of the fourth and fifth lumbar disk. He was treated for radiculitis. Respondent prescribed Dilaudid to relieve the pain that patient Golden was suffering from and based on the fact that Golden reportedly had been receiving Dilaudid from a former physician. Respondent conducted an examination of patient Golden and prescribed exercises for him. Respondent did not take x-rays although he states that he observed x-rays which had been taken by Golden's former physician. Respondent prescribed Dilaudid for Golden because it was the only drug which "killed the pain, unlike motrin and metrobromate." Nearing the end of Respondent's treatment of patient Golden, his wife began stealing Mr. Golden's drugs. Respondent referred her to a methadone program and obtained a notarized statement from Mrs. Golden to substantiate the fact that she was diverting drugs intended for her husband. Respondent observed that patient Golden was becoming addicted to Dilaudid nearing the end of his treatment although throughout the major portion of his treatment of patient Golden, he felt that while he was dependent on Dilaudid, he was not felt that while he was dependent on Dilaudid, he was not "addicted." Respondent tried to reduce the amount of Dilaudid that he was prescribing to patient Golden without success. Respondent believed that Dilaudid was medically necessary to treat patient Golden due to the suffering he was undergoing from the chronic pain. (Respondent's testimony and Petitioner's Exhibit 20). B. Ellen Henderson was treated by Respondent during the dates of approximately March, 1981 through January, 1982. Henderson suffered with her lumbar spine. Patient Henderson took motrin tablets since her preteen years. Patient Henderson has been treated at several methadone centers and is believed to have been taking approximately 25-40 Dilaudid four-milligram tablets per day. Upon Respondent's first treatment of patient Henderson, he advised her that she was "killing herself and that she needed to reduce that terrible dosage of Dilaudid." Patient Henderson was "treated for pain in the back and to reduce the amount of Dilaudid." In this regard, Respondent tried to reduce her intake of Dilaudid to approximately 8 Dilaudid four-milligram tablets per day. When Respondent stopped treating patient Henderson, he had reduced the amount of Dilaudid that he was prescribing for her to approximately 8 four- milligram tablets of Dilaudid per day. C. Respondent treated Ronald Chica from approximately March, 1981 through November, 1982. Chica was treated for spondylolysis--a degeneration of the vertebrae. Respondent prescribed Dilaudid for patient Chica because it relieved the pain. Respondent knew that patient Chica was addicted to the drug Dilaudid. D. James Brannigan was treated by Respondent from approximately May of 1981 through January of 1982. Respondent knew that Mr. Brannigan was dependent upon Dilaudid. Despite this knowledge, Respondent continued to prescribe Dilaudid for Mr. Brannigan in an effort to treat Brannigan's addiction with Dilaudid. Respondent was attempting to ease the withdrawal symptoms that patient Brannigan would suffer if he were immediately cut off from his supply of Dilaudid. E. Respondent treated patient Gilbert Fernandez during the dates of approximately February of 1981 through approximately February of 1982. During that period, Mr. Fernandez suffered from compression features of the ribs and the lumbar region. Mr. Fernandez had a physical and psychological dependence on the drug Dilaudid. Respondent treated patient Fernandez by prescribing Dilaudid tablets for him. Patient Fernandez had been treated at methadone centers in the past and presently was receiving methadone treatment while Respondent was treating him. Respondent prescribed Dilaudid to relieve the pain as well as to ease the withdrawal symptoms that patient Fernandez would undergo if he was immediately taken from the administration of Dilaudid. F. Between the dates of approximately February of 1981 through February of 1982, Respondent prescribed approximately 2,190 four-milligram Dilaudid tablets for patient Ronald Wetherington. Patient Wetherington was given approximately 60 tablets every 7 days. Patient Wetherington was addicted to the drug Dilaudid and Respondent ultimately referred him to a methadone center to deal with his withdrawal problems. G. During the period of February, 1981 through February, 1982, Respondent prescribed approximately 2,220 four-milligram Dilaudid tablets for patient Michael Sallee. Patient Sallee suffered from and was treated by Respondent for a compression fracture of the fifth lumbar. Mr. Sallee was a cabinetmaker and did considerable lifting in the performance of his work. Respondent knew that Mr. Sallee was dependent upon Dilaudid and continued to prescribe the narcotic during the term of his treatment. Respondent attempted to treat Mr. Sallee's addiction with Dilaudid. H. During the period of January of 1981 through January of 1982, Respondent treated patient Rudolph Ferguson and, during that period, prescribed approximately 820 four-milligram Dilaudid tablets for him. Patient Ferguson suffered from and was treated for back and rib problems from an auto accident. Respondent knew that patient Ferguson was dependent upon the drug Dilaudid and knew he was addicted to Dilaudid. Despite this knowledge, Respondent continued prescribing the drug Dilaudid to patient Ferguson to reduce the withdrawal symptoms and "to continue to treat the disease." Respondent referred patient Ferguson to a methadone clinic and, in fact, drove him to a nearby clinic for treatment. I. Respondent treated patient Patsy Gamlin during the period of November 21, 1981 through December 12, 1981. During that period, he prescribed 180 tablets or approximately 60 tablets every 10-14. Respondent administered a drug screen during December of 1981 and did not treat patient Gamlin after December. Dilaudid is a narcotic analgesic; its principal therapeutic effect is relief of pain. There is no intrinsic limit to the analgesic effect of Dilaudid; like morphine, adequate doses will relieve even the most severe pain. Clinically however, dosage limitations are imposed by the adverse effect, primarily respiratory, depression, nausea and vomiting which can result from high dosages. (Physicians Desk Reference, page 1038 [1984 Edition]) The Physicians Desk Reference has this to say about drug abuse and dependence: Dilaudid is a schedule II narcotic. Psychic dependence, physical dependence, and tolerance may develop upon repeated administration of narcotics; therefore dilaudid should be prescribed and administered with caution. However, psychic dependence is unlikely to develop when dilaudid is used for a short time for treatment of pain. Physical dependence, the condition in which continued administration of the drug is required to prevent the appearance of a withdrawal syndrome, usually assumes clinically significant proportions only after several weeks of continued narcotic use, although some mild degree of physical dependence may develop after a few days of narcotic therapy. Tolerance, in which increasingly large doses are required in order to produce the same degree of analgesia, is manifested initially by a shortened duration of analgesic effect, and subsequently by decreases in the intensity of analgesia. The rate of development of tolerance varies among patients. Prior to prescribing a drug such as Dilaudid, a physician should take a full history from a patient and perform a thorough physical examination. The history should include, inter alia, the patient's chief complaint, with questions from the physician to the patient involving areas of past problems with the nervous system, ears, eyes, lungs, chest, respiratory system, GI tract and urinary tract. The physical examination should involve all body systems, including blood pressure, examination of the head, neck, chest and back regions. If patient complains of low back pain, there should be a physical examination specifically involving the low back area before prescribing the scheduled controlled substance here at issue. The past history is important to determine the duration of the problem, any previous medical treatment, examinations or tests by other physicians regarding the lumbosacral or low back area. A physical examination should be performed designed to elicit indications of neurological evolvement, including straight-leg raise tests, impairment of sensation in the extremities tests and other neurological inquiries. Such a full history and a physical examination is prior to initiating a course of treatment involving treatment of chronic pain due to the existence of a wide assortment of other treatment modalities which might treat the root of the problem, rather than merely being pain symptoms. An examination of the Respondent's records and the prescribing patterns of Dilaudid for the patients involved indicates that Respondent simply made insufficient findings upon which to base the decision to prescribe the drug Dilaudid. By prescribing Dilaudid, without an adequate physical examination, or the gathering of detailed patient medical history, would constitute a failure to conform to the level of care, skill and treatment recognized by reasonably prudent similar physicians under these conditions and circumstances. By continuing to prescribe these drugs, without any involved discussion or consideration of the effect the previous course of treatment had had on the patient, other than simple inquiry by Respondent concerning, as example, how the patient was feeling, 3/ also constitutes inappropriate prescribing of scheduled controlled substances, and demonstrates a failure to conform to the generally accepted an prevailing standards of medical practice in the Dade County community. (Testimony of Dr. Handwerker) Respondent has never been subjected to disciplinary proceedings in the past. His past professional record reveals that he has a sincere concern for his patients. Throughout these investigative proceedings and the final hearing herein, the Respondent was candid, forthright and truthful. His prescribing of the controlled substance Dilaudid was based on his mistaken opinion that it was medically necessary to prescribe Dilaudid for his patients. Throughout these proceedings, it became clear that Respondent had not kept abreast of the proper course of treatment, detection and proper prescribing patterns for scheduled drugs for the patients be treated. To Respondent's credit, he has been studying the proper prescribing of controlled substances since the initiation of the investigation and the administrative proceedings involved herein. Respondent has never "faked" exams and every prescription that he wrote was based on an office visit and an exam, though a very cursory exam. Respondent did not receive any illegal profits from the sale of drugs nor did he divert, or attempt to divert, any drugs for illegal profit. His office fees, which range from $15 to $25 were not based on the amount of the drugs prescribed but, rather, on the patient's ability to pay. Respondent operates a small general practice with his wife serving as his receptionist. He personally completes all prescription forms with his wife/receptionist. Patients receiving treatment from Respondent are free to get their prescriptions filled at any pharmacy of their choice. Respondent was unaware and the evidence does not show that any of his patients had prior criminal records.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and the entire evidence of record, it is therefore recommended that a Final Order be entered imposing a written reprimand and one year's probation upon the Respondent Carlos de la Fe, and requiring that during the probationary, he enroll and complete, to the satisfaction of the Board of Medical Examiners, a continuing medical education course concerned with the appropriate indications for and prescription of scheduled controlled substances. 4/ RECOMMENDED this 24th day of October, 1984 in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of October, 1984.
The Issue Whether CFSATC, Inc. (Petitioner), should be selected as the service provider instead of Metro Treatment of Florida, L.P. (Metro/Intervenor), to meet the need of an additional outpatient methadone maintenance program in the Department of Children and Family Services (DCF), District 7 (Osceola County).
Findings Of Fact The Department of Children and Family Services (DCF/Respondent) notified Petitioner by letter dated May 28, 1999, that DCF had selected another applicant to be the service provider to meet the determined need of one additional outpatient methadone maintenance program in DCF, District 7. As an applicant to be a service provider, Petitioner's interests are substantially affected by Respondent's action. Respondent also notified Intervenor by letter dated May 28, 1999, that Metro had been selected by DCF to be the service provider to meet the determined need of one additional outpatient methadone maintenance program in District 7, as published by Respondent in the Florida Administrative Weekly. On June 18, 1999, Petitioner timely filed a Petition challenging Respondent's action on May 28, 1999, in "denying its license" with Respondent. On July 7, 1999, Petitioner filed an Amended Petition with DCF which not only challenged Respondent's action in "denying" Petitioner's license, but also challenged Respondent's May 28, 1999, action in "awarding a license" to Metro. On or about August 10, 1999, Metro filed a Motion to Intervene in the instant proceeding which was granted. Intervenor's interests in being selected as the service provider to meet the determined need of an additional outpatient methadone maintenance program in DCF, District 7, as published by Respondent are substantially affected by the Petition seeking to challenge Respondent's action, or request that DCF issue a second license. Determination of Need The intent of Chapter 397, Florida Statutes, as it relates to methadone licenses is to control the growth of methadone programs. Under the statute and rules, DCF is required to complete an annual heroin and methadone treatment needs assessment survey no later than October 1, and publish the results of the survey no later than the following January 1. Respondent failed to complete a needs assessment survey in 1998. In 1999, Respondent, as the State Methadone Authority, conducted a needs assessment for methadone providers by collecting information on four different criteria delineated in Rule 65D-16.014(1)(c)1.c., Florida Administrative Code, including arrest data from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement and information on travel hardship from the local district offices of DCF. The data was compiled into a report which concluded that "a need has been established in Districts 7 and 11," but not in any other district. It is Respondent's responsibility, as the State Methadone Authority, to review the needs assessment data and/or report and to interpret the data, and make a determination as to the number of new medication treatment service providers needed in each district. Respondent determined that there is a need for one additional methadone medication treatment service provider in Osceola County. Respondent's determination of need for only one additional outpatient methadone treatment provider in Osceola County is consistent with past DCF practices of limiting the expansion of medication treatment programs to a single facility at a time. On April 9, 1999, Respondent published a statement of findings in the Florida Administrative Weekly, identifying Respondent's determination of need for the state. The statement which provided as follows: Pursuant to section 397.427, Florida Statutes, and administrative rules adopted thereunder, the Department of Children and Family Services has conducted a survey to determine the need for new medication (methadone) treatment service providers. The survey results are provided by the Department of Children and Family Services District Offices as follows: District 7 and 11 The need for one additional outpatient methadone maintenance program has been established for each of these districts. Prospective applicants for a license to operate an outpatient methadone maintenance program in Districts 7 and 11 may direct requests for an application to the following: District 7-Department of Children and Family Services Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Program Office, 400 West Robinson Street, Hurston Building, South Tower, Suite S-430, Orlando, Florida 32801, Attention: Glen Casel. District 11-Department of Children and Family Services, Adult Care Division, 401 N.W. 2nd Avenue, Room 812, North Tower Miami, Florida 33128, Attention: David Raymond. Districts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14 and 15. The need for additional medication (methadone) services has not been established in these districts. Copies of the assessment report may be obtained from: Department of Children and Family Services, Substance Abuse Program Office, 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 3, Room 105-I, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700. Respondent published a correction to its April 9, 1999, publication on April 30, 1999, in the Florida Administrative Weekly. The April 30, 1999, publication was identical to the April 9, 1999, publication except that it provided for a May 14, 1999, deadline for submitting applications to Districts 7 and 11. No administrative petitions or challenges were filed with Respondent challenging its determination of need for "one additional outpatient methadone maintenance program" for Osceola County. Petitioner filed an application to be a new service provider for District 7 with DCF dated April 14, 1999. The application did not contain a physical address for the proposed clinic. Respondent informed Petitioner verbally and in writing that in order for the application to be considered it would have to provide a physical location or address. In addition, it would have "to provide a fire inspection, evidence of zoning approval, occupational licenses and originally, also a health inspection of the property, which was after the fact." Petitioner secured a physical location and submitted a supplement to its application on May 10, 1999. The fire inspection submitted by Petitioner for the proposed facility showed that it had code violations which would need to be corrected before Respondent could issue a license. Intervenor's original application was sent by Federal Express, standard overnight delivery, on May 13, 1999, addressed to Glen Casel, Florida Department of Children and Family Services, 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 1129, Orlando, Florida. According to the published notice in the Florida Administrative Weekly, prospective applicants for a license to operate an outpatient methadone maintenance program in Districts 7 and 11 are instructed to "direct requests for an application" to District 7, Department of Children and Family Services, Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Program Office, 400 West Robinson Street, Hurston Building, South Tower, Suite S-430, Orlando, Florida 32801, Attention: Glen Casel. The notice does not state a specific address where the application must be filed. Suite 1129 is the District Administrator's Office for DCF, District 7. Respondent sought to verify, prior to reviewing the applications, that Intervenor's application was received by DCF on May 14, 1999. The evidence presented at hearing was sufficient to indicate that Metro's application was received by Respondent on May 14, 1999. In response to DCF's April 9, 1999, and/or April 30, 1999, publication in the Florida Administrative Weekly, Respondent received two timely-filed applications for license to operate one additional methadone outpatient clinic in District 7. One application from Petitioner and one application from Intervenor. The number of responses to Respondent's April 9, 1999, and/or April 30, 1999, published notice of need exceeded the determined need for "one additional outpatient methadone maintenance program" for District 7. When the number of applications exceeds the need determined by DCF, Respondent views the application process as a two-step process. First, Respondent reviews the applications pursuant to Rule 65D-16.014(1)(c)1.c., Florida Administrative Code, to select a service provider based on "organizational capability" to implement DCF's rules; and second, the applicant selected must then come into compliance with all the license requirements of Section 397.403, Florida Statutes, to obtain a permanent license. In looking at the "organizational capability" of the applicants, Respondent rates the applicants based on their ability to implement the required provisions of the administrative rule. It is Respondent's interpretation of both its statute and administrative rules that fire inspections, zoning approval, safety inspection, and occupational licenses need to be in place prior to Respondent's issuing a permanent license to a service provider, but do not necessarily have to be in place prior to evaluating competing applications when the number of applications exceeds the need determined by Respondent. Both applications were evaluated by Respondent pursuant to the rule, for selection of the service provider. In its initial evaluation of two application, Respondent determined that Metro's written policies and procedures demonstrate that its "organizational capability . . . to properly implement the appropriate federal and state methadone regulations" exceeds the organizational capability of Petitioner. Petitioner's Organizational Capability Carol Ball testified that she was the executive director and program sponsor for Petitioner. Ball is not a licensed health professional. She understood that pursuant to Rule 65D-16.014(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code, defining "program sponsor," she could substitute five years' experience in the field of addictions in lieu of being a licensed health professional. Respondent testified that in order to be a program sponsor for a methadone service provider, a person had to be a licensed health professional and have five years experience in the field of addictions. Therefore, Ball did not qualify as "program sponsor." Ball was then recalled as a witness and testified that she was only the program sponsor for purposes of the FDA, not the State of Florida. Ball's testimony that she was not the program sponsor for Petitioner is not credible. Petitioner presented no evidence as to the identity of a program sponsor other than Ball. Petitioner's application failed to include letters of reference or a statement of educational level or work experience for its program sponsor as required by the rules. Dr. Juan Perez Boudet, who is identified in Petitioner's application as the medical director, is a physician licensed by the State of Florida and has worked in the field of addictions for at least 15 years. Petitioner's application did not include résumés or background information for any of its staff. The rules require that an applicant submit written policies and procedures with the application. Petitioner failed to submit any written policies and procedures as part of its original application. Petitioner testified that it did not provide résumés, background information, and written policies and procedures as part of its original application as required by the rules because the information "was not requested by the Department." The person responsible for regulatory and licensing issues for Petitioner testified that she did not review the applicable administrative rules prior to submitting the application. Petitioner submitted an undated policies and procedures manual into evidence at the hearing but presented no testimony about such policies and procedures. Petitioner's policies and procedures manual consists of approximately 200 pages, 50 percent of which are blank FDA and state forms. Petitioner's policies and procedures manual indicates that the manual submitted by Petitioner at the hearing has not been recently updated. Petitioner displayed a lack of knowledge of the requirements of Chapter 65D-16, Florida Administrative Code, and Chapter 397, Florida Statutes, specifically as it relates to the application process. It repeatedly faulted Respondent for any shortcomings in Petitioner's application. Metro's Organizational Capability Dr. Randall B. Greene is identified in both Intervenor's original application filed with DCF on May 14, 1999, and the updated application, tendered into evidence at the hearing, as both the program sponsor and executive medical director for Metro Treatment of Florida, L.P., d/b/a Mid Florida Metro Treatment Center. Dr. Randall B. Greene is a doctor of osteopathy licensed by the State of Florida, License No. OS-0004037. Dr. Greene operated eight methadone clinics in several states, including Florida, from 1985 to 1997, when he sold the clinics to the parent company of Metro. Dr. Greene is currently under a management agreement with Colonial Management Group, L.P., which owns and manages Metro. Under the terms of the management agreement, Dr. Greene's duties include establishing new methadone clinics, formulating policies and procedures that relate to medical practice, and ensure the operation of the methadone clinics from a medical perspective, and complies with federal and state rules and regulations. Dr. Greene exhibited an in-depth knowledge as to the operation of Metro's clinics in each city, as well as staffing patterns. Dr. Greene has been working in the field of addiction in excess of five years as required by the rules. Dr. Greene, as executive medical director of Metro, oversees all medical services provided by Metro's clinics, as well as the licensed physician/medical director for each clinic. Dr. Green's responsibilities are described in Metro's policies and procedures manual as required by the rules. Metro's original application, as well as its updated application, include a résumé for Dr. Greene which sets forth his educational level and work experience, and a letter of recommendation from Dr. Greene's former employer as required. Dr. Greene prepared Metro's application currently at issue. Peter Santostefano is the chief executive officer of Metro and its parent company, Colonial Management Group, L.P. The CEO retains overall administrative responsibility and authority in all center or program matters. William Sheridan is the Vice President of Operations for Colonial Management Group, L.P., a Delaware limited partnership which is authorized to do business in Florida, which owns and manages Metro. It owns and operates eight methadone treatment centers in Florida. He currently supervises five regional directors who supervise 30 methadone programs nationwide. Sheridan holds a Bachelors degree in criminal justice, a masters degree in counseling and is certified as an addictions specialist by the American Academy. Prior to assuming the position of Vice President of Operations for Colonial Management, Sheridan worked directly for Dr. Greene holding positions as a case manager for the Daytona Methadone Clinic in 1987, a program director for the Daytona Methadone Clinic from 1988-1991, with duties including operating a methadone clinic in compliance with state and federal regulations; a regional director from 1991 to 1993 where he had management oversight over all methadone clinic and implemented policies and procedures in a specific geographic area; and vice president of Operations from 1993 until 1997, when Dr. Greene sold his clinics to its current owners. Sheridan was retained as Vice President of Operations by Colonial Management Group, L.P., when it acquired the clinics from Dr. Greene. Intervenor's current organizational structure includes a hierarchy of case managers, program directors, and regional directors. Sheridan is listed on Intervenor's application as the qualified professional, insured training coordinator, and data coordinator and is fully familiar with Chapter 65D-16, Florida Administrative Code, and the duties and functions of each position and stated that he would fill such positions if Intervenor could not hire permanent qualified personnel to fill such positions when the clinic opens. Carol Schwartz will be the program director in Osceola County and is certified as Certified Addictions Professional by the State of Florida. Intervenor identified in its original and updated application that it would open its clinic with three counselors, in addition to its program director. Intervenor identified in its original application and updated application that it would have a licensed professional nurse, Sharon Jones, on staff. She is licensed by the State of Florida. Dr. Greene reviewed the need assessment published by DCF along with a February 19, 1999, letter from the district administrator to Mr. Emenheiser, the "Methadone Authority" and determined that Kissimmee was the best location for the new methadone clinic in Osceola County, as 68 percent of the travel hardship cases lived in Kissimmee. Both Intervenor and Petitioner stated that they anticipated that the clinic in Osceola County would start with about 20-35 patients and would increase over time. Rule 65D-16.014(3)(I)3., Florida Administrative Code, requires that, for methadone programs, there be no more than 45 patients to one full-time counselor. Based on the travel hardship identified by Respondent of approximately 100 patients from the Osceola County area, and a review of Intervenor's organizational chart, Intervenor will be properly staffed to meet the need identified by the Department. Intervenor's application indicated that the program component requested in the application form could grow to 400 patients. Intervenor testified that it adds additional counselors, as needed, to meet the patient-to-counselor ratio required by Respondent. Intervenor's clinic, at all times material to the instant case, has been continuously licensed by Respondent and in good standing. Intervenor has contracted with Dr. Paul "Chip" Roberts to provide medical services in the Osceola clinic on a day-to-day basis. Dr. Roberts' title is that of licensed physician/medical director for purposes of the FDA. Dr. Roberts is a doctor of osteopathy, licensed by the State of Florida, License No. OS-0005120, and has eight years of experience in the field of addiction. Dr. Roberts has worked in the Orlando Methadone Treatment Center, for both Dr. Greene and now Colonial Management Group, L.P., as the clinic's licensed physician/medical director since 1987. Dr. Roberts is responsible for all patients, conducts physical examination, reviews laboratory work, drug screens, and interfaces with nurses and counselors in reference to medical needs. Dr. Roberts can perform the duties in Osceola County, as well as Orlando, as 75 of the patients in Orlando live in Osceola County and will likely transfer. Dr. Roberts, in his capacity as licensed physician/medical director, directly oversees all medical services provided by the program on a day-to-day basis, and his responsibilities are described in Intervenor's policies and procedures manual as required by the rules. Dr. Greene presented testimony regarding the way the policies and procedures operated, the controls in place for inventory, pharmacy, the unique methadone control, staff control, in regard to nurses responsibilities, and how the job is to be performed. Metro's policies and procedures manual consists of 330 pages and over 200 indexed subsections which provide detailed explanations and procedures regarding all aspects of the operation of a methadone clinic, including, but not limited to: administration, program standards, admission procedures, treatment procedures, transfer procedures, detoxification procedures, discharge procedures, pharmacy services and protocols, medical services, and protocols. Intervenor's policies and procedures were developed by Dr. Greene and Sheridan and are updated on an annual basis. Intervenor's written policies and procedures, as submitted at the hearing, demonstrate that its "organizational capability . . . to properly implement the appropriate federal and state methadone regulations" exceeds the organizational capability of Petitioner. Intervenor's original and updated applications contained current general and professional liability insurance policies for Metro, and also covered various physician's whose services are engaged by Colonial Management Group. Intervenor's original and updated applications contained sufficient information that Metro is financially well-able to run the Mid Florida Metro Treatment Center in Osceola County.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order selecting Metro Treatment of Florida, L.P., d/b/a Mid Florida Metro Treatment Center, as the service provider to provide methadone outpatient service in accordance with the DCF's determination of need for District 7 and dismissing Petitioner's Petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of May, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of May, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Keith A. Graham, Esquire Yovannie Rodriguez-Smith, Esquire Marchena and Graham, P.A. 233 South Semoran Boulevard Orlando, Florida 32807 James Sawyer, Esquire District 7, Legal Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 400 West Robinson Street, Suite S-1106 Orlando, Florida 32801-1782 Wilbur E. Brewton, Esquire Kelly Brewton Plante, Esquire Gray, Harris and Robinson, P.A. 225 South Adams Street, Suite 250 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Virginia Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue In addition to the issue of whether the Respondent committed the acts alleged, the administrative complaint alleges on its face that the Respondent was not licensed to practice medicine in the State of Florida until July 13, 1982. Most of the administrative complaint relates to alleged violations by the Respondent prior to the date of his licensure. A primary issue is the Petitioner's jurisdiction over the Respondent to prosecute for acts committed prior to his licensure. A major factual issue in this case are the dates upon which the doctor's conduct allegedly took place.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent was licensed as a medical doctor on July 13, 1982, in the State of Florida. Prior to that date the Respondent was not licensed to practice medicine in this or any other state. Prior to his licensure he was participating in a medical internship program in Pensacola, Florida. He was permitted to practice and prescribe medicine as an intern in and within the limits of this program. (Re: Count I through Count IV) The Respondent presented prescriptions for Eskatrol and Dexedrine on two different occasions to two different pharmacies. These prescriptions listed the Respondent as the person for whom the prescriptions were filled and signed by the Respondent. Neither prescription was accepted by the pharmacists and neither prescription was introduced into evidence. Eskatrol and Dexedrine are amphetamine compounds and are Schedule II controlled substances. The Respondent's ex-wife placed the Respondent's use of amphetamines in February of 1981. See Transcript page 95 line 19 through page 96 line 1. One of the pharmacists to whom the prescription was presented by the Respondent was Ann Cole Wilson, the Respondent's former sister-in-law and sister of his ex-wife. Wilson's testimony concerning the date of the alleged occurrence testifies as follows: Q. Can you tell me what occurred on that occasion, and tell me approximately when this occurred? A. Like I say, it's hard to remember. It was sometime during the summer months. Q. The summer of what year? A. Oh, gosh. Right now it's been, let's see, `82 or `83. Q. The summer of `82? A. I would say `82 yeah. The other pharmacist who testified regarding the Respondent's presentation of prescriptions for amphetamines was Elizabeth S. Grimsley. Grimsley testified regarding the alleged events as follows: Q. How did you come to meet him? A. He brought in a prescription one night for, two prescriptions, rather, written for him by himself for Eskatrol and Dexedrine, amphetamine prescriptions. Q. These prescriptions were written for the use of Dr. Taylor and they were written by Dr. Taylor? A. Yes, sir. Q. Do you remember approximately when this occurred? A. No, sir; roughly a year and a half or two years ago, I suppose. The latter witness is very vague about the date, and the former witness has an interest in these proceedings by virtue of her relationship with the Respondent's former wife. The relationship by Respondent and his former wife is characterized by hostility and continuing litigation arising out of their divorce and concerning child custody. It is concluded that the Petitioner failed to prove the acts occurred after the date of the Respondent's licensure. (Counts V, VI) The Respondent ordered legend and other drugs from pharmaceutical companies using the name of Michael Archer, M.D. and Archer's DEA registration number. Archer did not approve the order or give the Respondent permission to use his DEA registration in order to obtain these drugs. Respondent's actions took place in 1981 and 1982 prior to the date of the Respondent's licensure by the Florida Board. See the depositions of Farrell, Schied & Perez. (Count VII) Between the dates of March 3, 1982, and June 30, 1982, the Respondent submitted drug orders for and received thirty Crescormon No. 4 iu- vials from Pharmacia Corporated, 800 Centennial Avenue, Piscataway, New Jersey 08854. These events occurred prior to the Respondent's licensure by the Petitioner. See deposition of Schied, Exhibit 3. Respondent ordered amino acids from Varitex Corporation, a Michigan company. These materials which are not legend drugs were ordered and received by the Respondent prior to the date of his licensure by the Petitioner. See deposition of Myers, Exhibit 4. Respondent ordered various drugs from Generix Drug Corp., 1900 W. Commercial Blvd., Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, in the same manner. All these transactions occurred before the Respondent was licensed. See the deposition of Perez, Exhibit 5. (Count VIII) The Respondent sold or provided Darrell R. Black substances represented by the Respondent and thought to be by Black a drug with the trade name Dianabol. Dianabol is a steroid and a legend drug. This transaction was not a part of Dr. Taylor's practice under the Pensacola Education Program, the internship in which Dr. Taylor was participating. This transaction occurred in 1981, prior to Dr. Taylor's licensure by the Board. See Transcript page 38. The Respondent sold or provided to Shaun Francis Farrell drugs represented by the Respondent and thought to be by Farrell testosterone and Deca-Durabolin. This transaction was not part of the Respondent's internship in the Pensacola Educational Program. These transactions occurred in 1981, prior to Respondent's licensure by the Board. See Transcript page 46. (Count IX) The Respondent presented prescriptions for and received various metabolic steroids during 1981. However, all of these were presented prior to the date of the Respondent's licensure by the Board. See Transcript, pages 15, 16, 20, 21, 22, 31, 32, 33. One prescription for Trisorlan was presented by the Respondent for himself on October 20, 1982. Trisorlan is a legend drug, however it is not a controlled substance. Trisorlan is a drug affecting the pigmentation of skin. Transcript page 24. No evidence was received concerning the propriety of Dr. Taylor prescribing this medication for himself. (Count XI) No evidence was received that the Respondent held himself out as being licensed to practice medicine. Black and Ferrell did not see Respondent as a doctor. Respondent saw Cayton at the hospital and was authorized to treat patients within the scope of his internship. Most of the witnesses stated that they knew that the Respondent was a doctor, that he was "practicing" at Sacred Heart Hospital. The Respondent holds a degree as an M.D. and was practicing at Sacred Heart as an intern. Further to the extent that the Respondent may have held himself out as a physician contrary to Section 458.327, he did so prior to the date of his licensure and acquisition of jurisdiction by the Board.
Recommendation Having found no evidence to support the jurisdiction of the Board over the Respondent on the allegations of Count X, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Board take no action against the Respondent and the administrative complaint against the Respondent be dismissed. DONE and ORDERED this 4th day of February, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of February, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph W. Lawrence, II, Esquire Dorothy Faircloth, Executive Department of Professional Director Regulation Department of Professional 130 North Monroe Street Regulation Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Board of Medical Examiners 130 North Monroe Street William Taylor, M.D. Tallahassee, Florida 32301 5271 Myrtlewood Sarasota, Florida 33580 Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Salvatore Carpino, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether the Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint dated March 26, 2010, and, if so, the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, the facts stipulated to by the parties in the Joint Prehearing Stipulation, and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department is the state agency responsible for the investigation and prosecution of complaints involving physicians licensed to practice medicine in Florida. See § 456.072, Fla. Stat. The Board of Medicine ("Board") is the entity responsible for regulating the practice of medicine and for imposing penalties on physicians found to have violated the provisions of section 458.331(1). See § 458.331(2), Fla. Stat. At the times pertinent to this proceeding, Dr. Christensen was a physician licensed to practice in Florida, having been issued license number 92135, and he practiced with the A1A Health & Wellness Clinic ("Clinic"), specializing in pain management. In 1975, Dr. Christensen received a degree in chiropractic, and he specialized in chiropractic orthopedics. Dr. Christensen has been practicing chiropractic orthopedics in the Palm Beach, Florida, area since 1975, although he took time away from his practice to attend medical school and to obtain a master's degree in public health. Dr. Christensen received his medical degree in 1995, and he completed a one-year internship in internal medicine. Dr. Christensen was certified in preventive medicine by the American Board of Preventive Medicine on January 22, 2007, and, after passing an examination, he was credentialed in March 2007 by the American Academy of Pain Management. Between February 9, 1997, and February 1998, Dr. Christensen was certified as an addiction professional by the American Association of Acupuncture and Oriental Medicine and the American College of Addictionology and Compulsive Disorders after having taken a 120-hour program in addictionology. Dr. Christensen first saw A.L. at the Clinic on February 12, 2007. At the time, A.L. was 21 years old, having been born on September 17, 1985. At the February 12, 2007, office visit, A.L. completed a Personal History form in which he stated that he was self- employed and worked in construction; that his major complaint was knee and back pain; and that the condition of which he complained began when he was 13 years old, which would have been in or about 1998. A.L. also noted on the Personal History form that he had seen other doctors for "pain management," but he did not include the names of any of the doctors who had provided pain management treatment. Dr. Christensen completed the New Patient History Form at A.L.'s first office visit. He noted that A.L. complained of intense, sharp, incapacitating pain in his left knee, with associated pain in his lower back. A.L. reported that he had had multiple surgeries on his knee that had been unsuccessful. Dr. Christensen performed a general examination of A.L. to confirm that he was alert and oriented and that his organ systems functioned properly. Dr. Christensen noted that A.L. was thin, but he did not identify any abnormal finding. Dr. Christensen did note that A.L. complained of anxiety. Because of A.L.'s complaints, however, Dr. Christensen focused his examination on A.L.'s left knee and lower back. Dr. Christensen observed scars on A.L.'s left knee, which confirmed the multiple surgeries that A.L. reported, and he also noted muscle atrophy of A.L.'s left leg, a condition that Dr. Christensen attributed to lack of exercise of the left leg. Dr. Christensen performed several orthopedic tests targeted at A.L.'s left knee and lower back, and Dr. Christensen's objective physical examination confirmed A.L.'s subjective complaints of pain. The differential diagnosis noted by Dr. Christensen on the New Patient History Form was multiple failed knee surgeries with associated lower back pain and lumbar disc syndrome. Dr. Christensen concluded that A.L. most likely had a lumbar disc problem because of A.L.'s abnormal gait resulting from the knee injury and the resulting pressure on A.L.'s pelvis. Dr. Christensen also noted on the New Patient History Form that A.L. reported that, each month for years, he had taken 60 to 90 80-milligram tablets of Oxycontin; 400 to 600 30- milligram tablets of Roxicodone; 200+ 40-milligram tablets of Methadone; 60 to 90 2-milligram tablets of Xanax; and 3 bottles of Oxifast. Based on these medications, dosages, and quantities, Dr. Christensen considered A.L. overmedicated, and he intended, during his treatment of A.L., to gradually reduce the amount of medications prescribed for A.L. Oxycontin and Methadone are pain medications, and Oxycontin and Roxicodone are trade names for the generic drug Oxycodone. Oxifast is a liquid form of Oxycodone, and Xanax is a drug used to treat anxiety. Both Oxycodone and Methadone are classified as schedule II controlled substances in section 893.03(2), Florida Statutes, and have a high potential for abuse; Xanax, which is the trade name for the generic drug Alprazolam, is classified as a schedule IV controlled substance in section 893.03(4), with a low potential for abuse relative to schedule I, II, and III controlled substances. As part of his initial office visit with Dr. Christensen, A.L. signed a Pain Management Agreement, in which he agreed that, among other things, he would not take any pain medications not prescribed by Dr. Christensen or seek treatment from any other doctors in order to obtain pain medications; prescriptions would be filled at the same pharmacy, which A.L. identified as "Gordons Pharmacy"; he would take the medications prescribed in the manner indicated on the label; he agreed to random urine drug tests; and he understood he would be discharged by Dr. Christensen if he failed to abide by the Pain Management Agreement. Dr. Christensen went over this agreement with A.L. during this initial office visit, and he emphasized that the agreement was a legal document that, if breached, would result in A.L.'s being discharged as Dr. Christensen's patient. In his typed notes for A.L.'s February 12, 2007, office visit, Dr. Christensen stated: Subjective: Mr. [L] indicated on his first visit today that he is feel constant severe pain in his left knee causing him to limp which refers pain to the lower back. Mr. L additionally reports restricted movement pain localized in the right lumbar, left lumbar, right lower lumbar area, and left lower lumbar area. Mr. [L] stated that for years he is made fairly comfortably by taking pain pills but his low back pain is a lot more uncomfortable due to bending, driving, lifting, and standing. He also stated today that he is experiencing constant severe pain in the area of the left knee joint and related he has had 7 failed knee surgeries since he was 13 years old. Mr. [L] additionally made particular comment about stiffness, restricted movement, and inflexibility pain localized in the left kneecap. Mr. [L]'s knee joint pain feels worse due to bending, standing, and walking. He states that taking pain pills reduces the severity of the pain. Dr. Christensen also noted in his typed notes that A.L. rated the level of knee joint and low back pain at nine on a scale of one to ten; Dr. Christensen's handwritten notes indicate that A.L. rated the level of pain at "10+". Dr. Christensen's assessment, as reflected in his typed notes, was that A.L. showed a persistent chronic symptomatology; that is, Dr. Christensen considered A.L.'s knee and lower back pain to be a chronic and stable condition, with no hope of improvement given that A.L. rejected additional surgery on his left knee as an option. Dr. Christensen also requested at the February 12, 2007, office visit that A.L. provide him with any MRI reports or other radiologic studies as soon as possible, and A.L. provided several radiological consultation reports the day after his initial office visit. The reports included an MRI of A.L.'s left knee done on or about April 1998; an MRI of A.L.'s lumbosacral spine done on or about December 2000; an MRI of A.L.'s left knee done on February 9, 2001; an MRI of A.L.'s left knee done on August 23, 2002; and a radiological study of A.L.'s cervical spine and a CT scan of A.L.'s brain in April 2006. Dr. Christensen reviewed the reports and confirmed that A.L.'s diagnosis was an osteochondral defect of his left knee, most likely from a sports injury. Dr. Christensen did not order additional diagnostic studies of A.L.'s knee and lower back because he concluded, as a chiropractic orthopedist and based both on his objective findings from the physical examination of A.L. and on his review of the radiological reports, that A.L.'s injury would not get better on its own; that additional diagnostic tests would show only that A.L.'s condition had gotten worse; and that the results of additional diagnostic tests would not change his diagnosis or treatment of A.L. The treatment plan for A.L. that Dr. Christensen outlined in his typed notes is as follows: One month appointment is scheduled for the patient. Pain medication that he was taking was reviewed and a decreased amount of pain medicine was prescribed. He was given a book on Subutex/Suboxone. I covered our pain management agreement, cautioned of side effects, addiction, health concepts, physical therapy, patient is too young for knee replacement, etc. Our plan is to reduce the patients [sic] present intake of pain meds . . . to a lessor [sic] amount each month as we are able. Dr. Christensen believed that A.L. was taking too much pain medication. He wanted to help A.L. undo the damage that had been done by the excessive pain medications that Dr. Christensen believed had been prescribed for A.L., and Dr. Christensen planned to reduce the amount gradually to a more appropriate level of medication. Accordingly, on February 12, 2007, Dr. Christensen wrote A.L. prescriptions for 60 40-milligram tablets of Methadone, with instructions to take one tablet two times per day; 300 30-milligram tablets of Roxicodone, with instructions to take two tablets five times per day; and 60 2-milligram tablets of Xanax, with instructions to take one tablet two times per day. Based on the quantities and dosages of medications that A.L. reported he was taking as of February 12, 2007, Dr. Christensen eliminated the prescriptions for Oxycodone and Oxifast and significantly reduced the number of 30-milligram Roxicodone tablets and 40-milligram Methadone tablets A.L. could take each month. Dr. Christensen prescribed Xanax for A.L. because A.L. reported to Dr. Christensen that he had anxiety; because Dr. Christensen observed that he was anxious during the office visit and knew that pain could cause anxiety; and because A.L. reported to Dr. Christensen that he had been taking Xanax prior to February 12, 2007. Although Dr. Christensen prescribed less Xanax for A.L. than A.L. reported that he had been taking, Dr. Christensen did not want to A.L. to stop taking Xanax abruptly because A.L. could have seizures and die. The prescriptions written for A.L. by Dr. Christensen significantly decreased the amount of pain medication A.L. was reportedly taking prior to February 12, 2007, but Dr. Christensen was satisfied that the prescriptions would provide a sufficient amount of medication to control A.L.'s pain. Dr. Christensen felt that he could not refuse to prescribe pain medications for A.L. on February 12, 2007, because, once a patient has been on pain medications for years, as A.L. reportedly had, stopping the pain medications abruptly could result in very severe withdrawal symptoms. In addition, Dr. Christensen was concerned that, if he did not prescribe pain medications for A.L., A.L. would not continue his treatment with Dr. Christensen. As part of his treatment plan, Dr. Christensen also discussed with A.L. on February 12, 2007, health concepts such as improving his diet, getting exercise, considering physical therapy, setting goals, and increasing spiritual awareness. In addition, he gave A.L. information on Suboxone, a drug used primarily to prevent withdrawal symptoms when the amount of opioids such as Roxicodone is significantly reduced. Although A.L. was not interested in discussing Suboxone at the February 12, 2007, office visit, Dr. Christensen intended to continue discussing the drug with A.L. at subsequent office visits because Dr. Christensen's ultimate plan was to wean A.L. off of opioids completely. A.L. continued treatment with Dr. Christensen until June 29, 2007, seeing Dr. Christensen on March 12, 2007; April 10, 2007; May 7, 2007; June 2, 2007; and June 29, 2007. As recorded in Dr. Christensen's typed notes, A.L. complained at each office visit of "constant severe pain" in his lower back and his left knee area, with restricted movement in the lower back area and "stiffness, restricted movement, and inflexibility pain localized in the left kneecap." At each office visit, A.L. rated his knee and/or lower back pain at nine on a scale of one to ten, except that, at the office visit on May 7, 2007, A.L. rated his knee joint pain at eight on a scale of one to ten. Dr. Christensen reviewed A.L.'s systems at each office visit and conducted a physical examination focused on A.L.'s left knee and back. Dr. Christensen's assessment of A.L.'s status at each office visit was that his condition was chronic and/or stable. At A.L.'s March 12, 2007, Dr. Christensen prescribed 60 40-milligram tablets of Methadone, with instructions to take one tablet two times per day; 300 30-milligram tablets of Roxicodone, with instructions to take two tablets five times per day; and 60 2-milligram tablets of Xanax, with instructions to take one tablet two times per day. In his handwritten notes of the March 12, 2007, office visit, Dr. Christensen noted that A.L. was stable on the pain medications prescribed. On March 12, 2007, A.L. also completed a Pain Outcomes Profile, in which he rated his pain generally as five or six on a scale of one to ten; A.L. rated his level of anxiety as seven on a scale of one to ten. In his handwritten notes of the April 10, 2007, office visit, Dr. Christensen stated that he had a long discussion with A.L. about weaning him off of the pain medications and developing goals for doing so. Dr. Christensen drew a graph in his notes of the April 10, 2007, office visit to illustrate his discussion with A.L. about taking one 30-milligram Roxicodone ten times at a time instead of two. Dr. Christensen noted that A.L. wanted to take the Roxicodone tablets more often than ten times per day, and Dr. Christensen explained to A.L. that he needed to take enough pain medication to control his pain but not enough that he would go into a state of euphoria because that would lead to addiction. Dr. Christensen expanded on his point about weaning A.L. off of the large dose of Roxicodone in his typewritten notes of the April 10, 2007, office visit: I explained the concept of 2 roxicodone's [sic] (60 mg) verse [sic] 30 mg taken more often. 2 tabs can cause excess, waste, build tolerance and the patient will run out of meds. Taking the roxicone [sic] 30 mg tablets one at a time will allow the patient to dose himself better, decrease tolerance, reduce waste, laste [sic] longer. Less pain, and ultimately take less pain meds. I showed him how 240 roxies would provide more pain relief than 300 roxies if taken 1 at a time more often then [sic] taking 2 or more at a time which is how the patient was taking them. On April 10, 2007, Dr. Christensen prescribed 60 40-milligram tablets of Methadone, with instructions to take one tablet two times per day and 60 2-milligram tablets of Xanax, with instructions to take one tablet two times per day. Dr. Christensen also prescribed 300 30-milligram tablets of Roxicodone, but he instructed A.L. to take one tablet ten times per day rather than two tablets five times per day. A.L. completed a Pain Outcomes Profile at the April 10, 2007, office visit, and he rated his pain level generally at five on a scale of one to ten; A.L. rated his level of anxiety at seven on a scale of one to ten. A.L. also signed an A1A Health & Wellness Clinic Patient Informed Consent and Notice of Material Risks for Treatment of Intractable Pain with Controlled Substances on April 10, 2007, in which A.L. confirmed that Dr. Christensen had recommended and A.L. had requested treatment with opioid pain medication. By signing the form, A.L. also confirmed that he and Dr. Christensen had discussed alternative therapies, including drug cessation treatment using Suboxone and potential side effects and risks of controlled substances. At A.L.'s next office visit, on May 7, 2007, Dr. Christensen prescribed 60 40-milligram tablets of Methadone, with instructions to take one tablet two times per day and 60 2- milligram tablets of Xanax, with instructions to take one tablet two times per day. Dr. Christensen decreased A.L.'s prescription for Roxicodone from 300 30-milligram tablets to 240 30-milligram tablets, with instructions to take one tablet eight times per day. Dr. Christensen also noted in his typewritten notes that A.L. refused physical therapy and that Suboxone/Subutex was discussed with A.L. but that A.L. indicated that he was "not at all interested." At A.L.'s June 2, 2007, office visit, Dr. Christensen further reduced to 210 the number of 30-milligram Roxicodone tablets he prescribed for A.L., and he instructed A.L. to take one tablet seven times per day. Dr. Christensen noted in the Follow Up Visit form that he completed on June 2, 2007, that A.L. was not happy about the decrease in the number of Roxicodone tablets and complained that he would be in pain. Dr. Christensen noted that he explained again that the goal was to get A.L. drug-free. Dr. Christensen also discussed additional knee surgery as an option, but he noted that A.L. emphatically refused further surgery. Dr. Christensen included on the Follow Up Visit form for the June 2, 2007, office visit a notation that states in part that A.L. brought with him a "Drug Class II w/o Script (it was meds prescribed by in wrong bottle.)." There is no further explanation or mention of this in either Dr. Christensen's handwritten notes or typewritten notes for the June 2, 2007, office visit. A.L.'s final office visit to Dr. Christensen was on June 29, 2007. Dr. Christensen noted on the Follow Up Visit form that A.L. complained of knee pain that was "unbearable" at times. Dr. Christensen also noted that A.L. was experiencing increased lower back pain because he was walking with a limp. Dr. Christensen again decreased to 180 the number of 30-milligram Roxicodone tablets he prescribed for A.L., with one tablet to be taken every six hours. Dr. Christensen noted: "Patient will be underdosed but it was explain [sic] the importance of ? Roxi More H2O, reviewed [pain management] contract & goals of ? meds over time." According to the notes on the Follow Up Visit form, Dr. Christensen intended to let A.L. stabilize at 180 30-milligram Roxicodone tablets per month and to talk with A.L. again about beginning Suboxone. Dr. Christensen believed that the amount of medications that A.L. claimed to be taking at the first office visit on February 12, 2007, was clearly excessive, but he believed that A.L. was telling the truth. Although doubts about A.L.'s truthfulness regarding his medications crossed Dr. Christensen's mind, he chose to believe A.L. was telling the truth for several reasons. First, Dr. Christensen believed that a physician must assume that a patient is telling the truth, especially a complex patient like A.L., unless there is an objective reason for doubting the patient's veracity. Second, Dr. Christensen considered A.L. to be a model patient; he was clean, polite, fully alert, and competent. In addition, A.L. continued to keep his appointments with Dr. Christensen even though Dr. Christensen was decreasing the amount of Roxicodone he prescribed for A.L. each month. Third, Dr. Christensen was aware from his physical examinations of A.L. and from A.L.'s medical history that A.L. had long-standing problems with his knee that caused him pain. A.L. reported that he had been on pain medication for approximately ten years, and, even though Dr. Christensen thought the amount of medications A.L. reported he was taking at his first office visit with Dr. Christensen on February 12, 2007, was excessive, Dr. Christensen thought that A.L. could conceivably be taking the amount of pain medications he reported because, over time, A.L. probably had built up a tolerance for the pain medications and needed to take more of the medication. Dr. Christensen was concerned about the amount of pain medication A.L. reportedly was taking, however, and, therefore, one of Dr. Christensen's goals for A.L.'s treatment was to reduce the amount of pain medications A.L. was taking and, eventually, to wean him off of pain medications entirely. Fourth, an incident occurred early in his relationship with A.L. that made Dr. Christensen doubt A.L.'s veracity, but this assessment was proven wrong. Shortly after his first office visit on February 12, 2007, A.L. returned to Dr. Christensen's office and asked for a replacement prescription for Roxicodone, explaining that the prescription was in the pocket of his jeans and that the prescription had been damaged when his mother washed the jeans. Dr. Christensen thought that A.L. was simply seeking an additional amount of the pain medication. Dr. Christensen told A.L. he would have to bring in the damaged prescription, but Dr. Christensen doubted that he would do so. A.L. brought in the prescription, which had obviously been damaged, and Dr. Christensen felt badly because he had misjudged A.L. He taped the damaged prescription in A.L.'s medical file to remind himself that he should not prejudge his patients. Even though A.L. had consented to urine drug tests in the Pain Management Agreement he signed on February 12, 2007, Dr. Christensen did not order A.L. to submit to a urine toxicology screening test on his initial office visit, as a condition of Dr. Christensen's taking him on as a patient, nor did Dr. Christensen order A.L. to submit to a random urine toxicology screening test during the time A.L. was Dr. Christensen's patient. Given the extremely large amount of pain medications A.L. reported to Dr. Christensen that he had been taking prior to his first office visit on February 12, 2007, and Dr. Christensen's concern that A.L. was overmedicated, Dr. Christensen should have considered asking A.L. to submit to a urine toxicology screening test as provided in the Pain Management Agreement. Even if Dr. Christensen had administered one or more urine toxicology screening tests to A.L., however, the results of the test would have revealed only the types of drugs in A.L.'s system; that is, the urine toxicology screening test could have confirmed that A.L. was taking the medications that he reported to Dr. Christensen on February 12, 2007, and would have identified any illicit drugs he was taking at the time of the test; it would not, however, have provided any information on the quantities of drugs in A.L.'s system and, therefore, would not have confirmed the quantities of drugs A.L. reported to Dr. Christensen that he was taking at the time of his first office visit. Summary and findings of ultimate fact A few words of explanation are necessary before proceeding with the analysis of the evidence in this case. Given A.L.'s tragic death in July 2007, it is difficult for all concerned in this case to restrict their analysis of the evidence to those facts of which Dr. Christensen was aware during the time he treated A.L., yet it is essential that the evidence be viewed from this perspective. It became apparent during the course of this hearing that A.L. did not disclose certain matters to Dr. Christensen that might have changed the course of Dr. Christensen's treatment of A.L. These matters are irrelevant to the issues presented in the Department's Administrative Complaint; they are not part of the record in this case; and they have not, therefore, been considered in the preparation of this Recommended Order. Counts One and Three through Eight The evidence presented by the Department is not sufficient to establish with the requisite degree of certainty that Dr. Christensen prescribed Roxicodone, Methadone, or Xanax for A.L. inappropriately or in excessive amounts or that he breached the standard of care in prescribing these medications. The Department's expert witness testified that Dr. Christensen violated the standard of care because the combination, quantities, and dosages of the medications Dr. Christensen prescribed for A.L. were excessive. The Department's expert witness did not, however, identify the standard of care that would have governed Dr. Christensen's treatment of A.L., nor did he provide a clear explanation of the basis for his opinion that the combination, quantities, and dosages of medications Dr. Christensen prescribed for A.L. were excessive, especially considering the combination, quantities, and dosages of medications that A.L. reported to Dr. Christensen that he was taking at the time of his first office visit with Dr. Christensen. Rather, the Department's expert witness repeatedly stated his opinion, based on "his knowledge of pharmacology and more than 20 years['] experience,"5 that the prescriptions written by Dr. Christensen, if taken by A.L. as directed, would be "100 percent lethal, 100 percent of the time."6 The Department's expert witness gave no cogent explanation for his opinion that the combination, quantities, and dosages of the drugs would be 100 percent lethal, 100 percent of the time,7 which opinion, in any event, is refuted by the fact that A.L. was successfully treated by Dr. Christensen with the same combination of drugs, albeit with decreasing quantities of Roxicodone, for a period of four and one-half months.8 In addition, in formulating his opinion that the quantities and dosages of the medications Dr. Christensen prescribed for A.L. were excessive, the Department's expert witness apparently did not consider the possibility that A.L. had, over the years, developed a tolerance for these medications.9 In fact, the Department's expert witness did not give credence to A.L.'s complaints of pain; he did not believe that A.L. should have been treated with narcotics for pain; and it can reasonably be inferred from his testimony that the Department's expert witness would have refused to treat A.L. The Department's expert witness dismissed A.L.'s complaints of pain as not credible, stating that "[t]he patient is extremely young to have any pain complaints."10 The Department's expert witness testified that, if he had been consulted, he "would have recommended a trial of spinal cord stimulation"; that Dr. Christensen could have "prescribe[d] an appropriate brace for the knee"; or that Dr. Christensen might have chosen "to then make a referral to an orthopedic surgeon" for surgery on A.L.'s knee.11 The testimony of the Department's expert witness as to the treatment he would have provided to A.L. was repeatedly conditioned by the word "if"; if A.L.'s reported knee problem were confirmed, and if the Department's expert witness had agreed to treat A.L. In fact, on the basis of the written medical records alone, the Department's expert witness dismissed A.L. as "a liar and probably a substance abuser and certainly diverting his medication" and labeled as "outlandish" A.L.'s "self reported history of medication and prescription" and his "claims of being prescribed high dosages and lethal quantities" of controlled substances.12 In rendering his opinion that the combination, quantities, and dosages of the medications Dr. Christensen prescribed for A.L. were excessive and in violation of the standard of care, the Department's expert witness did not acknowledge in his testimony that Dr. Christensen considered the quantities, dosages, and number of different pain medications that A.L. reported on his first office visit to be excessive; that Dr. Christensen concluded that A.L. was overmedicated; that Dr. Christensen's treatment plan focused on decreasing the quantity of medications prescribed for A.L.; that Dr. Christensen did, in fact, refuse to write A.L. prescriptions for Oxycodone and Oxifast; that, at A.L.'s first office visit, Dr. Christensen wrote prescriptions for Roxicodone and Methadone for A.L. that were for quantities substantially smaller than those A.L. reportedly was taking; that Dr. Christensen assumed that A.L. was truthful when he reported that he was taking 60 to 90 two-milligram Xanax; that Dr. Christensen could not eliminate Xanax from the prescriptions he wrote for A.L. because abrupt withdrawal from Xanax could cause death; that Dr. Christensen reduced by one-third the number of two-milligram Xanax he prescribed for A.L.; that Dr. Christensen introduced at A.L.'s first office visit the possibility of A.L.'s using Suboxone to help in weaning him off of opioid analgesics such as Roxicodone and Methadone; that Dr. Christensen steadily decreased the quantity of Roxicodone he prescribed for A.L., until the amount was substantially less than the amount A.L. reportedly was taking at the time of his first office visit with Dr. Christensen. By failing to indicate that he considered these factors in rendering his opinions and by making the broad and unsupported assertion that the medications prescribed by Dr. Christensen for A.L. were 100 percent lethal, 100 percent of the time, the Department's expert witness substantially diminished the credibility of his opinions. Rather than taking an objective view of the treatment that Dr. Christensen provided A.L. from February 12, 2007, to June 29, 2007, the Department's expert witness demonstrated throughout his testimony a disdain for Dr. Christensen as a physician. This disdain for Dr. Christensen is made particularly clear when the Department's expert witness attributed to Dr. Christensen a purely economic motive in his treatment of A.L. The Department's expert witness testified that Dr. Christensen, in common with "most pill mills or physicians like the subject," had "a huge economic incentive" for his treatment of A.L.13 These statements demonstrated a bias against Dr. Christensen that substantially diminished the credibility of his testimony, in general, for the following reasons. First, there was no allegation in the Administrative Complaint and no evidence in this record to support the categorization of Dr. Christensen by the Department's expert witness as a physician associated with a "pill mill." Second, in reaching his conclusion that Dr. Christensen's motivation for treating A.L. was purely financial, the Department's expert witness assumed, in the absence of even a scintilla of evidence in this record, that Dr. Christensen required his patients to pay a substantial amount of cash for each office visit and that Dr. Christensen was a "dispensing physician," that is, a physician who sells drugs as well as prescribing them.14 Count Two In Count Two of the Administrative Complaint, the Department charged Dr. Christensen with violating the standard of care in four respects, which are discussed in detail below. Failure to diagnose a history of anxiety The evidence presented by the Department is not sufficient to establish with the requisite degree of certainty that Dr. Christensen's treatment of A.L. fell below the standard of care because he failed "to diagnose a history of anxiety to support prescribing Alprazolam."15 Dr. Christensen noted on the New Patient History Form completed during A.L.'s first office visit on February 12, 2007, that A.L. reported a history of anxiety as a psychiatric condition, and A.L. also reported that he was currently taking Alprazolam, or Xanax. On each of A.L.'s subsequent office visits to Dr. Christensen, A.L. reported on the Pain Outcomes Profile that he had significant feelings of anxiety, and Dr. Christensen observed that A.L. exhibited anxious behaviors during his office visits. The Department's expert witness apparently overlooked this information in Dr. Christensen's medical records because he testified that he could find no justification for prescribing Alprazolam for A.L.16 Failure to order urine toxicology screening test The evidence presented by the Department is not sufficient to establish with the requisite degree of certainty that Dr. Christensen's treatment of A.L. fell below the standard of care because he failed "to order screening urine toxicology to rule out usage of illicit substances or confirm usage of prescribed medications." The Department's expert witness identified the standard of care at the times pertinent to this proceeding as requiring patients to submit to intermittent urine toxicology screening studies so that the patient wouldn't know when such testing would take place. The Department's expert witness further explained that it was always a matter of clinical judgment as to when to require a patient to submit to a urine toxicology screening study, even to a patient such as A.L., who had reported taking a large quantity of pain medications at the time of his first office visit to Dr. Christensen. The Department's expert witness testified that, given the amount of pain medications A.L. reported to Dr. Christensen that he was taking at the time of A.L.'s first office visit, a urine toxicology screening study of A.L. at the first office visit would be "indicated," but the Department's expert witness did not testify that Dr. Christensen violated the standard of care by failing to require A.L. to submit to such a study at that first office visit or during the time he was treating A.L. In fact, according to Dr. Christensen's expert witness, at the times pertinent to this proceeding, it would not be within the standard of care to require a patient to submit to a urine toxicology screening study within the first four and one-half months of treatment.17 Finally, there is no indication in the record that Dr. Christensen had any reason to suspect that A.L. was taking illicit substances; the primary concern Dr. Christensen, and the Department's expert witness, had with respect to A.L. was the quantity of pain medications he was reportedly taking at the time of his first office visit. Because a urine toxicology screening study reveals only the types of substances in the urine and not the quantity of such substances, a urine toxicology screening study would not have revealed whether A.L. was lying about the quantities of pain medications he reported to Dr. Christensen on his first office visit, as was concluded by the Department's expert witness; such a study would have revealed only whether A.L. was, in fact, taking these substances, a concern that, based on the information available to him, Dr. Christensen did not have at A.L.'s first or subsequent office visits. According to the standard of care identified by the Department's expert witness, Dr. Christensen did not deviate from this standard of care by using his clinical judgment to decide not to require A.L. to submit to a urine toxicology screening study. Failing to refer A.L. for treatment for substance abuse The evidence presented by the Department is not sufficient to establish with the requisite degree of certainty that Dr. Christensen's treatment of A.L. fell below the standard of care because he failed "to refer Patient A.L. to a psychiatrist and/or addiction specialist and/or rehabilitation center for substance abuse." The only mention of Dr. Christensen's failure to refer A.L. to a psychiatrist, addiction specialist, or rehabilitation center in the testimony of the Department's expert witness was in answer to the question of the Department's counsel: "Would respondent's failure to do so in this case fall below the standard of care?" The Department's expert witness answered: "Given his [A.L.'s] claims of previous medication prescription and usage, yes."18 The Department's expert witness never defined the standard of care to which he was referring, and his opinion, therefore, is not persuasive on this issue.19 Failure to order diagnostic tests The evidence presented by the Department is not sufficient to establish with the requisite degree of certainty that Dr. Christensen's treatment of A.L. fell below the standard of care because he failed "to order diagnostic tests to justify the course of treatment for patient A.L." The Department's expert witness testified that he would "not be prepared to say that [Dr. Christensen's failure to order a diagnostic test to justify his course of treatment for A.L. fell below the standard of care] because there's no justification for the course of treatment regardless of any study or consultation that the subject could have initiated."20 There was no allegation in the Administrative Complaint that Dr. Christensen violated the standard of care because there was no justification for the treatment he provided A.L., and this testimony is irrelevant to a determination of whether Dr. Christensen should have ordered additional diagnostic tests for A.L. The Department's expert witness did, however, go on to state that, under the circumstances of this case, "a reasonable and prudent physician . . . should have, at the very least, ordered an MRI study of the knee, [and] performed a comprehensive physical examination of the effected [sic] joint" and that "many physicians would have ordered an MRI of the knee or at the very least, perform [sic] a very detailed and well documented physical examination and then written down his treatment plan and the justification for his treatment plan."21 To the extent that this testimony constitutes the articulation of the standard of care by the Department's expert witness, the opinion of the Department's expert witness that Dr. Christensen fell below this standard of care is unsupportable for two reasons. First, the Department's expert witness incorrectly identified the report of the MRI of A.L.'s knee done in 1998 as the only MRI report in Dr. Christensen's medical records. The Department's expert witness overlooked the report in Dr. Christensen's medical records of the post-surgical MRI done of A.L.'s left knee on August 23, 2002, four and one-half years before A.L.'s first office visit to Dr. Christensen in February 2007. Therefore, the opinion of the Department's expert witness that Dr. Christensen fell below the standard of care for failing to order an MRI is not persuasive because it is based on the incorrect assumption that the most recent MRI of A.L.'s knee was done nine years prior to his first office visit with Dr. Christensen. Second, Dr. Christensen did a comprehensive physical examination of A.L.'s left knee joint. Dr. Christensen, aided by his background in chiropractic orthopedics, performed several tests on A.L.'s left knee, which, together with the post- operative MRI done in August 2002, led him to the conclusion that, if anything, the condition of A.L.'s left knee would not have improved, and probably would have worsened, over the intervening years. Dr. Christensen documented the results of the examination in the typed notes he prepared on February 12. 2007, and set out his diagnosis and treatment plan for A.L. Therefore, the opinion of the Department's expert witness that Dr. Christensen fell below the standard of care for failing to conduct a comprehensive physical examination of A.L.'s left knee and to document the results of the examination and the treatment plan for A.L. is unpersuasive because the Department's expert witness apparently overlooked this information in A.L.'s medical records.22
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint filed against John Christensen, M.D., by the Department of Health. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of June, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S Patricia M. Hart Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of June, 2011.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Pharmacy. Petitioner seeks to suspend, revoke or take other disciplinary action against the Respondents. Respondent BGJM, Inc. (hereinafter "Save-on Drugs") holds Permit No. 7171 located at 4282 North State Road 7, Lauderdale Lakes, Florida. Save on Drugs has held said permit at all times material hereto. Respondent Robert E. Levy holds Pharmacy License No. 0017283 and has held said license at all times material hereto. Respondent Levy operated Save on Drugs as the sole proprietor and is the only pharmacist employed at the aforementioned store. Respondent Levy, while working at Save on Drugs, between the dates October 16, 1981 and April 2, 1982, dispensed approximately 139,000 Methaqualone tablets on 3,136 prescriptions. Respondent Levy ceased dispensing Methaqualone tablets approximately three (3) weeks prior to the institution of Petitioner's investigation of Respondent Levy's dispensing of controlled substances. The Respondent dispensed, over a three-month period, some 57,250 units of Methaqualone on behalf of one practitioner, a Dr. Lena. A specific breakdown of Dr. Lena's prescribing activity for part of the relevant period is as follows: DATE PHARMACY DRUG AMOUNT SCRIPT 12/14/81 Save-On Quaa-300 mg. 630 14 12/15 Save-On 720 16 12/16 Save-On 495 11 12/17 Save-On 765 17 12/18 Save-On 1,440 32 12/21 Save-On 945 21 12/22 Save-On 1 x 30 mg. 675 15 12/23 Save-On incl. 1,080 24 12/24 Save-On 1,215 27 12/28 Save-On 1,035 23 12/29 Save-On 1,305 29 12/30 Save-On 1,575 35 12/31 Save-On 1,305 29 Totals 13,185 293 The numerous prescriptions introduced into evidence by the Petitioner reflect circumstances where Respondent Levy failed to properly initial and date Schedule II prescriptions as they were filed. As example, Petitioner offered the following: prescription Nos. 48854, 48052, 50189, 48068, 48856, 48912 and 48905. Louis Fisher 2/ , an employee of the Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, since approximately November, 1971, has been involved with the regulation of controlled substances. Mr. Fisher works with doctors as well as pharmacists at the retail level. Mr. Fisher is a registered pharmacist and has been charged with drafting regulations for controlled substances. Without question, Methaqualone is a Schedule II drug and is a sedative and hypnotic agent. The drug has a high abuse potential. During the summer of 1982, Methaqualone was changed from Schedule II to a Schedule I controlled substance. After being provided with a hypothetical situation giving the number of prescriptions that Respondent Levy had filled during the time period involved, Mr. Fisher concluded that a pharmacist filling the number of prescriptions within the time period as is here involved by Respondent Levy was, in Mr. Fisher's opinion, unprofessional, excessive, outside the course of good professional practices, and not conduct amounting to professional practice in the patients' best interest. 3/ Dr. Lena was employed by Northeast Medical Services, a stress clinic. In this regard, the parties stipulated that all the prescriptions involved herein were written by a licensed medical doctor. Daniel O'Connell, an investigator with the Department of Professional Regulation, visited the Respondent's store during approximately October 1981, and performed a routine change of ownership inspection. At that time, Respondent Levy engaged in a conversation with investigator O'Connell at which time Respondent Levy was apprised of the problem with respect to dispensing Methaqualone in the south Florida area. Jim R. Golden, an investigator with the Department of Professional Regulation since approximately September 1981, visited Respondent Levy's store during April 1982, to perform a routine inspection to determine the amount of Schedule II drug prescriptions that Respondent was filling. Investigator Golden reviewed a large number of prescriptions that were filled by Respondent for Dr. Lena and inquired of Respondent the reason for dispensing such a large number of prescriptions for Methaqualone tablets. Respondent Levy replied that it was the "money end of it" and that he (Respondent) could fill six (6) Methaqualone prescriptions and do better with those prescriptions from a profit viewpoint than he could with the remainder of his other prescribing activities in the store for the remainder of any given day. Further, Respondent related that he hand to do extensive repairs to make the store operational. (Testimony of Investigator Golden)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That Respondent BGJM, Inc.'s Permit No.7171 be REVOKED. That Respondent Robert E. Levy's Pharmacy License No. 0017283 be placed on probation for a period of two (2) years. RECOMMENDED this 12th day of May, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of May, 1983.
