STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
MIAMI-DADE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD,
vs.
Petitioner,
Case No. 12-3630TTS
ISABEL DIAZ-ALMAREZ,
Respondent.
/
RECOMMENDED ORDER
On May 24, 2013, a duly-noticed hearing was held via video teleconference with sites in Miami and Tallahassee, Florida, before F. Scott Boyd, an administrative law judge assigned by the Division of Administrative Hearings.
APPEARANCES
For Petitioner: Sara M. Marken, Esquire
Miami-Dade County School Board Suite 430
1450 Northeast 2nd Avenue Miami, Florida 33132
For Respondent: Mark S. Herdman, Esquire
Branden Vicari, Esquire Herdman and Sakellarides, P.A. Suite 110
29605 U.S. Highway 19, North
Clearwater, Florida 33761 STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Whether Respondent's employment as a teacher by the Miami- Dade County School Board should be suspended or terminated for
the reasons specified in the letter of notification of suspension and dismissal dated September 6, 2012, and the Notice of Specific Charges filed on January 10, 2013.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Petitioner sent Respondent a letter of notification of suspension without pay and initiation of dismissal proceedings dated September 6, 2012, advising her of the alleged grounds for termination, and of her right to an administrative hearing. In a letter dated September 11, 2012, Respondent requested an administrative hearing. The matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for the assignment of an administrative law judge on November 8, 2012. The case was scheduled for final hearing on January 18, 2013. The final hearing was continued three times and finally conducted on
May 24, 2013.
The parties stipulated to certain facts, which were accepted at hearing and are included among those set out below. Petitioner presented the testimony of three witnesses and offered Exhibits P-1 through P-5 and P-9 through P-14, which were admitted into evidence without objection. Exhibit P-5 consisted of pages 53, 59, and 66-81 of what had been marked for identification as Petitioner’s Exhibit 5. When three of Respondent’s former students who had been subpoenaed as Petitioner’s witnesses did not appear, Petitioner moved to
introduce their depositions into evidence. A preliminary ruling finding the witnesses unavailable under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.330(a)(3)(D) and accepting the depositions was made, but opportunity was given to each side to file a memorandum of law by June 7, 2013, as to the uses that could be made of the depositions. Respondent did not dispute that the witnesses had been subpoenaed to testify at the hearing, and permission for Petitioner to late-file the depositions and evidence of service was granted. Respondent, a dance teacher, testified on her own behalf and offered the testimony of seven other witnesses and no exhibits. After consideration of memoranda submitted by the parties, the earlier ruling as to the admissibility of the depositions for any purpose was reversed, and by Order dated June 18, 2013, the parties were advised that the depositions were not admissible under Florida Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.330(a)(3)(D) and so would be considered only to supplement or explain other evidence.
The Transcript of the hearing was filed on July 11, 2013. Proposed Recommended Orders were timely filed by both parties
and were considered.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Miami-Dade County School Board (School Board) is charged with the responsibility to operate, control, and
supervise the public schools within the School District of Miami-Dade County, Florida.
Ms. Isabel Diaz-Almarez was employed as a full-time dance teacher at South Miami Senior High School (South Miami), within the School District of Miami-Dade County. Ms. Diaz- Almarez also served as coach of the Cobra Charmers Dance Team and sponsor of the Booster Club for the Cobra Charmers.
Ms. Diaz-Almarez was employed by Miami-Dade County Public Schools (MDCPS) pursuant to a professional services contract beginning in July 2009.
In July 2012, as a result of parental concerns voiced to the administration, an investigation was initiated and conducted by the MDCPS Civilian Investigative Unit.
MDCPS sent Ms. Diaz-Almarez a letter of notification of suspension without pay and initiation of dismissal proceedings dated September 6, 2012, advising her of the alleged grounds for termination and of her right to an administrative hearing.
Ms. Diaz-Almarez is substantially affected by action of the School Board to suspend or terminate her employment.
Ms. Diaz-Almarez was a dance teacher, the coach of the dance team, and the sponsor of the Booster Club. Testimony of a parent and several students indicated that Ms. Diaz-Almarez was a good teacher and was effective in performing her roles. She
was popular with students, some of whom referred to her as “Mrs. D.”
Ms. Diaz-Almarez had an intern assigned to her class through MDCPS. The intern’s name was Ivonna Ledon, and she passed the required background clearance and was fingerprinted. After the internship ended, Ms. Ledon would occasionally teach one of Ms. Diaz-Almarez’s classes during the day, and continued to come in after school to work with the students on the dance team. She was paid by Ms. Diaz-Almarez with checks from Booster Club funds. Ms. Ledon described her position as the assistant coach of the Cobra Charmers dance team.
Classes at South Miami are set up in three periods each day, with each period lasting two hours: periods one, three, and five on one day; periods two, four, and six the next day; in alternating fashion. The Dance Team class met in periods five and six, a two-hour block at the end of each day. One of these periods was officially called “ballet.”
Ms. Diaz-Almarez also hired Ms. Priscilla Marrero to come to her fifth and sixth period classes, usually once or twice a week, to teach the Cobra Charmers Dance Team. Ms. Diaz- Almarez testified that she believed Ms. Marrero had been fingerprinted through the “Arts for Learning” program before she came to South Miami because Ms. Marrero told her so. Ms. Diaz- Almarez did not send an e-mail to the district to verify if
Ms. Marrero had been cleared to work with students. Ms. Diaz- Almarez would sometimes watch Ms. Marrero teach her class, sometimes participate in the class, and sometimes do other work related to planning and preparation for upcoming events and performances.
The instructors hired by Ms. Diaz-Almarez were not hired by the administration of South Miami or MDCPS. Teachers are permitted to have volunteers. A one-time volunteer must go through the main office at South Miami in order to sign in. Longer-term volunteers must complete background forms with MDCPS and be cleared with a background check. Ms. Ledon and
Ms. Marrero were paid from Booster Club funds and were not volunteers.
South Miami students Dayron Davilla, Felipe Gonzalez, Ernie Diaz, and Marcelo Gonzalez were not enrolled in dance classes during the 2011-2012 school year, and did not have
Ms. Diaz-Almarez as a teacher. These students nevertheless frequented Ms. Diaz-Almarez’s classroom. Felipe testified that he would go to Ms. Diaz-Almarez’s classroom three or four times a week. He testified that he would get a pass to do things like help Ms. Diaz-Almarez “move a couch or something” and that he never went to Ms. Diaz-Almarez’s classroom without a pass.
Felipe was seen sleeping on the couch in Ms. Diaz- Almarez’s classroom on more than one occasion. Felipe testified
he did fall asleep on the couch “once or twice” but that it was during lunch or after school. He testified that on one occasion he had ordered food from a nearby restaurant that was delivered to him at the school, so he was not hungry when lunch period came and he fell asleep on the couch.
The principal at South Miami during the 2011-2012 school year was Mr. Gilberto Bonce. On one or two occasions, Mr. Bonce discovered the boys in Ms. Diaz-Almarez’s classroom when they were not supposed to be there, and sent them back to their classroom.
Ms. Diaz-Almarez set up a collection box in her room in which the students would deposit payments to the Booster Club. The child of the Booster Club treasurer would collect payments from the box and give them to her mother, and the student would return with Booster Club checks made out to whoever was to get the money.
Periodically during the 2011-2012 school year,
Ms. Diaz-Almarez would receive checks from the treasurer of the Booster Club with which she would then pay the choreographers (she also sometimes paid them in cash). This was all Booster money, and Ms. Diaz-Almarez did not go through the school’s internal fund accounting processes. Ms. Diaz-Almarez also had an ATM card from the Booster Club’s bank account, which had been given to her by the treasurer to purchase items that the Booster
Club did not have time to handle, such as first aid supplies, fundraising supplies, ribbon for costumes, or awards and trophies. Again, these were Booster funds and Ms. Diaz-Almarez did not go through the school’s internal funds for these purchases.
Ms. Diaz-Almarez was aware of the guidelines for managing a Booster Club and knew that, as faculty advisor, she was not permitted to handle Booster Club funds. Only students and parents are permitted to handle Booster Club funds under these guidelines.
During the 2011-2012 school year, Ms. Diaz-Almarez maintained accounts on social media sites such as Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram. On Facebook, Ms. Diaz-Almarez was “friends” only with students who were seniors or 18 years of age. On Instagram, Ms. Diaz-Almarez was at first unaware that she could set up a private account in which she would be able to approve each person wanting to “follow” her. Instead, she initially had a public account, which allowed anyone to read the content and view the pictures on her account. Later, she established a private account. She also “followed” some seniors at South Miami on her Instagram account, including some students who were not students in her classes. On Twitter, she also was unaware that there was a private setting. She would try to block non-senior students who were “following” her on Twitter
when she caught them, but she allowed seniors to follow her. She communicated with her students on these social media sites. Some of these communications were not dance-related.
Shortly before the winter break of the 2011-2012 school year, Ms. Diaz-Almarez posted a picture of Felipe Gonzalez, Dayron Davilla, Kassandra Llanes, Marcelo Gonzalez, Sara Sigel, and Kayan Fernandez (all students at South Miami) on her Facebook page. The picture was taken in Ms. Diaz-Almarez’s office. Several of the students can be seen smiling and holding up miniature bottles of alcohol and shot glasses. Ms. Diaz- Almarez testified she could not remember how she got the picture. Ms. Diaz-Almarez testified she did not realize the picture showed the students with alcohol. The evidence showed that at one point, she said she thought the bottles contained perfume, and she also testified that she just saw a picture of a group and posted it. Her testimony was not credible. Ms. Diaz- Almarez knew that the picture showed students with alcohol.
Although the School Board alleged that Ms. Diaz- Almeraz gave the small bottles of alcohol and the shot glasses to the students, this was not proven. Ms. Diaz-Almarez denied it. A student by the name of Alex Martinez testified that he and another student, Kassandra Llanes, gave the boys in the picture the small bottles of alcohol and that he took the
picture. Another student also testified that she saw Alex taking the photograph.
The classroom used by Ms. Diaz-Almarez included three smaller rooms connected to the open studio: a dressing room, a storage room where costumes and props were kept, and the office. The dressing room and the storage room did not have doors that could be locked from the inside. A “Do Not Disturb” sign was kept so that when privacy was needed in these rooms, Ms. Diaz- Almarez could put up the sign on the outside of the doors.
Ms. Diaz-Almarez testified that on one occasion after school she put up the “Do Not Disturb” sign on the storage room door and told her students that she was going to be getting waxed, but she testified that she had only said that as a joke, and that she actually was going into the storage room to show a visitor costumes.
At the end of the 2011-2012 school year, students began planning for the prom. About 15 students, many of whom were associated with the Cobra Charmers, collected money to rent a hotel penthouse suite for the weekend after the prom. The suite rented for more than $1,000. Ms. Diaz-Almarez testified that the hotel in Miami would only accept “Paypal” and not credit cards. She testified that at the last minute the students were in danger of losing their reservation because neither they nor any of their parents had a Paypal account and
they could not wait the three days it required to open one, so she put the suite on her Paypal account.
The Friday afternoon of the prom, Ms. Diaz-Almarez took a half-day of sick leave and went with some students to get the suite ready. Ms. Diaz-Almarez drove with Dayron Davilla, while Javier Trujillo drove another vehicle. They unloaded food from the two cars and took it upstairs to the suite, where
Ms. Diaz-Almarez helped put it away in the kitchen. Ms. Diaz- Almarez testified that there was no alcohol in her car and that she saw no alcohol in the suite. Dayron asked Ms. Diaz-Almarez to help him create a little gift display with rose petals and mints for his girlfriend, and she did.
Ms. Diaz-Almarez also left a number of items in the suite that she had bought as gifts for the students. She testified that “[i]t was for them to possibly use. It was a little bit of a joke, and I bought them things that I knew that they probably would forget to take on purpose.” She testified she gave them a first aid kit, sunscreen, after-sun lotion, mouthwash, mints, toothpaste, freeze pops, Gatorade, and Jolly Ranchers. She denied arranging these items in a display on a tray and denied that she also gave them Jell-O, lemons, two bottles of alcohol, or condoms.
Javier’s screen name on Instagram was “javixxt.” A picture of a tray containing most of the above-mentioned items,
including the Jell-O, lemons, two bottles of alcohol, and condoms, was posted to his account, along with the notation, “Thank you Mrs. D!!!(:”
Felipe testified that Javier read out a card to the students in the suite from Mrs. Diaz-Almarez that said, in substance, “I’m proud of you. Have a good weekend. Be safe.” Felipe said he never saw where the card came from and did not know if it was sitting on the tray.
As Janette Vazquez and Xaylin Garza -- two of the students who stayed in the after-prom hotel suite -- testified, each of the roughly 15 students staying there brought their own bottle of alcohol. These were full size bottles, that is, liters, quarts, or “fifths.” The alcohol was put in the kitchen. The suite was fairly large and a person had to walk by the kitchen to get to the bedrooms.
Ms. Diaz-Almarez returned to the hotel room the following day around lunchtime with her husband. Her husband made steaks in the oven because there was no grill. As Felipe testified, Ms. Diaz-Almarez was also in the kitchen. After lunch, Ms. Diaz-Almarez talked with the girls in one of the bedrooms, then went down to the pool and the sauna with them. They then returned to the suite, watched television, and had dinner. After this, Ms. Diaz-Almarez and her husband left. Ms. Diaz-Almarez testified that she never saw any of the
students drinking alcohol. She testified she never saw any alcohol in the suite. Several students testified that they never saw Ms. Diaz-Almarez drinking alcohol or taking “Jell-O shots.” Ms. Diaz-Almarez’s testimony that she did not see any alcohol in the suite is not credible, and is rejected. Given the testimony of numerous witnesses as to the amount of alcohol in the suite, and the credited testimony that the bottles were in the kitchen and that Ms. Diaz-Almarez spent time in the kitchen, a bedroom, and the living room, it is determined that she saw the alcohol.
Ms. Diaz-Almarez’s interactions with her students reflect a deep immaturity and craving for their approval. She dealt with them as if she wanted to be popular with them and be their peer, rather than assume an appropriate role displaying strong leadership and character for their benefit.
Ms. Diaz-Almarez failed in her obligation to protect students from conditions harmful to their mental and physical health.
Assisting students to rent a hotel suite and fraternizing with students in after-prom activities where there was alcohol were completely incompatible with maintaining a position of authority with respect to students, and were so serious as to impair Ms. Diaz-Almarez’s effectiveness as a teacher in MDCPS.
The facts did not show that Ms. Diaz-Almarez intentionally exposed any student to embarrassment or disparagement.
The facts did not show that Ms. Diaz-Almarez intentionally violated or denied a student’s legal rights.
The facts did not show that Ms. Diaz-Almarez harassed or discriminated against any student, or failed to protect any student from harassment or discrimination.
The facts did not show that Ms. Diaz-Almarez exploited a relationship with a student for personal gain or advantage.
The facts did not show that Ms. Diaz-Almarez used institutional privileges for personal gain or advantage.
Ms. Diaz-Almarez’s conduct in posting a picture showing students in her office with alcohol on her Facebook page, as well as in assisting students to rent a hotel suite and fraternizing with them in after-prom activities where there was alcohol was conduct inconsistent with the standards of public conscience and good morals.
Ms. Diaz-Almarez’s conduct in posting the Facebook picture and her conduct surrounding the after-prom weekend was not sufficiently notorious to bring public disgrace or disrespect to herself or to the education profession.
The facts did not show that Ms. Diaz-Almarez’s conduct in posting the Facebook picture and her conduct surrounding the after-prom weekend impaired her service in the community.
The facts did not show that Ms. Diaz-Almarez failed to teach efficiently and faithfully, using the books and materials required, following the prescribed courses of study, and employing approved methods of instruction as provided by law and by rules of the State Department of Education.
The facts did not show that Ms. Diaz-Almarez failed to maintain honesty in all her professional dealings.
The facts did not show that Ms. Diaz-Almarez failed to maintain, prepare, or submit promptly any report that was required by State law, State Department of Education rule, Board rule, or administrative directive.
The facts did not show that Ms. Diaz-Almarez used abusive or profane language or displayed unseemly conduct in the workplace.
The facts did not show that Ms. Diaz-Almarez made malicious or intentionally false statements about a colleague.
The facts did not show that Ms. Diaz-Almarez submitted fraudulent information on any document in connection with professional activities.
The facts did not show that Ms. Diaz-Almarez failed to obey local, State, and national laws, codes and regulations.
The facts did not show that Ms. Diaz-Almarez unreasonably denied any student access to diverse points of view.
The facts did not show that Ms. Diaz-Almarez sent any students on non-school-related errands.
Ms. Diaz-Almarez inappropriately associated with students in a manner which gave the appearance of impropriety, including participation in situations that were sexually suggestive and which involved alcohol.
Ms. Diaz-Almarez’s inappropriate association with students in a manner which gave the appearance of impropriety, including participation in situations that were sexually suggestive and which involved alcohol, impaired Ms. Diaz- Almarez’s effectiveness in the school system.
The facts did not show that Ms. Diaz-Almarez engaged in unacceptable relationships or communications with students in the nature of dating; any form of sexual touching or behavior; making sexual, indecent, or illegal proposals, gestures or comments; or exploiting her teacher-student relationship.
Ms. Diaz-Almarez transported a student in a private vehicle without the approval of the principal.
Ms. Diaz-Almarez’s transportation of a student in a private automobile did not impair Ms. Diaz-Almarez’s effectiveness in the school system.
The actions of Ms. Diaz-Almarez constitute misconduct in office and just cause for suspension or termination of her employment as a dance teacher at South Miami.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) has jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties in this case, pursuant to section 1012.33(6), and sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes (2013). Pursuant to
section 120.65(11), the Miami-Dade County School Board has contracted with DOAH to conduct these hearings.
Petitioner is a duly constituted School Board charged with the duty to operate, control, and supervise all free public schools within the School District of Miami-Dade County, Florida, under section 1001.32, Florida Statutes (2011).1/
Respondent was employed by Petitioner as a high school dance teacher within the School District of Miami-Dade County pursuant to a professional services contract from July 2009 through September 5, 2012, when the School Board suspended her without pay and initiated dismissal proceedings against her.
Respondent’s substantial interests are affected by suspension or termination of her employment and she has standing to contest Petitioner’s action. McIntyre v. Seminole Cnty. Sch. Bd., 779 So. 2d 639, 641 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001).
Petitioner seeks to terminate Respondent's employment, and has the burden of proving the allegations set forth in its letter of notification of dismissal and Notice of Specific Charges by a preponderance of the evidence, as opposed to the more stringent standard of clear and convincing evidence applicable to the loss of a license or certification. Cropsey v. Sch. Bd. of Manatee Cnty., 19 So. 3d 351 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009), rev. denied, 29 So. 3d 1118 (Fla. 2010); Cisneros v. Sch. Bd. of
Miami-Dade Cnty., 990 So. 2d 1179 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008).
Respondent’s employment was governed by the collective bargaining agreement between Miami-Dade County Public Schools and the United Teachers of Dade (UTD Contract), the rules of the School Board, and Florida law.
Section 1.A.1. of Article XXI of the UTD Contract provides that "the [School] Board and [UTD] recognize the principle of progressive discipline," and that "the degree of discipline shall be reasonably related to the seriousness of the offense." Section 1.B.1.a. of that Article provides that "[a]ny member of the instructional staff may be suspended or dismissed at any time during the school year, provided that the charges against him/her are based upon Florida Statutes."
Section 1.B.2. goes on to provide, in part, that "[d]ismissals and suspensions shall be effected in accordance with applicable
Florida Statutes, including the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) "
Generally, a professional services contract is a continuous contract which renews automatically. Pursuant to sections 1012.22(1)(f) and 1012.33(6)(a), the School Board has the authority to suspend or terminate employees under a professional services contract for just cause.
Section 1012.33(1)(a) provides that "[j]ust cause includes, but is not limited to, the following instances as defined by rule of the State Board of Education: immorality, misconduct in office, incompetency, gross insubordination, willful neglect of duty, or conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude."
Whether Respondent committed the charged offenses is a question of ultimate fact to be decided by the trier of fact in the context of each alleged violation. McKinney v. Castor, 667 So. 2d 387, 389 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Langston v. Jamerson, 653 So. 2d 489, 491 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).
Section 1001.02(1), Florida Statutes, grants the State Board of Education authority to adopt rules pursuant to sections 120.536(1) and 120.54 to implement provisions of law conferring duties upon it.
Count I (Misconduct in Office)
Consistent with this rulemaking authority, the State Board of Education has defined “misconduct in office” to
implement section 1012.33(1) in Florida Administrative Code Rule 6A-5.056.
It should be noted that Count I erroneously set forth the text of rule 6A-5.056 as it was amended to read on July 8, 2012, rather than as it read at the time of the alleged conduct.2/ The specification might have been drafted with more care, but the language of the rule relied upon by Petitioner and the language referencing the Code of Ethics of the Education Profession in Florida and the Principles of Professional Conduct for the Education Profession in Florida are quite similar in the old and new rules. Respondent was not prejudiced.
Florida Administrative Code Rule 6A-5.056(3) provides:
Misconduct in office is defined as a violation of the Code of Ethics of the Education Profession as adopted in Rule 6B- 1.001, F.A.C., and the Principles of Professional Conduct for the Education Profession in Florida as adopted in Rule 6B- 1.006, F.A.C., which is so serious as to impair the individual’s effectiveness in the school system.
Rule 6B-1.001, renumbered without change as 6A-10.080 and entitled “Code of Ethics of the Education Profession in Florida,” provides:
The educator values the worth and dignity of every person, the pursuit of truth, devotion to excellence, acquisition of knowledge, and the nurture of democratic citizenship. Essential to the achievement of these standards are the freedom to learn
and to teach and the guarantee of equal opportunity for all.
The educator's primary professional concern will always be for the student and for the development of the student's potential. The educator will therefore strive for professional growth and will seek to exercise the best professional judgment and integrity.
Aware of the importance of maintaining the respect and confidence of one's colleagues, of students, of parents, and of other members of the community, the educator strives to achieve and sustain the highest degree of ethical conduct.
While by its terms rule 6A-5.056(3) requires that conduct be shown to violate both the Ethics Code and the Principles of Professional Conduct, it has been noted that the precepts set forth in the Ethics Code are "so general and so obviously aspirational as to be of little practical use in defining normative behavior." Miami-Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Brenes, Case No. 06-1758 (Fla. DOAH Feb. 27, 2007; Miami-Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd. Apr. 25, 2007). Attention should therefore be directed toward any violation of the Principles of Professional Conduct for the Education Profession in Florida, because violations of these specific Principles would necessarily also violate the more general and aspirational Code of Ethics.
Rule 6B-1.006, renumbered without change as 6A-10.081, is entitled “Principles of Professional Conduct for the
Education Profession in Florida.” The School Board first alleges that Respondent violated section (3)(a) of that rule:
Obligation to the student requires that the individual:
Shall make reasonable effort to protect the student from conditions harmful to learning and/or to the student's mental and/or physical health and/or safety.
Petitioner argues that far from protecting students from conditions harmful to their mental and physical health, Respondent actually helped them engage in harmful activities.
Petitioner proved that Respondent assisted students in renting a hotel suite for after-prom weekend activities not condoned by MDCPS, took a half-day of “sick leave” to help students move groceries to the suite and decorate it, visited the suite the following day, and fraternized with the students there. While Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent supplied the students with the alcohol or condoms that were present in the suite, Petitioner did prove that Respondent was aware that the alcohol was there. The fact that some may consider such after-prom activities a “rite of passage” does not alter the fact that they are illegal and dangerous to the young men and women involved.
Petitioner proved that Respondent failed in her obligation to protect students from conditions harmful to their mental and physical health.
The School Board alleges that Respondent also violated section 6A-10.081(3)(e), which provides that the individual:
Shall not intentionally expose a student to unnecessary embarassment or disparagement.
Petitioner did not specifically argue in its Proposed Recommended Order, and the evidence does not show, that Respondent intentionally exposed any student to embarrassment or disparagement, unnecessary or otherwise.
Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent violated the Principle of Professional Conduct for the Education Profession in Florida set forth in section 6A-10.081(3)(e).
The School Board alleges that Respondent violated section 6A-10.081(3)(f), which provides that the individual:
Shall not intentionally violate or deny a student’s legal rights.
Petitioner did not specifically argue in its Proposed Recommended Order, and the evidence does not show, that Respondent intentionally violated or denied a student’s legal rights.
Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent violated the Principle of Professional Conduct for the Education Profession in Florida set forth in section 6A-10.081(3)(f).
The School Board alleges that Respondent violated section 6A-10.081(3)(g), which provides that the individual:
Shall not harass or discriminate against any student on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, age, national or ethnic origin, political beliefs, marital status, handicapping condition, sexual orientation, or social and family background and shall make reasonable effort to assure that each student is protected from harassment or discrimination.
Petitioner did not specifically argue in its Proposed Recommended Order, and the evidence does not show, that Respondent harassed or discriminated against any student, or failed to protect any student from harassment or discrimination.
Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent violated the Principle of Professional Conduct for the Education Profession in Florida set forth in section 6A-10.081(3)(g).
The School Board alleges that Respondent violated section 6A-10.081(3)(h), which provides that the individual:
Shall not exploit a relationship with a student for personal gain or advantage.
Petitioner did not specifically argue in its Proposed Recommended Order, and the evidence does not show, that
Respondent exploited a relationship with a student for personal gain or advantage.
Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent violated the Principle of Professional Conduct for the Education Profession in Florida set forth in section 6A-10.081(3)(h).
The School Board alleges that Respondent violated section 6A-10.081(4)(c), which provides that:
Obligation to the public requires that the individual:
* * *
(c) Shall not use institutional privileges for personal gain or advantage.
The Notice of Specific Charges alleged that Respondent invited unauthorized personnel onto campus to provide her with personal grooming services. Use of class time and school facilities to receive a “wax” would certainly constitute use of her institutional privileges for personal gain. Respondent’s testimony that she only put up the “Do Not Disturb” sign to show a visitor costumes and that her comment about getting a wax was just a joke was not compelling, but this testimony is not sufficient to meet Petitioner’s burden. The evidence does not show that Respondent used institutional privileges for personal gain or advantage.
Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent violated section 6A-10.081(4)(c).
A violation of a Principle of Professional Conduct for the Education Profession in Florida does not necessarily constitute either misconduct in office or just cause for suspension or dismissal, however, unless it is "so serious as to impair the individual's effectiveness in the school system." Fla. Admin. Code R. 6A-5.056(3); MacMillan v. Nassau Cnty. Sch. Bd., 629 So. 2d 226, 230 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).
While no direct testimony regarding impairment of effectiveness was presented at hearing, impairment may be established in the absence of "specific" or "independent" evidence where the conduct engaged in by the teacher is of such a nature that it "speaks for itself" in terms of its seriousness and its adverse impact on the teacher's service and effectiveness. In such cases, proof that the teacher engaged in the conduct also constitutes proof of impaired effectiveness. Abrams v. Seminole Cnty. Sch. Bd., 73 So. 3d 285, 295 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011)(while determined on an individual basis, impairment may be found as a matter of law for some misconduct); Walker v. Highlands Cnty. Sch. Bd., 752 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)(commotion in class, including intoxicated student, showed class was out of control such that no evidence of impaired effectiveness was necessary, misconduct "spoke for itself").
Here, the evidence that Respondent failed in her obligation to protect students from conditions harmful to their
mental and physical health is misconduct that “speaks for itself.” Assisting students to rent a hotel suite and fraternizing with them in after-prom activities where there was alcohol was completely incompatible with maintaining a position of authority with respect to students, and by its very nature was so serious as to necessarily impair Respondent’s effectiveness as a teacher in MDCPS.
Petitioner proved by a preponderance of evidence that Respondent failed to make reasonable effort to protect students from conditions harmful to their mental and physical health. Respondent therefore violated both the Ethics Code and the Principles of Professional Conduct, and that violation was so serious as to impair Respondent’s effectiveness in the school system. Respondent is guilty of misconduct in office as defined by rule 6A-5.056(3).
Count II (Immorality)
Count II incorrectly set forth the text of a later version of the rule defining immorality, rather than the text as it read at the time of the alleged conduct. At the time of the alleged conduct, State Board of Education rule 6A-5.056(2) provided:
Immorality is defined as conduct that is inconsistent with the standards of public conscience and good morals. It is conduct sufficiently notorious to bring the individual concerned or the education
profession into public disgrace or disrespect and impair the individual’s service in the community.
The specification as drafted and the applicable rule are substantially similar, except for the presence of the phrase “sufficiently notorious.” Although technically deficient for this reason, it is well-settled that an administrative complaint need not be cast with that degree of technical nicety required in a criminal prosecution. Libby Investigations v. Dep't of
State, 685 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). The School Board need only state the acts complained of with sufficient specificity to allow an applicant a fair chance to prepare a defense. Davis v. Dep't of Prof’l Reg., 457 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). The charge of immorality was clear in light of the detailed description of the alleged conduct of Respondent. Jacker v.
Sch. Bd. of Dade Cnty., 426 So. 2d 1149, 1151 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)(Jorgenson, J., concurring)(school board must set forth the alleged conduct as well as notice of the statute or rule which it claims was violated). Respondent was not prejudiced by the erroneously drafted specification.
Petitioner argues that Respondent’s posting of the picture showing students in her office with alcohol on her Facebook page was an act inconsistent with the standards of public conscience and good morals. The posting of a picture depicting smiling, underage students holding small bottles of
alcohol and shot glasses on public school property made it appear as if Respondent, a public school teacher entrusted with the custody and care of youth, condoned and promoted illegal and dangerous activity. This conduct was inconsistent with the standards of public conscience and good morals.
Respondent’s conduct later in the school year (already discussed above) in assisting students to rent a hotel suite and fraternizing with them in after-prom activities where there was alcohol was also conduct inconsistent with the standards of public conscience and good morals. Respondent proved this element of immorality.
However, under the rule in effect at the time of the alleged conduct, it is not enough for Respondent’s conduct to have been inconsistent with the standards of public conscience and good morals. The conduct must also have been “sufficiently notorious” to bring “public disgrace or disrespect” on the teacher or the education profession.3/ McKinney v. Castor, 667 So. 2d 387 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)(principal's acts of soliciting prescription drugs from employees on two occasions did not constitute just cause where it was not sufficiently notorious). Even if wide public awareness of the fact that Respondent posted the photograph could be inferred simply from the popularity of Facebook, there was no evidence to suggest that Respondent suffered “public disgrace” or “public disrespect.” While the
testimony indicated that one parent did contact the school to request an investigation, the opinions of the only parent to testify, and several of the students, were in fact very complimentary to Respondent. Taken as a whole, the evidence fails to demonstrate that the posting of the photograph brought “public disgrace or disrespect” to Respondent or to the education community. Similarly, there was no evidence to indicate anyone in the general public was even aware of Respondent’s activities with respect to the after-prom weekend, much less that Respondent or the education community suffered public disgrace or disrespect.
Additionally, for conduct to constitute immorality it must also have impaired the teacher’s service in the community. McNeill v. Pinellas Cnty. Sch. Bd., 678 So. 2d 476, 478 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)(reversing school board order that conduct constituted immorality where competent substantial evidence supported ALJ’s finding that conduct did not impair individual’s service in the community). Petitioner did not cite to any cases parallel to Abrams and Walker, cited above in connection with allegations of misconduct, that would permit a finding of impairment of service as a matter of law in cases involving immorality, though that would be logically consistent. Cf. McKinney v. Castor, 667
So. 2d 387, 389 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)(dearth of record evidence to support required finding of fact that soliciting medication
impaired service in community). Petitioner offered insufficient evidence to show that either Respondent’s posting of the picture on her Facebook page or her conduct surrounding the after-prom weekend impaired her service in the community.
Petitioner failed to prove by preponderance of the evidence that Respondent’s conduct constituted immorality as defined in rule 6A-5.056.
School Board Rules
Section 1012.33(1) does not purport to establish an all-inclusive list of conduct that constitutes "just cause" for suspension or dismissal. The plain language “just cause includes, but is not limited to” clearly allows suspension or dismissal for other reasons.
On the other hand, violations of school board rules do not necessarily constitute just cause to suspend or dismiss an employee. While section 1012.53(2) does provide in part that instructional staff shall perform “duties prescribed by district school board rules,” not every failure to do so meets the statutory threshold for suspension or dismissal pursuant to section 1012.33(1)(a) and (6)(a).
Under the doctrine of noscitur a sociis (a word is known by the company it keeps), the other words used within a string of concepts in a statute are examined to derive the legislature's overall intent. Nehme v. Smithkline Beecham
Clinical Labs., Inc., 863 So. 2d 201, 205 (Fla. 2003); Turnberry
Isle Resort & Club v. Fernandez, 666 So. 2d 254, 256 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). The statute’s enumeration of immorality, misconduct in office, incompetency, gross insubordination, willful neglect of duty, and commission of a crime of moral turpitude thus limits “just cause” to grounds of similar significance and weight.
In addition, given that the statute has directed the State Board of Education to define certain statutorily enumerated grounds, it is clear that a district school board may not ignore these definitions, or alter or contravene them, under the guise of creating another distinct basis for “just cause.” Interpreting section 1012.33 to allow a school board to do so would render the language “as defined by rule of the State Board of Education” completely superfluous and meaningless. Murray v. Mariner Health, 994 So. 2d 1051, 1061 (Fla. 2008)(statutory provision will not be construed in such a way that it renders any other provision meaningless or absurd); Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Millender, 666 So. 2d 882, 886 (Fla. 1996)(each subsection, sentence, and clause must be read in light of the others to form a congruous whole so as not to render any language superfluous). A school board could not create a different definition of immorality, for example, as a distinct ground of suspension or dismissal under section 1012.33(1), but
instead would be bound by the State Board of Education’s definition, as mandated by the statute.
Section 1001.41(2), Florida Statutes, grants district school boards the authority to adopt rules pursuant to
sections 120.536(1) and 120.54 to implement their statutory duties and supplement rules prescribed by the State Board of Education.
Miami-Dade County School Board Policy 3210, Standards of Ethical Conduct, lists specific “obligations” of educational professionals, almost all of which are copied verbatim from the Principles of Professional Conduct for the Education Profession as set forth in rule 6A-10.081.
Miami-Dade County School Board Policy 3210.01, Code of Ethics, restates verbatim the three parts of the Code of Ethics of the Education Profession in Florida set forth in rule 6B-
1.001. It then goes on to describe fundamental principles underlying the Code of Ethics, and to provide more detailed guidance to persons subject to the Code as to Conflicts of Interest, Conduct Regarding Students, and Personnel Matters.
Miami-Dade County School Board Policy 3213, Student Supervision and Welfare, begins with a reference to the responsibility of instructional staff to “maintain the highest professional, moral, and ethical standards” in dealing with students. It goes on to set forth numerous specific requirements
and prohibitions with respect to misconduct involving students, such as “staff members shall not send students on any non-school related errands” and “staff members shall not transport students in a private vehicle without the approval of the principal.”
These three School Board rules, violation of which is alleged as Counts III, IV, and V, thus do not create new categories of “just cause” for termination, but instead are explicitly duplicative of, or provide elaboration on, provisions of State Board of Education rule 6A-5.056, which so broadly defines “misconduct in office.”
The cited School Board rules reiterating and elaborating4/ on the Code of Ethics and Principles, therefore, are considered here not as distinct grounds of “just cause,” but rather as additional counts of misconduct in office.
Several alleged violations of these School Board rules are substantively identical to alleged violations of the State Board of Education rules already discussed above and will not be revisited; only new allegations will be considered.
Count III (Policy 3210)
School Board Policy 3210 A.1. requires an instructional staff member to “teach efficiently and faithfully, using the books and materials required, following the prescribed courses of study, and employing approved methods of instruction
as provided by law and by rules of the State Department of Education.”
Petitioner argues that allowing students not assigned to her classroom to spend time there affected Respondent’s ability to teach her students efficiently, and that the young men were a constant distraction. While the record does show that South Miami students not assigned to Respondent’s classes spent an inordinate amount of time there, the connection of that fact to violation of this rule is less clear. There was little or no evidence suggesting that the assigned students were “distracting” as argued. Testimony indicated that the unassigned students later formed an unofficial dance team themselves. Taken as a whole, there is insufficient evidence to show that Respondent was not teaching dance “efficiently and faithfully.”
Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent violated School Board Policy 3210 A.1.
School Board Policy 3210 A.17. requires an instructional staff member to “maintain honesty in all professional dealings.”
Petitioner argues that Respondent’s undisputed failure to follow the guidelines governing the use of Booster Club funds, or to compel parents to do so, was a failure to maintain honesty. But even a knowing violation of rules does not necessarily constitute dishonesty. There was no evidence suggesting
Respondent was misappropriating Booster funds or personally profiting from them, only that she failed to follow the required administrative procedures. There is no evidence that she cheated, stole, lied, or was untruthful with respect to the funds. Her failure to follow the guidelines does not constitute dishonesty.
Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent violated School Board Policy 3210 A.17.
School Board Policy 3210 A.18. requires an instructional staff member to “maintain, prepare, and submit promptly all reports that may be required by State law, State Department of Education rules, Board rules, and administrative directives.”
There was no evidence at hearing of any report required by State law, Department of Education rule, Board rule, or administrative directive, or that Respondent failed to promptly submit a required report.
Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent violated School Board Policy 3210 A.18.
School Board Policy 3210 A.21. directs that an instructional staff member shall “not use abusive and/or profane language or display unseemly conduct in the workplace.”
Petitioner did not specifically argue in its Proposed Recommended Order, and the evidence does not show, that
Respondent used abusive or profane language or displayed unseemly conduct in the workplace.
Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent violated School Board Policy 3210 A.21.
School Board Policy 3210 A.23. directs that an instructional staff member shall “not make malicious or intentionally false statements about a colleague.”
Petitioner did not specifically argue in its Proposed Recommended Order, and the evidence does not show, that Respondent made malicious or intentionally false statements about a colleague.
Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent violated School Board Policy 3210 A.23.
School Board Policy 3210 A.26. directs that an instructional staff member shall “not submit fraudulent information on any document in connection with professional activities.”
Petitioner did not specifically argue in its Proposed Recommended Order, and the evidence does not show, that Respondent submitted fraudulent information on any document in connection with professional activities.
Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent violated School Board Policy 3210 A.26.
Count IV (Policy 3210.01)
It is alleged that Respondent violated School Board Policy 3210.01, entitled Code of Ethics, which provides in section B of “Each employee agrees and pledges” that an employee will “obey local, State, and national laws, codes and regulations.”5/
While it was shown that Respondent violated the Booster Club Guidelines put together by the District Athletic Activities and Accreditation Office and approved by the School Board, there was no evidence that these Guidelines were adopted by the agency pursuant to section 120.54, Florida Statutes, so as to constitute a “regulation” of MDCPS within the meaning of section B. Section 120.57(1)(e) also prohibits a school board from basing agency action that determines the substantial interests of a party on an “unadopted rule” as defined in section 120.52(20).
Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent violated section B of “Each employee agrees and pledges” of School Board Policy 3210.01.
Petitioner alleges another violation of School Board Policy 3210.01, which provides in section C under “Conduct Regarding Students” that an employee “shall not unreasonably deny a student access to diverse points of view.”
Petitioner did not specifically argue in its Proposed Recommended Order, and the evidence does not show, that Respondent unreasonably denied any student access to diverse points of view.
Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent violated School Board Policy 3210.01, “Conduct Regarding Students,” section C.
Count V (Policy 3213)
Count V alleges violations of School Board Policy 3213, entitled Student Supervision and Welfare.
Policy 3213 provides in section D that “staff members shall not send students on any non-school related errands.”
Petitioner did not specifically argue in its Proposed Recommended Order, and the evidence does not show, that Respondent sent a student on any non-school-related errands. There was testimony that student Laura Mili was sent by Respondent to get props from the room for the Christmas show, but this errand was related to school.
Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent violated School Board Policy 3213, section D.
School Board Policy 3213, section E, provides:
[S]taff members shall not inappropriately associate with students at any time in a manner which may give the appearance of impropriety, including, but not limited to, the creation or participation in any
situation or activity which could be considered abusive or sexually suggestive or involve illegal substances such as drugs, alcohol, or tobacco.
Respondent inappropriately associated with students at the after-prom weekend in a manner which gave the appearance of impropriety. Rather than relating to her students in the capacity of a teacher, she acted as if she was a peer. After- prom parties are notorious for situations involving consumption of alcohol by under-aged students, and the testimony that the suite contained a full-sized bottle of alcohol for each student confirms that this event was no exception. The fact that her female students were there with their boyfriends and that condoms were openly displayed in the suite made the entire event more than sexually “suggestive.” Even assuming that Respondent offered no support for any sexual activity or alcohol consumption, the mere presence of an MDCPS employee at this event unquestionably gave the appearance of impropriety.
Petitioner proved that Respondent violated School Board Policy 3213, section E.
School Board Policy 3213, section F, provides:
Staff members shall not engage in unacceptable relationships and/or communications with students. Unacceptable relationships and/or communications with students include, but are not limited to the following: dating; any form of sexual touching or behavior; making sexual, indecent or illegal proposals, gestures or comments;
and/or exploiting an employee-student relationship for any reason. Any sexual or other inappropriate conduct with a student by any staff member will subject the offender to potential criminal liability and discipline up to and including termination of employment.
On its face, the first sentence of this rule might seem to encompass Respondent’s posting of the photograph of students holding alcohol as an “unacceptable communication” or her repeated instances of fraternization with students as “unacceptable relationships.” However, the examples which follow make clear that only more serious conduct is covered by the rule. Fla. Police Benevolent Ass'n v. Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs., 574 So. 2d 120, 121 (Fla. 1991)(ejusdem generis
requires that general terms in a statute be construed in a manner consistent with more precise terms associated with them). Thus, the “including, but not limited to” language extends only to other conduct in the nature of indecent proposals, dating, exploitation, or sexual touching.
Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent violated School Board Policy 3213, section F.
School Board Policy 3213, section I, provides that “staff members shall not transport students in a private vehicle without the approval of the principal.”
Respondent transported a student to the rented hotel suite in a private vehicle on the afternoon of the prom to
prepare the suite for the students’ after-prom weekend. Respondent testified that she took sick leave to make the trip and so it would have been extremely awkward for her to have requested permission to transport the student to decorate the suite for the after-prom weekend, which was not a school function. This circumstantial evidence makes it clear that Respondent did not request, and Principle Bonce did not grant, approval for Respondent to transport the student.
Petitioner proved that Respondent violated School Board Policy 3213, section I.
As discussed earlier, the State Board of Education has determined by rule that there is “just cause” for termination for misconduct in office only if violations of the Code of Ethics or Principles are so serious as to impair the teacher’s effectiveness in the school system. Less serious violations of the Code or Principles, therefore, do not legally constitute “just cause.” It follows that section 1012.33 and rule 6A-5.056 similarly prohibit the finding of “just cause” based upon misconduct in office consisting of a violation of a School Board rule that is not so serious as to impair the teacher’s effectiveness in the school system.
Respondent’s violation of School Board Policy 3213, section E, inappropriate association with an appearance of impropriety, is based upon the same after-prom incident earlier
found to impair Respondent’s effectiveness in the school system, and violation of section E impairs Respondent’s effectiveness for the same reasons. Respondent’s violation of section E constitutes misconduct in office and just cause for dismissal.
Respondent’s violation of School Board Policy 3213, section I, transporting a student in a private vehicle without the approval of the principle, in contrast, is not conduct of such a nature that it "speaks for itself" in terms of its seriousness and its adverse impact on Respondent’s effectiveness. Respondent’s violation of section I does not constitute misconduct in office or just cause for dismissal.
Penalty
Respondent’s conduct reflects a deep immaturity and craving for student approval, not the strong leadership and character required in teacher-student interaction. However, there was scant evidence that Respondent’s misconduct exploited students or violated school policy for her personal gain. Given the seriousness of the offenses and in light of the principle of progressive discipline, suspension would be appropriate.
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED:
That the School Board of Miami-Dade County, Florida, enter a final order finding Ms. Isabel Diaz-Almarez guilty of
misconduct in office, suspend her employment without pay for a period of 180 school days, and place her on probation for a period of two years. Because Ms. Diaz-Almarez has already been suspended for more than 180 school days, it is RECOMMENDED that her employment be reinstated, with the calculation of back pay not to include pay for the 180-day suspension period.
DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of July, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.
S
F. SCOTT BOYD Administrative Law Judge
Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building
1230 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060
(850) 488-9675
Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of July, 2013.
ENDNOTES
1/ References to statutes and rules throughout this Recommended Order are to versions in effect from September 2011 through June 2012, the period of alleged incidents, except as otherwise indicated.
2/ Although few dates were in evidence, testimony demonstrated that the incidents forming the basis of the charges occurred near the 2011 Christmas holiday, during the academic year, or at the time of the school prom in 2012. An agency rule cannot be retroactive, unless the enabling statute expressly authorizes such retroactivity. § 120.54(1)(f), Fla. Stat. Anglickis v.
Dep't of Prof'l Reg., 593 So. 2d 298, 300 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)(rule not in effect at time of audit could not have been violated). Section 1012.33 contains no suggestion that the State Board of Education was granted authority to define “misconduct in office” retroactively.
3/ The phrase “sufficiently notorious” has subsequently been deleted from State Board of Education rule 6A-5.056, but the purpose and effect of deleting this phrase is not yet entirely clear, since the rule still requires a showing of “public disgrace or disrespect.” If public disgrace or disrespect is present, it does not appear to be difficult to also conclude that the conduct was sufficiently notorious to have caused that result.
4/ The Code of Ethics of the Education Profession in Florida, as set forth in rule 6B-1.001, is particularly in need of such elaboration. As was noted in Miami-Dade County School Board v. Brenes, Case No. 06-1758 (Fla. DOAH Feb. 27, 2007; Miami-Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd. Apr. 25, 2007), the three paragraphs are "so general and so obviously aspirational as to be of little practical use in defining normative behavior."
5/ This awkward reference to the specific portion of
Policy 3210.01 results from the fact that Petitioner’s rules are not written with designated sections, subsections, paragraphs, and subparagraphs in a hierarchical pattern typical of legal codes. Rewriting them in rule format would greatly increase clarity and ease of reference. A few “allegations” in the Notice of Specific Charges could not even be discussed, because they fail to provide any behavioral requirements or prohibitions that could be violated. For example, a definition of “Integrity” is simply set forth and described as being a “fundamental principle” upon which the Code of Ethics is “predicated.”
COPIES FURNISHED:
Mark Herdman, Esquire
Herdman and Sakellarides, P.A. Suite 110
29605 U.S. Highway 19, North
Clearwater, Florida 33761
Sara M. Marken, Esquire
Miami-Dade County School Board
1450 Northeast 2nd Avenue, Suite 430
Miami, Florida 33132
Alberto M. Carvalho, Superintendent Miami-Dade County Public Schools 1450 Northeast 2nd Avenue, Suite 912
Miami, Florida 33132
Dr. Tony Bennett Commissioner of Education
Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1514
325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
Matthew Carson, General Counsel Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1244
325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS
All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within
15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the Final Order in this case.
| Issue Date | Document | Summary |
|---|---|---|
| Oct. 30, 2013 | Agency Final Order | |
| Jul. 30, 2013 | Recommended Order | Respondent's failure to make reasonable effort to protect students from mental and physical harm and inappropriate association with students warranted six-month suspension from employment without pay. |
LEE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD vs ORLANDO TORRES, 12-003630TTS (2012)
BROWARD COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD vs DEBORAH TERSIGNI, 12-003630TTS (2012)
DADE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD vs YVONNE M. WEINSTEIN, 12-003630TTS (2012)
BROWARD COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD vs KENNETH W. MILLER, 12-003630TTS (2012)
MIAMI-DADE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD vs ROBERT F. WARD, 12-003630TTS (2012)
