The issue in this case is whether Respondent, while serving as Secretary of the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ), violated section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes (2007-2009),1/ by incurring excessive travel costs between St. Petersburg and Tallahassee, Florida, after receiving reasonable notice and admonition from the Governor's administration that the travel was excessive.Respondent made excessive trips to St. Petersburg, his primary residence.

The issue is whether Respondent, Ed DePuy, committed the following violations as alleged in the Ethics Commission's Order Finding Probable Cause dated December 9, 2009, and the Supplemental Order Finding Probable Cause dated September 8, 2010: Whether Respondent violated s ection 112.3143(3)(a), Florida Statutes, regarding a July 11, 2006, vote/measure which affected a real estate development in which Respondent had an interest. Whether Respondent violated section 112.3143(3)(a) regarding an August 22, 2006, vote/measure which affected a real estate development in which Respondent had an interest. Whether Respondent violated s ection 112.3143(3)(a), regarding a January 9, 2007, vote/measure which affected a real estate development in which R espondent had an interest. Whether Respondent violated s ection 112.3143(3)(a) regarding a March 13, 2007, vote/measure which affected a real estate development in which Respondent had an interest. Whether Respondent violated a rticle II, section 8 of the Florida Constitution by failing to disclose income received in 2007 on his 2007 CE Form 6, Full and Public Disclosure of Financial Interests. Whether Respondent violated s ection 112.3143(3)(a) regarding a January 9, 2007, vote/measure which would inure to the special private gain or loss of a principal by whom Respondent was retained or to the special private gain or loss of the parent organization or subsidiary of a corporate principal by which Respondent was retained. Whether Respondent violated s ection 112.3143(3)(a) regarding a March 13, 2007, vote/measure which would inure to the special private gain or loss of a principal by whom Respondent was retained or to the special private gain or loss of the parent organization or subsidiary of a corporate principal by which Respondent was retained. h. Whether Respondent violated article II, section 8 of the Florida Constitution, by failing to disclose a secondary source of income received in 2007 on his 2007 CE Form 6, Full and Public Disclosure of Financial Interests.Former county commissioner should pay a fine for failure to report income on his 2007 CE Form 6, Full and Public Disclosure of Financial Interests. Recommend that other allegations be dismissed for lack of clear and convincing evidence.

The issues for determination are whether Respondent, Lonnie Evans, violated section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes (2008), by misusing his position by using the Chief of Police's city-owned vehicle for campaigning, and if so, what penalty should be imposed?Clear and convincing evidence did not support a finding that Respondent misused his poistion in violation of Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, with regard to the City of Coleman 2008 mayoral campaign.

The issues for determination are whether Respondent, Frank Moore, violated section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes (2008), by misusing his position and/or resources within his trust to help Lonnie Evans in his 2008 re-election campaign for Mayor of Coleman; whether Respondent violated section 112.313(6) by engaging in a traffic stop of Timothy Brunson to discuss a pending ethics complaint; and if either or both violations are proven, what penalties should be imposed?Clear and convincing evidence did not support a finding that Respondent misused his position in violation of Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, with regard to the City of Coleman 2008 mayoral campaign.

The issues for determination are whether Respondent, Frank Moore, violated section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes (2008), by misusing his position and/or resources within his trust to help Lonnie Evans in his 2008 re-election campaign for Mayor of Coleman; whether Respondent violated section 112.313(6) by engaging in a traffic stop of Timothy Brunson to discuss a pending ethics complaint; and if either or both violations are proven, what penalties should be imposed?Clear and convincing evidence did not support a finding that Respondent misused his position in violation of Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, with regard to the City of Coleman 2008 mayoral campaign.

The issues in the case are as follows: Whether Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G4-12.017 is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority; and Whether the committee procedure used by the Construction Industry Licensing Board to review applications for licensure is invalid as an unadopted rule.The Rule expands legislative authority and is invalid. The procedure for application approval by the committee is an unadopted rule and is invalid.

The issue is whether Petitioner's application for reinstatement of his licensure as a land surveyor should be granted or denied.Petitioner made a good faith effort to comply with license renewal statutes and rules, and his failure to comply was due to an illness which justified his failure to renew.

The issue in this case is whether Petitioner's application for a license to engage in the business of contracting should be granted or denied.Respondent denied Petitioner`s contract application on the ground that a prior felony conviction disqualified him. However, Petitioner has established sufficient proof of rehabilitation. Recommend that his application for licensure be approved.

This is a rule challenge proceeding in which the following specific issues are presented: Whether Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G4-12.006 is an invalid delegation of legislative authority, and Whether application of the provisions of Section 112.011(1)(b), Florida Statutes, by the Construction Industry Licensing Board in its quasi-judicial capacity constitutes an agency statement of general applicability that requires rulemaking by the agency.An adopted rule repealed by the legislative action cannot be challenged under Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. A related agency statement was not a rule.

The issues are whether the existing and proposed provisions of Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G4-15.005, as identified in the next paragraph, are invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority.Petitioner had standing to challenge net-worth rule as applicable to trades for which Petitioner offered pre-licensing courses. Petitioner proved existing and prior net-worth rules for these trades modified, enlarged, and contravened the law implemented.