Findings Of Fact Before 1989, the Petitioner, Gregory Miller, was a community control counselor (in effect, a juvenile probation officer) working for HRS. After several years of satisfactory job performance, his employment was terminated for unsatisfactory job performance in 1989. The Petitioner believes his termination by HRS was unfair. On January 30, 1991, the Petitioner, Gregory Miller, pled nolo contendere to attempted arson in violation of Section Section 806.01, Fla. Stat. (1991). Adjudication was withheld, and the Petitioner was placed on probation for two years. The attempted arson charge arose at a time in October, 1990, when the Petitioner, who has a 20-year history of substance abuse and suffers from bipolar disorder and borderline personality disorder, decompensated under financial and other stress and attempted to burn his automobile in order to fraudulently obtain property and casualty insurance benefits. At the time of the arson attempt, his car was parked in the garage, and a tenant was residing in the garage apartment overhead. The tenant noticed the fire started by the Petitioner, put it out and reported it to the Petitioner. The Petitioner berated him for putting the fire out and told him to get his personal belongings out of the garage apartment and leave. While the tenant was in the garage apartment gathering his belongings, the Petitioner was attempting to restart the fire. The tenant had been a worker's compensation client of the Petitioner. The Petitioner continued to have mental and emotional and substance problems that led to additional criminal charges. On February 13, 1991, he was arrested and charged with battery of a law enforcement officer, a third degree felony. On October 3, 1991, the Petitioner pled guilty to the lesser included offense of resisting arrest without violence, a misdemeanor, and was sentenced to seven days time served in jail. On or about December 22, 1991, the Petitioner overdosed on a mixture of drugs and alcohol in a possible suicide attempt. When confronted with law enforcement officers, the Petitioner struck the officers and was arrested and charged with battery of a law enforcement officer, a third degree felony. The Petitioner was involuntarily committed under the Baker Act, and on September 21, 1992, he pled nolo contendere to simple battery, a first degree misdemeanor, and was sentenced to one day time served in jail and ordered to pay $200 in fine and court costs. As a result of his other criminal charges, the Petitioner was charged with violation of his probation on the attempted arson charge. On or about March 16, 1992, the Petitioner pled guilty to violation of probation. Adjudication on the violation of probation was withheld, but probation was revoked, and he was resentenced under the attempted arson charge to a year of community control, followed by a year of probation. On or about March 8, 1992, the Petitioner was charged with driving with his license suspended or revoked for failure to maintain required insurance coverage. Since 1992, the Petitioner has not been involved in any additional criminal activity or charges. On February 23, 1993, his community control was converted to probation. He moved to Pasco County and, on December 22, 1993, his probation was terminated early. The Petitioner has sought professional counseling. On or about March 22, 1993, he was referred to a vocational rehabilitation counselor with the Department of Labor and Employment Security, Division of Vocational Rehabilitation. Since approximately early 1994, he also has been under the care of a psychiatrist. With the help of counseling, the Petitioner has been sober since before August, 1993. Fortunately, therapy seems to have been successful. Except for two short hospitalizations for decompensation and medication adjustment early in his counseling, the Petitioner has been sober and mentally stable over the course of the last three years. From a mental health standpoint, the Petitioner no longer seemed to be a danger to himself or others, and he was making good progress in rehabilitating himself. On or about May 18, 1995, the Petitioner sought employment with Action Youth Care, a provider on contract with HRS. When he applied for the job, he was required to complete an Affidavit of Good Moral Character that swore, in pertinent part, that he had "not been found guilty of, or entered a plea of nolo contendere or guilty to, any offense prohibited under . . . Section 806.01 [Florida Statutes, arson]." The affidavit also required the Petitioner to "acknowledge the existence of any criminal . . . record regardless of whether [he] was adjudged guilty by the court and regardless of whether or not those records have been sealed or expunged." The Petitioner signed without acknowledging his attempted arson record. When his name was screened, the attempted arson record disqualified him from employment, and the Petitioner was terminated from his employment pending his request for an exemption. Despite the Petitioner's commendable progress in rehabilitating himself, there still are signs that some instability persists. He does not seem to appreciate the seriousness of his criminal record and history of substance abuse and mental illness, as they relate to HRS's statutory obligation to properly assess his moral character under Section 409.175, Fla. Stat. (1995). Instead, he blames HRS's actions on a "political" conspiracy to prevent him from obtaining employment. Similarly, he attempts to excuse his criminal record by blaming it all on HRS--the termination of his employment in 1989 allegedly was the sole cause of his decompensation and the resulting criminal offenses. His excuse for falsifying his Affidavit of Good Moral Character was that it was reasonable not to disclose the arson record because it was only attempted arson, not arson. He does not seem to appreciate that there is little or no difference in blameworthiness between the two. (The only real difference between the two is how soon the fire goes out or is put out.) Finally, the Employee Closing Summary produced by Action Health Care upon termination of the Petitioner's employment stated that Action would not re-hire the Petitioner and that the Petitioner's "weak areas" included: "poor rapport with team"; "would not accept authority"; and "documentation skills." (No "strengths" were noted on the form.) The Petitioner again blamed HRS, contending that the person who completed the form was lying to cooperate with HRS's conspiracy against the Petitioner. It is found that the evidence, taken as a whole, was not clear and convincing proof of rehabilitation and good moral character at this time.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that HRS enter a final order denying the Petitioner's request for an exemption from disqualification. DONE and ENTERED this 21st day of August, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of August, 1996.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether the Respondent, the Department of State, Division of Licensing, should grant the applications of the Petitioner, Ricky O. Dawes, for a Class "C" Private Investigator License and for a Class "G" Statewide Firearms License. Specifically, under Section 493.6118(3), Fla. Stat. (1991), the issue as to each application is whether there is clear and convincing evidence that the Petitioner lacks good moral character.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Ricky O. Dawes, was a municipal law enforcement officer from approximately 1975 through the middle of 1977. He was a deputy sheriff and, later, a detective with the Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office from approximately June, 1978, through April, 1979, and from May, 1980, through August, 1992. Background checks when he was employed with the Sheriff's Office revealed no evidence of facts that would establish a personal history of dishonesty, unfairness, or disrespect for the rights and property of others or for the laws of Florida or of the nation. Nor is there any evidence, during the course of his employment through approximately May, 1992, that the Petitioner had a personal history of dishonesty, unfairness, or disrespect for the rights and property of others or for the laws of Florida or of the nation. During the summer of 1992, and for some time before, the Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office was involved in a substantial multiple-law-enforcement- agency investigation. In approximately June or July, 1992, the law enforcement agencies involved learned that the subjects of the investigation not only knew about it but had been given copies of four pages of notes made by members of the Sheriff's Office involved in the investigation that listed, by name and in some cases additional identifying information, some 15 "suspects" and 22 "possible targets." The disclosure seriously compromised the investigation, to say the least. An internal investigation was launched to determine the source of the damaging disclosure. It was revealed that a copy of the notes had been in the copying room of the identification and records section of the Sheriff's Office for approximately six to eight weeks prior to the disclosure. An employee recalled: seeing it on a work table in the copying room at the beginning of that time period; looking at it and realizing it was something important that should not be made public; thinking that whoever put it there would be back for it soon; and finishing his business in the copying machine, leaving the notes where he had found them. He also recalled returning to the copying room the next day and not seeing the notes where he had left them. He assumed at the time that whoever had put them there had returned and removed them. But later, in July, 1992, he read in the local newspapers that copies of documents sounding much like what he had seen in the copying room had been given to the suspects under investigation. He returned to the copying room and found the notes in a stack of miscellaneous papers. Several people, including the Petitioner, were questioned under oath during the course of the internal investigation. The Petitioner was questioned in a deposition conducted by an assistant state attorney on or about July 30, 1992. During the deposition, the Petitioner was shown copies of the four pages of notes that were recovered from the copying room and was asked whether he had ever seen a copy of them. The Petitioner looked at all four pages carefully (the deposition transcript indicates a pause in the proceedings) and answered, "no." After the deposition, the four pages of notes recovered from the copying room were processed for latent fingerprints. The Petitioner's left thumb print appeared on the left side of one of the pages, labeled at the top "Possible Targets," about two-thirds of the way up the page. On the list of 14 "possible targets" on that page were the names Vincent Loscalzo, who the testimony indicates is reputed to be involved in organized crime in the Tampa area, and several others whom the Petitioner either knew personally or whose names he would have recognized. The Petitioner's left thumb print also appeared on the left side of the next page of the list of "possible targets," also about two-thirds of the way up the page. On the list of eight names on that page were at least two names the Petitioner would have recognized. One was the husband of the mayor of the City of Tampa. The Petitioner knows Vincent Loscalzo personally. While employed with the Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office, the Petitioner also was in business for himself distributing an oil re-refiner. The Petitioner is concentrating on that business now that he has "retired" from the Sheriff's Office. (The Petitioner tried to give the false impression that his "retirement" in August, 1992, had nothing to do with the internal investigation and that the Petitioner had been planning for some time to retire in August, 1992, to concentrate on his business.) The product was manufactured by a company in which Vincent Loscalzo has an ownership interest. Loscalzo has an office above a lounge he owns in Tampa, called the Brothers Lounge, and the Petitioner has had conversations with him there. It is found that the Petitioner testified falsely on his deposition that he had never before seen copies of the four pages of notes recovered from the copying room. Many people, besides the Petitioner, had access to the copying room during the six to eight weeks that the notes were there. Most had legitimate Sheriff's Office business to conduct, and they would not have been questioned or supervised. Others, not having legitimate Sheriff's Office business to conduct, also could have entered the copying room unquestioned and unsupervised during that time period. Two other person's fingerprints were identified on the notes- -the person who brought the notes into the copying room and left them, and the person who saw the notes and recovered them after reading about them in the newspaper. Not all people who touched the notes necessarily would have left fingerprints that could be lifted and identified. Many factors would enter into the question whether someone who touched the notes would leave prints that could be lifted and identified. In addition to those identified, some unidentifiable prints were left on the notes. Under these facts, the Respondent concedes in its proposed recommended order that it was unable to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the Petitioner criminally disclosed the existence of a substantial criminal investigation to the subjects of the investigation. On or about January 23, 1993, the Petitioner was stopped for driving a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol consumption. As the arresting officer approached the Petitioner's vehicle, from the rear, the Petitioner opened the driver-side door and got out. As he did, his left pant leg got caught on an object that appeared to be under the pant leg at the Petitioner's ankle, and the pant leg bunched up and bulged. The Petitioner identified himself to the arresting officer as a retired deputy sheriff. Based on the arresting officer's experience and knowledge, particularly that off-duty law enforcement officers often concealed their firearms under the pant leg in an ankle holster, the arresting officer asked if the bulge he saw under the pant leg was a firearm. The Petitioner acknowledged that it was. In answer to the officer's question whether the Petitioner had a permit to carry a concealed firearm, told the officer that he did. In fact, the Petitioner did not even apply for a concealed firearm license until March 30, 1993, and one was not issued to him until April 6, 1993. It is found from the clear and convincing totality of the evidence in this case, taken as a whole, that the Petitioner lacks a personal history of honesty, fairness, and respect for the rights of others and for the laws of Florida.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Respondent, the Department of State, Division of Licensing, enter a final order denying the applications of the Petitioner, Ricky O. Dawes, for a Class "C" Private Investigator License and for a Class "G" Statewide Firearms License. RECOMMENDED this 19th day of August, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of August, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-2048S To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat. (1991), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Rejected as not proven that the resignation was totally voluntarily. Also, no party questioned about it at the hearing knew the procedures for licensure by a former law enforcement officer. In any event, the procedures are matters of law, not fact, and are set out in Section 790.06, Fla. Stat. (1991). Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent necessary. Rejected in part as not proven and as being conclusions of law. Fact of the pendency of criminal proceedings, a ruling suppressing evidence, and the State's appeal accepted but unnecessary. Rejected as not proven and as contrary to facts found and as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence that the firearm was visible. (It was only detectable.) Part of the rest is rejected as being conclusions of law, and the other part of the rest is accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted but unnecessary that the Petitioner has been charged but not convicted. The rest is rejected as being argument and conclusions of law. Accepted (the questions to the witnesses excluded reference to the charges leveled in this case) and subordinate to facts found. Rejected in part as being argument and conclusions of law and in part as not proven and as contrary to facts found and to the greater weight of the evidence. First sentence, accepted and incorporated. Second sentence, rejected in part as being argument but otherwise accepted but in part subordinate to facts contrary to those found and contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Third sentence, rejected as being argument and not proven and contrary to facts found and contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Fourth sentence, rejected for the same reasons as in 3., above. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-2. Accepted and incorporated. 3. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 4.-9. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 10. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. 11.-13. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 14. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. 15.-16. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 17. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Ellis Faught, Jr., Esquire 206 Mason Street Brandon, Florida 33511 Henri C. Cawthon, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, Mail Station #4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Honorable Jim Smith Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Phyllis Slater, Esquire General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, PL-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Respondent committed the offenses charged in the Administrative Complaint concerning unlawfully committing a battery upon a person he had placed under arrest and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is an agency of the State of Florida charged with regulating the licensure and enforcing the practice standards of law enforcement officers. The Respondent is a certified law enforcement officer being certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission on May 12, 1986, and holding Law Enforcement Certificate No. 82811. He was employed by the DeFuniak Springs Police Department as a law enforcement officer during the period of October 29, 1985, until his termination on November 13, 1997. On April 12, 1997, Daniel Robertson was a passenger in a vehicle driven by his girlfriend. The vehicle was stopped by Officer James Burnham of the DeFuniak Springs Police Department for a traffic violation at approximately 3:00 a.m. When the officer approached the vehicle, he detected a strong odor of alcohol which he believed to come from the driver. He asked the female driver to step out of the vehicle and submit to a field sobriety test. Upon completion of the test, he placed her under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol. While the officer conducted the field sobriety test on the driver, the passenger, Daniel Robertson, began arguing with Officer Burnham about the test and creating a verbal disturbance. Officer Burnham radioed for other officers to respond to the incident. Officers Travis Howell and the Respondent, Kenneth G. May, of the DeFuniak Springs Police Department, together with a civilian, Bradley Stafford, responded to Officer Burnham's call for assistance. Stafford was a civilian authorized by the police department to ride along with Officer Howell as an observer. Once his girlfriend was arrested, Mr. Robertson became concerned about driving the vehicle home, since he owned the pick-up truck in question. Officer Burnham advised him that if he could pass a sobriety test in the field, then he would be allowed to drive home. Officer Burnham administered two field sobriety tests to Robertson and advised him that he had failed both tests and could not drive his vehicle. Mr. Robertson began again loudly arguing with Officer Burnham, after being told to quiet down. Officer Burnham advised him that he was under arrest for disorderly intoxication and told him to place his hands behind his back. Mr. Robertson refused to place his hands behind his back and Officers Burnham, Howell and May, the Respondent, had to physically subdue Mr. Robertson as they attempted to handcuff him with his hands behind his back. Because Officer Burnham had already placed the female driver in the back seat of his patrol car, he asked the Respondent to transport Mr. Robertson to the county jail. The Respondent thereupon escorted Mr. Robertson to the Respondent's police car. Officer Howell followed the Respondent and Mr. Robertson but never physically touched Robertson. The Respondent physically placed Robertson into the back seat of the police car. Robertson was verbally complaining, using foul language, but did not physically resist being placed in the police car. Mr. Robertson continued to verbally complain and berate the Respondent until the Respondent finally slapped him one time in the face, while Robertson was seated in the car with his hands cuffed behind his back. Robertson was then transported to the Walton County Jail by the Respondent and charged with disorderly intoxication and resisting arrest without violence. Mr. Robertson continued to verbally complain to the Respondent, although he was not physically resistant or physically struggling with the Respondent. Once they were inside the jail with his hands still cuffed behind his back and in the presence of other officers, the Respondent sprayed Robertson in the eyes with pepper spray. Mr. Robertson was continuing to be verbally abusive at this point, but his hands were cuffed behind his back and he engaged in no physical contact with the Respondent. The Respondent maintains that he sprayed Mr. Robertson with pepper spray because Robertson was coming toward him in a threatening manner. This account of events is belied by the testimony of Officer Howell, however, which is more credible under the circumstances, as it is not self-serving and which is accepted. The Chief of Police of DeFuniak Springs, Mr. Ray Burgess, and the Assistant State Attorney, Clayton Adkinson, felt that an unbiased investigation was needed and therefore requested the services of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement to conduct the investigation into Mr. Robertson's complaint. Special Agent Carl Causey with the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) was assigned to conduct an investigation into Robertson's complaint against the Respondent and did so. He interviewed numerous witnesses including Robertson, Officers Burnham and Howell, and the civilian who rode with Officer Howell on the night in question, as well as the Respondent. Respondent stated at his interview with Agent Causey that he told Officer Burnham that Mr. Robertson had intentionally kneed him in the groin while he was placing him into the police car and therefore Robertson should be charged with resisting arrest with violence. This statement was contrary to the statements of officers Burnham and Howell and Mr. Bradley Stafford. It is also contrary to the statements those three individuals made in their testimony at hearing. During Agency Causey's second interview with Officer Burnham, Officer Burnham denied that the Respondent ever told him that Robertson had kneed him during the process of getting Robertson into the patrol car. Upon completion of his investigation, Agent Causey filed an investigative report. Agent Causey also arrested the Respondent and charged him with two counts of battery on Mr. Robertson. The Respondent pled no contest to those charges in the Walton County Court and was adjudicated guilty on both counts of misdemeanor battery involving Mr. Robertson.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Respondent be found guilty of a failure to maintain good moral character as required by Section 943.13(7), Florida Statutes, and as elucidated by the other authority referenced herein and that the Respondent's certification be subjected to a six-month suspension, followed by a one-year probationary period. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of March, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: James D. Martin, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of March, 1999. H. R. "Bob" Bishop, Jr., Esquire Florida Police Benevolent Association, Inc. 300 East Brevard Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 A. Leon Lowry, II, Director Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent Three Rivers Legal Services engaged in unlawful employment practices with regard to Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner Attorney Kaimowitz was born on May 5, 1935. He attended the University of Wisconsin, served in the U. S. Army, and was a journalist early in his career. He worked to obtain voting rights for African-Americans in the Deep South as a volunteer for the Congress of Racial Equality in the summer of 1964. He attended law school at New York University and while attending law school worked for the New York Civil Liberties Union as an investigator. Upon graduating from law school in 1967, he applied for membership in the New York State Bar Association and was eventually admitted. He was employed as a staff attorney with the Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law in New York City. He was suspended from that position. In 1970 he was awarded a Reginald Heber Smith Fellowship which took him to Michigan Legal Services in Detroit, Michigan. He remained there until he took a sabbatical so that he could complete a Legal Services Corporation Research Fellowship in 1979 and 1980, which was located at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He could have returned to his employment at Michigan Legal Services but instead sued that entity. He also sued Pennsylvania Legal Services, Legal Services of North Carolina, and the Mental Health Law Project of the District of Columbia for alleged age discrimination in hiring. From December 1980 until 1984 he was employed as associate counsel for the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund in New York and Connecticut. He left there because of a "labor dispute." In March of 1985 he was hired as director of the Greater Orlando Area Legal Services (GOALS). He was fired in 1986. He sued GOALS, and obtained a financial settlement. Subsequently he applied for jobs with Broward County Legal Services and Central Florida Legal Services. When he was turned down for those jobs, he sued both entities based on age discrimination. The action against Central Florida Legal Services ended in 1999 or 2000 with a confidential settlement involving the payment of money to Attorney Kaimowitz. At some point he also entered into a confidential settlement with Broward County Legal Services. Attorney Kaimowitz claims that the suits he filed against various legal services programs were based on his personal mission to reform the hiring practices of legal services programs, and he avers that he has been on that mission since 1980. Although he claims to have instituted these suits for altruistic motives, many of them resulted in monetary settlements that benefited him personally. None of these suits were tried to the point that a verdict resulted. After being fired by GOALS he obtained a master's in communications from the University of Central Florida in 1988. While attending school he worked as a journalist for the "Orlando Weekly," a publication targeted to African-Americans in the Orlando area. Subsequently Attorney Kaimowitz represented African- Americans in civil rights actions, including employment discrimination in the Orlando area. He was in private practice of law at that time although he had no office. In 1989 or 1990 a court assessed fees against him for engaging in frivolous litigation. Attorney Kaimowitz moved to Gainesville because his domestic partner was seeking a Ph.D. at the University of Florida. From May 14, 1999, until February 7, 2002, he worked for Alachua County as an investigator into citizen complaints of discrimination in housing and public accommodation. He was terminated from that job because of accusations of "serious misconduct." He claimed his discharge from this job was in retaliation for whistle blowing. He sued, and received a monetary settlement. He subsequently and unsuccessfully sought employment with the City of Gainesville, the University of Florida, and with the State of Florida. He had a dispute with the University of Florida based on the University's failure to publish written material that he submitted. He filed suits pro se based on age discrimination against Gainesville for failing to hire him and against the University of Florida and the Florida Board of Regents because of the publication dispute and because they refused to hire him. The suit against the Board of Regents was settled by a monetary payment to him of a confidential sum, according to Attorney Kaimowitz. In 1997, Judge Maurice Paul, a U. S. District Judge, entered an order forbidding Attorney Kaimowitz from filing pro se lawsuits in his court. Prior to 2003, Attorney Kaimowitz was disciplined by the Florida Supreme Court on two occasions. A Florida Bar report dated January 29, 2002, reported a finding on January 3, 2002, of professional misconduct. He was reprimanded for making a statement he knew to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the integrity of a judge. He had been previously reprimanded by the Florida Supreme Court in 1998. Attorney Kaimowitz is proud that he has filed countless motions to disqualify judges. He claims he has succeeded in disqualifying, at one time or another, every judge in the Middle District of Florida, and several in the Eighth Judicial Circuit, which includes the Gainesville area. Attorney Kaimowitz agrees with the notion that he is, "the most well-known offensive personality in the Eighth Judicial Circuit," but asserts that this reputation was not fully achieved until 2004. This self-characterization is accepted based on the evidence adduced in this case. Attorney Kaimowitz suffered a hearing loss and began using hearing aids in 1992. It is found as a fact that he hears well enough to try a case, which was demonstrated in this case. At his request, counsel table was moved close to the bench. He subsequently announced that this accommodated his hearing deficiency. Attorney Kaimowitz was arrested for causing a disturbance in a Gainesville City Commission meeting in 2002. He is very proud of being arrested. On November 16, 2004, Eighth Judicial Circuit Judge Larry Gibbs Turner entered an order entitled Sentence on Judgment of Guilty of Direct and In-Direct Criminal Contempt, following a Judgment of Guilty of eight separate allegations of direct and indirect criminal contempt on October 13, 2004. This Order recited the following language: A review of the fifteen (15) volumes of the record in this cause clearly demonstrates that throughout these proceedings Mr. Kaimowitz carefully, willfully, and with calculation and premeditation abused his status as a lawyer/pro se litigant in filing repetitious and frivolous pleadings including, but not limited to, his repeated motions to recuse every judge associated with this case. Mr. Kaimowitz's most recent effort to recuse this undersigned judge was framed by his GABE KAIMOWITZ'S APPLICATION TO DISQUALIFY JUDGE LARRY G. TURNER, FROM TAKING ANY FURTHER ACTION IN THIS MATTER - LAWFUL OR UNLAWFUL - BECAUSE THE JURIST HAS BEEN AND CURRENTLY APPARENTLY IS AN EMPLOYEE OF THE FLORIDA BOARD OF REGENTS, AND/OR ITS SUCCESSOR RESPONSIBLE FOR THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA AND AFFIDAVIT/CERTIFICATE WITH GABE KAIMOWITZ'S APPLICATION TO DISQUALIFY JUDGE LARRY G. TURNER, FROM TAKING ANY FURTHER ACTION IN THIS MATTER - LAWFUL OR UNLAWFUL - BECAUSE THE JURIST HAS BEEN AND CURRENTLY APPARENTLY IS AN EMPLOYEE OF THE FLORIDA BOARD OF REGENTS, AN/OR ITS SUCCESSOR RESPONSIBLE FOR THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA. The motions/applications seeking recusal of each of the judges in this cause provide ample evidence of Mr. Kaimowitz's "style" of litigation in which he intentionally confuses, obfuscates, insults, defames, and makes scurrilous and unsubstantiated claims against parties, judges, witnesses, and others related and unrelated to the litigation. Further evidence is found in his VERIFIED MOTION FOR ARREST OF JUDGMENT BASED ON FRAUD COMMITTED UPON THIS COURT. Beginning at page 10 of that motion Mr. Kaimowitz claims that he ". . . has learned that repeated motions for recusal as evidence pours in eventually tends to work in his favor. For instance, after Judge Jopling finally recused himself, Kaimowitz had little difficulty resolving at mediation the underlying cases. They were assigned to Judge Turner at the time, but all he did was agree to the parties' stipulated willingness to proceed to mediation." Over the following several pages, Mr. Kaimowitz recites his history of recusal litigation in other state and federal cases. Judge Turner permanently enjoined Attorney Kaimowitz from filing further pro se litigation in the county and circuit courts of the Eighth Judicial Circuit. Although Judge Turner based his finding on Kaimowitz v. The Florida Board of Regents, Eighth Circuit Case No. 01-1996-CA-3260, he noted a number of cases involving Attorney Kaimowitz going back to 1996, including Eighth Judicial Circuit Case No. 01-2003-CA-2400-A, Gabe Kaimowitz v. Gainesville, Florida, and the Gainesville Sun, in which Judge Toby S. Monaco outlined abuses as a basis for his dismissal of Attorney Kaimowitz's Complaint with prejudice. The Respondent and Its Executive Director, Allison Thompson TRLS exists pursuant to Title 42 U. S. Code, § 2996 et seq. It is governed, inter alia, by Title 45, Code of Federal Regulations, § 1600.1, et seq. Its mission is to provide equal access to the system of justice so that those who are otherwise unable to afford adequate counsel may have high quality legal assistance to seek redress of grievances. It receives funding from the Legal Services Corporation in Washington, D.C., the Florida Bar Foundation, United Way, and other local and national government sources. TRLS is headquartered in Gainesville, Florida, and serves eleven mostly rural counties surrounding Alachua County, as well as Alachua County. It works with other volunteer agencies and with pro bono attorneys. It is essential to the success of TRLS that it maintain cordial relations with the community and the bar. Ms. Thompson hires all of the TRLS management team. TRLS does not use an application form when seeking applicants for jobs. Advertisements for positions solicit resumes. TRLS does not maintain a "pool" of applicants for any particular job. The number of employees at TRLS fluctuates depending on funding. The racial, age, and gender composition of TRLS personnel from May 2003 to May 2004, was as follows: Whites 20 Blacks 19 Asian 2 Hispanic 2 Male 11 Female 32 Of the above, the oldest was born in 1947. Three of the above were born in that year. Since 2003, new attorney hires, (including law school graduates not admitted) were as follows: Whites 10 Blacks 6 Asian 0 Hispanic 1 Male 4 Female 13 Of these, the oldest was born in 1958. TRLS has hired, since Ms. Thompson has been Executive Director, at least one person who was over the age of 70. TRLS does not have quotas or a diversity plan that requires certain races, genders, or ages to be given preference in hiring. TRLS is guided in this regard by Title 45, Code of Federal Regulations, § 1616.1, et seq. Specifically, Title 45, Code of Federal Regulations, § 1616.6 requires that TRLS adopt, "employment qualifications, procedures, and policies that meet the requirements of applicable laws prohibiting discrimination in employment, and shall take affirmative action to insure equal employment opportunity." The hiring record of TRLS, taken as a whole, demonstrates compliance with this requirement and does not indicate any pattern of discrimination. Ms. Thompson has been the executive director of TRLS since 1996. She is an African-American. She graduated from the University of Florida Law School and was admitted to the Florida Bar in 1974. She has extensive experience in the delivery of legal services to the poor. She worked for Tampa Legal Services beginning in 1973. It became a Legal Services Corporation program while she was employed there. She began working for Rhode Island Legal Services in 1976, practicing primarily family law. Ms. Thompson worked for Philadelphia Legal Services for five years and then, beginning in 1982, worked for a number of years in the U. S. Virgin Islands where she was litigation director. She was appointed Executive Director of TRLS in December of 1996. Job applications with TRLS in 2003 and earlier Attorney Kaimowitz applied for a managing attorney position with TRLS in 1997. Ms. Thompson interviewed him and determined that he was an "interesting person" but was not the type of person who would work well with others. She concluded he would be difficult to manage. She noted that if she had a job which did not require working well with others, she might wish to hire him in the future. Attorney Kaimowitz applied for a job as a staff attorney in 2001. He received a letter dated May 13, 2001, from Ms. Thompson, advising him that he was not selected and that she would keep his resume on file. Attorney Kaimowitz responded to this letter with a letter dated August 15, 2001, that pointed out two settlements he had received from legal services programs in Florida based on their alleged discrimination against him because of his age. He also discussed his whistle blowing with regard to GOALS and stated, "I include this information to indicate that when there really is a will, there is a way." Ms. Thompson took this as a threat. Attorney Kaimowitz applied for a job as a managing attorney in the TRLS Lake City office in 2002. He was not interviewed for that position. TRLS advertised for a fair housing attorney and a fair housing testing coordinator in various publications during April 2003. Attorney Kaimowitz applied for both of these jobs. He interviewed with Ms. Thompson and Mary O'Rourke, a staff attorney with TRLS, on May 30, 2003. Ms. Thompson asked Ms. O'Rourke to sit in as a witness to the interview because she was concerned that Attorney Kaimowitz would sue TRLS if she did not hire him. Initially, Attorney Kaimowitz expressed an interest in both the fair housing attorney job and the fair housing testing coordinator job. However, during the interview Attorney Kaimowitz stated that he did not wish to apply for the fair housing attorney position, but wished to be considered only as an applicant for the fair housing testing coordinator position. The occupant of this position was expected to supervise individuals who would determine if discrimination in housing was occurring. Attorney Kaimowitz claimed during his testimony that he told Ms. Thompson and Ms. O'Rourke that his ability to hear was impaired. He claimed he told them he required an accommodation for his hearing loss. He stated that he had a discussion with Ms. O'Rourke during the interview about an electronic system where a court reporter would record words spoken, and the words would be displayed on a monitor so that he could read what was being said. Attorney Kaimowitz appeared at the interview wearing one hearing aid. Ms. Thompson said that Attorney Kaimowitz said that one of his hearing aids was "in the shop." Ms. Thompson testified that he announced during the interview that his hearing loss was corrected by his hearing aids. Ms. Thompson said it was clear that he had no difficulty in understanding her with only one hearing aid. In no event did she perceive him as being hearing impaired. Ms. O'Rourke stated that the conversation claimed by Attorney Kaimowitz regarding an electronic monitor system to aid hearing never occurred. Based on Ms. O'Rourke's testimony, Ms. Thompson's testimony, and Attorney Kaimowitz's credibility, which is addressed in detail below, it is found that at the time of this interview Attorney Kaimowitz did not claim the need for an accommodation based on an alleged hearing impairment and he was not perceived as being hearing impaired. Ms. Thompson wanted employees at TRLS who would maintain a good relationship with the local bar. Even though the housing testing coordinator position was not a job requiring the incumbent to be a licensed attorney, it is not helpful for TRLS to have employees who are at odds with the local bar or community. She was looking for an employee who was a team player, who could get along with the other employees at TRLS, the local bar, and with persons in the community. She also wanted someone with good references. The fair housing testing coordinator required training in Jacksonville. Ms. Thompson believed Attorney Kaimowitz could not be trained because, "He already knew everything." She believed he couldn't take orders. She was troubled because he had no references from people who had supervised him. Although attorneys who have their own practice cannot give references of supervisors, they usually can give a judge or judges as a reference, but Attorney Kaimowitz did not provide any judges as references. Attorney Kaimowitz provided a co-plaintiff in a lawsuit and a professor named Joe Little as references. Ms. Thompson called Professor Little but did not feel it would be worthwhile calling his co-plaintiff, who was embroiled in a lawsuit at the time. She was concerned because Attorney Kaimowitz told her, with regard to references, "everyone in Gainesville was suspect." Moreover, he did not provide any references from his time as director of GOALS, which was a job where he had a supervisor who could comment on his work. Ms. Thompson was aware of Attorney Kaimowitz's arrest during a Gainesville City Commission meeting, and was aware of at least one of his Florida Supreme Court reprimands at the time she decided not to hire him. She was also aware that he would occasionally write in "black English," and she found that offensive. She believed him to be a disruptive force. She stated she would not hire him if he was "the last man on earth." She stated that an equally obnoxious black man would often apply for positions at TRLS, and she would not hire him for the same general reasons that she would not hire Attorney Kaimowitz. Ms. Thompson thought Attorney Kaimowitz would be a liability to her organization. She noted that, "He makes comments without any basis. He makes sweeping comments when he knows nothing. He doesn't even check." Brenda Scafadi was eventually hired for the housing testing coordinator. She was, at the time, a 50-year-old white woman who had a disability in the form of fibromyalgia. She was not an attorney. She was hired because she was perceived to be a team player and she had good references. Ms. Scafadi resigned after about eight months and was replaced by Steve Malu, a 50-year-old Nigerian, who also was not an attorney. Attorney Kaimowitz was a person Ms. Thompson had personally known for about six years at the time of the interview. She also knew about him from his letters to the "Gainesville Sun" and numerous e-mails he sent to her and to others. She was aware of his reputation in the community. She refused to hire him because she did not believe he would be a good employee. Neither his age, nor his race, nor his claimed hearing loss was a factor in her decision. Attorney Kaimowitz received a letter from Ms. Thompson dated July 22, 2003, advising him that she had, "decided to offer the position to different applicants who I thought would be more appropriate for our needs." The Americorps positions On August 1, 2004, Americorps positions in Gainesville and Jacksonville were advertised. These jobs were targeted at inexperienced attorneys and paid "living expenses" and a promise of scholarship help rather than a salary. During the evening of August 2, 2004, Ms. Thompson offered testimony before the Gainesville City Commission. After her testimony she departed, although the meeting continued. After exiting the building, she heard footsteps behind her and turned to see Attorney Kaimowitz following her. There were no other people in the area. He stated that he wanted to "mediate our situation" but was informed by Ms. Thompson that there was nothing to mediate because she did not discriminate. She told him she was tired of him making disparaging comments about her program and her staff. Attorney Kaimowitz expressed an interest in the Americorps positions in an e-mail to Ms. Thompson dated August 5, 2004, which was in the nature of a resume. In this letter he said, "I certainly will refrain from any action I suggested I might take through this month of August, so that we can see if we can reach an accommodation in that time." Ms. Thompson regarded this as a threat. Ms. Thompson did not interview him for the Americorps positions because the "resume" e-mail of August 5, 2004, did not match the requirements of the job. Three of the positions were designed for attorneys TRLS could train so that they could recruit students from the law school to assist in the delivery of services. The other two positions required no litigation skills and were designed to provide limited legal services over the telephone to a large volume of clients. Another reason Ms. Thompson found Attorney Kaimowitz to be unsuitable for this job were statements he made to her, such as claiming she hired an "incompetent black male." She had seen, and was familiar with, another widely circulated writing in which he stated, "The real 'piece of work' is Three Rivers Legal Services, and their foolish young attorney of color Glorimil Walker, everyone's favorite minority attorney since she speaks her mind--even if it is against the adults and children at University Centre." The Americorps attorneys hired during this period, instead of Attorney Kaimowitz, included Shelly E. Beach, who was a 26-year-old white female, Melissa B. Long, a 29-year-old black female, and Julie A. Santioni, a 26-year-old white female. Ms. Thompson, and TRLS did not discriminate or retaliate against Mr. Kaimowitz in refusing him an Americorps position. He was not hired because the job was unsuitable for him and because he was unsuitable for employment at TRLS. Retaliation Attorney Kaimowitz's original claim of retaliation was based on his view that TRLS would not hire him because he had sued Central Florida Legal Services and that Ms. Thompson knew and would not hire him because of that lawsuit. Ms. Thompson denied this. Attorney Kaimowitz's second claim of retaliation was based on the complaint to the Commission concerning the refusal of TRLS to hire him for the fair housing testing coordinator position. For reasons that are abundantly clear herein, there were numerous reasons for not hiring him other than retaliation. Attorney Kaimowitz's Credibility Attorney Kaimowitz claims that he applied for the fair housing attorney position as well as the fair housing testing coordinator. Both Ms. Thompson and Ms. O'Rourke stated that at his interview he said he wished to apply only for the fair housing testing coordinator. Attorney Kaimowitz also claims that he informed Ms. Thompson and Ms. O'Rourke at his interview that he was hard of hearing and required an accommodation. Ms. Thompson and Ms. O'Rourke both said that during the interview he asserted that any hearing problems he had were resolved by hearing aids. Attorney Kaimowitz has demonstrated through his pleadings and actions in court, and before this Administrative Law Judge, that he has a low regard for the truth. As an example, he claims to believe in the equality of mankind, but during his examination of Ms. Thompson, he threw a document at her and stated that, "And then you could never find discrimination unless I don't want a nigger in here." As a consequence all issues involving credibility are resolved against Attorney Kaimowitz. That being the case, it is found by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not seek the fair housing attorney position in 2003 and that he did not assert during the interview that he was hard of hearing and thus required an accommodation.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the petitions be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of June, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of June, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Carla D. Franklin, Esquire 4809 Southwest 91st Terrace Gainesville, Florida 32608 Gabe H. Kaimowitz, Esquire Post Office Box 140119 Gainesville, Florida 32614-0119 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services improperly awarded a contract to National Health Laboratories, Inc. for the reasons set forth in the petition.
Findings Of Fact By Invitation to Bid mailed March 26, 1993 (ITB), the Dade County Public Health Unit requested bids on an annual contract for the performance of clinical laboratory test services. The Dade County Public Health Unit is under the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS). The contracting agency shall hereafter be referred to as HRS. The ITB called for the opening of bids on April 12, 1993. Six bids were timely submitted. The apparent low bid was submitted by National Health Laboratories, Inc. (NHL). The NHL bid was $202,271. The second low bid was submitted by Continental Medical Laboratory, Inc. (CML). The CML bid was $241,100. HRS issued a notice of intent to award the contract to NHL. CML timely protested. There is no issue as to the responsiveness of the CML bid. The only issue as to the responsiveness of the NHL bid concerns the matters raised by CML. CML's petition alleges that the bid of NHL was defective because the Sworn Statement Pursuant to Section 287.133(3)(a), Florida Statutes, on Public Entity Crimes (Public Entity Crime Affidavit) was incomplete, an agreement attached to the Public Entity Crime Affidavit did not relieve NHL from disqualification concerning CHAMPUS fraud, and NHL should be disqualified from bidding because it failed timely to inform the Department of Management Services of the company's conviction of a public entity crime. Paragraph 10 of the General Conditions of the ITB allows HRS to "waive any minor irregularity or technicality in bids received." However, special conditions provide, in part: PUBLIC ENTITY CRIMES Any person submitting a bid or proposal in response to this invitation must execute the enclosed [Public Entity Affidavit], including proper check(s), in the space(s) provided, and enclose it with the bid/proposal. Failure to complete this form in every detail and submit it with your proposal will result in immediate disqualification of your bid. The Public Entity Crime Affidavit completed by NHL and submitted with its bid was executed and notarized on April 9, 1993. Paragraph six of the form affidavit states: Based on information and belief, the statement which I have marked below is true in relation to the entity submitting this sworn statement. [Indicate which statement applies.] Neither the entity submitting this sworn statement, nor any of its officers, directors, executives, partners, shareholders, employees, members, or agents who are active in the management of the entity, nor any affiliate of the entity has been charged with and convicted of a public entity crime subsequent to July 1, 1989. The entity submitting this sworn statement, or one or more of its officers, directors, executives, partners, shareholders, employees, members, or agents who are active in the management of the entity, or an affiliate of the entity has been charged with and convicted of a public entity crime subsequent to July 1, 1989. The entity submitting this sworn statement, or one or more of its officers, directors, executives, partners, shareholders, employees, members or agents who are active in the management of the entity, or an affiliate of an entity has been charged with and convicted of a public entity crime subsequent to July 1, 1989. However, there has been a subsequent proceeding before a Hearing Officer of the State of Florida, Division of Administrative Hearings and the Final Order entered by the Hearing Officer determined that it was not in the public interest to place the entity submitting this sworn statement on the convicted vendor list. [attach a copy of the final order] The next paragraph of the Public Entity Crime Affidavit form states: I UNDERSTAND THAT THE SUBMISSION OF THIS FORM TO THE CONTRACTING OFFICER FOR THE PUBLIC ENTITY IDENTIFIED IN PARAGRAPH I (ONE) ABOVE IS FOR THAT PUBLIC ENTITY ONLY AND, THAT THIS FORM IS VALID THROUGH DECEMBER 31 OF THE CALENDAR YEAR IN WHICH IT IS FILED. I ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT I AM REQUIRED TO INFORM THE PUBLIC ENTITY PRIOR TO ENTERING INTO A CONTRACT IN EXCESS OF THE THRESHOLD AMOUNT PROVIDED IN SECTION 287.017, FLORIDA STATUTES FOR CATEGORY TWO OF ANY CHANGE IN THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS FORM. In completing the Public Entity Crime Affidavit, NHL penned in, just over the second alternative that discloses a conviction, "See Attached." The attachment was a copy of an Agreement dated December 31, 1992, between NHL and the "state of Florida" (Settlement Agreement). The agreement was executed by an NHL officer and the Director, Medicaid Fraud Control Unit of the Auditor General Office. The Auditor General's Office is not part of the Department of Management Services. The Settlement Agreement concerns invoices from NHL to the Florida Medicaid program for certain cholesterol and iron tests from January 1, 1987, through November 30, 1992. The Settlement Agreement requires NHL to pay as restitution to the State of Florida $1,470,917. In return, the state of Florida, for itself and on behalf of its agents and assigns, will release and forever discharge NHL, its current or former officers, directors, employees, agents, shareholders, affiliates, assigns and successors from any and all claims, actions, demands or causes of action including penalties or interest against any of them, either civil or criminal, as regards Medicaid reimbursement [for certain cholesterol and iron tests] between January 1, 1987 and November 30, 1992, except that nothing contained in this Settlement Agreement shall preclude the state Medicaid program from seeking recoupment of payments made [for certain cholesterol tests] during the period covered by this Settlement Agreement, subject to the understanding that NHL will contest any such recoupment action on the grounds that such payments were appropriate. The Settlement Agreement also provides: The state of Florida agrees that neither the Settlement Agreement nor any federal criminal conviction or other sanction of the corporation or a current or former officer or employee of NHL as regards claims for Medicaid reimbursement [for certain cholesterol and iron tests] [b]etween January 1, 1987 and November 30, 1992 will be the basis for a state exclusion of NHL from the Florida Medicaid program. NHL is a company that provides laboratory testing nationally and receives payment for many of its services from government sources, such as Medicaid, Medicare, or CHAMPUS. CHAMPUS is the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services. During the period of 1987 through 1992, NHL supplied certain cholesterol and iron testing, in addition to that specifically requested by the health-care provider, at little or no cost to the health-care provider. But NHL invoiced various government payors at higher rates. On December 18, 1992, NHL entered guilty pleas to two counts of criminal fraud involving these practices as they concern the CHAMPUS program. These pleas were the bases of a conviction and sentence that included a criminal fine of $1,000,000. One or two former officers entered guilty pleas to charges of criminal fraud involving these practices as they concern the Medicaid program. As part of the settlement, NHL paid the United States the sum of $100,000,000. At the same time, NHL was negotiating with various states, including Florida, with respect to the above-described billing practices. On December 8, 1992, the Director of the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit in the Florida Office of the Auditor General wrote a letter to NHL confirming a proposed settlement. The conditions of the settlement are incorporated in the above- described Settlement Agreement. On December 17, 1992, the Assistant Secretary for Medicaid in HRS mailed a letter to NHL agreeing that HRS would not take administrative action for the above-described cholesterol and iron claims submitted for reimbursement by NHL to the Florida Medicaid program. NHL did not inform the Department of Management Services of the guilty plea, conviction, and $1,000,000 criminal fine. However, based probably on information received in early February 1993 from another governmental entity in Florida, the Department of Management Services, on February 8, 1993, sent a letter to NHL advising it that the Department had received information that NHL had been convicted of a public entity crime and requesting copies of the charges and final court action. NHL complied and the Department's investigation is continuing. On February 18, 1993, HRS Deputy Secretary for Health, sent a memorandum to all of the County Public Health Units directors and administrators advising them of concerns about laboratory fraud and attaching a recent report concerning the NHL case. The report described the NHL guilty pleas, conviction, and sentencing, as well as the business practices that led to the prosecution. By memorandum dated March 18, 1993, HRS Assistant Secretary for Medicaid informed HRS Depute Secretary for Health that the Auditor General had entered into the Settlement Agreement. The memorandum states that, on December 17, 1992, the Assistant Secretary signed an agreement with NHL not to terminate it from the Florida Medicaid program, which was the "same treatment afforded many other providers--including [County Public Health Units]--who overbilled the Medicaid program. The Assistant Secretary's memorandum describes the settlement as requiring NHL to make "full restitution," although the $1.4 million in restitution involves only the iron test and the State of Florida and NHL may still litigate whether any reimbursement is due for the cholesterol tests. The failure of NHL to check the second alternative on the Public Entity Crime Affidavit did not confer an economic advantage on NHL in the subject procurement. The material attached to the affidavit sufficiently informed HRS of the criminal conviction of NHL. Likewise, the omission of any mention of CHAMPUS claims in Paragraphs two and three of the Settlement Agreement did not confer any economic advantage on NHL in the procurement. The purpose of mentioning only Medicaid in the Settlement Agreement is that Florida has no jurisdiction over the CHAMPUS program. NHL was concerned only that Florida not terminate NHL's participation in the program over which Florida had jurisdiction--the Medicaid program. These references to "Medicaid reimbursement" are merely descriptive and are not intended to limit the scope of the exoneration purportedly effectuated in the Settlement Agreement.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a final order dismissing the bid protest of Continental Medical Laboratory, Inc. ENTERED on August 24, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of August, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-3951BID Treatment Accorded Proposed Findings of Respondent and Intervenor 1-8 and 11: adopted or adopted in substance. 9-10 and 12-15: rejected as subordinate. 16-31: adopted or adopted in substance. 32-37: rejected as subordinate and irrelevant. 38-43 and 45-48: rejected as irrelevant and legal argument. 44: adopted. 49-50: adopted as to absence of material variations. 51: rejected as subordinate and recitation of evidence. Treatment Accorded Proposed Findings of Petitioner 1-14 and 16-17: adopted or adopted in substance. 15: rejected as legal argument and unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 18-21: rejected as subordinate, repetitious, and legal argument. 22-27: adopted in substance. 28: rejected as irrelevant. 29 (first sentence): rejected as repetitious and irrelevant. 29 (second sentence): rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 30: adopted, but the period of the delay of DMS review in this case was too short to make any difference. 31: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence with respect to a delay of such a short duration. 32: rejected as legal argument inviting a remedy far in excess of any remedy provided for or envisioned by 287.133. 33: rejected as legal argument inviting a remedy far in excess of any remedy provided for or envisioned by 287.133, at least under the facts of the present case. 34: rejected as irrelevant. 35: rejected as legal argument and unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Geoffrey Kirk Adorno & Zeder, P.A. 2601 S. Bayshore Dr., Ste. 1600 Miami, Florida 33133 Morton Laitner, District Counsel District 11 Legal Office 401 NW 2d Ave., Ste. N-1014 Miami, Florida 33128 Thomas F. Panza Seann Michael Frazier Panza, Maurer 3081 E. Commercial Blvd., Ste. 200 Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33308 John Slye, General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Robert L. Powell Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue presented for decision herein is whether or not Respondent engaged in acts and/or conduct on July 27, 1983, which reduced his effectiveness as a law enforcement officer by committing a battery upon a police officer and failed to maintain good moral character as required pursuant to Section 943.1395(5), Florida Statutes, and Section 943.13(7), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received including post-hearing documents submitted by Respondent, I hereby make the following relevant factual findings. By its Administrative Complaint filed December 19, 1984, as amended, Petitioner seeks to revoke the certification of Respondent, Lamont Taylor, who was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission on January 5, 1978. Respondent has been issued Certificate No. C-4405. On July 27, 1983, Respondent was stopped by Louis Churukian, a general patrolman employed by the Metro-Dade Police Force in excess of two years. Officer Churukian was employed on the 12-8 shift on July 27, 1983, and arrested Respondent for speeding, to wit, 50 miles per hour in a 35 miles per hour zone on Northwest 163 Street in the area of 14th Avenue, Miami Beach, Florida. In making the arrest, Respondent had to be apprehended with Officer Churukian using his emergency equipment (siren and emergency lights) for more than two blocks. When Officer Churukian was able to get Respondent to pull over, Respondent was told that he was observed speeding (50 miles per hour in a 35 miles per hour zone) whereupon Respondent was asked to tender his driver's license. Respondent was unable to produce his driver's license and he remained belligerent and hostile to Officer Churukian throughout the time that he was being arrested. Due to Respondent's hostile attitude, Officer Churukian requested the assistance of a backup officer who assisted in taking Respondent to a Metro-Dade police station for booking. Prior to placing Respondent under arrest, Officer Churukian asked Respondent if he had any weapons on his person whereupon Respondent advised that he had a gun in his waistband. Officer Churukian removed the weapon from Respondent's waistband which was a Smith and Wesson 357 revolver loaded with 6 rounds of "upper jacketed" ammunition. Respondent was transported to Station G where he was fingerprinted and booked for failure to produce a driver's license and later for battery upon a police officer. After Respondent was booked and his handcuffs were removed, he approached Officer Churukian without warning and struck him in the soft tissue area of his throat. Officer Churukian was administered emergency treatment for soreness and inflammation in the soft tissue area of his throat. Throughout the arrest and booking procedure, Officer Churukian did not engage in any act which might be regarded as provocative to prompt Respondent to strike him. In what has been described as a "sucker punch" by Officer Charlie Lee Daye, a correctional officer employed in a shakedown area of the Metro-Dade County Jail since approximately May 29, 1976, Respondent knocked Officer Churukian to the floor of the police station. Angel Nieves, a special response technician for Metro-Dade Police Force for a period in excess of thirteen years, was called upon to assist Officer Churukian to take Respondent to the jail. Special response technicians are always called upon when there are charges made against fellow police or correctional officers in Dade County. While Officer Churukian took Respondent to the jail, he was not abusive and Officer Nieves saw nothing that would prompt Respondent to strike Officer Churukian. Respondent failed to offer any mitigating testimony or other evidence to refute the allegations set forth in the Petitioner's charges filed herein. On April 5, 1994, respondent was accepted as a candidate for the State's Attorney's Deferred Prosecution Program and therefore he Respondent was not adjudicated guilty of the charges filed against him.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is hereby recommended that the Respondent's Certificate Number C-4405 be revoked. RECOMMENDED this 8th of July 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of July 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert Rand, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Lamont Taylor 14404 NW 15 Drive Miami, Florida 33167 Darylp McLaughlin Director Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue At the commencement of the hearing, the parties stipulated that Petitioner had filed applications for Class "A" and Class "C" licenses and was qualified except for the failure to demonstrate good moral character. The bases for the dispute over Petitioner's character were: Petitioner's arrest record; Petitioner's alleged falsification of his applications as to his employment with the Pittsburgh Police Department; and Petitioner's check for the application fee was dishonored for insufficient funds.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner duly filed applications with the Department of State, Division of Licensing for Class "A" and Class "C" licenses. Except for matters related to Petitioner's good moral character, Petitioner is qualified for licensure. Petitioner's application reflects that he answered the question whether he had been arrested affirmatively with the following comment: The Courts of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in all five cases from 1965 to 1974 - ruled that as a Police Officer, I acted within the scope of my authority - These cases stem from being an undercover Narcotics Officer. The Petitioner's arrest records as maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation reveal several juvenile offenses, not considered by the Department and not at issue. This record also reveals the following arrests of Petitioner as an adult: Date Place Charge Disposition 06/09/66* Pittsburgh VDD & CA Not guilty 08/15/66* Pittsburgh VUFA Not guilty 08/20/66* Allegheny County VDDCA 06/24/67* Allegheny County VUFA Unavailable per contra 06/30/70 *Only one offense with different charges made on different dates 09/05/74 Allegheny County Theft, VUFA Discharged 09/23/74 05/07/75 Allegheny County Fraud - imper- sonating a public servant 12/19/79 Office of Provost No charge No charge Martial Petitioner presented testimony and supporting documentary evidence that the arrests reported on the FBI criminal history for the dates 06/09/66 through 06/24/67 were all related to the same offense, and that these charges were resolved in favor of the Petitioner by a verdict of not guilty. See Petitioner's Exhibit #1. The judge arrested judgment of the two years' probation for the charge of 05/07/75. See Respondent's Exhibit #2. Petitioner stated that based upon his status as a capital police officer he was not guilty of fraud or impersonation of a public servant. The Petitioner's remaining arrest was on 09/05/74, and was discharged. Petitioner's explanation of these arrests is not consistent with the explanation stated on his application form. According to the resume accompanying his application, Petitioner was employed on the indicated dates in the following positions: Date Position 1963 to 1965 Globe Security 1965 to 1970 Pittsburgh Police Department, special patrolman 1970 to 1973 NAACP special investigator and Bucci Detective Agency 1972 to 1976 Commonwealth Property Police with State of Pennsylvania 1973 to 1974 Part-time security guard in addition to employment listed above May, 1976 January, 1977 Federal Civil Service guard March, 1977 September, 1977 Part-time security guard with A&S Security December, 1978 Sears, Roebuck and Company as to June, 1980 undercover security investigator February, 1979 Security guard to June, 1980 September, 1979 VA, guard at VA Hospital GS5 to June, 1980 June, 1980 Came to Florida Petitioner stated that his check for the application fee bounced because of his travel back and forth to Pennsylvania to try to develop the data to support his application, which depleted his bank account. He has since made the check good and paid the fees by money order.
Recommendation The Petitioner has failed to establish that he has the requisite good character for licensure; therefore, it is recommended that the Petitioner's applications for Class "A" and Class "C" licensure be denied. DONE and ORDERED this 19th day of April, 1982, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. James Barnett 758 Woodville Road Milton, Florida 32570 James V. Antista, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of State Division of Licensing R. A. Gray Building, Room 106 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of April, 1982. George Firestone, Secretary Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact In 1932, Respondent was driving one of three cars involved in an automobile accident in Ohio. Respondent was approximately 18 years old. Two females in one of the automobiles not driven by Respondent died in the accident. They were Ms. Clara Shaw and Ms. Betty Montgomery. In January, 1933, Respondent was indicted for manslaughter of Ms. Montgomery. 2/ Respondent was also indicted for "failure to stop in case of an automobile accident" ("failure to stop"). Manslaughter was a felony in Ohio in 1933. Failure to stop was not a felony. 3/ Respondent initially pled not guilty to both manslaughter and failure to stop. Pursuant to a plea bargain between Respondent's attorney and the state attorney, Respondent subsequently changed his plea and entered a plea of guilty to both manslaughter and failure to stop. In exchange for Respondent entering a guilty plea, Respondent was sentenced to six months in the county jail and placed on probation for one year. Respondent served only 37 days of his sentence. The balance of his sentence and the imposition of court costs was suspended during the court's April term. Respondent successfully completed his probation. Respondent was not found guilty of manslaughter in Ohio in 1933. There is no adjudication of guilt in the court file for either manslaughter or failure to stop. Only a certificate of sentence appears in the court file. A certificate of sentence was entered only for failure to stop. No certificate of sentence was entered for manslaughter. In 1933, Section 12404 of the Ohio General Code required a person who was found guilty of manslaughter to be: . . . imprisoned in the penitentiary not less than one year nor more than twenty years. The court had no authority to find Respondent guilty of manslaughter and then either impose a sentence of less than one year or allow Respondent to serve out that sentence anywhere except the state penitentiary. 4/ The court sentenced Respondent to six months in the county jail. Respondent served only 37 days of his six month sentence. None of those days were served in the state penitentiary. Respondent remained in Ohio until he moved to Florida in 1940 or 1941. The state of Ohio never prevented Respondent from exercising his civil rights. Once Respondent reached the age of 21, he voted in local, state, and national elections in Ohio. Respondent also voted in local, state, and national elections in Florida for 50 years. 5/ Respondent served in the U.S. military for 2 1/2 years after his criminal conviction in Ohio. Thereafter, Respondent was employed in the defense industry by North American Aviation and by Martin Marietta from 1951 through 1977. Respondent had a confidential security clearance at North American Aviation and a secret security clearance at Martin Marietta. 6/ Respond disclosed his Ohio criminal record during security checks required for both North American Aviation and Martin Marietta. Respondent has been licensed to carry a concealed weapon in Florida for approximately seven years. He is applying for the third renewal of that license.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent not guilty of being "found guilty" of a felony in another state, within the meaning of Section 790.23(1)(d), and granting Respondent's request for the license at issue in this proceeding. RECOMMENDED this 25th day of July, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of July, 1995.
