The Issue The issues in this case are whether six outdoor advertising sign permits previously issued to Petitioner should be reinstated; or, if not, whether new permits should be issued for the six advertising facings (two on each of three sign structures) in Clearwater, Florida.
Findings Of Fact In June 1982, National lawfully erected an outdoor advertising billboard structure with two advertising facings located adjacent to State Road 60, 0.5 mile east of U.S. 19, pursuant to permit number 6868 issued by the City of Clearwater (the City), on October 22, 1981, and pursuant to state sign permit numbers AF604 and AF605 issued by DOT on November 18, 1981. In January 1983, National lawfully erected an outdoor advertising billboard structure with two advertising facings located adjacent to State Road 60, 0.4 mile east of U.S. 19, pursuant to permit number 10406 issued by the City on October 15, 1982, and pursuant to state sign permit numbers A1288 and A1289 issued by DOT on December 20, 1982. On or about July 1, 1984, National lawfully erected an outdoor advertising billboard structure with two advertising facings located adjacent to State Road 60, 0.3 mile east of U.S. 19, pursuant to permit number SN - 24060117 issued by the City on June 6, 1984, and pursuant to state sign permit numbers AM631 and AM632 issued by DOT on January 12, 1984. National maintained the three outdoor advertising billboard structures, containing six advertising faces, as identified in Findings of Fact numbers 1, 2 and 3, above (the "subject sign structures"), in the same condition as they were when erected. Following the lawful erection of the subject sign structures, National paid DOT the required annual permit fees through the year 1995, which allowed National to maintain and operate the subject sign structures through December 31, 1995. In March of 1995, DOT notified National that it was dropping state sign permit numbers AF604, AF605, A1288, A1289, AM631, and AM632 from its inventory because DOT had no jurisdiction over the segment of State Road 60, east of U.S. 19, adjacent to which the subject sign structures were located. The evidence was that DOT did so by serving on National a "Notice of Violation," citing DOT's lack of jurisdiction. The "Notice of Violation" gave National the opportunity to request an administrative hearing to contest DOT's action. National had no reason to question DOT's position on the jurisdictional issue but rather relied upon DOT's determination that DOT did not have jurisdiction in March of 1995. National chose not to request a hearing. The evidence was not clear as to when the DOT lost, or believed it lost, jurisdiction; the evidence also was not clear whether the DOT ever had, or believed it ever had, jurisdiction. At the time DOT dropped state sign permit numbers AF604, AF605, A1288, A1289, AM631, and AM632 from its inventory, DOT did not refund any permit fees to National, including the permit fees which National had paid for the 1995 calendar year. Consequently, permit numbers AF604, AF605, A1288, A1289, AM631, and AM632 were fully paid through December 31, 1995. On November 2, 1995, the section of State Road 60, east of U.S. 19, along which the subject sign structures are located became part of the National Highway System (NHS), and became jurisdictional for the purpose of permitting outdoor advertising billboard structures. On August 26, 1996, Kenneth M. Towcimak, as Director of DOT's Office of Right of Way, issued a memorandum to all District Outdoor Advertising Administrators addressing implementation of outdoor advertising control over roadways which were previously uncontrolled by DOT, and which became designated as part of the NHS on November 28, 1995. The Towcimak memorandum of August 26, 1996, required notification by registered mail, with return receipt requested, to all owners of such outdoor advertising billboard structures, that they must obtain state permits by January 1, 1997. There was no evidence as to whether DOT ever notified National by registered mail, with return receipt requested, that National was required to obtain state permits by January 1, 1997, for the subject sign structures. National filed six applications for the subject sign structures on or about December 29, 1997 (one for each of the two sign facings on each sign structure). On the part of the forms asking for the location of the sign, the six applications described the location of the signs, respectively, as: "Reinstated State Tag # AF 604-10"; "Reinstated State Tag # AF 605-10"; "Reinstated State Tag # AM 631-10"; "Reinstated State Tag # AM 632-10"; "Reinstated State Tag # AI 288-10"; and "Reinstated State Tag # AI 289-10." The applications contained copies of the permits previously issued by DOT for the operation and maintenance of the subject sign structures, copies of Landowner's permission and copies of City building permits for the original construction of the sign structures. Although the applications included copies of the City building permits for the original construction of the sign structures, DOT knew that the City no longer considered the sign structures to be legal under the City's code. In 1989, the City amended its code to place limitations on the size (height and area) and concentration (one per lot) of signs in the locations of the subject sign structures. The subject sign structures exceeded at least some of the new limitations; however, the code amendment provided for a seven-year "amortization" period, until January 19, 1996, during which the signs would be permitted as legal, non-conforming signs. At the end of the "amortization" period, the signs no longer were legal under the City code. Some of the information on National's six applications was incorrect or incomplete. But all of the incorrect or incomplete information could easily have been remedied, and "incorrect information" is not the real basis upon which DOT gave notice of intent to deny the applications. The real basis for the notice of intent was the illegality of the sign structures under the City code. On or about November 22, 1999, National filed with DOT a Petition for Reinstatement for each of the three signs (each petition seeking reinstatement of the two permits for the two advertising facings for each sign structure) under Section 479.07(8)(b)1-3, Florida Statutes (1999). On January 31, 2000, DOT issued a Notice of Intent to Deny Petition for Reinstatement as to each of the three such petitions filed by National.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Department of Transportation enter a final order denying National's petitions for reinstatement and National's applications for new sign permits. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of April, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of April, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Gerald S. Livingston, Esquire Aileen Reilly, Esquire Livingston & Reilly, P.A. Post Office Box 2151 Orlando, Florida 32802 Kelly A. Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Thomas F. Barry, Secretary Attention: James C. Myers Clerk of Agency Proceedings Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Pamela Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458
Findings Of Fact On November 3, 1982, outdoor advertising sign permits AR946-06 and AK947-06 were issued by the Department of Transportation to Sandy Advertising Company. The permits were for a location on the west (north) side of U.S. Highway 90 approximately two miles east of its intersection with U.S. Highway 29 within the city limits of Pensacola, Florida. Sandy Advertising Company transferred those permits to Lamar Advertising Company of Pensacola, Inc. Annual renewal payments have been made each year in a timely manner by Lamar Advertising Company of Pensacola, Inc. No permit tags have been displayed at the Lamar sites and no sign has been built or maintained at the Lamar sites since issuance of the permits. Without having submitted an application for a permit to the Department of Transportation, Outdoor Media of Pensacola, Inc., obtained a building permit from the City of Pensacola for the erection of an outdoor advertising sign located in Escambia County approximately 3,790 feet east of State Road 296 on the north side of U.S. Highway 90. Pursuant to the building permit, Outdoor Media erected a sign at that location. The sign had an east and a west face and was less than 500 feet from the site for which permits AK946-06 and AK947-06 were issued. Each face of the sign required a separate permit from the Department of Transportation. Learning of the erection of Outdoor Media's sign, the Department notified Petitioner to remove it. Instead Outdoor Media applied for two sign permits for each face of the sign. On August 8, 1988, the Department of Transportation received Petitioner's applications for a state outdoor advertising permit. The applications were for each face of the sign located on U.S. 90 (Scenic Highway), a federal aid primary highway in Pensacola, Escambia County, Florida. The applications were denied on the ground that two other permits, permit AK946- 06 and permit AK947-06, had been issued to Lamar Advertising of Pensacola, Inc., for a location on the same side of the highway within one thousand feet of Petitioner's site. The spacing impediment caused by the earlier permits is the sole basis for denial of Petitioner's permit applications by the Department of Transportation. Petitioner meets all other permit requirements. In 1984, the legislature extensively revised Chapter 479, Florida Statutes. See Chapter 84-227, Laws of Florida. Of particular concern in this proceeding are the changes to Section 479.07, Florida Statutes, and whether those changes apply to permits AK946-06 and AK947-06. The revisions to this section introduced very specific tag display as well as sign erection and maintenance requirements for all permits. The revisions increased the fee schedules and provided that all permits expire annually on January 15. Section 479.07, Florida Statutes, as amended states in part: (5)(a) For each permit issued, the department shall furnish to the applicant a serially numbered permanent metal permit tag. The permittee is responsible for maintaining a valid permit tag on each permitted sign facing at all times. The tag shall be securely attached to the sign facing or, if there is no facing, on the pole nearest the highway; and it shall be attached in such a manner as to be plainly visible from the main-traveled way. The permit will become void unless the permit tag is properly and permanently displayed at the permitted site within 30 days after the date of permit issuance. If the permittee fails to erect a completed sign on the permitted site within 270 days after the date on which the permit was issued, the permit will be void, and the department may not issue a new permit to that permittee for the same location for 270 days after the date on which the permit became void. (b) If a permit tag is lost, stolen, or destroyed, the permittee to whom the tag was issued must apply to the department for a replacement tag. Upon receipt of the application accompanied by a service fee of $3, the department shall issue a replacement permit tag. A permit is valid only for the location specified in the permit. Valid permits may be transferred from one sign owner to another upon written acknowledgment from the current permittee and submittal of a transfer fee of $5 for each permit to be transferred. However, the maximum transfer fee for any multiple transfer between two outdoor advertisers in a single transaction is $100. A permittee shall at all times maintain the permission of the owner or other persons in lawful control of the sign site to have and maintain a sign at such site. (8)(a) All licenses and permits expire annually on January 15, and all license and permit renewal fees are required to be submitted to the department by no later than January 15. On or before November 1 of each year, the department shall send to each permittee a notice of fees due for all permits which were issued to him prior to September 30. Such notice shall list the permits and the permit fees due for each sign facing. The permittee shall, no later than January 1 of each year, advise the department of any additions, deletions, or errors contained in the notice. Permit tags which are not renewed shall be returned to the department shall be accounted for by the permittee in writing, which writing shall be submitted with the renewal fee payment. (b) If a permittee has not submitted his fee payment by January 15, the department shall, no later than February 1, send a notice of violation to the permittee, requiring the payment of the permit fee within 30 days after the date of the notice and payment of a delinquency fee equal to 10 percent of the original amount due or, in the alternative to these payments, requiring the filing of a request for an administrative hearing to show cause why his sign should not be subject to immediate removal due to expiration of his license or permit. If the permittee submits payment as required by the violation notice, his license or permit will be automatically reinstated and such reinstatement will be retroactive to January 15th. If the permittee does not respond to the notice of violation within the 30-day period, the department shall remove the sign without further notice and without incurring any liability as a result of such removal. (9)(a) A permit shall not be granted for any sign for which a permit had not been granted by the effective date of this act unless such sign is located at least: One thousand five hundred feet from any other permitted sign on the same side of the highway, if on an interstate highway. One thousand feet from any other permitted sign on the same side of the highway, if on a federal-aid primary highway. The minimum spacing provided in this paragraph does not preclude the permitting V-type, back-to-back, side- to-side, stacked, or double-faced signs at the permitted sign site. A permit shall not be granted for a sign pursuant to this chapter to locate such sign on any portion of the interstate or federal-aid primary highway system, which sign: Exceeds 50 feet in sign structure height above the crown of the main- traveled way, if outside an incorporated area; Exceeds 65 feet in sign structure height above the crown of the main- traveled way, if inside an incorporated area; or Exceeds 950 square feet of sign facing including all embellishments. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed so as to cause a sign which is conforming on the effective date of this act to become nonconforming. The effective date(s) of the amendments to Section 479.07, Florida Statutes, is stated in Section 27 of Law 84-227. Section 27 specifically and explicitly made permits issued prior to June 30, 1984 subject to the new provisions of Law 84-227. Section 27 states: This act shall take effect October 1, 1984, except that the amendments to Section 479.07 F.S. shall take effect July 1, 1984; however, any permit or license which is valid and applicable as of June 30, 1984, shall remain valid and applicable until January 15, 1985, unless the license or permit earlier expires or is revoked. [Emphasis supplied]. In spite of the language of Section 27, it is DOT's interpretation that for permits issued prior to July 1, 1984, permittees are not required to display tags within thirty (30) days and erect signs within 270 days as provided in Section 479.07(5)(a), Florida Statutes, effective July 1, 1984. DOT nonetheless requires pre-1984 permits to comply with Sections 479.07(5)(b) and (8)(a), Florida Statutes. While DOT's interpretation is not in writing and has not been promulgated as a rule pursuant to Sections 120.54 or 120.55, Florida Statutes, it is applied statewide and has been held to be an invalid unpromulgated rule in Case NO. 5227R, Final Order issued December 29th, 1988. DOT relies upon the definition of "non-conforming" signs given in Section 479.01(12), Florida Statutes. Section 479.01(12), Florida Statutes, states in part: `Nonconforming sign' means a sign which was lawfully erected but which does not comply with the land use, setback, size, spacing, and lighting provisions of state or local law, rule, regulation, or ordinance passed at a later date or a sign which was lawfully erected but which later fails to comply with state or local law, rule, regulation, or ordinance due to changed conditions. [Emphasis supplied.] 1/ DOT does not rely upon the exceptions listed in Section 479.16, Florida Statutes, as amended by Chapter 84-227. The exceptions are numerous, but do not specifically enumerate "Pre-July 1, 1984 permits." It is DOT's view that permits issued before July 1, 1984, are valid with or without a sign being erected or tags maintained or displayed. These "secret signs" can only be discovered after the application is submitted and DOT checks its computer records. The effect of DOT's interpretation is that pre- 1984 outdoor advertising sign permits can exist into perpetuity without the holder thereof ever erecting a sign or posting a metal tag as long as the permittee renews its permit. This interpretation is directly opposed to the legislature's purpose in enacting the 1984 amendments, i.e., the prevention of advertisers stockpiling unused sites and permits. Moreover, this interpretation is contrary to the pre- or post-1984 statutory language and is not a reasonable interpretation of the statute. DOT bases it's interpretation on the ground that the constitution prohibits the retroactive application of the 1984 amendments to permits existing prior to the effective date of those amendments. DOT did not offer any evidence as to the accuracy of its view on the requirements of the constitution. Failing such evidentiary support, DOT has failed to carry its burden of proof when utilizing an unpromulgated rule on a case by case basis. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties to and subject matter of this cause. Section 120.57(1) Florida Statutes. Section 479.07, Florida Statutes, was amended by Chapter 84-227, Laws of Florida, to require that parties obtaining outdoor advertising permits post their permit tags within thirty (30) days and erect their signs within two hundred seventy (270) days or their permits would automatically become void. The amendment became effective July 1, 1984. The amendment also expressly and explicitly provided for treatment of pre-July 1, 1984 permits by stating" . . . any permit or license which is valid and applicable as of June 30, 1984, shall remain valid and applicable until January 15, 1985, unless the license or permit earlier expires or is revoked. [Emphasis supplied]. Section 479.01(12) only makes exceptions for nonconforming "signs lawfully erected." Section 479.07(9)(c) only provides that nothing in subsection (9), pertaining to spacing requirements or permitting of new signs after July 1, 1984, may be construed to cause a sign which is conforming on the effective date of the Act to become nonconforming. See the definition of "sign" contained in Section 479.01(14), Florida Statutes, and of "erect" contained in Section 479.01(4), Florida Statutes. However, in spite of the clear language of the statutes, DOT interprets the term "permitted signs" as including permits issued prior to July 1, 1984, but which have no sign erected on the site. DOT has placed an interpretation upon the statutes that is not apparent from their language. The plain language of Sections 479.01(12) and 479.07(9)(c) only applies to signs which have been constructed on the permit site. The sections do not apply where no sign has been constructed. Since no signs were ever erected on the sites covered by permit AK946-06 and AK947-06 neither Section 479.01(12) nor 479.07(9)(c) applies to Lamar's permits. Further, DOT interprets the amendment to Section 479.07, now codified as Section 479.07(5)(a), requiring permit display and sign erection within a specified time period, to be applicable only to permits initially issued after the effective date of July 1, 1984. The agency has not enforced that subsection against preexisting permits and renewals of such preexisting permits, irrespective of whether or not a sign has ever been erected on the permitted site. However, the agency has applied and enforced against preexisting permits all other portions of the amendments, including but not limited to the mandatory recurring uniform annual January 15 renewal date and increased renewal fee with regard to preexisting permits. The agency has taken this approach on the grounds that the constitution prohibited the amendment from being applied retroactively to such preexisting permits. In Administrative Case NO. 88-5227R, this interpretation was held to be an invalid unpromulgated rule. However, agencies have the choice of properly promulgating rules and applying them with the full force and effect of law or of fully explicating those policies by demonstrating the policies' reasonableness and factual accuracy on a case by case basis in Section 120.57 proceedings. McDonald v. Department of Banking and Finance, 346 So.2d 569 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Amos v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 444 So.2d (Fla, 1st DCA 1983); Gulf Coast Home Health Services Of Florida, Inc. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 513 So.2d 704 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). As noted earlier, the sole reason for DOT's policy was that it was required by the constitution. Such a bare bones claim as "the constitution requires it" is tantamount to the claim that was asserted in Florida Cities Water Company v. Florida Public Service Commission, 384 So.2d 1280 (Fla. 1980) that a previous statutory interpretation was "wrong as a matter of law." In Florida Cities, no record foundation was made for the non-rule policy being followed in that case. The Florida Supreme Court held that such a rationale was not sustainable absent adequate record support for the application of non-rule agency policy. In this case, DOT has failed to affirmatively show the reasonableness and factual accuracy of the policy that sign permits which were issued prior to July 1, 1984, should not be subject to Section 479.07(5), Florida Statutes, enforcement and should be treated as if they constituted, erected and maintained signs for purposes of Section 479.07(9), Florida Statutes. It is doubtful that DOT could ever show the accuracy of its view of the constitution. The case law in the area clearly establishes that permits such as these are not property in the constitutional sense. Such permits do not confer any right, estate or vested interest, and are revocable at the will of the legislature. Such permits are also subject to new permit conditions. State ex rel First Presbyterian Church of Miami v. Fuller, 187 So. 148 (Fla. 1939); City of Miami Beach v. Deauville Operating Corp., 129 So.2d 185 ( Fla. 3d DCA 1961) and Kawasaki of Tampa, Inc. v. Calvin, 348 So.2d 897 ( Fla. 1st DCA 1977). Moreover, the 1984 amendments to Chapter 479 do not require retroactive application to be applied to permits AK946-06 and AK947-06. The new permit conditions were applicable only upon the expiration of the old permits on January 15. Thereafter, the new permit conditions applied to the renewal. Therefore, since Lamar did not build any signs on the sites covered by either permit AK946-06 or AK947-06 within 270 days of its first renewal after the effective date of the statutory revisions to Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, and has not posted the required tags at the sites, permits AK946-06 and AK947-06 are void and cannot be used as a basis for denying Petitioner's sign applications. As in Florida Cities, having failed to establish the reasonableness and accuracy of its policy, the foregoing policy cannot form the basis of the permit denials. This is especially true in light of the fact that DOT's policy ignores the clear language of the statutory amendments.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a Final Order voiding Permits AK946-06 and AK947-06, held by Respondent, Lamar Advertising Company, Inc., and granting the applications of Outdoor Media of Pensacola, Inc. DONE and ENTERED this 23rd day of May, 1990, at Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of May, 1990.
The Issue The issue in these causes is whether denial of Petitioners' outdoor advertising sign site permit applications by Respondent were correctly determined under Subsection 479.111(2), Florida Statutes (2003), on the basis that the sign sites were unzoned commercial/industrial areas; and on the basis that within attending factual circumstances, the sign site did not qualify as unzoned commercial/industrial areas as defined in Subsection 479.01(23), Florida Statutes (2003).
Findings Of Fact Based upon the observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying; documentary materials received in evidence; evidentiary rulings made pursuant to Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes (2003); and the entire record of this proceeding, the following relevant and material findings of fact are determined: Petitioner, Tropical Landholdings, a Florida Corporation, was created in 1998 and purchased approximately 700 to 800 acres of land comprised of residential multi-family and commercial properties along Interstate 75 (I-75) in Punta Gorda, Florida. On September 8, 2003, Petitioner, Crown Advertising, Inc., of Belleview, Florida, submitted three outdoor advertising sign site permit applications to the Department for review. On September 23, 2003, the Department denied the three outdoor advertising sign site permit applications for the following reasons: (1) the sign sites were not permitted under the local land use designation of site (§ 479.111(2), Fla. Stat. (2003)); and (2) the sign sites did not qualify as unzoned commercial/industrial area. § 479.01, Fla. Stat. (2003). The sign site permit application forms used by Petitioners in these causes were composed and authorized by the Department. The form required the applicant to obtain and provide information regarding the proposed sign site, what is proposed to be constructed on the site, and where the proposed construction is to occur. The sign site permit applications also required the applicant to secure information from the appropriate local zoning official of the future land use designation and the current zoning of the proposed sites enacted by the local government's Comprehensive Plan and land use development regulations. This form required information from the local government as to whether the applicant is or is not in compliance with all adopted local ordinances. Permission to erect an outdoor sign structure on the identified sign site is subject to approval by the City. Petitioners complied with the requested information. The local government, the City of North Port, approved the three sign site permit applications in question and granted Petitioners permission to erect three outdoor billboard signs. This local grant of approval was then subjected to concurring approval by the Department. After receiving the sign site permits that were approved by the City, the Department engaged the services of a consultant to conduct on-site review and identification of: (1) the local government's designation for each proposed sign site; (2) the permitted uses of each proposed sign site (local drainage facilities, pipeline corridors, underground communication cables, electric transmission lines, and outdoor advertising signs); and (3) a review of adjacent and surrounding parcels. The consultant reported to the Department the factual circumstances attendant the three locally approved sign sites. It should be noted that the consultant did not render an opinion regarding the Department's approval or denial of the sign site permit applications. The sign sites in question were zoned under the local "land use designation" of the City of North Port's Ordinance 02-46, Section 53.146 (Ordinance 02-46), as a "utility industrial corridor." The zoned land was composed of strips of land measuring 25 to 70 feet in width on the west side and 160 to 170 feet in width on the east side. The "permitted governmental uses" of a parcel zoned as a "utility industrial corridor," included such uses as underground communication cables, electric transmission lines, and outdoor advertising signs. Ordinance 02-46, under the title "Prohibited Uses and Structures," specifically prohibits "all commercial and industrial uses." Based upon a review of all information provided by Petitioners, the local government, and its consultant, the Department first determined the three sign sites on which the subject signs were to be erected and located, prohibited commercial or industrial uses. The Department then determined, based upon an analysis of the materials provided by its consultant and the City of North Port, the three sign sites in question had not been zoned for commercial or industrial uses as a part of the local government's comprehensive zoning plan. Based upon (1) the prohibition of commercial or industrial uses and (2) no commercial or industrial zoning of the sign sites, the Department concluded these three sign sites were zoned "primarily to permit outdoor advertising," a prohibited function. The denials were required. Under the local land use designation of Ordinance 02-46, the City of North Port's permitted uses included local drainage facilities and a pipeline corridor. Under governmental uses designation of Ordinance 02-46, the City of North Port's permitted uses included underground communication cables, electric transmission lines, and outdoor advertising. However, Ordinance 02-46 specifically prohibits all commercial and industrial uses under the governmental uses designation. When questioned by Petitioners, Ms. Holschuh testified "that the Department's intent was to allow [sign] permits whenever possible and never prohibit the installation of billboards." From this specific statement of testimony, Petitioners argued that "implementing the intent the Department must look beyond the labels of the zoning and look at the actual primary uses allowed under those designations." (Emphasis added.) Ms. Holschuh disagreed with Petitioners' characterization of the Department's procedures and convincingly maintained that the Department based its denials on "sign site zoning" and factors considered for determining an "unzoned commercial/industrial area" as defined by statute. Continuing with its argument, Petitioners conclude "[T]he department . . . appears to be in conflict with Judge Barbara Staros' decision of February 16, 2004, in a rule challenge proceeding, where she analyzed the Sign Permit procedure under Section 479.07, Florida Statutes." In her Final Order, Administrative Law Judge Barbara Staros made a Finding of Fact in paragraph 30, stating: Once the local government zoning official certifies that the proposed sign identified in the application is in compliance with the comprehensive plan adopted pursuant to Chapter 163, the Department does not go behind that certification to look factually at whether the zoning action was consistent with the comprehensive plan. Page 13. The procedures followed by the Department in this proceeding complied with Judge Staros Finding of Fact in paragraph 31, where she wrote: The Department uses the application and the information contained therein to determine whether a proposed sign location falls within the definition of a "commercial or industrial zone." If it does, [fall within] then the Department determines whether those designations were adopted as part of the local government's comprehensive planning efforts or were "primarily" adopted to permit outdoor advertising signs on that location. Page 30. Based upon it's receipt, review, and analysis of the specific facts provided by all parties of interest, the Department determined the sites where the signs were to be erected prohibited commercial or industrial use. The Department factually determined that no local zoning identified the sites as commercial or industrial. The Department concluded correctly and in accord with Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-10.0052 that these three sign sites were zoned by the City of North Port, the local governmental entity, "primarily to permit outdoor advertising" contrary to sign site permit procedures under Section 479.07, Florida Statutes (2003). Based upon the evidence of record and considering the size of the sign site, the local government's zoning of the site, designated uses of the site, and prohibited uses on the site, denial of the sign applications was correctly determined pursuant to Subsection 479.111(2), Florida Statutes (2003), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-10.0052. Based on the testimonies of Ms. Holschuh and James Duff, who testified regarding his ownership, property taxes paid, and the investors' inability to use the property in question to their economic advantage, Petitioners failed to carry the burden of producing a preponderance of credible evidence to establish that the Department incorrectly and/or wrongfully denied Petitioners' applications for three sign site permits pursuant to Subsection 479.111(2), Florida Statutes (2003), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-10.0052.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Metro Advertising Company, is a licensed outdoor advertising company doing buiness in Orlando, Florida, through a division known as Eagle Outdoor. In 1964 the Petitioner acquired two outdoor advertising signs situated side-by-side on U.S. 17-92, 1.49 miles south of SR 436, in Seminole County, Florida. Thereafter, these signs were permitted by the Department and issued permit numbers 3988-2 and 3990-2. The Petitioner has renewed these permits each year by paying the appropriate annual renewal fee to the Department, including the renewal fees for the year 1985. Some time in 1983 the Departmet's outdoor advertising inspector noticed that the two signs which are the subject of this proceeding did not have affixed to them the permit tags as required. This inspector informed a representative of the Petitioner who was a divisional manager of the company, that these signs did not display permit tags, and advised that this be corrected. Subsequently, the Department's outdoor advertising administrator also discussed the matter of the missing tags on the subject signs with the Petitioner's divisional manager. At this time the divisional manager denied that the Petitioner owned these signs, and that there was no reason to replace the tags. On December 12, 1983, violation notices were issued by the Department charging that the signs at the subject location were in violation of the statutes and rules, and that these signs would be removed unless an administrative hearing was requested within 30 days. Since the Petitioner's logo appeared on these signs, the violation notices were directed to the Petitioner, and mailed returned receipt requested. When the time afforded to request an administrative hearing expired without any response from the Petitioner, the Department issued its final order for the removal of the subject signs. Pursuant to this order, the Department caused these signs to be removed. The signs that the Deparatment removed were nonconforming signs. If they were rebuilt they would violate the statutory spacing requirements.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's request for replalcement tags for permit numbers 3988-2 and 3990-2 for signs on U. S. 17-92, 1.49 miles south of SR 436, in Seminole County, be DENIED, and that the fees paid by the Petitioner for the years 1984 and 1985 be REFUNDED. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered this 15th day of July, 1985 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of July, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Gerald S. Livingston, Esq. Post Office Box 2151 Orlando, Florida 32802-2151 Philip S. Bennett, Esq. Haydon Burns Building, MS 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064 Hon. Paul A. Pappas Secretary Dept of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: The outdoor advertising sign that is the subject of the instant proceeding (hereinafter referred to as the "Sign") is a billboard with steel "I" beams and iron stringers which sits perpendicular to U.S. Highway 1 approximately 1,800 feet south of Hypoluxo Road and approximately 1,000 feet north of Neptune Drive in Palm Beach County. Petitioner has owned the Sign since about 1978 or 1979, when it purchased the assets of the Sign's previous owner, Outdoor Media. The Sign was originally erected in 1963 by Ferrin Signs, Inc., pursuant to a permit issued by Palm Beach County. In 1967, Ferrin Signs, Inc., obtained a permit from Palm Beach County to perform further work on the sign. Shortly thereafter, Ferrin Signs, Inc., sold the Sign to Outdoor Media. Prior to March of 1970, the land on which the Sign is located was in the unincorporated area of Palm Beach County. In March of 1970, the land was annexed by the Town of Hypoluxo and has been within the Town's jurisdictional boundaries ever since. The Town of Hypoluxo has an ordinance currently in effect that regulates signs within the Town. The ordinance, like its predecessors dating back to 1961, prohibits "off premises signs." It also contains a section dealing with "nonconforming signs," which provides as follows: Signs or sign structures made nonconforming by this sign and signage code shall be governed by the following regulations: A sign existing within the town on or before November 30, 1992, which, because of its height, square foot area, location or other characteristics, does not conform to this article is hereby declared to be a nonconforming sign. A nonconforming sign under this subsection may be allowed to remain in existence, but if destroyed or allowed to deteriorate in excess of 50 percent of the depreciated value of the structure, it may not be replaced. The status afforded signs under this section shall not be applicable to any sign for which no sign permit was ever issued; such signs are deemed illegal signs and are subject to the provisions of this article governing illegal signs. No conforming sign or sign structure shall be permitted to be erected for the same property containing an existing nonconforming sign until the nonconforming sign has been removed or made conforming. An "off premises sign" that does not qualify for "nonconforming sign" status is subject to removal under the ordinance. The Town also has a building code. Under the code, a building permit is required before a sign within the Town may be altered or repaired. No building permit has ever been issued by the Town for any work to be performed on the Sign. On December 27, 1990, the Department issued a Notice of Violation alleging that Petitioner was maintaining the Sign without a state-issued outdoor advertising sign permit, as required by Section 497.07, Florida Statutes. In response to the Notice of Violation, Petitioner advised the Department that it would be filing an application for such a permit. Petitioner filed its application on January 12, 1993. The application was accompanied by, among other things, a copy of the 1963 Palm Beach County permit referred to in Finding of Fact 3 above. The application package, however, contained neither a permit for the Sign issued by the Town of Hypoluxo, nor a statement from any Hypoluxo official indicating that the Sign was eligible for such a permit or was otherwise allowable under the Town's sign ordinance. Accordingly, after receiving the application package, the Department contacted the Mayor of the Town, the Honorable Al Merion, to ascertain the Town's position on the matter. In conjunction therewith, it provided Mayor Merion with a copy of the 1963 Palm Beach County permit that had accompanied Petitioner's application. By letter dated January 25, 1993, Mayor Merion responded to the Department's inquiry. In his letter, he wrote: Receipt is hereby acknowledged of your fax transmittal containing a permit issued by Palm Beach County to the Ferrin Signs, Inc. on January 24, 1963. The permit issued by Palm Beach County is not valid because it is not within their [sic] jurisdiction to issue sign permits for property lying within the territorial boundaries of the Town of Hypoluxo. To the best of our knowledge, the Town of Hypoluxo has no record of a permit being issued to Ferrin Signs Inc. It should be noted that, in the past years, on numerous occasions, the billboard in question has been illegally constructionally altered by virtue of no permit having been obtained from the Town. On or about February 2, 1993, the Department returned Petitioner's application to Petitioner. In the Memorandum of Returned Application that it sent to Petitioner, the Department gave the following reason for denying the application: "local permit not provided for Town of Hypoluxo." Although the Town no longer contends that Palm Beach County was without authority to issue the 1963 pre-annexation permit for construction of the Sign, the Town still takes the position that, because of unpermitted post- annexation repairs and alterations, the Sign is prohibited and subject to removal under the Town's current sign ordinance. 1/
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for a state outdoor advertising sign permit. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 4th day of January, 1994. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of January, 1994.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, National Advertising Company, submitted applications for outdoor advertising sign permits to construct three (3) back-to-back outdoor advertising structures displaying six (6) outdoor advertising faces. One structure was to be located on the west side of 1-95, one mile south of State Road 76; the next structure was to be located on the west side of I- 95, 2300 feet south of State Road 76; and, the third structure was to be located on the west side of 1-95, 3800 feet south of State Road 76, all in Martin County, Florida. The applications submitted to the Department of Transportation by National Advertising Company had attached to them appropriate land leases and copies of appropriate Martin County Building Permits. The applications submitted to the Department by National Advertising Company were received by the Department on September 24, 1986. On October 27, 1986, the Department, acting by and through its District Administrator for Outdoor Advertising for District IV, Mr. Fred J. Harper, issued its Memorandum of Returned Application rejecting the applications submitted by National Advertising Company for the permits in question, based on Section 479.11(10), Florida Statutes. The first two sites in question are located on a segment of the Interstate Highway System in Martin County which was recently completed. The remaining site, one mile south, is slated to be open to the motoring public during December, 1987. Current urban area Boundaries are based on the 1980 U.S. Census designations, recommendations of the Metropolitan Planning Agency and approval by the Department and the Federal Highway Administration. Urban area boundaries can be inside or outside of the city limit, depending on population density. The current urban area designation for Martin County shows the area south of SR76, adjacent to the west side of 1-95, (the proposed site locations) to be outside the urban boundary.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Transportation enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's permit applications. RECOMMENDED this 29th day of September, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of September, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Gerald S. Livingston, Esquire 200 East Robinson Street Post Office Box 2151 Orlando, Florida 32802 Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Kaye Henderson, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =================================================================
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner’s Outdoor Advertising Permit Applications should be denied due to application deficiencies, and because the signs are located adjacent to a designated scenic highway.
Findings Of Fact The Department of Transportation regulates outdoor advertising signs located in proximity to the state highway system, interstate highway system, and federal-aid primary highway system. U.S. Highway 1 is a federal-aid primary highway that runs in a generally north/south direction along the east coast of Florida. In April l995, the Department issued outdoor advertising sign permit tag number BK459 to Town & Country Realty for an outdoor advertising sign (the “original sign”). The original sign was constructed adjacent to and on the west side of U.S. Highway 1 in Sebastian, Florida (the “property”). Records maintained by the Department during the period of the original sign’s existence, i.e., the Department’s outdoor advertising database from July 31, 2002, indicate that the original sign was located at U.S. Highway 1 milepost 18.496. That evidence, created contemporaneously with the sign’s existence, and before any controversy regarding the sign arose, is accepted as the most persuasive evidence of the precise location of the original sign. Mr. Pye testified that outdoor advertising sign permits are issued for a specific location, rather than for any location on a parcel of property. Given the precise spacing requirements for signs (see, e.g., section 479.07(9) and section 479.11), and the permitting of signs to the thousandths of a mile, Mr. Pye’s testimony is accepted. The original sign was located against a backdrop of vegetation. The original sign was single-sided with a north- facing sign face. As such, the original sign could normally be seen only from vehicles traveling southbound on U.S. Highway 1. On June 13, 2000, U.S. Highway 1, from milepost 14.267 to milepost 22.269 was designated as the Indian River Lagoon State Scenic Highway. The scenic highway designation included the stretch of U.S. Highway 1 on which the property fronts. On March 18, 2004, Henry Fischer & Sons, Inc./Town & Country Realty sold the property and the original sign to Petitioner. Daniel Taylor, a licensed real estate broker, worked on the transaction that led to Petitioner’s ownership of the property. He indicated that the property was desirable because it was clean, cleared, and demucked, and because it had the permitted original sign as an attractive asset, since the sign provided an income stream that could be used to pay property taxes. Eric Fischer, who was a director of Town & Country Realty, testified that, when the property was sold to Petitioner, the original sign was intended “to go with the property.” Upon the sale of the property and the original sign, Petitioner believed that Town & Country Realty would notify the state of the sale of the sign, and that he would thereafter be contacted by the state. Mr. Taylor testified that he and Petitioner called the Department and determined that Petitioner “could just step into the Fischer's shoes.” Based on the testimony of Petitioner and Mr. Taylor, Petitioner knew, or should have known, that the Department had regulatory oversight over the sign. An Outdoor Advertising Permit Transfer Request form is required to be submitted to the Department in order to transfer a sign permit from one person to another. No Outdoor Advertising Permit Transfer Request form was submitted for permit tag number BK459. Petitioner was never contacted by the state regarding the sale of the sign. Nonetheless, Petitioner continued to lease the sign and, as detailed herein, to replace and move the sign after the hurricanes of 2004. In September and October 2004, Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne struck Sebastian, Florida, very badly damaging the original sign. The wooden supports were flattened and no longer usable, and the sign was “pretty demolished.” Petitioner testified that he was told by an official of Indian River County to relocate the original sign to keep it from proximity of trees that could, in the event of a recurrence of the 2004 storms, topple and destroy the sign. The testimony, which was intended to prove the truth of the matter asserted, i.e., that Petitioner was directed by a governmental representative to relocate the sign, was uncorroborated by evidence that would be admissible over objection in a civil trial. Petitioner hired a person to rebuild a sign on the property. When the sign was rebuilt, it was not replaced at its original location at milepost 18.496. Rather, the “rebuilt sign”1/ was moved to the cleared center of the property at milepost 18.535. Instead of a single-faced sign normally visible to northbound traffic, the rebuilt sign was a double-faced sign, with sides facing north and south. As such, the rebuilt sign could be seen by vehicles traveling U.S. Highway 1 in either direction. The original sign had four equally-spaced square support posts. The rebuilt sign has three equally-spaced round, and more substantial, support poles. The rebuilt sign has 11 horizontal stringers on each face, with each stringer secured to the three support posts. The stringers are uniform in appearance. The photographs of the rebuilt sign clearly show all of the stringers on one side, and some of the stringers on the other. The stringers show no evidence of having undergone storm damage, or of having been secured to support posts at different points along the stringers. The preponderance of the evidence supports a finding that the stringers were -- as were the posts -- new, stronger, intact materials when the rebuilt sign was constructed, and were not materials salvaged from the remains of the original sign. The original plywood facing on the original sign was replaced with vinyl facings on the rebuilt sign. As a result of the foregoing, a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the rebuilt sign was a new sign erected of entirely new materials, and was not established as a result of maintenance or repair of the original sign. After the March 18, 2004, sale of the property and the post-hurricane erection of the rebuilt sign, Town & Country Realty continued to receive renewal billing from the Department for the original sign, along with several other signs owned by Town & Country Realty. Town & Country Realty, having sold the property on which the original sign was located and having no apparent interest in maintaining its other signs, did not pay the renewal bills. On January 31, 2005, the Department issued a Notice of Violation and Order to Show Cause Non-Payment (“NOV”) to Town & Country Realty. The NOV provided a grace period of 30 days within which the license and permits could be renewed, subject to a penalty. Town & Country Realty did not renew the license or permits. On March 7, 2005, the Department issued a Final Notice of Sign Removal, noting that Town & Country Realty had not made payment for renewal or request an administrative hearing to contest the NOV. As a result, Town & Country Realty was given the option of either petitioning for reinstatement of the license and permits, or removing the signs, including the sign bearing permit tag number BK459. Failure to exercise one of the options within 90 days was to result in the removal and disposal of the sign by the Department. On March 22, 2005, as a result of the continued requests for payment, Town & Country Realty submitted an Outdoor Advertising Permit Cancellation Certification form (“Cancellation Certification”) to the Department for permit tag number BK459. The Cancellation Certification was received by the Department on March 24, 2005. The Cancellation Certification was signed by Carl Fischer, president of the permit holder, Town & Country Realty. Mr. Fischer indicated that it was the permit holder’s intent “that the above-referenced Permit(s) be cancelled,” and that “all entities with a right to advertise on the referenced sign have been notified of the permit cancellation.” In the “Date Sign Removed” field of the form, Mr. Fisher wrote “see below.” In the bottom margin of the form, Mr. Fischer noted that the sign had been destroyed by one of the 2004 hurricanes, and that “new owner rebuilt sign and I removed BK459 tag and enclosed it.” The Cancellation Certification did not provide any information regarding the rebuilt sign or whether it was a sign that required a permit from the Department,2/ nor did it provide the name, address, or other identifying information regarding the “new owner.” It was not clear when Mr. Fischer removed permit tag number BK459, but it was nonetheless removed and returned to the Department with the Cancellation Certification. The Cancellation Certification was not intended by Mr. Fischer to affect Petitioner’s rights or interest in the rebuilt sign, but was a means of stopping renewal bills from being sent to Town & Country Realty. A Cancellation Certification may be conditioned upon issuance of a new sign permit, provided the Cancellation Certification is submitted along with an outdoor advertising permit application. The Cancellation Certification gave no indication that permit tag number BK459 was being conditionally canceled as a requirement for issuance of a new permit, and was not accompanied by an outdoor advertising permit application. On March 24, 2005, permit tag number BK459 was cancelled. From 2005 until June 2014, the rebuilt sign remained in place without inquiry from the Department, during which time Petitioner continued to lease and receive income from the sign. No transfer of or application for a sign permit for the rebuilt sign was filed, and no payment of annual fees was made. No explanation was provided as to why the March 7, 2005, Final Notice of Sign Removal was not enforced, or why the rebuilt sign, which has at all times been clearly visible from U.S. Highway 1, was allowed to remain in place for nearly a decade despite having no affixed permit tag. On or about May 28, 2014, Mr. Johnson, who was on patrol in the area, noticed that the advertising on the rebuilt sign had been changed. The change caught his attention, so he reviewed the Department’s outdoor advertising sign database to determine whether the sign was permitted. He confirmed that the rebuilt sign was not permitted. On June 5, 2014, Mr. Johnson affixed a “30-day green notice” to the rebuilt sign, which provided notice of the Department’s determination that the sign was illegal, and was to be removed within 30 days. Failure to remove the sign was to result in the removal of the sign by the Department. On June 9, 2014, the Department issued a Notice of Violation - Illegally Erected Sign (NOV) to Petitioner for the rebuilt sign. Petitioner did not submit a hearing request regarding the NOV. Rather, Petitioner called the telephone number that was listed on the NOV. He spoke with someone at the Department, though he could not remember who he spoke with. Petitioner was advised to file an application for the sign, a remedy that is described in the NOV. On December 1, 2014, Petitioner submitted Outdoor Advertising Permit Application Nos. 61203 and 61204 for the northward and southward faces of the Current Sign at milepost 18.535. Petitioner subsequently submitted additional information, including local government approval, in support of the application. On December 18, 2014, the Department issued a Notice of Denied Outdoor Advertising Permit Application for application Nos. 61203 and 61204 (“notice of denial”) to Petitioner. The bases for the notice of denial were that the property’s tax identification numbers submitted in various parts of the application did not match, thus constituting “incorrect information” in the application, and that the rebuilt sign is located on a designated scenic highway, thus prohibiting issuance of the permit. In the Pre-hearing Stipulation filed by the parties, the Department, though referencing “incorrect information” as a basis for the December 18, 2014, notice of denial, concluded its statement of position by stating that “[i]n sum, the Department properly denied [Petitioner’s application] as the sign is located on a scenic highway.” That focus on the scenic highway issue in the Pre-hearing Stipulation could, of itself, constitute a waiver and elimination of other issues, including that of incorrect information. See Palm Beach Polo Holdings, Inc. v. Broward Marine, Inc., 174 So. 3d 1037 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015). However, looking beyond the Pre-hearing Stipulation, the issue of incorrect information was not the subject of testimony at the final hearing, finds no substantial support in the documentary evidence, and made no appearance in the Department’s Proposed Recommended Order. The record in this proceeding does not support a finding that Petitioner provided “incorrect information” in his application, or that such “incorrect information” supports a denial of the application. On February 12, 2015, Petitioner filed a request for an informal administrative hearing with the Department to contest the notice of denial. The request for hearing included affidavits from Petitioner and Henry A. Fischer, a vice-president of Town & Country Realty, each of which provided that Town & Country Realty “submitted to the governmental authorities included but not limited to the Florida Department of Transportation notice of the transfer of the property and the sign permit to Mr. Daddano as well as his correct mailing address of 15 Lakeside Lane, N. Barrington, IL 60010.” It is not known whether the N. Barrington, Illinois, address was that of Mr. Fischer or that of Petitioner. Regardless, no such notice of transfer, or any other document bearing the referenced address, was introduced in evidence or discussed at the final hearing. The preponderance of the evidence indicates that the March 22, 2005, Outdoor Advertising Permit Cancellation Certification, with the notation described in paragraph 30 above, was the only notice provided to the Department regarding the disposition of permit tag number BK459. By June 4, 2015, the advertising copy that caught Mr. Johnson’s attention had been removed and replaced with a “This Sign For Rent” covering. By no later than November 17, 2015, well after the Department issued the notice of denial, and without any other form of approval or authorization from the Department, Petitioner had the rebuilt sign “pivoted” in roughly its existing location, so that it is now parallel to U.S. Highway 1. As such, only the side of the sign facing U.S. Highway 1 is visible from the highway, making it a “one-way reader” as opposed to a two-sided sign. Nonetheless, unlike the original one-sided sign, which was perpendicular to the highway against a backdrop of vegetation, the pivoted rebuilt sign can be seen by traffic traveling in either direction on U.S. Highway 1.3/
Recommendation Upon consideration of the above Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Department of Transportation enter a final order denying Outdoor Advertising Permit Application Nos. 61203 and 61204. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of April, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of April, 2016.
Findings Of Fact The outdoor advertising sign which is the subject of this proceeding has been erected on a small parcel of land located approximately one-quarter of a mile west of First Street on Rockland Key, next to the southbound lane of U.S. 1, in Monroe County, Florida. This location is outside the city limits of any municipality. On approximately October 1, 1983, Mr. Frank Toppino, who is not a party to this proceeding and who was not presented as a witness at the hearing, leased the subject property to the Pier House Inn and Beach Club for one year. Under the terms of this lease, the Pier House Inn received the right to use the property for an outdoor advertising structure which the parties to the lease contemplated would be constructed there. The Pier House agreed to pay the sum of $950 to Mr. Toppino as rent for the year. In addition, the Pier House agreed to undertake construction of the sign on the land for the benefit of Mr. Toppino, the lessor, after the lease expires. The PIER House received the right to use this land for one year, and the right to place advertising copy of its choice on the face of the outdoor advertising structure for one year. The lease between Mr. Toppino and the Pier House Inn covering the subject property was received in evidence. This lease, and the testimony of the general manager of the Pier House Inn who executed it as lessee, which is detailed above, supports a finding of fact that Mr. Frank Toppino and not the Pier House was the owner of the outdoor advertising structure which is the subject of this proceeding on October 1, 1983. Subsequently, when the Department's Outdoor Advertising Administrator made his inspection of the subject sign, there was no state outdoor advertising permit affixed thereto, and the Department has not issued any permit for this structure. The sign was erected between two other permitted signs, and it is closer than 500 feet to both of these existing and permitted structures. The sign which is the subject of this proceeding is located adjacent to a federal- aid primary highway outside any incorporated city or town. It is visible from U.S. 1, and it is within 660 feet of the edge of the pavement of this highway. The Department's Outdoor Advertising Administrator made a determination that the Pier House Inn was the owner of the sign in question based upon information contained in a Monroe County Building Permit application, and based upon the hearsay information received during telephone conversations. However, this information is controverted by the direct testimony of the general manager of the Pier House Inn which is itself corroborated by the lease between Mr. Toppino and the Pier House which is in evidence. Thus, the testimony received from the Department's witness is not of sufficient quality to support a finding of fact that the Pier House Inn is the owner of the sign in question. Moreover, the Department has the burden of proof on this issue, and the quantity and quality of the evidence presented on the matter of ownership of the subject sign does not carry this burden.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the violation notice issued on December 12, 1983, to the Pier House Inn and Beach Club, be dismissed, without prejudice to the reinstitution of proceedings in which the violation notice is directed to the actual owner of the sign in question. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered this 23rd day of August, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of August, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Haydon Burns Bldg., M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064 H. Ray Allen, Esquire 618 Whitehead Street Key West, Florida 33040
The Issue Whether Petitioner, KOA Campground, violated Section 479.07(1), Florida Statutes, by placing a sign facing a state road right-of-way without a valid sign permit. Whether Petitioner, KOA Campground, violated Section 479.07(9)(a)2, Florida Statutes, by placing a sign in violation of the DOT spacing rule. Whether Petitioner, KOA Campground, violated Section 479.04(1), Florida Statutes, by operating outside the city limits without a state license. Whether Petitioner, KOA Campground, is entitled to the issuance of a sign permit for the east-facing sign located 678 feet West of Seven Dwarfs Lane on US Highway 192, in Osceola County, Florida. Whether Respondent, Peloso, violated Section 479.07(1), Florida Statutes, by placing a sign facing a state road right-of- way without a valid sign permit. Whether Respondent, Peloso, violated Section 479.07(9)(a)2, Florida Statutes, by placing a sign in violation of the DOT spacing rule. Whether Respondent, Peloso, violated Section 479.07(5)(a), Florida Statutes, by failure to display a current valid sign permit tag. Whether Respondent, Peloso's state permit number AG636-10 become invalid and subject to revocation by the DOT.
Findings Of Fact The Florida Department of Transportation (DOT) is the state agency charged with the duty to administer and enforce the provisions of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, which regulates outdoor advertising structures along the state highway system. Petitioner, KOA Campground, as Lessor, and Respondent, Arthur S. Peloso, as Lessee, entered into a Lease for space to erect a sign structure to be located approximately 0.67 mile east of State Road 535 (north side) adjacent to U.S. 192 in Osceola County on March 1, 1982. The real property described in said Lease covered an area approximately 100 feet in width adjoining the Peloso property to the east. On the property encompassed in said Lease, dated March 1, 1982, KOA erected some time in 1982, at its expense, an existing sign on its property which was constructed to face east. The message on the sign related to the KOA Campground which is on the same site. As such, it is an on-premises sign not requiring a DOT sign permit so long as the message on the sign relates to the business being conducted on the property. On the land adjoining the property described in said Lease, Peloso erected a sign, at his own expense, on his property in 1982 which was constructed to face west. At that time in 1982, Peloso applied for and received two outdoor advertising permits nos. AG636-10 and AG637-10, from the DOT. AG636-10 was issued for the west facing sign and AG637-10 was issued for the east facing sign. AG636-10 was promptly posted on the west facing sign which presently advertises Peloso's restaurant in Kissimmee, Florida. Said permit has remained posted on that sign continuously to the present time. AG637-10 was lost by Peloso. Thereafter, a request was filed by Peloso to replace permit AG636-10 rather than AG637-10. As a result, permit AX346-35 was issued to replace AG636- 10, and no replacement for AG637-10 has been issued. AX346-35 has now been posted along with AG636-10 on the west-facing sign owned by Peloso. Peloso has continuously paid the renewal fees relating to both permits issued. Pursuant to paragraph 6 and 7 of the Lease, dated March 1, 1982, the 100 foot strip of land owned by KOA was leased to Peloso and states: "6. Said premises are hereby leased for use by the lessee as a site for billboard advertising sign only, and for no other use or purposes unless the lessor gives his written consent thereto, and shall be operated at all times in a lawful manner. The lessee shall carry all necessary insurance, procure all necessary permits and licenses, and build and construct all signs in strict conformity with applicable Florida Statutes; and the lessor shall not be liable or held responsible therefor in any manner whatsoever. The parties agree that the lessee shall position his sign so that it faced in the general direction of west and the lessee shall provide space for the lessor to place a sign in the vicinity thereof also, so that it faces in the general direction of east." The Lease does not set forth a specific purpose on its face, but was requested in order to accommodate setback requirements under local law, and possibly to allow the sign to be erected to overhang the KOA boundary line. Said Lease has not been terminated and is still in full force and effect. On October 14, 1988, Peloso filed applications for two outdoor advertising sign permits "to rebuild and improve existing sign structure", which were treated as an amendment to the existing permits and tentatively approved by DOT. KOA filed an application for an outdoor advertising sign permit for the east-facing sign on its property sometime in the Fall of 1989. Peloso is the holder of the two existing permits (AG636-10 and AX346- 35), and is entitled to maintain permits for both an east-facing and a west- facing sign in the vicinity of the present Peloso restaurant sign (AG636-10). KOA has whited-out the copy on its sign and presently is not advertising any business (on-site or off-site) on the sign. Peloso has ceased construction on his new sign structure.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that: The Alleged Violations of the Florida Statutes and Florida Administrative Code and Notice to Show Cause, dated June 30, 1989, directed to KOA Campground be dismissed, so long as its sign qualifies for exempt status under the provision of Section 479.16(1), Florida Statutes. The Alleged Violations of the Florida Statutes and Florida Administrative Code and Notice to Show Cause, dated October 20, 1989, directed to Arthur S. Peloso be dismissed, upon compliance with Section 479.07(5)(b), Florida Statutes, (lost tag). Thereafter, DOT should process the Amended Application of Peloso, dated October 14, 1988, relating to the construction of a new sign structure and ensure compliance with all applicable statutes and rules. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of June, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Buildi.ng 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of June, 1990. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by Petitoner, KDA Campground. Paragraph 1- Accepted in substance except the statement the original permit was issued "for the existing sign on KOA property...", which is rejected as against the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 2- The first sentence is rejected as against the greater weight of the evidence. The second sentence is Accepted. Paragraph 3- Accepted in substance. Paragraph 4- Rejected. Paragraph 5- Accepted in substance. Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by Respondent, Arthur S. Peloso. Paragraphs 1-9. Accepted in substance. The Department of Transportation did not file proposed findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: William H. Muntzing, Esquire 1102 Oak Street Post Office Box 421966 Kissimmee, Florida 34742 Philip W. Watson, Esquire Akerman, Senterfitt & Eidson Firstate Tower, 17th Floor Post Office Box 231 Orlando, Florida 32302 Rivers Buford, Jr., Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, MS 58 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0450 Ben G. Watts Secretary Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0450 Thomas H. Bateman, III General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0450
Findings Of Fact There is no dispute regarding the facts here involved. SR 60 is a federal aid primary highway and the signs are located within the city limits of Tampa, Florida. No permit has been issued and the sign structure is located 150 feet from a permitted sign. Accordingly the signs violate the spacing requirements of the statutes. This is really the only issue here involved; however, both parties presented evidence and Respondent submitted a proposed recommended order on whether or not an application for a permit for these signs should be approved. Resolving this issue would be premature and result in an advisory opinion. However, to preserve the evidence and save having to repeat the hearing when, and if, Respondent submits an application for a permit the following is submitted. The signs in question were erected within the city limits of Tampa in 1974. At the time these signs were erected no state permit was required. In 1976 an application was submitted for a permit for these signs. This application was returned to the applicant to resubmit on new forms and be sure to complete the application (Exhibit 2). The permitted sign, from which the instant sign is not the required spacing, is located on the right of way of the cross town expressway, and when construction starts, this sign will be removed.
