C STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
FLORIDA MANUFACTURED HOUSING ASSOCIATION, )
INC., a Florida incorporated association ) not for profit, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) CASE NO. 88-1133RP
)
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION, )
DIVISION OF FLORIDA LAND SALES, )
CONDOMINIUMS AND MOBILE HOMES, )
)
Respondent, )
and )
)
FEDERATION OF MOBILE HOME OWNERS )
OF FLORIDA, INC., )
)
Intervenor. )
)
FINAL ORDER
Pursuant to notice, this cause was heard by Linda M. Rigot, the assigned Hearing Officer of the Division of Administrative Hearings, on May 3-4, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida.
Petitioner Florida Manufactured Housing Association, Inc., was represented by David D. Eastman, Esquire, Tallahassee, Florida; Respondent Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes was represented by Thomas Presnell, Jr., Esquire, and Debra Roberts, Esquire, Tallahassee, Florida; and Intervenor Federation of Mobile Home Owners of Florida, Inc., was represented by Lee Jay Colling, Esquire, Orlando, Florida.
Petitioner Florida Manufactured Housing Association, Inc., timely filed a petition pursuant to Section 120.54(4), Florida Statutes, seeking a determination that Respondent's proposed rule 7D-31.002 is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Respondent's first motion to dismiss was granted, and Petitioner timely filed an amended petition. Petitioner and Respondent stipulated that the Intervenor had standing to intervene in this proceeding in support of the proposed rule. Accordingly, the issue for determination herein is whether Respondent's proposed rule 7D-31.002 is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Petitioner presented the testimony of Frank Williams, Leonard Jeter, Jack Ziegler, James F. Gould, William Michael Hart II, Bob Custer, and Faye Mayberry. Respondent presented the testimony of Bill Williams. Additionally, Petitioner's Exhibits numbered 1-21 and Respondent's Exhibits numbered 1-3 were admitted in evidence.
Petitioner and Respondent submitted post-hearing proposed findings of fact in the form of proposed final orders. A ruling on each proposed finding of fact can be found in the Appendix to this Final Order.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Chapter 723, Florida Statutes, the Florida Mobile Home Act, became law on June 4, 1984, created by Chapter 84-80, Laws of Florida. Chapter 723 expressly preempts to the state all regulation and control of mobile home lot rents in mobile home parks and all those matters relating to the landlord-tenant relationship treated by or falling within the purview of the chapter. The statute regulates any residential tenancy in which a mobile home is placed upon a rented or leased lot in a mobile home park in which 10 or more lots are offered for rent or lease. The statute requires that every owner of a mobile home park containing 26 or more lots shall file a prospectus with the Respondent prior to entering into an enforceable rental agreement. Respondent has the power and duty to enforce and ensure compliance with the provisions of the chapter and rules promulgated pursuant to the chapter relating to the rental of mobile home lots. Respondent is further authorized to promulgate rules, pursuant to Chapter 120, which are necessary to implement, enforce and interpret the chapter.
The proposed rule at issue in this proceeding was first published in the Florida Administrative Weekly, Volume 14, Number 7, February 19, 1988. The parties have requested official recognition of the proposed rule and its date of publication, and that request is hereby granted.
Proposed rule 7D-31.002, Florida Administrative Code, provides: 7D-31.002 Fees, Charges and Assessments.
For tenancies in existence before June 4, 1984, including any assumptions of those tenancies pursuant to Section 723.059, Florida Statutes, the mobile home owner is not obligated to pay any fees, charges or assessments which were not disclosed fully
in writing prior to occupancy, any provision to the contrary in a prospectus notwithstanding, unless the park owner can establish that the fees, charges or assessments have been collected as a matter of custom as defined in subsection (4) of this rule. Furthermore, the mobile home owner is not obligated to install any permanent improvements at all, including those mandated by governmental entities or utility companies.
For tenancies created on or after June 4, 1984, pass through charges, as defined
in Section 723.003(9), Florida Statutes, may be imposed by the mobile home park owner if the mobile home owner's obligation to pay such charges was disclosed in general terms pursuant to Sections 723.011 and 723.012, Florida Statutes, or pursuant to Section 723.013, Florida Statutes, even though the charge being imposed was not
disclosed specifically, and the imposition of such pass through charges is not a violation of Section 723.042, Florida Statutes. However, pass through charges may not be imposed if the mobile home owner's obligation to pay such charges was not disclosed generally and prior to occupancy as required by Section 723.042, Florida Statutes and by Sections 723.011(2) and 723.012, Florida Statutes or Section 723.013, Florida Statutes, whichever is applicable.
No fee, charge or assessment shall be imposed by a mobile home park owner on the purchaser of a mobile home situated in the park that is offered for sale by a resident of the park and as a condition to the purchaser being reviewed or approved for residency in the park.
A fee, charge or assessment has been collected as a matter of custom if it was collected prior to July 1, 1976.
Petitioner is a not-for-profit incorporated association, whose members include approximately 1,000 mobile home park owners and operators who own and operate mobile home parks in the State of Florida.
Petitioner's members each lease at least 25 or more lots for the placement of mobile homes within each of their mobile home parks. Each of the members is therefore required to file and receive approval of a prospectus from Respondent prior to entering into an enforceable rental agreement for the lease of lots in those mobile home parks.
Tom Coon, owner and operator of Hillsboro Mobile Home Park, located at Route 3, Box 801, Pompano Beach, Florida 33067, has "passed through" and charged for the hook-up fees and installation of sewer and water lines for hook-up to the Coconut Creek City Utility System. The cost to Mr. Coon for hook-up was
$116,808 which includes fees which were not disclosed prior to occupancy and permanent improvements which were mandated as a result of actions by state and local government and the utility company.
David Zell, owner of Colony Mobile Home Park, 2301 North 29th Avenue, Hollywood, Florida 33020, has "passed on" real estate tax increases in 1987 and 1988, as a result of entering into a three year negotiated agreement with the home owners negotiating committee, pursuant to mediation in 1986. The agreement allows for pass-on of increases in taxes and limits rent increases during that three year term. The total cost of pass-on charges for ad valorem property tax increases was $6,417.62 over that two year period. There is at least a
$3,337.62 ad valorem property tax increase which will be passed-on in 1989. This pass-on charge for real estate taxes would be prohibited in that the real estate taxes were not disclosed to the residents prior to occupancy, nor were they collected prior to July 1, 1976.
Charles Aultman is the owner and operator of Plantation Manor Mobile Home Park, 3032 South U.S. Route 1, Fort Pierce, Florida 33450. Aultman passed-on ad valorem property tax and utility increases for the years 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987 and 1988 for all residents of the park. The total amount
passed-on was $33,872.57. This charge would be prohibited as not disclosed prior to occupancy or charged as a matter of custom as defined in the proposed rule.
Jim Dale, owner of Rexmere Village Mobile Home Park, 11300 Rexmere Boulevard, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33325-4099, has passed-on increases to ad valorem property taxes for the mobile home park to each of his residents in 1987 and 1988. The approximate cost of the pass-ons at this point is $120,000 per year. The pass-on charge for increased ad valorem property taxes is based upon an agreement entered into between the mobile home owners and the park owner that limits the increases in lot rental amount in the park, but allows for pass-ons of increased ad valorem property taxes. In addition, the mobile home park prospectus includes a charge for parking which limits the on-street parking in the mobile home park. This charge was not collected prior to July 1, 1976, and was not disclosed prior to occupancy, but has been collected since the prospectus was delivered in the mobile home park. There is a collection rate of approximately $8,000 per year parking charges in the mobile home park.
Pauline Mantwil is the owner of Sunshine Mobile Manor, which had its sewage treatment plant condemned by the Department of Environmental Regulation. The park was required to tie into the Martin County Sewage Treatment System (Dixie Plant). The cost to each mobile home owner was allocated at $730 per space. The park owner passed-through this cost. The cost was disclosed in the prospectus, but was not disclosed prior to occupancy in the mobile home park. The total cost for impact fees and other costs associated with tie-in to the system is approximately $150,000. This pass-on of tie-in and other costs to hook up to the sewage treatment plant would be prohibited under the proposed rule because it was not disclosed prior to occupancy and because, in part, the costs include some permanent improvements to the sewage treatment system within the park.
Mike Pond is the owner of Palm Shores Mobile Village, Inc., a mobile home park located at Number 1, East Lane, Lake Alfred, Florida 33850. The mobile home park consists of 97 lots. The park owner has no records of the fees and charges which were collected prior to July 1, 1976, and there was no disclosure of fees and charges prior to occupancy to the residents who moved in prior to the time the prospectus was approved and delivered. The prospectus was approved August 21, 1985, and delivered shortly thereafter. The mobile home park was mandated to enlarge its sewage treatment plant by the Department of Environmental Regulation. The park passed-through the costs of the sewage treatment plant enlargement to each resident within the park, at a cost of
$218.25 per lot. In addition, there is an ad valorem property fire tax which is passed-on to each resident of $34.05 per lot. The fire tax is included within the November 1 tax bill and is paid March 31 of the next year. Neither the charge for sewer enlargement or the fire tax was disclosed prior to occupancy.
The park owner has no record as to whether these types of fees and charges were collected prior to July 1, 1976.
Clayton, Williams and Sherwood is a partnership doing business in the State of Florida, which operates the Coral Lakes Mobile Home Park located in Broward County, Florida. Clayton, Williams and Sherwood has passed-on increases in ad valorem property taxes in 1986 and 1987 to each resident within the mobile home park. The total pass-on charges for those two years is $15,600. There are
118 lots in the park that were occupied by residents prior to June 4, 1984. Each of these lots was charged a pass-on charge for taxes. Clayton, Williams and Sherwood is not aware of whether ad valorem tax increases were passed-on to
residents prior to July 1, 1976, nor are they aware as to what disclosures were made to the residents in the mobile home park prior to occupancy.
Clayton, Williams and Sherwood is the park owner of Shadow Hills Mobile Home Park in Orange County, Florida. Orange County has mandated that the mobile home park hook-up to the county sewer system. The cost of hook-up is
$829,000 for hook-up fees, $50,000 to install a lift station for the purpose of complying with regulations for hook-up to the county sewage system, and $50,000 to eliminate percolation ponds which are currently on site. The owner of the mobile home park intends to pass-through the cost of the hook-up to the Orange County sewer system by amortizing that cost over a fourteen-year period. The mobile home park prospectus provides that the mobile home park may pass-through costs incurred due to the actions of state and local governments or utility companies. The park owner does not know whether these charges were collected prior to July 1, 1976.
Clayton, Williams and Sherwood is also the park owner of Lakewood Mobile Home Park in Indian River County, Florida. Indian River County has mandated that Lakewood Mobile Home Park hook-up to the county sewer system at a cost of $484,000 to the mobile home park. This $484,000 includes hook-up fees and approximately $50,000 for a lift station to be installed as part of the hook-up. The prospectus for Lakewood Mobile Home Park provides that the park owner may pass-through costs incurred due to actions by state and local governments or utility companies as a separate charge. However, the park owner does not know whether a pass-through charge was disclosed to the residents of the park prior to occupancy nor whether such charge was collected prior to July 1, 1976.
Charles Metcalf is the owner of Woodall's Trailer Park, located at 2121 New Tampa Highway, Lakeland, Florida 33801. Woodall's Trailer Park was required by the City of Lakeland to upgrade the electric utility system in the park. The approximate cost of this upgrade, which is presently being installed, is $35,000. The park owner operated the mobile home park based upon oral leases prior to the submission and approval of the prospectus of the mobile home park. The prospectus was approved June 4, 1985, by Respondent. The mobile home park owner intends to pass-through the cost of upgrading the electrical utility system to 253 mobile home lots located in the park. Those 253 mobile home lots are occupied by residents who were residents of the park as of June 4, 1984.
The park owner did not disclose a pass-through or pass-on charge to any of those residents prior to occupancy, nor has a pass-through or pass-on charge been collected in the park prior to July 1, 1976. A pass-through charge is allowed in the mobile home park prospectus for costs incurred as the result of actions of state or local governments or utility companies.
Jack Zieaer is the manager of Gulfstream Harbor, a 383 unit mobile home park, which began development in 1980. Approximately 235 lots were occupied on June 4, 1984 and approximately 260 lots were occupied on December 31, 1984. The prospectus for the mobile home park, which was filed on December 31, 1984, and distributed to existing tenants in the park, authorizes the imposition of separate charges on the home owners in addition to the basic lot rental amount, which separate charges were not disclosed in advance of occupancy. One hundred and twenty-three residents of the park received advance disclosure of all the charges set forth in the prospectus prior to occupancy. The tenancies of those 123 residents began after June 4, 1984.
James F. Gould is the resident manager of Mobile Home Country Club, which contains 269 lots and which has been in operation for approximately 25
years. Twenty to twenty-five residents apply for residency in the park each year. The park imposes an application fee of $50 to screen the residents.
Approximately $32,000 per year is collected for separate water and sewer charges plus an administrative fee. The separate charge for water was disclosed to people when they moved into the park.
William Hart is the owner and operator of seven mobile home parks, including Havenwood Adult Mobile Home Community. In 1981, 1986 and 1987, Hart passed-through to the residents at Havenwood tax increases in addition to the basic lot rental amount. All of Hart's prospectuses authorize the pass-through of charges billed by state or local governments or utility companies and provide for a $50 investigation fee to investigate proposed residents. The total investigative fees collected from all seven of Hart's parks in 1987 was approximately $9,400. The taxes passed-on in Havenwood in 1981, 1986 and 1987 total approximately $850, $1,300, and $2,100 respectively.
DeAnza Corporation owns eight mobile home parks in Florida with about 5,300 spaces, including Mobil Americana Mobile Home Park in St. Petersburg, Florida. Mobil Americana Mobile Home Park was in operation prior to June 4, 1984, and was developed beginning about 22-23 years ago. DeAnza purchased Mobil Americana in 1976, at which time there was a lease in place in the park. There were 758 residents in the park at the time it was purchased of whom 275 continue in occupancy today. DeAnza charges an application fee in all of its parks of
$50, except for one park which charges an application fee of $20. Five hundred and forty-eight of the 758 lots presently occupied at Mobil Americana are occupied by residents who moved in before June 4, 1984. The City of St.
Petersburg has instructed DeAnza to install 11 new fire hydrants in Mobil Americana, and DeAnza has responded by proposing to install two. An engineer has estimated that it would cost approximately one-half million dollars to install 11 hydrants in the park and that it would cost approximately $68,500 to install only two. DeAnza and the City are continuing to negotiate concerning the fire hydrants. The park intends to pass-through the costs of any fire hydrants to the residents. Rents are increased in the park yearly, and every two years the rental level is set by the market. The park owner determines the market.
A substantial number of Petitioner's members will experience an adverse and/or substantial economic impact as a result of the proposed rule, if adopted. The past practice of collecting pass-through and pass-on charges by the park owners will be illegal under the proposed rule. In addition, the past collections of fees, charges and assessments which were not disclosed prior to occupancy or collected prior to July 1, 1976, will be illegal and subject to Respondent's enforcement jurisdiction. Those illegal charges may be required to be paid back to the homeowners. As such, there is a substantial economic impact from the proposed rule.
Petitioner has standing to challenge proposed rule 7D-31.002, pursuant to sections 120.54(4) and 120.57, Florida Statutes.
Petitioner's Executive Director conducted a partial survey of Petitioner's members. Over 5 percent of the surveyed parks have already charged pass-through charges for governmentally mandated capital improvements to their residents, including residents of the parks prior to June 4, 1984, and a substantial number of others intend to in the future.
The term "entrance fee," as that term is commonly understood in the mobile home industry, is a fee charged for moving a mobile home onto a vacant
mobile home lot in a mobile home park, whether that is done by a dealer or a home owner. The term "application fee" as that term is commonly understood in the mobile home industry, is a charge for recouping the costs associated with credit checks, screening, and criminal background checks in qualifying a potential resident of the park. It applies to someone who purchases an existing home in the park.
The Respondent acknowledges that there is an economic impact from the statute as interpreted by the proposed rule and that the economic impact of the proposed rule on regulated persons was pointed out to the Respondent during workshops on the proposed rule. However, the Respondent did not conduct any investigation of the economic impact of the proposed rule. No economist conducted the economic impact analysis; rather, the economic impact statement supporting the proposed rule was prepared by Respondent's legal section. No consideration was given by Respondent to the amount of monies involved in pass- through charges. Further, no review was made by Respondent of the prospectuses contained in its own files in order to determine the kind or extent of economic impact on the persons regulated by Respondent, i.e., the park owners.
The parties have stipulated that there is no provision in chapter 723, Florida Statutes, which expressly provides that all fees, charges and assessments have to be fully disclosed in writing.
Pass-through charges or pass-on charges are not prohibited by chapter 723, Florida Statutes; rather, that chapter specifically defines pass-through charges and even requires that all prospectuses contain a description of the manner in which pass-through charges will be assessed.
It is the common understanding in the mobile home industry that park owners cannot require mobile home owners to install permanent improvements on their individual lots, such as driveways, etc. However, mobile home owners can be contractually obligated to pay the cost of installing capital improvements required by local governments or utility companies--pass-through charges by statutory definition.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the subject matter hereof and the parties hereto. Section 120.54(4), Florida Statutes.
Petitioner challenges the subject proposed rule as constituting an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. That term is defined in section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes (1987), as follows:
'Invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority' means action which goes beyond powers, functions, and duties delegated by the Legislature. A proposed or existing rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority if any one or more of the following apply:
The agency has materially failed to follow the applicable rulemaking procedures set forth in s. 120.54;
* * *
(c) The rule enlarges, modifies, or contravenes the specific provisions of law implemented, citation to which is required by s. 120.54(7);
* * *
(e) The rule is arbitrary or capricious.
Petitioner contends that the proposed rule provisions are an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because the rule enlarges, modifies, and contravenes the specific provisions of law implemented; is arbitrary and capricious; is violative of Article I, Section 10, Florida Constitution; and the agency has materially failed to follow the applicable rulemaking procedures by failing to prepare an economic impact statement. The burden on the Petitioner in a case of this nature is a heavy one, but a Petitioner who shows that a rule purports to accomplish ends different or greater than what is authorized by statute has met the challenger's burden. For the reasons set forth below, the Petitioner has met its burden.
Chapter 723, Florida Statutes, was created as part of Chapter 84-80, Laws of Florida, which repealed existing mobile home park regulations contained in Chapter 83, Part III, Florida Statutes (1983). In place of the earlier Chapter 83, Part III, the Florida Mobile Home Act established new comprehensive statewide mobile home park landlord/tenant regulations, which substantially modified existing rights, duties and obligations between mobile home park owners and mobile home owners who leased lots in those parks. The Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes was given authority to enforce, and to adopt rules to enforce, interpret and implement the statute. Section 723.006, Florida Statutes.
The statute mandated disclosure of certain information to all tenants residing in the park as of June 4, 1984, and to all prospective tenants who leased a lot in the mobile home park after that date. See, e.g., sections 723.011, 723.012 and 723.013, Florida Statutes. In mobile home parks with 26 or more spaces, the mobile home park owner is required to deliver a prospectus to all existing residents in the park and to all prospective lessees prior to entering into a new enforceable rental agreement. Section 723.011(1) and (2). The prospectus requirement became effective January 1, 1985, for parks with 100 or more spaces, and July 1, 1985, for parks with fewer than 100 spaces. Under the terms of the statute, the prospectus is deemed incorporated into the rental agreement (Section 723.031(10)), and the park owner may not increase the lot rental amount for an existing tenant until a prospectus has been delivered. Sections 723.031(7) and 723.011(1). Once delivered to the home owner, the prospectus binds the park owner, and the existing homeowner who assumes it, to its terms for the length of the tenancy offered and creates an obligation which may be assumed by a subsequent purchaser of the mobile home.
The court in Village Park Mobile Home Association, Inc. v. State Department of Business Regulation, 506 So.2d 426, 428 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) recognized that the prospectus is a disclosure document which when implemented establishes the terms and conditions of the rental agreement between the park owner and mobile home owner:
The prospectus is fundamentally a disclosure document. As required by Section 723.012, the prospectus, as drafted by the park owner, must contain certain
information and exhibits, including a description of the mobile home park property (Section 723.012(4)(c)), a description of the recreational and other common facilities to be used by the homeowners (Section 723.012(5)), the arrangements for management of the park and maintenance and operation of the park property (Section 723.012(6)), a description of all improvements which are required to be installed by the mobile home owner (Section 723.012(7)), a description of the manner in which utility and other services will be provided to the home owners (Section 723.012(8)), an explanation of the manner in which rents and other charges will be raised, including 90 days advance notice and disclosure of any rate increase or pass-through charges, and any other fees, costs or charges to which the home owner may be subjected (Section 723.012(9)), and an explanation of the manner in which park rules or regulations will be set, changed or promulgated, including park regulations currently in effect (Section 723.012(10)).
The Act requires that the prospectus contain as exhibits any ground lease which may be in effect, covenants and restrictions affecting the park property, and a copy of the rental agreement which will be offered by the park owner in the rental of mobile home lots (Section 723.012(13)). As may be seen from the above statutory analysis, the purpose of the prospectus is to disclose to prospective lessees certain information regarding the future operation of a mobile home park.
The mobile home owner has the-right to cancel or void the rental agreement if a prospectus is not delivered prior to occupancy. In the case of the initial occupancy in the mobile home park by the purchaser of a new mobile home, the rental agreement is "voidable" by the lessee until 15 days after receipt by the lessee of the prospectus (Section 723.014(1)), but in no event may the period of voidability extend beyond 45 days of initial occupancy. Section 723.014(1). In the case of an existing tenant, the mobile home owner has the right to "cancel" the rental agreement offered within 15 days after receipt of the prospectus. Section 723.014(2).
The legislature intended that the requirements of Chapter 723, including the prospectus and rental agreement provisions, were to apply to existing residents of mobile home parks at the time of the expiration, or renewal, of their existing rental agreement. Sections 723.011(1), (2) and (3); 723.012(14)(d); 723.014(2); 723.031(5), (6) and (7). Due to the unique nature of the mobile home park landlord/tenant relationship, the expiration, or
renewal, of the existing rental agreement is the point at which the provisions of the new statute must be applied.
The Respondent's proposed rule deals with fees, charges and assessments in a mobile home park. The proposed rule is divided into four (4) subsections:
Subsection (1) of the proposed rule divides tenancies in a mobile home park into those created prior to June 4, 1984, and those created on or after that date, the effective date of Chapter 723, Florida Statutes. With respect to those tenancies created prior to June 4, 1984, the proposed rule provides that the tenant has no obligation to pay any fee, charge or assessment that was not disclosed fully in writing prior to occupancy, any provisions to the contrary in the prospectus notwithstanding, unless the fee, charge or assessment had been collected "as a matter of custom" as defined in the rule.
The Respondent's argument for the rule is that it is derived from the provisions of section 723.011(3), which provide that with respect to a tenant in the park on June 4, 1984, the prospectus must "contain the same terms and conditions as rental agreements offered to all other mobile home owners residing in the park on the effective date" of the Act. The Respondent points to its existing rule, 7D-31.001(3), Florida Administrative Code, adopted in 1987, which requires the park owner to provide a prospectus with the same terms and conditions as lease agreements which were required to be offered pursuant to the already-repealed section 83.760, Florida Statutes (1983), and argues that the lease agreement offered pursuant to section 83.760 did not allow for charging any fees or charges that were not disclosed fully in writing prior to occupancy pursuant to the requirements contained in repealed section 83.764, Florida Statutes.
There are two provisions contained within Chapter 723 relating to the prospectus and rental agreement that require separate treatment of existing residents of a mobile home park on the Act's effective date. Section 723.011, the section cited as authority for the proposed rule, provides that:
(3) With regard to a tenancy in existence on the effective date of this chapter, the prospectus or offering circular offered by the mobile home park owner shall contain the same terms and conditions as rental agreements offered to all other mobile home owners residing in the park on the effective date of this act, excepting only rent variations based upon lot location and size, and shall not require any mobile home
owner to install any permanent improvements.
In addition, Section 723.031 requires the rental agreement offered in the prospectus to contain all financial obligations of the mobile home owner to the park owner and all services provided by the park owner to the home owner. The statute also provided a "bridge" between repealed section 83.760 and the new statute, which provided that for a tenancy in existence on the effective date of the Act and until the expiration of the existing rental agreement, the provisions of section 723.031 would not prohibit passing-on increased costs, including increased costs for utilities, which are incurred due to the actions of any state or local government. Section 723.031(5), Florida Statutes.
The Respondent's argument suffers from a number of fatal flaws. First, it ignores the statutory purpose behind Chapter 723. The chapter is a complete revision of the law regulating mobile home park landlord/tenant matters. The prospectus, which is required to be delivered to all tenants in the park, is a binding agreement for the length of the tenancy. The prospectus is not required to be delivered until the renewal or expiration of a rental agreement for an existing tenant. Section 723.011(2). The statutory purpose for section 723.011(3) was to require that the park owner deliver a prospectus containing the same terms and conditions to each resident residing in the park on the effective date of the Act. The statute does not vest any rights to the terms of previous rental agreements between the park owner and the mobile home owner. The statute establishes a new tenancy based on the prospectus at the expiration of the existing rental agreement.
Second, since the terms of the prospectus apply at the renewal or expiration of the existing agreement, no existing contractual rights are impaired by the statute. Respondent, in the proposed rule, however, establishes vested contractual rights to the first rental agreement entered into between the park owner and the mobile home owner.
There are also no vested rights to be free from any fees, charges or assessments that may not have been disclosed prior to occupancy based upon the provisions contained in repealed section 83.764, Florida Statutes. Chapter 83, Part III, Florida Statutes (1983), did not contain any similar provisions to those relating to the prospectus that are contained in Chapter 723. The prospectus is required to not only disclose all fees, charges and assessments, pursuant to section 723.012(9)(b)(8) but also to detail the manner of lot rental amount increases and the factors which will control raising the lot rental amount. Section 723.012(9)(b). Thus, while the mobile home owner might have a right during the term of the rental agreement to be free from a specific charge, there is no right under the statute to be free from paying "any costs incurred, including increased costs for utilities, due to the actions of state or local government." See section 83.760, Florida Statutes (1983), which specifically allowed park owners to pass-on to tenants increased costs due to actions of governments or utilities although not provided for in the lease. Since there was no right to be free from payment of rent in Chapter 83, only the limited right to be free from payment of a specific fee, charge or assessment, Chapter 723 does not modify any substantial right.
Third, the Respondent was required by statute to review each filed prospectus to determine if it were adequate to meet the requirements of the Act. Section 723.011(1)(a) and (b). The Respondent promulgated rules relating to the prospectus to meet the requirements of Chapter 723. The Respondent testified that when a park owner filed a prospectus, Respondent reviewed the prospectus, the rental agreement and the rules and regulations to determine if they comply with Chapter 723. The Respondent, with respect to the witnesses testifying at hearing, reviewed and approved each filed prospectus, allowed existing residents to enter into enforceable rental agreements based upon the prospectus, and allowed purchasers of a mobile home to assume the prospectus offered to the initial recipient, pursuant to section 723.059. Now, the Respondent seeks a modification of the existing rental agreement and rewriting the terms of the prospectus delivered to, and assumed by, those existing residents. The park owner has the right to rely upon the approval given by Respondent and on the terms and conditions of the prospectus as delivered to the mobile home owner. That prospectus is binding for the term of the tenancy according to Respondent's rule 7D-31.001(6), Florida Administrative Code. Moreover, the tenants had the opportunity to cancel the rental agreement offered in the prospectus within 15
days of delivery of the prospectus. Section 723.014(2). The Respondent cannot, by this rule, require a revision of the obligations and duties of the parties to the prospectus. To do so would be violative of Article I, Section 10, Florida Constitution (1968) since that would clearly impair the obligations of contracts.
Fourth, the Respondent has ignored the plain meaning of the language in sections 723.031(5) and (6), Florida Statutes. Section 723.031(5)(c) provides, in part as follows:
The provisions hereof notwithstanding, the mobile home park owner may pass on, at any time during the term of the lot rental agreement, ad valorem property taxes and utility charges, or increases of either, provided that the ad valorem property taxes and the utility charges are not otherwise being collected in the remainder of the lot rental amount and provided further that the passing on of such ad valorem property taxes or utility charges, or increases of either, was disclosed prior to tenancy, was being passed on as a matter of custom between the mobile home park owner and the mobile home owner, or such passing-on was authorized by law. Such ad valorem taxes and utility charges shall be a part of the lot rental amount as defined by this chapter. [Emphasis supplied]
Section 723.031(6) provides that "except for pass through charges" as defined in section 723.003(9), the park owner may not collect any fees, charges or assessments which were not disclosed prior to occupancy or collected as a matter of custom. Both of these provisions were derived from section 723.031(5), as adopted in 1984, which provided that until the term of the existing rental agreement expired, the park owner was not prohibited from "passing on" costs incurred due to the actions of state or local government. Existing rental agreements on June 4, 1984, as provided by section 83.760 Florida Statutes, allowed that the park owner could "pass on" the costs incurred, including increased costs for utilities, due to the actions of state or local government. "Pass through" charges (section 723.031(6)) and "pass on" charges (section 723.031(5)(c)) were legally authorized in Chapter 83 prior to June 4, 1984, and are clearly authorized under Chapter 723. The proposed rule would prohibit these charges unless they were disclosed fully in writing prior to occupancy or were collected as a matter of custom as defined by the proposed rule.
The Respondent's rule a tempts to make the provisions of leases entered into at the time of occupancy in a mobile home park and prior to the enactment of Chapter 723, binding on the park owner. It is clear that the legislature intended for the provisions of Chapter 723 to apply to existing tenants in mobile home parks. There is no basis for applying terms and conditions from rental agreements which are no longer in force on current landlord/tenant relationships created after the effective date of Chapter 723. Respondent's is clearly an erroneous reading of the statute.
Respondent's interpretation of the statute is contrary to the legislative purpose of the Act, and the requirements of the rule are not
appropriate to the ends specified in the legislation. The result of this rule will be to establish separate rental agreements throughout the park, based not upon disclosures contained in the prospectus, but upon what can be proven by the park owner as "fully disclosed in writing prior to occupancy." That the legislature intended for a new rental agreement based upon the terms of the prospectus delivered to the existing mobile home owner, cannot be questioned.
The Respondent, after having approved of the manner of increasing the lot rental amount in the prospectus, and approving the fees, charges and assessments that will be charged in the park set forth in the prospectus and rental agreement and rules an regulation, and establishing by rule that the park owner deliver a document that will be binding for the length of the tenancy (and any assumptions of that tenancy as allowed by the statute), cannot now overturn the statutory scheme that is in place throughout the state and amend existing contractual rights.
Subsection (1) of the proposed rule also provides that the mobile home owner who had a tenancy in existence before June 4, 1984, is "not obligated to install any permanent improvements at all, including those mandated by governmental entities or utility companies." The Respondent testified that this part of the rule would preclude a park owner from charging a "pass-through charge" as defined in section 723.003(9), because the pass-through charge is defined as an improvement. Respondent relies on section 723.011(3), which provides in pertinent part:
(3) With regard to a tenancy in existence on the effective date of this chapter, the prospectus or offering circular offered by the mobile home park owner ... shall not require any mobile home owner to install any permanent improvements.
Respondent contends that this language prohibits charging a pass-through charge as defined in the Act:
(9) The term "pass-through charge" means the mobile home owner's proportionate share of the necessary and actual direct costs and impact or hookup fees for a governmentally mandated capital improvement, which may include the necessary and actual direct costs and impact or hookup fees incurred for capital improvements required for public or private regulated utilities.
Section 723.003(9), Florida Statutes (1987).
The term "permanent improvement" is undefined in the statute. The Respondent argues that a pass-through charge is by definition a charge for an improvement and therefore would be prohibited under the proposed rule. This is an erroneous reading of the statute. Because a pass-through charge is specifically defined as a charge for a "mandated capital improvement" does not mean that it is proscribed by the more general prohibition against installation of permanent improvements. The general rule of statutory construction is that where a statute contains a specific provision and a general one which would
include the specific provision, the specific provision prevails. In section 723.031(6), it is clear that pass-through charges are specifically allowed.
Moreover, the amendments to the statute dealing with pass-through charges, being a more recent enactment, control the earlier provisions of the law. Sections 723.003(9) and 723.031(6), allowing a park owner to charge pass- through charges, were enacted in 1986, two years after the provision cited by the Respondent as authority for this proposed rule. The last expression of the legislative will is the law in cases of conflicting provisions in the same statute. Here, the sections of the statute are not even in conflict. One provision prohibits the park owner from requiring the home owner to install permanent improvements. The other provision allows the park owner to charge a fee for mandated capital improvements, including certain fees and charges coincident thereto.
Subsection (2) of the Respondent's proposed rule deals with tenancies created on or after June 4, 1984, and establishes on what basis the park owner may charge "pass through charges" to those tenants. The proposed rule requires that the park owner disclose, either in the prospectus or in a separate written disclosure, the pass-through charges that will be charged to the park owner. The proposed rule also states:
However, pass-through charges may not be imposed if the mobile home owner's obligation to pay such charges was not disclosed generally and prior to occupancy ...
The rule directly conflicts with section 723.031(6), which provides in pertinent part:
Except for pass through charges, as defined in this chapter, failure on the part of the mobile home park owner or developer to disclose fully all fees, charges or assessments prior to tenancy, unless it can be shown that such fees, charges, or assessments have been collected as a matter of custom between the mobile home park owner and the mobile home owner, shall prevent the park owner or operator from collecting said , charges and assessments ...
[Emphasis added]
The Respondent argues that the provisions contained in sections 723.011, 723.012, 723.013, and 723.042, all require disclosure of fee, charges and assessments, and that those requirements must be read in pari materia with the provisions in section 723.031(6). Respondent's reading of the statute fails to consider the two rules of statutory construction that apply in this case.
The provisions of section 723.031(6) are the last enacted provisions of the statute and, therefore, control the other terms, to the extent that they conflict. Moreover, the provisions of section 723.031(6) provide a specific exemption from the requirement of disclosure or collection as a matter of custom. When the legislature has carefully employed a term in one section of the statute and has excluded it in another, it should not be implied where excluded.
Subsection (3) of Respondent's proposed rule prohibits the charging of screening or application fees from purchasers of mobile homes which are situated in the park and sold by a resident of the park. Facially, it would also prohibit pet fees and charges for extra persons. The proposed rule is allegedly derived from section 723.041(3), which states:
No entrance fee may be charged by the park owner to the purchaser of a mobile home situated in the park that is offered for sale by a resident of the park.
Elsewhere in section 723.041, Florida Statutes, entrance fees are authorized.
The term "entrance fee" is not defined in the statute. Therefore, the term should be defined according to its plain and ordinary meaning. There was testimony from a number of witnesses regarding the term "entrance fee" and comparing it to an application or screening fee. The term "entrance fee" used in its ordinary sense is a fee charged for entrance into the park, i.e., bringing a mobile home into a park for placement on a vacant lot. A screening or application fee has a plain and ordinary meaning, i.e., a fee to recoup the costs of screening or reviewing a potential resident. A fee charged for screening or reviewing a purchaser of a mobile home already in the park is authorized generally by section 723.059(1) and 723.064(1)(e) which allow for "qualifying" a purchaser for residency in the park. "Entrance fees" and screening or application fees are distinctly different types of charges. Respondent has no basis for prohibiting screening, application, or other fees in the proposed rule, under the prohibition contained in section 723.041(3) relating only to "entrance fees" in a specific situation.
Section (4) of the proposed rule defines "collected as a matter of custom." In the instant case, the agency has dramatically limited the plain and ordinary definition of the term "custom" in an arbitrary and capricious manner which unreasonably alters the provisions of the statutory enabling authority.
As such, the agency's proposed definition of the term "collected as a matter of custom" is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Although the proposed rule purports to implement and interpret section 723.031(6), Florida Statutes, Respondent's definition of the term "collected as a matter of custom" constitutes an unlawful attempt to enact substantive legislation. By defining the statutory term "collected as a matter of custom" as collected prior to July 1, 1976, the Respondent arbitrarily defines what a "custom" is and is not.
Unlike the proposed rule, the statutes which the agency cites for authority provide no specific definition for the term "custom." Thus, for purposes of administrative rulemaking, "custom" must be used according to its plain and ordinary meaning. The administrative imposition of an arbitrary date to fix the inception of a "custom" is an impermissible addition of substantive criteria to the statute. It is well settled that an administrative agency may not adopt a rule which conflicts with or modifies an existing statute. A rule which purports to do so is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
In addition to impermissibly modifying existing statutory law, the proposed definition bears no rational relationship to either the alleged statutory authority or the plain and ordinary meaning of the term. If the legislature had intended to so severely restrict the definition of "custom," it could easily have done so when it amended the statute in 1986. By limiting the
definition of "custom" to collection of fees, charges or assessments which have taken place prior to July 1, 1976, the agency has exceeded its rulemaking authority. See Florida Association of Academic Nonpublic Schools v. State, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 8 FALR 5321, 5331 (Final Order October 3, 1986).
Finally, Petitioner contends that proposed rule 7D-31.002 is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because it is not supported by an adequate economic impact statement. Section 120.54(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1987) requires, in part, that:
Each agency shall provide information on its proposed action by preparing a detailed economic impact statement. The economic impact statement shall include:
* * *
2. An estimate of the cost or the economic benefit to all persons directly affected by the proposed action;
* * *
A detailed statement of the data and method used in making each of the above estimates; and
An analysis of the impact on small business as defined in the Florida Small
and Minority Business Assistance Act of 1985.
The failure to provide an adequate economic impact statement is grounds for holding a proposed rule invalid. Section 120.54(2)(d), Florida Statutes, (1987).
The economic impact statement prepared by the Respondent states that there is no economic impact on persons regulated by the agency. However, the proposed rule prohibits park owners from charging certain fees and passing-on costs of government mandated capital improvements. Park owners will ultimately be required to repay the charges interpreted as illegal by the proposed rule. Thus, there are definite costs which will be incurred as a result of the proposed rule. Although they may not be subject to quantification in every instance, they are certainly susceptible to identification, and, pursuant to the directives of section 120.54(2)(b), the agency has a duty to do so.
It is well settled that if an agency fails to adopt an economic impact statement, or if the statement is false or erroneous, the agency's proposed rule constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. The evidence in this cause plainly establishes that the proposed rule will have a significant economic impact on mobile home park owners. This impact stems not from existing statutory authority but from the provisions of the rule itself.
In the agency's published notice of proposed rule 7D-31.002, Respondent specifically states that the purpose of the proposed rule is to interpret sections 723.031(6) and 723.041(3), Florida Statutes; to define the phrase "collected as a matter of custom" used in section 723.031(6); and to clarify that "tenancies in existence before June 4, 1984, are not required to pay any undisclosed charges or install any permanent improvements, including those which are mandated by governmental entities or utility companies." The substantive provisions of the proposed rule do not merely restate existing statutory authority. The rule interprets and modifies statutory language in a
way which has significant, identifiable economic impact. The facts in the record demonstrate that the agency was aware of these potential impacts when it drafted the proposed rule and the accompanying economic impact statement.
Respondent's failure to even mention the economic impacts the proposed rule has upon mobile home park owners cannot be considered harmless error. Although the inadequacy of an economic impact statement is subject to the statutory harmless error rule, in this case the gross deficiencies of the economic impact statement are material and do impair the fairness of the proceeding and correctness of the action in promulgating the rule.
Respondent has further failed to demonstrate that it fully considered these impacts when it promulgated its economic impact statement. The economic impact statement is silent as to any particular data used by the agency to determine the existence or nonexistence of economic impact resulting from the proposed rule, in direct conflict with the requirements of section 120.54(2)(b)(4), Florida Statutes. Part five of the economic impact statement merely states that the "... data and estimates were based upon experience and analysis by the Bureau of Mobile Homes and the department's legal staff." Part five provides nothing in the way of a "detailed statement of the data and method used" by the Department in its determination that the proposed rule will have no economic impact. As such, neither the methodology employed nor the data utilized by Respondent in preparing the economic impact statement is sufficiently explicated so as to attach any credibility to the conclusions reached in the statement.
In short, Petitioner has met its burden of showing that the proposed rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority in that sections
1 and 2 of the proposed rule contravene the specific provisions of the law implemented, section 3 of the proposed rule enlarges the specific provisions of the law implemented, and section 4 is without any basis in law or in logic. Additionally, each and every section of the proposed rule is arbitrary or capricious, and the agency has materially failed to follow applicable rulemaking procedures in that it has issued an economic impact statement which incorrectly represents that the rule has no economic impact and which is supported by no data and no evidence that consideration was given by Respondent to the economic impacts of the rule. Respondent simply argues that there is a "washout" of economic impacts because the same amount of money currently paid by mobile home owners would under the rule have to be paid instead by mobile home park owners. That argument is illogical since monies being paid by mobile home owners are being paid pursuant to contract rights contained within current rental agreements and approved prospectuses, while it is the rule itself that would make those amounts of money be paid instead by the mobile home park owners.
Lastly, there is no rational basis for the selection of the date 19767 or even 1984, in the proposed rule. Changing contractual rights based upon whether certain conduct occurred twelve years ago impairs contractual rights and obligations and violates Article I, Section 10, of the Florida Constitution. Similarly, the distinction between tenancies in effect on June 4, 1984, and those effective thereafter ignores the fact that most of the leases admitted in evidence create only one year tenancies. It is reasonable to assume that a substantial number of the tenancies in existence on June 4, 1984, have since expired. Those which have been renewed are governed by the terms of the prospectus and the current rental agreement in which all charges, fees, and assessments would be fully disclosed in writing prior to the existence of the renewed tenancy.
On April 4, 1988, Intervenor filed a Stipulation as to Intervention by the Federation of Mobile Home Owners of Florida, Inc., representing that Petitioner and Respondent had no objection to its intervention in this proceeding. At the final hearing, Intervenor presented no affirmative evidence but merely adopted the arguments and evidence of the Respondent. Since the Respondent presented no evidence to prove Intervenor's standing in this proceeding, a fortiori Intervenor presented none. Rather than filing a proposed final order, the Intervenor adopted Respondent's proposed final order as its own. Respondent's proposed final order contains no proposed findings of fact regarding Intervenor's standing. On May 24, 1988, Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Intervenor alleging that Intervenor has failed to prove that it is entitled to party status in the cause in that Intervenor has failed to prove that the interests of a substantial number of its members are substantially affected by the proposed rule. Neither the Respondent nor the Intervenor has filed any pleading in opposition to the granting of that motion. The general language of the Stipulation is insufficient to place Intervenor on notice that it would be required to prove its standing in this proceeding.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is,
ORDERED that Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss Intervenor be and the same is hereby denied. It is further
ORDERED that proposed rule 7D-31.002 is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
DONE and ORDERED this 24th day of June, 1988, at Tallahassee, Florida.
LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building
2009 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
(904) 488-9675
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of June, 1988.
APPENDIX TO FINAL ORDER, CASE NO. 88-1133RP
Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 1, 3-7, and the first 2 sentences of 9 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Final Order.
Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 2 has been rejected as being unnecessary for determination herein.
Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 8, the third sentence of 9, and 10 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting conclusions of law, argument of counsel, or recitations of the testimony.
Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 1(a) and (b), 1(d), 1(f)-1(p), 2, 7 except for the fourth sentence, 8, the first 5 sentences in 9, and the first twelve sentences in 10 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Final Order.
Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 1(c) and 1(e) have been rejected as being unnecessary for determination herein.
Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 3-6, the fourth sentence of 7, and the sixth through eighth sentences in 9 have been rejected as being irrelevant to the issues under consideration herein.
Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 12 and the thirteenth through fifteenth sentences in 10 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting conclusions of law, argument of counsel, or recitations of the testimony.
Respondent's proposed finding of fact numbered 11 is over 3 pages long and has been rejected as being a mixture of sentences containing irrelevant material and of sentences which do not constitute findings of fact but rather constitute argument of counsel or mere recitation of testimony.
COPIES FURNISHED:
E. James Kearney, Director Department of Business Regulation Division of Florida Land Sales,
Condominiums, and Mobile Homes 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000
David D. Eastman, Esquire Jack M. Skelding, Esquire Post Office Box 669
318 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32302
Thomas Presnell, Esquire Debra Roberts, Esquire Department of Business
Regulation
725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000
Lee Jay Colling, Esquire Suite 500, NCNB National Bank
Building
Orlando, Florida 32801
Van B. Poole, Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32393-1000
Liz Cloud, Chief
Bureau of Administrative Code The Capitol - 1802
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
Carroll Webb, Executive Director Administrative Procedure Committee
120 Holland Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1300
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW
A PARTY WHO IS ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS FINAL ORDER IS ENTITLED TO JUDICIAL REVIEW PURSUANT TO SECTION 120.68, FLORIDA STATUTES. REVIEW PROCEEDINGS ARE GOVERNED BY THE FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE. SUCH PROCEEDINGS ARE COMMENCED BY FILING ONE COPY OF A NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THE AGENCY CLERK OF THE DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS AND A SECOND COPY, ACCOMPANIED BY FILING FEES PRESCRIBED BY LAW, WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST DISTRICT, OR WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL IN THE APPELLATE DISTRICT WHERE THE PARTY RESIDES. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF RENDITION OF THE ORDER TO BE REVIEWED.
================================================================= DISTRICT COURT OPINION
=================================================================
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
FEDERATION OF MOBILE HOME NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES OWNERS OF FLORIDA, INC. and TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED. REGULATION, DIVISION OF
FLORIDA LAND SALES, CASE NOS. 88-1880 & 88-1881 CONDOMINIUMS AND MOBILE HOMES, DOAH CASE NO. 88-1133RP
Appellants,
v.
FLORIDA MANUFACTURED HOUSING ASSOCIATION, INC.
Appellee.
/ Opinion filed June 27, 1989.
Appeals from orders of the State of Florida, Division of Administrative Hearings.
Debra Roberts, Assistant General Counsel, Tallahassee, for appellant Division.
Lee Jay Colling and Thomas Presnell, Jr., of Collins & Beattie, P.A., Orlando, for appellant Federation of Mobile Homeowners of Florida, Inc.
Jack M. Skelding, Jr., and David D. Eastman of Parker, Skelding, McVoy and Labasky, Tallahassee, for appellee Florida Manufactured Housing Association, Inc.
PER CURIAM.
AFFIRMED.
SMITH, C.J., THOMPSON and MINER, JJ., CONCUR.
M A N D A T E
From
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA FIRST DISTRICT
To the Honorable, the Judges of the Linda M. Rigot
Deputy Commissioner WHEREAS, in that certain cause filed in this Court styled:
FLORIDA MANUFACTURED HOUSING ASSOCIATION, INC., A Florida
incorporated association not for profit
Case No. 88-1880
vs. Your Case No. 88-1133-R
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION, DIVISION OF FLORIDA LAND CONDOMINIUMS AND MOBILE HOMES
vs.
FEDERATION OF MOBILE HOME OWNERS OF FLORIDA, INC.
The attached opinion was rendered on June 27, 1989.
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED that further proceedings be had in accordance with said opinions, the rules of this Court and the laws of the State of Florida.
WITNESS the Honorable Douglass B. Shivers
Chief Judge of the District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District and the Seal of said court at Tallahassee, the Capitol, on this 28th day of July, 1989
Clerk, District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District
M A N D A T E
From
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA FIRST DISTRICT
To the Honorable, the Judges of the Linda M. Rigot
Deputy Commissioner WHEREAS, in that certain cause filed in this Court styled:
FLORIDA MANUFACTURED HOUSING ASSOCIATION, INC., A Florida
incorporated association not for profit
Case No. 88-1881
vs. Your Case No. 88-1133-R
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION, DIVISION OF FLORIDA LAND CONDOMINIUMS AND MOBILE HOMES
vs.
FEDERATION OF MOBILE HOME OWNERS OF FLORIDA, INC.
The attached opinion was rendered on June 27, 1989.
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED that further proceedings be had in accordance with said opinions, the rules of this Court and the laws of the State of Florida.
WITNESS the Honorable Douglass B. Shivers
Chief Judge of the District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District and the Seal of said court at Tallahassee, the Capitol, on this 28th day of July, 1989
Clerk, District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District
| Issue Date | Proceedings |
|---|---|
| Jun. 24, 1988 | Final Order (hearing held , 2013). CASE CLOSED. |
| Issue Date | Document | Summary |
|---|---|---|
| Jun. 27, 1989 | Opinion | |
| Jun. 24, 1988 | DOAH Final Order | Classic example of proposed rules invalid under every criterion and obviously unconstitutional. |
