USCA1 Opinion
May 3, 1996 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
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No. 94-1202
JOSEPH F. CONSOLO,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DANIEL F. GEORGE, ET AL.,
Defendants - Appellants.
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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Nathaniel M. Gorton, U.S. District Judge]
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[Hon. Mark L. Wolf, U.S. District Judge]
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Before
Boudin, Circuit Judge,
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Aldrich, Senior Circuit Judge,
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and Young,* District Judge.
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Donald V. Rider, Jr., Assistant City Solicitor, with whom
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David M. Moore, City Solicitor, and Diana H. Horan, Assistant
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City Solicitor, were on brief for appellants.
Thomas C. Cameron, with whom Dennis J. Curran, and Curran &
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Cameron, were on brief for appellee.
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* Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.
Per Curiam. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988(b) and 1st
Per Curiam
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Cir. R. 39.2, Joseph F. Consolo ("Consolo") here seeks attorney
fees incurred in defending a jury verdict in his favor both on
appeal and through a futile petition for certiorari.
BACKGROUND
BACKGROUND
A jury awarded Consolo $90,000 in damages against
Worcester police officers Daniel George ("George") and Michael
Mulvey ("Mulvey") for violations of Consolo's civil rights.
George and Mulvey appealed four issues to this Court and we
affirmed in all respects. Consolo v. George, 58 F.3d 791 (1st
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Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 520 (1995).
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On behalf of Consolo, Attorneys Thomas C. Cameron
("Cameron") and Dennis J. Curran ("Curran") filed a fee
application (the "Application") for award of appellate counsel
fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988(b). In the Application,
Consolo also requested an award of expenses and fees for
paralegal Kenneth O'Sullivan ("O'Sullivan"). Consolo also filed
a supplemental fee application (the "Supplemental Application")
for services related to opposing certiorari.
George and Mulvey's objections to the Application and
Supplemental Application fall into six general categories: (1)
the timeliness of Consolo's appeal; (2) the adequacy of records
kept by Cameron and Curran regarding their fees and expenses; (3)
whether work performed by Cameron and Curran was necessary and
productive; (4) the reasonableness of rates charged by Cameron
and Curran; (5) whether work performed by O'Sullivan was
necessary and productive; and (6) the reasonableness of expenses
charged by Cameron and Curran.
DISCUSSION
DISCUSSION
Traditionally, litigants have borne their own legal
costs. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421
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U.S. 240, 247 (1975). Certain statutes and equitable doctrines
permit departure from this tradition. See In re Thirteen
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Appeals, 56 F.3d 295, 304-305 (1st Cir. 1995). Under the Civil
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Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, courts may award
reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party in a civil
rights action. 42 U.S.C. 1988(b). In authorizing such awards,
Congress intended to reduce the financial impediments that hinder
individuals from asserting their rights. Furtado v. Bishop, 635
_______ ______
F.2d 915, 918-19 (1st Cir. 1980).
Courts grant attorney's fees under 1988(b) unless
there is a special reason compelling denial. Supreme Ct. v.
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Consumer's Union of the United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 737
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(1980). Prevailing plaintiffs may receive fees for time spent
defending an appeal, if the plaintiff is ultimately successful.
See Souza v. Southworth, 564 F.2d 609, 613 (1st Cir. 1977).
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Parties may also receive fees for time spent litigating fee
applications. Lund v. Affleck, 587 F.2d 75, 77-78 (1st Cir.
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1978).
A. Timeliness of Consolo's Application
A. Timeliness of Consolo's Application
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George and Mulvey object to the Application and
Supplemental Application, claiming that both are untimely. The
governing local rule regarding appellate fee applications states:
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An application . . . for an award of fees
and other expenses . . . shall be filed
with the clerk of the court of appeals
within 30 days of the date of entry of
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the final circuit judgment . . . . For
purposes of the 30-day limit, a judgment
shall not be considered final until the
time for filing an appeal or a petition
for a writ of certiorari has expired, or
judgment is entered by the court of last
resort.
1st Cir. R. 39.2 (emphasis added).
Consolo filed the Application on August 8, 1995. The
Supreme Court denied George and Mulvey's Petition for Writ of
Certiorari on November 27, 1995. Consolo filed the Supplemental
Application on December 15, 1995.
1. Supplemental Fee Application
1. Supplemental Fee Application
George and Mulvey note that parties may petition the
Supreme Court for rehearing up to 25 days after denial of
certiorari. Sup. Ct. R. 44.2. For purposes of 1st Cir. R. 39.2,
George and Mulvey contend that final judgment does not occur
until this 25 day period ends.
However, "[t]he order of denial will not be suspended
pending disposition of a petition for rehearing except by an
order of the Court or a Justice." Sup. Ct. R. 16.3. The Supreme
Court issued no such order in the instant case. Without a
delaying order, denial of certiorari is final judgment for the
purposes of the local rule. After this final judgment, Consolo's
attorneys had 30 days to file an application for attorney's fees.
1st Cir. R. 39.2. Consolo met this requirement by filing on
December 15, 1995. Therefore, Consolo's Supplemental Application
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is timely under 42 U.S.C. 1988(b) and 1st Cir. R. 39.2.
2. Fee Application
2. Fee Application
Rule 39.2 serves three purposes: (1) it promotes
fairness by requiring parties to apply for fees within a
reasonable time after a case's resolution; (2) it advances
judicial efficiency by reducing of the number of fee applications
filed; and (3) it prevents this Court from issuing awards under
1988(b) inconsistent with subsequent decisions on the case.
George and Mulvey contend that Consolo filed his
Application prematurely, and that the Court should deny both the
Application and the Supplementary Application.2 George and
Mulvey argue that we should interpret 1st Cir. R. 39.2 to deny
applications filed before final judgment. Because Consolo filed
his Application before the Supreme Court denied certiorari, the
Application was most certainly premature. Consolo's Supplemental
Application, however, amended and expanded his Application.
Thus, even though Consolo's first application was premature, the
Supplemental Application incorporated and cured the Application.
Since the Supplemental Application is timely under 1st Cir. R.
39.2, we must, therefore, examine the claims presented in both
the Application and Supplemental Application.
B. Reasonableness of Consolo's Applications
B. Reasonableness of Consolo's Applications
This Court has customarily thought it best to calculate
reasonable fees through the lodestar time and rate method.
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2 Paradoxically, George and Mulvey also argue in the alternative
that Consolo's first application was late, first acknowledging
but then choosing to ignore the plain test of 1st Cir. R. 39.2.
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Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. 104 Acres of Land, 32 F.3d 632, 634
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(1st Cir. 1994); but see In re Thirteen Appeals, 56 F.3d at 305-
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308 (common fund cases). The lodestar is a numerical point of
reference reached by multiplying the total number of hours
reasonably spent by a reasonable hourly rate. Grendel's Den,
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Inc. v. Larkin, 749 F.2d 945, 950 (1984) (citing Hensly v.
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Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433-34 [1983]). The lodestar is a
presumptively reasonable fee, but it is subject to upward or
downward adjustment for special circumstances. Lipsett v.
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Blanco, 975 F.2d 934, 937 (1st Cir. 1992) (citing Blum v.
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Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 897 [1984]).
1. Adequacy of record keeping
1. Adequacy of record keeping
For the Court to determine whether hours billed are
reasonable, applicants must provide highly detailed records of
their time expenditures. Phetosomphone v. Allison Reed Group,
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Inc., 984 F.2d 4, 7 (1st Cir. 1993) (citing Grendel's Den, Inc.,
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749 F.2d at 952). The Court demands specific information
regarding the number of hours, dates, and the nature of work
performed. Deary v. City of Gloucester, 9 F.3d 191, 197-98 (1st
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Cir. 1993) (citing Calhoun v. Acme Cleveland Corp., 801 F.2d 558,
560 [1st Cir. 1986]). Lack of contemporaneous records calls for
substantial reduction or denial of fee awards, except in
"extraordinary circumstances." Id. While this Court has not
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demanded inclusion of the actual, contemporaneously kept time
sheets or records in fee applications, their inclusion aids the
Court in more easily assessing the validity, necessity, and
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reasonableness of hours billed. Applicants fail to supply such
records at their peril. See id. (noting that submission of
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actual time slips allowed a trial court to deny 78 of 699.4 hours
requested).
Here, Consolo's Application and Supplemental
Application included affidavits that distilled records
contemporaneously kept by Cameron, Curran, and O'Sullivan. The
Application and Supplemental Application did not include their
original time sheets. Normally an attorney's account of time
spent must be scrutinized with care. Calhoun, 801 F.2d at 560;
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Grendel's Den, Inc., 749 F.2d at 950. Without original time
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sheets, we hold an applicant's summary of hours spent to an even
higher level of scrutiny. Here, we must use our own experience
and judgment to determine if Cameron and Curran's billing
accurately reflects time spent. We resolve inconsistencies and
ambiguities against the applicant.
Before calculating the lodestar, we must address two
issues of some concern to this Court. The first issue relates to
the Application. On July 19, 1994, Curran filed a Motion to
Enlarge Time to File Brief. The Motion to Enlarge would have
extended the deadline to file Consolo's Appellate Brief from
July 14, 1994 to July 21, 1994. In that Motion to Enlarge,
Curran represented that Consolo's attorneys needed the additional
time "to proofread the Brief, review transcript references and
reproduce trial exhibits for this appeal." Plaintiff-Appellee's
Motion to Enlarge Time to File Brief at 2. The Court granted
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this Motion on July 21, 1994, so counsel could perform these
clerical tasks. In the Application, Curran and Cameron requested
reimbursement for work performed during this additional week.
Some of the work claimed during this period is unrelated to the
limited, clerical tasks described in the Motion to Enlarge.3
Poor record keeping by Cameron and Curran may have
resulted in inaccurate billing during this period.
Alternatively, Curran may have misrepresented the reasons for his
Motion to Enlarge Time. In either case, the Court is not
disposed to grant attorney's fees for these inconsistencies. See
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Brewster v. Dukakis, 3 F.3d 488, 494 n.6 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting
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that courts can and should deny recovery for such "sloppy" record
keeping). Unfortunately, Consolo's application did not
adequately distinguish between time spent on clerical (permitted
under the Motion to Enlarge) and non-clerical tasks.4 Because
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3 Work that falls outside of Consolo's Motion to Enlarge Time
includes:
July 15, 1994 "[B]egin drafting Statement of Facts."
July 18, 1994 "Revise Statement of Facts."
July 19, 1994 "[R]evise Statement of Facts for Brief."
4 This is the source of much difficulty concerning the
Application and Supplemental Application. Cameron and Curran
provided the number of hours spent on Consolo's case per day, and
roughly the subject matter or task on which they spent this time.
While they did divide the number of hours spent by attorney, they
did not divide the number of hours by task. For example, Curran
claims he spent 5.05 hours on July 14, 1994, "continu[ing] review
of ten volumes of trial transcript to prepare [the] Statement of
Facts for Brief; [and in] telephone conferences with [the]
Clerk's Office and with [defense counsel]." This forces the
Court to guess how much time Curran spent in review of the
volumes and how much was spent in telephone conferences.
Applicants should consider detail almost as important as
conscientious and accurate reporting.
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we are unable to distinguish these time periods, any work
performed inconsistent with the Motion to Enlarge will result in
denial of award for that day. Thus, we will not consider
Curran's application for 10.3 hours on July 15 and 19, 1994 in
our calculation of the lodestar. Similarly, we will ignore
Cameron's application for 1.3 hours on July 18, 1994.
The second issue relates to the Supplemental
Application; it contains disturbingly similar inaccuracies as
those discussed above. Under oath, Curran stated that he spent
one hour making revisions to the Supplemental Application and
supporting materials drafted by Cameron. Yet, Curran requests .9
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hours for his own work spent to draft the Supplemental
Application. He also claims a separate .8 hours to revise the
Supplemental Application. We demand the strictest level of
accuracy, honesty, and good faith in applications for fees under
1988(b). The Court will deny any section of an application
containing inaccurate statements; we will similarly deny
applications that are knowingly incorrect. Thus we deny .9 hours
from calculation of the lodestar in Consolo's Supplemental
Application.
2. Necessity of work performed by Consolo's attorneys
2. Necessity of work performed by Consolo's attorneys
Defendants strenuously object to Consolo's application
for fees regarding preparation for, and attendance at, two Civil
Appeal Management Program pre-argument conferences (the "Appeal
Conferences"). Both Cameron and Curran attended these two Appeal
Conferences. The Court requires these conferences to promote
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judicial efficiency. We give notice that the Court demands a
high degree of comprehension of the legal and factual issues
presented. Thus, this Court will award fees for preparation for,
and attendance at, the Appeal Conferences. However, 1988(b) is
not a full employment program. Where one attorney would have
been sufficient, 1988(b) will not allow recovery of fees for
the work of two; the Court will discount the work of superfluous
attorneys. Hart v. Bourque, 798 F.2d 519, 523 (1st Cir. 1986)
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(citing King v. Greenblatt, 560 F.2d 1024, 1027 [1st Cir. 1977],
cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916 [1978]). Courts should ordinarily
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greet a claim that several lawyers were required to perform a
single set of tasks with healthy skepticism. Pearson v. Fair,
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980 F.2d 37, 47 (1st Cir. 1992) (internal citations omitted).
Similarly, we should not shift fees for time spent in review of
another attorney's research. Hart, 798 F.2d at 522-23. This
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Court will only include the work of one attorney's preparation
and appearance for the Appeal Conferences when calculating the
number of "reasonable hours" for the lodestar. Since it appears
that Curran performed the great majority of the preparatory work
for these conferences, we find that his work was reasonable under
Hart and Pearson. Therefore, when calculating the number of
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reasonable hours for the lodestar, we will not include 2 hours on
March 30, 1994, and .75 hours on May 12, 1994, claimed by Cameron
in conjunction with the Appeal Conferences.
George and Mulvey object to the Application regarding
work performed in preparation for oral argument. While Cameron
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presented oral argument, Curran provided research. George and
Mulvey would limit Consolo's recovery for this overlap. Such
limitations are appropriate where there is redundancy in legal
work. Hart, 798 F.2d at 523. At best, Curran and Cameron's
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arrangement was an inefficient use of resources. For example,
while Cameron's attendance would have been sufficient, Curran
joined his co-counsel in conferences with consultants. Section
1988(b) does not compel recovery for waste.5 This Court will
consider only one attorney's work in research of the oral
argument toward the number of "reasonable hours spent" for the
lodestar. Therefore, we deduct 7.6 hours from our calculation of
reasonable hours spent.6
We do, however, allow recovery of the fees for both
attorneys' attendance at the appellate hearing, as Curran was
present to answer any factual questions regarding the trial and
Cameron argued the substantive issues of law. Courts should not
read the requirements of "reasonable hours expended" to limit
their own factfinding process.
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5 The attendance of two attorneys at the Appeal Conferences is
not per se superfluous. However, given the lack of
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contemporaneous time records and the application's
inconsistencies, Consolo's application fails to meet its burden
of proof for this expense.
Similarly, we do not hold as matter of law that Cameron and
Curran's research arrangement was duplicative. Nevertheless, in
this instance we find that Consolo has failed to justify this
expense.
6 We deduct 1.1 hours for work on August 25, 1994; 1.8 hours for
work on September 6, 1994; .7 hours for work on September 7,
1994; and 4.0 hours for work on September 8, 1994.
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3. Reasonable fees per hour
3. Reasonable fees per hour
The fee per hour for work on the litigation is the
"core rate." Brewster, 3 F.3d at 492 n.4. Applicants should
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bill other work, including work on the application itself, at a
reduced "non-core rate." Id. A reasonable hourly rate is the
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prevailing market rate in the relevant legal community for
similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills.
Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 & n.11. "Absent more unusual
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circumstances . . . the fee rates of the local area should be
applied even when the lawyers seeking fees are from another
area." Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 555 (10th Cir. 1983).
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Consolo contends that the relevant legal market is Boston, where
this Court heard the appeal. Consolo provided an affidavit
declaring that $175 per hour is a reasonable fee for such work in
Boston. George and Mulvey claim that the relevant legal
community is Worcester, where the incidents giving rise to the
claim occurred. George and Mulvey provide no evidence regarding
Boston area fees, but provide an affidavit declaring that the
relevant per hour fee in Worcester is $150. Here, the district
judge allowed Consolo's request for $175 per hour for trial work
in Worcester. We defer to the determination by the trial judge
and consider $175 the "core rate," a reasonable fee per hour for
purposes of the lodestar.7
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7 Because the trial court concluded that $175/hr. was a
reasonable fee in Worcester and George and Mulvey admit that
$175/hr. was a reasonable fee in Boston, we need make no
determination as to whether the trial court or the appellate
court's legal community is used in calculation of the lodestar.
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Consolo also applied for fees in conjunction with the
creation of the fee applications themselves. "Time reasonably
expended in connection with a fee application is compensable . .
. but it may be fairly compensated at a reduced rate." Brewster,
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3 F.3d at 494 (internal citations omitted). Applicants often
spend such time doing little more than documenting action
previously taken. Id. In this case, we will allow "non-core"
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work such as this at one-half the "core rate." Thus, the fee per
hour for work on the Application and Supplemental Application is
$87.50.
4. Lodestar calculation
4. Lodestar calculation
Consolo applied for a total of 157.9 hours under the
Application. This Court denied 11.3 hours from the calculation
of the lodestar for the obvious inconsistencies in that
application. As noted above, this Court also denied 10.35 hours
within the lodestar, as these hours represent unnecessary or
redundant work. Thus, this Court finds that 136.25 hours was a
"reasonable number of hours" for purposes of the lodestar. Of
the 136.25 hours, 116.05 hours are billed at the "core rate,"
$175 per hour, for appellate related work. The remaining 20.2
hours are billed at $87.50 per hour, half the "core rate," for
application related work. Therefore, Consolo's lodestar for his
Application is $22,076.25.8
Under the Supplemental Application, Consolo seeks fees
for 41.1 hours. Of these, Cameron and Curran spent 29.7 hours on
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8 (116.05 x $175) + (20.2 x $87.50).
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certiorari-related activities; recovery for these hours is at the
"core rate" of $175. Cameron and Curran spent the remaining 11.4
hours either on Consolo's rebuttal memorandum or on the
supplemental fee application. This Court denied .9 hours from
calculation of the lodestar, due to inconsistencies regarding
time spent on the Supplemental Application. We compensate the
remaining 10.5 at one-half of the "core rate," $87.50.
Therefore, Consolo's lodestar for the Supplemental Application is
$6,116.25.9 Consolo's total lodestar is $28,192.50.10
5. Special factors
5. Special factors
Courts may depart from the lodestar to compensate for
"special circumstances." Lipsett, 975 F.2d at 937. Here, the
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Court addressed the concerns of both parties when it calculated
the lodestar. We, therefore, find no reason to depart from the
lodestar in awarding appellate and certiorari fees. We must
satisfy ourselves of the overall fairness and reasonableness of
the fee under these particular circumstances. Lund, 587 F.2d at
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77. This lodestar meets these requirements. Thus, the Court
awards Consolo $28,192.50 for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C.
1988(b).
6. Paralegal fees under 1988(b)
6. Paralegal fees under 1988(b)
Consolo also applied for $1,312.50 in paralegal fees.
Consolo claims that O'Sullivan spent 37.5 hours on the appeal,
for which Consolo claims compensation at $35 per hour. Courts
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9 (29.7 x $175) + (10.5 x $87.50).
10 $22,076.25 + $6116.25.
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may grant paralegal fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988(b).
Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 285 (1989). Courts commonly
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use the lodestar for calculation of such fees. Id.
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O'Sullivan's work included attendance at the Appeal
Conferences and the oral argument before this Court. As stated
above, we deny recovery where the work performed by an attorney
is redundant. Hart, 798 F.2d at 523. We will also deny recovery
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for unnecessary paralegal work. O'Sullivan's attendance at the
conferences and the hearing was unnecessary; we will not shift
this expense to George and Mulvey. Thus we deny recovery for 5.4
hours of O'Sullivan's claim.
"Purely clerical or secretarial tasks should not be
billed at a paralegal rate, regardless of who performs them."
Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 288 n.10. Some of O'Sullivan's claimed time
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is clerical.11 The court will not order a shift of fees for
this time; therefore, we deny an additional 4.05 hours requested
by Consolo for O'Sullivan's work. The remaining 28.05 hours
constitute a "reasonable number of hours" for O'Sullivan's
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11 Tasks that are clearly clerical include:
March 21, 1994 Review file .15 hours
April 18, 1994 Locate documents .3 hours
in file
July 20, 1994 To Copy Cop .3 hours
July 21, 1994 Reorganize file 1.3 hours
July 22, 1994 Continue to .4 hours
reorganize file
September 6, 1994 Locate documents .2 hours
for oral argument
September 7, 1994 Locate documents .5 hours
for oral argument
January 26, 1995 Retrieve documents .5 hours
July 5, 1995 Locate documents .4 hours
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lodestar. George and Mulvey did not contest the $35 per hour
rate claimed by O'Sullivan. Thus, we adopt this as the "core
rate" for O'Sullivan's lodestar. We see no reason to deviate
from the lodestar in this case as we find no "special
circumstances" that merit an increase or decrease. See Lipsett,
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975 F.2d at 937. Thus, this Court awards Consolo $981.75 for
O'Sullivan's fees.12
7. Expenses
7. Expenses
Courts may include an attorney's reasonable expenses
when awarding fees under 1988(b). Grendel's Den, Inc., 749
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F.2d at 951. Section 1988(b) provides for awards of "incidental
and necessary expenses incurred in furnishing effective and
competent representation." Northcross v. Board of Educ., 611
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F.2d 624, 639 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 (1979).
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Consolo claimed $290.78 in his Application for expenses relating
to the appeal. He also claimed $427.71 in the Supplemental
Application for certiorari-related expenses.
We will not shift the cost of long-term investments
made during litigation. Included in his Application, Curran
requests $117.91 for a police misconduct litigation treatise. We
do not question the usefulness of this text; however, attorneys
should make a good faith effort to minimize expenses before
filing for fees under 1988(b). We find no such effort here.
Certainly, Consolo's attorneys could have borrowed the text from
a library for a significantly smaller sum. Thus we deny payment
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12 28.05 x $35.00.
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for this expense.
George and Mulvey objected to expenses for the
transcript of the Defendant's closing argument. George and
Mulvey claim that Consolo never used the transcript, and thus we
should not shift its cost. We think it is inappropriate to
cross-reference expenses to the text of an Appellant's Brief when
awarding fees. It is likely that Cameron and Curran investigated
a course of argument they later deemed unworthy. Denying such
research is contrary to the purpose of 1988(b). Thus, the
Court grants Consolo's request for $84 for the transcript of the
closing argument.
George and Mulvey also contest the use of a courier to
send Consolo's appellate brief to the Defendants' counsel. This
service cost $14. Consolo appears to have retained the courier
in good faith; it was a reasonable attempt to provide George and
Mulvey with a copy of the brief. Thus we grant the request for
$14.
Consolo requests $54.15 in photocopy and library
expenses. Parties may recover such reasonable expenses.13
See, e.g., Northcross, 611 F.2d at 639. George and Mulvey do not
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object; thus this expense is granted. George and Mulvey also do
not object to a $8.39 expense for a videotape; this is granted.
The remaining $26.27 in the Application was an expense
Consolo should have obtained under Fed. R. App. P. 39.
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13 Counsel billed $3.20 of Consolo's fee application for costs
to "misc." and not to Consolo. We do not consider this amount in
our calculations.
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Applicants should not seek such costs under the aegis of a
1988(b) action. Therefore, we grant $143.40 in expenses under
the Application.14
In the Supplemental Application, Consolo included a
bill from a legal publisher clearly identifying necessary and
reasonable expenses related to certiorari. While we have no
record of payment, bills such as these are rebuttable evidence of
an expense. We presume that Cameron and Curran will pay this
bill. If George and Mulvey had demonstrated otherwise, we would
not have shifted this expense. Thus, we grant $327.71 for
reproduction and service of Consolo's Brief in Opposition.
Finally, Cameron requests $100 reimbursement for admission fees
to the bar of the Supreme Court. George and Mulvey do not object
to this expense; it is thus granted.
C. Conclusion
C. Conclusion
In total, this court awards $29,745.36 to Consolo for
appellate and certiorari attorney's fees and costs pursuant to 42
U.S.C. 1988(b) and 1st Cir. R. 39.2.
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14 $290.78 - ($117.91 + $26.27 + $3.20).
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