Filed: Nov. 04, 2019
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: 17-3056-cr United States v. Murphy UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT August Term 2018 (Argued: May 3, 2019 Decided: November 4, 2019) Docket No. 17-3056-cr UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee, v. NICHOLAS MURPHY, Defendant-Appellant. ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT Before: KEARSE, WESLEY, and CHIN, Circuit Judges. Appeal from a judgment entered in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Bryant, J.) convi
Summary: 17-3056-cr United States v. Murphy UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT August Term 2018 (Argued: May 3, 2019 Decided: November 4, 2019) Docket No. 17-3056-cr UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee, v. NICHOLAS MURPHY, Defendant-Appellant. ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT Before: KEARSE, WESLEY, and CHIN, Circuit Judges. Appeal from a judgment entered in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Bryant, J.) convic..
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17‐3056‐cr
United States v. Murphy
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
August Term 2018
(Argued: May 3, 2019 Decided: November 4, 2019)
Docket No. 17‐3056‐cr
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
NICHOLAS MURPHY,
Defendant‐Appellant.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
Before:
KEARSE, WESLEY, and CHIN, Circuit Judges.
Appeal from a judgment entered in the United States District Court
for the District of Connecticut (Bryant, J.) convicting defendant, following a
guilty plea, of traveling interstate for the purpose of engaging in ʺillicit sexual
conductʺ with a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b). The government
charged that the intended ʺillicit sexual conductʺ was the sexual abuse of an
individual at least 12 years old but not yet 16 years old, who was at least four
years younger than the defendant. See 18 U.S.C. § 2243(a). As the parties
stipulated, however, the victim told the defendant she was 16 years old and the
defendant told detectives he believed her to be 16 years old. On appeal, the
defendant contends that the district court committed plain error in accepting his
guilty plea.
VACATED and REMANDED.
SARAH P. KARWAN, Assistant United States Attorney
(Marc H. Silverman, Assistant United States
Attorney, on the brief), for John H. Durham, United
States Attorney for the District of Connecticut,
New Haven, Connecticut, for Appellee.
MATTHEW BRISSENDEN, Matthew W. Brissenden, P.C.,
Garden City, New York, for Defendant‐Appellant.
___________
CHIN, Circuit Judge:
In this case, the government charged defendant‐appellant Nicholas
Murphy with traveling in interstate commerce for the purpose of engaging in
ʺillicit sexual conductʺ in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b). The government
2
alleged that the intended ʺillicit sexual conductʺ was the sexual abuse of an
individual at least 12 years old but not yet 16 years old, who was at least four
years younger than the defendant. See 18 U.S.C. § 2243(a). Thus, Murphy was
charged with (a) traveling in interstate commerce (b) for the purpose of (1)
knowingly engaging in a sexual act with (2) a minor not younger than 12, not yet
16, and at least four years his junior.
Murphy pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement that stipulated
that when he was 25 years old, he traveled from Rhode Island to Connecticut for
the purpose of having sexual intercourse with a young girl he told detectives he
believed to be 16 years old when in fact she was younger than 16 but older than
13. The government, defense counsel, Murphy, and, ultimately, the district court
proceeded on the assumption that § 2423(b), when charged with § 2243(a) as the
intended illicit sexual conduct, could be violated without knowledge of the
victimʹs age.
We hold that 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) is not a strict liability crime. As
charged here, the statute criminalizes interstate travel ʺfor the purpose ofʺ ‐‐ that
is, with the intent of ‐‐ engaging in a sexual act with someone aged at least 12, not
yet 16, and at least four years the defendantʹs junior. Murphy, however,
3
apparently believed he was going to have sexual intercourse with a 16‐year‐old.
Hence, while he might very well have been guilty of a different crime, on this
record, he was not guilty of violating § 2423(b). Accordingly, we vacate
Murphyʹs conviction and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
BACKGROUND
A. Statutory Background
The indictment charges that Murphy traveled in interstate
commerce for the purpose of engaging in illicit sexual conduct with another
person in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b). Section 2423 provides, in part:
(b) Travel with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct. ‐‐
A person who travels in interstate commerce . . . for the
purpose of engaging in any illicit sexual conduct with
another person shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than 30 years, or both.
....
(f) Definition. ‐‐ As used in this section, the term ʺillicit
sexual conductʺ means
(1) a sexual act . . . with a person under 18 years of age
that would be in violation of Chapter 109A if the sexual act
occurred in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction
of the United States . . . .
4
18 U.S.C. § 2423. 1 Section 2423(b) thus criminalizes travel for certain illegal
purposes, namely, for the purpose of committing a crime listed in Chapter 109A.
According to the indictment, the ʺillicit sexual conductʺ that Murphy intended to
engage in was the ʺsexual abuse of a minorʺ as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2243(a).
Section 2243, entitled ʺ[s]exual abuse of a minor or wardʺ and
included in Chapter 109A, provides:
(a) Of a Minor. ‐‐ Whoever, in the special maritime and
territorial jurisdiction of the United States or in a Federal
prison, or in any prison, institution, or facility in which
persons are held in custody by direction of or pursuant to a
contract or agreement with the head of any Federal
department or agency, knowingly engages in a sexual act with
another person who ‐‐
(1) has attained the age of 12 years but has not attained
the age of 16 years; and
(2) is at least four years younger than the person so
engaging;
Or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title,
imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both.
....
(c) Defenses. ‐‐ (1) In a prosecution under subsection (a) of
this section, it is a defense, which the defendant must
establish by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
defendant reasonably believed that the other person had
attained the age of 16 years. . . .
1 On December 21, 2018, following Murphyʹs plea, § 2423(b) was amended to
require travel ʺwith a motivating purpose,ʺ rather than travel ʺfor the purpose of,ʺ
engaging in illicit sexual conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) (as amended by Abolish Human
Trafficking Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115‐392, § 14, 132 Stat. 5250, 5256 (2018)).
5
(d) State of Mind Proof Requirement. ‐‐ In a prosecution
under subsection (a) of this section, the Government need
not prove that the defendant knew ‐‐
(1) the age of the other person engaging in the sexual
act; or
(2) that the requisite age difference existed between the
persons so engaging.
18 U.S.C. § 2243 (emphasis added). Section 2243(a) thus criminalizes the
substantive act of sexual abuse of a minor who is at least 12 years old, has not yet
attained the age of 16 years old, and is at least four years younger than the
defendant. As noted in subsection (d), this crime contains no requirement of
proof of knowledge of the victimʹs age. As noted in subsection (c), however, it is
an affirmative defense that the defendant reasonably believed the victim to be at
least 16 years old.
B. Factual Background2
In 2015, Murphy was a 25‐year‐old U.S. Air Force member. Murphy
met the victim through the online dating website ʺPlenty of Fish.ʺ Murphy told
the victim he was 19 years old when in fact he was 25 years old. The victimʹs
profile stated that she was 19 years old. After their initial introduction on the
2 These facts are undisputed and are drawn from the material available to the
district court at the time it accepted Murphyʹs plea: the indictment, the plea agreement,
and the plea transcript.
6
dating website, Murphy and the victim continued to correspond on the Facebook
Messenger application. The victim eventually told Murphy that she was 16 years
old. In fact, however, the victim was 14 years old ‐‐ at least 12 years old and not
yet 16 years old.
On the evening of September 16, 2015, Murphy drove from Rhode
Island to Connecticut where the victim resided with her parents. Murphyʹs
purpose in traveling to Connecticut was to engage in sexual conduct with the
victim. Once he arrived in Connecticut, Murphy and the victim engaged in
sexual intercourse.
On September 24, 2015, shortly after his rendezvous with the victim
in Connecticut, Murphy was interviewed by local Connecticut law enforcement.
Murphy admitted to having sexual intercourse with the victim, and he stated
that he believed the victim to be sixteen years old.
C. Procedural History
On December 14, 2016, a grand jury in the District of Connecticut
charged Murphy with violating 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b). The indictment charges that:
From on or about September 16, 2015, through and
including September 17, 2015, the defendant . . . traveled in
interstate commerce, from the State of Rhode Island to the
State of Connecticut, for the purpose of engaging in any
illicit sexual conduct (as defined in Title 18, United States
7
Code, Section 2246(f)(1)) with a person under 18 years of
age, that would be in violation of Title 18, United States
Code, Chapter 109A, if the sexual act occurred in the special
maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States,
namely, sexual abuse of a minor in violation of Title 18,
United States Code, Chapter 109A, Section 2243(a).
All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section
2423(b).
Appʹx at 18. Hence, Murphy was charged with one crime: travel in interstate
commerce for the purpose of engaging in illicit sexual conduct with a minor in
violation of § 2423(b). The meaning of a critical component of the crime, ʺillicit
sexual conduct,ʺ is defined with reference to a separate statute, § 2243(a).
On June 5, 2017, Murphy appeared before a magistrate judge
(Richardson, J.) and signed a plea agreement. The plea agreement provided that
the crime to which he was pleading guilty had two ʺessential elementsʺ that
ʺmust be satisfiedʺ:
1. The Defendant traveled in interstate commerce
2. For the purpose of engaging in illicit sexual conduct with
another person.
Appʹx at 85. The plea agreement did not define the term ʺillicit sexual conductʺ
either by reference to statute or otherwise. At the plea hearing, the magistrate
judge explained to Murphy that if he were to go to trial, the government would
have to prove certain elements beyond a reasonable doubt. The court referenced
8
page one of the plea agreement and asked the government to read the elements
aloud. Neither the government nor the magistrate judge explained the term
ʺillicit sexual conduct.ʺ
The plea agreement stipulated that (a) ʺ[the victim] told [Murphy]
that she was sixteen when, in fact, she was less than sixteen but older than
thirteen years oldʺ and (b) Murphy ʺtold the detectives that he believed her to be
sixteen.ʺ Appʹx at 93. When asked to describe his conduct, Murphy explained to
the magistrate judge:
I traveled from Rhode Island to Connecticut to meet with
this girl to engage in sexual activities. I should have known
as the adult that it was a poor decision on my part and I
should have known better. She was underage, and . . . I
should have never taken that drive to begin with, but I did.
. . . I should have known better once I arrived [at] the house
that it was a poor situation and shouldnʹt have engaged in
the activity.
Appʹx at 54. Hence, Murphy did not provide any additional indication of his
knowledge of the victimʹs age, other than that ʺ[s]he was underageʺ and he
ʺshould have known better.ʺ
Later in the plea hearing, the government stated on the record that
were the case to go to trial, it would prove that ʺthe victim told [Murphy] that
she was 16 even though her Plenty of Fish profile stated 19, but she was in fact
9
younger than 16, being older than 13 and under 16.ʺ Appʹx at 58. The
government confirmed that Murphy ʺtold the detectives that he knew [the
victim] to be 16.ʺ Id. at 60.
The court proceeded to ask Murphy whether he ʺbelieve[d he was]
. . . in fact guilty of the charge to which [he was] offering to plead guilty.ʺ Id. at
62. Murphy responded in the affirmative. At the conclusion of the proceeding,
the magistrate judge advised that he would recommend that the district court
accept the plea. By order dated June 6, 2017, the district court (Bryant, J.)
accepted the plea.
Murphy was also charged, based on the same conduct, in
Connecticut with sexual assault in the second degree in violation of Conn. Gen.
Stat. § 53a‐71(a)(1).3 On July 7, 2017, approximately one month after he pled
guilty in federal court, Murphy pled guilty to this offense in Connecticut
3 This statute proscribes ʺsexual intercourse with another person [who is] thirteen
years of age or older but under sixteen years of age [if] the actor is more than three
years older than such other person.ʺ Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a‐71(a)(1). Under this statute,
the state is not required to establish
that the accused knew that the person with whom he had sexual intercourse was
under the age of sixteen; the state must prove only that the accused knowingly
engaged in sexual intercourse with a person who, in fact, had not attained the
age of sixteen.
State v. Sorabella, 277 Conn. 155, 169 (2006).
10
Superior Court. Murphy agreed to be sentenced to the 9‐month mandatory
minimum term of imprisonment as well as a 10‐year period of probation, which
carries with it sex offender registration requirements. A judgment to this effect
was entered on October 30, 2017.
On September 13, 2017, Murphy appeared before the district court
(Bryant, J.) for sentencing. The district court determined the applicable
Guidelines range to be 70 to 87 monthsʹ imprisonment and sentenced Murphy to
a below‐Guidelines sentence of 60 monthsʹ imprisonment, to run concurrently
with his state sentence.
This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Murphy argues that the district court erred in accepting his plea
because it failed to ensure that (1) he understood the essential elements of the
crime, namely the element of knowledge that the intended victim was under the
age of 16 and (2) there was a factual basis for his plea. Because Murphy did not
identify either of these claimed errors in the district court, we review for plain
error only. See United States v. Torrellas, 455 F.3d 96, 103 (2d Cir. 2006).
11
The government argues that the district court did not err, much less
plainly err, because (1) knowledge that the victim was under the age of 16 is not
an element of the offense, and (2) even if such knowledge is an essential element,
there was no plain error because Murphy understood the nature of the offense
and there was an adequate factual basis for the district court to find that this
element was satisfied. We address the two arguments in turn.
I. Knowledge of the Intended Victimʹs Age
The government makes two arguments with respect to knowledge
of the intended victimʹs age: first, it contends that knowledge that the intended
victim is under the age of 16 is not an essential element of the crime of
conviction; and, second, it argues in the alternative that if knowledge is required,
it need only prove knowledge that the intended victim was under the age of 18.
We address both arguments in turn.
A. Knowledge That the Intended Victim Is Under 16
We conclude that knowledge that the intended victim is under the
age of 16 is an element of the crime of conviction, 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b).4 We begin
4 As discussed further, infra at 24‐25, our use of the term ʺknowledgeʺ throughout
encompasses a defendantʹs belief, however mistaken, that the victim is under the age of
16. See United States v. Jennings, 471 F.2d 1310, 1313 (2d Cir. 1973) (noting that
culpability for a crime with a knowing mens rea ʺturns upon the defendantʹs knowledge
or beliefʺ that the requisite facts exist); see also United States v. Langley,
549 F.3d 726, 729
12
with the language of the statute. Section 2423(b) is entitled ʺ[t]ravel with intent to
engage in illicit sexual conduct.ʺ (emphasis added). By its terms, § 2423(b)
criminalizes (a) the act of traveling interstate (b) ʺfor the purpose ofʺ engaging in
ʺillicit sexual conduct.ʺ (emphasis added). Thus, what is required is the act of
crossing state lines with the specific intent to engage in an illicit sexual act. See
United States v. Han, 230 F.3d 560, 563 (2d Cir. 2000) (ʺ§ 2423(b) criminalizes
crossing state lines with a criminal intentʺ).
The intended illicit sexual conduct charged here is (1) a sexual act5
with (2) a particular class of persons: those who have attained the age of 12, who
have not yet reached the age of 16, and who are at least four years younger than
the defendant. See 18 U.S.C. § 2243(a). Accordingly, the words of § 2423(b) make
clear that the statute, when charged with § 2243(a) as the underlying Chapter
109A offense, requires the government to prove that the defendant (a) traveled in
interstate commerce (b) for the purpose of engaging in (1) a sexual act with (2) a
person who is at least 12 years old but has not yet attained the age of 16 years old
(8th Cir. 2008) (noting that § 2423(b) ʺrequire[s] the government to demonstrate [the
defendant] believed [the victim] to be under the age of sixteenʺ (emphasis added)).
5 The term ʺsexual actʺ is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2246. The meaning of this term is
not at issue in this appeal.
13
and is at least four years younger than the defendant. The crux of the offense is
travel with the requisite intent.
By its terms, then, § 2423(b) criminalizes interstate travel for the
purpose of engaging in ʺillicit sexual conduct.ʺ What makes the otherwise
innocent conduct of crossing state lines to engage in a sexual act with another
person illicit is that the sexual conduct intended to be performed is with an
individual that federal law ‐‐ in this case § 2243(a) ‐‐ has deemed incapable of
consent: those under the age of 16. Accordingly, only when one travels
interstate intending to engage in a sexual act with someone ʺwho has not
attained the age of 16 years,ʺ see 18 U.S.C. § 2243(a), will that person be subject to
up to 30 yearsʹ imprisonment, see Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 622 n.3
(1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (noting the presumption that crimes ʺrequire[]
knowledge . . . of the facts that make the defendantʹs conduct illegalʺ).
This result accords with common sense. Because § 2423(b)
criminalizes mere travel with the requisite state of mind, and that state of mind
in this case is intent to sexually abuse a minor in violation of § 2243(a), the crime
is complete when one travels interstate with the intent of having sex with
someone under the age of 16; the crime does not require the actual sexual abuse
14
of a minor. An example illustrates the absurdity of reading out the knowledge
requirement:
Imagine that John, who is 25 years old, registers with a dating
website. He sees a profile for Mary, which states that she is 21 years old. John
and Mary arrange a meeting. One Saturday night, John travels from
Massachusetts to New Hampshire intending to have consensual sex with Mary.
If Mary was actually a 15‐year‐old girl posing as a 21‐year‐old woman, then,
under the governmentʹs reading of the statute, John would have violated
§ 2423(b) the moment he crossed over from Massachusetts to New Hampshire.
This would be so despite the fact that John traveled with the intent to have sex
with someone he believed to be 21 years old. Although his intent was to have
sex with an adult, because Mary was actually 15, under the governmentʹs theory
he would have committed a crime punishable by up to 30 yearsʹ imprisonment.
This is simply not how the statute was intended to operate.
Given this straightforward reading of the statute and common‐sense
understanding of its proscription, it is unsurprising that many of our sister
circuits have held that § 2423(b), when charged with § 2243(a) as the intended
Chapter 109A offense, includes as an essential element knowledge that the
15
intended victim is under 16 years old. See United States v. Schneider, 801 F.3d 186,
189 (3d Cir. 2015) (noting that § 2423(b) criminalizes ʺtravel[] . . . with the intent
to engage in sex with a minor between the ages of twelve and sixteenʺ); United
States v. Stokes,
726 F.3d 880, 895‐96 (7th Cir. 2013) (noting that ʺ§ 2423(b) . . .
criminalize[s] interstate and foreign travel undertaken for . . . the . . . purpose[]. . .
[of] engaging in a sexual act with a minor between the ages of 12 and 16 if the
perpetrator is at least four years older than the victimʺ); United States v. Langley,
549 F.3d 726, 729 (8th Cir. 2008) (noting that § 2423(b) ʺrequire[s] the government
to demonstrate [the defendant] believed [the victim] to be under the age of
sixteenʺ); United States v. Buttrick,
432 F.3d 373, 374 (1st Cir. 2005) (noting that
§ 2423(b) criminalizes ʺtraveling in interstate commerce with the purpose of
engaging in illicit sexual conduct with another person between twelve and
sixteen years of ageʺ).
Likewise, the conclusion that § 2423(b) includes as an element
knowledge that the intended victim is under the age of 16 is supported by the
federal pattern jury instructions. Sandʹs Modern Federal Jury Instructions
provides that in a prosecution under § 2423(b), the government must prove two
elements: (1) interstate travel and (2) intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct. 3
16
Modern Criminal Jury Instructions § 64‐21 (2019). It further provides that ʺʹillicit
sexual conductʹ means . . . e.g., a sexual act with a person who had reached the
age of twelve years old but had not reached the age of sixteen years old, and who
is at least four years younger than the defendant.ʺ Id. § 64‐23 (brackets omitted).
While ʺ[t]he government does not have to prove that the defendant actually
engaged in illicit sexual conduct, [it] must prove that he or she traveled with the
intent to engage in such conduct.ʺ
Id. The comment explains that
the government must allege and prove that the defendant
traveled with the intent to engage in sexual activity that, if it
had occurred, could have been charged as a federal offense if
it had occurred in a federal enclave. Thus, it will be
necessary to incorporate a general description of the conduct
element of the sexual abuse offense that it is alleged
defendant intended to commit. . . . Thus, . . . if the [intended]
victim was between twelve and sixteen, then the age of the
intended victim and the age difference between the victim and the
defendant should be included. The age of consent under federal
law is sixteen years old, so under federal law, sex with a person
between sixteen and eighteen is chargeable only if the defendant
engaged in coercive conduct, such as the use of force or threats
or administering some intoxicant to the victim. If the
intended victim is older than eighteen, it is not chargeable
under section 2423(b) . . . .
Id. § 64‐23 cmt. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). The comment thus clarifies,
consistent with the discussion that follows, see infra at 22‐24, that intended sex
with a 16‐ or 17‐year‐old is chargeable only if a Chapter 109A offense other than
§ 2243(a) is implicated.
Id.
17
We also note that the Department of Justice has itself acknowledged
that prosecutions under § 2423(b) require proof of the defendantʹs purpose,
including the age of the intended victim. In a 1998 letter, the Department of
Justice urged Congress to remove § 2423(f)(1)ʹs cross‐reference to Chapter 109A
in part because ʺa person who traveled in interstate commerce with the intention
of having consensual sexual activity with a 16‐year‐old minor would not violate
the statute,ʺ which had become ʺa barrier to prosecution of Section 2423(b) crimes
in cases where the person travels to meet a minor aged 16‐18.ʺ H. R. Rep. No.
105‐557, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. at 28 (letter of Ann M. Harkins, Acting Assistant
Attorney General).
In support of its position that knowledge that the intended victim is
under the age of 16 is not an element of § 2423(b), the government likens
§ 2423(b) to § 2243(a), the underlying Chapter 109A offense. The government
argues that § 2243(a) is a strict liability crime with respect to the defendantʹs
knowledge of the victimʹs age, relying on the language in § 2243(d)(1) that the
government need not prove that the defendant knew the age of the victim.
Hence, the government contends that it ʺis difficult to see how such knowledge
could be an element under [§] 2423(b).ʺ Governmentʹs Br. at 24. According to
18
the government, ʺsuch strict liability is not out of the ordinary for statutes
concerning the exploitation of children.ʺ Id. at 27 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
As an initial matter, we reject the governmentʹs contention that §
2243(a) imposes strict liability. Indeed, § 2243(c) provides that ʺit is a defense . . .
that the defendant reasonably believedʺ that the victim had attained the age of
16. 18 U.S.C. § 2243(c). Moreover, § 2423(b) and § 2243(a) differ in material
ways. While § 2423(b) criminalizes the actus reus of interstate travel combined
with the mens rea of a ʺpurpose ofʺ engaging in ʺillicit sexual conduct,ʺ § 2243(a)
criminalizes the actus reus of engaging in a sexual act with a minor in certain
federal enclaves and expressly provides that the government need not prove
knowledge of the victimʹs age. See 18 U.S.C. § 2243(d). In other words, § 2243(a)
is the prototypical crime that does not require knowledge of the victimʹs age
because ʺthe perpetrator confronts the underage victim personallyʺ and thus has
ʺa reasonable opportunity to observe the victim.ʺ United States v. Robinson, 702
F.3d 22, 32 (2d Cir. 2012) (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 1591) (internal quotation marks
omitted). By contrast, § 2423(b) is a crime of intent that criminalizes the
ʺotherwise innocent conductʺ of traveling interstate, see United States v. X‐
19
Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72 (1994), and so ʺa conviction is entirely
sustainable even if no underlying criminal sexual act ever occurs,ʺ
Vargas‐Cordon,
733 F.3d at 375 (internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing § 2423(a)).
Moreover, § 2423(b) contains no disclaimer of a mens rea requirement as to the
victimʹs age, and we generally presume that criminal statutes contain mens rea
requirements even where not explicitly provided in the statute.
Staples, 511 U.S.
at 605‐06.
The government also attempts to compare § 2423(b) with its
statutory neighbor, § 2423(a). Section 2423(a) criminalizes the knowing
transportation of an individual under the age of 18 with the intent that the
individual engage in prostitution, and it does not require scienter as to the
victimʹs age. 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a); see United States v. Griffith, 284 F.3d 338, 349‐51
(2d Cir. 2002). But § 2423(a) too is materially different from § 2423(b).
In Griffith, we held that the presumption in favor of a mens rea
requirement as to the victimʹs age does not apply to § 2423(a) because ʺa
defendant is already on notice that he is committing a crime when he transports
an individual of any age in interstate commerce for the purpose of prostitution.ʺ
Id. at 351. That the person is in fact under the age of 18 only aggravates the
20
already criminal act. See United States v. Taylor, 239 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 2001).
Under § 2423(b), by contrast, the defendantʹs travel with the purpose of having
sex with a minor under the age of 16 is the essence of the offense, without which
§ 2423(b) would criminalize purely innocent conduct not accompanied by any
criminal intent.
A better analogue to § 2423(b) as charged in this case is found in 18
U.S.C. § 2241(c). See United States v. Farley, 607 F.3d 1294, 1325 (11th Cir. 2010)
(noting that although these ʺtwo statutory provisions apply to different age
categories of victims,ʺ they ʺare materially identicalʺ). Section 2241(c)
criminalizes ʺcross[ing] a State line with intent to engage in a sexual act with a
person who has not attained the age of 12 years.ʺ As the Sixth Circuit has
explained, ʺ[t]he critical fact that renders the defendantʹs conduct criminal . . . is
. . . the intent with which the act was done,ʺ so while ʺit is no crime to travel
between states, . . . to do so with the evil intent described in [§] 2241(c) will
subject a person to the punishment prescribed by Congress.ʺ United States v.
DeCarlo,
434 F.3d 447, 457‐58 (6th Cir. 2006). Accordingly, like § 2423(b), criminal
liability under § 2241(c) ʺturns on the criminal intent with which [the defendant]
acted, not on the existence of an actual child.ʺ
Farley, 607 F.3d at 1325; see also
21
United States v. Cryar, 232 F.3d 1318, 1323 (10th Cir. 2000) (ʺIt is certainly not the
crossing alone but the crossing in order to engage in sexual activity with
underage persons that is criminal.ʺ); accord United States v. King,
604 F.3d 125,
139‐40 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Lukashov,
694 F.3d 1107, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012).
We thus reject the governmentʹs arguments that the crime of
conviction does not contain a requirement that the defendant know that the
intended victim was under the age of 16.
B. The Governmentʹs Alternative Argument
In the alternative, the government argues that to the extent § 2423(b)
requires knowledge of the intended victimʹs age, it need only prove that the
defendant traveled interstate for the purposes of engaging in a sexual act with
someone under the age of 18 (rather than 16), so long as that person is in fact
under the age of 16. Government Br. at 25 (asserting that ʺcriminal liability
attaches where the victim actually is under the age of 16, even if the defendant
mistakenly believed that the victim is 16 or 17ʺ); see also Oral Argument at 10:25‐
45 (ʺ[I]f there is an intent requirement as to age in [§] 2423, it is . . . activity with
someone under the age of 18.ʺ).
22
In support of this argument, the government points to § 2423(f)(1)ʹs
definition of ʺillicit sexual conduct.ʺ This subsection defines ʺillicit sexual
conductʺ as ʺa sexual act . . . with a person under 18 years of age that would be in
violation of chapter 109A if the sexual act occurredʺ in a federal enclave.
(emphasis added). The government contends that a requirement that the
defendant knows the victim to be between the ages of 12 and 16 would render
superfluous § 2423(f)(1)ʹs ʺunder 18 years of ageʺ language. This argument
misses the mark.
Chapter 109A contains multiple provisions, some of which relate to
sexual abuse of minors under the age of 16, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2243, 2241(c), and
some of which relate to rape and sexual abuse generally, without regard to the
age of the victim, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a)‐(b), 2242. Section 2423(f) thus
criminalizes interstate travel for the purpose of committing aggravated sexual
abuse under 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a)‐(b) or sexual abuse under § 2242 ‐‐ but only
where the victim is under the age of 18. The fact that the Chapter 109A offense
used here ‐‐ § 2243(a) ‐‐ limits the intended victims to those aged at least 12 and
no more than 15 does not, therefore, render this ʺunder 18ʺ limitation
23
superfluous. Indeed, this limitation is consistent with the general proscription of
§ 2423, which is entitled ʺTransportation of Minors.ʺ
While the ʺunder 18ʺ limitation may be superfluous in this case, it is
not superfluous in the overall statutory scheme. Where, as here, the government
charges that a defendant has violated § 2423(b), with § 2243(a) as the underlying
Chapter 109A offense, the ʺunder 18ʺ limitation will necessarily be met if the
intent to commit the acts described in § 2243(a) is proven, because intending to
have sex with someone between the ages of 12 and 16 necessarily includes the
intent to have sex with someone under the age of 18. But § 2423(b)ʹs age
limitation would not be met by the intent to commit other Chapter 109A
offenses. Section 2242(2)(B) is a Chapter 109A offense that prohibits ʺknowingly
. . . engag[ing] in a sexual act with another person if that other person is . . .
physically incapable of declining participation in . . . that sexual act.ʺ Thus,
where the government charges that a defendant has violated § 2423(b) with
§ 2242 as the underlying Chapter 109A offense, the ʺunder 18ʺ limitation will
serve an important function. In addition to proving that the defendant (a)
traveled interstate with (b) the intent to engage (1) in a sexual act (2) with
someone who is physically incapable of declining participation in that sexual act,
24
the government will also likely have to prove that the defendant (3) knew the
intended victim to be under the age of 18. This is so despite the fact that § 2242,
standing alone, contains no limitation based on age.
The governmentʹs proffered interpretation of § 2423(b) is also belied
by the uniform authority holding that the victimʹs actual age is not an element of
the crime. Indeed, there are many cases in which the government has
successfully prosecuted violations of § 2423(b) where the intended victim was in
fact an adult undercover detective posing as a minor under the age of 16.6 If the
government were correct that the victimʹs age is merely a fact that must be
proven, and not a component of the mens rea requirement, then § 2423(b) could
not be used to prosecute individuals who traveled interstate with the intent to
have sex with an individual they believed to be under the age of 16 if in fact the
6 See United States v. Hicks, 457 F.3d 838, 841 (8th Cir. 2006) (ʺ[A] defendant may be
convicted of violating § 2423(b) if he or she travels in interstate commerce with the
purpose of engaging in criminal sexual conduct with a person believed to be a minor
regardless of whether such person is actually a minor.ʺ); United States v. Tykarsky,
446
F.3d 458, 469, 471 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting that ʺ[t]he actual age of the intended victim is
not an element of the offense; criminal liability turns simply on the purpose for which
the defendant traveledʺ (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)); United States
v. Blazek,
431 F.3d 1104, 1108 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Root,
296 F.3d 1222, 1231‐32
(11th Cir. 2002); see generally United States v. Vang,
128 F.3d 1065, 1069 (7th Cir. 1997)
(discussing the history of § 2423(b) and its roots in the Mann Act); cf. United States v.
McGuire,
627 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir. 2010) (upholding the § 2423(b) conviction of a
defendant who ʺconfigured his travels [for religious retreats] to optimize his sexual
activityʺ).
25
purported minor turned out to be an adult law enforcement officer posing as a
minor.
* * *
In sum, it is not a violation of § 2423(b), when charged with 18
U.S.C. § 2243(a) as the intended Chapter 109A offense, to travel in interstate
commerce for the purpose of engaging in a consensual sexual act with a 16‐year‐
old. Rather, the government must prove that the defendant (a) traveled in
interstate commerce (b) for the purpose of (1) engaging in a sexual act (2) with
another person who is at least 12 years old but has not yet attained the age of 16
years old and is at least four years younger than the defendant. Intent, including
with respect to the age of the intended victim, is a critical element of the crime.
II. Plain Error
We next consider whether, in light of our conclusion that Murphyʹs
crime of conviction includes as an essential element knowledge that the intended
victim was under the age of 16, the district court committed plain error in
violation of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, in accepting
Murphyʹs plea. Murphy claims that the district court violated Rule 11 by failing
(1) to ensure that he understood the nature of the charge to which he pleaded
26
guilty, in violation of Rule 11(b)(1)(G), and (2) to determine that there was a
factual basis for the plea, in violation of Rule 11(b)(3).
A. Standard of Review
Because Murphy did not identify either of these claimed errors in
the district court, we review for plain error only. See United States v. Torrellas, 455
F.3d 96, 103 (2d Cir. 2006). To satisfy the plain error standard, Murphy must
demonstrate that ʺ(1) there was error, (2) the error was plain, . . . (3) the error
prejudicially affected his substantial rights, [and] (4) the error seriously affected
the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.ʺ United States
v. Lloyd,
901 F.3d 111, 119 (2d Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).
B. Applicable Law
Under Rule 11, the district court is required to ʺinform the defendant
of, and determine that the defendant understands, . . . the nature of each charge
to which the defendant is pleading.ʺ Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(G). ʺThis Rule . . .
is designed to assist the district judge in making the constitutionally required
determination that a defendantʹs guilty plea is truly voluntary.ʺ United States v.
Maher, 108 F.3d 1513, 1520 (2d Cir. 1997). ʺWhat is essential . . . is that the court
determine by some means that the defendant actually understands the nature of
27
the charges.ʺ Id. at 1521. ʺThe nature of the inquiry required by Rule 11 must
necessarily vary from case to case, and, therefore, . . . matters of reality, and not
mere ritual, should be controlling.ʺ McCarthy v. United States,
394 U.S. 459, 467
n.20 (1969) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).
In addition to ensuring that the defendant understands the nature of
the charges, ʺ[b]efore entering judgment on a guilty plea, the court must
determine that there is a factual basis for the plea.ʺ Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3). The
district court must ʺassure itself simply that the conduct to which the defendant
admits is in fact an offense under the statutory provision under which he is
pleading guilty.ʺ Lloyd, 901 F.3d at 123 (internal quotation marks omitted). This
requirement ʺis designed to protect a defendant who is in the position of
pleading voluntarily with an understanding of the nature of the charge but
without realizing that his conduct does not actually fall within the charge.ʺ
Maher, 108 F.3d at 1524 (internal quotation marks omitted). ʺ[T]his factual basis
must be sufficiently established by the record, rather than by assumptions of fact
made by the trial judge which may be open to dispute.ʺ Seiller v. United States,
544 F.2d 554, 564 (2d Cir. 1975). ʺA lack of a factual basis for a plea is a
substantial defect calling into question the validity of the plea. Such defects are
28
not technical, but are so fundamental as to cast serious doubt on the
voluntariness of the plea.ʺ United States v. Adams, 448 F.3d 492, 502 (2d Cir. 2006)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
C. Application
We analyze the two claimed errors independently for purposes of
the first two prongs of the plain error standard ‐‐ whether there was error, and
whether the error was plain. We conclude that the district court did so err with
respect to both of Murphyʹs claims. We then consider the third and fourth
prongs of the plain error standard ‐‐ whether the errors prejudicially affected
Murphyʹs substantial rights, and whether the errors seriously affected the
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. We conclude that
they did.
1. Understanding of the Charge
As we have held above, the charge of travel in interstate commerce
for the purpose of engaging in an illicit sexual act as charged here includes as an
essential element knowledge that the intended victim was under the age of 16.
Neither Murphyʹs indictment, nor his plea agreement, nor the discussions at his
plea hearing informed him of this essential element. Accordingly, the district
29
court erred in failing to ensure that Murphy understood the nature of the offense
to which he pleaded guilty.
Murphyʹs indictment alleges only that the ʺillicit sexual conductʺ he
traveled with the intent to perform was the ʺsexual abuse of a minor in violation
of Title 18, United States Code, Chapter 109A, Section 2243(a).ʺ Appʹx at 18.
Murphyʹs plea agreement includes an even more threadbare statement of the
elements, stating only that the ʺessential elementsʺ are that Murphy traveled
interstate ʺ[f]or the purpose of engaging in illicit sexual conduct with another
person.ʺ Id. at 85. At his plea hearing, Murphy was similarly informed only that
the government must prove ʺthat the purpose of [his] travel was to engage in
illicit sexual conduct with . . . another person.ʺ
Id. at 53. At no point was
Murphy told the meaning of ʺillicit sexual conductʺ or provided the statutory
text of § 2243(a). And it was never explained to Murphy that § 2243(c) provides
that it is a defense in a prosecution under §2243(a) that the defendant reasonably
believed the victim ʺhad attained the age of 16 years.ʺ 18 U.S.C. § 2243(c).
Indeed, the government, Murphy, defense counsel, and the district
court were all apparently of the view that the crime of conviction included no
requirement that the government prove that the defendant intended to engage in
30
a sexual act with an individual the defendant knew (or believed) to be under the
age of 16. This misunderstanding was not limited to the proceedings leading up
to the plea. It persisted through the sentencing phase, where the government
argued that § 2423(b) did not require scienter as to the victimʹs age.7 Thus, there
was error.
The error was plain. ʺAn error is plain if it is clear or obvious under
current law . . . [or] so egregious and obvious as to make the trial judge and
prosecutor derelict in permitting it, despite the defendantʹs failure to object.ʺ
United States v. Gore, 154 F.3d 34, 42‐43 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal citation and
quotation marks omitted). As explained above, the governmentʹs proffered
interpretation of the statute is inconsistent with its plain words. At least four
circuits had held, in no uncertain terms, that § 2423(b), when charged with §
2243(a) as the underlying illicit sexual conduct, ʺrequire[s] the government to
demonstrate [the defendant] believed [the victim] to be under the age of sixteen.ʺ
Langley, 549 F.3d at 729; see also
Schneider, 801 F.3d at 193;
Stokes, 726 F.3d at 895‐
7 At sentencing, the government stated that ʺwhether he believed her to be 16 or 14
is irrelevant to the offense he stands convicted of.ʺ Appʹx at 214; see also
id. at 223
(defense counsel arguing ʺit doesnʹt matter whether you know the age of the younger
person or notʺ);
id. at 229 (defense counsel arguing that the defendantʹs ʺmental stateʺ is
ʺnot . . . relevant to guilt or innocenceʺ).
31
96; Buttrick, 432 F.3d at 374. Although we have not had occasion to make this
explicit, ʺ[n]either the absence of circuit precedent nor the lack of consideration
of the issue by another court prevents the clearly erroneous application of
statutory law from being plain error.ʺ United States v. Evans,
155 F.3d 245, 252 (3d
Cir. 1998). The pattern federal jury instructions also confirm, in explicit terms,
that the age of the intended victim is part of the ʺconduct element of the sexual
abuse offenseʺ that the government must prove the ʺdefendant intended to
commit.ʺ 3 Sandʹs Modern Federal Criminal Jury Instructions § 64‐23 cmt (2019).
The government has pointed to no authority indicating otherwise.
We thus conclude that the district court plainly erred in violation of Rule
11(b)(1)(G).
2. Factual Basis for the Plea
The district court also plainly erred in failing to ensure that there
was an adequate factual basis for Murphyʹs plea. It is undisputed that ʺthe
victim told [Murphy] that she was 16,ʺ Appʹx at 58, and Murphy ʺtold the
detectives that he knew [the victim] to be 16,ʺ id. at 60. The government
stipulated in the plea agreement that each of those representations was made and
stated them on the record at Murphyʹs plea hearing. Nothing in the record on
appeal ‐‐ the indictment, the plea agreement, or the plea transcript ‐‐ indicates
32
that the victim told Murphy she was under the age of 16 or that Murphy believed
her to be under the age of 16. It was not a violation of § 2423(b), as charged here,
for Murphy to travel interstate for the purpose of engaging in a sexual act with a
16‐year‐old. Accordingly, the district court erred in accepting Murphyʹs plea.8
This error was plain. The government argues that there was an
arguable basis in fact for accepting Murphyʹs plea in part because Murphy stated
in his plea allocution that the victim ʺwas underageʺ and that he ʺshould have
known better.ʺ Appʹx at 54. These statements do not support the governmentʹs
8 There was some discussion at the sentencing about the Murphyʹs knowledge of
the victimʹs true age. Murphy argued below and maintains on appeal that he did not
know her true age. And it is undisputed that Murphy never admitted to knowing her
true age. The district court, however, found this assertion ʺdubious,ʺ Appʹx at 253,
because according to the presentence report, the victimʹs Facebook page showed the
victim to be 14 years old and thus the victimʹs true age ʺwas in the public domainʺ and
available to Murphy, id. at 248. These ʺfactsʺ were not in the record at the time of the
plea, and it is unclear whether we may consider them in evaluating whether there
existed a factual basis for the plea under Rule 11. Compare
Lloyd, 901 F.3d at 123 & n.9
(holding that there was a sufficient factual basis for the plea because ʺthe District Court
could . . . consider the presentence report in concluding that [the defendant]ʹs plea was
supported by the requisite factual basisʺ), with Irizarry v. United States,
508 F.2d 960, 967‐
68 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding that the facts used to determine whether there is a factual
basis for the plea ʺmust be put into the record at the time of the pleaʺ and that ʺ[p]ost
hoc explanations . . . are insufficientʺ), and
Maher, 108 F.3d at 1524‐25 (same).
In any event, in light of the plea agreement, the partiesʹ stipulation, and the
governmentʹs representations during the plea allocution, all of which confirmed that
Murphy consistently stated that he believed the victim was 16 years old, there was not
an adequate factual basis for the district court to accept Murphyʹs plea of guilty to
violating § 2423(b) with § 2243(a) charged as the intended Chapter 109A offense.
33
contention that Murphy pled guilty to facts consistent with the crime of traveling
interstate for the purpose of having sex with someone under the age of 16. They
may merely evidence Murphyʹs sense of moral culpability, which is
understandable given that Murphy lied about his age and had sex under cover of
night with someone he thought was a 16‐year‐old almost 10 years his junior.
None of this, however, changes the reality that the facts Murphy pleaded to are
not actually criminal under his crime of conviction. Thus, the district court
plainly erred in accepting the plea.
3. Prejudicial Effect on Substantial Rights
The errors prejudicially affected Murphyʹs substantial rights. There
is a reasonable probability that but for the errors, the defendant would not have
entered the plea. See Lloyd, 901 F.3d at 119. In addition to the state and federal
charges, the Air Force initiated separation proceedings against Murphy, seeking
a dishonorable discharge. Under the military code, any member of the military
who ʺcommits a sexual act upon a [person who has not yet attained the age of 16
years but] who has attained the age of 12 yearsʺ is guilty of sexual assault of a
child. See 10 U.S.C. § 920b(b). This statute provides as an affirmative defense
ʺthat the accused reasonably believed that the child had attained the age of 16
years.ʺ
Id. § 920b(d)(2). Murphy successfully invoked this mistake of age
34
defense and, thus, the military ʺdidnʹt have legal basis to dischargeʺ him. Appʹx
at 244; see also id. at 188‐90. As a result of his successful invocation of the defense,
Murphy was honorably discharged from the Air Force.
There is every reason to believe that if the district court had ensured
that Murphy understood the nature of the § 2423(b) charge, Murphy would have
argued ‐‐ and perhaps prevailed in doing so ‐‐ that he had not violated the
statute because he traveled interstate for the purpose of having sex with a 16‐
year‐old.
4. The Fairness, Integrity, and Public Reputation of Judicial
Proceedings
Finally, based on the seriousness, pervasiveness, and obviousness of
the legal and factual defects here, the fairness of the judicial proceedings was
seriously affected. Murphy did not understand the nature of the crime with
which he was charged and, even assuming the truth of the governmentʹs
allegations, Murphy did not admit having had the intent required for
commission of the crime. Yet he was convicted. This strikes at the heart of the
fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings. See Montgomery
v. United States, 853 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1988); Godwin v. United States,
687 F.2d 585,
35
589‐91 (2d Cir. 1982). Accordingly, we exercise our discretion to correct these
errors and vacate Murphyʹs conviction.
D. Request for Reassignment
Murphy requests that, in the event of a remand, the case be
reassigned to a different district judge. The request is denied. ʺRemanding a
case to a different judge is a serious request rarely made and rarely granted.ʺ
United States v. Singh, 877 F.3d 107, 122 (2d Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The error here was not just the district courtʹs; rather, both the
prosecutor and defense counsel operated under the same misunderstanding. We
are confident that the experienced and capable district court, with the benefit of
the legal clarity provided herein, will preside over the proceedings on remand
fairly and impartially. See
id.
CONCLUSION
Because we vacate Murphyʹs conviction, we do not consider his
arguments that the sentence imposed was procedurally unreasonable, that
defense counsel provided ineffective assistance at sentencing, or that the district
court abused its discretion in imposing a special assessment.
36
For the reasons set forth above, we VACATE Murphyʹs conviction
and REMAND to the district court for further proceedings.
37
