STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
FLORIDA ENGINEERS MANAGEMENT CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
vs.
RICK E. MCCOY, P.E.,
Respondent.
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) Case No. 01-4756PL
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RECOMMENDED ORDER
A formal hearing was conducted in this case on April 11, 2002, in Clermont, Florida, and on April 29, in Tallahassee, Florida, before Suzanne F. Hood, Administrative Law Judge with the Division of Administrative Hearings.
APPEARANCES
For Petitioner: Douglas Sunshine, Esquire
Florida Engineers Management Corporation
2507 Callaway Road, Suite 200
Tallahassee, Florida 32303-5267
For Respondent: Michael E. Riley, Esquire
Gray, Harris & Robinson, P.A.
301 South Bronough Street, Suite 600 Post Office Box 11189
Tallahassee, Florida 32302-3189
George E. Hovis, Esquire Gray, Harris & Robinson, P.A. Post Office Drawer 120848 Clermont, Florida 34712-0848
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The issues are as follows: (a) whether Respondent Rick E. McCoy is guilty of violating Section 471.033(1)(g), Florida Statutes, and Rule 61G15-30.005, Florida Administrative Code; and (b) if so, what discipline should be imposed.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
On October 9, 2001, Petitioner Florida Engineers Management Corporation (Petitioner or FEMC) filed an Administrative Complaint against Respondent Rick E. McCoy, P.E. (Respondent).
The complaint alleged that Respondent had engaged in the negligent practice of engineering in violation of Section 471.033(1)(g), Florida Statutes, and that he had violated Rule 61G15-30.005, Florida Administrative Code.
In Count I, the complaint alleges that Respondent violated Section 471.033(1)(g), Florida Statutes, when he signed and sealed Standard Dock System Drawings 1 and 2, containing deficiencies. The deficiencies included, but were not limited to, a failure to show design load criteria for wind loads and gravity load, and a failure to show the details for the assembly of the laminated lift beam to the structure.
In Count II, the complaint alleges that Respondent violated Section 471.033(1)(g), Florida Statutes, when he signed and sealed a post splice detail drawing and calculation for a typical dock post splice as an addendum to the dock design
already on file with the Lake County Building Department (Building Department). According to Count II, the post splice detail showed only tension load capacity and did not show compression, moment, and shear capacity or any limitations.
Count II also alleges that the post splice detail failed to identify the project.
In Count III, the complaint alleges that Respondent violated Rule 61G15-30.005, Florida Administrative Code, on November 23, 1998, when Respondent retained the services of a professional engineer to design a standard post connection detail to be used with the Norquist Construction Company, Inc., dock design. Count III alleges that Respondent subsequently submitted a letter to the Building Department advising it of the revised detail for a typical dock post splice without reviewing the plans for compliance prior to the submission.
On December 4, 2001, Respondent filed an Answer to Administrative Complaint. The answer included Respondent's request for an administrative hearing. Petitioner referred the case to the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) on December 10, 2001. DOAH assigned DOAH Case No. 01-4756PL to the case against Respondent.
On December 6, 2001, Petitioner filed an Administrative Complaint against William T. Lindemann, P.E. (Mr. Lindemann). The complaint alleged that Mr. Lindemann had violated Section
471.033(1)(g), Florida Statutes, by negligently practicing engineering.
Administrative Law Judge Charles C. Adams issued a Notice of Hearing dated December 19, 2001, in DOAH Case No. 01-4756PL. The Notice of Hearing scheduled the case against Respondent for hearing on February 19, 2002.
On December 31, 2001, Mr. Lindemann filed a request for a formal administrative hearing to contest the charges against him. Petitioner referred the case against Mr. Lindemann to DOAH on January 28, 2002. DOAH assigned Case No. 02-0352PL to
Mr. Lindemann's case.
On January 15, 2002, Respondent filed a Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs asserting the affirmative defenses of res judicata, collateral estoppel, release and settlement agreement. Petitioner filed a response in opposition to the motion on January 22, 2002. Judge Adams denied the motion by Order dated January 24, 2002.
On January 30, 2002, Petitioner filed an unopposed Motion for Continuance. On February 18, 2002, Judge Adams granted a continuance and rescheduled the hearing for April 11-12, 2002.
On February 4, 2002, a Joint Response to Initial Order was filed in DOAH 02-0352PL. The response identified DOAH Case Nos. 01-4756PL and 02-0352PL as related cases. The response
indicated that all parties requested consolidation of the cases.
Judge Adams issued an Order of Consolidation on February 18, 2002.
On March 21, 2002, Petitioner filed an unopposed Motion to Amend Administrative Complaint in DOAH Case No. 01-4756PL. The motion was granted by Order dated March 26, 2002.
On April 1, 2002, the parties filed a Joint Pre-hearing Stipulation containing admitted facts. The admitted facts as they relate to the issues in this proceeding are accepted and are separately detailed in the Findings of Fact of this Recommended Order.
On April 8, 2002, DOAH reassigned these consolidated cases to Administrative Law Judge Suzanne F. Hood.
During the hearing on April 11, 2002, Petitioner presented the testimony of two witnesses and offered five exhibits that were accepted into evidence. Respondent testified on his own behalf, presented the testimony of three additional witnesses, and offered 18 exhibits that were accepted into evidence.
Mr. Lindemann testified on his own behalf, presented the testimony of one additional witness, and offered two exhibits that were accepted into evidence.
Before the hearing concluded on April 11, 2002, the parties agreed to continue the hearing in Tallahassee, Florida, on a mutually convenient date. Subsequently, a Notice of Hearing
dated April 15, 2002, scheduled the continued hearing for April 29, 2002.
During the hearing on April 29, 2002, Mr. Lindemann made an appearance by telephone. Mr. Lindemann offered one exhibit that was accepted into evidence. Respondent presented the testimony of two witnesses and offered five exhibits that were accepted into evidence. The files in DOAH Case Nos. 01-4756PL and
02-0352PL contain copies of all hearing exhibits.
A two-volume Transcript of the April 11, 2002, proceeding was filed on April 29, 2002. A one-volume Transcript of the April 29, 2002, proceeding was filed on May 14, 2002. Because DOAH Case Nos. 01-4756PL and 02-0352PL share the hearing Transcript, it is filed with DOAH Case No. 01-4756PL.
On May 8, 2002, Respondent filed a Notice of Filing Respondent's Counsel's Letter of May 1, 2002. The notice clarified that the 1999 case against Respondent involved DOAH Case No. 99-5136 and FEMC Case No. 99-00059. The notice
also stated that the 1999 case against Mr. Lindemann involved FEMC Case No. 99-00092.
Petitioner and Respondent filed their Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on June 13, 2002.
On June 19, 2002, Respondent filed an unopposed Notice of Filing Respondent's Counsel's June 17, 2002, Letter. The letter requested Petitioner's counsel to correct a misstatement in
Petitioner's Proposed Recommended Order. Specifically, the letter disputes Petitioner's assertion that Respondent has waived or failed to assert certain affirmative defenses.
According to the June 17, 2002, letter, Respondent presented the defenses of collateral estoppel and settlement agreement and release in a prior letter dated December 26, 2001, to which Petitioner did not object. The letter is correct on those points. The June 17, 2002, letter also correctly asserts that the Pre-Hearing Stipulation clearly sets forth res judicata, collateral estoppel, estoppel, waiver or release and settlement agreement as affirmative defenses.
For purposes of issuance of this Recommended Order, DOAH Case Nos. 01-4756PL and 02-0352PL cases are hereby unconsolidated.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Stipulated Facts
Petitioner is charged with regulating the practice of engineering pursuant to Chapters 455 and 471, Florida Statutes.
Respondent is, and has been at all times material hereto, a licensed engineer in the State of Florida, having been issued license number PE 38725.
On May 17, 1995, Respondent signed and sealed Standard Dock System Drawings 1 and 2.
The drawings signed and sealed by Respondent on May 17, 1995, do not show design load criteria for wind loads and gravity load imposed on the structure.
The drawings signed and sealed by Respondent on May 17, 1995, do not show the details for the assembly of the laminated lift beam to the structure.
On December 1, 1998, Respondent submitted a signed and sealed document enclosing a post splice detail drawing and calculations for a typical dock post splice to the Building Department as an addendum to Respondent's dock design already on file.
The post splice detail drawing and calculations show only tension load capacity and do not show compression, moment, and shear capacity or limitation of the splice design.
Respondent submitted a letter to the Building Department advising it of the revised detail for a typical dock post splice.
The only documents that Petitioner will rely upon to tend to prove that Respondent committed negligence as alleged in Count I of the Administrative Complaint are: (a) the expert report of Nasir Alam, P.E., and Iqbal Shaikh, P.E., dated August 15, 2001; (b) the law and rules governing professional engineers; (c) Respondent's Standard Dock System Drawings 1
and 2; and (d) the investigative report in the instant case.
The only documents that Petitioner will rely upon to prove that Respondent committed negligence as alleged in Count II of the Administrative Complaint are: (a) the expert report of Nasir Alam, P.E., and Iqbal Shaikh, P.E., dated August 15, 2001; (b) the law and rules governing professional engineers; and (c) Respondent's December 1, 1992, document enclosing a post splice detail drawing and calculations for a typical dock post splice.
The only documents that Petitioner will rely upon to prove that Respondent committed a violation of Rule
61G15-30.005, Florida Administrative Code, as alleged in Count III of the Administrative Complaint are: (a) the December 1, 1998, letter from Respondent to D.T. Greiner, the
Building Department's director; (b) calculations prepared by WTL Engineering, Inc., dated November 23, 1998; and (c) a dock post details drawing signed and sealed by Mr. Lindemann on
November 23, 1998.
Respondent was charged with negligence in the practice of engineering by Petitioner in FEMC Case No. 99-00059.
FEMC Case No. 99-00059 was returned to the Probable Cause Panel of the Board of Professional Engineers and the complaint was dismissed without further prosecution.
The master dock plan at issue in FEMC Case
No. 99-00059 is the same master dock plan at issue in FEMC Case No. 01-0022, the instant case.
Petitioner's prosecution of Respondent in FEMC Case No. 01-0022, the instant case, pertains to Respondent's master dock plan or the dock post splice detail or other revisions or other supplements to that master dock plan.
FEMC Case No. 01-0022, the instant case, does not allege any facts that are not relevant to Respondent's master dock plan or the post splice detail or other revisions or other supplements to that master dock plan.
The Administrative Complaint in FEMC Case No. 01-0022, the instant case, pertains to actions or omissions taken by Respondent before October 22, 1999.
FEMC Case No. 01-0022, the instant case, does not allege any facts that are not relevant to Respondent's actions or omissions before October 22, 1999.
The Florida Legislature has not amended Section 471.033(1)(g), Florida Statues, since October 22, 1999.
The Board of Professional Engineers has not amended Rule 61G15-30.005, Florida Administrative Code, since
October 22, 1999.
The Florida Legislature has not amended the investigative and prosecutorial powers granted to Petitioner in Section 471.038(3), Florida Statutes, since October 22, 1999.
FEMC Case No. 01-0022, the instant case, is not supported by any facts that have occurred since October 22, 1999.
FEMC Case No. 01-0022, the instant case, is not supported by any laws or rules that have been enacted, adopted, or amended since October 22, 1999.
No events relevant to FEMC Case No. 01-0022 have occurred since October 22, 1999.
Joseph Dougherty furnished information to Petitioner, which was relied upon or referred to in FEMC Case No. 99-00059.
Joseph Dougherty furnished information to Petitioner, which was relied upon or referred to in FEMC Case No. 01-0022, the instant case.
Facts Determined at Hearing
Respondent's professional engineering experience primarily involves land development with a focus on drainage, water, and sewer. Prior to signing and sealing the engineering documents at issue here, Respondent had never designed a structure as a licensed professional engineer.
Ken Norquist owns Norquist Construction Company, Inc. (Norquist Construction). Since its creation in 1972, the
company has constructed approximately 200 boat docks in Lake County, Florida.
In 1995, the Building Department started requiring contractors to present engineering plans in order to receive building permits for the construction of boat docks. The Building Department did not require the plans to identify a specific project. Instead, the Building Department required a contractor to identify the project when he pulled the building permit. The building department held the contractor and not the engineer responsible for project administration on such specific projects.
In 1995, the Building Department requested
Mr. Norquist to file some standard dock drawings. The Building Department made this request because Mr. Norquist was building the same kind of dock over and over again.
In 1995, Mr. Norquist requested Respondent to review drawings that the construction company allegedly had utilized to build docks in Lake County, Florida, for several years. In fact, the construction company had not used any engineering drawings in the construction of the boat docks because, according to Mr. Norquist, they were "cookie cutter" stuff.
By letter dated May 17, 1995, Respondent submitted a signed and sealed Standard Dock Design to the Building Department. The letter stated that the design had been
developed in conjunction with Norquist Construction. The letter stated that Mr. Norquist had successfully constructed the design numerous times in the past. The letter requested the Building Department to place the design on file in an effort to simplify future permit requests for Norquist Construction.
Respondent reviewed but did not create the drawings for the Standard Dock Design (master plan) that he signed, sealed, and submitted on May 17, 1995. There is no evidence that Respondent was ever retained to become the engineer of record for the construction of any specific boat dock that the Building Department permitted and that Mr. Norquist constructed using the master plans. Respondent never visited the site of any such construction; no one ever requested him to do so.
Respondent considered the following in reviewing the master plan: (a) boat docks constructed consistent with the drawings would withstand a 100-mile per hour wind load and gravity loads of 100-pounds per square inch; (b) six-by-six inch posts would result in a safe structure; (c) the boat docks, if constructed pursuant to the master plan, would be safe because the displayed dock enclosure measured 10 x 24 feet and the largest boat that could fit in the enclosure was approximately 2,500 to 4,000 pounds; (d) the boat docks would withstand gravity loads of an 8,000-pound boat; and (e) an 8,000-pound boat stored in the dock would cause only a quarter-inch of
deflection in the structure. Respondent reached these conclusions but did not show them on any of his plans.
Respondent made several changes to Mr. Norquist's drawings. Respondent changed the drawing to show the posts being inserted into the lake bottom five feet and not three feet as originally shown and to show braces installed on the posts. Respondent's master plan did not show that the posts were spliced. The record is unclear as to when Respondent first became aware that the posts were spliced.
Respondent did not provide a detail for the assembly of the boatlift on the drawings because it is a pre-engineered structure. Respondent knew that the owner of the dock would choose the boatlift on a specific project. Mr. Norquist did not request Respondent to design the details for optional boatlifts that might or might not be installed on a specific boat dock.
In March of 1997, the Building Department issued a permit to Norquist Construction to build a boat dock for John Winner in Lake County, Florida. The master plan was included in the permit documents. There is no evidence that Respondent was aware of this particular permit in 1997. The construction of the Winner boat dock was completed in April 1997.
In June 1997, the Building Department issued another permit to Norquist Construction to build a boat dock for Patricia Harvey who subsequently married Joe Dougherty.
Respondent was not aware of this permit when it was issued in 1997.
The Winner and Dougherty boat docks subsequently were under water for approximately 96 days until the water in the lake receded. The owners of the docks became dissatisfied with the condition of their docks.
On August 25, 1997, Respondent submitted a revision to the Standard Dock Design for Norquist Construction to the Building Department.
In 1998, Mr. Norquist requested Respondent to analyze the way in which Mr. Norquist was using post splices in the construction of boat docks. Post splices were not shown on the master plan even though Mr. Norquist had been using them in the construction of boat docks for 15 years. In fact, every dock that Mr. Norquist constructed utilized such dock post splices. The post splices were necessary to allow for the elevation of the docks in the event that the lake had unusually high water.
Respondent performed an analysis and concluded that Mr. Norquist's post splices were safe. However, in an abundance of caution, Respondent requested Mr. Lindemann to review the post splice connection for Mr. Norquist. Respondent made it clear to Mr. Lindemann that he would be working for Mr. Norquist and not Respondent.
Before beginning his analysis, Mr. Lindemann confirmed with Mr. Norquist that the dock post splice would be used to support an open pier, without columns and a shelter, to which a 3,000-pound boat could tie up. Mr. Lindemann then reviewed the dock post splice construction as requested. He determined that the dock post splices would resist an uplift exerted by a boat. He tested the tension loads that could be sustained by the boat docks and concluded that a boat dock constructed with the splice would sustain more than 3,000 pounds of uplift.
On April 15, 1998, Mr. Lindemann signed and sealed a drawing of a post splice connection with a maximum uplift not to exceed 5,000 pounds. Mr. Lindemann did not create the drawing but signed and sealed the one already in the possession of
Mr. Norquist.
On June 18, 1998, Respondent signed and sealed what appears to be Mr. Lindemann's April 15, 1998, drawing. However, Respondent's drawing shows a maximum uplift not to exceed 3,000 pounds and contains some notes not included with Mr. Lindemann's drawing.
On August 28, 1998, Respondent submitted a standard post connection detail to the Building Department. The cover letter states that the post connection detail had been developed in connection with Norquist Construction. The drawing was an
addendum to the dock design on file with the Building Department.
In the Fall of 1998, Mr. Norquist requested
Mr. Lindemann to prepare additional post splice detail drawings and calculations for tension load. Mr. Lindemann once again made sure that the post splice detail was not supposed to include columns for boat shelters. Thereafter, Mr. Lindemann complied with this request, signing and sealing the drawings and calculations on November 23, 1998. The calculations show that the dock would withstand 11,900 pounds of uplift.
By letter dated December 1, 1998, Respondent advised the Building Department that he was submitting revised detail for a typical dock post splice developed in conjunction with WTL Engineering, Mr. Lindemann's firm. The letter stated that the documents were submitted as an addendum to the dock design currently on file.
The Building Department received Respondent's December 1, 1998, letter on December 21, 1998. The December 1, 1998, letter covered the post splice detail drawing signed and sealed by Mr. Lindemann on November 23, 1998. The documents did not identify a specific project or include other information such as load criteria, which is generally required on structural engineering documents for a specific structure. The documents became part of the master plan that was not site specific.
When Respondent submitted Mr. Lindemann's November 23, 1998, post spice detail drawings and calculation to the Building Department, he adopted and incorporated Mr. Lindemann's work into the master plan. However, Respondent's submittal of
Mr. Lindemann's work does not indicate that Respondent "delegated" responsibility for the drawings and calculations to Mr. Lindemann or that Mr. Lindemann was the "delegated engineer" for a component of the master plan because Mr. Lindemann performed the work for Mr. Norquist, not Respondent.
In February 1999, the Building Department wrote Mr. Dougherty a letter regarding his boat dock. The letter stated that the Building Department had requested and
Mr. Norquist had submitted certain engineering documents for the boat dock. The letter advised that the Building Department could not complete inspections of the boat dock until
Mr. Dougherty allowed Mr. Norquist on the property to finish the construction.
In February 1999, a Circuit Judge conducted a civil trial in Winner v. Norquist Construction Company, Inc., Circuit Court Case No. 98-163-CA. In that trial, Mr. Lindemann testified that he was only requested to design a splice that would withstand 3,000 pounds of uplift but he had designed one that would withstand 11,900 pounds of uplift. On April 22,
1999, the judge entered a Final Judgment finding that Mr. Winner was not entitled to damages.
By letter dated May 7, 1999, an attorney representing Mr. Winner and Mr. Dougherty filed a complaint with Petitioner. The complaint alleged that Respondent's master plan did not show a splice joint detail and that such detail had been filed with the Building Department after the Winner boat dock had been completed. The letter raised engineering concerns regarding the engineering drawings, the splice joints including their ability to withstand 100-mile per hour wind, and the piling depth. Petitioner received this complaint on May 10, 1999.
Under cover of a letter dated May 12, 1999, the attorney representing Mr. Winner and Mr. Dougherty sent Petitioner a report prepared by an engineering intern under the direction of Ted Holtz, P.E. According to the report, the intern had examined the Winner boat dock and concluded that it would not withstand 100-mile per hour wind. The report also discussed the adequacy or inadequacy of the structure in relation to moment, shear, and deflection, among other things.
Based on the complaint filed on behalf of Mr. Winner and Mr. Dougherty, Petitioner initiated investigations to determine if Respondent and/or Mr. Lindemann were guilty of negligence in the practice of engineering contrary to Section 471.033(1)(g), Florida Statutes. These investigations resulted
in FEMC Case No. 99-00059 against Respondent and FEMC Case No. 99-00092 against Mr. Lindemann.
On or about July 14, 1999, Stanley Ink, P.E., one of Petitioner's consulting engineers, reported on his review of the case against Respondent. Mr. Ink reached the following conclusions: (a) the master plan did not show column splices or code criteria for live or wind loads; (b) anchors were noted in the plans but fasteners were not specified; (c) No. 4 pine lumber was specified in the plans; (d) Respondent's and
Mr. Lindemann's splice drawings do not address moment, shear, height of the post, or the maximum load on the post; (e) if a boatlift were installed as set forth in the master plan, it would increase loads and forces to the posts; (f) the location and weight limitations on the boatlift were not specified in the plans; (g) the master plans were not adequate for the pictured docks because they left too much for a contractor to assume;
the Building Department should not have allowed a permit to be issued with this master plan and post splice detail; and
both engineers should have placed limits on the splice detail.
On or about August 12, 1999, Mr. Ink filed a report on his review of the case against Mr. Lindemann. Mr. Ink reached the following conclusions: (a) it appears that Respondent is the project engineer with Mr. Lindemann brought into the case
because he signed a splice detail that was included in the file;
the splice detail signed by Mr. Lindemann in April 1998 is the same detail that Respondent signed after removing
Mr. Lindemann's name and changing the date; (c) Mr. Lindemann should not be charged with any violation but he should be cautioned to put a specific limitation on any future drawings; and (d) if Mr. Lindemann had stated that the splice was to be used in tension only applications, it could not have been used on (the Winner or Dougherty) dock.
On October 6, 1999, Petitioner's Probable Cause Panel met to consider the FEMC Case No. 99-00092 against
Mr. Lindemann. The panel concluded that there was no probable cause to issue an administrative complaint against
Mr. Lindemann.
On October 19, 1999, Petitioner entered a Closing Order dismissing the FEMC Case No. 99-00092 against
Mr. Lindemann. That same day, Petitioner sent Mr. Lindemann a letter advising him that the case was being dismissed. This letter did not contain a caution for Mr. Lindemann to place appropriate limitations on his drawings in the future.
Based on Mr. Ink's report, Petitioner issued an Administrative Complaint dated October 22, 1999, against Respondent in FEMC Case No. 99-00059. Petitioner subsequently
referred this complaint to the Division of Administrative Hearings in DOAH Case No. 99-5136.
The 1999 Administrative Complaint against Respondent alleged as follows: (a) Respondent signed, sealed, and submitted a master plan in 1995 and a revision to that plan in 1997 for use in the Building Department's dock permitting process; (b) Respondent signed and sealed the design of a dock post splice detail to supplement the master plan in August 1998;
the master plan included a dock with a boatlift which increased loads and forces to dock posts; and (d) the splice detail design was deficient because it did not specify the location or weight limitations on the boatlift and because Respondent did not place any limitation on the use of the splice detail.
By letter dated November 15, 1999, Mr. Lindemann offered his support to Respondent in defending himself before the Probable Cause Panel. Mr. Lindemann's letter stated that he had reviewed the master plans, finding them structurally adequate and in conformance with the building code adopted by the Building Department. Mr. Lindemann concurred with the master plan subject to its adaptation to a specific site with the owner specifying the boat load to be accommodated and subject to the Building Department performing inspections.
On February 17, 2000, George Hovis, Esquire, representing Respondent, filed a Motion to Strike and Motion for Costs and Attorney's Fees pursuant to Section 120.569(2)(e), Florida Statutes, in DOAH Case No. 99-5136. The motion reviewed the following facts of the case: (a) Respondent did not design the splice used on the boatlift in question because the splice design was not created until after the boat dock was constructed; (b) the master plan dated May 17, 1995, did not contain a splice design and had never been questioned; (c) the August 25, 1997, master plan was filed months after the Winner dock was completed and had never been questioned; (d) Respondent filed the original L-splice design on August 28, 1998; (e) the record in Mr. Winner's civil trial against Mr. Norquist established that the November 23, 1998, drawing was prepared after the Winner dock was constructed; and (f) Respondent was not a party in the Winner civil suit. The motion alleged that Petitioner had ignored the rulings of the Circuit Judge in the Winner civil suit.
On February 25, 2000, Petitioner filed a response in opposition to Respondent's Motion to Strike and Motion for Costs and Attorney's Fees. The response states that, based on additional evidence submitted subsequent to the finding of probable cause, Petitioner's counsel had agreed to resubmit the DOAH Case No. 99-5136 against Respondent to the Probable Cause
Panel. Subsequently, the Administrative Law Judge in DOAH Case No. 99-5136 placed the case in abeyance.
In February 2000, Petitioner submitted the case against Respondent for review by James Power, P.E., another of Petitioner's consulting engineers. Mr. Power's report dated March 7, 2000, indicated that he reviewed the following:
(a) the 1995 master plan; (b) the 1997 revision to the master plan; (c) the August 1998 standard post connection documents; and (d) the December 1999 submittal of a typical dock post splice developed in conjunction with Mr. Lindemann.
In his report dated March 7, 2000, Mr. Power concluded as follows: (a) there was no evidence that Respondent ever accepted responsibility for the design, construction, or inspection of the Winner or Dougherty docks; (b) none of the drawings that Respondent signed and sealed referred to a specific project; (c) Respondent was not responsible for the Building Department's issuance of improper permits; and
(d) there was no evidence to justify a charge against Respondent.
By letter dated April 5, 2000, Petitioner's counsel advised the Building Department that Petitioner had filed an Administrative Complaint against Respondent alleging negligence in the practice of engineering due to structural deficiencies in the master plan. The letter stated that Petitioner was
concerned because the Building Department was not requesting project-specific engineering plans but was issuing permits based on the master plan.
On June 6, 2000, Mr. Power reviewed the file against Respondent for the second time. Once again he reached the following conclusions: (a) Respondent's submissions to the Building Department were not sufficiently complete to justify the issuance of building permits; (b) it was regrettable that Respondent allowed his drawings to be used like he did but that the Building Department was responsible for issuing the permits;
(c) Respondent's drawings were of marginal quality but acceptable if supplemented by complete drawings of a specific installation; (d) the splice detail did not specify where or under what circumstances it was to be used; (e) the splice detail contained a drafting error; (f) Respondent was not obligated to provide a design for any structure which might make use of his splice detail; and (g) it was for an engineer of record, a role Respondent never undertook, to determine the suitability of the detail in a specific structure for which he had assumed design responsibility. In sum, Mr. Power disapproved of the Building Department's permitting policy and the manner in which Respondent's drawings were used, but he did not believe the evidence justified a charge of negligence against Respondent.
After receiving Mr. Power's reports, Respondent's attorney and Petitioner's counsel agreed that Petitioner would resubmit the case against Respondent to the Probable Cause Panel with a recommendation to dismiss the case without further prosecution. Respondent agreed to withdraw his Motion for Costs and Attorney's Fees and to specify all limitations on the use of his future drawings.
Upon learning that Petitioner might dismiss the Administrative Complaint against Respondent, Mr. Dougherty became concerned. Petitioner's former president responded to Mr. Dougherty's concerns in a letter dated June 15, 2000. The letter stated that Petitioner's consulting engineer had concluded that Respondent was not negligent in preparing and submitting the master plan to the Building Department. The letter also stated that the Winner and Dougherty docks were not the same or similar to the dock in the master plan. According to the letter, there was no evidence that Respondent designed the Winner and Dougherty docks.
On July 13, 2000, the Probable Cause Panel discussed the case against Respondent. Based on the prosecutor's recommendation and review of the entire file including
Mr. Power's reports, the panel decided to find no probable cause and to dismiss the case against Respondent without further prosecution.
On July 28, 2000, the Probable Cause Panel issued a Closing Order in FEMC Case No. 99-00059. The Order stated that the case would be dismissed with a letter to Respondent advising him in the future to specify on his plans conditions under which his seal was not valid.
On August 2, 2000, Petitioner's counsel filed a Status Report in DOAH Case No. 99-5136. This pleading stated that the Probable Cause Panel had reconsidered the case, closing it without further prosecution. The pleading requested that the Administrative Law Judge close the file.
By letter dated August 2, 2000, Petitioner advised Respondent that the Probable Cause Panel had reconsidered his case and directed the case to be dismissed without further prosecution. The letter also advised Respondent that in the future he should specify on the face of his plans any limitations or conditions under which his seal would not be valid. Respondent has complied with this request.
The Administrative Law Judge entered an Order Closing File in DOAH Case No. 99-5136 on August 17, 2000.
Subsequently, Mr. Dougherty contacted Petitioner's prosecuting attorney by telephone. The prosecuting attorney advised Mr. Dougherty that if Petitioner were presented with new evidence showing that Respondent was the engineer of record for his dock, Petitioner would reopen the case against Respondent.
In February 2001, Mr. Dougherty furnished Petitioner with the deposition testimony of one of the Building Department's inspectors. The deposition testimony had been taken in August 22, 2000, in conjunction with a civil suit filed by Mr. Dougherty against Norquist Construction. See Joseph Dougherty and Patricia Dougherty v. Norquist Construction
Company, Inc., Fifth Judicial Circuit, in and for Lake County, Florida, Circuit Court Case No. 98-986 CA. The deposition testimony indicated that Respondent was the engineer of record for the Dougherty boat dock. This was the first time that the deposition testimony had been provided to Petitioner.
Mr. Dougherty's second complaint also included the following: (a) a copy of Mr. Lindemann's November 15, 1999, letter, offering to support Respondent in his defense of Petitioner's 1999 case against Respondent; (b) a report prepared by R. Alan Lougheed of Lougheed Resource Group, Inc.; and (c) a report prepared by Robert White.
After receiving Mr. Dougherty's second complaint, Petitioner's investigator reviewed Respondent's and
Mr. Lindemann's files. He determined that, in the prior cases against Respondent and Mr. Lindemann, Petitioner had overlooked whether the master plan and post splice detail contained information regarding the capacity of structures built pursuant to the plans to withstand a 100-mile per hour wind. Therefore,
Petitioner's investigator concluded that Mr. Dougherty's second complaint did not represent an exact duplicate of the 1999 cases against Respondent and Mr. Lindemann. Mr. Dougherty's second complaint resulted in the opening of FEMC Case Nos. 01-0022
and 01-0023 against Respondent and Mr. Lindemann respectively.
Petitioner's investigator referred Respondent's file to another consulting engineer, Iqbal Shaikh, P.E. The purpose of the referral was to determine once again if Respondent and/or Mr. Lindemann had committed negligence in the practice of engineering.
In a report dated August 16, 2001, Iqbal Shaikh, P.E., reviewed the following documents: (a) Mr. Dougherty's second complaint; (b) the 1995 master plan; (c) the August 28, 1998, post connection splice detail; (d) Mr. Lindemann's November 15, 1999, letter; (e) Mr. Lindemann's November 23, 1998, post splice drawings and calculations; (f) the August 22, 2000, deposition testimony of the building inspector; and (g) an inspection report prepared by Lougheed Resource Group, Inc.
Mr. Shaikh's report found that Respondent's work was deficient for the following reasons: (a) the 1995 master plan did not identify the project, show design load criteria for wind loads and gravity load, or show the details for the assembly of the laminated lift beam; and (b) the December 1998 submittal of Mr. Lindemann's November 23, 1998, post splice drawings and
calculations did not identify the project and did not show compression, moment, and shear capacity of the splice.
Mr. Shaikh's report concluded that Mr. Lindemann's November 23, 1998, post splice detail drawings and calculations were deficient because the documents failed to identify the project and failed to show compression, moment, and shear capacity or limitation of the splice design.
Based on Mr. Shaikh's report, Petitioner issued the Administrative Complaint against Respondent in FEMC Case
No. 01-0022. Petitioner also issued the Administrative Complaint against Mr. Lindemann in FEMC Case No. 01-0023.
The parties agreed to present the deposition testimony of Mr. Power in lieu of testimony at hearing. Mr. Power testified that he would not rely solely on the testimony of a building inspector to determine whether Respondent was engineer of record for a project. Mr. Power reaffirmed his earlier opinions that Respondent was not the engineer of record for any specific dock and that he was not guilty of negligence of violating a rule because the master plan and parts thereof were not site specific. Mr. Power's testimony is credited here.
On the other hand, Petitioner presented the testimony of Nasir Alam, P.E., another of Petitioner's consulting engineers and a member of Mr. Shaikh's firm. Mr. Alam testified that Respondent was the engineer of record for any project
constructed using the master plan signed and sealed by Respondent. Mr. Alam testified that Respondent was engineer of record for the November 23, 1998, post splice detail drawings and calculations created by Mr. Lindemann if Respondent submitted the documents after delegating the responsibility to Mr. Lindemann to create or review the them. Mr. Alam also testified that it was immaterial to this case whether Respondent was engineer of record for the Dougherty dock because the master plan and post splice detail drawings and calculations on their face represented the negligent practice of engineering.
Mr. Alam's testimony is not persuasive.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this proceeding. Sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes.
Petitioner is a Florida not-for-profit corporation, which under Section 471.038(3), Florida Statutes, is authorized to "provide administrative, investigative, and prosecutorial services" for the Board of Professional Engineers (the Board).
Sections 471.033(1)(a), Florida Statutes, authorizes the Board to discipline an engineer proved guilty of violating one of the Board's rules. Similarly, Section 471.033(1)(g), Florida Statutes, authorizes the Board to discipline an engineer proved guilty of negligence in the practice of engineering.
Petitioner must prove that Respondent violated Section 471.033(1)(g), Florida Statutes, and Rule 61G15-30.005, Florida Administrative Code, by clear and convincing evidence. Department of Banking and Finance v. Osborne Stern & Company, 670 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 1996).
Before determining whether Petitioner met its burden to prove that Respondent is guilty of negligence or of a rule violation, Respondent's defenses of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and release and settlement agreement must be resolved. For the reasons set forth below, these defenses do not apply to this proceeding.
Administrative proceedings recognize the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Thompson v. Department of Environmental Regulation, 511 So. 2d 989, 990 (Fla. 1987)(res judicata); Holiday Inns, Inc. v. City of Jacksonville, 678
So. 2d 528 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)(collateral estoppel).
In Department of Environmental Protection v. Burgess, 667 So. 2d 267, 269 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), the Court stated as
follows:
Clearly the doctrine of res judicata may apply to an agency determination made pursuant to the agency's quasi-judicial decision-making authority. [Citation Omitted] For res judicata to act as a bar to subsequent relitigation, however, there must be a final agency order in a prior proceeding and identity in "(1) the thing sued for; (2) . . . the cause of action;
(3) . . . [the] persons and parties of the action; and (4) . . . the quality in the person for or against whom the claim is made." [Citation Omitted]
Collateral estoppel applies only when the parties and issues in two cases are identical and the particular matter was fully litigated and determined in a contest, which resulted in a final decision in a court of competent jurisdiction. See Husky
Industries, Inc. v. Griffith, 422 So. 2d 996, 999 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); Department of Transportation v. Juliano, 801 So. 2d 101 (Fla. 2001).
In this case, there was no final agency order in FEMC Case No. 99-00059. Instead, the case was resubmitted to the Probable Cause Panel with a recommendation of dismissal. Based on the recommendation and review of the entire file, the panel found no probable cause and dismissed the case, advising Respondent to place appropriate limitations on drawings that he signed and sealed in the future. If Respondent had violated this advice, the Board could not have alleged that Petitioner violated one of its orders. Petitioner's decision to dismiss the case with advice to Respondent before an administrative hearing on the merits and the issuance of a final order by the Board was not an action adverse to Respondent that would bar further prosecution. With this result, Respondent could not be considered to have violated the terms of his licensure.
The Board never decided the prior case against Respondent on its merits. Therefore, neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel applies in this case.
Likewise, the dismissal of the prior case without further prosecution and with advice to Respondent did not constitute a release and/or settlement agreement between Petitioner and/or the Board and Respondent. Petitioner's prosecutor agreed to and did recommend that the Probable Cause Panel dismiss the prior case without further prosecution. That was all she was authorized to do. Respondent agreed to drop his claim for attorney's fees and to abide by Petitioner's advice in the future. No release and/or settlement was reached that would bar further prosecution.
Although Petitioner's prosecutor and Respondent have complied with their agreement, it was within Petitioner's discretion to find or not find probable cause in the future. Petitioner made its decision in the 1999 case based on the record before it on July 28, 2000. That decision did not bar the Probable Cause Panel from finding probable cause in this case based on new evidence showing that Respondent was the engineer of record for the Dougherty dock and after reviewing the report of Mr. Shaikh.
Respondent correctly asserts that the investigative file in the prior case contained references to several possible
grounds for finding that Respondent was negligent, such as the failure to identify a specific project on signed and sealed documents, failure to show design load criteria for wind loads and gravity load, failure to show the details for the assembly of laminated lift beam, and failure to show compression, moment, and shear capacity of the post splice. However, Petitioner's prior Administrative Complaint in FEMC Case No. 99-00059 only alleged a deficiency in Respondent's splice detail design, which did not specify the location or weight limitations on the boat lift or any limitations on the use of the splice detail. The fact that Petitioner's prior Administrative Complaint did not include every possible violation of rule or law existing at that time does not preclude Petitioner from including those allegations in a subsequent Administrative Complaint that is supported by probable cause.
Respondent's Motion to Strike and Motion for Attorney's Fees in the prior case clearly maintained that Respondent was not the engineer of record for any dock built by Mr. Norquist and that the master plan, apart from the post splice detail, had never been questioned. Even if Petitioner were barred from raising issues about the inadequacy of Respondent's post splice detail, Respondent cannot now claim that allegations in the current Administrative Complaint regarding the master plan as it existed in 1995 through 1998
present duplicative issues. In the instant case, Petitioner's Administrative Complaint presents additional facts and allegations from the Administrative Complaint in the prior case.
Turning to the merits of the case, Rule
61G15-19.001(4), Florida Administrative Code, states as follows:
(4) A professional engineer shall not be negligent in the practice of engineering. The term negligence set forth in 471.033(1)(g), Florida Statutes, is herein defined as the failure by a professional engineer to utilize due care in performing in an engineering capacity or failing to have due regard for acceptable standards of engineering principles. Professional engineers shall approve and seal only those documents that conform to acceptable engineering standards and safeguard the life, health, property and welfare of the public. Failure to comply with the procedures set forth in the Responsibility Rules as adopted by the Board of Professional Engineers shall be considered as non-compliance with this section unless the deviation or departures therefrom are justified by the specific circumstances of the project in question and the sound professional judgment of the professional engineer.
Rule 61G15-30, Florida Administrative Code, sets forth the Responsibility Rules Common to All Engineers. Rule 61G15-30.005, Florida Administrative Code, states as follows:
An engineer of record who delegates a portion of his responsibility to a delegated engineer is obligated to communicate in writing his engineering requirements to the delegated engineer.
An engineer of record who delegates a portion of his design responsibility to a
delegated engineer shall require submission of delegated engineering documents prepared by the delegated engineer and shall review those documents for compliance with his written engineering requirements and to confirm the following:
That the delegated engineering documents have been prepared by an engineer.
That the delegated engineering documents of the delegated engineer conform with the intent of the engineer of record and meet the written criteria.
That the effect of the delegated engineer's work on the overall project generally conforms with the intent of the engineer of record.
Rule 61G15-31, Florida Administrative Code, sets forth the Responsibility Rules of Professional Engineers Concerning the Design of Structures. Rule 61G15-31.001, Florida Administrative Code, states as follows:
The engineer of record for a structure is responsible for all structural aspects of the design of the structure including the design of all of the structure's systems and components. As noted herein the engineer of record for a structure may delegate responsibility for the design of a system or component part of the structure to a qualified delegated engineer. In either case, the structural documents shall address, as a minimum, the items noted in the following subsections covering specific structural systems or components. Both the engineer of record for the structure and the delegated engineer, if utilized, shall comply with the requirements of the general responsibility rules, and with the requirements of the more specific structural responsibility rules contained herein.
Rule 61G15-31.002, Florida Administrative Code, states as follows:
Engineer of Record for the Structure. The Florida registered professional engineer who develops the structural design criteria and structural framing concept for the structure, performs the analysis and is responsible for the preparation of the structural construction documents.
Structural Component. An individual structural member designed to be part of a structural system.
Structure. The entity to be built.
Structural System. A portion of a structure comprising an assembly of structural components.
Structural Engineering Documents. The structural drawings, specifications and other documents setting forth the overall design and requirements for the construction, alteration, modernization, repair, removal, demolition, arrangement
and/or use of the structure, prepared by and signed and sealed by the engineer of record for the structure. Structural engineering documents shall identify the project and specify design criteria both for the overall structure and for structural components and structural systems. The drawings shall identify the nature, magnitude and location of all design loads to be imposed on the structure. The structural engineering documents shall provide construction requirements to indicate the nature and character of the work and to describe, detail, label and define the structure's components, systems, materials, assemblies, and equipment.
Structural Submittals. Submittals required by the structural engineering documents which do not require the seal of a professional engineer, such as:
Drawings prepared solely to serve as a guide for fabrication and installation and requiring no engineering input such as
reinforcing steel shop drawings, structural steel, and steel joints and joist girder erection drawings.
Catalog information on standard products not fabricated for a specific project.
Structural Delegated Engineering Documents. Documents prepared by a delegated engineer to whom the engineer of record for the structure has delegated responsibility for the design of a structural component or system.
Count I of the Administrative complaint alleges that Respondent violated Section 471.033(1)(g), Florida Statutes, because his 1995 master plan failed to show design load criteria for wind loads and gravity load and failed to show the details for the assembly of the laminated lift beam to the structure. Count II of the Administrative Complaint alleges that Respondent violated the same statute because his submittal of
Mr. Lindemann's November 23, 1998, dock post splice drawings and calculations failed to show compression, moment, and shear capacity or any limitations and failed to identify the project.
In order to determine whether Respondent is negligent as alleged in Count I and Count II, one must consider whether he was the engineer of record as defined in Rule 61G15-31.002(1), Florida Administrative Code. The rule on its face does not specify that an engineer who prepares or submits drawings and/or calculations for a generic project that is not site specific becomes the engineer of record for any project built using those
drawings and/or calculations. The record here, including
Mr. Dougherty's permit, contains no evidence that Respondent was ever designated as the engineer of record for a specific dock.
In fact, Mr. Daughterty's permit does not even reference Respondent's master plan. It only refers to Mr. Norquist as the contractor.
Rule 61G15-31.002(5), Florida Administrative Code, clearly would require inclusion of the information that Petitioner asserts constitutes deficiencies in Respondent's 1995 master plan and his submittal of the November 23, 1998, dock post splice drawings and calculations if Respondent had prepared and/or submitted the documents for a specific dock. However, the rule does not require an engineer to include the missing information when a client, who is an experienced contractor, has limited the engineer's work to the design of a standard dock plan, showing only tension load capacity, that can be used for repetitive non-specific projects.
The rules in Chapter 61G15, Florida Administrative Code, do not specifically prohibit preparation of standard plans and drawings. Moreover, the rules do not require engineers to anticipate every possible use that might be made of standard plans so that they can include all required information that might be necessary or include an all consuming disclaimer or limitation on the use of the plans. Because the rules do not
answer the questions presented in this case, it is necessary to consider the custom and usage in the engineering profession in interpreting them.
There is no consensus of opinion in the engineering profession regarding an engineer's design responsibility for generic plans. Petitioner's own experts cannot agree that, under the facts of this case, Respondent was the engineer of record for any and every dock built using his plans. Petitioner's experts cannot agree as to the design criteria that was required to be included in the master plan or the post splice detail drawings and calculations.
The most persuasive evidence indicates that Respondent was not the engineer of record as defined by rule and that his 1995 master plan and submittal of the November 1998 post splice detail drawings and calculations were adequate for a generic dock plan that was not site specific. Therefore, Respondent is responsible only for the design criteria displayed on his plans. He cannot be faulted because additional or different information was required for the construction of a specific dock pursuant to a contract between Mr. Norquist and a third party.
The Building Department should not have allowed Mr. Norquist to pull permits for specific projects if the
information in the master plan and all drawings and calculations
were insufficient for those projects. In any event, Respondent had no obligation to supplement his work with site-specific information when he was not retained for that purpose.
To the extent that Respondent was engineer of record as defined in Rule 61G15-31.002(1), Florida Administrative Code, and to the extent that his documents failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 61G15-31.002(5), Florida Administrative Code, the record here shows that any deviation or departure from the latter was allowed by the specific circumstances of the project and Respondent's sound professional judgment. The project was a generic boat dock plan and the specific circumstance is that Mr. Norquist limited the scope of Respondent's work.
The evidence is not clear and convincing that Respondent was negligent as alleged in Count I and Count II of the Administrative Complaint. Therefore, Petitioner has not met its burden of proving that Respondent violated Section 471.033(1)(g), Florida Statutes.
In Count III, Petitioner alleges that Respondent violated Rule 61G15-30.005, Florida Administrative Code, and therefore can be disciplined pursuant to Section 471.033(1)(a), Florida Statutes. Specifically, Petitioner alleges that Respondent retained the services of Mr. Lindemann to design the November 23, 1998, dock post splice detail drawings and
calculations and subsequently submitted those drawings and calculations to the Building Department without reviewing the documents for compliance prior to the submission.
The record shows that Respondent did not delegate any responsibility to Mr. Lindemann because Mr. Lindemann performed his work for Mr. Norquist. Therefore, Rule 61G15-30.005, Florida Administrative Code, is not applicable here.
It is true that Respondent adopted and incorporated Mr. Lindemann's work into the master plan. To the extent that Respondent was required by Rule 61G15-30.005, Florida Administrative Code, to ensure that Mr. Lindemann's drawings and calculations complied with the engineering requirements of the master plan or generally conformed to Respondent's intent for the generic dock plan, credible evidence indicates that Respondent met his obligation. The most credible evidence indicates that all of Respondent's documents were adequate under the circumstances.
The evidence in not clear and convincing that Respondent is guilty of violating Rule 61G15-30.005, Florida Administrative Code. Therefore, Respondent cannot be disciplined under Section 471.033(1)(a), Florida Statutes.
Finally, Respondent is not entitled to attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Section 120.595(1), Florida Statutes. Petitioner did not file the Administrative Complaint in this
case for an improper purpose as defined in Section 120.595(1), Florida Statutes, which states as follows in pertinent part:
The final order in a proceeding pursuant to s. 120.57(1) shall award reasonable costs and a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party only where the nonprevailing adverse party has been determined by the administrative law judge to have participated in the proceeding for an improper purpose.
In proceedings pursuant to
s. 120.57(1), and upon motion, the administrative law judge shall determine whether any party participated in the proceeding for an improper purpose as defined by this subsection and
s. 120.569(2)(e). In making such determination, the administrative law judge shall consider whether the nonprevailing adverse party has participated in two or more other such proceedings involving the same prevailing party and the same project as an adverse party and in which such two or more proceedings the nonprevailing adverse party did not establish either the factual or legal merits of its position, and shall consider whether the factual or legal position asserted in the instant proceeding would have been cognizable in the previous proceeding. In such event, it shall be rebuttably presumed that the nonprevailing adverse party participated in the pending proceeding for an improper purpose.
* * *
(e) For the purposes of this subsection:
1. "Improper purpose" means participation in a proceeding pursuant to s. 120.57(1) primarily to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or for frivolous purpose or to needlessly increase the cost of licensing or securing the approval of an activity.
There was no prevailing party or nonprevailing adverse party in the 1999 case, which was never decided on its merits. In the prior case, neither party established the factual or legal merits of its position as part of litigation. Moreover, Petitioner's factual or legal positions asserted in the instant proceeding would not have been cognizable in the previous proceeding because there was no evidence in the prior case that Respondent was the engineer of record for a specific dock and without such evidence, the Probable Cause Panel was unable to agree on a finding of probable cause.
Mr. Power, as one of Petitioner's consulting engineers in the 1999 case, concluded in two reports that Respondent was not negligent and had not violated a rule because Respondent was not the engineer of record for any of the docks constructed using his plan. In these reports and in his testimony at hearing in this case, Mr. Powers stated that his opinion regarding Respondent's engineering practices would be totally different if, in fact, Respondent was the engineer of record for a site-specific project. However, Petitioner was allowed to file the second Administrative Complaint upon receiving evidence indicating that Respondent was the engineer of record even if Petitioner did not prevail in this position.
The record in its entirety supports the pre-hearing ruling by Judge Adams denying Respondent's Motion for Cost and
Attorney's Fees. Respondent's renewal of that motion in Respondent's Proposed Recommended Order should be denied.
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is
RECOMMENDED:
That Petitioner enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint and denying Respondent request for attorney's fees pursuant to Section 120.595, Florida Statutes.
DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of July, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.
SUZANNE F. HOOD
Administrative Law Judge
Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building
1230 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060
(850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675
Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of July, 2002.
COPIES FURNISHED:
Michael E. Riley, Esquire Gray, Harris & Robinson, P.A.
301 South Bronough Street, Suite 600 Post Office Box 11189
Tallahassee, Florida 32302-3189
George E. Hovis, Esquire Gray, Harris & Robinson, P.A. Post Office Drawer 120848 Clermont, Florida 34712-0848
Douglas Sunshine, Esquire Florida Engineers Management
Corporation
2507 Callaway Road, Suite 200
Tallahassee, Florida 32303-5267
Natalie A. Lowe, Executive Director Board of Professional Engineers Department of Business and
Professional Regulation 2507 Callaway Road, Suite 200
Tallahassee, Florida 32303-5267
Hardy L. Roberts, III, General Counsel Department of Business and
Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS
All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within
15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the final order in this case.
| Issue Date | Document | Summary |
|---|---|---|
| Jan. 08, 2003 | Agency Final Order | |
| Jul. 09, 2002 | Recommended Order | Respondent not negligent in preparing/submitting a generic plan for a boat dock that included a generic dock post splice. |
