131 B.R. 499 (1991) In re BICOASTAL CORPORATION d/b/a SimuFlite, f/k/a The Singer Company, Debtor. Bankruptcy No. 89-8191-BKC-8P1. United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida, Tampa Division. September 10, 1991. *500 Harley Riedel, Dykema Gossett, Cindy LoCicero, Tampa, Fla., for debtor. William Goldman, Brown & Wood, New York City, Donald E. Engle, Oppenheimer Wolff & Donnelly, St. Paul, Minn., for Unsecured Creditors. Sarah L. Kistler, Asst. U.S. Trustee, Tampa, Fla. ORDER ON INTERIM FEE APPLI..

136 B.R. 567 (1992) In the Matter of Michael DAVIDOFF and Shirley Davidoff, Debtors. Bankruptcy No. 91-7938-8B3. United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida, Tampa Division. February 12, 1992. George Allen DuFour, Tampa, Fla., for debtors. Chris C. Larimore, Bradenton, Fla., trustee. Robert G. Cochran, Tampa, Fla., for First Florida Bank. ORDER DENYING DEBTORS' SECOND AMENDED MOTION TO VALUE SECURITY THOMAS E. BAYNES, Jr., Bankruptcy Judge. THIS CAUSE came on for hearing upon Debtors' Second Ame..

The issue is whether Petitioners are entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to section 57.111, Florida Statutes (2017).1/ Petitioners are entitled to such an award if: Petitioners were the prevailing parties in a previous administrative proceeding initiated by the Department of Transportation (“the Department”); (b) the Department’s actions were not substantially justified; and (c) no special circumstances exist that would make an award of fees and costs unjust.Petitioners failed to satisfy the requirements for an award of fees and cost pursuant to section 57.111.

The issue is whether Petitioners are entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to section 57.111, Florida Statutes (2017).1/ Petitioners are entitled to such an award if: Petitioners were the prevailing parties in a previous administrative proceeding initiated by the Department of Transportation (“the Department”); (b) the Department’s actions were not substantially justified; and (c) no special circumstances exist that would make an award of fees and costs unjust.Petitioners failed to satisfy the requirements for an award of fees and cost pursuant to section 57.111.

The issue is whether Petitioners are entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to section 57.111, Florida Statutes (2017).1/ Petitioners are entitled to such an award if: Petitioners were the prevailing parties in a previous administrative proceeding initiated by the Department of Transportation (“the Department”); (b) the Department’s actions were not substantially justified; and (c) no special circumstances exist that would make an award of fees and costs unjust.Petitioners failed to satisfy the requirements for an award of fees and cost pursuant to section 57.111.

The issue is whether Franklin County (County) has given reasonable assurance that it satisfies all requirements for an after-the-fact permit authorizing the construction of a rock revetment seaward of the coastal construction control line (CCCL) on Alligator Drive, also known as County Road 370.County gave reasonable assurances that new coastal armoring (revetment) would not have adverse impacts on an adjacent revetment or adjacent upland properties.

The issue for determination in this proceeding is the fair market value as of October 15, 1998, of common stock of Citizens Bank of Wakulla held by Petitioners, dissenting minority shareholders.Dissenting stockholders are entitled to valuation of $19.78 per share of their bank stock. A minority discount is appropriate, as is consideration of discussions regarding sale of the bank, although the latter consideration is entitled to little weight.

Whether Proposed Rule 46-4.0081(2)(d), Florida Administrative Code, providing that, beginning January 1, 1998, no person shall fish with, set, or place in the water any seine with a mesh size larger than two inches stretched mesh, is a valid exercise of the delegated legislative authority of Respondent, Marine Fisheries Commission, and whether said rule was proposed in accordance with the statutory standards Respondent must follow pursuant to Section 375.025, Florida Statutes.Marine Fisheries commission repeal of Rule 46-4.0081(1)(g) and substitution of Proposed Rule 46-4.0081(2)(d) constitutes a valid exercise of delegated legislative authority.

Petitioner proved compliance with all relevant statutory and rule requirements in establishing economic, environmental, and public interest justification for granting of Power Plant Site certification.

Whether Respondent (“the St. Marks Stone Crab Festival” or “the Festival”) violated the Florida Civil Rights Act, chapter 760, part I, Florida Statutes (2019),1 by precluding Petitioner (“Michael Grasso” or “Mr. Grasso”) from bringing his dog onto its premises. Mr. Grasso filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (“the Commission”) on December 20, 2019, alleging that the St. Marks Stone Crab Festival discriminated against him based on his disability: I am an individual with a disability. I was discriminated against because of my disability. On October 26, 2019, I attempted to enter the St. Marks Stone Crab Festival. As I approached the table where admissions were being taken, a female who identified herself as Anna Bell told me that there was a no pet policy. I told her that I understood but my dog is a service animal for my disability and is exempt from rules for pets. This individual then asked me to produce an ID card proving he was actually a service animal. I told her that I did not have one and I tried to explain to her that the law did not require me to have one. I also told her that I would not enter if she did not want us to and I then asked her who was in charge so that I could follow up later. When I told her about the law, she proceeded to get the sheriff’s officers who were on site. The officer (Deputy Yarbrough) spoke with me and admitted that they did not know the law as it pertained to service animals and I printed it out for him. Mr. Yarbrough acknowledged that the law said that an ID was not required, but he said that since it was the rules of the Festival, he was there to enforce their rules. Mr. Yarbrough maintained that I was not allowed entrance unless I left my service animal elsewhere. I wrote a letter to Ray Stokes who sits on the city council and I called him, and he was belligerent and questioned whether I had a need for a service 1 Unless stated otherwise, all statutory references shall be to the 2019 version of the Florida Statutes. animal. Mr. Stokes refused further contact with me. On June 5, 2020, the Commission issued a Notice setting forth its determination that reasonable cause existed to believe that an unlawful practice had occurred: [Mr. Grasso] attempted to enter [the Festival] on October 26, 2019. [Mr. Grasso] alleged that [the Festival] denied him service by refusing to let him enter due to his disability and need for a service animal. The investigation supports his allegations. [Mr. Grasso] provided proof that he is disabled and requires the use of a service animal. [The Festival] acknowledged that it has a policy of requiring disabled guests with service animals to provide identification proving that the animal is a service animal. [The Festival] also acknowledged that since [Mr. Grasso] did not have documentation that his dog is a service animal, he was denied entry into the festival. This is direct evidence of disability discrimination. Mr. Grasso filed a Petition for Relief on July 6, 2020, and the Commission referred this matter to DOAH on July 7, 2020, for a formal administrative hearing. The final hearing was commenced as scheduled on August 27, 2020. Due to unforeseen circumstances, the final hearing was continued to September 17, 2020, and completed that day. Mr. Grasso called himself, Deputy Robert Standeford, and Sergeant Jeffrey Yarbrough as witnesses. Petitioner’s Exhibits 1 through 8 were accepted into evidence. The St. Marks Stone Crab Festival called Paula Bell and William M. Bishop, Jr., as witnesses and did not attempt to move any exhibits into evidence. The Transcript from the proceeding conducted on August 27, 2020, was filed on September 16, 2020, and the Transcript from the proceeding conducted on September 17, 2020, was filed on October 21, 2020. Both parties filed their proposed recommended orders prior to October 21, 2020, and those pleadings were considered in the preparation of this Recommended Order.The greater weight of the evidence demonstrates that Respondent violated section 760.08, Florida Statutes, by denying Petitioner access to a public accommodation.