SCHUMAN, P.J. Defendant Markley petitions us to reconsider our decision in Cruze v. Hudler, 246 Or.App. 649 , 267 P.3d 176 (2011), in which we reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in his favor. The majority of his petition either mischaracterizes aspects of our opinion or simply reargues issues that were raised in the briefs and decided adversely to him, and we decline to reconsider those issues. ORAP 6.25(1)(e) (petitions for reconsideration "addressing legal issues...
HADLOCK, J. Plaintiff, who used to work for defendants as a car salesman, alleges that he sought less-stressful employment after he suffered a heart attack. Plaintiff asserts that defendants promised to give him a "corporate" position that would accommodate his needs and further claims that, in reliance on that promise, he turned down a job with a different employer. This litigation followed defendants' later decision not to hire plaintiff for the corporate job. Plaintiff's amended...
ORTEGA, P.J. Defendants appeal from a general judgment awarding plaintiff damages and prejudgment interest, and from a supplemental judgment awarding attorney fees and costs. Plaintiff is a collection agency that sued defendants to recover legal fees charged pursuant to a fee agreement between defendant B & A Automotive, Inc. (B & A) and its former attorney, Scott Bassinger (Bassinger). 1 Defendant Gonzales and defendant Mulhall (the individual defendants), both of whom were associated with B...
SERCOMBE, P.J. This case concerns whether plaintiffs' rights to develop a residential subdivision had vested under Measure 49. In 1969, plaintiffs acquired a 62-acre tract of land in rural Clackamas County. At that time, the property's zoning allowed residences to be built on one-acre parcels. More restrictive zoning was subsequently applied that confined the uses of the property to agricultural and forestry uses. Pursuant to Measure 37, former ORS 197.352(8) (2005), amended by Or. Laws...
LANDAU, J. pro tempore. This is a legal malpractice case in which plaintiff contends that defendants were negligent in providing advice to plaintiffs during negotiations for the sale of a business. The jury found that one of defendants was negligent, but that his negligence did not cause plaintiffs any damage. On appeal, the issue is whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the subject of causation. Specifically, plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in delivering...
NAKAMOTO, J. Defendant appeals a judgment of conviction for driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII), ORS 813.010. Defendant assigns error to the trial court overruling his objections and directing him to answer questions about conversations that he had with his attorney. We conclude that the trial court incorrectly ruled that defendant waived his lawyer-client privilege when he testified, and that error prejudiced defendant. Accordingly, we reverse and remand. We review a trial...
DUNCAN, J. Claimant was injured at work and brought a workers' compensation claim. ORS 656.202(1). Employer awarded claimant "permanent partial disability." ORS 656.214. The award included a payment for "impairment," ORS 656.214(1)(a), but not for "work disability," ORS 656.214(1)(e). Claimant sought administrative review, asserting that she was entitled to a payment for work disability because she had not returned to or been released to "regular work." ORS 656.214(2)(a), (b). Specifically,...
WALTERS, J. pro tempore. In this case, plaintiffs Ritter and Davis challenge the authority of defendant Nye Ditch Users Improvement District to enter their property for the purpose of improving and repairing the Nye Ditch that traverses their property. 1 Plaintiffs Davis challenge defendant's authority to assess fees against them for that purpose. This case arose on cross-motions for summary judgment, and we affirm the trial court's judgment for defendant. I. DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO ACCESS...
HASELTON, P.J. Plaintiff appeals a supplemental judgment denying her attorney fees, challenging the trial court's rejection of her exceptions, ORS 36.425(6), to the arbitrator's denial of her fee petition. The trial court sustained the arbitrator's determination that plaintiff had no entitlement to attorney fees under ORS 20.080 and further held that, because plaintiff had not invoked ORS 20.082 as a possible ground for fee entitlement before the arbitrator, that ground was not cognizable...
WOLLHEIM, J. Defendant appeals a judgment extending his probation after a hearing in which defendant appeared pro se, contending that the trial court erred in allowing him to waive counsel without advising him of the risks of representing himself. We conclude that the trial court erred in failing to advise defendant of the risks of self-representation and reverse. In February 2008, defendant, who was then age 18, pleaded guilty to the crime of contributing to the sexual delinquency of a...
NAKAMOTO, J. Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction of one count each of unlawful delivery of methamphetamine, ORS 475.890; unlawful possession of methamphetamine, ORS 475.894; and first-degree child neglect, ORS 163.547. Because we conclude that the trial court erred by denying defendant's right to present a closing argument, we reverse and remand. That disposition obviates the need to address defendant's assignment of error concerning her sentence. At the end of the bench trial,...
ARMSTRONG, J. Plaintiff obtained a money judgment against defendant for personal injuries that plaintiff had sustained in an automobile accident. Before the court entered the judgment, defendant's liability insurer reimbursed plaintiffs insurer for the amount of personal injury protection (PIP) benefits provided by plaintiffs insurer to plaintiff. More than a year after the court entered the judgment, defendant's liability insurer sought a credit against plaintiff's judgment for the amount of...
SCHUMAN, P.J. Petitioner filed an untimely request for a hearing with the Oregon Driver and Motor Vehicles Services Division (DMV) to contest the suspension of his driving privileges. DMV denied the request and petitioner seeks judicial review. As he did before DMV, he argues that his untimeliness resulted from "just cause" as defined by DMV rules and that therefore DMV erred in denying his request. ORS 813.440(l)(g). Further, he contends that DMV's order lacked "substantial reason," that is,...
WOLLHEIM, J. Plaintiff appeals a judgment dismissing his Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) claims, against defendant Union Pacific Railroad Company for strict liability and negligence, based on hip injuries allegedly sustained on the job. The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment after determining that, because plaintiff became aware of his work-related injuries more than three years before he filed the claims, they were barred by the three-year statute of...
SCHUMAN, P.J. Plaintiffs brought this action against two defendants, Martin L. Hudler and Charles R. Markley, who allegedly defrauded them by means of an investment scheme. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Markley on all of plaintiffs' claims, and refused to allow plaintiffs to amend their complaint to allege a racketeering claim against either defendant. Plaintiffs now appeal, arguing that the court erred in granting Markley's motion for summary judgment and in denying...
SERCOMBE, J. Plaintiff and defendant Derek Walker are owners of adjoining properties. Plaintiff brought an action against defendants—Derek Walker and his wife, Cassondra—for interference with an easement, alleging that defendants wrongfully impeded plaintiffs use of a dirt access road that runs through the Walker property. Defendants moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted the motion, concluding that plaintiff did not have an express easement to use the dirt access road and...
DUNCAN, J. Plaintiff filed this action for forcible entry and detainer (FED), asserting that it had a right to possession of the premises at issue because it had properly terminated its lease agreement with defendant based on defendant's violation of a material term of the lease agreement, specifically, an occupancy rule prohibiting loud noise and illegal activity. The trial court entered a judgment in defendant's favor, holding that the lease agreement did not incorporate the occupancy rule....
PER CURIAM. Vacated and remanded for reconsideration. State v. Machuca, 347 Or. 644 , 227 P.3d 729 (2010); State v. Martinez-Alvarez, 245 Or.App. 369 , 263 P.3d 1091 (2011).
PER CURIAM. Vacated and remanded for reconsideration. State v. Machuca, 347 Or. 644 , 227 P.3d 729 (2010); State v. Martinez-Alvarez, 245 Or.App. 369 , 263 P.3d 1091 (2011).
PER CURIAM. Vacated and remanded for reconsideration. State v. Machuca, 347 Or. 644 , 227 P.3d 729 (2010); State v. Martinez-Alvarez, 245 Or.App. 369 , 263 P.3d 1091 (2011).
