STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

NATIONAL ADVERTISING COMPANY, DOAH CASE NOS.: 99-3940T

99-3941T

Petitioner, 99-3942T

00-0720T

vs. 00-0721T

00-0723T DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, DOT CASE NOS.: 98-0017

98-0019

Respondent. 98-0018

/ 00-0022

FINAL ORDER

On November 28, 1995, the federal government caused State Road 60 in Pinellas County to become part of the National Highway System and, therefore, a jurisdictional roadway for purposes of the DEPARTMENT'S obligation to regulate outdoor advertising structures. Subsequent to that action, the DEPARTMENT informed all owners of outdoor advertising structures adjacent to the subject roadway that their signs now required a State Outdoor Advertising Permit, and advised them to apply for permits.

Petitioner, NATIONAL ADVERTISING COMPANY (NATIONAL),

submitted outdoor advertising permit applications to the DEPARTMENT for three billboard structures (six permits). The DEPARTMENT subsequently denied the applications and NATIONAL requested an administrative hearing. The parties agreed to stay the proceedings until the conclusion of Stowell v. Dep't of Transp. (DOAH Case Number 97-1417T), 743 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). After the appellate court rendered its decision in the Stowell case in the DEPARTMENT'S favor, NATIONAL elected to proceed to an administrative hearing, and the matters were referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) on September 20, 1999. In addition to its challenge to the DEPARTMENT'S denial of its permit applications, NATIONAL requested reinstatement of previously issued permits. The cases were consolidated for hearing on February 17, 2000.

On February 17, 2000, a formal administrative hearing was held in Tampa, Florida, before J. Lawrence Johnston, Administrative Law Judge. Appearances on behalf of the parties were as follows:

For Petitioner: Gerald S. Livingston, Esquire

Aileen Reilly, Esquire Livingston & Reilly, P.A.

612 East Colonial Drive, Suite 350 Post Office Box 2151

Orlando, Florida 32802

For Respondent: Kelly A. Bennett, Esquire

Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 605 Suwannee Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458

At the hearing, NATIONAL bore the burden of proof. NATIONAL called two employees of the DEPARTMENT as witnesses and offered exhibits 1 through 13, which were admitted into evidence. The DEPARTMENT called two employees of the DEPARTMENT as witnesses and offered exhibits 1 through 3, which were accepted into evidence. Official recognition was taken of all relevant statutes and rules. The transcript of the proceeding was filed on April 3, 2000. On March 17, 2000, the DEPARTMENT and NATIONAL filed their respective Proposed Recommended Orders. On April 3, 2000, Judge Johnston issued his Recommended Order. On April 17, 2000, the DEPARTMENT and NATIONAL filed their respective exceptions to IN Recommended Order. On April 24, 2000, the DEPARTMENT filed its response to NATIONAL'S exceptions.

Subsequent to the issuance of the Recommended Order by the Administrative Law Judge, NATIONAL filed a Notice of Additional Authority, to which the DEPARTMENT filed a response. NATIONAL also filed a Motion for Stay of Entry of a Final Order. These post-hearing filings are addressed below.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

As stated by the Administrative Law Judge in his Recommended Order, the issues presented were "whether six outdoor advertising sign permits previously issued to Petitioner should be reinstated; or if not, whether new permits should be issued for the six advertising facings (two on each of three sign structures) in Clearwater, Florida."

BACKGROUND

On January 13, 1998, the DEPARTMENT issued Notice of Denied Application to NATIONAL for signs which were originally issued state permits in the 1980s. The subject signs are located adjacent to State Road 60 (Gulf-to-Bay Boulevard), .5, .4, and .3 miles east of U.S. 19 (Highland Avenue). On January 23, 1998,

NATIONAL filed a petition for a formal hearing and a Notice of Amendment to Petition on January 28, 1998.

In March 1995, NATIONAL received a Notice of Permit Void for each of the subject signs, which indicated that the permits corresponding to the signs were void because the DEPARTMENT did not have jurisdiction over the subject roadway. NATIONAL did not request an administrative hearing with respect to the Notice of Permit Void and since March 1995 those permits have been void.

In June 1996, the DEPARTMENT notified NATIONAL that State Road 60 east of U.S. 19 had become a part of the National Highway System (NHS) and that all signs adjacent to that roadway were required to be permitted pursuant to Chapter 479, Florida Statutes. After State Road 60, east of U.S. 19, became a part of the NHS, sign owners were required to file an application and supply the appropriate attachments (e.g., land owner permission, local government certification, etc.) to obtain the required state permits.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the City of Clearwater passed and amended an ordinance which required that the subject signs either be modified to comply with the terms of the Clearwater Code or be removed, either of which was to be completed by January 19, 1996. Section 479.07(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1997), requires every permit application to be accompanied by, among other items, a statement from the appropriate local governmental official indicating that the sign complies with all local governmental requirements. NATIONAL'S applications were not accompanied by a statement from the appropriate local governmental official, i.e., the City of Clearwater, indicating that the signs comply with all local governmental requirements.

The City of Clearwater later provided the DEPARTMENT with a statement indicating that the signs do not comply with all local governmental requirements. As such, at the time of the DEPARTMENT'S review of NATIONAL'S applications, it was the conclusion of the DEPARTMENT that the subject locations were not permittable. The subject outdoor advertising permit applications and requests for reinstatement were denied in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, and NATIONAL sought an administrative hearing.

DEPARTMENT'S EXCEPTIONS TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER

The DEPARTMENT'S first exception is to the date November 2, l995, in Finding of Fact No. 10. The DEPARTMENT points out that the correct date on which the pertinent portion of State Road 60

became jurisdictional was November 28, 1995, not November 2,

1995.

A review of the record reveals that the correct date is November 28, l995, and that the reference to November 2, 1995, is an apparent scrivener's error.

The DEPARTMENT'S first exception is accepted and Finding of Fact No. 10 is corrected accordingly.

The DEPARTMENT'S second exception is to the first sentence of Conclusion of Law No. 19, determining a sign permit to be a license under Section 120.52(9), Florida Statutes. By its exception, the DEPARTMENT argues that this conclusion is contrary to the law, there are no facts or evidence in the record to support such a conclusion, and the issue of whether outdoor advertising permits are licenses for the purposes of Section 120.52(a), Florida Statutes, was not raised by any party.

A review of the record in this case reveals that counsel for NATIONAL mentioned in his opening statement to the Administrative Law Judge:

And that takes us to the last part of the case, which is the deemer part which we'll get to later on today. And we maintain that the Department is now required by operation of law to issue the permits under the deemer portion provisions of Chapter 120 when read in concert with certain provisions of Chapter 479. (T. 231)

However, application of the deemer provisions of Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, to this case was never raised as an issue, prior to the hearing the DEPARTMENT was not on notice that it would be an issue in the case, and the record is devoid of any testimony or evidence regarding the "deemer" provisions of Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, and how they apply to the issuance of outdoor advertising permits issued by the DEPARTMENT. NATIONAL'S proposed conclusions of law that a petition for reinstatement, if not acted upon within thirty (30) days, should be deemed granted, was too little, too late, and should not have been considered by the Administrative Law Judge. Understandably, NATIONAL provided no record citations to support its proposed conclusions.

Section 120.60(1), Florida Statutes, provides that if an application for a license is not acted upon by the agency within ninety (90) days (or a shorter period of time as provided by law), the license is deemed approved. NATIONAL argued in its

Proposed Recommended Order that because Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, provides that the DEPARTMENT shall act on an application for an outdoor advertising permit within thirty (30) days, the DEPARTMENT should likewise be required to act upon a petition for reinstatement of an outdoor advertising permit within thirty (30) days. NATIONAL further argued that because outdoor advertising permits are licenses, the provisions of Section 120.60(1), Florida Statutes, must apply and if the DEPARTMENT fails to act upon a petition for reinstatement of an outdoor advertising permit within thirty (30) days, the permits should be deemed granted.

Under the circumstances, the Administrative Law fudge improperly considered and addressed NATIONAL'S position that a petition for reinstatement of a sign permit is subject to the provisions of Section 120.60(1), Florida Statutes, and, if not acted upon within thirty (30) days, is deemed granted.

Conclusions of Law No. 18 and 19 address this issue which was not previously raised, and the DEPARTMENT was afforded no opportunity to present testimony or evidence, or otherwise address the issue. Where issues are not sufficiently raised, parties are not afforded full opportunity to address the issues, and the issues are neither relevant nor material to the outcome, it is improper for the Administrative Law Judge to address the issues in a Proposed Recommended Order and for the DEPARTMENT to resolve such issues in a final order.

The DEPARTMENT is responsible for the administration of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, and Rule 14-10, Florida Administrative Code. Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, and Rule 14-10, Florida Administrative Code, the provisions regulating outdoor advertising structures, as authorized by Chapter 479,

Florida Statutes, make a clear distinction between licenses and permits for purposes of outdoor advertising. Thus, had the issue of the applicability of Section 120.60(1), Florida Statutes, to outdoor advertising sign permits been properly raised, testimony and evidence of the DEPARTMENT'S interpretation of the statute and the rule would have been admissible. Department of HRS v.

A.S., 648 So. 2d 128 (Fla. 1995) (administrative interpretation of a statute by an agency responsible for its administration is given great weight). Had the issue been properly and timely raised, due process would have been afforded, and the issue would have been properly and fully addressed by the parties.

Whether an outdoor advertising permit or an application for reinstatement of an outdoor advertising permit is a license and, therefore, subject to the "deemer" provisions of Section 120.60(1), Florida Statutes, was not properly raised and is, in any event, unnecessary to the resolution of the issues presented

in this proceeding. As such, Conclusions of Law No. 18 and 19 must be rejected.

The DEPARTMENT'S second exception is accepted in part and rejected in part.

NATIONAL'S EXCEPTIONS TO RECOMMENDED ORDER

As its first exception, NATIONAL argues that an application for reinstatement of a sign permit is part of the DEPARTMENT'S permitting process and, as such, constitutes an application for a license.

NATIONAL argues that in Conclusions of Law No. 18 and 19, the Administrative Law Judge correctly concluded that: (1) Section 120.60(1), Florida Statutes, governing the processing of an application for a license, requires approval or denial within ninety (90) days following receipt of the application for such license, unless a shorter period of time for agency action is provided by law; (2) that Section 479.07(4), Florida Statutes, requires the DEPARTMENT to approve or deny applications for sign permits within a thirty (30) day period; and (3) that sign permits clearly fall within the definition of a license under Section 120.52(9), Florida Statutes. NATIONAL continues by claiming that the Administrative Law Judge then incorrectly concludes that a petition for reinstatement of a license is not an application for a license, and consequently, Section 120.60(1), Florida Statutes, does not apply to NATIONAL'S petitions for reinstatement of its previously canceled state sign permits. That conclusion, according to NATIONAL, is inconsistent with the very language of Section 120.60(1), Florida Statutes, which is broad and inclusive in nature, as opposed to being limited in its scope. NATIONAL argues that the section commences by stating that "EVERY APPLICATION for a license shall be approved or denied within ninety (90) days" and further provides that "the agency must approve ANY APPLICATION for a license. . . If the agency has not approved or denied the application within the time periods prescribed by this subsection." (emphasis added by NATIONAL)

NATIONAL finds it unfortunate that the terms "every," "application," and "any," are not defined in Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. Consequently, NATIONAL argues, the definition commonly ascribed to such terms must be relied upon, and that it is well settled that in the absence of statutory definition, words of common usage are construed in their plan and ordinary sense.

State v. Hagan, 387 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 1980). "If necessary, the plain and ordinary meaning of the word can be ascertained by reference to a dictionary." Green v. State, 604 So. 2d 471, 473 (Fla. 1992). Moreover, according to NATIONAL, a court may refer

to a dictionary to ascertain the plain and ordinary meaning which the legislature intended to ascribe to the term. Gardner v.

Johnson, 451 So. 2d 477, 478 (Fla. 1984). In this case, NATIONAL argues, Black's Law Dictionary provides great guidance in evaluating the issue of whether or not a petition for reinstatement of permits qualifies for inclusion in the term "every application for a license," and in the term "any application for a license."

Black's Law Dictionary defines the word "every" to mean "each one of all; all the separate individuals who constitute the whole, regarded one by one. The term is sometimes equivalent to 'all'; and sometimes to 'each'." (Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, 1990.) Black's Law Dictionary defines the word "application" to mean "a putting to, placing before, preferring a request or petition before a person. The act of making a request for something. A petition. . . An appeal or petition, especially as written or presented; a putting to, placing before; preferring a request or petition to or before a person; the act of making a request for something." (Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, 1990.) Black's Law Dictionary defines the term "any" to mean "some; one out of many; an indefinite number. . . .

One or some (indefinitely). 'Any' does not necessarily mean only

one person, but may have reference to more than one or to many." (Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, 1990.)

NATIONAL argues that based upon the definitions in Black's Law Dictionary, the question of whether or not an application (petition) for reinstatement of a license is synonymous with an application for a license must be answered in the affirmative. Clearly, a petition for reinstatement of a license qualified, and is included, in the class of "every application" or "any application." According to NATIONAL, the Administrative Law Judge's Conclusion of Law No. 19 that "a petition for reinstatement of a license is not an application for a license" is contrary to established law, rule and reason, and fails to support his further conclusion that Section 120.60(1), Florida Statutes, does not apply to NATIONAL'S petitions for reinstatement of its state sign permits.

There is no evidence or testimony in this record to support NATIONAL'S position, and any suggestion that it was an issue was only mentioned in passing during opening remarks by counsel for NATIONAL. Although counsel for NATIONAL stated that he "would get to [the issue] later on today," he never did. (T. 23) There is no evidence or testimony in the record because the issue was never raised by NATIONAL, it was never addressed during discovery or during the administrative hearing, and there was no objection to the issues as stated by the Administrative Law Judge, which did not include whether a permit or application for reinstatement

of an outdoor advertising sign is a license. In addition, as detailed above in the response to the DEPARTMENT'S second exception, NATIONAL'S arguments and the conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge are improper and unnecessary to the resolution of the issues properly presented. The Administrative Law Judge's Conclusions of Law No. 18 and 19 are unnecessary to the resolution of this proceeding. As such, Conclusions of Law No. 18 and 19 must be rejected.

NATIONAL'S first exception is rejected.

In its second exception, NATIONAL claims that the Administrative Law Judge's Recommended Order impermissibly favors local governmental regulations over state statutes regarding the regulation and permitting of outdoor advertising sign structures.

According to NATIONAL, in Findings of Fact Nos. 1 through 3, the Administrative Law Judge correctly concluded that NATIONAL lawfully erected the three subject outdoor advertising sign structures pursuant to permits issued by the City of Clearwater during October 22, 1981, through July 1, 1984. In Finding of Fact No. 13, the Administrative Law Judge correctly concluded that when NATIONAL filed its six applications for the subject sign structures, on or about December 29, 1997, NATIONAL included therewith copies of the building permits issued by the City of Clearwater for the original construction of the subject sign structures. Armed with these findings of fact, the Administrative Law Judge, according to NATIONAL, incorrectly concludes in his analysis of Section 479.07(3)(b), Florida Statutes, that because the City's sign code had been amended and NATIONAL'S sign structures no longer complied with the City's code, that NATIONAL failed to provide the required local government statement, notwithstanding NATIONAL'S production of the earlier issued local building permits. The Administrative Law Judge, NATIONAL claims, incorrectly ignores the fact that the City of Clearwater in this case had already issued permits to NATIONAL for the construction, erection, and operation of the subject sign structures.

NATIONAL asserts that the testimony of Ken Towcimak, Senior Manager for the DEPARTMENT in the area of regulation of outdoor advertising, and the individual responsible for policy and procedure, established that unpermitted outdoor advertising sign structures located adjacent to roadways which later become jurisdictional do not have to comply with the statutory requirement set forth in Chapter 479, Florida Statutes. As to size, spacing, height, and zoning, such sign structures are permitted by the DEPARTMENT as legal nonconforming signs.

NATIONAL argues that these regulatory requirements are overlooked by the DEPARTMENT in permitting signs which later become

jurisdictional. An additional permitting requirement in Section 479.07(3)(b), Florida Statutes, requires applications for signs (to be constructed in the future) to likewise comply with local governmental regulations. However, NATIONAL continues, in situations involving existing sign structures, which were previously permitted by the applicable local government, to now require them to again comply with local governmental regulations, while ignoring the requirements set forth in Florida Statutes, carves an impermissible distinction in favor of local ordinances, while ignoring the provisions of state statutes relating to the same regulatory requirements regarding size, spacing, height, zoning, etc.

NATIONAL ignores the evidence and testimony in the record upon which the Administrative Law Judge properly relied to determine that the long since expired building permits were insufficient to establish "local government permission." NATIONAL is correct in its statement that when the subject roadway came under DEPARTMENT control, the law governing the

state requirements for size, height, spacing, and zoning were not considered when permitting existing signs. However, due to the enactment of Section 479.15, Florida Statutes, the DEPARTMENT is precluded from permitting signs which do not comply with local government requirements. See also §§ 479.07(3)(b), and 479.15(1), Fla. Stat. As the record undisputedly reflects, nonconformity and illegality are separate and distinct determinations and the DEPARTMENT is without authority to permit a sign declared illegal by a local governmental entity. The record contains competent, substantial evidence to support the Administrative Law Judge's Conclusion of Law No. 26 that the subject signs do not comply with the City's codes and that conclusion is well supported in the law.

NATIONAL'S second exception is rejected.

NATIONAL'S third exception is to Conclusion of Law No. 24 because it improperly rules upon, and concludes, the actions of the City of Clearwater to be legal.

The Administrative Law Judge, in paragraph 24 of his Recommended Order, cites with approval Section 479.15(1), Florida Statutes, as the statutory basis for the DEPARTMENT denying reinstatement of NATIONAL'S sign permits, or in the alternative, issuance of new permits to NATIONAL. NATIONAL claims that the Administrative Law Judge emphasizes that the DEPARTMENT may not issue a permit for any sign which is prohibited by another public board, officer, or agency, which again relates to the required local governmental approval required under Section 479.07(3)(b), Florida Statutes. However, NATIONAL argues, what the Administrative Law Judge failed to consider is the limitation

contained in Section 479.15(1), Florida Statutes, which requires that any such prohibition by a public board, officer, or agency, must be "in the lawful exercise of its powers." Inferentially, the Administrative Law Judge has concluded, according to NATIONAL, the actions of the City of Clearwater to be in the lawful exercise of its powers by concluding that Section 479.15(1), Florida Statutes, prohibits the DEPARTMENT from issuing NATIONAL the required permits. Additionally, NATIONAL argues, the Administrative Law Judge's conclusion that the evidence supports a finding that the subject sign structures do not comply with the City's codes and will not be permitted by the City, is totally contrary to Findings of Fact No. 1 through 3, wherein the Administrative Law Judge concludes that the outdoor advertising sign structure in question are already permitted by the City.

The record reflects that in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the City of Clearwater passed and amended an ordinance which required that the subject signs either be modified to comply with the terms of the applicable Clearwater Code Chapter or be removed, either of which was to be completed by January 19, 1996. On the other hand, there is no evidence or testimony in the record to contradict such a finding or conclusion or which would support a finding that the referenced ordinance was other than a legal action by the City of Clearwater. The City of Clearwater's position is that after January 19, 1996, the subject signs became illegal. As there is no evidence or testimony in the record that the City's determination has been challenged in a court of competent jurisdiction, the Administrative Law Judge could, and did, properly conclude that the City's actions were legal.

NATIONAL third exception is rejected.

As its fourth exception, NATIONAL claims the date set forth in Findings of Fact No. 10 is incorrect. According to NATIONAL, the record is unrefuted that the date State Road 60, east of U.S. 19, became jurisdictional is November 28, 199S, citing also to Finding of Fact No. 11.

As previously noted, the record reflects the accuracy of NATIONAL'S fourth exception and Finding of Fact No. 10 is corrected accordingly.

NATIONAL'S fourth exception is accepted.

NATIONAL'S NOTICE OF ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY

On May 25, 2000, NATIONAL served upon the DEPARTMENT its Notice of Additional Authority," ostensibly in support of its "arguments made in its Exceptions to the Recommended Order."

There is no authority in Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, or the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure for the post-trial filing of additional argument and reinterpretation of evidence to support a party's position. NATIONAL'S Notice of Additional Authority goes beyond citation to additional case or statutory authority to support its previously made arguments. Rather, NATIONAL'S

post-hearing filing makes new arguments to support its original position and reargues its case.

NATIONAL'S additional arguments should have been presented to the Administrative Law Judge through legal argument or through the examination and cross examination of witnesses. All of NATIONAL'S additional arguments go to the propriety or legality of the City of Clearwater's Sign Code. Both the city attorney and a code enforcement officer for the City of Clearwater testified at the administrative hearing. The arguments made by NATIONAL in its Notice of Additional Authority should have been developed through those witnesses or additional witnesses and evidence which NATIONAL could have introduced. This is not the proper time arm the DEPARTMENT is not the proper forum to which new post-hearing arguments should be made.

The DEPARTMENT is without authority to consider NATIONAL'S Notice of Additional Authority, and the arguments therein have not been considered in the DEPARTMENT'S review of the record, consideration of the Recommended Order, and the preparation of this Final Order.

NATIONAL'S MOTION FOR STAY OF ENTRY OF A FINAL ORDER

On June 26, 2000, NATIONAL filed with the DEPARTMENT'S Clerk of Agency Proceedings, a Motion for Stay of Entry of a Final Order and exhibits thereto. The DEPARTMENT has fully considered NATIONAL'S motion in this regard, but declines to stay the issuance of the Final Order in this matter. Notwithstanding the DEPARTMENT'S denial of NATIONAL'S motion to stay the entry of the Final Order in this matter, the DEPARTMENT shall consider NATIONAL'S motion as a motion to stay the removal of the subject sign structures as required by the recommendation of the Administrative Law Judge that NATIONAL'S petitions for reinstatement and NATIONAL'S applications for new sign permits be denied. NATIONAL'S motion is recast as a motion to stay removal of the subject signs, as contemplated by Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.310 and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.550.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. After review of the record in its entirety, it is determined that the Administrative Law Judge's Findings of Fact

   in paragraphs 1 through 9 and 11 through 17 are supported by the record and are accepted and incorporated as if fully set forth herein.

   
   

2. The Findings of Fact in paragraph 10 are accepted as corrected and incorporated as if fully set forth herein.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The DEPARTMENT has jurisdiction over the subject matter of and the parties to this proceeding pursuant to Chapters 120 and 479, Florida Statutes.

   
   

2. The Conclusions of Law in paragraphs 20 through 28 are supported in the law. As such, they are adopted and incorporated as if fully set forth herein.

   
   

3. The Conclusions of Law in paragraphs 18 and 19 are rejected.

ORDER

Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is

ORDERED that the Administrative Law Judge's Recommended Order, as herein corrected and modified, is adopted. It is further

ORDERED that the permits previously issued to Petitioner, NATIONAL ADVERTISING COMPANY, for the subject signs are declared void by operation of law and the subject signs are illegal and must be removed. It is further

ORDERED that Petitioner, NATIONAL ADVERTISING COMPANY, shall remove the subject signs and all associated debris within thirty

(30) days of the date of this Final Order. It is further.

ORDERED, that should Petitioner, NATIONAL ADVERTISING COMPANY, fail to remove the subject signs and any debris associated with said removal within the thirty (30) days herein provided, the Respondent, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, or its contractor, shall remove the subject sign and all costs associated with such removal are hereby assessed against Petitioner, NATIONAL ADVERTISING COMPANY. It is further

ORDERED, that the motion of Petitioner, NATIONAL ADVERTISING COMPANY, for a stay of the entry of the Final Order in this matter is denied without prejudice to the consideration of the motion by the DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION as a motion to stay

the removal of the subject signs and the entry of an appropriate order thereon.

DONE AND ORDERED this 30th day of June, 2000.

THOMAS F. BARRY, JR. P.E

Secretary

Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building

605 Suwannee Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399

ENDNOTE

1/ References to the transcript of the proceeding below are identified as (T.) followed by the appropriate page number(s).

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL

THIS ORDER CONSTITUTES FINAL AGENCY ACTION AND MAY BE APPEALED PURSUANT TO SECTION 120.68, FLORIDA STATUTES, AND RULES

9.110 AND 9.190, FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, BY FILING A NOTICE OF APPEAL CONFORMING TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 9.110(d), FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, BOTH WITH THE APPROPRIATE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL, ACCOMPANIED BY THE APPROPRIATE FILING FEE, AND WITH THE DEPARTMENT'S CLERK OF AGENCY PROCEEDINGS, HAYDON BURNS BUILDING, 605 SUWANNEE STREET, M.S.

58, TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-458, WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS OF RENDITION OF THIS ORDER.

Copies furnished to:

Kelly A. Bennett Assistant General Counsel

Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 605 Suwannee Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458

Gerald S. Livingston, Esquire Aileen Reilly, Esquire Livingston & Reilly, P.A.

612 East Colonial Drive, Suite 350 Post Office Box 2151

Orlando, Florida 32802

Juanice Hagan

Assistant Manger, Right of Way Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 22 605 Suwannee Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399

Lynn Holschuh

Outdoor Advertising Administrator Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 22 605 Suwannee Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399

Susan Rosetti

Outdoor Advertising Administrator, District VII

Department of Transportation

11201 North McKinley Drive, M.S. 7-900

Tampa, Florida 33612-6456

Docket for Case No: 99-003940

Orders for Case No: 99-003940