vs. ) CASE NO. 81-1003
Respondent. )
Pursuant to agreement of the parties, hearing was held in Miami, Florida, on April 9 and 10, 1981, before the Division of Administrative Hearings and its duly designated Hearing Officer, R. T. CARPENTER. The parties were represented by:
For Petitioner: Harold F. X. Purnell, Esquire
Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
For Respondent: Henry A. Amoon, Esquire
This case was presented through a Notice to Show Cause and an Emergency Order of Suspension issued by the Petitioner, State of Florida, Division of alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, against the Respondent, Bourbon Street Corporation, d/b/a Bourbon Street. Petitioner seeks revocation of Respondent's alcoholic beverage license No. 23-0523 series 4-COP based on the following charges contained in the Notice to Show Cause:
On or about February 18, 1981, you, BOURBON STREET CORP., D/B/A/ BOURBON STREET, licensed under the beverage laws, and/or your agent, servant, or employee, MAYA QAULLIU, on your licensed premises, did unlawfully sell and/or deliver a controlled substance named or described in Florida Statute 893.03(1)(c)(3)
to wit: cannabis, to Beverage Officer R. JONES in violation of Florida Statute 893.13(1)(a)
to wit: Florida Statute 561.29(1)(a).
On or about February 18, 1981, you BOURBON STREET CORP., D/B/A BOURBON STREET, licensed under the beverage laws, and/or your agent, servant, or employee, "Mary", on your licensed premises, did unlawfully sell and/or deliver a controlled substance named or described in Florida Statute 893.03(1)(c)(3) to wit: cannabis, to Beverage Officer M. IMPERIAL in violation of Florida Statute 893.13(1)(a) to wit: Florida Statute 561.29(1)(a).
On or about February 18, 1981, you BOURBON STREET CORP., D/B/A BOURBON STREET, licensed under the beverage laws, and/or your agent, servant, or employee, MAYA QAULLIU, on your licensed premises, did unlawfully conspire
to commit a felony, to wit: Sale and/or delivery of a controlled substance that is named or described in Florida Statute 893.03(2)(a)(4) to wit: Florida Statute
777.04(4), to wit: Florida Statute 561.29(1)(a).
On or about February 22, 1981, you, BOURBON STREET CORP., D/B/A BOURBON STREET, licensed under the beverage laws, and/or your agent, servant, or employee, JACQUE LA PRIEST, on
your licensed premises, did unlawfully sell and/or deliver a controlled substance named
or described in Florida Statute 893.03(2)(a)(4) to wit: cocaine, to Beverage Officer T. DOUGLAS. in violation of Florida Statute 893.13(1)(a)
to wit: Florida Statute 561.29(1)(a).
On or about February 23, 1981, you, BOURBON STREET CORP., D/B/A/ BOURBON STREET, licensed under the beverage laws, and/or your agent, servant, or employee MAYA QAULLIU, on your licensed premises, did unlawfully conspire to commit a felony to wit: Sale or delivery of a controlled substance that is named or
described in Florida Statue 893.03(2)(a)(4)
to wit: cocaine, to Beverage Officers R. JONES and M. IMPERIAL, in violation of Florida Statute 777.04(4) to wit: Florida Statute 561.29(1)(a).
On or about February 23, 1981, you, BOURBON STREET CORP., D/B/A BOURBON STREET, licensed under the beverage laws, and/or your agent, servant, or employee, JENIFER, on your licensed premises, did unlawfully sell and/or deliver a controlled substance named or described in Florida Statute 893.03(1)(c)(3) to wit: Cannabis, to Beverage Officers R. JONES and
M. IMPERIAL, in violation of Florida Statute 893.13(1)(a) to wit: Florida Statute 561.29 (1)(a).
On or about February 23, 1981, you, BOURBON STREET CORP., D/B/A BOURBON STREET, licensed under the beverage laws, and/or your agent, servant, or employee, JENIFER, on your
licensed premises, did unlawfully sell and/or deliver a controlled substance named or described in Florida Statute 893.03(1)(c)(3) to wit: Cannabis, to Beverage Officers T. DOUGLAS and J. MAGGIO, in violation of Florida Statute 893.13(1)(a) to wit: Florida Statute 561.29(1)(a).
On or about February 23, 1981, you, BOURBON STREET CORP., D/B/A BOURBON STREET, licensed under the beverage laws, and/or your agent, servant, or employee, MAYA QAULLIU, on your licensed premises, did unlawfully sell and/or deliver a controlled substance named or described in Florida Statute 893.02=3(2)(a)(4) to wit: cocaine, to Beverage Officer T. DOUGLAS in violation of Florida Statute 893.13(1)(a)
to wit: Florida Statute 561.29(1)(a).
On or about March 19, 1981, you, BOURBON STREET CORP., D/B/A BOURBON STREET, licensed under the beverage laws, and/or your agent, servant, or employee, JACQUE LA PRIEST, on your licensed premises, did unlawfully sell and/or deliver a controlled substance named
or described in Florida Statute 893.03(2)(a)(4) to wit: Cocaine, to Beverage Officer T. DOUGLAS, in violation of Florida Statute 893.13(1)(a) to wit: Florida Statute 561.29 (1)(a).
On or about March 20, 1981, you BOURBON STREET CORP., D/B/A BOURBON STREET, licensed under the beverage laws, and/or your agent, servant, or employee JACQUE LA PRIEST, on your licensed premises, did unlawfully sell and/or deliver a controlled substance named
or described in Florida Statute 893.02(2)(a)(4) to wit: Cocaine, to Beverage Officer T. DOUGLAS, in violation of Florida Statute 893.13(1)(a)
to wit: Florida Statute 561.29(1)(a).
On or about March 2,1 1981, you, BOURBON STREET CORP., D/B/A BOURBON STREET, licensed under the beverage laws, and/or your agent, servant, or employee, JACQUE LA PRIEST, on your licensed premises, did unlawfully sell and/or deliver a controlled substance named
or described in Florida Statute 893.02(2)(a)(4) to wit: Cocaine, to Beverage Officer T. DOUGLAS in violation of Florida Statute 893.13(1)(a) to wit: Florida Statute 561.29(1)(a).
Beginning on or about February 18, 1981, you, BOURBON STREET CORP., D/B/A BOURBON STREET, licensed under the beverage laws, license
#23-0523:4-COP, your agent, servant, or employee, did maintain a place, to wit: your licensed premises at 19839-41 N.W. 2 Avenue, North Miami, Dade County, Florida, which is resorted to by persons using controlled substances for the purpose of using these controlled substances, to wit: cannabis and cocaine, or which place is used for keeping or selling them in violation of Florida Statute 893.13(2)(a)(5) within Florida Statute 561.29(1)(c).
Beginning on or about February 18, 1981, you, BOURBON STREET CORP., D/B/A BOURBON STREET, licensed under the beverage laws, license
#23-0523:4-COP, your agent, servant, or employee, did keep or maintain a public nuisance on your licensed premises, to wit:
maintaining a building or place which is visited by persons for the purpose of unlawfully using substances controlled under Chapter 893 (Florida Statutes as amended) or which is used for the illegal keeping, selling, or delivering of same, contrary to Florida Statute 823.10 and Florida Statute 561.29(1)(c).
The stock in Bourbon Street Corporation is owned by Richard Stanton and James Urie. These individuals also own several other bars and enterprises in the Dade-Broward area. All of the entertainment corporations are managed by Jane Kruger. One such company, Crazy Jim's Corporation, contracts with dancers to provide entertainment at the various Stanton-Urie enterprises managed by Kruger. Bourbon Street pays Crazy Jim's a fee for providing dancers. The dancers are, in turn, paid on an hourly or shift basis by Crazy Jim's.
The bartenders at Bourbon Street are employees of the Bourbon Street Corporation and are in charge when on duty. They are instructed to contact Kane Druger when they have trouble with a dancer or with any facet of the business. In practice, bartenders control dancers to the extent of telling them when to dance, when to mingle with customers, how to conduct themselves, and to leave the premises if they are too "high" to work.
The efforts of management to prevent drug use and sale by employees- dancers involve the posting of rules of conduct in the dressing room and inclusion of these rules in employment contracts; the use of polygraph examinations; and occasional premises visits by undercover "spotters." Several employees-dancers have been discharged for drug use.
The openness of drug use and sales in Bourbon Street varies. The testimony of Beverage Officers Douglas, Maggio, Jones and Imperial, detailed below, indicates generally open drug use and discussion of sales during the period of their investigation (February and March, 1981).
During the same period, Beverage Officers Alford, Thompson, Nelson and Fitzenmeyer were also assigned to the Bourbon Street investigation. By stipulation, they observed nothing of an incriminating nature. An attorney and a police officer who were patrons of Bourbon Street saw or heard nothing incriminating on their visits. An undercover investigator working for Bourbon Street observed no drug activity during a check in December, 1980, but had observed substantial drug activity on an earlier visit in May, 1980.
On February 22nd, 1981, Beverage Officer Douglas entered the licensed premises of Bourbon Street to investigate alleged violations and remained on the premises until 4:45 a.m. February 23rd. Officer Douglas met a dancer identified as Jacque LaPriest who agreed to arrange a purchase of cocaine. Thereafter, LaPriest placed two calls using the telephone located at the bar. After the second call, which was placed about 4:10 a.m., she advised Douglas that her man would be there in 20 to 25 minutes. At 4:30 a.m. a man introduced as Dave arrived. LaPriest obtained a package which contained the alleged cocaine. Douglas paid $140 to LaPriest for the substance.
Douglas then left the premises and field tested the substance. He received a positive indicating of cocaine and prepared the substance for delivery to the Metropolitan Dade County Public Safety Department Crime Laboratory Bureau (hereinafter crime lab). Officer Douglas sealed the substance in an envelope but did not personally deliver it to the crime lab. The test was performed by Harry J. Coleman, and his report (Exhibit 2) established that the substance was cocaine. [Count 4].
On the evening of February 22nd and the morning of February 23, 1981, Beverage Officers Douglas and Maggio were on the licensed premises of Bourbon Street. They engaged in conversations centering on drugs with a dancer identified as Jennifer. At about 12:30 a.m., February 23, Jennifer gave Douglas and Maggio a packet containing a substance they believed to be cannabis.
Douglas field tested the substance and obtained an indication of cannabis. The crime lab analysis performed by Albert C. Christensen confirmed that the substance was cannabis (Exhibit 4). [Count 7].
About 2:30 a.m., February 23, 1981, Beverage Officer Douglas, while on the licensed premises of Bourbon Street, was approached by a dancer identified as Maya Qaulliu. She offered to sell Douglas one gram of cocaine for $80.00. Douglas made the purchase and secured the substance for delivery to the crime lab. The analysis, performed by Albert C. Christensen, established that the substance was cocaine (Exhibit 4). [Count 8].
During the early morning hours of March 19, 1981, Beverage Officer Douglas was on the licensed premises of Bourbon Street. A dancer, Jacque LaPriest, offered to obtain cocaine for him at $90 per gram. They agreed that Douglas would purchase two grams and give LaPriest one-half gram. At 12:50 a.m. LaPriest informed Douglas that her man had arrived. She went outside the bar to meet the individual bringing the substance. Douglas paid LaPriest $180 and observed her receiving the packets, which Douglas subsequently acquired. He field tested the substance and obtained an indication of cocaine. The crime lab analysis performed by Jack J. Genova established that the substance was cocaine (Exhibit 6). [Count 9].
On the evening of March 19, and in the early morning hours of March 20, 1981, Beverage Officer Douglas was on the licensed premises of Bourbon Street. He discussed drugs with a dancer identified as Jacque LaPriest. At 12:45 a.m., LaPriest advised Douglas that she was going to "snort" cocaine and agreed to save a "line" for Douglas. She subsequently gave him a folded one dollar bill which contained the alleged cocaine. He replaced this dollar bill and tipped LaPriest for giving him the substance. Douglas secured the dollar bill for later analysis. The crime lab test performed by Jack J. Genova established that the substance was cocaine (Exhibit 8). [Count 10].
On the evening of March 20 and early morning of March 21, 1981, Beverage Officer Douglas was on the licensed premises of Bourbon Street. The dancer, Jacque LaPriest, offered to obtain two grams of cocaine for Douglas with a request that he give her one half-gram. Subsequently, LaPriest delivered three packets of the alleged cocaine to Douglas. He gave one container to LaPriest and field tested the contents of the remaining packets. He obtained a positive indication of cocaine which was later confirmed by the crime lab analysis performed by Kenneth F. Ede (Exhibit 15). [Count 11].
On the evening of February 17 and early morning hours of February 18, 1981, Beverage Officers Jones and Imperial were on the licensed premises of Bourbon Street. Jones was approached by the dancer Maya Qaulliu who subsequently gave him two alleged cannabis cigarettes. Jones secured the cigarettes and later submitted them for analysis. The crime lab report, signed by Newton E. Porter, confirmed that the cigarettes contained cannabis (Exhibit 12). [Count 1].
Beverage Officers Imperial and Jones were on the licensed premises of Bourbon Street on the evening of February 17 and the early morning hours of February 18, 1981. Imperial was approached by a dancer identified as Mary, who subsequently gave him an alleged cannabis cigarette. He retained the cigarette and later submitted it for laboratory analysis. The crime lab report, prepared by Newton E. Porter, established that the cigarette contained cannabis (Exhibit 13). [Count 2].
Beverage Officers Imperial and Jones were on the licensed premises of Bourbon Street in the early morning hours of February 18, 1981, and sought to purchase cocaine from the dancer Maya Qaulliu. In response to this request, Qaulliu introduced Imperial and Jones to an individual identified as Herbert R. Wolff, who thereafter left the premises. About 30 minutes after Wolff's departure, the bartender Nina called Qaulliu, who was on the dance stage, to the phone. The beverage officers heard Qaulliu discussing cocaine and during the conversation she stated to the officers: "$80 dollars a gram for coke." This statement was made openly and could have been heard by other persons near the bar, including the bartender Nina who was closer to Qaulliu than the beverage officers. [Counts 3, 12, 13].
Wolff returned to the bar and was thereupon accompanied to the restroom by Imperial and Jones. Wolff gave the beverage officers two grams of suspected cocaine for which each officer paid Wolff $80. This material was later delivered to the crime lab for testing and was found to contain cocaine by Jack J. Genova (Exhibit 18). [Count 3].
Subsequently, during the early morning hours of February 18, 1981, Wolff offered to sell cannabis to Beverage Officers Jones and Imperial. This offer took place on the licensed premises in the presence of Qaulliu. The
officers agreed to buy and accompanied Wolff to a parking lot adjacent to the premises where they observed about five pounds of suspected cannabis in the trunk of Wolff's car. The officers purchased one pound of the substance for
$180. The material was subsequently tested in the crime lab where it was found to contain cannabis by Newton E. Porter (Exhibit 20). [Counts 12, 13].
Beverage Officers Jones and Imperial were on the licensed premises of Bourbon Street during the evening of February 22, and the early morning hours of February 23, 1981. A dancer known as Kitten or Jennifer gave Jones a suspected cannabis cigarette which he later submitted for crime lab analysis. The substance was tested by Robert J. DiMarzo and proved to be cannabis (Exhibit 23). [Count 6].
During the late evening of February 22, 1981, Beverage Officers Imperial and Jones asked the dancer Maya Qaulliu if cocaine was available. She advised them that she could arrange a purchase and placed several phone calls in the presence of the bartender, Mary. Imperial heard Qaulliu order two grams of cocaine for $80 per gram. Mary was standing nearby and could have heard these conversations. About 2:00 a.m. February 23, Herbert Wolff arrived and requested that Imperial and Jones follow him into the restroom. He then delivered the suspected cocaine and received $180 from the beverage officers. Wolff inhaled a substance suspected to be cocaine while they were in the restroom. Customers came in and left the restroom during these transactions and could have heard the discussions. The substance purchased by Officers Imperial and Jones was forwarded to the crime lab and was found to be cocaine by Robert J. DiMarzo (Exhibit 23). [Counts 5, 12, 13].
Newton E. Porter, who prepared Exhibits 12, 13 and 20, was the only crime lab analyst present to testify at the hearing. However, Porter verified that the other reports offered into evidence by Petitioner were prepared by crime lab employees assigned to substance analysis. Porter described the crime lab accounting controls and testing procedures, and was available for cross- examination on these matters. This testimony coupled with property receipts which the beverage officers obtained on each substance submitted to the crime lab support a finding that the evidence was properly handled and that the conclusions reached in the crime lab reports are valid.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties to this action. Respondent sought hearing on an emergency basis, and duly waived its right to notice under Subsection 120.57(1)(b) 2, Florida Statutes (1979).
Section 561.29, Florida Statutes (1979) provides in part:
The division is given full power and authority to revoke or suspend the license of any person holding a license under the Beverage Law, when it is determined or found by the division upon sufficient cause appearing of:
Violation by the licensee or his or its agents, officers, servants, or employees, on the licensed premises, or elsewhere while in the scope
of employment, of any of the laws of this state. . . .
Respondent first argues that the charges set forth in the Notice to Show Cause lack specificity, particularly Counts 12 and 13 which use the language: "Beginning on or about February 18, 1981. . . ." These charges were supported by acts which occurred between February 18, and April 2, 1981, when the investigation was concluded and Respondent's beverage license was suspended. Therefore, these charges are neither open-ended nor lacking in specificity. Further, as stated in Florida Board of Massage v. Thrall, 164 So.2d 20, 22 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964):
[W]e note that in administrative proceedings of this nature it is not necessary that the information or accusation be case with that degree of technical nicety required in criminal prosecution.
Respondent next contends that its dancers are independent contracts retained by a separate corporation and are not, therefore, "agents, officers, servants or employees" within the meaning of the above cited statute. An independent contractor is defined at 17 Fla. Jur 174 as follows:
An independent contractor is one who pursues an individual employment or occupation and represents his employer as to the results of
his work but not as to the means by which the results are accomplished. Another commonly accepted definition is that an independent contractor is one who, in the exercise of an independent employment, contracts to do certain work according to his own methods, and without being subject to the control of his employer except as to the product or result of his work.
The difference between an independent contractor and a servant is well recognized, the chief distinction being the right of control over the work. . .
The degree of control exercised over the dancers by management is substantial as demonstrated by the rules incorporated in each dancer's contract. See Exhibit 27. Further, the evidence in this proceeding established that control and supervision of the dancers is exercised by Bourbon Street bartenders as well as by the general manager of these companies. Therefore, Respondent's attempt to avoid responsibility for the violations of its dancers based on an independent contractor theory must be rejected.
Charges One through Eleven involve the sale/delivery of cannabis in violation of Subsections 893.13(1)(a) and 893.03(1)(c)3 or sale/delivery of cocaine in violation of Subsections 893.13(1)(a) and 893.03(2)(a)4, Florida Statutes. The alleged sale or delivery was demonstrated by the testimony of the investigating officers and the crime lab reports to have occurred as charged in each of these Counts.
Respondent raised objections to the chain of custody of the substances and to the failure of Petitioner to produce all of the laboratory analysts who performed the tests. Although each beverage officer did not personally deliver the substance to the crime lab, all suspected drugs were identified, sealed and retained in the custody of the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco until
mailed or receipted for by the crime lab. One of the six crime lab analysts was present to testify, and nothing in his direct or cross-examination provided any basis to question the regularity of the procedures followed in the investigation or the reliability of the results obtained.
In the case of Smith v. Mott, 100 So.2d 173 (Fla. 1957), a question as to the admissibility of a report of the Board of Health was raised since the analyst performing the test was not called as a witness. In holding the evidence admissible, the Court at page 176 stated:
In the Mutual Insurance Company case we held that such evidence was admissible as a public record. We emphasize the fact that in reaching
that conclusion we gave substantial consideration to the fact that the specimen there was regularly taken, mailed to the State Board of Health laboratory in a routine manner and that all of the procedure followed was regular in every respect and done in accordance with the duty imposed on that branch of the government
vested with this duty and charged with this responsibility; that when such was made to appear, the report was prima facie evidence
of that which it purported to disclose. There is a solid basis for this holding. One of
the basic reasons for holding it admissible as evidence and accepting it as such is the high probability of its truthfulness and verity. It is admissible for much the same reason that evidence is admissible under the res gestae rule. One of the factors
for holding that evidence otherwise inadmissible, is admissible under the res gestae rule, is
that it is usually given in such close proximity to the main event as to preclude the likelihood of reflection and fabrication. Another reason for holding the evidence in this case admissible is that persons hired
by a governmental agency to perform chemical tests will be presumed to have been properly qualified and to have skillfully performed their duties unless contradictory testimony is offered. Public records are made as a matter of routine and preserved in the interest of the general welfare. The investigation is impersonal to those charged with the duty of making it. The prime object is to determine the facts by using acceptable methods and to preserve those facts in the interest of the state for its use and the use of its citizens. There is little likelihood of or reason for fabrication and no purpose to be served
by it. In those cases where, as here, it is shown that such reports are prepared in the manner prescribed by the statute and have become a part of the public records
they are, as said in the Mutual Life Insurance Company case, prima facie evidence of what such document purports to show.
Moreover, as stated in the Mutual Insurance Company case, 'If its verity is to be overthrown, the duty is on the one challenging it to do so.'
Counts 3 and 5 involve the charge of criminal conspiracy in violation of Section 777.04(4), Florida Statutes, as well as violation of the controlled substance statute cited above. As sated in Pearce vs. State, 330 So.2d 783, 784 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976): "The gravemen of the offense in criminal proceeding conspiracy is the agreement between two or more persons. . . ." The involvement of the dancer in arranging the procurement of illegal drugs for the officers from third party sources is thus sufficient to support the conspiracy charges. In both counts, the substances were received by the officers, tested and shown to be cocaine.
Count 12 involves keeping or maintaining the licensed premises as pace resorted to by persons illegally using, keeping or selling controlled substances in violation of Subsection 893.13(2)(a)5, Florida Statutes. Here, there was no showing of intent by the owners or managers to keep or maintain the premises for any of these purposes. Therefore, this charge should be dismissed.
Count 13 involves a charge of maintaining a public nuisance. Section 893.10, Florida Statutes, is violated where the premises are visited by persons for the purpose of unlawfully using, keeping, or selling controlled substances. This charge is fully supported by the repeated instances of illegal drug use, sales, and delivery attested to by the officers. This charge may be distinguished from Count 12 in that active involvement by the owners or managers is not required.
Respondent argues that the public nuisance charge is inappropriate since the statute is aimed at providing injunctive relief rather than beverage license suspension or revocation. However, Section 561.29(1)(a), Florida Statutes, permits revocation or suspension for violation "of any of the laws of this state" (emphasis added).
Respondent contends that neither its owners or managers had knowledge of the violations described herein. The responsibility of the licensee for the acts of its agents, servants or employees does not depend on either the licensee's presence or actual knowledge of the violations. In the case of Pauline v. Lee, 147 So.2d 359 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1962), the alcoholic beverage license of a bar was revoked where five female employees offered to commit prostitution with beverage officers over a three day period, with such offers being made in front of a bartender who was in a position to overhear the conversation. In upholding the revocation the Court at pages 362 and 364 stated:
Certainly it is not the intent or the purpose of the law that the licensee must be present during any and every violation of law by his employees in proceedings for revocation of an alcoholic beverage license under said section [561.29(1)(a)].
* * *
The persistent and practiced manner with which
the solicitations described by the state's witnesses were made is sufficient to permit a factual inference leading to the conclusion
that such violations of law were either fostered, condoned, or negligently overlooked by the licensee, notwithstanding his absence from the premises on the dates in question.
A similar result was reached in Torch Club, Inc. v. Keating, 174 So.2d 746 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1965), where an alcoholic beverage license was revoked when nine agents of the licensee solicited drinks and/or offered to commit prostitution on four different days. In the instant case, there were eleven separate sales or deliveries of narcotics on five different business days. Such repeated violations are ample evidence of Respondent's negligence in supervising the licensed premises.
Although the above findings will support the revocation sought by Petitioner, mitigating circumstances should be considered. Respondent's only prior violation involved an unregistered cigarette machine. While its effort to control illegal drug use and sales by and through its dancers has been largely ineffective, limited results were obtained through the use of spotters, rules of conduct, polygraph examinations and terminations. There is nothing in this record to indicate that the sales or use of illegal drugs were fostered by the licensee or were in any way advantageous to its business. Finally, widespread drug traffic in the Dade-Broward area makes control by the bar operator a difficult and demanding task. Since license revocation is the most serious penalty which can be imposed, it should be applied only where both the facts and the overall circumstances warrant its imposition.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent be found guilty of violations as alleged in
Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 13 of the Notice to Show Cause. It
RECOMMENDED that the charges contained in Count 12 be dismissed. It is further
RECOMMENDED that Respondent's License No. 23-0523, Series 4-COP be suspended for a period of 90 days, inclusive of the temporary suspension now in effect.
DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of April, 1981 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.
R. T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of April, 1981.
Harold F. X. Purnell, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Henry A. Amoon, Esquire
123 N. W. 12th Avenue Miami, Florida 33128
