Chief Justice DURRANT, opinion of the Court:
¶ 1 Floyd Eugene Maestas was charged with aggravated murder, a violation of section
¶ 2 Because Mr. Maestas's numerous claims encompass various aspects of his convictions and sentence, we provide a broad overview of the facts and procedural history of this case and include additional facts as we address each issue in the analysis section. As an initial matter, we note that jurors in capital cases consider guilt and sentencing in separate proceedings. Accordingly, the facts and procedural history of this case are set forth in different sections: (I) the crime and investigation, (II) the guilt phase of the trial, and (III) the penalty phase of the trial.
¶ 3 On appeal, we construe "the record facts in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict."
¶ 4 On September 28, 2004, Mr. Maestas met William Irish and Rodney Renzo. While traveling together in Mr. Maestas's car, the three men agreed to rob a house. Mr. Maestas identified seventy-two-year-old Donna Bott's home as the one they would rob and entered the home, followed by Mr. Irish and Mr. Renzo. Upon entering, Mr. Maestas went into a back room, and Mr. Irish saw him on top of a woman who was struggling on a bed. Mr. Irish saw the woman's legs move and heard that her screams were muffled by a pillow covering her face. At that point, Mr. Irish heard Mr. Maestas threaten to stab the woman if she did not tell him where he could find some money. Later, Mr. Renzo saw Mr. Maestas punching and stomping on the woman "over and over" while she was on the floor. Mr. Renzo stated that, after Mr. Maestas stopped punching and stomping on the woman, she did not appear to be moving. At that point, the men decided to leave Ms. Bott's home.
¶ 5 After leaving Ms. Bott's home, the men drove to the home of eighty-seven-year-old Virginia Chamberlain. Mr. Irish remained outside while Mr. Maestas and Mr. Renzo entered the home. Upon entering, Mr. Maestas pulled Ms. Chamberlain's shirt over her head, scratching her arm and causing it to bleed. He then hit her and asked her for her purse. At that point, Ms. Chamberlain pushed her medical alert button and the two men left her home.
¶ 6 Sometime after the men left Ms. Chamberlain's home, Mr. Maestas's car ran out of gas on a freeway on-ramp. The men abandoned the car, and Mr. Irish and Mr. Renzo left Mr. Maestas. A police officer later found Mr. Maestas's abandoned car on the freeway and discovered Ms. Chamberlain's wallet inside.
¶ 7 Approximately three days after the robberies, a neighbor became concerned about Ms. Bott and called the police. The officer responding to the call found Ms. Bott's body on the floor next to her bed. She was naked from the waist down. Another detective found a ripped pair of women's underwear on the bed and collected usable fingerprints from Ms. Bott's home.
¶ 8 The medical examiner, Dr. Todd Grey, performed an autopsy on Ms. Bott and found internal and external injuries on her body and face. Specifically, Dr. Grey discovered numerous and extensive bruises and abrasions on Ms. Bott's body, including her chest area, shoulders, abdomen, face, knees, and hips. He also found a laceration through Ms.
¶ 9 As part of the investigation, police officers interviewed Mr. Maestas twice. Both times, he asserted that no one else ever drove his car and that he was driving it the night it was abandoned. When a homicide detective noticed cuts and scrapes on Mr. Maestas's arms, he had a lab technician collect blood samples from Mr. Maestas, Mr. Irish, and Mr. Renzo. The DNA from Ms. Bott's fingernail scrapings was then tested using a Y-chromosome short-tandem repeats (Y-STR) DNA analysis
¶ 10 Based on the foregoing evidence, the State charged Mr. Maestas with the aggravated murder of Ms. Bott and the aggravated burglary of Ms. Chamberlain's home.
¶ 11 Before trial on these charges, Mr. Maestas filed motions regarding the admissibility of the fingerprint and DNA evidence and a motion to strike the option of the death penalty pursuant to Atkins v. Virginia,
¶ 12 In his motion regarding the fingerprint evidence, Mr. Maestas claimed that such evidence is not inherently reliable and requested that the court hold a hearing to determine the reliability of fingerprint evidence prior to such evidence being admitted. In the alternative, he requested a cautionary jury instruction regarding fingerprint evidence. The court heard argument on this issue during a pretrial hearing, but ultimately denied his motion. In his motion regarding the DNA evidence, Mr. Maestas argued that the Y-STR testing method was novel and not inherently reliable. The court held a hearing on Mr. Maestas's motion and heard testimony from a forensic scientist employed by Sorenson Forensics. At the end of this testimony, the court took judicial notice of the inherent reliability of Y-STR DNA testing and allowed the DNA evidence to be introduced at trial.
¶ 14 After the pretrial motions, the court proceeded to empanel a jury. In the jury selection process, the court held an initial meeting with potential jurors where it distributed a questionnaire, asked preliminary questions about their qualifications for service, and admonished them regarding proper juror conduct.
¶ 15 During the trial, the State presented evidence that Mr. Maestas was guilty of aggravated murder and aggravated burglary. Specifically, the State introduced the testimony of Mr. Irish and Mr. Renzo, linking Mr. Maestas to the murder of Ms. Bott and the burglary of Ms. Chamberlain's home. The State also introduced the testimony of Mr. Maestas's ex-wife, who lived in Ms. Bott's neighborhood. In addition, the State presented DNA and fingerprint evidence and the medical examiner's testimony.
¶ 16 Regarding the DNA evidence, the forensic scientist explained the Y-STR DNA testing method and testified that, based on this analysis, both Mr. Irish and Mr. Renzo could be excluded as the source of the DNA from under Ms. Bott's fingernails. But he stated that neither Mr. Maestas nor his paternal relatives could be excluded. Regarding the fingerprint evidence, an expert testified that two fingerprints taken from inside Ms. Bott's home matched Mr. Maestas and one fingerprint matched Mr. Irish.
¶ 17 At trial, the medical examiner, Dr. Grey, testified concerning the cause and manner of Ms. Bott's death. After explaining his role as a medical examiner, he stated that he found injuries on Ms. Bott consistent with stabbing, strangulation, and blunt force trauma, but that he found no evidence of rape or trauma to the vaginal area. Dr. Grey was also asked whether the injuries inflicted on Ms. Bott were "purposely inflicted." In response, he testified that the stab wounds "appeared to be consistent with an intentional stab wound" and that the strangulation was "purposefully inflicted."
¶ 18 At the close of the State's case, Mr. Maestas moved for a directed verdict, arguing that the State had not proven that the murder was committed in an especially heinous manner or that the murder was committed during an attempt to commit forcible sexual abuse. In addition, Mr. Maestas claimed that the State had not proven that he had the requisite intent to support a conviction for aggravated murder. The court denied the motion.
¶ 19 Mr. Maestas then proceeded to present his defense, claiming that Mr. Renzo and Mr. Irish stole his car, committed the crimes, and framed him. For support, he presented the testimony of witnesses who claimed to have heard Mr. Irish use racial slurs and admit to stealing the car and framing Mr.
¶ 20 After Mr. Maestas presented his defense, the parties presented their closing arguments to the jury. During the State's closing arguments, the prosecution stated that "defendants usually testify." Further, it indicated that, if Mr. Maestas disputed the DNA evidence, he could have tested it himself.
¶ 21 On the last day of trial, the judge received two notes from the jury. The first note indicated that a juror had read a newspaper article about the trial. Although there is no record of whether the judge made counsel aware of the note, the judge did hold a meeting with the juror who allegedly read the newspaper article and determined that she could continue to serve on the jury. Defense counsel and the prosecution were both present at this meeting with the juror.
¶ 22 The second note from the jury asked, "Are we here until we've reached a verdict? Overnight? Until 5?" The judge responded with a note stating, "Not overnight. How long? We will all have a say if necessary." Although the judge met with counsel that day regarding a note from the jury, it is unclear from the record whether the judge informed the parties of this note or of his written response.
¶ 23 The jury convicted Mr. Maestas of the aggravated murder of Ms. Bott and the aggravated burglary of Ms. Chamberlain's home. Regarding the aggravated murder charge, the jury found four aggravating factors: (1) the murder was committed in the course of an aggravated burglary; (2) the murder was committed in the course of an aggravated robbery; (3) the murder was committed in the course of an attempt to commit forcible sexual abuse; and (4) the murder was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious, cruel, or exceptionally depraved manner.
¶ 24 After the jury reached its verdict, the State sought to prove that death was the appropriate penalty. The State therefore introduced aggravating circumstances relevant to the sentence, as well as victim impact evidence concerning the crime.
¶ 25 The State presented evidence concerning Mr. Maestas's history of criminal conduct, both as a youth and as an adult. For example, the State introduced a certified copy of Mr. Maestas's conviction in 1990 for burglary of the home of Phyllis Demetropolos. The State also presented Ms. Demetropolos to testify about the circumstances surrounding the burglary.
¶ 26 In addition, the State introduced the following evidence regarding specific crimes that Mr. Maestas committed as an adult, but for which he was not convicted: (a) the aggravated burglary of Alinda McClean's home and (b) the aggravated burglary of Leone Nelson's home.
¶ 27 In the 1970s, Mr. Maestas pled guilty to the third degree felony of theft by receiving stolen property, based on his possession of property stolen from Ms. McClean. The State sought to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had actually committed aggravated burglary, although he had not been convicted of that crime. Specifically, the State introduced Mr. Maestas's plea, parole revocation documents, and police testimony to show that he committed aggravated burglary. Because Ms. McClean had since passed away, the State also presented testimony about the incident from her granddaughter.
¶ 28 In the 1990s, Mr. Maestas pled guilty to the class A misdemeanor of theft for stealing Ms. Nelson's property. Again, although he had not been convicted of aggravated
¶ 29 The State also presented other aggravating evidence, including pictures of Ms. Bott's bedroom after her assault and photographs of her body. Further, the State introduced the testimony of Mr. Maestas's ex-wife, who testified that Mr. Maestas had not taken responsibility for the crime. The State also introduced the testimony of an agent with Adult Probation and Parole, and the testimony of a prison caseworker who had supervised Mr. Maestas.
¶ 30 Further, the State introduced testimony from Ms. Bott's family about the impact of her murder. Specifically, Ms. Bott's granddaughter read from her personal blog about how the murder had affected her.
¶ 31 After the State presented its case that death was the appropriate penalty, Mr. Maestas's counsel began presenting evidence of mitigating circumstances. But the day after defense counsel began its presentation, Mr. Maestas personally sent a letter to the court objecting to his counsel's plan to present a witness to testify that she had observed Mr. Maestas having sex with his sister when he was a child. He claimed this testimony was a lie. In response, defense counsel stated that they intended to proceed with presenting all the mitigating evidence they had compiled, despite Mr. Maestas's objections. When the court inquired if defense counsel would be willing to refrain from presenting the specific evidence to which Mr. Maestas objected, but still present the remaining evidence, defense counsel refused and said "it's not negotiable."
¶ 32 The trial court then ordered defense counsel to advise Mr. Maestas of the importance of presenting mitigating evidence and to consult with him regarding what evidence, if any, he wanted to present. Defense counsel discussed the mitigating evidence in "broad terms" with Mr. Maestas and described "in pretty specific terms ... what each individual witness would say." After this discussion, Mr. Maestas informed the court that he wished to waive the right to present mitigating evidence. He acknowledged that his decision was knowing and voluntary. He had initially requested that he be allowed to represent himself during the remainder of the penalty phase, but later agreed to retain his defense counsel so that they could make the closing argument on his behalf.
¶ 33 The trial court concluded that Mr. Maestas's decision to waive the right to present mitigating evidence was knowingly and voluntarily made and ordered defense counsel not to present further mitigating evidence. Mr. Maestas then briefly spoke to the jury and said that he did not commit the crime. No other mitigating evidence was presented.
¶ 34 During jury deliberations in the penalty phase, the judge received a note from the jury. The note asked whether the parole board could "overrule" a jury's sentence of life without parole. The judge responded with a note stating that the jury was "directed to the jury instructions as a whole and specifically Instruction No. 12." Instruction No. 12 stated that "[i]f a person is sentenced to life in prison without parole, this means that he will never be eligible for parole and will spend the remainder of his life in prison." The judge informed counsel of this note and his response before the jury's sentence was read in open court, but after the jury had reached its verdict. Defense counsel did not object at the time, but did object five days later, before the court formally imposed
¶ 35 After the jury reached its verdict, Mr. Maestas filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that two jurors, jurors 8 and 18, engaged in misconduct. Specifically, he alleged that jurors 8 and 18 provided false information on their court questionnaires and interjected prejudicial extraneous information into the jury's deliberative process. The trial court denied this motion.
¶ 36 Our standard of review varies with the different types of challenges that Mr. Maestas raises. "In reviewing a jury verdict, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict."
¶ 37 We also note that we "will review errors raised and briefed on appeal in death penalty cases, even though no proper objection was made at trial, but will reverse a conviction based upon such errors only if they meet the manifest and prejudicial error standard."
¶ 38 On appeal, Mr. Maestas raises several arguments concerning his convictions and his sentence under Utah's death penalty scheme. We have organized his claims into six categories: (I) jury issues, (II) evidence and arguments in the guilt phase of the trial, (III) challenges regarding the death penalty exemption hearing, (IV) evidence and arguments in the penalty phase, (V) constitutional challenges to Utah's death penalty scheme, and (VI) claims of cumulative error.
¶ 39 Mr. Maestas raises five challenges concerning the selection of the jury, communications with the jury, and the jury's deliberations. Specifically, he alleges that he is entitled to a new trial because (A) during voir dire, the court improperly granted and improperly denied for-cause challenges to prospective jurors; (B) the court erred when it failed to admonish the jurors on some occasions; (C) the court erred when it conducted proceedings and communicated with the jury in the absence of Mr. Maestas and his counsel; (D) the court improperly responded to the jury's question regarding life without parole; and (E) jurors committed
¶ 40 Mr. Maestas argues that the trial court committed reversible error in granting the State's for-cause challenge to prospective juror 50 and in denying his for-cause challenges to prospective jurors 16, 20, and 27. He contends that, as a result, he was forced to use three of his four peremptory challenges to remove those jurors.
¶ 41 As an initial matter, when reviewing the propriety of a denial or grant of a challenge for cause, "we look to the entire voir dire exchange with the challenged juror."
¶ 42 Regarding jury selection in death penalty cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that "a juror may not be challenged for cause based on his views about capital punishment unless those views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath."
¶ 43 Thus, once statements are made during voir dire that "facially raise a question of [a prospective juror's] partiality or prejudice, an abuse of discretion occurs unless the challenged juror is removed by the court or unless the court or counsel investigates further and finds the inference rebutted."
¶ 44 First, Mr. Maestas asserts that, because the court based its decision on prospective juror 50's "hesitation or conscientious scruples against [imposing the] death penalty," it erred in removing that prospective juror for cause. We disagree. The
¶ 45 Second, Mr. Maestas argues that the court erred in failing to remove prospective juror 16 after the prospective juror indicated that "he would consider evidence that is mitigation under Utah's statute as aggravation." According to Mr. Maestas, the prospective juror's single statement that he would "probably" consider an actor's drug use as an aggravating circumstance demonstrated that he would not act impartially. We disagree. Prospective juror 16's statement was made without context or a discussion of the relevant statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Indeed, prospective juror 16 was never told that an actor's drug use during the commission of a crime was statutorily considered a mitigating circumstance.
¶ 46 Third, Mr. Maestas argues that the court erred in failing to remove prospective juror 27 after she stated that death was the appropriate penalty in cases of intentional murder. He asserts that her statement demonstrates that she would not act impartially. We disagree. Although prospective juror 27's statement may raise a question of partiality, the statement appears to be merely a light impression. It was made after defense counsel rephrased the prospective juror's original statement that death may be appropriate for "cold-blooded murder." Further, the challenged remark was rebutted by prospective juror 27's responses that she did not believe that the death penalty was the only appropriate sentence for aggravated murder, that she did not have strong feelings about the death penalty, and that she would follow the law and the trial court's instructions regarding when to impose the death penalty. Because it appears that the challenged statement was merely a light impression that was sufficiently rebutted, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that prospective juror 27 could act impartially.
¶ 47 Fourth, Mr. Maestas argues that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to remove prospective juror 20 after he made repeated statements about his preference for a sentence of death and said that he would look less favorably on Mr. Maestas because of his race. We agree that, based on the entire voir dire exchange with prospective juror 20, his views would likely "prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath."
¶ 49 Having determined that the court abused its discretion only in denying only the for-cause challenge to prospective juror 20, we next examine whether that error prejudiced Mr. Maestas. Following the denial of his for-cause challenge, Mr. Maestas used a peremptory challenge to remove prospective juror 20. Where a defendant uses a peremptory challenge to remove a juror who should have been removed for cause, we require that the defendant demonstrate prejudice.
¶ 50 In this case, Mr. Maestas does not make such an assertion. Instead, he claims that, under State v. Saunders, we can find prejudice if we "take into account on a cumulative basis all erroneous rulings with respect to rulings on voir dire and for-cause challenges."
¶ 51 Mr. Maestas claims that the trial court failed to admonish the jury nine times over the course of the two-week trial: before one break on the first day of the guilt phase, four breaks on the second day, two breaks on the fifth day, and a break on both the first and second days of the penalty phase. He claims that he should be afforded a new trial because of these failures to admonish the jury. Because this claim was not preserved, Mr. Maestas must show plain error, meaning
¶ 52 Mr. Maestas contends that we should presume harm and grant a new trial in every case where the court fails to admonish a jury at any recess. We decline to adopt such a rule. Automatically granting a new trial for any instance where the court fails to admonish the jury before a recess fails to take into account whether, and to what extent, the jury has been properly admonished by the court in other instances. If the admonition "is not given but the harm that it was designed to forestall never occurs, it would be pointless to order a new trial simply to have the [admonition] given."
¶ 53 We do not, however, foreclose the possibility that a presumption of harm may be warranted based on the particular circumstances of a case.
¶ 54 Because this case does not warrant a presumption of harm, Mr. Maestas must show that he was actually harmed by the court's failures to admonish the jury. He contends that he must have been harmed because the court's failure resulted in a juror being exposed to publicity about the case.
¶ 55 Mr. Maestas asserts that he is entitled to a new trial because his constitutional rights to be present and to counsel were violated when he and his counsel were absent from certain court proceedings and communications with the jury.
¶ 57 In addition to the right to be present, the Sixth Amendment affords the defendant the right to assistance of counsel.
¶ 58 With these standards in mind, we address Mr. Maestas's claim that he was denied the right to be present and the right
¶ 59 Mr. Maestas contends that his right to be present and right to counsel were violated when he and his counsel were absent from certain court proceedings over the course of the guilt and penalty phases of the trial. Specifically, he claims that his rights were violated when (a) he and his counsel were absent from an initial meeting with prospective jurors, (b) he was absent from the beginning of a preliminary motion hearing, and (c) he and his counsel were absent during the judge's unrecorded conversation with and dismissal of the jury on one day in the penalty phase. Because these claims were not preserved, we consider them only for plain error, which means that an error must be both harmful and obvious.
¶ 60 Prior to holding the initial meeting with prospective jurors, the judge and the parties discussed the scheduled meeting on multiple occasions, but the judge stated that it was not necessary for the parties to attend. As a result, neither Mr. Maestas nor his counsel appeared at the initial jury meeting. At that meeting, the judge administered an oath and asked the prospective jurors a few preliminary questions regarding their general qualifications for jury service.
¶ 61 Mr. Maestas asserts that we should grant him a new trial because holding the meeting in the absence of his counsel constituted a structural error that does not require a showing of harm, or, in the alternative, holding the meeting in his absence and the absence of his counsel was a harmful error. We disagree.
¶ 62 First, because the initial meeting was not a "critical stage" of the proceeding, Mr. Maestas has not demonstrated that holding the meeting in the absence of his counsel constituted a structural error. The focus of the meeting was on basic ministerial matters.
¶ 63 Second, Mr. Maestas has failed to demonstrate that it was a harmful error to
¶ 64 Mr. Maestas also asserts that he was harmed because his counsel's absence prevented them from being able to answer the prospective jurors' questions or follow up on concerns about the jurors' qualifications for service. But his counsel was provided an opportunity to question jurors during voir dire to ensure that the jurors were qualified. Because the judge deferred the prospective jurors' questions and did not remove any jurors, the prospective juror pool remained the same and Mr. Maestas was not placed in a different position as a result of the meeting. Accordingly, Mr. Maestas has not demonstrated that he was harmed by his or his counsel's absence from this initial meeting. We therefore decline to grant a new trial on this basis.
¶ 65 Prior to trial, the court held a pretrial motion hearing to review the parties' various motions. Before Mr. Maestas came into the courtroom, counsel made their appearances and discussed the outstanding evidentiary motions to be heard that day, including issues related to the motion regarding fingerprint evidence. At that point, the prosecution noted that Mr. Maestas was not present and defense counsel requested that Mr. Maestas be brought into the courtroom. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Maestas entered the courtroom and the court explained what had occurred in his absence. Neither Mr. Maestas nor his counsel raised any objections to his absence before or after he came into the courtroom. On appeal, however, Mr. Maestas contends that his absence from the beginning of this hearing violated his right to be present. We disagree.
¶ 66 Mr. Maestas has not demonstrated that the court committed an obvious and harmful error. The beginning of this pretrial motion hearing was not a "stage of the criminal proceeding that [was] critical to its outcome."
¶ 67 On the third day of the penalty phase, Mr. Maestas asked to proceed as his own counsel. In response, the judge and counsel for both parties discussed this request outside the presence of the jury. The court then took a brief recess before ruling on Mr. Maestas's request. When the judge returned, he stated as follows:
Neither Mr. Maestas nor his counsel objected to the judge's interaction with the jury.
¶ 68 On appeal, however, Mr. Maestas contends that the judge's interaction violated his right to be present and right to counsel because the interaction took place in his absence and the absence of his counsel. He argues that prejudice should be presumed when a judge engages in ex parte communication with the jury. But we decline to adopt an automatic presumption of prejudice, and, because Mr. Maestas has not shown that the judge's unrecorded communication with the jury resulted in harm, we reject Mr. Maestas's claim that he should be granted a new trial on this basis.
¶ 69 In declining to automatically presume prejudice where a judge communicates ex parte with the jury, we note that we have held that a presumption of prejudice may arise as a result of some ex parte contact with the jury.
¶ 70 We note that it may be appropriate to presume prejudice in some instances, such as where the judge discusses substantive matters with jurors.
¶ 71 Without a presumption of prejudice, Mr. Maestas must show harm in order to prevail on his claim. He has not done so. While he contends that the judge's off-the-record dismissal of the jury could have caused the jury to feel "a greater warmth and affinity toward the judge," it seems unlikely that jurors would feel any differently toward the judge than if he had dismissed them with counsel and Mr. Maestas present. Further, as the judge was not an adversary to Mr. Maestas in the proceedings, it would not have been problematic if jurors felt appreciative toward the judge after being dismissed. In addition, while Mr. Maestas contends that it is possible that the judge said something to the jurors to indicate that Mr. Maestas was causing a delay, he proffers no evidence to support this conjecture. Because he has not demonstrated harm, we decline to grant Mr. Maestas a new penalty phase on this basis.
¶ 72 Mr. Maestas argues that he was denied his right to be present and his right to counsel when the judge responded to three notes sent by the jury without first informing counsel. Specifically, he challenges the judge's response to (a) two notes the jury sent during the guilt phase of the trial and (b) one note sent during the penalty phase. We reject these claims.
¶ 73 As an initial matter, we set forth the contents of the two notes the jury sent to the judge during the guilt phase, along with the judge's responses. The first note (Juror Tainting Note) was written on the sixth day of the guilt phase and stated, "Last week I made a comment about hoping to not miss all 3 weeks my kids are off track. [Juror 8] (on the back row) leaned over and said, `I may have read an article in the paper that said trial would last only two weeks.'" Although it is not clear from the record that the judge informed counsel that he had received this note, he did hold an in-chambers meeting with defense counsel, the prosecution, and juror 8.
¶ 74 During that meeting, the judge told juror 8, "We have some concerns about whether or not anything in the press or anything in the paper has come to your attention, that you have read about the trial." Juror 8 responded that she had read a headline about the trial and saw a picture in the paper, but that she was not looking for any information and did not read the accompanying story. Defense counsel declined to ask any additional questions. The prosecution, however, inquired into whether juror 8 would follow the court's instructions despite any information she gleaned about the case from the headline. Based on juror 8's assurances that she had not read any articles and that she would follow the court's instructions, the judge, the prosecution, and defense counsel agreed that juror 8 would not be removed.
¶ 75 The jury sent the judge a second note (Scheduling Note) during or before deliberations on the last day of the guilt phase. The note asked, "Are we here until we've reached a verdict? Overnight? Until 5?" Although it is unclear whether the judge informed the parties of this note, the record shows that the judge wrote a note to the jury responding, "Not overnight. How long? We will all have a say if necessary."
¶ 76 Mr. Maestas contends that the judge committed reversible error in responding to the two jury notes without disclosing the exact content of the notes on the record. Because he did not preserve these arguments
¶ 77 We note that, in this case, counsel was present during the judge's response to the allegations raised in the Juror Tainting Note. Although the judge and counsel met with juror 8 regarding whether she had read any newspaper articles about the case, Mr. Maestas asserts that his right to be present and his right to counsel were violated because there is no record that the judge disclosed the contents of the note to him or his counsel. We are not persuaded that this was a reversible error.
¶ 78 As an initial matter, "[a]n in-chambers conference concerning the dismissal of a juror ... is not a stage of the trial when the absence of the defendant would frustrate the fairness of the trial so long as counsel for the defendant is present."
¶ 79 In this case, even if the judge did not show the Juror Tainting Note to Mr. Maestas or his counsel, the error was harmless for three reasons. First, Mr. Maestas has not alleged that juror 8 was partial or biased because of any newspaper article that she read during the course of the trial.
¶ 80 Because defense counsel was present at the in-chambers conference to address the allegations in the Juror Tainting Note and
¶ 81 Mr. Maestas asserts that, when the judge responded to the Scheduling Note, he reinstructed the jury outside of his presence and the presence of his counsel. We reject this characterization of the judge's response.
¶ 82 A defendant has the constitutional right to be present at "any stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical to its outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure."
¶ 83 In Valentine v. United States, the judge delivered a note to the jury without the parties' knowledge.
¶ 84 As in Valentine and McMurry, the judge's response to the Scheduling Note in this case addressed only scheduling matters. Specifically, the jury asked the judge whether they were to deliberate "until [they] reached a verdict? Overnight? Until 5?" And the judge's response was that everyone would "have a say if necessary" on when proceedings would end for the day. This response was not an "instruction" at all. Indeed, the response did not charge the jury to take any action, to return a verdict by a certain time, or to consider any substantive issue. Rather, the judge's response simply informed the jury that, if they did not reach a verdict by the end of the day, they would "have a say" in determining when to conclude their deliberations. Because the response involved only scheduling issues, it was not a critical stage of the proceeding. Accordingly, we do not presume harm.
¶ 85 Mr. Maestas must therefore demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for his absence and the absence of his counsel, there would have been a more favorable outcome.
¶ 86 Because it was not a critical stage of the proceeding, and because the response did not harm Mr. Maestas, neither his right to be present nor his right to counsel were violated by the judge's responses to the two notes from the jury during the guilt phase.
¶ 87 After the jury began deliberations regarding Mr. Maestas's sentence, it had a question about life without parole (LWOP). It sent a note (LWOP Note) asking, "If we make the decision of life without parole, is that a guarantee? Can the parole board over-rule our decision?" Without informing the parties of the note, the judge responded, "You are directed to the jury instructions as a whole. And specifically [I]nstruction No. 12." Instruction No. 12 provided: "If a person is sentenced to life in prison without parole, this means that he will never be
¶ 88 After the jury had reached a verdict, but before the verdict was announced in open court, the judge called the prosecution and defense counsel into his chambers and informed them of the LWOP Note and his response. Neither the prosecution nor defense counsel made any objections at that time. But before the court formally imposed Mr. Maestas's sentence, defense counsel objected to the judge's response on the grounds that the judge, by responding to the LWOP Note without informing the parties, had violated Mr. Maestas's right to be present, right to counsel, and right to due process. The judge ruled that his response to the LWOP Note was proper, that Mr. Maestas's motion was untimely, and that the parties had agreed to the appropriateness of the judge's response.
¶ 89 On appeal, Mr. Maestas renews his claims that the judge's response to the LWOP Note violated his right to be present, right to counsel, and right to due process. He argues that jury re-instruction is a critical stage of the proceeding and therefore contends that it was structural error for the judge to respond to the note without notifying the parties of the note's contents. He asserts that he should be granted a new penalty phase on this basis. We disagree.
¶ 90 While some courts have found that jury re-instruction qualifies as a critical stage of the proceeding,
¶ 91 In this case, by directing the jury to the instructions as a whole, and particularly to Instruction No. 12, the judge merely reiterated the prior instructions upon which the parties had agreed. Thus, to prevail on his claim, Mr. Maestas must show that he was harmed by the judge's response to the LWOP Note.
¶ 92 Mr. Maestas contends that he was harmed because the jury's question shows that it voted to impose death based on an incorrect understanding of the sentencing options, and defense counsel would have requested additional clarification if they had been informed of the note. We are not persuaded by this argument for three reasons. First, as discussed below in Part I.D., we conclude that the judge's response was appropriate and that Mr. Maestas was not harmed by the response because Instruction No. 12 actually misstated the law to his benefit. Second, while juror affidavits indicate that discussion about the meaning of life
¶ 93 Because the judge's response to the LWOP Note was merely a reiteration of jury instructions previously agreed upon by the parties, and because Mr. Maestas has not shown that he was harmed by this response, we conclude that Mr. Maestas's constitutional rights were not violated. Accordingly, we reject the assertion that Mr. Maestas is entitled to a new penalty phase on this basis.
¶ 94 But we note that, even though the judge did not commit reversible error in responding to the jury's three notes, it is advisable for judges to inform counsel and disclose the contents of any jury notes on the record before providing a response. When a judge answers a jury's note without consulting counsel, the judge exposes the verdict to challenges that could easily be avoided. To protect a verdict and to respect a defendant's right to a fair trial, judges should inform counsel of each note they receive from the jury.
¶ 95 Mr. Maestas argues that the trial court committed a reversible error because it failed to ensure that the jury understood the meaning of a sentence of life without parole. He asserts that the trial court violated his rights under the Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment by its response to the LWOP Note from the jury. Specifically, he argues that the court should have responded that the jury's sentencing decision could not be overruled by the Board of Pardons, instead of directing the jury to Instruction No. 12. Because Mr. Maestas raises constitutional questions, we review the court's conclusions for correctness.
¶ 96 The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the principles of due process require the sentencing jury in a capital case to be informed that the defendant is ineligible for parole when "the defendant's future dangerousness is at issue, and state law prohibits the defendant's release on parole."
¶ 97 In Simmons v. South Carolina, the prosecution argued at trial that the defendant's "future dangerousness was a factor for the jury to consider when fixing the appropriate punishment."
¶ 98 In finding a violation of the principles of due process, the U.S. Supreme Court highlighted the point that the defense had conclusively established that the defendant "was in fact ineligible for parole under [state] law."
¶ 99 Unlike the instructions given in Simmons, in the case currently before us, the trial court's instructions regarding life without parole were sufficient to satisfy Mr. Maestas's constitutional rights for two reasons. First, even if we assume that Mr. Maestas's future dangerousness was at issue,
¶ 100 Second, the trial court was not obliged to tell the jury that the Board of Pardons and Parole could never overrule the jury's sentence of life without parole because such a statement is inaccurate under Utah law. The U.S. Supreme Court's language in Simmons does not require a jury to be instructed in a manner that affirmatively conceals the legal possibility of a defendant's parole.
¶ 101 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the principles of due process and the Eighth Amendment were not violated when the judge responded to the LWOP Note by directing the jury to Instruction No. 12. Accordingly, we reject Mr. Maestas's claim of error.
¶ 102 Mr. Maestas asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial based on two instances of alleged juror misconduct. He asserts that (1) two jurors failed to honestly answer material questions during voir dire and (2) the jury was exposed to and considered extraneous prejudicial information during its deliberations.
¶ 103 A trial court may grant a new trial "in the interest of justice if there is any error or impropriety which had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party."
¶ 104 When determining whether a juror's answers during voir dire warrant a new trial, we have adopted the test set forth in McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood.
¶ 105 Under the first prong of the McDonough test, a juror's objective honesty is assessed by evaluating whether the answer was true or false at the time it was given.
¶ 106 First, juror 8 stated in voir dire that, based on her attendance in a criminology class, she understood "life without parole" to mean that an individual must serve at least twenty years in prison, but "there is still an option of parole ... after that time." Nonetheless, when asked whether she would follow the judge's instructions and statement about the meaning of a sentence of life without parole, even if those instructions conflicted with her studies, juror 8 stated that she "would follow the judge." Mr. Maestas argues that juror 8's response was a dishonest answer requiring a new trial. We disagree.
¶ 107 Juror 8's answer that she could set aside her understanding of the meaning of "life without parole" and follow the judge's instructions was not objectively dishonest because it called for a prediction of a future event. Moreover, Mr. Maestas has not proffered any evidence that juror 8 intended to, or actually did, disregard the judge's instructions in voting for the death penalty. Indeed, the State proffered an affidavit from juror 8 in which she stated that, after the judge instructed the jury to follow Instruction No. 12, "the jurors agreed to follow [his] instruction, and the discussion [about the meaning of life without parole] moved on to a different topic." For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that juror 8's answer during voir dire was not objectively dishonest and therefore fails under the first McDonough prong.
¶ 108 Second, juror 18 was asked in her court questionnaire whether anyone in her family had ever been "charged with a crime" and, if so, "what crime and what was the outcome?" The questionnaire gave one line of writing space to identify the "crime" and two lines to describe the "outcome." Juror 18 answered that her son had been arrested and charged with "passing a check that didn't belong to him" and was on probation. In responding to a separate question, juror 18 indicated that her son had also been charged with "busting in [her] door." Further, juror 18 stated that she thought that courts are too "soft" on criminals but that she did not have strong or negative feelings toward the legal system.
¶ 109 After sentencing, juror interviews indicated that, during deliberations, juror 18 had told the other jurors that her son had "a substantial juvenile history with over 65 felonies before he reached the age of 18 and that nothing had happened to him as far as meaningful punishment by the court." Based on this information, Mr. Maestas argues that juror 18 provided dishonest answers during voir dire when she failed to document the extent of her son's juvenile history and answered that she did not have strong feelings about the criminal justice system.
¶ 110 Juror 18's responses regarding her feelings toward the criminal justice system do not qualify as objectively dishonest. As an initial matter, juror 18's statement during deliberations is likely barred from our consideration by rule 606(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
¶ 111 In addition, juror 18's failure to disclose the extent of her son's juvenile history was not objectively dishonest because the questionnaire's inquiries were ambiguous. Specifically, the questionnaire asked whether a family member was "ever charged with a crime?" and provided only one line of writing space for the answer. (Emphasis added.) A reasonable interpretation is that a lengthy list of criminal charges was not required. Juror 18's response therefore cannot be said to have been objectively dishonest in light of the ambiguous nature of the question.
¶ 112 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Mr. Maestas has not satisfied the first prong of the McDonough test because neither juror's answers were objectively dishonest.
¶ 113 Next, we analyze whether the jury was exposed to and considered extraneous prejudicial information during its deliberations. We recognize that "[t]he requirement that a jury's verdict must be based upon the evidence developed at the trial goes to the fundamental integrity of all that is embraced in the constitutional concept of trial by jury."
¶ 114 But rule 606(b) has an exception that allows a juror to testify on the question of "whether ... extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention."
¶ 115 First, Mr. Maestas contends that juror 8's assertion that individuals sentenced to life without parole could nevertheless be paroled constitutes extraneous prejudicial information. And he claims that he was prejudiced by this statement. We disagree. The question of whether jury discussions of parole eligibility constitute extraneous information is an issue of first impression in our state. Other jurisdictions, however, have examined this issue and reached various results.
¶ 116 Juror 8's comment was not prejudicial to Mr. Maestas because the evidence shows that the jury was already confused about the meaning of life without parole before juror 8 made her comment. And after juror 8's statement about her understanding of life without parole, the jury submitted the LWOP Note to the judge. When the jury was instructed to reread Instruction No. 12, it is uncontested that "the question was answered, the jurors agreed to follow the instruction, and the discussion moved on to a different topic." Accordingly, there is no evidence that juror 8's statement about her understanding of life without parole influenced the jury's decision or prejudiced Mr. Maestas.
¶ 117 Second, Mr. Maestas contends that juror 18's statements during jury deliberations regarding her son's juvenile history and her feelings about his punishment constitute extraneous prejudicial information. We disagree. Neither a juror's personal experiences nor her feelings or beliefs constitute extraneous prejudicial information.
¶ 118 In sum, we reject each of Mr. Maestas's five challenges concerning the selection of the jury, the judge's communications with the jury, and the jury's deliberations. Accordingly, we decline to grant him a new trial on these bases.
¶ 119 Mr. Maestas next raises four arguments regarding the guilt phase of his trial. Specifically, he asserts that he is entitled to a new guilt phase because (A) the court erred in admitting expert testimony about the Y-STR DNA analysis and fingerprint testing, (B) the court erred in allowing certain portions of the medical examiner's testimony, (C) the prosecution made three improper comments that tainted the fairness of the proceeding, and (D) there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions for the aggravated murder of Ms. Bott and the aggravated burglary of Ms. Chamberlain's home. We reject each of these claims.
¶ 120 Mr. Maestas asserts that the trial court erred when it admitted scientific and expert testimony regarding the Y-STR DNA results and the fingerprint testing because such evidence is unreliable and unduly prejudicial. We disagree.
¶ 121 The admission of scientific evidence and expert testimony is governed by rules 702 and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
¶ 122 We review a trial court's decision to admit expert testimony for an abuse of discretion and find error only if no reasonable person would take the view the trial court adopted.
¶ 123 Before addressing Mr. Maestas's claims concerning the admission of the Y-STR
¶ 124 At the evidentiary hearing and at trial, Dr. Wrigley testified that the Y-STR DNA analysis uses the same process and technology to extract, amplify, and identify DNA that is generally employed with polymerase chain reaction (PCR) STR DNA tests. But instead of focusing on all the chromosomes in a person's DNA, as in PCR STR testing, the Y-STR analysis focuses specifically on the Y-chromosome, found only in males and inherited through the male's paternal lineage. Dr. Wrigley testified that because all males in the same paternal lineage have the same forensic markers, called alleles, on their Y-chromosomes, the Y-STR analysis indicates whether an individual and all of his paternal relatives can be excluded as possible contributors as the source of a DNA sample. He stated that, although the analysis may not be able to affirmatively identify an individual as the source of the DNA, Y-STR analysis is "a very strong tool for excluding an individual." Dr. Wrigley testified that a Y-STR analysis is especially helpful when the DNA sample is mixed with female DNA or when there are multiple male suspects. And he explained that the State selected the Y-STR test in this case because the State assumed that Ms. Bott fought her attacker and that they were looking for a male suspect.
¶ 125 Dr. Wrigley also explained the Y-STR analysis process. He stated that, during the short tandem repeat process, analysts look for alleles on the Y-chromosome. The Y-STR analysis generates a graphic representation of the presence of an allele and the amount of relative fluorescence units (RFUs) that the allele generates. Dr. Wrigley testified that Sorenson Forensics's practice is to find a viable marker for any allele with an RFU of 75 or above, and to compare that allele with the unknown source sample (in this case, the DNA found under Ms. Bott's fingernails — "fingernail scrapings") to determine if the two samples contain the same allele. When the same allele is present in both samples, the individual cannot be excluded as a possible contributor of the DNA. Dr. Wrigley explained that the statistical significance of such a match is determined by comparing the allele to a database of 3,561 sample Y-chromosomes.
¶ 126 Regarding the Y-STR analysis in this case, Dr. Wrigley stated that the DNA from Ms. Bott's fingernail scrapings was not consistent with DNA from Mr. Irish or Mr. Renzo. Thus, both men could be excluded as the source of the DNA. But Dr. Wrigley testified that the DNA from Ms. Bott's fingernail scrapings contained an allele that was consistent with, or that "matched," the DNA from Mr. Maestas. Dr. Wrigley clarified to the jury that the term "match" meant that neither Mr. Maestas nor his paternal relatives could be excluded as the source of the DNA. Then, for statistical purposes, Dr. Wrigley outlined the "random match probability" that someone within the sample database of 3,561 DNA profiles would have the same allele as the DNA from Ms. Bott's fingernail scrapings. He explained that the probability that a profile from the database would have the same allele as the DNA from Ms. Bott's fingernail scrapings was 1 in 746 for the DNA taken from her left hand and 1 in 1,203 for the DNA taken from her right hand.
¶ 127 After the evidentiary hearing, the court took judicial notice of the reliability of a Y-STR analysis and determined that the analysis was reliably applied to the facts in this case because Sorenson Forensics was qualified to conduct the testing. Accordingly, the court concluded that the DNA test met the threshold requirements of rule 702(b) and could therefore be presented to the jury.
¶ 129 On appeal, Mr. Maestas argues that the court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence and expert testimony about the Y-STR DNA testing because (a) the Y-STR analysis did not satisfy the requirements of rule 702(b), and (b) the evidence was more prejudicial than probative, in violation of rule 403. We disagree.
¶ 130 Mr. Maestas claims that the trial court erred in concluding that the Y-STR DNA expert testimony satisfied the requirements of rule 702(b). First, he argues that Y-STR analysis is not generally accepted in the scientific community and that the court therefore erred when it took judicial notice of the inherent reliability of the Y-STR analysis. Second, he asserts that Sorenson Forensics was not qualified to perform the testing and that its minimum threshold of 75 RFUs was inadequate. Accordingly, he claims that the court erred when it concluded that the analysis was reliably applied in this case. We reject these arguments.
¶ 131 First, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion when it took judicial notice of the inherent reliability of the Y-STR DNA analysis. A "court may take judicial notice of the inherent reliability of the scientific principles and techniques at issue if they have been generally accepted by the relevant scientific community."
¶ 132 In this jurisdiction, we have previously stated that analyses serving to exclude particular individuals can be inherently reliable.
¶ 133 In addition, the trial court emphasized that STR DNA testing has been accepted by the relevant scientific community and other jurisdictions have treated Y-STR DNA testing as "merely a type of STR DNA testing."
¶ 134 Second, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Sorenson Forensics was qualified to perform the analysis and that its minimum threshold of 75 RFUs was adequate. As an initial matter, we note that, in determining whether laboratories are qualified to perform certain testing, courts examine whether the laboratory's testing methods are consistent with those that are scientifically acceptable.
¶ 135 Regarding the minimum threshold of 75 RFUs, other courts have admitted DNA analyses that have used RFU thresholds at or below 75.
¶ 137 Mr. Maestas claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted the Y-STR DNA expert testimony because the testimony was significantly more prejudicial than probative, in violation of rule 403. Specifically, he asserts that, because the prosecution stated that the DNA "matched" Mr. Maestas, the jury was unduly impressed with the evidence. We disagree.
¶ 138 Rule 403 provides that "[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of ... misleading the jury."
¶ 139 In this case, we conclude that the Y-STR DNA evidence was not unduly prejudicial because it was likely that the jury was able to fairly weigh the evidence. As mentioned above, Dr. Wrigley repeatedly explained that the Y-STR analysis was a tool for excluding individuals as the source of the DNA from Ms. Bott's fingernail scrapings. And he consistently stated that the Y-STR DNA test results showed that Mr. Irish and Mr. Renzo could be excluded as the source of the DNA, but that Mr. Maestas and his paternal relatives could not. Although the prosecution and Dr. Wrigley occasionally spoke in terms of the DNA "matching" Mr. Maestas, Dr. Wrigley clarified that a "match" meant that the DNA profiles had the same allele, such that the individual could not be excluded. Because Dr. Wrigley consistently presented the analysis as a tool for exclusion, and clarified that "match" meant only that the individual could not be excluded, the jury would have been able to fairly weigh his testimony. Thus, the Y-STR DNA evidence was not unfairly prejudicial and did not violate rule 403.
¶ 140 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the Y-STR DNA expert testimony satisfied the requirements of rule 702(b) and rule 403.
¶ 141 Mr. Maestas next argues that fingerprint identification evidence is not reliable, and accordingly, that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted the expert testimony about such evidence. In the alternative, he asserts that even if fingerprint evidence is deemed to be reliable, the trial court erred when it failed to give the jury a separate cautionary instruction regarding the reliability of that evidence. We are not persuaded by either of Mr. Maestas's arguments.
¶ 142 As we previously noted, an expert may testify about scientific methods
¶ 143 Nonetheless, Mr. Maestas argues that fingerprint identification evidence is not generally accepted in the scientific community. Accordingly, in his motion to the trial court and in his brief on appeal, Mr. Maestas cites two articles criticizing fingerprint identification evidence.
¶ 144 Further, at the pretrial hearing to consider Mr. Maestas's motion regarding the admissibility of the fingerprint evidence, defense counsel did not argue that fingerprint identification evidence is inherently unreliable or that fingerprint identification methods had been unreliably applied in Mr. Maestas's case. Instead, defense counsel conceded that the Utah Court of Appeals' opinion in State v. Quintana,
¶ 145 In response, the State said that it "was prepared to put on a witness today to satisfy both prongs of the objections in this case." But after defense counsel reported that they would "relent on [the] request for a... hearing" regarding the reliability of fingerprint evidence, the State asked that its witness be excused. It also asked that the record reflect that "should Quintana have been found to not be applicable to this case, [it] would have put on testimony that fingerprint evidence is unique, that it is inherently reliable, separate and apart from the fact that there is an appellate decision on that point."
¶ 146 Defense counsel did not object or request that the State put forth evidence establishing the reliability of the fingerprint evidence. Nor did defense counsel assert that they were prepared to offer expert testimony to address the questions of whether fingerprint identification evidence is inherently reliable or whether the methods had been reliably applied to the facts of the case. Indeed, defense counsel did not request further discussion on the admissibility of the fingerprint identification evidence at the pretrial hearing, nor did they request an additional hearing on the matter. Further, defense counsel did not present expert testimony, either at the hearing or at trial, asserting either that fingerprint evidence is generally unreliable or that fingerprint identification methods were not properly applied in this case. Morever, defense counsel did not move to strike the expert testimony presented by the State at trial.
¶ 147 Under these circumstances, we cannot say that no reasonable person would have taken the position adopted by the trial court.
¶ 148 Having determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the fingerprint identification evidence, we are not persuaded that a separate cautionary jury instruction about the reliability of fingerprint evidence was warranted. We have previously stated that "fingerprint evidence is not entitled to special treatment" and therefore does not require a special cautionary instruction.
¶ 149 Here, Mr. Maestas requested that the jury be told that "there is no ... basis to believe that fingerprint examiners are infallible" and that "there are no national standards to ensure the proficiency or skill of fingerprint examiners." The trial court denied the request, stating that the information in Mr. Maestas's proposed instruction had been incorporated in the general expert witness instruction. We agree. The expert instruction explained that the jury should "look at [the expert's] qualifications, the reasoning process the experts used, and the overall credibility of their testimony." The instruction further stated that "[e]xperts can testify about facts, and they can give their opinions in their area of expertise," but the jury is free to accept or reject the expert's opinion. This instruction was sufficient to guide the jury in its evaluation of the fingerprint expert's testimony. Thus, Mr. Maestas's cautionary instruction was unnecessary.
¶ 150 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err in admitting the fingerprint evidence or in failing to give a cautionary instruction about the reliability of such evidence.
¶ 151 Next, Mr. Maestas argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted the medical examiner's testimony that Ms. Bott's injuries were "purposefully inflicted" and that they would have been painful. Before addressing his claims, we provide a brief overview of the medical examiner's testimony.
¶ 152 During trial, Dr. Grey explained that, in his role as a medical examiner, he determines whether an individual's death was natural, a suicide, an accident, or a homicide. He testified that the medical determination of homicide is different than the criminal determination because, under the medical definition, a homicide means that "the death resulted from the intentional action of another person."
¶ 153 When the prosecution asked whether the injuries appeared to be "purposefully inflicted," Dr. Grey stated that they did. He explained that, based on the nature, extent, and types of injuries Ms. Bott suffered, her death would not be consistent with someone "tripping and falling." Instead, Dr. Grey concluded that Ms. Bott's death was a homicide, meaning her death was caused by an intentional act of another person. The prosecution also asked Dr. Grey whether the injuries Ms. Bott experienced would have been painful. In response, Dr. Grey explained that he believed that incurring the injuries would have been "a very painful, uncomfortable process" as long as the victim was conscious. On cross-examination, Dr. Grey clarified that he was not a pain specialist and that his speculation that the injuries would be painful was not based on his professional medical opinion.
¶ 154 On appeal, Mr. Maestas asserts that the trial court committed a prejudicial error in admitting certain portions of the medical examiner's testimony. First, he asserts that the medical examiner's testimony that the injuries were "purposefully inflicted" violated rule 704 of the Utah Rules of Evidence because it improperly addressed Mr. Maestas's mental state. Second, he contends that the
¶ 155 First, we conclude that the medical examiner's testimony did not violate rule 704. Rule 704 states that an expert witness may not "state an opinion about whether the defendant did or did not have a mental state or condition that constitutes an element of the crime charged ... [because] these matters are for the trier of fact alone."
¶ 156 Second, even if the medical examiner's testimony was not helpful to the jury, it was not prejudicial. Rule 702(a) permits expert testimony if it "will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue."
¶ 157 In this case, it may not have been helpful for Dr. Grey to state that the type of injuries Ms. Bott experienced could cause pain in a conscious victim. But we cannot say that the testimony was unduly prejudicial. The idea that a stab wound, strangulation, and blunt force trauma could cause pain was well within the knowledge of the average individual. Having been provided the details about the manner and number of injuries to Ms. Bott's body, the jury could have readily inferred on its own that Ms. Bott's injuries would have been painful to a conscious victim. Coupled with Dr. Grey's testimony that his prediction of pain was not based on his medical expertise, it is unlikely that the jury would have given Dr. Grey's statement significant weight. We therefore conclude that any error was not prejudicial and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the medical examiner's testimony.
¶ 158 Next, Mr. Maestas claims that he is entitled to a new guilt phase because the
¶ 159 As an initial matter, we note that the prosecution's remarks constitute misconduct meriting reversal if they "call to the attention of the jurors matters they would not be justified in considering in determining their verdict and ... the error is substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable likelihood that in its absence, there would have been a more favorable result for the defendant."
¶ 160 With this standard in mind, we address Mr. Maestas's claims that the prosecution committed misconduct (1) by stating in its closing arguments that "defendants usually testify;" (2) by asserting that Mr. Maestas could test the DNA if he disagreed with the Y-STR analysis results; and (3) by implying, without introducing supporting evidence, that defense witnesses were not credible.
¶ 161 Mr. Maestas claims that, during rebuttal in closing arguments, the prosecution made a prejudicial comment that violated his constitutional right against self-incrimination. Specifically, he points to the following statement by the prosecution:
Mr. Maestas did not object to the closing argument, but on appeal he asserts that the prosecution's statement that "defendants usually testify" constitutes an obvious and prejudicial error. We disagree.
¶ 162 It is well settled that the prosecution's direct reference to a defendant's decision not to testify "is always a violation of the defendant's [F]ifth [A]mendment right against self-incrimination."
¶ 163 In this case, we conclude that any error was harmless for the following reasons. As an initial matter, we note that it is unclear whether the prosecution was referring to Mr. Maestas or to his codefendants, Mr. Irish and Mr. Renzo, when the prosecution stated that "defendants usually testify." For example, the State highlights six instances in the prosecution's closing arguments where Mr. Irish and Mr. Renzo were referred to as "defendants." And the prosecution's statement came in rebuttal after defense counsel questioned the motives and credibility of Mr. Irish's and Mr. Renzo's testimonies. Thus, in context, this statement was ambiguous and not likely of such a character that the jury would necessarily construe it to be a comment on Mr. Maestas's failure to testify.
¶ 164 Further, even if the prosecution's comment did refer to Mr. Maestas, the jury was explicitly instructed that it should not consider a defendant's choice not to testify. Specifically, the jury was instructed as follows:
With this strong instruction, the jury was aware that it should not consider Mr. Maestas's decision not to testify as evidence of his guilt.
¶ 165 Finally, the prosecution's statement was not harmful in light of the wealth of evidence implicating Mr. Maestas in Ms. Bott's murder. The jury heard witness testimony that Mr. Maestas punched and stomped on Ms. Bott's body and expert testimony about DNA and fingerprint evidence that linked Mr. Maestas to the scene. Because the jury was given a strong curative instruction and there was overwhelming evidence of Mr. Maestas's guilt, even assuming the prosecution's statement referred to Mr. Maestas, we conclude that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶ 166 Mr. Maestas asserts that the prosecution engaged in misconduct when it indicated that he could conduct his own DNA test if he disagreed with the Y-STR DNA results.
¶ 167 In the criminal justice system, a defendant is presumed innocent and the prosecution must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶ 168 In this case, the prosecution's remark was prompted by Mr. Maestas's claims that the State had specifically chosen an inferior and unreliable DNA analysis. Indeed, during closing argument, defense counsel stated, "Why didn't [the State] do the better DNA testing? Why didn't we have a number like one in 400 quintillion? [W]hat the State gives you in asking you to ... convict [Mr.] Maestas of aggravated murder is one in 746." In response, the prosecution explained that the DNA is available for any "better DNA testing" that Mr. Maestas wished to conduct. Because the prosecution's remark simply countered the defendant's arguments that the State purposely selected an unreliable DNA test, it did not shift the burden of proof to Mr. Maestas and we therefore conclude that the remark was not improper.
¶ 169 Mr. Maestas claims that the prosecution engaged in misconduct while questioning two defense witnesses on crossexamination. Specifically, he claims that the prosecution "insinuated that additional evidence existed that undermined [two of the defense] witness[es]' testimon[ies], but did not present [any supporting] evidence to the jury."
¶ 170 Although counsel is afforded "considerable latitude in making arguments to the jury,"
¶ 171 But even if the prosecution fails to limit its questioning to the facts that
¶ 172 In this case, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the trial court committed an obvious error when it did not intervene during the prosecution's cross-examination of these two defense witnesses. Indeed, there is no indication the prosecution lacked the ability to prove the facts suggested by its questions. Because the questions Mr. Maestas challenges dealt with the secondary issue of the witnesses' credibility, and because the defense did not object to these questions at the time, it is understandable that the prosecution did not present evidence regarding the facts to which it alluded.
¶ 173 But even if the prosecution's questions were improper, such that the court committed an obvious error in failing to intervene, Mr. Maestas has not demonstrated that the comments were prejudicial. Because there is strong proof of Mr. Maestas's guilt, we do not presume that the remarks were prejudicial. Thus, Mr. Maestas must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that he would have received a more favorable outcome if the prosecution had not asked the challenged questions.
¶ 174 He argues that, if the prosecution had not insinuated that the defense witnesses were untrustworthy, the jury may have believed the defense witnesses' testimony indicating that the codefendants stole Mr. Maestas's car and framed him for the crimes that they committed, perhaps motivated to act against Mr. Maestas because of his race. But there are several reasons why the jury would not have found this testimony plausible even without any insinuation that the defense witnesses were untrustworthy. The story conflicts with the codefendants' testimony, the expert testimony about DNA and fingerprint evidence that linked Mr. Maestas to the scene of the crime, and Mr. Maestas's statements to the police investigator that he had been driving his car on the night that the crime occurred. Accordingly, Mr. Maestas has failed to demonstrate that he would have received a more favorable outcome if the prosecution had not asked the questions he challenges.
¶ 175 For the foregoing reasons, we reject Mr. Maestas's arguments that the prosecution's comments entitle him to a new guilt phase.
¶ 176 Finally, Mr. Maestas argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his convictions for the aggravated murder of Ms. Bott and the aggravated burglary of Ms. Chamberlain's home.
¶ 177 "[I]n considering an insufficiency-of-evidence claim, we review the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict."
¶ 178 First, there is sufficient evidence that Mr. Maestas had the requisite mental state to support his conviction for aggravated murder. Under the aggravated murder statute, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that "the actor intentionally or knowingly cause[d] the death of another" in connection with any of several statutory aggravating factors.
¶ 179 We have recognized that a defendant's mental state can be proven by circumstantial evidence,
¶ 180 In this case, the evidence is sufficient to indicate that Mr. Maestas intentionally or knowingly caused Ms. Bott's death. The State presented the testimony of Mr. Irish and Mr. Renzo, who stated that they had observed Mr. Maestas punch and stomp on Ms. Bott's body. In addition, the jury heard the testimony of the medical examiner, who described Ms. Bott's numerous injuries — including a stab wound to her face; extensive bruises and abrasions on her chest, shoulders, abdomen, face, knees, and hips; injuries consistent with strangulation; several broken ribs; tearing around her heart; and a tear in her aorta. Given the witness testimony, the nature and multiple types of injuries, and the age of the victim, the jury could have reasonably inferred that Mr. Maestas's "conscious objective" was to cause Ms. Bott's death or that he was "reasonably certain" that his conduct would cause her death. Accordingly, we reject his claim that there was insufficient evidence to show that he acted with the requisite intent or knowledge.
¶ 181 Second, there is sufficient evidence that Mr. Maestas committed the aggravated burglary of Ms. Chamberlain's home. Under the aggravated burglary statute, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the actor committed burglary in connection with one of several aggravating factors.
¶ 182 In this case, Ms. Chamberlain testified that she saw someone enter her home through the window who then pulled her shirt over her head. She testified that, as the person pulled off her shirt, he scratched her arm causing it to "bleed[] really badly." And Mr. Renzo testified that he saw Mr. Maestas hit Ms. Chamberlain two times.
¶ 183 Although he acknowledges this evidence, Mr. Maestas asserts that the court cannot rely on the testimony of Mr. Irish or Mr. Renzo because their statements were self-serving and conflicted with Ms. Chamberlain's testimony. But "[c]ontradictory testimony alone is not sufficient to disturb a jury verdict."
¶ 184 Here, we cannot say that Mr. Irish or Mr. Renzo's testimony was physically impossible or inherently improbable. Indeed, a good deal of Mr. Irish's and Mr. Renzo's testimony was consistent with Ms. Chamberlain's. For example, just as Ms. Chamberlain testified, Mr. Renzo testified that Mr. Maestas pulled Ms. Chamberlain's shirt over her head and demanded her purse. In addition, the jury could have found Mr. Renzo and Mr. Irish credible because their version of the night's events was corroborated by the DNA and fingerprint evidence found at Ms. Bott's home and by the fact that Ms. Chamberlain's wallet was found inside Mr. Maestas's car. In light of these facts, Mr. Maestas has not established that the evidence was so inconclusive or inherently improbable that the jury must have entertained a reasonable doubt that he committed the aggravated burglary of Ms. Chamberlain's home. Accordingly, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence to support Mr. Maestas's convictions for the aggravated murder of Ms. Bott and the aggravated burglary of Ms. Chamberlain's home.
¶ 185 In sum, we reject each of Mr. Maestas's four challenges concerning the evidence and arguments presented during the guilt phase of his trial. We therefore decline to grant him a new guilt phase on these bases.
¶ 186 Prior to the guilt phase of the trial, Mr. Maestas filed a motion pursuant to Atkins v. Virginia
¶ 187 As an initial matter, we note that, in Atkins, the U.S. Supreme Court held that executing mentally retarded individuals constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment "in the light of ... evolving standards of decency."
¶ 188 In accordance with the holding in Atkins, the Utah Legislature enacted the Exemption Statute,
¶ 189 The Exemption Statute presumes that a defendant is not mentally retarded and places the burden on the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she meets both prongs of the statutory definition.
¶ 190 Pursuant to Mr. Maestas's request, the trial court held a hearing (Atkins hearing) to determine whether he met the definition of "mentally retarded" under the Exemption Statute. Over the course of three days, the court heard testimony regarding Mr. Maestas's intellectual and adaptive functioning, including testimony from two mental health experts for the defense and one mental health expert for the prosecution. The court concluded that, although Mr. Maestas had demonstrated SDAF in the area of impulse control, he had failed to demonstrate either SDAF in the area of reasoning or SSGIF. The court also concluded that Mr. Maestas had not shown that his intellectual deficits resulted in his adaptive functioning deficits. Thus, the court determined that he did not qualify as mentally retarded under the Exemption Statute.
¶ 192 Mr. Maestas argues that the trial court erred in concluding that he had failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that he met the statutory definition of "mentally retarded." As discussed above, the Exemption Statute requires defendants to prove that they have both "significant subaverage general intellectual functioning" and "significant deficiencies in adaptive functioning" in the area of reasoning or impulse control.
¶ 193 Because we must consider the trial court's interpretation of the Exemption Statute, as well as its application to the facts of Mr. Maestas's case, we are faced with a mixed question of fact and law. "[W]ith regard to many mixed questions of fact and law, it is either not possible or not wise for an appellate court to define strictly how a legal concept is to be applied to each new set of facts."
¶ 195 As an initial matter, we note that, although the Exemption Statute requires defendants to demonstrate "significant subaverage general intellectual functioning" by a preponderance of the evidence,
¶ 196 Both the language and the context of the Exemption Statute make it clear that, to be considered mentally retarded, a defendant must have substantial intellectual impairments such that his or her intellectual functioning is significantly below average. Indeed, the Exemption Statute explicitly states that "a defendant is `mentally retarded' if the defendant has significant subaverage general intellectual functioning that results in and exists concurrently with significant deficiencies in adaptive functioning that exist primarily in the areas of reasoning or impulse control."
¶ 197 Indeed, the purpose of the Exemption Statute is to set Utah's standard for determining whether defendants are mentally impaired to such a degree that it would be unconstitutional to apply the death penalty to them. The U.S. Supreme Court has noted that "[n]ot all people who claim to be mentally retarded [will be] so impaired as to fall within the range of mentally retarded offenders"
¶ 198 In determining whether defendants have demonstrated SSGIF, scores on intelligence quotient (IQ) tests can be one helpful measure.
¶ 199 Indeed, in Atkins, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that states'"statutory definitions of mental retardation ... generally conform to the clinical definitions" of the American Psychiatric Association (APA) and the American Association on Mental Retardation, which is now called the American Association of Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities.
¶ 200 But we note that IQ scores are just one factor to be considered in determining if the defendant has SSGIF. The testing instrument or other circumstances may result in an IQ score that does not truly reflect a defendant's intellectual functioning.
¶ 201 Having considered the showing required to establish "significant general intellectual functioning" under the Exemption Statute,
¶ 202 In determining that Mr. Maestas had not adequately demonstrated SSGIF, the court considered the reports from mental health experts, the testimony of those experts and other witnesses, and the exhibits entered into evidence. Much of the testimony and evidence focused on Mr. Maestas's IQ and background. In regard to Mr. Maestas's IQ, the court heard extensive testimony about the validity of IQ tests in general, the validity of the various IQ tests that had been administered to Mr. Maestas over time, and other research and theories about IQ tests, including how factors like the standard error of measurement
¶ 203 In reaching this conclusion, the trial court found that Mr. Maestas's score of seventy-seven on an IQ test in 2005 "constitute[d] meaningful evidence suggesting that [Mr. Maestas's] general intellectual functioning is not significantly [s]ubaverage." Indeed, the court accepted the prosecution's expert testimony that, if the test had been administered and scored properly, it would have resulted in an IQ score of at least eighty-five.
¶ 204 Noting that "[t]he experts ... agreed that scores from IQ tests are not determinative of a person's intellectual functioning," the court went on to consider other factors to determine whether the severity of Mr. Maestas's intellectual impairments rose to the level of SSGIF. One such factor was that Mr. Maestas had struggled academically and was enrolled in special education classes in school. But the court found that, without more, evidence of his academic difficulties was insufficient to establish the requisite intellectual deficits.
¶ 205 Because there is adequate evidence to support the trial court's factual findings and inferences, we conclude that it did not err in ruling that Mr. Maestas failed to adequately demonstrate that his general intellectual functioning was significantly subaverage.
¶ 206 Mr. Maestas challenges the trial court's interpretation of the Exemption Statute's requirement that a defendant show that his "significant subaverage general intellectual functioning ... results in" his "significant deficits in adaptive functioning."
¶ 207 Mr. Maestas argues that the Exemption Statute is unconstitutional because (1) it violates the Sixth Amendment by allowing the trial court, rather than a jury, to determine whether a defendant is mentally retarded, and (2) it violates the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause by requiring the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he is mentally retarded, rather than placing the burden on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is not mentally retarded.
¶ 208 Mr. Maestas offers two main arguments in support of his claims. First, he asserts that the holding in Atkins makes the absence of mental retardation an element necessary to impose death and that the State therefore has a duty to prove the absence of
¶ 209 "To establish that the error should have been obvious to the trial court, [a defendant] must show that the law governing the error was clear at the time the alleged error was made."
¶ 210 First, we note that neither we nor the U.S. Supreme Court have directly considered whether the Sixth Amendment requires a jury to determine whether a defendant is mentally retarded for purposes of death penalty eligibility. We have also not considered whether the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause require the State to bear the burden of proving that a defendant is not mentally retarded before the death penalty can be imposed. Thus, there is no governing law in this jurisdiction that would support Mr. Maestas's claim that the trial court committed an obvious error in applying the provisions of the Exemption Statute that he challenges. Further, in other jurisdictions, some courts have ruled that it does not violate a defendant's constitutional rights for a judge to determine whether a defendant is mentally retarded for purposes of death penalty eligibility.
¶ 211 Second, Mr. Maestas's arguments that the absence of mental retardation is analogous to an element of a crime or an aggravating factor do not comport with the law governing these issues. The absence of mental retardation is unlike an element of a crime, such as intent, that must be proven to the jury before a defendant can be convicted. Indeed, mental retardation has nothing to do with a defendant's conviction; it relates solely to the sentence that the defendant is eligible to receive.
¶ 212 Further, in Atkins, the Court did not define mental retardation as an element that must be proven to a jury; instead, Atkins analogized mental retardation to an affirmative defense.
¶ 213 Indeed, in Atkins, the Court recognized that "mentally retarded persons who meet the law's requirements for criminal responsibility should be tried and punished when they commit crimes."
¶ 214 Similarly, the absence of mental retardation is not an aggravating circumstance in capital sentencing. Indeed, in Atkins, the Court stated that, although "[t]hose mentally retarded persons who meet the law's requirements for criminal responsibility should be tried and punished when they commit crimes,"
¶ 215 Indeed, when a defendant is convicted of a crime that provides for the death penalty as a possible sentence, "an increase in a defendant's sentence is not predicated on the outcome of the mental retardation determination; only a decrease."
¶ 216 Third, we note that practical considerations and procedural protections support our conclusion that it was not an obvious error for the trial court to take the role of determining whether Mr. Maestas was mentally retarded and to have Mr. Maestas bear the burden of proof on this matter. The court is well equipped by experience and training to evaluate and weigh complex evidence and expert testimony about a defendant's mental functioning. And although "[t]he difficulties a mentally retarded person may have in testifying, communicating, and expressing remorse may negatively influence the jury,"
¶ 217 Further, Utah's death penalty scheme has other procedural safeguards to ensure that there is a high degree of confidence that the death penalty is appropriate. Indeed, even though the court determined whether Mr. Maestas qualified as mentally retarded under the Exemption Statute, the State was required to prove to the jury that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt and that death was the appropriate penalty.
¶ 218 In sum, because Mr. Maestas failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he had the requisite intellectual deficits, we uphold the trial court's conclusion that he did not qualify as mentally retarded under the Exemption Statute. And, because we uphold the court's finding that Mr. Maestas lacked significant subaverage general intellectual functioning, it is unnecessary for us to consider whether the Exemption Statute requires that a defendant's intellectual deficits have a causal relationship to his deficits in adaptive functioning. Finally, we conclude that the trial court did not commit an obvious error in applying the provisions of the Exemption Statute that allow the court to determine whether a defendant is mentally retarded and require the defendant to bear the burden of proof regarding mental retardation.
¶ 219 The Utah Code provides that "[w]hen a defendant has pled guilty to or been found guilty of a capital felony, there shall be further proceedings before the court or jury on the issue of sentence."
¶ 220 Mr. Maestas challenges certain evidence presented in the penalty phase of his trial. Specifically, he asserts that he is entitled to a new penalty phase because the trial court erred (A) in granting his request to waive the right to present mitigating evidence, (B) in denying his motion to present the jury with evidence regarding the execution process and prison conditions, and (C) in allowing the State to present certain evidence as aggravating circumstances. We reject each of these claims.
¶ 221 Mr. Maestas argues that he is entitled to a new penalty phase because the trial court erred in granting his request to waive the right to present mitigating evidence. Before addressing his claim, we set forth the circumstances of Mr. Maestas's waiver.
¶ 222 Following the State's presentation of aggravating circumstances, the defense began to present evidence of mitigating circumstances. Its first witness was a police officer who testified about the poverty and difficult living conditions in Mr. Maestas's childhood hometown. The officer also testified about responding to a homicide at the Maestas home involving the stabbing of Mr. Maestas's sister by her boyfriend. The court recessed after this testimony.
¶ 223 The next morning, before the jury entered the courtroom, Mr. Maestas presented a letter to the court objecting to certain mitigating evidence that defense counsel intended to present.
¶ 225 At that point, the court reminded defense counsel that a defendant has the right to direct his defense. The court also expressed concern over defense counsel's unwillingness to compromise and their determination to present evidence in violation of Mr. Maestas's wishes. The court then asked, "In light of what I've just stated is there any hope, are you willing to accommodate his desires?" Defense counsel responded, "From our point of view it's not negotiable." Counsel added that they would "not simply... follow Mr. Maestas's wishes on this" unless the court ordered them "not to present evidence that ... contravenes Mr. Maestas's wishes."
¶ 226 In considering Mr. Maestas's request to dismiss his counsel because they insisted on presenting mitigating evidence to which he objected, the court concluded that waiver of counsel "at this point[,] under the circumstances[,] cannot be voluntary," because defense counsel's insistence on presenting evidence that contravened Mr. Maestas's wishes placed him in a position where he felt he had to waive counsel in order to prevent the evidence to which he objected from coming forward. Accordingly, the court ordered defense counsel "to advise Mr. Maestas of mitigation[,] [i]ts purpose, its effect, its reasons, what it's intended to show, what [it] is intended to demonstrate[,] [and] the reasons why defense counsel thinks it's appropriate." It further ordered counsel "to consult with Mr. Maestas as to what changes, if any, to that testimony [there] will be. And then abide by Mr. Maestas's wishes regarding mitigation presentation. If that means no mitigation will be presented, so be it."
¶ 227 After providing defense counsel the opportunity to talk with Mr. Maestas, the court met again with Mr. Maestas, defense counsel, and the prosecution. Defense counsel reported what they had explained to Mr. Maestas concerning the purpose and importance of mitigating evidence, and they proffered to the court the mitigating evidence that they were planning to present.
¶ 228 The court again asked Mr. Maestas if he understood that it was in his best interest to present the evidence, and Mr. Maestas responded in the affirmative. Likewise, the court asked if Mr. Maestas had fully considered defense counsel's advice not to waive the right to present mitigating evidence, as well as the potential consequences of not presenting the mitigating evidence. Mr.
¶ 229 In addition, the court asked whether anyone was forcing Mr. Maestas to waive the right to present mitigating evidence, whether any promises had been made to get him to make this decision, and whether he had received any information from any source to convince him to waive the right to present mitigating evidence. Mr. Maestas responded in the negative to each question. He informed the court that he made the decision "from [his] own free will." Regarding his request to dismiss his counsel, Mr. Maestas reported to the court that he had decided to retain his counsel because he felt that the attorneys would be better able to handle the closing argument. Following this discussion, defense counsel objected at length to Mr. Maestas's request to waive the right to present mitigating evidence, arguing that counsel had a constitutional duty to both investigate and present mitigating evidence on a defendant's behalf.
¶ 230 At that point, the court held another recess. Upon returning, the court again reiterated that Mr. Maestas had been advised by his attorneys and the court that it was in his best interest to present mitigating evidence. The court then asked Mr. Maestas, "[G]iven my advice, [and] your attorneys' advice to continue as intended with mitigation evidence, do you wish to change and follow that advice, or are you going to insist on going forward without the mitigation evidence?" Mr. Maestas responded, "I insist on going forward without the mitigation evidence." After further discussion, the court said, "I'm going to give you one last opportunity to change your mind if that's what you would like at this point." Mr. Maestas responded, "I won't change my mind, your Honor." The court then explained that, if Mr. Maestas insisted on waiving the presentation of mitigating evidence, this decision would be irrevocable. Mr. Maestas responded that he understood. The court then stated that it found Mr. Maestas "knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently ... waived [the] right to present additional mitigation evidence in this trial." Accordingly, the court ordered defense counsel not to present further mitigating evidence.
¶ 231 In accordance with the court order, defense counsel did not present any other mitigating evidence. Instead, Mr. Maestas briefly addressed the jury prior to closing arguments. While addressing the jury, he said, "My attorneys wanted to put on evidence... which was kind of important. And it kind of covered my background a little bit, and it had something to do with my family." But he explained, "I didn't want my family to become involved in this case so I asked them not to put on any evidence." Mr. Maestas went on to state, "I accept your verdict. I feel bad about Ms. Bott. I feel bad about Ms. Chamberlain. And I feel bad about everybody." He concluded by saying, "From the beginning I said I wasn't guilty of this crime. And today, again, I'm going to tell everybody I didn't kill Ms. Bott. I hope you understand because I didn't. And I'm sorry. Thank you for listening — listening to my case."
¶ 232 During closing arguments, defense counsel explained to the jury that certain mitigating evidence had not been presented at Mr. Maestas's request "because it was so terrible, and so horrifying, and so upsetting to him and his family, that he would rather face a death sentence than have you hear what kind of life and background he came from." Defense counsel then reiterated testimony given by the police officer regarding the fatal stabbing of Mr. Maestas's sister and the "damaging environment" of Mr. Maestas's early childhood home. Counsel also highlighted the testimony given by a witness for the prosecution that Mr. Maestas's behavior in prison had improved over time and that he had gone long periods of time without any discipline.
¶ 233 On appeal, Mr. Maestas argues that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel when it ordered defense counsel not to present further mitigating evidence,
¶ 234 The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
¶ 235 But the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the Sixth Amendment "implies a right in the defendant to conduct his own defense, with assistance at what, after all, is his, not counsel's trial."
¶ 237 Like other decisions that a represented defendant has the right to make, such as the decision to plead guilty to an offense or testify in the proceedings,
¶ 238 Although Mr. Maestas argues that our decision in Arguelles addressed only the right of unrepresented defendants to waive the right to present mitigating evidence, there is nothing in our reasoning to limit our holding to unrepresented defendants. Our conclusion was based on a defendant's right to "control the course of proceedings,"
¶ 240 Similarly, in State v. Wood, we recognized that defendants do not lose the right to direct their defense by virtue of having retained representation.
¶ 241 We also note that, although the U.S. Supreme Court has not directly addressed this issue, it has indicated that a represented defendant may waive the right to present mitigating evidence. For example, in Blystone v. Pennsylvania, the Court noted that, "contrary [to] advice from his counsel," the defendant "decided not to present any proof of mitigating evidence during his sentencing proceedings."
¶ 242 Thus, because the Sixth Amendment is meant to protect the control a defendant has over his or her own case, we decline to interpret the amendment as limiting a defendant's "right to control the nature of his or her defense"
¶ 243 In this case, after Mr. Maestas informed the court that he wished to dismiss defense counsel and proceed as his own counsel, the trial court stated that he could not knowingly and voluntarily waive the right to counsel. The court concluded that, because of "intransigence on the part of defense counsel," Mr. Maestas was essentially placed in a position where he felt forced to dismiss his counsel in order to prevent the presentation of the evidence to which he objected. "To avoid forcing a defendant to resort to self-representation,"
¶ 244 Accordingly, rather than granting Mr. Maestas's request to proceed as his own counsel, the court instructed defense counsel to discuss with Mr. Maestas the role of mitigating evidence and the evidence that they planned to present, and then to reach a compromise with Mr. Maestas regarding the presentation of mitigating evidence. After this discussion, defense counsel reported that Mr. Maestas did not want any negative information about his family to be presented. But instead of reaching a compromise with Mr. Maestas, as instructed by the court, counsel insisted on presenting all the mitigating evidence that they had planned. After further discussion between Mr. Maestas, the court, and counsel, Mr. Maestas agreed to retain defense counsel but maintained that he wanted to waive the presentation of all mitigating evidence. Under these circumstances, accepting Mr. Maestas's waiver was appropriate in light of both his right to counsel and right to direct his case because it allowed Mr. Maestas a say in his defense while enabling him to remain represented by defense counsel.
¶ 245 Further, we note that the trial court conducted a lengthy and searching inquiry before concluding that Mr. Maestas had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to present mitigating evidence. Indeed, before making its determination, the court gave counsel multiple opportunities to speak with Mr. Maestas, and it specifically required counsel "to advise Mr. Maestas of mitigation[, i]ts purposes, its effects, its reasons, what it's intended to show, what [it] is intended to demonstrate[, and] the reasons why defense counsel thinks it's appropriate." In addition to privately meeting with Mr. Maestas, defense counsel proffered to the court, in Mr. Maestas's presence, a summary of the mitigating evidence that they planned to present. Both counsel and the court repeatedly reiterated to Mr. Maestas the importance of presenting mitigating evidence. Following this extensive discussion, the court asked Mr. Maestas several questions to make sure he was knowingly and voluntarily waiving the presentation of mitigating evidence, and Mr. Maestas responded appropriately to each question.
¶ 246 Nonetheless, Mr. Maestas contends that, because he suffers from some degree of intellectual impairment, this inquiry was not sufficient to determine if he had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to present mitigating evidence. But we have "recognized a competent defendant's right to exert control over his or her defense."
¶ 247 In this case, Mr. Maestas's competency was never challenged. Although he has put forth evidence regarding intellectual impairments, this evidence does not call his competency into question.
¶ 248 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court's acceptance of Mr. Maestas's waiver and its order that counsel not present further mitigating evidence did not violate Mr. Maestas's Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
¶ 249 Mr. Maestas also contends that the lack of mitigating evidence presented during the penalty phase resulted in an unreliable sentence in violation of the Eighth Amendment. We disagree.
¶ 250 The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the Eighth Amendment requires that a "capital defendant generally must be allowed to introduce any relevant mitigating evidence regarding his character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense."
¶ 251 Additionally, in State v. Arguelles, we explained that a defendant's decision to waive the presentation of mitigating evidence did not affect the reliability of his death sentence because other procedural safeguards ensured that his sentence satisfied the requirements of the Eighth Amendment.
¶ 252 These three procedural safeguards also ensured the reliability of Mr. Maestas's death sentence in spite of his decision to waive the presentation of further mitigating evidence. First, the jury found Mr. Maestas guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of committing aggravated murder, which is a death-eligible offense.
¶ 253 Second, the jury was properly instructed regarding the standard for imposing the death penalty. The jury was instructed that it could return a sentence of death only if it was persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the State had established both that "the totality of aggravating circumstances outweighs the totality of mitigating circumstances ... in terms of their respective substance and persuasiveness," and "that the imposition of the death penalty is justified and appropriate in this case." The jury was further instructed, "[E]ven if you determine that the totality of aggravating circumstances outweighs the totality of mitigating
¶ 254 Further, in determining whether the imposition of the death penalty was appropriate in this case, the jury was informed that it could consider factors "including, but not limited to," (1) "[t]he nature and circumstances of the crime"; (2) Mr. Maestas's "character, background, history, mental and physical condition"; (3) the "impact of the crime on the victim's family and community"; and (4) "any other facts in aggravation or mitigation of the penalty." Similarly, the jury was instructed that, "[i]n determining whether aggravating or mitigating circumstances exist, you may consider all of the evidence produced either by the State or the defendant in this hearing and during the guilt phase of the trial, including testimony and exhibits admitted and presented to you during either proceeding."
¶ 255 Third, Mr. Maestas's sentence withstands our appellate review. As discussed, both defense counsel and the trial court thoroughly reviewed the purpose and importance of mitigating evidence with Mr. Maestas, as well as the potential consequences of waiving the presentation of such evidence. The court conducted a rigorous inquiry into the circumstances of Mr. Maestas's waiver to ensure that Mr. Maestas fully understood the potential consequences of his decision to proceed without mitigating evidence and that his waiver was knowing and voluntary. Following this inquiry, Mr. Maestas was given the opportunity to address the jury, and, in closing arguments, defense counsel directed the jury to the mitigating evidence that had been presented prior to Mr. Maestas's waiver, as well as other evidence favorable to Mr. Maestas. In addition, the jury was properly instructed regarding the weighing of aggravating and mitigating evidence, as well as the standard for returning a sentence of death. In light of these procedural safeguards, we conclude that Mr. Maestas's waiver of the right to present mitigating evidence did not violate the Eighth Amendment by rendering his death sentence unreliable.
¶ 256 Finally, we note that Mr. Maestas, as required by the Eighth Amendment,
¶ 257 Finally, we conclude that Mr. Maestas's waiver of the right to present mitigating evidence did not violate the "unnecessary rigor" clause of article I, section 9 of the Utah Constitution. That clause states that "[p]ersons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor."
¶ 258 Despite the fact that article I, section 9 is focused on a defendant's confinement, Mr. Maestas argues that the provision applies to the penalty phase of a capital trial. Specifically, he contends that "[c]arrying out a death sentence is part of the nature of the process and conditions of confinement." He argues that "article I, section 9 requires at the very least that death sentences be imposed in a reliable manner, that sentences be individualized, and that the jury consider all relevant mitigating evidence."
¶ 259 Given our explicit language that article I, section 9 is focused on the "process and conditions of confinement,"
¶ 260 In sum, Mr. Maestas's decision to waive the presentation of mitigating evidence did not violate the Sixth Amendment, the Eighth Amendment, or article I, section 9 of the Utah Constitution. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in granting Mr. Maestas's request to waive the presentation of mitigating evidence and we decline to grant him a new penalty phase on this basis.
¶ 261 During the penalty phase of the trial, Mr. Maestas filed motions to allow the jury to view both the manner in which he would be executed, should he receive a sentence of death, and the manner in which he would be imprisoned, should he receive a sentence of life without parole. In the alternative, his motions requested that he be allowed to introduce evidence regarding the manner of execution and imprisonment. The trial court denied these motions, reasoning that such information was not proper mitigating evidence. On appeal, Mr. Maestas argues that the trial court's decision violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution because that constitutional provision allows him to present any evidence that might cause the jury to decline to impose a sentence of death. We are not persuaded by Mr. Maestas's argument.
¶ 262 We recognize that the Eighth Amendment "establishes two separate prerequisites to a valid death sentence."
¶ 263 Although the Eighth Amendment allows for the presentation of evidence related to the defendant's character, the defendant's history, or the circumstances of the crime, it does not require a court to allow any other evidence that might cause the jury to decline to impose a sentence of death.
¶ 264 In this case, because information regarding the execution process and conditions of imprisonment does not relate to Mr. Maestas's personal culpability, we reject his claim that such information is constitutionally required. Indeed, information regarding the manner of execution and imprisonment was not related to Mr. Maestas's character, his background, or the circumstances of his offense. Further, other jurisdictions agree that "evidence regarding the conditions of prison life in a maximum security prison is not proper mitigating evidence"
¶ 265 In a penalty phase proceeding, the jury is presented with evidence to determine whether the totality of the aggravating circumstances outweighs the totality of the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶ 266 Concerning the aggravating circumstances, the jury may hear evidence on the statutory aggravating factors that raise the crime from criminal homicide to the charge of aggravated murder.
¶ 267 With this understanding, we turn to Mr. Maestas's arguments on appeal. Mr. Maestas claims that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to consider (1) as statutory aggravating factors that the murder was committed in an especially heinous or cruel manner and in the course of an attempt to commit forcible sexual abuse, (2) evidence that two of his prior convictions involved crimes greater than those to which he pled guilty, (3) victim impact evidence regarding his prior crimes and the aggravated murder of Ms. Bott, and (4) other evidence of aggravating circumstances. We reject each of Mr. Maestas's claims and we affirm his sentence.
¶ 268 As discussed above, in the penalty phase of a capital trial, a jury may consider the statutory aggravating factors that elevate the crime to aggravated murder.
¶ 269 In the guilt phase of this case, the jury was presented with evidence supporting four statutory aggravating factors: the homicide was committed (1) in the course of an aggravated robbery;
¶ 270 In the penalty phase, the State, during its presentation of aggravating circumstances, included the four statutory aggravating factors that the jury had found during the guilt phase. In addition, the trial court instructed the jury that it could consider all four statutory aggravating factors, among other circumstances, when it considered whether the totality of the aggravating circumstances outweighed the totality of the mitigating circumstances. After weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the jury decided that the totality of the aggravating circumstances outweighed the totality of the mitigating circumstances
¶ 271 On appeal, Mr. Maestas alleges that he is entitled to a new penalty phase because there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find the statutory aggravating factors of heinousness and attempt to commit forcible sexual abuse.
¶ 272 As an initial matter, we note that "we will not automatically set aside a death sentence if one [statutory] aggravating factor is [later found to be] invalid."
¶ 273 In this case, there is considerable evidence supporting the conclusion that the jury did not err in finding that the murder was especially heinous or cruel
¶ 274 First, under Utah's death penalty scheme, the jury is not limited to considering only the statutory aggravating factors that it found during the guilt phase.
¶ 275 Second, even if the two statutory aggravating factors were removed from the jury's calculus, the overall aggravating circumstances would still outweigh the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. Indeed, Mr. Maestas recognizes that the jury found two other statutory aggravating factors that it could properly consider in determining the appropriate penalty.
¶ 276 For these reasons, we conclude that any alleged error in the jury's consideration of the two statutory aggravating factors was harmless, and that the imposition of the death penalty was therefore justified and appropriate.
¶ 277 Mr. Maestas raises several claims of error concerning the introduction of evidence that he committed greater crimes than those to which he pled guilty. Before addressing his specific claims, however, we provide a brief overview of the law concerning the
¶ 278 As discussed above, Utah's death penalty scheme provides that, during the penalty phase of a capital trial, the jury may consider, among other things, evidence relating to "the defendant's character, background, [and] history."
¶ 279 In this case, the State sought to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Maestas had committed two other aggravated burglaries in the past. Specifically, the State proffered evidence that Mr. Maestas had committed the aggravated burglary of Alinda McClean's home in the 1970s and the aggravated burglary of Leone Nelson's home in the 1980s.
¶ 280 Regarding the aggravated burglary of Ms. McClean's home, the State introduced testimony of the police officer who investigated the crime. The officer testified that, in 1976, an intruder broke into the home of seventy-nine-year-old Ms. McClean, stole her television and other personal property, and severely beat her. As a result of the assault, Ms. McClean had severe bruising on her face, chest, head, feet, and legs. In addition, Ms. McClean's right eye had to be removed. The officer also testified that Ms. McClean had blood and skin under her fingernails, leading the police to conclude that she had fought her attacker. At the time of the incident, Ms. McClean gave police a description of the assailant and the description matched Mr. Maestas. The officer also stated that, one day after the attack, Mr. Maestas was in possession of the television and other personal property that had been stolen from Ms. McClean's home. Further, the officer testified that Mr. Maestas had scratches on his body and that he gave police a false alibi for the night of the incident.
¶ 281 The State also introduced the testimony of Ms. McClean's granddaughter, who described her grandmother's injuries.
¶ 282 Regarding the aggravated burglary of Ms. Nelson's home, the State introduced the testimony of Ms. Nelson. Ms. Nelson stated that, in 1989, a man attacked her in her home and tried to rob her. In describing the attack, Ms. Nelson testified that she was hit repeatedly on her face and back, choked until she almost passed out, stomped on, and had her clothes ripped off her body. Ms.
¶ 283 At the conclusion of the penalty phase, the jury was instructed regarding the elements of aggravated burglary. The jury was also informed that, if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Maestas had committed the aggravated burglary of Ms. McClean's home or of Ms. Nelson's home, it could consider this evidence as an aggravating circumstance. In addition, the jury was instructed that, even if it found that Mr. Maestas had committed the aggravated burglaries, it could also consider his convictions for theft and theft by receiving, which resulted from these same incidents, as additional aggravating circumstances. After its deliberation, the jury concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Maestas had committed both aggravated burglaries.
¶ 284 On appeal, Mr. Maestas asserts that he is entitled to a new penalty phase proceeding for three reasons: (a) the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce evidence that his prior convictions involved greater crimes than those to which he pled guilty, (b) the trial court committed plain error in admitting the parole revocation documents into evidence, and (c) the jury's finding was erroneous because there was insufficient evidence to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that he had committed the two prior crimes. We disagree.
¶ 285 Although Mr. Maestas recognizes that our holding in Lafferty I allows the State to present evidence of criminal conduct that did not result in a conviction, he argues that the trial court erred in allowing evidence of these aggravated burglaries for four reasons. First, he claims that it was unduly prejudicial for the jury to be "tainted by the inflammatory nature" of the two other aggravated robberies because the crimes would "remind the jurors of the underlying capital homicide." Second, he contends that our holding in Lafferty I is inapplicable here. He argues that Lafferty I permits only evidence of conduct for which the defendant was not convicted, and, by pleading guilty to the lesser offenses of theft and theft by receiving, he was convicted for the incidents involving Ms. McClean and Ms. Nelson. Third, he asserts that the trial court violated his constitutional protection against double jeopardy by allowing the jury to consider his convictions for the lesser offenses as well as the greater crimes that the State sought to prove during the penalty phase of the trial. Finally, he contends that he was prejudiced by the trial court's decision to allow the State to present evidence of his convictions and evidence of the aggravated burglaries because that decision led the jury to impermissibly count the same aggravating circumstance twice. We reject each of these claims.
¶ 286 First, we conclude that Mr. Maestas has not satisfied his burden of showing that the evidence was unduly prejudicial.
¶ 287 Second, although our holding in Lafferty I refers to the State presenting "evidence of violent crimes which have not yet resulted in convictions,"
¶ 288 This same rationale applies to all evidence of a defendant's prior criminal acts. Indeed, evidence of a defendant's past criminal conduct, even conduct exceeding that to which he pled guilty, provides the jury with important information about the defendant's violent propensities. And it presents the jury with an accurate picture of the defendant's background, history, and character. Because it is consistent with our rationale in Lafferty I, we hold that evidence of crimes beyond those for which the defendant has been convicted may be admitted, so long as the jury is instructed on the elements of the crime and finds that each element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶ 289 Consistent with the rule announced in Lafferty I, the jury in this case was instructed on the elements of aggravated burglary and told that it could consider the evidence as an aggravating circumstance only if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Maestas had committed the crime against Ms. McClean or Ms. Nelson. Because the evidence was relevant to Mr. Maestas's history, character, and background, and because the jury was properly informed and instructed in accordance with our rule in Lafferty I, the trial court did not err in allowing the State to present evidence that Mr. Maestas committed the two aggravated burglaries, even though he had pled guilty to lesser offenses. Accordingly, we decline to grant Mr. Maestas a new penalty phase on this basis.
¶ 290 Third, we reject Mr. Maestas's assertion that this evidence violated the constitutional protection against double jeopardy. It is well settled that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the U.S. Constitution protects a defendant from a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction and against multiple punishments for the same offense.
¶ 291 In this case, the protections against double jeopardy were not violated when the State presented the evidence regarding Mr. Maestas's convictions and the aggravated burglaries of Ms. McClean's home and Ms. Nelson's home. This evidence was presented so the jury could consider it when determining the appropriate sentence for the capital homicide. Because the jury was determining the appropriate penalty for a subsequent crime, the introduction of evidence concerning Mr. Maestas's past criminal behavior did not constitute a second prosecution for that past behavior and did not result in multiple punishments for the same offense. Thus, the protections against double jeopardy were not violated, and we decline to grant Mr. Maestas a new penalty phase on this basis.
¶ 292 Finally, we reject the argument that the jury impermissibly double counted the same aggravating circumstance. As an initial matter, we note that Mr. Maestas has not pointed to any evidence that the jury double counted the same aggravating circumstance when determining whether the totality of the aggravating circumstances outweighed the totality of the mitigating circumstances. Indeed, it was the underlying conduct that created the aggravating circumstances, and there was no indication that the jury mistakenly believed that the convictions and the aggravated burglaries arose from different underlying conduct. In other words, there is no indication that the jury thought that the convictions and aggravated burglaries arose out of four separate incidents instead of the two occasions that created the aggravating circumstances. Further, Mr. Maestas has not shown that it would have been erroneous for the jury to have considered, as separate aggravating circumstances, the aggravated burglaries and his convictions for the lesser offenses arising from those incidents.
¶ 293 But even were we to find that the jury did double count the aggravated burglaries and the convictions, and that this double counting was erroneous, any such error would have been harmless. Indeed, even if we remove the evidence of the aggravated
¶ 294 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not commit prejudicial error in allowing the State to introduce evidence that Mr. Maestas's prior convictions involved greater crimes than those to which he pled guilty.
¶ 295 Mr. Maestas next argues that the trial court erred in admitting the parole revocation documents concerning the aggravated burglary of Ms. McClean. Specifically, he contends that the parole revocation documents "contained inflammatory, unduly prejudicial, unreliable, and irrelevant information" that violated the rules of evidence and the constitution. Because Mr. Maestas did not raise this argument in the trial court, we review his claim for plain error, meaning that the error must be both obvious and harmful.
¶ 296 As an initial matter, we note that different rules governing the admissibility of evidence apply to the penalty phase of a trial. "[E]vidence may be admissible during the penalty phase, even if excluded by the rules of evidence during the guilt phase."
¶ 297 Concerning constitutional principles, we note that, under the principles of due process, the evidence presented in the penalty phase must be relevant and reliable.
¶ 298 In this case, because a court may admit "[a]ny evidence" in the penalty phase that it "considers to have probative force,"
¶ 300 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that any error that the trial court may have committed in admitting the parole revocation documents was harmless. Accordingly, we decline to grant Mr. Maestas a new penalty phase on this basis.
¶ 301 Mr. Maestas's final claim is that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that he had committed the aggravated burglary of Ms. McClean's home and the aggravated burglary of Ms. Nelson's home. Although he does not dispute that Ms. McClean and Ms. Nelson were attacked during the course of the burglaries, he contends that the evidence was insufficient to identify him as the perpetrator of those crimes.
¶ 302 As an initial matter, we note that, "[i]n considering an insufficiency of the evidence claim, we review the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury."
¶ 303 Regarding the aggravated burglary of Ms. McClean's home, the jury heard the investigative police officer's testimony that Mr. Maestas matched the description of the assailant; that Ms. McClean had blood and skin under her fingernails, and Mr. Maestas had scratches on his face and arms; that Mr. Maestas gave a false alibi for the night of the incident; and that he was in possession of the television and other personal property that was stolen from Ms. McClean's home. In addition, the jury was presented with evidence that Mr. Maestas had pled guilty in this matter to the offense of theft by receiving. And regarding the aggravated burglary of Ms. Nelson's home, the jury heard Ms. Nelson testify that Mr. Maestas was the perpetrator. Further, the jury was presented with evidence that Mr. Maestas had pled guilty in this matter to the offense of theft.
¶ 304 We conclude that, when viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the foregoing evidence was sufficient to identify Mr. Maestas as the perpetrator in both aggravated burglaries. Nothing about this evidence was inconclusive or inherently improbable such that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that Mr. Maestas committed the crimes. Accordingly, we reject Mr. Maestas's challenge to the jury's verdict, and we decline to grant him a new penalty phase on this basis.
¶ 305 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not commit prejudicial error in allowing the State to present evidence that Mr. Maestas committed greater crimes than those to which he pled guilty.
¶ 306 Mr. Maestas also claims that certain testimony in the penalty phase of his trial constituted unconstitutional victim impact evidence. Specifically, he asserts that the court committed reversible error by admitting prejudicial victim impact evidence from two witnesses who testified about Mr. Maestas's prior crimes,
¶ 307 We note that, during the penalty phase of a capital case, section 76-3-207(2)(a)(iii) of the Utah Code (Victim Impact Provision) expressly allows the introduction of evidence pertaining to "the victim and the impact of the crime on the victim's family and community without comparison to other persons or victims." Nonprejudicial evidence regarding the victim and the impact of the crime on the victim's family has been upheld under the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
¶ 308 Ultimately, however, we need not decide what limitations, if any, the state constitution places on the use of victim impact evidence. "Before treating the constitutional issue on its merits, we determine whether the victim impact evidence in this case was prejudicial. If this potential error is not prejudicial, we need not reach the constitutional questions."
¶ 309 With that in mind, we now turn to the question of whether Mr. Maestas was prejudiced by (a) the alleged victim impact evidence concerning Mr. Maestas's past crimes or (b) the victim impact evidence concerning Ms. Bott's death.
¶ 310 We first address the alleged victim impact evidence concerning Mr. Maestas's prior crimes. While introducing evidence that Mr. Maestas committed the aggravated burglary of Ms. McClean's home in the 1970s, the State presented the testimony of Ms. McClean's granddaughter.
¶ 311 Next, when the State sought to prove that Mr. Maestas committed the aggravated burglary of Ms. Nelson's home in the 1980s, Ms. Nelson testified about the incident. After describing the burglary and subsequent assault, she stated that the hospital staff treated her poorly when she sought treatment for her injuries. On cross examination, defense counsel asked Ms. Nelson whether she had given "some interviews to the press" concerning her assault, and Ms. Nelson responded that she had. But defense counsel interrupted her when she began to state her reason for the interviews. On redirect, Ms. Nelson explained that she gave the interviews after seeing the press coverage about
¶ 312 In analyzing Mr. Maestas's claims, we note that the Victim Impact Provision does not expressly provide for the introduction of victim impact evidence concerning a defendant's prior crimes.
¶ 313 Indeed, the comments Mr. Maestas challenges were moderate in tone and did not express an opinion about his character or the appropriate sentence. In addition, any allegedly improper statements were not pervasive. For example, Ms. McClean's granddaughter made one comment about seeing her grandmother's injuries. This comment came after a police officer had provided the jury with extensive details about Ms. McClean's injuries, including her severe bruising, swollen face, and the fact that her right eye had to be removed as a result of the attack. Similarly, Ms. Nelson's statements about her own hospital visit and being "upset" by Mr. Maestas's release constituted only two sentences in thirteen pages of her testimony describing the attack and the injuries that she sustained.
¶ 314 Given the nature of the contested evidence, and considering the other evidence that had been presented, there is not a reasonable probability that, but for the admission of these statements, Mr. Maestas would have received a more favorable sentence. We therefore conclude that these comments were not prejudicial.
¶ 315 We next address Mr. Maestas's claim that the State presented prejudicial victim impact evidence about Ms. Bott's death. The State introduced victim impact testimony from Ms. Bott's granddaughter in accordance with the Victim Impact Provision. As part of this testimony, Ms. Bott's granddaughter stated that, after the homicide, she cleaned Ms. Bott's house and personally "cleaned up the blood on the floor." In addition, the granddaughter read the following excerpt from her personal blog:
¶ 316 We conclude that this testimony was not prejudicial because it was moderate in tone, provided only a description of the loss that the granddaughter felt as a result of Ms. Bott's death, and did not convey an opinion of Mr. Maestas's character or the appropriate sentence. Although the granddaughter's statements provided vivid images of her grief, such descriptive accountings are not necessarily prejudicial.
¶ 317 Because the evidence Mr. Maestas challenges was not prejudicial, "we decline to reverse the result of the penalty phase and do not need to address the constitutional questions"
¶ 318 Mr. Maestas raises four other arguments concerning the evidence introduced in the penalty phase of his trial. Specifically, he claims that he is entitled to a new penalty phase because (a) the trial court impermissibly admitted a certified copy of his conviction for burglary and witness testimony about the incident, (b) testimony about his past criminal behavior warranted a mistrial, (c) testimony that he did not show remorse for the aggravated murder violated his right against self-incrimination, and (d) testimony about his behavior in prison was improper. We disagree.
¶ 319 Mr. Maestas asserts that he is entitled to a new penalty phase because the trial court erred in admitting a certified copy of his prior conviction for burglary as well as witness testimony concerning the circumstances of that offense. Specifically, he challenges the State's introduction of a certified copy of his 1990 conviction for the burglary of Phyllis Demetropolos's home. The State also called Ms. Demetropolos to testify about the circumstances surrounding that burglary. Although Mr. Maestas did not object to this evidence in the trial court, on appeal, he alleges that the court committed plain error in admitting his prior conviction as well as the testimony concerning the offense. Notably, Mr. Maestas does not assert that Ms. Demetropolos's testimony contained inaccurate information or constituted victim impact evidence. Instead, he contends only that, by admitting the conviction and the testimony, it created a risk that the jury would double count this aggravating circumstance. We are unpersuaded by Mr. Maestas's argument for two reasons.
¶ 320 First, the trial court did not err in admitting the certified conviction and the testimony about the circumstances of the crime. Indeed, as discussed above, we have recognized that accurate information about a defendant's past criminal conduct provides the sentencing body with important information
¶ 321 Second, there is no evidence that the jury impermissibly double counted this aggravating circumstance. But even if the jury did so, any such error would have been harmless.
¶ 322 Next, Mr. Maestas asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial after the State elicited improper testimony from an agent with Adult Probation and Parole (AP & P). During the penalty phase, the AP & P agent testified about Mr. Maestas's criminal history and parole revocations. As part of that testimony, he read a presentence investigation report completed by AP & P after Mr. Maestas's 1990 conviction for the burglary of Ms. Demetropolos's home. The report summarized Mr. Maestas's criminal and parole history and stated as follows:
¶ 323 At the close of the agent's testimony, defense counsel expressed concern about the AP & P agent's statement that Mr. Maestas was "convicted for the offenses of a career criminal." The prosecution agreed to remedy any potential error with this statement and to clarify that Mr. Maestas's convictions were for burglaries, not for being a "career criminal." At that point, the prosecution asked the AP & P agent to clarify for the jury that Mr. Maestas's convictions were for burglaries. The AP & P agent provided this clarification.
¶ 324 The next day, however, Mr. Maestas moved for a mistrial based on the AP & P agent's testimony.
¶ 325 As an initial matter, we note that trial courts have discretion in granting or denying a motion for a mistrial.
¶ 326 In this case, Mr. Maestas has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial. Indeed, the AP & P agent's brief reference to Mr. Maestas's "career criminal" conviction was not of the type that "so likely influenced the jury that the defendant cannot be said to have had a fair trial."
¶ 327 Mr. Maestas also argues that the trial court erred in admitting witness testimony that he had not shown remorse or taken responsibility for the murder of Ms. Bott. In the penalty phase, the State introduced the testimony of Mr. Maestas's ex-wife. On direct examination, the following exchange took place between the prosecution and Mr. Maestas's ex-wife:
¶ 328 Although Mr. Maestas did not object to the prosecution's questioning in the trial court, on appeal, he argues that the court committed plain error in allowing his ex-wife's testimony. Specifically, he claims that his ex-wife's comment on his lack of remorse or failure to take responsibility violated his constitutional right against self-incrimination and that this violation was prejudicial. We reject this argument.
¶ 329 As an initial matter, we note that there is nothing per se unconstitutional about considering a defendant's lack of remorse as an aggravating circumstance.
¶ 330 Finally, Mr. Maestas challenges witness testimony regarding his behavior while in prison. During the penalty phase, the State introduced the testimony of a caseworker with the Department of Corrections. The caseworker stated that he had supervised Mr. Maestas during "the last four months of [Mr. Maestas's] last incarceration" and was familiar with his prison file. The prison file contained chronological notes, reports, and progress updates compiled over the thirty years Mr. Maestas has been in and out of prison. When asked to give an opinion about Mr. Maestas's behavior in prison, the caseworker stated as follows:
¶ 331 On cross-examination, defense counsel questioned the caseworker about Mr. Maestas's prison file and emphasized reports in that file indicating that Mr. Maestas had not received disciplinary referrals from 1976-79 or 1993-94. In closing arguments, defense counsel highlighted the caseworker's assessment that Mr. Maestas's behavior continued to improve as he got older. Defense counsel then encouraged the jury to consider this evidence as a mitigating circumstance.
¶ 332 Although Mr. Maestas did not object to this testimony at trial, and in fact referred to it in his closing argument, on appeal, he contends that the trial court committed plain error in admitting the caseworker's statements. Specifically, he asserts that the testimony improperly relied upon Mr. Maestas's prison file and that the file was inadmissible hearsay under the rules of evidence and the Confrontation Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Because Mr. Maestas did not raise this argument in the trial court, we review his claim for plain error.
¶ 333 As discussed above, we again note that, under Utah's death penalty scheme, evidence "may be admissible during the penalty phase, even if excluded by the rules of evidence during the guilt phase."
¶ 334 In this case, there is considerable evidence supporting the conclusion that the caseworker's testimony was not erroneously admitted. But, regardless, any potential error was harmless. The caseworker's statements about Mr. Maestas's behavior in prison is probative of his character and future dangerousness. As such, it may be used as evidence. Indeed, both the prosecution and defense counsel used the caseworker's testimony to highlight different portions of Mr. Maestas's prison record. In fact, defense counsel highlighted Mr. Maestas's diminishing violent behavior and lack of disciplinary actions for periods of his incarceration during closing arguments and defense counsel argued that the jury could consider this evidence as a mitigating circumstance. Because defense counsel used the caseworker's testimony to introduce favorable evidence, and relied on this testimony, and because the testimony was probative of Mr. Maestas's behavior, character, and conduct, we conclude that the overall testimony was not harmful. Accordingly, we decline to grant Mr. Maestas a new penalty phase on this basis.
¶ 336 Mr. Maestas raises five other constitutional challenges. He contends that: (A) the trial court violated the Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution by denying his motion to argue last in the penalty phase hearing; (B) the process of death qualification violates the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and article I, sections 7, 10, and 12 of the Utah Constitution because it results in juries that are more prone to convict and impose death sentences; (C) Utah's current death penalty scheme violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, as well as "state due process" and article I, section 9 of the Utah Constitution because recent amendments have resulted in a statute that impermissibly fails to narrow the class of death-eligible offenses; (D) under a proportionality review, his death sentence is disproportionate in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution; and (E) research purporting to find that capital jurors do not abide by constitutional principles in decision making supports an inference that both Utah's death penalty scheme and his death sentence violate the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and article I, section 9 of the Utah Constitution.
¶ 337 All five constitutional challenges are questions of law that we review for correctness.
¶ 338 During the penalty phase hearing, Mr. Maestas filed a motion to argue last, which the trial court denied. He argues that, by denying his motion to argue last in the penalty phase, the court allowed the jury to sentence him based on information that he did not have the opportunity to deny or explain. He contends that this resulted in the jury imposing an unreliable sentence in violation of the Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment. We reject his argument.
¶ 339 First, we note that the order of procedure and argument for criminal trials is outlined in rule 17(g) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Specifically, rule 17(g)(7) provides that when the parties argue before the jury, "the prosecution shall open the argument, the defense shall follow and the prosecution may close by responding to the defense argument." And we have previously held that rule 17(g)(7) "applies to the penalty phase of [a] defendant's trial."
¶ 340 Second, the U.S. Supreme Court has noted that the principles of due process are violated when a death sentence is imposed "on the basis of information which [the defendant] had no opportunity to deny or explain."
¶ 341 Mr. Maestas does not claim that the prosecution exceeded the scope of an appropriate rebuttal. Indeed, he fails to point to any information in the prosecution's closing argument that he was prevented from explaining or denying over the course of the proceedings. Thus, because rule 17 appropriately limits the scope of the prosecution's closing argument "to only those matters argued by the defense,"
¶ 342 Additionally, while Mr. Maestas argues that the denial of the motion resulted in an unreliable sentence in violation of the Eighth Amendment, he offers no case law to support this claim.
¶ 343 For the foregoing reasons, we reject Mr. Maestas's argument that denying his motion to argue last resulted in an unreliable sentence in violation of the Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying Mr. Maestas's motion.
¶ 344 Mr. Maestas argues that death-qualified juries are more prone to convict and impose death sentences, which he contends violates defendants' right to trial by an impartial jury. Accordingly, he argues that the process of death qualification violates the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and article I, sections 7, 10, and 12 of the Utah Constitution. We reject his arguments.
¶ 345 As an initial matter, "death qualification" concerns the removal of jurors whose "views on capital punishment would prevent or substantially impair the performance of the juror's duties as a juror in accordance
¶ 346 In State v. Alvarez and State v. Young, we considered the argument that death qualification unconstitutionally "creates a conviction-prone jury."
¶ 347 In this appeal, Mr. Maestas raises no new argument to cause us to reach a different result than the U.S. Supreme Court reached in Lockhart v. McCree or that we reached in Alvarez or Young.
¶ 348 Mr. Maestas argues that Utah's death penalty scheme violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution because recent amendments to Utah's death penalty scheme have expanded the offenses eligible for the death penalty and broadened the permissible aggravating factors. As a result, he claims that the death penalty scheme fails to sufficiently narrow the class of death-eligible offenses, which allows the arbitrary and capricious imposition of death sentences. We reject his argument.
¶ 349 The U.S. Constitution requires that death penalty schemes "genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty" and "justify the imposition of a more severe sentence."
¶ 351 As a result, we are not persuaded to depart from our precedent on this issue. We therefore reject Mr. Maestas's claim that Utah's death penalty scheme is unconstitutional for failing to sufficiently narrow the class of death-eligible offenses.
¶ 352 Mr. Maestas argues that, under a proportionality review, his death sentence violated the Eighth Amendment and article I, section 9, of the Utah Constitution. Specifically, he asserts that his sentence was disproportionate because of his low level of intellectual functioning, the lack of mitigating evidence presented, and because "the nature of [his crime] suggests homicide was not the primary motivation." We reject his arguments.
¶ 353 Neither the U.S. Constitution nor the Utah Constitution requires capital sentences to be reviewed for proportionality.
¶ 355 Second, Mr. Maestas's sentence was not disproportionate to his level of culpability. In reviewing the proportionality of a death sentence, we do not attempt to determine whether the defendant was "extremely culpable or just somewhat culpable."
¶ 356 Third, Mr. Maestas's sentence was not disproportionate in comparison to the general sentencing pattern in our state. Mr. Maestas argues that "the homicide was committed as part of a beating; beatings of this sort do not always result in death and the nature of this homicide suggests homicide was not the primary motivation." But Mr. Maestas was convicted of aggravated murder for punching, stomping, strangling, and stabbing an elderly woman to death, which means that the jury determined that he "intentionally or knowingly cause[d] the death" of the victim under aggravating circumstances.
¶ 357 Finally, Mr. Maestas argues that Utah's death penalty scheme violates the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution based on research purporting to show that capital jurors do not always make decisions consistent with constitutional principles. Based on this research, Mr. Maestas contends that we should conclude that Utah's death penalty scheme is unconstitutional or infer that his jury violated constitutional principles in imposing the death sentence.
¶ 358 In McCleskey v. Kemp, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether a statistical
¶ 359 The Court noted that, "[b]ecause discretion is essential to the criminal justice process, [it] would demand exceptionally clear proof before [it] would infer that the discretion has been abused."
¶ 360 These same concerns apply to Mr. Maestas's argument that the research he proffers compels a conclusion that Utah's death penalty scheme, and his conviction under that scheme, violate constitutional principles. We agree that "discretion is essential to the criminal justice process," and, accordingly, like the U.S. Supreme Court, we require "exceptionally clear proof" before finding that such "discretion has been abused."
¶ 361 In sum, we reject all five of Mr. Maestas's constitutional challenges and affirm his death sentence.
¶ 362 Lastly, Mr. Maestas argues that he should be granted both a new guilt phase and a new penalty phase because of the cumulative effect of errors made over the course of the proceedings. He argues that the "errors worked together ... to create an unfair and unreliable outcome." We disagree.
¶ 363 "Under the cumulative error doctrine, we will reverse [a jury verdict or sentence] only if the cumulative effect of the several errors undermines our confidence... that a fair trial was had."
¶ 364 In this case, for each of Mr. Maestas's claims of error, we have found that either no substantial error was committed or that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Because Mr. Maestas was not harmed by any substantial errors over the course of the proceedings, our confidence in the fairness of his guilty verdict and his sentence of death is not undermined. Thus, the cumulative error doctrine does not apply, and we do not grant Mr. Maestas a new guilt or penalty phase on this basis.
¶ 365 We reject each of Mr. Maestas's challenges to his convictions for aggravated robbery and aggravated murder and to his sentence under Utah's death penalty scheme. Accordingly, we affirm his conviction and death sentence.
Chief Justice DURRANT authored the opinion of the Court, in which Associate
Chief Justice NEHRING, Justice DURHAM, Justice PARRISH, and Justice LEE joined.
Id.
In this case, the jury heard testimony that Ms. Bott's underwear had been torn off her body, and that she had an abrasion on her hip. And the medical examiner testified that the abrasion could have been caused by the act of tearing her underwear off her body. This evidence supports the conclusion that the jury did not err in finding that the murder was committed in the course of an attempt to commit forcible sexual abuse.
