June 23, 1995         [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]



                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT



              





                                 ____________________





        No. 94-2248 



                             FRANK A. GRECO, M.D., Ph.D.,



                                Plaintiff, Appellant,



                                          v.



                             MARY C. FITZPATRICK, ET AL.,



                                Defendants, Appellees.





                                 ____________________



                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT



                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS



                    [Hon. Richard G. Stearns, U.S. District Judge]



                                 ____________________



                                        Before



                                Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                           ___________

                          Selya and Boudin, Circuit Judges.
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                                 ____________________



            Frank A. Greco, M.D., Ph.D., on brief pro se.
            ___________________________

            Scott  Harshbarger, Attorney  General,  and Rebecca  P.  McIntyre,
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        Assistant Attorney General, on brief for appellees.





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                 Per Curiam.   We  affirm the judgment  substantially for
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            the  reasons  recited in  the  district  court's decision  of



            November 10, 1994, adding only the following comments.



                 In  objecting to  the district  court's reliance  on the



            Rooker-Feldman doctrine,  see Rooker  v. Fidelity  Trust Co.,
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            263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v.
                                 _____________________________________



            Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), plaintiff argues that he is not
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            seeking to overturn any state court judgment per se and that,



            in  fact, many of the challenges here advanced to the probate



            court  proceedings  were never  pursued  in  the state  court



            system.    The  Rooker-Feldman  doctrine  recognizes  that  a
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            federal district court lacks appellate jurisdiction to review



            a  state  court judgment.   See,  e.g.,  id. at  482-86; Gash
                                        ___   ____   ___             ____



            Assocs.  v. Village of  Rosemont, Ill., 995  F.2d 726, 728-29
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            (7th Cir. 1993);  Lancellotti v.  Fay, 909 F.2d  15, 17  (1st
                              ___________     ___



            Cir. 1990).  What  plaintiff fails to recognize is  that such



            "impermissible appellate  review may  occur  when a  district



            court is asked  to entertain a claim that was not even argued



            in the state court but is 'inextricably intertwined' with the



            state court judgment."   Ritter  v. Ross, 992  F.2d 750,  753
                                     ______     ____



            (7th Cir.  1993) (quoting  Feldman, 460  U.S.  at 483  n.16),
                                       _______



            cert.  denied,  114 S.  Ct. 694  (1994); accord,  e.g., Keene
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            Corp. v.  Cass, 908 F.2d  293, 296-97 (8th  Cir. 1990).   The
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            multiple claims here  presented--alleging violations of  such



            matters  as due process,  equal protection, and  the right to



            counsel--are  sufficiently  "intertwined"  with  the  probate



            court  proceedings so  as to  fall within  the Rooker-Feldman
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            doctrine's embrace.   Plaintiff's remedy is  to appeal within



            the state  court system and  then, if necessary,  to petition



            the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.



                 We add that plaintiff's various allegations would falter



            even if the merits were to  be considered.  To list just some



            of  the  infirmities affecting  his complaint:   In  order to



            state a cause of action under  the second clause of 42 U.S.C.



               1985(2),  plaintiff  was required  to  allege class-based,



            invidiously  discriminatory  animus,   see,  e.g.,  Hahn   v.
                                                   ___   ____   ____



            Sargent, 523 F.2d 461, 469 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
            _______                                     ____________



            U.S. 904  (1976); divorced  fathers seeking custody  of their



            children  do not  form a  protected class  under   1985.   No



            Sixth Amendment right to counsel obtains in civil proceedings



            of this nature.  See, e.g., Wilson v. State of New Hampshire,
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            18  F.3d 40, 41 (1st  Cir. 1994) (per  curiam).  Unauthorized



            conduct  that  cannot be  foreseen  and  controlled does  not



            constitute  a due  process violation  "until and  unless [the



            state]  ...  refuses to  provide  a  suitable postdeprivation



            remedy,"  Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984); no such
                      ______    ______



            showing has been  made here.   With respect  to those  claims



            that were  or  could  have been  presented  in  state  court,







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            relitigation thereof would  be barred on preclusion  grounds.



            See, e.g., Willhauck v.  Halpin, 953 F.2d 689, 705  (1st Cir.
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            1991).   The judicial defendants would be immune from most if



            not  all of  the damage  claims here  presented.   See, e.g.,
                                                               ___  ____



            Mireles v.  Waco, 502  U.S. 9 (1991)  (per curiam).   And the
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            Commonwealth and  the probate  court (along with  the private



            defendants in  their official  capacities) are  not "persons"



            within the  meaning of 42 U.S.C.   1983.  See, e.g., Hafer v.
                                                      ___  ____  _____



            Melo,  502 U.S. 21, 25-26  (1991); Will v.  Michigan Dep't of
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            State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 62-70 (1989).  
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                 Affirmed.
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