This appeal is from affirmance by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals1 of a judgment of the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions2 convicting appellant, Siamack Zaimi, of "bring[ing]" the Shah of Iran "into public disrepute"3 in purported violation of D.C.Code Sec. 22-1115.4 Zaimi contends that that section imposes an unconstitutional restraint on freedom of speech and that the evidence at his trial was insufficient to warrant conviction.5 We conclude that the activities upon which Zaimi's conviction rested did not infringe Section 22-1115. Accordingly, and without reaching Zaimi's constitutional arguments, we reverse.

* On June 12, 1968, while the Shah of Iran was in temporary residence at Blair House during an official visit to the United States, Zaimi and a companion, Khosro Kalantari,6 became principals in two incidents on the sidewalk across the street from Blair House.7 The first occurred about 12:30 p. m. when, as the Shah was getting into a car en route to the White House, Zaimi and Kalantari stepped off the curb and "shouted" in a foreign language.8 The second episode took place about 2:10 p. m. while the Shah was inside Blair House. Zaimi and his companion were again observed on the sidewalk, and Zaimi was carrying "something wrapped" under his arm. Police officers approached, inquired as to what it was, and were told that it was a banner which Zaimi intended to unfurl when the Shah came out of Blair House.9 The officers seized the banner, informing them it would be unlawful to display it within five hundred feet of Blair House while the Shah was staying there.10 Then followed the events which precipitated their arrests.

Failing in efforts to persuade the officers to return the banner, Kalantari, and then Zaimi, mounted a curbing beside the sidewalk and each began "shouting," partly in English and partly in a foreign tongue. As described at trial, Kalantari declared "that the Shah was selling out to American capitalists" and Zaimi "said approximately the same thing."11 The speeches lasted about five minutes; about thirty people were standing nearby and "[t]hey just watched what was going on." It appears without controversy that Zaimi and Kalantari were then within five hundred feet12 of Blair House, and that neither had a permit to engage in speechmaking at that point.13 Officers advised the pair that they were violating the law14 and, when they refused to desist, placed them under arrest.15

Zaimi and Kalantari were jointly prosecuted on an information laying two charges under Section 22-1115. The first was that they "did . . . [i]ntimidate, coerce, harass and bring into public disrepute an officer of a foreign government . . . within five hundred feet of a building . . . being used and occupied by the representative of a foreign government . . . for an official purpose without a permit from the Chief of Police . . . ."16 The second charge was that they "did congregate within five hundred feet of such building . . . and refuse to disperse after having been ordered so to do by the police authorities. . . ."17 At the conclusion of trial, without a jury, the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions granted a defense motion to dismiss the second charge,18 but found both guilty on the charge, in the court's words, "that they did bring into public disrepute an officer of a foreign government, the Shah of Iran. . . ."19 Each was sentenced to pay a fine of $100 or spend five days in jail.20 The District of Columbia Court of Appeals rejecting Zaimi's constitutional and insufficiency-of-evidence claims, affirmed21 and the case is here for our review.22

For convenience of analysis, we reproduce Section 22-1115 in toto. It provides:

It shall be unlawful to display any flag, banner, placard, or device designed or adapted to intimidate, coerce, or bring into public odium any foreign government, party, or organization, or any officer or officers thereof, or to bring into public disrepute political, social, or economic acts, views, or purposes of any foreign government, party, or organization, or to intimidate, coerce, harass, or bring into public disrepute any officer or officers or diplomatic or consular representatives of any foreign government, or to interfere with the free and safe pursuit of the duties of any diplomatic or consular representatives of any foreign government, within five hundred feet of any building or premises within the District of Columbia used or occupied by any foreign government or its representative or representatives as an embassy, legation, consulate, or for other official purposes, except by, and in accordance with, a permit issued by the superintendent of police of the said District; or to congregate within five hundred feet of any such building or premises, and refuse to disperse after having been ordered so to do by the police authorities of the said District.23

This was the statute upon which Zaimi was charged, tried and convicted, and the first effort it beckons is one to ascertain just what species of conduct its multifarious provisions restrict. As even the most careful examination of this section discloses, the reach of some of its prohibitions is far from certain.

In two of its several aspects, the meaning of Section 22-1115 rings clearly. One is the portion following the only semicolon-the fifth prohibition, making it unlawful "to congregate within five hundred feet of any such building or premises, and refuse to disperse after having been ordered so to do by the police authorities of the said District."24 It is apparent merely from a reading that this interdiction is functionally as well as grammatically separate from those preceding it. The other aspect in which the statutory language presents no difficulty is the first prohibition, making it unlawful "to display any flag, banner, placard, or device designed or adapted to intimidate, coerce, or bring into public odium any foreign government, party, or organization, or any officer or officers thereof."25 It is evident, as the parties recognize, that there can be no violation of this injunction without a "display" of a "flag, banner, placard, or device" which is "designed or adapted" to produce one or more of the enumerated consequences.

The remaining provisions of Section 22-1115, however, are not nearly so distinct. The second prohibition relates to conduct intended "to bring into public disrepute political, social, or economic acts, views, or purposes of any foreign government, party or organization."26 The third prohibition refers to activity calculated "to intimidate, coerce, harass, or bring into public disrepute any officer or officers or diplomatic or consular representatives of any foreign government."27 The fourth prohibition is aimed at behavior undertaking "to interfere with the free and safe pursuit of the duties of any diplomatic or consular representatives of any foreign government."28 The question, however, is whether Section 22-1115 means that "[i]t shall be unlawful [simply] to" achieve a result specified in these three provisions, or whether it means that "[i]t shall be unlawful to display any flag, banner, placard, or device designed or adapted to" achieve the prohibited result.29

Thus we are confronted by the problem whether the second, third and fourth prohibitions of Section 22-1115 intercept conduct which does not involve the "display" of a "flag, banner, placard, or device designed or adapted" to bring about one or more of the effects condemned.30 Stated differently, the problem is whether an offense under Section 22-1115 is committed simply by utterances unaccompanied by a "congregat[ing]" or a "display" of a "flag, banner, placard, or other device" which is "designed or adapted" to accomplish an end which the section undertakes to forbid.31 If not, it follows that Zaimi did not trespass upon the statute for, as the trial judge found, there was no "congregat[ing]"32 and, as the uncontradicted evidence demonstrated, the banner which Zaimi at one time carried was never "display[ed]."33

We have not previously had occasion to examine the scope of Section 22-1115 in this regard. In Frend v. United States,34 this court was summoned primarily to resolve a First Amendment challenge by four defendants in a situation where an infraction was beyond peradventure. As the opinion in that case states, "[t]he evidence abundantly shows that all four defendants flagrantly violated the terms of the" statute,35 for "[a]t the time of the arrest, each defendant was parading in the public streets in front of the Austrian or the German embassy with a number of other persons, some of whom were carrying banners or placards inscribed with language . . . intended and calculated to bring into contempt the German Government."36 Since "this congregation of people with opprobrious signs and songs in the streets in front of the embassies was a concerted, prearranged plan intended 'to bring into public disrepute political, social, or economic . . . views . . . of [a] foreign government,' " the conclusion was that "[i]n the circumstances, and without stopping to determine whether each of the defendants was then displaying one of the placards mentioned, we think that all are guilty under the provisions of the local law making it an offense to aid and abet in a violation of a law."37 Neither in Frend nor in any other case have we been called upon to determine whether Section 22-1115 tolerates a conviction where the allegedly offensive conduct consisted wholly in spoken words.38

The parties did not deal with this problem in their briefs or oral arguments. When, after submission of the case, it became apparent to us that it lay at the threshold, we invited supplemental memoranda addressed to it. The parties responded, each arguing that Section 22-1115 covers speech as well as demonstrative acts. We have carefully considered these presentations, and have ourselves investigated the matter independently. We detail herein the fruits of our study.

Our starting point is the language of Section 22-1115,39 and it is obvious that it is readily susceptible to either of two possible constructions. By one-which the parties advocate-the statute would limit the need for "display" of a "flag, banner, placard, or device" to the first prohibition.40 If this is what the statute means, the second, third and fourth prohibitions could be violated by utterances without more. On the other hand, Section 22-1115 may with equal facility be construed as extending the need for "display" of a "flag, banner, placard or device" to each of its prohibitions except the fifth, forbidding "congregat[ing]."41 By this interpretation, utterances alone would not bring the person making them within the purview of the statute. Rather, Section 22-1115 would proscribe only two acts: (a) the "display," without a permit and within five hundred feet of premises used by representatives of a foreign government of a "flag, banner, placard, or device designed or adapted" to bring about results made taboo by the first four prohibitions; and (b) the "congregat[ing]," within the five hundred foot area, of persons who refuse to disperse upon request of the police, whether or not there is such a display.

Lacking a decisive indication in the statutory text as to the choice properly to be made between these two constructional alternatives, we turn to the legislative history for such assistance as it may afford.42 Section 22-1115 had its genesis in a joint resolution introduced by Senator Pittman, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.43 As offered, the resolution, to the extent pertinent to the question here, contained two discrete provisions. One, which was to forerun Section 22-1115, specified

That it shall be unlawful to display any flag, banner, or device designed or adapted to bring into public notice any party, organization, or movement, or the political, social, or economic views or purposes of any individual or group, upon any portion of any public highway, street, or alley, including the sidewalks and parkways on both sides thereof, within the District of Columbia adjacent to or within five hundred feet of any building or premises used or occupied by any foreign government or its representatives as an embassy or for diplomatic or other official purposes, except by, and in accordance with, a permit issued by the superintendent of police of the said District; or to congregate upon any such portion of any highway, street, alley, sidewalk, or parkway, and refuse to disperse after having been ordered so to do by the police authorities of the said District.44

The other, directed toward loitering on public thoroughfares in the vicinity of such premises, specified that

It shall be unlawful for any person or persons, singly or in groups, to loiter upon any portion of any public highway, street, alley, sidewalk, or any parkway along the same, within the District of Columbia adjacent to any premises used or occupied by any foreign government or its representatives as an embassy or for diplomatic or other official purposes.45

Senator Pittman's resolution was referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,46 which promptly reported a measure to the Senate. The Committee's version was quite similar to the first provision of the Pittman proposal:

[I]t shall be unlawful to display any flag, banner, or device or design adapted to bring into public notice any party, organization, or movement, or the political, social, or economic acts, views, or purposes of any individual, party, group, or organization within 500 feet of any building or premises within the District of Columbia used or occupied by any foreign government or its representatives as an embassy or for diplomatic or other official purposes, except by and in accordance with the permit issued by the superintendent of police of the said District; or to congregate within 500 feet of any such building or premises and refuse to disperse after having notice so to do by the police authorities of the said District.47

The Committee, however, dropped the Pittman provision dealing with loitering.

Plainly, the resolution offered by Senator Pittman undertook proscription only of picketing, congregating and loitering near diplomatic sanctuaries. The first provision would have made unlawful only some "display" of a "flag, banner, or device designed or adapted to bring" certain things "into public notice," when the "display" occurred in close proximity to premises used by foreign governments or their representatives and without a permit authorizing that action;48 or some "congregat[ing]" on public thoroughfares in the vicinity of such premises, coupled with a refusal to disperse after being ordered to do so by police.49 The same must be said for the resolution reported out by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.50 Neither version would have condemned any conduct unassociated with some form of "congregat[ing]" or some "display" of a "flag, banner, or device" having a particularized design or adaptation. And although Senator Pittman's offering would also have imposed a ban upon loitering, the Committee omitted it.

When the resolution came up for debate in the Senate, Senator Pittman declared that its first proscription "merely prohibits a display of flags or banners within 500 feet of an embassy or legation or consulate when the flags or banners or devices are intended to bring into public notice an organization or party or group."51 The motivation for the resolution, he explained, was the need to protect diplomatic sanctuaries in the United States in order to secure protection of American citizens abroad, particularly those seeking shelter within our own sanctuaries in countries experiencing internal conflict.52 Queried by Senator La Follette as to whether "anything has happened in the City of Washington which . . . threatened or endangered the life of any of the representatives of other governments,"53 Senator Pittman read a statement of a police inspector describing the picketing of four embassies,54 and a letter from then Secretary of State Hull urging adoption of the resolution.55

The bill reported by the Committee on Foreign Relations, however, was not to engage the attention of the Senate for very long, for Senators Pittman and La Follette each offered amendments as complete substitutes for the Committee's version.56 It was the Pittman amendment, with but a single modification,57 which was to emerge as the present Section 22-1115. The La Follette amendment, on the other hand, adopted an entirely different approach. It would have amended an existing statute58 prohibiting disorderly conduct and assemblages,59 and unquestionably would have forbidden some types of vocal communication as well as some displays of banners and placards.60

Despite the textual differences in the Pittman amendment, neither upon its introduction nor at any point during the lengthy debate that followed did Senator Pittman unequivocally indicate a desire to expand the restriction on communication beyond displays of the type which the Committee's resolution would have outlawed. The Senator emphasized his purpose to protect the safety of occupants of diplomatic sanctuaries from demonstrations likely to erupt in mob violence,61 and referred repeatedly to displays of banners and placards.62 At no time, however, did the Senator or any of his colleagues make any statement clearly indicative either of an intention to intercept mere utterances or an understanding that his amendment would do so.63

Some amount of discussion followed inquiries to Senator Pittman as to why his goals would not be attained by the amendment tendered by Senator La Follette.64 That amendment, as we have said, would have forbidden some kinds of utterances as well as displays of some kinds of banners and devices.65 The colloquies ensuing upon such inquiries underscore Senator Pittman's concern over picketing rather than speechmaking. When Senator Vandenberg questioned Senator Pittman's reluctance to accede to Senator La Follette's substitute,66 Senator Pittman replied:

The Attorney General is very anxious to assure them that their homes will be safe from any attacks, that their families will be safe from any attacks or intimidation, and that their government shall not be brought into disrepute, and that odium shall not be placed upon them right in their faces by the display of placards and banners in front of their embassies or legations.67

When Senator Vandenberg pointed out that the La Follette amendment would "prohibit not only the things to which [Senator Pittman's] resolution refers but a great many other things,"68 Senator Pittman argued that the La Follette proposal,

while it does not meet the material questions at all, is in the nature of an insult to the very principle and policy that the nations have recognized with regard to ambassadors and ministers since the beginning of government. We are to put them in the same position, it is understood, as passersby on the street; if the picketers do not indulge in any swearing or use obscene language, then the ambassadors or ministers have no right whatsoever to complain.69

And when Senator La Follette insisted that Senator Pittman "tell the Senate, if my amendment were agreed to, what could take place that . . . would . . . [be] objectionable if the police . . . enforced the law,"70 Senator Pittman retorted:

[You ask me] what they can do besides insult? What can they do without using obscene language? What can they do without swearing? Those are the acts against which [Senator La Follette's substitute] protects. What can they do? They can inscribe on a banner and hold it right in front of the entrance of an embassy.71

Thus Senator Pittman, the author and proponent of the amendment which ultimately became Section 22-1115, rejected a specific prohibition against oral communication.72

In the waning moments of debate, Senator La Follette focused on the part of Senator Pittman's amendment making it unlawful "to bring into public notice . . . any political, social or economic acts, views, or purposes of any foreign government, party, or organization, or to intimidate, coerce, harass, or bring into public disrepute. . . ."73 Senator La Follette declared that Senator Pittman "has again and again indicated that he does not believe that the people in this country have the right or should have the right, no matter how well they conduct themselves, no matter how proper or appropriate their representations may be, to go within 500 feet of any premises occupied by the representative of any government accredited to this country."74 Senator Pittman replied:

There is hardly any use is discussing the matter any longer with the Senator. The language shows that it refers to the carrying of banners or devices. If the Senator still thinks that the offense is walking up and down, I cannot agree with him.75

The significance of this response derives from the fact that the language of the Pittman amendment to which Senator La Follette referred is outside the clause which contains the language "to display any flag, banner, placard, or device designed or adapted. . . ."76

Shortly after this duologue, the debate ended. Senator La Follette's substitute bill was voted down;77 Senator Pittman accepted a proviso to his substitute78 which, as thus modified, was passed.79 The Pittman version then traveled the route to enactment without further change or debate.80

In sum, Section 22-1115 began as a committee-fashioned joint resolution framed in language which could leave no doubt as to its inapplicability to spoken as distinguished from written and symbolic communications. Although that formulation was soon displaced by Senator Pittman's amendment, which eventuated as the enacted measure, no difference in goals or proscriptions material to this case was urged or acknowledged. Although it was never said flatly that the Pittman substitute was limited to displays of banners and like paraphernalia, such events as possessed some degree of positivity suggest that it was. And although throughout the long debate the participants constantly and consistently referred to picketing and demonstrating with banners and similar devices, we find not a single statement reliably indicating either advocacy or understanding that the Pittman measure would forbid spoken words.81 So truly amazing that fact would be if the Pittman measure had been so intended that it is difficult to believe that it was.

Against this backdrop we measure the contentions of Zaimi and the Government-the latter assuming the burden82-that the prohibitions of Section 22-1115 extend to speech as well as other types of conduct transpiring without a permit within the geographical limits set by the section. The Government first asserts that since both the first and the third prohibitions refer to "any officer or officers,"83 they become redundant unless the third is indulged operation without displays of the type the first concededly demands.84 We cannot agree with this argument. We perceive no significant duplication in the two provisions,85 and in any event the Government's interpretation would not remove it.86 Moreover, "[w]hile courts should interpret a statute with an eye to the surrounding landscape and an ear for harmonizing potentially discordant provisions, these guiding principles are not substitutes for congressional lawmaking."87 These considerations apply with even greater force to the Government's argument that the first and second prohibitions are redundant.88 We cannot accept these or other feeble suggestions89 as a panacea for the grave uncertainty bred by the statutory language and history in terms of any embargo on vocal acts.90

The Government resorts also to the congressional debates in an effort to buttress the construction it espouses. We are told that some of the remarks evince a purpose to proscribe not only picketing with banners and similar devices but every form of conduct intruding upon the inviolability of diplomatic premises. Save for one misread colloquy,91 the Government does not identify any remarks of that sort, and our own study of the debates has not enabled us to. Lastly, the Government refers to three isolated remarks during debate as demonstrations of a legislative intent to ban utterances. We have discussed those remarks previously,92 and it suffices to repeat that we cannot read them so boldly.

More fundamentally, the Government's arguments miss the point. The crucial inquiry is not whether Section 22-1115 covers utterances ambivalently, but whether it "plainly and unmistakably" does so.93 The governing principle is that penal statutes are to be interpreted with exactitude,94 a rule deriving sustenance from considerations more ancient than the Nation itself. "Reasonable precision in the definition of crime has been regarded as a desideratum by free people since the early days of the common law."95 Moreover, the specification of criminal offenses is peculiarly the business, not of courts, but of legislatures.96 Criminal statutes are thus "to be construed strictly, not loosely;"97 "[s]tatutes will not be read to create crimes . . . unless the purpose so to do is plain,"98 and "ambiguity" concerning the ambit of criminal statutes "should be resolved in favor of lenity."99 Nowhere is the need for definitional precision greater than in situations where the statute intrudes upon an area which draws protection from the First Amendment.100

So it is that "one 'is not to be subjected to a penalty unless the words of the statute plainly impose it.' "101 Criminal statutes are not to be broadened beyond the fair import of their language;102 they "may not be held to extend to cases not covered by the words used."103 "Before one may be punished, it must appear that his case is plainly within the statute; there are no constructive offenses."104

It is evident that Section 22-1115, as applied to utterances, without more, does not meet these wholesome standards. Whatever meager conclusions as to its applicability to oral communications may be drawn from its text105 and its legislative history,106 it must be conceded that the section is seriously equivocal on that score. That, we think, is fatal to the conviction under review. We realize that disreputation may be wrought by word of mouth as well as by displays of signs and banners. But "[t]he fact that a particular activity may be within the same general classification and policy of those covered does not necessarily bring it within the ambit of the criminal prohibition."107 On the contrary, "[w]e should not derive criminal outlawry from some ambiguous implication,"108 and "judicial enlargement of a criminal act by interpretation is at war with a fundamental concept of the common law that crimes must be defined with appropriate definiteness."109

At the very least, Section 22-1115 is equally conducive to dual interpretations. By one, oral communications do not impinge upon it; by the other, they may.110 In our view, the case for the first construction is compelling. For "when choice has to be made between two readings of what conduct Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the harsher alternative, to require that Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and definite."111 As the Supreme Court has admonished:

This principle is founded on two policies which have long been part of our tradition. First, "a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed. To make the warning fair, so far as possible the line should be clear."112 Second, because of the seriousness of criminal penalties, and because criminal punishment usually represents the moral condemnation of the community, legislatures and not courts should define criminal activity. This policy embodies "the instinctive distaste against men languishing in prison unless the lawmaker has clearly said they should."113 Thus, where there is ambiguity in a criminal statute doubts are resolved in favor of the defendant.114

Perhaps the most striking circumstance in this case is that if Congress had really intended to forbid utterances, it would have been easy enough to have made that plain. Indeed, Senator La Follette did just that in the amendment which Senator Pittman flatly rejected.115 Section 22-1115 meticulously specifies the consequences against which it erects protection for foreign governments and their representatives, and makes it crystal clear that at least some of its provisions are bulwarks against displays of written and symbolic communication,116 but it nowhere mentions the spoken word as a prohibited medium.

Section 22-1115 thus stands in sharp contrast with the newly enacted Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States.117 That legislation pursues objectives not essentially variant from those underlying Section 22-1115,118 and provides for foreign emissaries in the states safeguards comparable to those afforded by Section 22-1115 and other statutes in the District.119 One of the Act's provisions closely resembles Section 22-1115 but, very significantly, it puts in plain English its prohibition against "utter[ances]" of "any word, phrase, sound, or noise" as well as against "parades, pickets, [and] displays [of] any flag, banner, sign, placard, or device."120 And the debates on the Act are replete with discussion of its circumscription on utterances, leaving no doubt as to the understanding and intent of Congress in that respect.121 We perceive no reason why, had Congress intended Section 22-1115 to bar oral as well as demonstrative conduct, it could not have been similarly explicit.

Section 22-1115, as we have said, clearly imposes a ban upon "congregat[ing]" within five hundred feet of "building[s] or premises" used or occupied by representatives of foreign governments and refusal "to disperse after having been ordered so to do by the police authorities."122 We conclude that the remaining provisions of Section 22-1115, properly construed, come into play only where there is a "display" of a "flag, banner, placard, or device designed or adapted to" produce one or more of the several consequences specified in those provisions.123 These demonstrative elements, we hold, are essential, and speech alone is not prohibited. The trial judge dismissed the count of the information charging Zaimi and Kalantari with "congregat[ing],"124 and uncontroverted evidence at their trial demonstrates that neither did more than make utterances.125 We do not reach the question whether Congress might validly proscribe conduct of the type in which Zaimi and his companion engaged.126 We say only that in Section 22-1115 Congress has not done so.

The judgment of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded with instructions to dismiss the information against Zaimi.

So ordered.

I concur in the result reached and in Judge Robinson's very scholarly and thorough opinion. The actions for which the appellant was charged and convicted simply were actions which were not intended to be prohibited by the language of the statute (D.C.Code, Sec. 22-1115), which the legislative history, as of the 1937 date of enactment, makes clear, whatever the present or recent administrative understanding of the effect of the statute. The conviction therefore cannot be allowed to stand.

The fact that the recent administrative interpretation of this statute has not been the same as that now promulgated by this court, plus the enactment of certain legislation in October 1972, obliges me to raise a caveat.

It seems undeniable on the basis of Judge Robinson's careful legislative history research that the correct interpretation of Sec. 22-1115 is that the prohibited conduct necessarily involves the display of a flag, banner, placard, or device designed to accomplish the prohibited objectives. This is the construction set forth in our opinion (footnote 41), it is supported by the construction of the original bill introduced by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Senator Pittman's substitute bill which ultimately became law, and by the dialogue between Senator Pittman and Senator La Follette, whose substitute bill (not adopted) would clearly have prohibited speech, gestures, or other acts to accomplish the objectives admittedly prohibited by Sec. 22-1115. So much for the history at the time the statute was enacted.

My caveat is that this interpretation of D.C.Code Sec. 22-1115 does not square with the new 1972 Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States,1 quoted in pertinent part in footnote 120 of the court's opinion. The court's opinion comments, "That legislation pursues objectives not essentially variant from those underlying Section 22-1115, and provides for foreign emissaries in the states safeguards comparable to those afforded by Section 22-1115 and other statutes in the District." (Footnote references omitted.)

The 1972 Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States in its comparable provision (18 U.S.C. Sec. 112(c)) begins: "Whoever within the United States but outside the District of Columbia and within one hundred feet of any building or premises belonging to or used or occupied by a foreign government. . . ." It then proceeds to prohibit among other things, "(1) parades, pickets, displays any flag, banner, sign, placard, or device, or utters any word, phrase, sound, or noise, for the purpose of intimidating, coercing, threatening, or harassing any foreign official. . . ." It seems to me that when the last Congress in October 1972 enacted a statute which "pursues objectives not essentially variant from those underlying Section 22-1115," but made that statute only applicable outside the District of Columbia, the Congress proceeded on the assumption that the existing statute in the District of Columbia provided the same protection for the foreign emissaries.2 If that assumption be true, then Congress apparently assumed that, not only was the displaying of any flag, banner, sign, placard, or device which would intimidate, coerce, threaten, or harass a foreign official prohibited, but likewise prohibited by the existing D.C. Code Sec. 22-1115 under which appellant Zaimi was convicted, erroneously as we now hold, were also actions described as "or utters any word, phrase, sound, or noise" for the same purposes.

If our opinion today is correct, then Congress by the 1972 legislation provided much more protection against harassment and intimidation for foreign emissaries outside the capital of our country than is now provided in Washington, D.C., itself. It is doubtful if Congress intended to do this. It appears that Congress in 1972 incorrectly assumed the interpretation of D.C.Code Sec. 22-1115 as set forth in footnote 40 in our opinion today, which would have sustained the conviction of Zaimi. It is doubtful if Congress analyzed the D.C. statute as we do in footnote 41, which we hold correct and which is supported by the history of the enactment of that legislation in 1937.

If my comparison of D.C.Code Sec. 22-1115 with the newly enacted Public Law No. 92-539 (1972) (18 U.S.C. Sec. 112(c)) is correct, and Congress did enact the latter under a misapprehension as to the limited coverage of D.C.Code Sec. 22-1115,3 then Congress may make the protection of foreign emissaries in the nation's capital uniform with that afforded throughout the United States in one of several ways. Congress could repeal the limiting words "but outside the District of Columbia" of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 112(c) and make clear that the new statute is designed to displace D.C.Code Sec. 22-1115 as law in the District of Columbia also. Or, Congress could enact appropriate portions of Public Law 92-539 as part of the D.C.Code and repeal the present D.C.Code Sec. 22-1115. Lastly, if in fact Congress is satisfied to have differing degrees of protection afforded foreign official guests inside and outside the national capital, then it can do nothing and permit the U.S.Code and D.C.Code provisions to reflect those differing degrees of protection.