STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND )

PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, ) CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING ) BOARD, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) CASE NO. 93-6387

)

IRVIN DINGLE, )

)

Respondent. )

)

RECOMMENDED ORDER

Pursuant to notice, the Division of Administrative Hearings, by its duly designated Hearing Officer, Claude B. Arrington, held a formal hearing in the above-styled case on May 10, 1994, in Miami, Florida.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Theodore R. Gay, Esquire

Senior Attorney

Department of Business and Professional Regulation

401 Northwest 2nd Avenue, Suite N-607 Miami, Florida 33128

For Respondent: Harold M. Braxton, Esquire

Tania Theresa Wong, Esquire Suite 400, One Datran Center 9100 South Dadeland Boulevard Miami, Florida 33156-7815

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

Whether the Respondent committed the offenses alleged in the Administrative Complaint, and the penalties, if any, that should be imposed.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On March 30, 1993, the Petitioner filed an Administrative Complaint containing three counts against the Respondent, who is a licensed roofing contractor. Count One of the Administrative Complaint charged Respondent with violating the provisions of Section 489.129(1)(n), Florida Statutes (1989), by proceeding on a job without first obtaining the required permit. Count Two of the Administrative Complaint charged Respondent with violating Section 489.129(1)(j), Florida Statutes (1989), by failing to comply with the provisions of Section 489.119(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1989). Count Two alleged that Respondent failed to comply with Section 489.119(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1989),

by not having his registration or certification number appear in a newspaper, air wave transmission, phone directory or other advertising medium used by the contractor. 1/ Count Three of the Administrative Complaint charged Respondent with violating the provisions of Section 489.129(1)(m), Florida Statutes (1989), by committing fraud or deceit or gross negligence, incompetency, or misconduct in the practice of contracting. 2/

The Respondent requested a formal hearing, and this proceeding followed.

Prior to the hearing, the Petitioner requested and received permission to take the telephone depositions of two witnesses, Ted Matchett and Daniel Lopez, both of whom lived in Crescent City, Florida, at the times their depositions were taken. Mr. Matchett was, at the times pertinent to this proceeding, the owner of the property on which the work in question was performed. Mr. Lopez was Mr. Matchett's live-in housekeeper. Those depositions were taken on April 29, 1994, and transcripts of their depositions were admitted into evidence at the hearing as Petitioner's Exhibits 1 and 2.

At the hearing, the Petitioner presented the testimony of one witness, Jose Arias, and two exhibits in addition to the depositions of Mr. Matchett and Mr.

Lopez. All exhibits offered by Petitioner were accepted into evidence. Mr. Arias was employed by the City of Miami as a building inspector.

The Respondent presented the testimony of four witnesses, Eamon Toner, David Dingle, Edward Dingle, and the Respondent, Irvin Dingle, and offered three exhibits, two of which were received in evidence. Mr. Toner was accepted as an expert in the field of roofing contracting. Irvin Dingle is the respondent in this proceeding. David Dingle and Edward Dingle are the son and nephew, respectively, of the Respondent and are employed by the Respondent's roofing company.

A transcript of the proceedings has been filed. Rulings on the parties' proposed findings of fact may be found in the Appendix to this Recommended Order.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, the Respondent was licensed by Petitioner as a roofing contractor and held license number RC 0021620. Respondent has worked in the roofing business since 1947 and has been a licensed contractor since 1969. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was the owner and qualifying agent for Dingle Roofing Company. There have been no previous disciplinary actions brought against the Respondent and he has never been sued.

   
   

2. Petitioner is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of contracting pursuant to Section 20.165, Florida Statutes, and Chapters 455 and 489, Florida Statutes.

   
   

3. At the time his deposition was taken Ted Matchett lived in Crescent City, Florida. At all other times pertinent hereto, Mr. Matchett was the owner and a resident of a duplex located at 2595 Tigertail, Miami, Florida. Mr. Matchett lived in one side of the duplex, which consisted of approximately two- thirds of the property, with his housekeeper, Daniel Lopez. The remainder of the duplex was rented to a tenant who was not identified by name.

4. The roof of Mr. Matchett's duplex consisted of two pitched roofs which tied in to a flat roof. Prior to the work at issue in this proceeding, the pitched portions of the roof were covered with Spanish tile. The roof was approximately twenty years old, leaked in several locations, and was in bad repair. The evidence in this proceeding is consistent with the opinion expressed by the Respondent that Mr. Matchett's roof should have been replaced five years before he contracted with Respondent.

   
   

5. At some date prior to contracting with the Respondent, Mr. Matchett hired a "handyman" to go up on his roof and repair the leaks that Mr. Matchett had detected. This handyman did not testify at the formal hearing and his qualifications as a roofer were not established. The handyman patched portions of the flat roof by covering the existing roof with slats and plywood, covering this with tar paper, and applying cold tar.

   
   

6. The manner in which the handyman repaired Mr. Matchett's roof does not meet the South Florida Building Code and is not an effective method of repairing leaks. The only practical way to seal a flat roof is to mop it with hot tar.

   
   

7. Mr. Matchett testified that the handyman had stopped the leaks and that his roof was not leaking when Respondent's company began its work. The greater weight of the evidence established that the roof was still leaking after the work by the handyman, and that these leaks could not be stopped until the roof was repaired by a roofer. The flat portion of the roof had an air conditioning unit on it. The vent areas of the air conditioner were still leaking after the handyman had done his work.

   
   

8. On July 19, 1991, Dingle Roofing Company entered into a contract with Mr. Matchett to re-roof the subject duplex. The contract between Dingle Roofing Company and Mr. Matchett was on a form used by Dingle Roofing Company. The Respondent negotiated this contract and executed it on behalf of his company.

   
   

9. The contract amount for the re-roofing portion of the job was in the amount of $5,460. The parties agreed that Respondent's company would add insulation to one portion of the property for an additional payment of $350. The contract required that debris be removed and that rotten wood be replaced.

   The amount specified in the contract contemplated that up to 200 feet of rotten wood would be replaced. Any rotten wood in excess of 200 feet that needed to be replaced would be replaced at the rate of $1.40 per foot. The contract was silent as to when payment would be due for replacement of rotten lumber exceeding 200 feet.

   
   

10. The following appeared as paragraph two of the "General Terms and Conditions" of the standard form contract used by Dingle Roofing Company:

    
    

    2. EXCEPTED LABILITY: Dingle Roofing Company shall not be responsible for damages or delay, either before commencement of or during the said work described herein on account of transportation difficulties, priorities, accidents, war, act of God, fire, sudden rains, storms, windstorms, other casualty or theft or other causes beyond its control.

11. There was no beginning date for the work and no completion date specified by the contract. The contract was accepted by Mr. Matchett on July 19, 1991.

    
    

12. Pertinent to this proceeding, the form contract contained the name, address and telephone numbers of Dingle Contracting Company and the following language that Petitioner asserts violates the provisions of Section 489.119(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1989): "ALL TYPES OF ROOFS" and "FREE ESTIMATES". The number, CC 000011956, appearing under the Respondent's signature on the contract with Mr. Matchett was not the Respondent's state contractor license number but was a county license number. The Respondent's state contractor license number RC 0021620 did not appear on the contract.

    
    

13. On July 23, 1991, Mr. Matchett paid Respondent the sum of $1,000. On August 15, 1991, Mr. Matchett paid Respondent the sum of $2,000. 3/

    
    

14. Respondent's company did not start the subject job right away because he was backed up with work. Mr. Matchett knew at the time he executed the contract that Respondent's company would not be able to immediately begin the work on the roof. On August 12, 1991, Respondent's company began the subject job.

    
    

15. The South Florida Building Code, the code used by the City of Miami, required that a building permit be obtained for roof repairs. Respondent's company did not secure a building permit for this work until November 6, 1991.

    
    

16. The Respondent's company worked on Mr. Matchett's roof between August

    12 and August 16, 1991. There was a considerable amount of rain prior to and during the time Respondent's men started work on the roof. The work began on the pitched parts since a pitched roof is easier to seal off in the event of rain. After drying in the pitched portions of the roof, work began on the flat portion of the roof where most of the rotten wood was located. On August 14, 1991, Respondent's workmen opened a small section of the flat portion of the roof to replace rotten wood. Before they could complete the work, it began to rain. The workers covered the area with plywood and tar. The workmen returned on August 17, 1991, and placed a tarpaulin over this area. There was no evidence that the workmen failed to act within the standards of the industry in sealing this exposed area.

    
    

17. Petitioner asserted at the hearing that the workmen tore holes in the roof and caused tile to be dropped through the ceiling of the duplex into the interior of the premises. Mr. Matchett testified that the interior of his home was damaged by these acts and by leaks caused by the workmen employed by Respondent's company. David Dingle and Edward Dingle, two of the workers who did the work on Mr. Matchett's roof, testified at the formal hearing as to the work that was done on the roof and as to the manner in which the work was done. Their testimony conflicts with that of Mr. Matchett. The conflict in the evidence is resolved by finding that while the interior of the duplex was damaged by leaks and there was a hole in the ceiling, Petitioner did not prove that Respondent's workmen caused the leaks that damaged Mr. Matchett's property by the work they did on the duplex. Respondent presented credible evidence that the leaks that damaged the interior of the duplex were on the flat portion of the roof and existed before the Respondent's company began work on the roof.

    
    

18. Respondent's company stopped work on Mr. Matchett's roof on August 16, 1991. On August 17, 1991, the workers returned to Mr. Matchett's property, but only to place a tarpaulin over an area of the roof they knew was leaking.

    Although there were conflicts in the evidence as to the reasons the work was stopped on August 16, 1991, these conflicts are resolved by finding that there were two reasons that work was stopped on that date. First, the workmen discovered that the job was more difficult and would be more expensive because of the amount of rotten wood that needed to be replaced. Respondent had asked Mr. Matchett for more money, but he refused to pay any more until the job was completed. Respondent asked Mr. Matchett for additional money to replace rotten wood since it became apparent that there was rotten wood in excess of 200 feet. 4/ Mr. Matchett had paid the Respondent $3,000, and he refused to make further payment until the work was completed. Second, the rainy season began in South Florida. To properly repair the flat portions of the roof, the Respondent's workmen would have to replace the rotten wood and replace the roof using a hot tar mix. The rotten wood could not be removed during rain because such removal would expose the interior of the house to rain. Additionally, hot tar cannot be mopped on during rain.

    
    

19. Mr. Matchett's roof was leaking at the time that the Respondent's company discontinued work in August 1991. Respondent knew that most of the flat portion of the roof was rotten, and he should have known that it was not watertight. Petitioner did not establish what Respondent should have done knowing that the flat roof was not watertight.

    
    

20. On August 19, 1991, a heavy rain revealed several leaks. Mr. Matchett made repeated efforts to reach the Respondent by telephone at the telephone numbers listed on the contract. Mr. Matchett talked to the Respondent by telephone on Sunday, October 6, 1991, and was told by the Respondent that he had underestimated the job and that he would finish when he could.

    
    

21. After August 17, 1991, the Respondent's company did no further work on Mr. Matchett's roof until November 4, 1991. Thereafter, the Respondent's men worked steadily until they completed the dry-in on November 11, 1991. The dry- in passed inspection on November 22, 1991, and the Respondent finished the job in December, 1991.

    
    

22. Petitioner failed to establish that the failure of Respondent's company to resume work on Mr. Matchett's roof prior to November, 1991, constituted fraud or deceit or gross negligence, incompetency, or misconduct in the practice of contracting. The only expert testimony in this proceeding was that Respondent acted consistent with the industry practices considering the rainy season, the extensive amount of rotten wood that needed to be repaired, and Mr. Matchett's unwillingness to pay for the additional wood that the job required. Petitioner introduced no expert testimony to the contrary.

    
    

    CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

    
    

23. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties to and the subject matter of this proceeding. See, Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes.

24. Petitioner has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence the allegations against Respondent. See Ferris v. Turlington, 510 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 1987); Evans Packing Co. v. Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, 550 So.2d 112 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). Evans Packing, supra, 550 So. 2d 112, 116, fn. 5, provides the following pertinent to the clear and convincing evidence standard:

    
    

    That standard has been described as follows:

    [C]lear and convincing evidence requires that the evidence must be found to be credible; the facts to which the witnesses testify must be distinctly remembered; the evidence must be precise and explicit and the witnesses must be lacking in confusion as to the facts in issue. The evidence must be of such weight that it produces in the mind of the trier of fact the firm belief of (sic) conviction, without hesitancy, as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established. Slomowitz v. Walker, 429 So.2d 797, 800 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983).

    
    

25. The provisions of Section 489.119(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1989), provide, in pertinent part, as follows:

    
    

    (b) The registration or certification number of each contractor shall appear in any newspaper, airwave transmission, phone directory, or other advertising medium used by that contractor.

    
    

26. The provisions of Section 489.129, Florida Statutes (1989), provide, in pertinent part, as follows:

    
    

    489.129 Disciplinary proceedings.--

    
    

    The board may revoke, suspend, or deny the issuance or renewal of the certificate or registration of a contractor, require financial restitution to a consumer, impose an administrative fine not to exceed $5,000, place a contractor on probation, require continuing education, assess costs associated with investigation and prosecution, or reprimand or censure a contractor if the contractor, or if the business organization for which the contractor is a primary qualifying agent or is a secondary qualifying agent responsible under s. 489.1195, is found guilty of any of the following acts:

    * * *

    (j) Failing in any material respect to comply with the provisions of this part.

    * * *

    1. Being found guilty of fraud or deceit or of gross negligence, incompetency, or misconduct in the practice of contracting.

       * * *

    2. Proceeding on any job without obtaining applicable local building department permits and inspections.

    
    

27. Petitioner established by clear and convincing evidence that Dingle Roofing Company, for whom Respondent is responsible, proceeded with the Matchett job without obtaining a required building permit in violation of Section 489.129(1)(n), Florida Statutes (1989), as alleged in Count I of the Administrative Complaint.

    
    

28. Petitioner argues that the form contract executed by Respondent on behalf of Dingle Roofing Company should be construed to be an "advertising medium" as that term is used in Section 489.119(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1989). Petitioner offered no evidence, other than the document itself, in support of this allegation. There was no evidence that Petitioner has adopted a rule or otherwise has rationale for support of this sweeping interpretation of what constitutes "an advertising medium", and there was no evidence that Dingle Roofing Company used this form contract as a means of advertising its services.

    
    

29. The conclusion that the form contract used in this proceeding should not be construed to meet the definition of an "advertising medium" is supported by the amendment to Section 489.119(5)(b), Florida Statutes, by Section 13 of Chapter 93-166, Laws of Florida. That amendment adds the following underscored language to Section 489.119(5)(b), Florida Statutes:

    
    

    (b) The registration or certification number of each contractor shall appear in any proposal, bid, contract, newspaper, airwave transmission, phone directory, or other advertising medium, as defined by board rule, used by that contractor in the practice of contracting.

    
    

30. Based on the foregoing, it is concluded that the form contract is not an "advertising medium" within the meaning of Section 489.119(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1989), and that, consequently, Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent violated the provisions of Section 489.129(1)(j), Florida Statutes (1989), as alleged in Count II of the Administrative Complaint.

    
    

31. It is axiomatic that in this proceeding to penalize the licensure of the Respondent, Petitioner is limited to the allegations contained in its pleadings. See, Sternberg v. Department of Professional Regulation, 465 So.2d 1324 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). Petitioner's pleading as to Count III premised the alleged violation of Section 489.129(1)(m), Florida Statutes (1989) on the failure of Respondent's company to timely complete the roofing job. As reflected by the findings of fact, Petitioner failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the industry standards as to performance under the circumstances. In light of the testimony from Respondent's expert witness that Respondent's company acted within industry standards, it is concluded that Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent violated the provisions of Section 489.129(1)(m), Florida Statutes (1989), as alleged in Count III of the Administrative Complaint.

32. Rules 21E-17.001 and 17.002, Florida Administrative Code, contain disciplinary guidelines of the Construction Industry Licensing Board that are pertinent to this proceeding. For a first time violation of Section 489.129(1)(n), Florida Statutes (1989), the recommended penalty in the absence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances is a $100.00 administrative fine. There was no clear and convincing evidence of aggravating or mitigating factors that would require deviation from the recommended penalty.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order which adopts the findings

of fact and the conclusions of law contained herein and which:

1. Finds that Respondent violated the provisions of Section 489.129(1)(n), Florida Statutes (1989), as alleged in Count I of the Administrative Complaint, and which assesses an administrative fine against the Respondent in the amount of $100.00 for that violation.

   
   

2. Finds that Respondent did not violate the provisions of Section 489.129(1)(j), Florida Statutes (1989), as alleged in Count II of the Administrative Complaint.

   
   

3. Finds that Respondent did not violate the provisions of Section 489.129(1)(m), Florida Statutes (1989), as alleged in Count III of the Administrative Complaint.

   
   

   DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of July 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

   
   

   
   

   CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON

   Hearing Officer

   Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building

   1230 Apalachee Parkway

   Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550

   (904) 488-9675

   
   

   Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of July 1994.

   
   

   ENDNOTES

   
   

   1/ The document towards which this allegation is directed is the form contract used by Dingle Contracting Company to formalize the agreement it had with the customer.

   2/ After re-alleging certain preliminary facts, Petitioner alleges in its Administrative Complaint the following facts pertaining to the alleged violation of Section 489.129(1)(m), Florida Statutes (1989):

   1. Contractor dried in the aforementioned roof on or about August 1, 1991, but failed to complete the work until on or about December 12, 1991.

   2. Between the time Contractor dried in the roof and finished the roof around December 12, 1991, numerous rains caused extensive damage to the interior of Customer's home.

   3. A final inspection was not passed for the aforementioned work until on or about December 16, 1991.

   4. Based on the preceding, Respondent committed misconduct in the practice of contracting because his failure to timely complete said roof resulted in interior damage to Customer's home.

3/ Mr. Matchett believes Respondent to be responsible for extensive damages to the interior of his duplex and to his personal belongings. These damages were estimated by Mr. Matchett to total $27,089.17. Because of these damages, Mr.

Matchett refused to pay Respondent the balance owed on the contract. At the time of the formal hearing, Mr. Matchett owed the Respondent approximately

$4,000.

4/ The Respondent had underestimated the amount of rotten wood that would have to be replaced. While the initial estimate was that approximately 200 feet of rotten wood would have to be replaced, by the time the Respondent's company completed the job, approximately 600 feet of rotten wood had been replaced.

APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-6387

The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner.

1. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, and 17 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order.

2. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 4 are rejected as being contrary to the findings made.

3. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 15 are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached.

The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent.

1. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 27, and 34 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order.

2. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 10, 11, 22, 23, 24, 25, 28, 29, 30, 31, and 33 are rejected as being subordinate to the findings made.

3. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 20, 21, 26, 35, and 36 are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached.

4. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 32 are rejected as being contrary to the findings made.

COPIES FURNISHED:

Theodore R. Gay, Esquire Department of Business and

Professional Regulation

401 Northwest 2nd Avenue, N-607 Miami, Florida 33128

Harold M. Braxton, Esquire Tania Therese Wong, Esquire Suite 400, One Datran Center 9100 South Dadeland Boulevard Miami, Florida 33156

Richard Hickok, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board 7960 Arlington Expressway, Suite 300

Jacksonville, Florida 32211-7467

Jack McRay, Acting General Counsel Department of Business and

Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions to this recommended order. All agencies allow each party at least ten days in which to submit written exceptions. Some agencies allow a larger period within which to submit written exceptions. You should contact the agency that will issue the final order in this case concerning agency rules on the deadline for filing exceptions to this recommended order. Any exceptions to this recommended order should be filed with the agency that will issue the final order in this case.

================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER

=================================================================

STATE OF FLORIDA

DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD

DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION,

Petitioner,

vs. Case No: 91-13572

License No: RC 0021620

IRVIN DINGLE, DOAH Case No: 93-6387

Respondent.

/

FINAL ORDER

THIS MATTER came before the Construction Industry Licensing Board (hereinafter referred to as the "Board") pursuant to Section 120.57(1)(b), Florida Statutes, on October 13, 1994, in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, for consideration of the Recommended Order (a copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference). The Petitioner was represented by Cathleen

1. O'Dowd. The Respondent was represented by counsel at the proceedings.

   
   

   Upon consideration of the Hearing Officer's Recommended Order, and the arguments of the parties and after a review of the complete record in this matter, and the exceptions filed, the Board makes the following:

   
   

   FINDINGS OF FACT

   
   

   1. The Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact are hereby approved and adopted in toto.

      
      

   2. There is competent, substantial evidence to support the Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The Board has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to the provisions of Section 120.57(1), and Chapter 489, Florida Statutes.

   
   

2. The Hearing Officer's Conclusions of Law are hereby approved and adopted except paragraphs twenty-eight (28) through thirty (30) where they are in conflict with Petitioner's Exceptions to Recommended Order which is hereby approved and adopted and incorporated herein by reference.

   
   

3. Respondent is guilty of violating Section 489.129(1)(j) and (n), Florida Statutes.

4. The penalty recommended by the Hearing Officer is hereby approved and expanded to include the additional penalties requested in Petitioner's Exceptions to Recommended Order.

   
   

5. There is competent, substantial evidence to support the Board's findings and conclusions.

THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:

Count III of the Administrative Complaint be DISMISSED.

Respondent shall pay a fine of Two Hundred dollars ($200) and costs of One Thousand Five dollars and Thirty-Five cents ($1,005.35) to the Board, within one hundred eighty (180) days of the filing of this Order, to be paid in equal installments every thirty (30) days.

To assure payment of the fine and costs, it is further ordered that all of Respondent's licensure to practice contracting shall be suspended with the imposition of the suspension being stayed for one hundred eighty (180) days. If the ordered fine and costs are paid within that one hundred eighty (180) day period, the suspension imposed shall not take effect. Upon payment of the fine and costs after the one hundred (180) days, the suspension imposed shall be lifted. If the licensee does not pay the fine and costs within said period, then immediately upon expiration of the stay, the licensee shall surrender the license to the Department of Business and Professional Regulation or shall mail it to the Board office.

In addition, the Respondent will be required to pay interest on fines due to the Board at a rate of 18 percent per annum, beginning on the one hundred eighty-first (181) day after the issuance of this Order.

Pursuant to Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, the Parties are hereby notified that they may appeal this Order by filing one copy of a Notice of Appeal with the Clerk of the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Northwood Centre, 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60, Tallahassee, Florida

32399-0792, and by filing the filing fee and one copy of the Notice of Appeal with the District Court of Appeal within thirty (30) days of the effective date of this Order.

This Order shall become effective upon filing with the Clerk of the Department of Business and Professional Regulation.

DONE AND ORDERED this 14th day of October, 1994.

ANDREA SERRAES, Chair

Construction Industry Licensing Board

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Final Order has been provided via certified mail to Irvin Dingle, 3076 Elizabeth Street, Miami, Florida 33133-4407 and c/o Harold M. Braxton and Tania Theresa Wong, Esquire, Suite 400, One Datran Center, 9100 South Dadeland Boulevard, Miami, Florida 33156-7815 and via U.S. Mail to the Board Clerk, Department of Business and Professional Regulation and its counsel, Northwood Centre, 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 this 7th day of November, 1994.

BRANDON L. MOORE

Deputy Agency Clerk

Docket for Case No: 93-006387

Orders for Case No: 93-006387