Findings Of Fact On December 20, 1985, Respondent was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission and issued certificate no. 14-84-502-04. Respondent's work in law enforcement in Florida has been as a correctional officer. On the night of December 27, 1986, Respondent left his home to go to the American Legion in Lake City, Florida. On his way he met his friend Eddie Goodbread, Jr. Goodbread asked the Respondent if he could go with him to the American Legion Club. The Respondent agreed to have Goodbread come with him. Once at the American Legion the two men socialized. When they got ready to leave the club the Respondent left with his girlfriend. Goodbread took the Respondent's car and parked it on Myrtle Street. Goodbread then went with the Respondent and the Respondent's girlfriend and another person, which the Respondent describes as a girl, to the house of a friend other than Goodbread. At that point the Respondent and Goodbread split up again. Respondent was then with his girlfriend and Goodbread had the keys to Respondent's car. The Respondent came back later and met with Goodbread. Prior to the rendezvous, while Respondent had been with his girlfriend in her car, he had placed a .25 caliber automatic pistol in the glove box of that car. He had a license to carry this weapon issued by local authorities. The weapon was not contemplated as being a necessary item for his work as a correctional officer. When the Respondent got out of his girlfriend's car and approached Goodbread, the Respondent had the pistol in his coat pocket. Respondent told Goodbread that he was ready to go home because he had to go to work the next morning. Goodbread said, in kidding with the Respondent, that he did not have the car keys and that he had locked them in the car. Respondent recognized that he was joking with him. Nonetheless, Respondent looked in the car and saw that the keys were not there. Respondent returned to Goodbread and told Goodbread to give him his keys. Goodbread again told Respondent that the keys were locked in the car. Respondent told Goodbread that he was starting to go home. Goodbread's reaction to this remark was to get in the car and say "let's go." Goodbread then jumped out of the car and said that he was not ready to go. Respondent told him to come on and give him his keys. Respondent told Goodbread "come on man. Let's go." Goodbread told Respondent that he wasn't ready to go that he wanted to talk to some girl. Respondent said "come on let's go." Respondent took the gun out and said "you are going to make me put this on you. Come on let's go." Goodbread grabbed the gun unexpectedly and the gun discharged and killed Goodbread. Respondent never intended to injure Goodbread in his display of the pistol. Eight or ten witnesses saw the incident. It was investigated by the Lake City Police Department and Respondent cooperated in that endeavor to include turning over the pistol to the police and giving a voluntary statement about the incident. Respondent was charged through the Grand Jury of Columbia County, Florida, with the exhibition of the handgun in a rude, careless, angry, or threatening manner, not in necessary self defense and contrary to Section 790.10, Florida Statutes. A copy of that indictment may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. As set forth in Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2, Respondent plead guilty to the offense and was fined $176. The firearm was forfeited to the state, he received 11 days in jail and a condition was placed upon him not to possess a firearm for one year. Respondent claims that as a consequence of the incident with his friend Goodbread he began to drink more than he had before. There being no frame of reference to compare his drinking habits before and after the incident, this comment has little utility in understanding his motivation to drink and drive. It has been established that on September 13, 1987, in the early morning hours of that day, specifically around 1:30 a.m., the Respondent was observed by Deputy Sheriff Charles R. Tate of the Columbia County, Florida Sheriff's office, driving in a reckless manner. In this incident the Respondent pulled out of Church Street onto Bay Avenue in Lake City, Florida, in a reckless manner. The officer speeded up in his attempt to stop the Respondent and engaged the emergency equipment in the officer's car. Respondent went west bound on Bay and turned south on Marion Street which is U.S. 41. In the course of this pursuit Respondent accelerated to speeds up to 65 miles per hour. Respondent finally pulled over around the intersection of Marion Street and Grandview Avenue. Respondent cooperated with Officer Tate in the investigation of the driving offense. This included the officer noting that the Respondent had the smell of alcohol about his person. As a consequence, the Respondent was asked to perform certain activities associated with a field sobriety test to ascertain if Respondent was capable of operating his motor vehicle. When the Respondent tried to perform the finger to nose test which is given with each hand, he was unable to do that with either hand. In trying to perform the walking test Respondent staggered and when he made the return trip in the walking test he nearly fell over and had to support himself. From the observations of the Respondent Officer Tate believed that the Respondent was driving under the influence when the stop was made. He arrested the Respondent for that offense and took him to the Florida Highway Patrol station where Robert Bellamy, a trained breathalyzer operator, administered a breathalyzer test to the Respondent. The results show that the Respondent was registering at .16 at 2:25 a.m., and registering at .15 at 2:27 a.m. with .10 being the legal presumption for impairment. Respondent was then taken to the Columbia County Jail. While at the jail correctional officer Jacklyn Yvonne Jones- Holland attempted to fingerprint his right hand. Ms. Holland knew of the Respondent before this evening but had had no opportunity before to speak to the Respondent. In the course of the fingerprinting Respondent took his left hand and rubbed it on the side of the officer's leg in the area of her groin. The first time he did this she stepped back on the chance that the Respondent was unaware of what he was doing at the time. However, when she moved the Respondent again put his hand on her leg in the area of her groin. Based upon the facts of this case in which Officer Tate describes the quality of the Respondent's impairment on a scale of 1 to 10, as being a 5 and Ms. Holland describes this impairment to be 6 or 7 on a scale of 1 to 10, Respondent is not found to be so under the influence that he did not realize what he was doing when inappropriately touching Ms. Holland in two instances. When he touched her the second time Ms. Holland went to another part of the building and made out a complaint against the Respondent for his assault and he was arrested for that offense. An Officer Myers read the Respondent his rights related to the assault during which conversation Respondent said, "I'm drunk. Oh yeah, that's what I'm here for. I'm drunk." There was no verbal exchange between the Respondent and Ms. Holland during the inappropriate touching. Ms. Holland had not invited those actions by the Respondent. The Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 3 constitutes the Florida Uniform Traffic Citation for the offense of driving under the influence and the disposition of that case in which the Respondent was fined $411, had his license suspended for six months, and attended school for persons who have driven under the influence. He also attended Alcoholics Anonymous and received other counseling contemplated for persons who may have drinking problems. Respondent says that he does not drink at present and no evidence was offered which would refute that claim. Respondent was charged under information with the unlawful, intentional and knowing touching or striking of Jacklyn Yvonne Jones-Holland and plead guilty to battery. He received a period of probation of one year for that offense. Certified copies of the information and order withholding adjudication of guilt and placing the defendant on probation can be found as exhibit numbers 5 and 4 respectively. The reckless display of the firearm leading to the death of his friend, and the battery committed on Ms. Holland are all indications of a lack of good moral character and are events for which the Respondent has no acceptable explanation or excuse. Driving under the influence is reprehensible but does not show a lack of good moral character.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and the conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered suspending the certificate of the Respondent for a period of six months. DONE and ENTERED this 6th day of December, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of December, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 89-3816 The facts as presented by the Respondent are commented on as follows: Paragraphs 1-5 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 6 is not accepted to the extent that it argues that the incident involving the death of Mr. Goodbread is directly responsible for the fact that the Respondent was driving under the influence on the night in question and committed the battery on Ms. Holland. Furthermore, the suggestion that the Respondent was too under the influence to understand the fact of his battery against Ms. Holland is rejected. His testimony that he does not have a recollection of touching Ms. Holland runs contrary to the impression of the facts, that impression being that the act of the Respondent was volitional. The idea of his cooperation with Trooper Bellamy in the administration of the breathalyzer examination and the efforts to comply with what was expected of him in responding to the circumstance of the driving under influence offense is recognized as mitigation, but does not explain away the offense. The suggestion in Paragraph 7 that the death of the friend and the driving under the influence are interrelated is not accepted. Respondent did indicate that he was emotionally upset over the death of his friend, this would be expected but it is not clear to what extent his drinking increased following the death of the friend as compared to his drinking habits before that time. Respondent's suggestion that he is free from the effects of alcohol problems at present was not refuted. Therefore, there is no reason to believe that he presently has any problem with alcohol abuse. Reference to other traffic violations and his service record as a correctional officer leaves a neutral impression of the Respondent which is neither to his advantage or that of the Petitioner. Consequently, the facts of those prior events have not been reported in the fact-finding set forth in the Recommended Order. Paragraph 8 is contrary to facts found. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph S. White, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Stephen A. Smith, Esquire Post Office Drawer 1792 Lake City, Florida 32056-1792 Jeffrey Long, Director Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 James T. Moore, Commissioner Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact Petitioner completed an application for issuance of a Class "C" Private Investigator License. That license request was denied on October 30, 1991. On November 20, 1991, Petitioner challenged the denial leading to the formal hearing held pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. The statement of denial was amended on December 23, 1991. The reasons in the amendment are associated with Petitioner's criminal law history. The amended statement of denial frames the dispute. Petitioner was charged in the case of United States of America v. Hugh Mattingly Padgett, Jr., No. 63-230-CR-J, in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Jacksonville Division, with having in his possession and custody, and under his control, a still and distilling apparatus set up, which had not been registered as required by law, in violation of Title 26 U.S.C., Section 5601(a)(1). He was convicted in that case upon a plea of guilty and fined $500. He was given a nineteen month sentence with was suspended upon service of probation for three years under supervision. The judgement and order of probation was entered on January 31, 1964. The probation was terminated after two years of service. That action by the Court shortening the probationary period was by order drawn on January 17, 1966. On May 8, 1981, in Hunterton County, New Jersey, Petitioner was convicted of distributing a controlled substance, methaqualone; possession of that controlled substance; possession of that controlled substance with intent to distribute and conspiracy to distribute that controlled substance. For this conviction he received a prison term totalling ten years and a $45,000 fine. Petitioner served the prison sentence in New Jersey. There was a Florida criminal law case which was basically the factual counterpart to the New Jersey prosecution. That case was State of Florida v. Hugh M. Padgett, Jr., No. CF880-2813A2-XX, in the Circuit Court, Tenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Polk County, Florida. On June 27, 1989, Petitioner plead guilty to the Florida case. That plea pertained to a violation of the Florida Racketeering Influence and Corrupt Organization Act, Section 943.462(3), Florida Statutes, and trafficking in methaqualone more than five kilograms but less than 25 kilograms, a lesser included offense, Section 893.135(1)(e)3, Florida Statutes. Part of the sentence which Petitioner was given in the Florida case involving the controlled substance methaqualone was a five year mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to Section 893.135(1), Florida Statutes. For entering his plea the court sentenced the Petitioner to a period of eight years concurrent time with 192 days credit for jail time served. Later by order of February 14, 1990, in connection with the case, Petitioner was given credit for 894 days of jail time served, reflecting credit for time spent in New Jersey awaiting return to Florida. The two cases involving controlled substances stem from activities by the Petitioner in 1980 in both Florida and New Jersey. Concerning the 1964 Federal conviction, Petitioner acknowledges that he knew of the operations of what he referred to as a "moonshine still" but denies that he received any money from that operation beyond rent money from the person to whom he had rented a house and upon which property the still had been found.
Recommendation Based upon a consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered which denies the application for a Class "C" Private Investigator License. DONE and ENTERED this 21st day of April, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of April, 1992. Copies furnished: Ronald L. Jones, Esquire Jones and Koch 1200 East Lafayette Street, Suite 108 Tallahassee, FL 32301 Henri C. Cawthon, Esquire Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, MS #4 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250 Honorable Jim Smith Secretary, Department of State The Capitol, MS #4 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250
The Issue The issue presented is whether Petitioner James Joseph Richardson has met his burden of proving actual innocence, thereby entitling him to compensation under the Victims of Wrongful Incarceration Compensation Act.
Findings Of Fact On October 25, 1967, Petitioner's wife prepared a breakfast of grits for their seven children. In a separate pot she prepared the children's lunch of beans, gravy, rice, and hogs head meat. She also fried some fresh chicken which she used to make sandwiches for her and Petitioner's lunch. She and Petitioner then left to get a ride to the grove where they worked picking fruit. It was their routine for Petitioner's wife to cook the food. The eldest child, eleven-year-old Betty Jean Bryant, would later serve it to all the children after the Richardsons left for work. It is not clear whether the children actually ate their breakfast grits that day. The school-age children went to school while the younger children remained at home. It was the routine for Petitioner's neighbor Betsy Reese to look after them. Petitioner's family and Betsy Reese and her children lived in the same structure, assumedly similar to a duplex. There was a common porch across the front. There was also a shed in the back yard. The school-age children returned to the home at lunchtime. Reese divided the food in the second pot into seven equal portions, and the children ate lunch. Right after the children returned to school after lunch, they began exhibiting terrible symptoms, such as leaking from their orifices, twitching, and rigidity. Teachers began grabbing the Richardson children and rushing them to the hospital. One of the teachers, knowing there were younger children at home, drove to the Richardson home. Those children were on the shared porch, displaying the same symptoms. Reese was sitting on the porch, holding one of the children. The teacher took them to the hospital. Petitioner and his wife were summoned to the hospital. Six of the children died that same day, and the seventh child died early the next morning. At the hospital, medical personnel did not know what substance was causing the illness and deaths. Sheriff Frank Cline went to the Richardson home and conducted several searches of the home and the shed attempting to find what had poisoned the children. When Petitioner and his wife arrived at the hospital, Cline obtained from Petitioner the key to the refrigerator and searched again. The next morning Reese and Charlie Smith, who was described as the town drunk, found a bag of parathion, a highly- toxic insecticide, in the shed behind the house. Cline and his deputies had searched the shed approximately four times during the day the children became sick and Cline had searched the shed by himself late that night, and no bag of parathion had been seen by them. It was determined that parathion was present in the pot the grits were cooked in, the pot the lunch was cooked in, the frying pan the chicken may have been cooked in, flour, corn meal, sugar, and other substances found in the refrigerator. It was also determined that parathion is what killed the children. Petitioner had a key to the refrigerator as did his wife. Indications are that a third key was left on the refrigerator for the babysitter's use. Petitioner was tried for the first degree murder of the eldest child Betty Jean Bryant and was convicted. The jury did not recommend mercy, and he was sentenced to death. His conviction was reviewed by the Supreme Court of Florida. Richardson v. State, 247 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 1971). Petitioner's death sentence was commuted to life when Florida's death penalty was held to be unconstitutional the following year. In October 1988, 21 years after the seven children were murdered, the official file, which had been stolen ten years earlier from the office of the assistant state attorney who had prosecuted Petitioner, appeared in the office of the Governor of the State of Florida. Governor Bob Martinez ordered the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) to investigate the disappearance and re-appearance of the file and accompanying information. That investigation resulted in new information and admissions surrounding the circumstances leading to the arrest and conviction of Petitioner. The Governor entered an Executive Order on July 31, 1989, appointing Janet Reno, State Attorney for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida, to provide prosecutorial assistance to FDLE. That Executive Order further directed FDLE to continue its investigation into all statements and evidence concerning Petitioner's arrest and conviction and to also investigate any violations of the criminal laws or misconduct by public officials relative to the events surrounding the deaths of the children and the arrest and conviction of Petitioner. On February 13, 1989, another Executive Order, amending the first, was signed by the Governor assigning State Attorney Reno to the Twelfth and Twentieth Judicial Circuits to discharge the duties of the State Attorneys in those Circuits relating to the investigation and prosecution of Petitioner's case. On March 31, 1989, a third Executive Order was signed. It amended the first two and recited that Reno and FDLE had reported their findings to the Governor and that Reno had also advised the Governor that Petitioner had filed a motion for post-conviction relief in the Circuit Court for the Twelfth Judicial Circuit. The Executive Order directed Reno to assume and discharge the duties of the State Attorney relating to any post-conviction proceedings involving Petitioner. A fourth Executive Order was then entered amending the first three by adding to Reno's duties consideration of any further prosecution of Petitioner. As a result of the extensive investigations conducted by Reno and FDLE, Reno joined in Petitioner's pending motion for post-conviction relief. Petitioner's request that his conviction and sentence be vacated was granted, and Petitioner was released from prison. Reno also made the decision that Petitioner would not be re-tried for the murder of Betty Jean Bryant and would not be prosecuted for the murders of the six other children. On May 5, 1989, Reno issued a 35-page Nolle Prosse Memorandum explaining in detail the evidence she had reviewed, the conflicting evidence she had considered, the apparent- perjured testimony that had been given at Petitioner's trial, and the conflicting witness statements which the State had before trial but had not disclosed to Petitioner's attorneys despite a court order to do so. The Memorandum discussed additional problems she had encountered because the physical evidence from the trial 21 years earlier had been misplaced or destroyed, a witness had later recanted his trial testimony, and key witnesses had died since the trial had taken place. Further, as a result of the publicity surrounding her investigation a number of persons had come forward claiming to have evidence, but they had never come forward during the initial investigation. Reno and the two Assistant State Attorneys who worked with her on her investigation determined that in evaluating whether Petitioner should be given post-conviction relief and whether Petitioner should be re-tried, they would only consider the files, records, and evidence that existed at the time that Petitioner was tried. They considered the evidence that had not been disclosed to anyone for 21 years to be unreliable. Some of it was also conflicting. She signed the Nolle Prosse Memorandum as did the two Assistant State Attorneys Don L. Horn and Richard L. Shiffrin. At the final hearing in this cause Don Horn testified extensively as to the contents of the Memorandum. Although he, Shiffrin, and Reno had discussed the misconduct they discovered on the part of the Sheriff and the prosecuting attorneys, they knew that the statute of limitations prevented taking action against those public officials, so the Memorandum did not discuss any action to be taken against them. It only considered the evidence against Petitioner. The Memorandum concluded that a "totally inadequate and incomplete investigation" into the deaths of the seven children had been conducted. Obvious leads had not been pursued, inconsistencies were not resolved, and standard investigative procedures had not been followed. The Memorandum further opined that at the time that Petitioner was charged with murder, the State did not have sufficient evidence to prove his guilt beyond and to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt. The Memorandum concluded that Petitioner "was probably wrongfully accused" based upon the evidence that existed at the time. Three years later a 260-page Memorandum Opinion prepared by United States Attorney Robert Merkle and indicating a need for further investigation into the 1968 prosecution of Petitioner was presented to the Treasurer of Florida. The Opinion, which was not admitted in evidence, was described as a "scathing indictment" of Reno's investigation. As a result, Governor Lawton Chiles issued a confidential Executive Order on October 16, 1992, appointing State Attorney Reno to further investigate all matters pertaining to or arising from the issues raised in the Opinion involving Petitioner's prosecution. On October 30, 1992, the Governor issued a second Executive Order deleting the provisions of his prior Order requiring that it be sealed and confidential. Assistant State Attorney Richard L. Shiffrin, who participated in Reno's first investigation, and Gertrude M. Novicki, Reno's Chief Assistant for Special Prosecutions, were assigned to conduct this investigation. Both of those Assistant State Attorneys signed the Response of the State Attorney of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit. The Response is not dated but a word-processing notation suggests it may have been issued on or about April 30, 1993. At the final hearing, Novicki testified regarding her Response. Rather than responding to or explaining each of the details set forth in Merkle's Memorandum Opinion, Novicki and Shiffrin re-examined the propriety of both the vacating of the original judgment of guilty and the decision to enter a nolle prosse. In doing so, they reviewed the original prosecution in light of the evidence at trial and of the law as it existed in 1968 and also reviewed the ability to re-prosecute Petitioner in light of the evidence currently available and admissible. The Response concluded that the Order granting Petitioner's motion to vacate his conviction and sentence was supported by the facts and the law and that the decision to enter a nolle prosse reached in 1989 was proper. The Response's summary states that the physical evidence against Petitioner did not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the testimonial evidence as to Petitioner's admissions of culpability were of dubious admissibility and value, the evidence of motive was equivocal at best, and the decision to enter a nolle prosse was unquestionably correct. The summary ends as follows: "Whether or not [Petitioner] is guilty of this horrible crime is uncertain. What is certain is that proof beyond a reasonable doubt of guilt is lacking." The prior proceedings involving Petitioner and the prior reviews of those proceedings have focused on the criminal law standard of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. That standard, however, is not applicable to this proceeding. In this proceeding wherein Petitioner is seeking monetary compensation for his wrongful incarceration, Section 961.03, Florida Statutes, requires Petitioner to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he committed neither the act nor the offense that served as the basis for the conviction and incarceration and that he did not aid, abet, or act as an accomplice to a person who committed the act or offense. Further, he must prove his actual innocence by verifiable and substantial evidence in order to meet the definition of wrongfully incarcerated person. Petitioner testified that he did not poison his children, that he did not kill his children, and that he never told anyone that he did. He also testified that he did not aid or assist anyone in poisoning or killing his children. In order to provide verifiable and substantial evidence in support of his testimony that he is innocent, Petitioner has taken two approaches. The first is by relying on the investigation detailed in the 1989 Nolle Prosse Memorandum and the testimony of Don Horn, one of the authors. (In its defense, the State offered the 1993 Response and the testimony of Gertrude Novicki, one of its authors.) In so doing, Petitioner has offered clear and convincing evidence that the investigation leading up to Petitioner’s prosecution and conviction was incomplete. The investigation revealed conflicting evidence about whether Petitioner had obtained life insurance policies on his children the night before they were murdered, which he had not, and whether Petitioner believed that he had. The investigation did not determine how the parathion got into the pots and skillet and various food products in the refrigerator or when. The investigation appeared to focus only on Petitioner as a suspect and not also on others whose involvement was suspicious. Toward the end of the investigation and prior to Petitioner’s criminal trial, the prosecutors wrote memos expressing concern about the weakness of their case and their possible inability to present even a prima facie case. After those memos were written, the Sheriff produced three jailhouse informants to testify that Petitioner admitted to them his crimes. They also gave statements that Petitioner said he thought that Reese did it and gave details of different motives she might have had. Rather than resolving the conflicting statements, the prosecution withheld the conflicting statements from the defense. The Nolle Prosse Memorandum discusses these statements and informants and finds that one of the jailhouse informants recanted his testimony after Petitioner’s trial and one was drunk when he testified. The third one, whose statements were given under circumstances that made them highly doubtful, died before the trial, and his testimony given at the preliminary hearing was given to the jury in the form of five witnesses who testified as to their recollections of his testimony. The informants were not the only ones to provide perjured testimony at Petitioner’s trial; the Sheriff also appears to have done so. A review of the Nolle Prosse Memorandum and the detailed evidence it discusses makes it clear that Petitioner was wrongfully accused based upon the evidence and lack of evidence the prosecution had gathered. It is further clear that Petitioner’s conviction and sentence based upon that insufficient evidence should have been vacated, and they were. It is further clear that re-trying Petitioner would be fruitless because the evidence available 21 years after the murders was insufficient: the physical evidence was missing or destroyed, many of the key witnesses were dead, and the evidence that might have been admissible for a re-trial was conflicting. However, the inability of the State to prove Petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt does not prove that Petitioner is actually innocent of committing the murders or aiding in the commission. Petitioner’s second approach to providing verifiable and substantial evidence of his actual innocence is attempting to show that Reese, not the Petitioner, murdered the children. The 1989 investigation showed that, at the time the Richardson children were poisoned, Reese was on parole for killing her second husband with a gun. Although there was also a rumor that she had poisoned her first husband, no evidence was found to support that rumor. Parenthetically, there was also a rumor that Petitioner killed his three other children in Jacksonville, but that was also untrue. Similarly, there was a rumor that Sheriff Cline fathered Reese’s granddaughter and that was why he steered the investigation away from her. The blood tests of all concerned done as part of the 1989 investigation proved that rumor also untrue. Petitioner relies also upon the facts that Reese was the last person in the Richardson home on the day in question, the person who served the children the poisoned lunch, and the person who found the parathion in the shed. Her unconcerned behavior while the Richardson toddlers were exhibiting horrible symptoms on her porch and her lack of concern about whether her children who were playing there might be at risk from whatever was making the Richardson children so sick are suggested to be evidence that she knew why the Richardson children were sick and why her children would not be. It was also suggested that she must have been the murderer since her third husband had gone to Jacksonville with Petitioner and his wife but they had returned without Reese’s husband who never did return to her. Petitioner relies heavily on evidence which he suggests constitutes admissions of her guilt by Reese. The 1988 investigation considered an affidavit by one certified nursing assistant and a taped interview of another, both of whom worked at a nursing home where Reese became a patient in 1986. The affidavit by Belinda Romeo asserts that Romeo asked Reese on more than 100 separate occasions if she killed the seven Richardson children, that Reese replied that she did, and that Reese was competent at the times Romeo asked that question. On the other hand, the transcript of a taped interview of Doris Harris, who was present several times when Romeo questioned Reese, is clearly contrary to that affidavit. Harris states that by the time Reese was admitted to the nursing home, she was incontinent, unable to walk, unable to feed herself, only “half way aware,” unable to say what day or year it was, "back to a child's state," and suffering from Alzheimer’s. When Romeo would ask if she killed the children, she would say that she killed them, say the name Charlie, and then lapse into incoherent mumbling. Harris believed that Reese was saying she killed them because she was the one who fed them the poisoned food, and not because she was the one who put the poison in the food. Reese’s “admissions” are, therefore, ambiguous and not trustworthy. Petitioner also introduced into evidence a 1988 affidavit of Richard H. Barnard, the Chief of Police who began an investigation into the children’s deaths. After he got Reese to admit she was in the Richardson home that day and served the children their lunch, he was removed from the investigation by the “Governor’s office” in a phone call which he believes Sheriff Cline instigated. His affidavit undermines the statements of the jailhouse informants, expresses his concern that Sheriff Cline may have tampered with the jury, and states his opinion that Sheriff Cline framed Petitioner. He concludes with his opinion that Petitioner was innocent and Reese was guilty. The hearsay evidence and suggestions that Reese was guilty of the murders do not constitute verifiable and substantial evidence of Petitioner’s innocence. Opinion testimony does not constitute verifiable and substantial evidence of Petitioner's innocence. The Nolle Prosse Memorandum and the Response do not constitute verifiable and substantial evidence of Petitioner’s innocence. The testimony of Horn and Novicki as to what they considered during their investigations does not constitute verifiable and substantial evidence of Petitioner’s innocence. Lastly, Petitioner’s own testimony denying his guilt is not verifiable and substantial evidence of his innocence. Simply put, the evidence in this proceeding does not establish Petitioner’s actual innocence. Since Chapter 961, Florida Statutes, does not provide a definition of “actual innocence,” Petitioner argues that the definition should be that based upon the evidence it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him. That definition is found in Supreme Court of the United States and Supreme Court of Florida cases. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995); Tompkins v. State, 994 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 2008); Mills v. State, 786 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 2001). Petitioner’s argument is not persuasive. All of those cases involved motions for post-conviction relief, not claims for money damages. That definition of actual innocence was likely utilized when Petitioner was granted post-conviction relief by having his conviction and sentence vacated and being released from prison, which is the relief which results from meeting that definition. That definition of actual innocence tests the legal sufficiency of evidence. The Statute regulating this proceeding does not consider legal sufficiency; rather, it considers factual sufficiency by requiring the undersigned to make findings of fact as to Petitioner’s actual innocence if proven by verifiable and substantial evidence. In other words, proof of factual innocence is required. Perhaps the reason the Statute does not contain its own definition of actual innocence is that the Legislature intended the words to have their plain, ordinary meaning. A review of the two investigations of Petitioner’s prosecution clearly shows an absence of evidence proving Petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. However, a review of the two investigations does not show that Petitioner is actually innocent. Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to meet his burden of proving actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence and, thus, has failed to establish that he is a wrongfully incarcerated person eligible for compensation under the Victims of Wrongful Incarceration Compensation Act. RECOMMENDED DETERMINATION Based on the record in this proceeding and the above Findings of Fact, it is RECOMMENDED that an order be entered by the Circuit Judge determining that Petitioner has failed to meet his burden of proving actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence, denying Petitioner’s claim for compensation, and dismissing his Petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of August, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of August, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert I. Barrar, Esquire Law Offices of Ellis Rubin & Robert I. Barrar 6619 South Dixie Highway, No. 311 Miami, Florida 33143 Raul C. De La Heria, Esquire 2100 Coral Way, Suite 500 Miami, Florida 33145 Dennis Nales, Esquire Office of the State Attorney 2071 Ringling Boulevard, Suite 400 Sarasota, Florida 34237 Earl Moreland, Esquire Office of the State Attorney 2071 Ringling Boulevard, Suite 400 Sarasota, Florida 34237
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent Three Rivers Legal Services engaged in unlawful employment practices with regard to Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner Attorney Kaimowitz was born on May 5, 1935. He attended the University of Wisconsin, served in the U. S. Army, and was a journalist early in his career. He worked to obtain voting rights for African-Americans in the Deep South as a volunteer for the Congress of Racial Equality in the summer of 1964. He attended law school at New York University and while attending law school worked for the New York Civil Liberties Union as an investigator. Upon graduating from law school in 1967, he applied for membership in the New York State Bar Association and was eventually admitted. He was employed as a staff attorney with the Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law in New York City. He was suspended from that position. In 1970 he was awarded a Reginald Heber Smith Fellowship which took him to Michigan Legal Services in Detroit, Michigan. He remained there until he took a sabbatical so that he could complete a Legal Services Corporation Research Fellowship in 1979 and 1980, which was located at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He could have returned to his employment at Michigan Legal Services but instead sued that entity. He also sued Pennsylvania Legal Services, Legal Services of North Carolina, and the Mental Health Law Project of the District of Columbia for alleged age discrimination in hiring. From December 1980 until 1984 he was employed as associate counsel for the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund in New York and Connecticut. He left there because of a "labor dispute." In March of 1985 he was hired as director of the Greater Orlando Area Legal Services (GOALS). He was fired in 1986. He sued GOALS, and obtained a financial settlement. Subsequently he applied for jobs with Broward County Legal Services and Central Florida Legal Services. When he was turned down for those jobs, he sued both entities based on age discrimination. The action against Central Florida Legal Services ended in 1999 or 2000 with a confidential settlement involving the payment of money to Attorney Kaimowitz. At some point he also entered into a confidential settlement with Broward County Legal Services. Attorney Kaimowitz claims that the suits he filed against various legal services programs were based on his personal mission to reform the hiring practices of legal services programs, and he avers that he has been on that mission since 1980. Although he claims to have instituted these suits for altruistic motives, many of them resulted in monetary settlements that benefited him personally. None of these suits were tried to the point that a verdict resulted. After being fired by GOALS he obtained a master's in communications from the University of Central Florida in 1988. While attending school he worked as a journalist for the "Orlando Weekly," a publication targeted to African-Americans in the Orlando area. Subsequently Attorney Kaimowitz represented African- Americans in civil rights actions, including employment discrimination in the Orlando area. He was in private practice of law at that time although he had no office. In 1989 or 1990 a court assessed fees against him for engaging in frivolous litigation. Attorney Kaimowitz moved to Gainesville because his domestic partner was seeking a Ph.D. at the University of Florida. From May 14, 1999, until February 7, 2002, he worked for Alachua County as an investigator into citizen complaints of discrimination in housing and public accommodation. He was terminated from that job because of accusations of "serious misconduct." He claimed his discharge from this job was in retaliation for whistle blowing. He sued, and received a monetary settlement. He subsequently and unsuccessfully sought employment with the City of Gainesville, the University of Florida, and with the State of Florida. He had a dispute with the University of Florida based on the University's failure to publish written material that he submitted. He filed suits pro se based on age discrimination against Gainesville for failing to hire him and against the University of Florida and the Florida Board of Regents because of the publication dispute and because they refused to hire him. The suit against the Board of Regents was settled by a monetary payment to him of a confidential sum, according to Attorney Kaimowitz. In 1997, Judge Maurice Paul, a U. S. District Judge, entered an order forbidding Attorney Kaimowitz from filing pro se lawsuits in his court. Prior to 2003, Attorney Kaimowitz was disciplined by the Florida Supreme Court on two occasions. A Florida Bar report dated January 29, 2002, reported a finding on January 3, 2002, of professional misconduct. He was reprimanded for making a statement he knew to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the integrity of a judge. He had been previously reprimanded by the Florida Supreme Court in 1998. Attorney Kaimowitz is proud that he has filed countless motions to disqualify judges. He claims he has succeeded in disqualifying, at one time or another, every judge in the Middle District of Florida, and several in the Eighth Judicial Circuit, which includes the Gainesville area. Attorney Kaimowitz agrees with the notion that he is, "the most well-known offensive personality in the Eighth Judicial Circuit," but asserts that this reputation was not fully achieved until 2004. This self-characterization is accepted based on the evidence adduced in this case. Attorney Kaimowitz suffered a hearing loss and began using hearing aids in 1992. It is found as a fact that he hears well enough to try a case, which was demonstrated in this case. At his request, counsel table was moved close to the bench. He subsequently announced that this accommodated his hearing deficiency. Attorney Kaimowitz was arrested for causing a disturbance in a Gainesville City Commission meeting in 2002. He is very proud of being arrested. On November 16, 2004, Eighth Judicial Circuit Judge Larry Gibbs Turner entered an order entitled Sentence on Judgment of Guilty of Direct and In-Direct Criminal Contempt, following a Judgment of Guilty of eight separate allegations of direct and indirect criminal contempt on October 13, 2004. This Order recited the following language: A review of the fifteen (15) volumes of the record in this cause clearly demonstrates that throughout these proceedings Mr. Kaimowitz carefully, willfully, and with calculation and premeditation abused his status as a lawyer/pro se litigant in filing repetitious and frivolous pleadings including, but not limited to, his repeated motions to recuse every judge associated with this case. Mr. Kaimowitz's most recent effort to recuse this undersigned judge was framed by his GABE KAIMOWITZ'S APPLICATION TO DISQUALIFY JUDGE LARRY G. TURNER, FROM TAKING ANY FURTHER ACTION IN THIS MATTER - LAWFUL OR UNLAWFUL - BECAUSE THE JURIST HAS BEEN AND CURRENTLY APPARENTLY IS AN EMPLOYEE OF THE FLORIDA BOARD OF REGENTS, AND/OR ITS SUCCESSOR RESPONSIBLE FOR THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA AND AFFIDAVIT/CERTIFICATE WITH GABE KAIMOWITZ'S APPLICATION TO DISQUALIFY JUDGE LARRY G. TURNER, FROM TAKING ANY FURTHER ACTION IN THIS MATTER - LAWFUL OR UNLAWFUL - BECAUSE THE JURIST HAS BEEN AND CURRENTLY APPARENTLY IS AN EMPLOYEE OF THE FLORIDA BOARD OF REGENTS, AN/OR ITS SUCCESSOR RESPONSIBLE FOR THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA. The motions/applications seeking recusal of each of the judges in this cause provide ample evidence of Mr. Kaimowitz's "style" of litigation in which he intentionally confuses, obfuscates, insults, defames, and makes scurrilous and unsubstantiated claims against parties, judges, witnesses, and others related and unrelated to the litigation. Further evidence is found in his VERIFIED MOTION FOR ARREST OF JUDGMENT BASED ON FRAUD COMMITTED UPON THIS COURT. Beginning at page 10 of that motion Mr. Kaimowitz claims that he ". . . has learned that repeated motions for recusal as evidence pours in eventually tends to work in his favor. For instance, after Judge Jopling finally recused himself, Kaimowitz had little difficulty resolving at mediation the underlying cases. They were assigned to Judge Turner at the time, but all he did was agree to the parties' stipulated willingness to proceed to mediation." Over the following several pages, Mr. Kaimowitz recites his history of recusal litigation in other state and federal cases. Judge Turner permanently enjoined Attorney Kaimowitz from filing further pro se litigation in the county and circuit courts of the Eighth Judicial Circuit. Although Judge Turner based his finding on Kaimowitz v. The Florida Board of Regents, Eighth Circuit Case No. 01-1996-CA-3260, he noted a number of cases involving Attorney Kaimowitz going back to 1996, including Eighth Judicial Circuit Case No. 01-2003-CA-2400-A, Gabe Kaimowitz v. Gainesville, Florida, and the Gainesville Sun, in which Judge Toby S. Monaco outlined abuses as a basis for his dismissal of Attorney Kaimowitz's Complaint with prejudice. The Respondent and Its Executive Director, Allison Thompson TRLS exists pursuant to Title 42 U. S. Code, § 2996 et seq. It is governed, inter alia, by Title 45, Code of Federal Regulations, § 1600.1, et seq. Its mission is to provide equal access to the system of justice so that those who are otherwise unable to afford adequate counsel may have high quality legal assistance to seek redress of grievances. It receives funding from the Legal Services Corporation in Washington, D.C., the Florida Bar Foundation, United Way, and other local and national government sources. TRLS is headquartered in Gainesville, Florida, and serves eleven mostly rural counties surrounding Alachua County, as well as Alachua County. It works with other volunteer agencies and with pro bono attorneys. It is essential to the success of TRLS that it maintain cordial relations with the community and the bar. Ms. Thompson hires all of the TRLS management team. TRLS does not use an application form when seeking applicants for jobs. Advertisements for positions solicit resumes. TRLS does not maintain a "pool" of applicants for any particular job. The number of employees at TRLS fluctuates depending on funding. The racial, age, and gender composition of TRLS personnel from May 2003 to May 2004, was as follows: Whites 20 Blacks 19 Asian 2 Hispanic 2 Male 11 Female 32 Of the above, the oldest was born in 1947. Three of the above were born in that year. Since 2003, new attorney hires, (including law school graduates not admitted) were as follows: Whites 10 Blacks 6 Asian 0 Hispanic 1 Male 4 Female 13 Of these, the oldest was born in 1958. TRLS has hired, since Ms. Thompson has been Executive Director, at least one person who was over the age of 70. TRLS does not have quotas or a diversity plan that requires certain races, genders, or ages to be given preference in hiring. TRLS is guided in this regard by Title 45, Code of Federal Regulations, § 1616.1, et seq. Specifically, Title 45, Code of Federal Regulations, § 1616.6 requires that TRLS adopt, "employment qualifications, procedures, and policies that meet the requirements of applicable laws prohibiting discrimination in employment, and shall take affirmative action to insure equal employment opportunity." The hiring record of TRLS, taken as a whole, demonstrates compliance with this requirement and does not indicate any pattern of discrimination. Ms. Thompson has been the executive director of TRLS since 1996. She is an African-American. She graduated from the University of Florida Law School and was admitted to the Florida Bar in 1974. She has extensive experience in the delivery of legal services to the poor. She worked for Tampa Legal Services beginning in 1973. It became a Legal Services Corporation program while she was employed there. She began working for Rhode Island Legal Services in 1976, practicing primarily family law. Ms. Thompson worked for Philadelphia Legal Services for five years and then, beginning in 1982, worked for a number of years in the U. S. Virgin Islands where she was litigation director. She was appointed Executive Director of TRLS in December of 1996. Job applications with TRLS in 2003 and earlier Attorney Kaimowitz applied for a managing attorney position with TRLS in 1997. Ms. Thompson interviewed him and determined that he was an "interesting person" but was not the type of person who would work well with others. She concluded he would be difficult to manage. She noted that if she had a job which did not require working well with others, she might wish to hire him in the future. Attorney Kaimowitz applied for a job as a staff attorney in 2001. He received a letter dated May 13, 2001, from Ms. Thompson, advising him that he was not selected and that she would keep his resume on file. Attorney Kaimowitz responded to this letter with a letter dated August 15, 2001, that pointed out two settlements he had received from legal services programs in Florida based on their alleged discrimination against him because of his age. He also discussed his whistle blowing with regard to GOALS and stated, "I include this information to indicate that when there really is a will, there is a way." Ms. Thompson took this as a threat. Attorney Kaimowitz applied for a job as a managing attorney in the TRLS Lake City office in 2002. He was not interviewed for that position. TRLS advertised for a fair housing attorney and a fair housing testing coordinator in various publications during April 2003. Attorney Kaimowitz applied for both of these jobs. He interviewed with Ms. Thompson and Mary O'Rourke, a staff attorney with TRLS, on May 30, 2003. Ms. Thompson asked Ms. O'Rourke to sit in as a witness to the interview because she was concerned that Attorney Kaimowitz would sue TRLS if she did not hire him. Initially, Attorney Kaimowitz expressed an interest in both the fair housing attorney job and the fair housing testing coordinator job. However, during the interview Attorney Kaimowitz stated that he did not wish to apply for the fair housing attorney position, but wished to be considered only as an applicant for the fair housing testing coordinator position. The occupant of this position was expected to supervise individuals who would determine if discrimination in housing was occurring. Attorney Kaimowitz claimed during his testimony that he told Ms. Thompson and Ms. O'Rourke that his ability to hear was impaired. He claimed he told them he required an accommodation for his hearing loss. He stated that he had a discussion with Ms. O'Rourke during the interview about an electronic system where a court reporter would record words spoken, and the words would be displayed on a monitor so that he could read what was being said. Attorney Kaimowitz appeared at the interview wearing one hearing aid. Ms. Thompson said that Attorney Kaimowitz said that one of his hearing aids was "in the shop." Ms. Thompson testified that he announced during the interview that his hearing loss was corrected by his hearing aids. Ms. Thompson said it was clear that he had no difficulty in understanding her with only one hearing aid. In no event did she perceive him as being hearing impaired. Ms. O'Rourke stated that the conversation claimed by Attorney Kaimowitz regarding an electronic monitor system to aid hearing never occurred. Based on Ms. O'Rourke's testimony, Ms. Thompson's testimony, and Attorney Kaimowitz's credibility, which is addressed in detail below, it is found that at the time of this interview Attorney Kaimowitz did not claim the need for an accommodation based on an alleged hearing impairment and he was not perceived as being hearing impaired. Ms. Thompson wanted employees at TRLS who would maintain a good relationship with the local bar. Even though the housing testing coordinator position was not a job requiring the incumbent to be a licensed attorney, it is not helpful for TRLS to have employees who are at odds with the local bar or community. She was looking for an employee who was a team player, who could get along with the other employees at TRLS, the local bar, and with persons in the community. She also wanted someone with good references. The fair housing testing coordinator required training in Jacksonville. Ms. Thompson believed Attorney Kaimowitz could not be trained because, "He already knew everything." She believed he couldn't take orders. She was troubled because he had no references from people who had supervised him. Although attorneys who have their own practice cannot give references of supervisors, they usually can give a judge or judges as a reference, but Attorney Kaimowitz did not provide any judges as references. Attorney Kaimowitz provided a co-plaintiff in a lawsuit and a professor named Joe Little as references. Ms. Thompson called Professor Little but did not feel it would be worthwhile calling his co-plaintiff, who was embroiled in a lawsuit at the time. She was concerned because Attorney Kaimowitz told her, with regard to references, "everyone in Gainesville was suspect." Moreover, he did not provide any references from his time as director of GOALS, which was a job where he had a supervisor who could comment on his work. Ms. Thompson was aware of Attorney Kaimowitz's arrest during a Gainesville City Commission meeting, and was aware of at least one of his Florida Supreme Court reprimands at the time she decided not to hire him. She was also aware that he would occasionally write in "black English," and she found that offensive. She believed him to be a disruptive force. She stated she would not hire him if he was "the last man on earth." She stated that an equally obnoxious black man would often apply for positions at TRLS, and she would not hire him for the same general reasons that she would not hire Attorney Kaimowitz. Ms. Thompson thought Attorney Kaimowitz would be a liability to her organization. She noted that, "He makes comments without any basis. He makes sweeping comments when he knows nothing. He doesn't even check." Brenda Scafadi was eventually hired for the housing testing coordinator. She was, at the time, a 50-year-old white woman who had a disability in the form of fibromyalgia. She was not an attorney. She was hired because she was perceived to be a team player and she had good references. Ms. Scafadi resigned after about eight months and was replaced by Steve Malu, a 50-year-old Nigerian, who also was not an attorney. Attorney Kaimowitz was a person Ms. Thompson had personally known for about six years at the time of the interview. She also knew about him from his letters to the "Gainesville Sun" and numerous e-mails he sent to her and to others. She was aware of his reputation in the community. She refused to hire him because she did not believe he would be a good employee. Neither his age, nor his race, nor his claimed hearing loss was a factor in her decision. Attorney Kaimowitz received a letter from Ms. Thompson dated July 22, 2003, advising him that she had, "decided to offer the position to different applicants who I thought would be more appropriate for our needs." The Americorps positions On August 1, 2004, Americorps positions in Gainesville and Jacksonville were advertised. These jobs were targeted at inexperienced attorneys and paid "living expenses" and a promise of scholarship help rather than a salary. During the evening of August 2, 2004, Ms. Thompson offered testimony before the Gainesville City Commission. After her testimony she departed, although the meeting continued. After exiting the building, she heard footsteps behind her and turned to see Attorney Kaimowitz following her. There were no other people in the area. He stated that he wanted to "mediate our situation" but was informed by Ms. Thompson that there was nothing to mediate because she did not discriminate. She told him she was tired of him making disparaging comments about her program and her staff. Attorney Kaimowitz expressed an interest in the Americorps positions in an e-mail to Ms. Thompson dated August 5, 2004, which was in the nature of a resume. In this letter he said, "I certainly will refrain from any action I suggested I might take through this month of August, so that we can see if we can reach an accommodation in that time." Ms. Thompson regarded this as a threat. Ms. Thompson did not interview him for the Americorps positions because the "resume" e-mail of August 5, 2004, did not match the requirements of the job. Three of the positions were designed for attorneys TRLS could train so that they could recruit students from the law school to assist in the delivery of services. The other two positions required no litigation skills and were designed to provide limited legal services over the telephone to a large volume of clients. Another reason Ms. Thompson found Attorney Kaimowitz to be unsuitable for this job were statements he made to her, such as claiming she hired an "incompetent black male." She had seen, and was familiar with, another widely circulated writing in which he stated, "The real 'piece of work' is Three Rivers Legal Services, and their foolish young attorney of color Glorimil Walker, everyone's favorite minority attorney since she speaks her mind--even if it is against the adults and children at University Centre." The Americorps attorneys hired during this period, instead of Attorney Kaimowitz, included Shelly E. Beach, who was a 26-year-old white female, Melissa B. Long, a 29-year-old black female, and Julie A. Santioni, a 26-year-old white female. Ms. Thompson, and TRLS did not discriminate or retaliate against Mr. Kaimowitz in refusing him an Americorps position. He was not hired because the job was unsuitable for him and because he was unsuitable for employment at TRLS. Retaliation Attorney Kaimowitz's original claim of retaliation was based on his view that TRLS would not hire him because he had sued Central Florida Legal Services and that Ms. Thompson knew and would not hire him because of that lawsuit. Ms. Thompson denied this. Attorney Kaimowitz's second claim of retaliation was based on the complaint to the Commission concerning the refusal of TRLS to hire him for the fair housing testing coordinator position. For reasons that are abundantly clear herein, there were numerous reasons for not hiring him other than retaliation. Attorney Kaimowitz's Credibility Attorney Kaimowitz claims that he applied for the fair housing attorney position as well as the fair housing testing coordinator. Both Ms. Thompson and Ms. O'Rourke stated that at his interview he said he wished to apply only for the fair housing testing coordinator. Attorney Kaimowitz also claims that he informed Ms. Thompson and Ms. O'Rourke at his interview that he was hard of hearing and required an accommodation. Ms. Thompson and Ms. O'Rourke both said that during the interview he asserted that any hearing problems he had were resolved by hearing aids. Attorney Kaimowitz has demonstrated through his pleadings and actions in court, and before this Administrative Law Judge, that he has a low regard for the truth. As an example, he claims to believe in the equality of mankind, but during his examination of Ms. Thompson, he threw a document at her and stated that, "And then you could never find discrimination unless I don't want a nigger in here." As a consequence all issues involving credibility are resolved against Attorney Kaimowitz. That being the case, it is found by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not seek the fair housing attorney position in 2003 and that he did not assert during the interview that he was hard of hearing and thus required an accommodation.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the petitions be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of June, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of June, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Carla D. Franklin, Esquire 4809 Southwest 91st Terrace Gainesville, Florida 32608 Gabe H. Kaimowitz, Esquire Post Office Box 140119 Gainesville, Florida 32614-0119 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services improperly awarded a contract to National Health Laboratories, Inc. for the reasons set forth in the petition.
Findings Of Fact By Invitation to Bid mailed March 26, 1993 (ITB), the Dade County Public Health Unit requested bids on an annual contract for the performance of clinical laboratory test services. The Dade County Public Health Unit is under the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS). The contracting agency shall hereafter be referred to as HRS. The ITB called for the opening of bids on April 12, 1993. Six bids were timely submitted. The apparent low bid was submitted by National Health Laboratories, Inc. (NHL). The NHL bid was $202,271. The second low bid was submitted by Continental Medical Laboratory, Inc. (CML). The CML bid was $241,100. HRS issued a notice of intent to award the contract to NHL. CML timely protested. There is no issue as to the responsiveness of the CML bid. The only issue as to the responsiveness of the NHL bid concerns the matters raised by CML. CML's petition alleges that the bid of NHL was defective because the Sworn Statement Pursuant to Section 287.133(3)(a), Florida Statutes, on Public Entity Crimes (Public Entity Crime Affidavit) was incomplete, an agreement attached to the Public Entity Crime Affidavit did not relieve NHL from disqualification concerning CHAMPUS fraud, and NHL should be disqualified from bidding because it failed timely to inform the Department of Management Services of the company's conviction of a public entity crime. Paragraph 10 of the General Conditions of the ITB allows HRS to "waive any minor irregularity or technicality in bids received." However, special conditions provide, in part: PUBLIC ENTITY CRIMES Any person submitting a bid or proposal in response to this invitation must execute the enclosed [Public Entity Affidavit], including proper check(s), in the space(s) provided, and enclose it with the bid/proposal. Failure to complete this form in every detail and submit it with your proposal will result in immediate disqualification of your bid. The Public Entity Crime Affidavit completed by NHL and submitted with its bid was executed and notarized on April 9, 1993. Paragraph six of the form affidavit states: Based on information and belief, the statement which I have marked below is true in relation to the entity submitting this sworn statement. [Indicate which statement applies.] Neither the entity submitting this sworn statement, nor any of its officers, directors, executives, partners, shareholders, employees, members, or agents who are active in the management of the entity, nor any affiliate of the entity has been charged with and convicted of a public entity crime subsequent to July 1, 1989. The entity submitting this sworn statement, or one or more of its officers, directors, executives, partners, shareholders, employees, members, or agents who are active in the management of the entity, or an affiliate of the entity has been charged with and convicted of a public entity crime subsequent to July 1, 1989. The entity submitting this sworn statement, or one or more of its officers, directors, executives, partners, shareholders, employees, members or agents who are active in the management of the entity, or an affiliate of an entity has been charged with and convicted of a public entity crime subsequent to July 1, 1989. However, there has been a subsequent proceeding before a Hearing Officer of the State of Florida, Division of Administrative Hearings and the Final Order entered by the Hearing Officer determined that it was not in the public interest to place the entity submitting this sworn statement on the convicted vendor list. [attach a copy of the final order] The next paragraph of the Public Entity Crime Affidavit form states: I UNDERSTAND THAT THE SUBMISSION OF THIS FORM TO THE CONTRACTING OFFICER FOR THE PUBLIC ENTITY IDENTIFIED IN PARAGRAPH I (ONE) ABOVE IS FOR THAT PUBLIC ENTITY ONLY AND, THAT THIS FORM IS VALID THROUGH DECEMBER 31 OF THE CALENDAR YEAR IN WHICH IT IS FILED. I ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT I AM REQUIRED TO INFORM THE PUBLIC ENTITY PRIOR TO ENTERING INTO A CONTRACT IN EXCESS OF THE THRESHOLD AMOUNT PROVIDED IN SECTION 287.017, FLORIDA STATUTES FOR CATEGORY TWO OF ANY CHANGE IN THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS FORM. In completing the Public Entity Crime Affidavit, NHL penned in, just over the second alternative that discloses a conviction, "See Attached." The attachment was a copy of an Agreement dated December 31, 1992, between NHL and the "state of Florida" (Settlement Agreement). The agreement was executed by an NHL officer and the Director, Medicaid Fraud Control Unit of the Auditor General Office. The Auditor General's Office is not part of the Department of Management Services. The Settlement Agreement concerns invoices from NHL to the Florida Medicaid program for certain cholesterol and iron tests from January 1, 1987, through November 30, 1992. The Settlement Agreement requires NHL to pay as restitution to the State of Florida $1,470,917. In return, the state of Florida, for itself and on behalf of its agents and assigns, will release and forever discharge NHL, its current or former officers, directors, employees, agents, shareholders, affiliates, assigns and successors from any and all claims, actions, demands or causes of action including penalties or interest against any of them, either civil or criminal, as regards Medicaid reimbursement [for certain cholesterol and iron tests] between January 1, 1987 and November 30, 1992, except that nothing contained in this Settlement Agreement shall preclude the state Medicaid program from seeking recoupment of payments made [for certain cholesterol tests] during the period covered by this Settlement Agreement, subject to the understanding that NHL will contest any such recoupment action on the grounds that such payments were appropriate. The Settlement Agreement also provides: The state of Florida agrees that neither the Settlement Agreement nor any federal criminal conviction or other sanction of the corporation or a current or former officer or employee of NHL as regards claims for Medicaid reimbursement [for certain cholesterol and iron tests] [b]etween January 1, 1987 and November 30, 1992 will be the basis for a state exclusion of NHL from the Florida Medicaid program. NHL is a company that provides laboratory testing nationally and receives payment for many of its services from government sources, such as Medicaid, Medicare, or CHAMPUS. CHAMPUS is the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services. During the period of 1987 through 1992, NHL supplied certain cholesterol and iron testing, in addition to that specifically requested by the health-care provider, at little or no cost to the health-care provider. But NHL invoiced various government payors at higher rates. On December 18, 1992, NHL entered guilty pleas to two counts of criminal fraud involving these practices as they concern the CHAMPUS program. These pleas were the bases of a conviction and sentence that included a criminal fine of $1,000,000. One or two former officers entered guilty pleas to charges of criminal fraud involving these practices as they concern the Medicaid program. As part of the settlement, NHL paid the United States the sum of $100,000,000. At the same time, NHL was negotiating with various states, including Florida, with respect to the above-described billing practices. On December 8, 1992, the Director of the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit in the Florida Office of the Auditor General wrote a letter to NHL confirming a proposed settlement. The conditions of the settlement are incorporated in the above- described Settlement Agreement. On December 17, 1992, the Assistant Secretary for Medicaid in HRS mailed a letter to NHL agreeing that HRS would not take administrative action for the above-described cholesterol and iron claims submitted for reimbursement by NHL to the Florida Medicaid program. NHL did not inform the Department of Management Services of the guilty plea, conviction, and $1,000,000 criminal fine. However, based probably on information received in early February 1993 from another governmental entity in Florida, the Department of Management Services, on February 8, 1993, sent a letter to NHL advising it that the Department had received information that NHL had been convicted of a public entity crime and requesting copies of the charges and final court action. NHL complied and the Department's investigation is continuing. On February 18, 1993, HRS Deputy Secretary for Health, sent a memorandum to all of the County Public Health Units directors and administrators advising them of concerns about laboratory fraud and attaching a recent report concerning the NHL case. The report described the NHL guilty pleas, conviction, and sentencing, as well as the business practices that led to the prosecution. By memorandum dated March 18, 1993, HRS Assistant Secretary for Medicaid informed HRS Depute Secretary for Health that the Auditor General had entered into the Settlement Agreement. The memorandum states that, on December 17, 1992, the Assistant Secretary signed an agreement with NHL not to terminate it from the Florida Medicaid program, which was the "same treatment afforded many other providers--including [County Public Health Units]--who overbilled the Medicaid program. The Assistant Secretary's memorandum describes the settlement as requiring NHL to make "full restitution," although the $1.4 million in restitution involves only the iron test and the State of Florida and NHL may still litigate whether any reimbursement is due for the cholesterol tests. The failure of NHL to check the second alternative on the Public Entity Crime Affidavit did not confer an economic advantage on NHL in the subject procurement. The material attached to the affidavit sufficiently informed HRS of the criminal conviction of NHL. Likewise, the omission of any mention of CHAMPUS claims in Paragraphs two and three of the Settlement Agreement did not confer any economic advantage on NHL in the procurement. The purpose of mentioning only Medicaid in the Settlement Agreement is that Florida has no jurisdiction over the CHAMPUS program. NHL was concerned only that Florida not terminate NHL's participation in the program over which Florida had jurisdiction--the Medicaid program. These references to "Medicaid reimbursement" are merely descriptive and are not intended to limit the scope of the exoneration purportedly effectuated in the Settlement Agreement.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a final order dismissing the bid protest of Continental Medical Laboratory, Inc. ENTERED on August 24, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of August, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-3951BID Treatment Accorded Proposed Findings of Respondent and Intervenor 1-8 and 11: adopted or adopted in substance. 9-10 and 12-15: rejected as subordinate. 16-31: adopted or adopted in substance. 32-37: rejected as subordinate and irrelevant. 38-43 and 45-48: rejected as irrelevant and legal argument. 44: adopted. 49-50: adopted as to absence of material variations. 51: rejected as subordinate and recitation of evidence. Treatment Accorded Proposed Findings of Petitioner 1-14 and 16-17: adopted or adopted in substance. 15: rejected as legal argument and unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 18-21: rejected as subordinate, repetitious, and legal argument. 22-27: adopted in substance. 28: rejected as irrelevant. 29 (first sentence): rejected as repetitious and irrelevant. 29 (second sentence): rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 30: adopted, but the period of the delay of DMS review in this case was too short to make any difference. 31: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence with respect to a delay of such a short duration. 32: rejected as legal argument inviting a remedy far in excess of any remedy provided for or envisioned by 287.133. 33: rejected as legal argument inviting a remedy far in excess of any remedy provided for or envisioned by 287.133, at least under the facts of the present case. 34: rejected as irrelevant. 35: rejected as legal argument and unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Geoffrey Kirk Adorno & Zeder, P.A. 2601 S. Bayshore Dr., Ste. 1600 Miami, Florida 33133 Morton Laitner, District Counsel District 11 Legal Office 401 NW 2d Ave., Ste. N-1014 Miami, Florida 33128 Thomas F. Panza Seann Michael Frazier Panza, Maurer 3081 E. Commercial Blvd., Ste. 200 Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33308 John Slye, General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Robert L. Powell Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
