STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND )
PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, ) DIVISION OF FLORIDA LAND SALES, ) CONDOMINIUMS AND MOBILE HOMES, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 99-3006
)
WILLIAM S. WALSH, )
)
Respondent. )
)
RECOMMENDED ORDER
An administrative hearing was conducted in this proceeding on March 14, 2000, in Orlando, Florida, before Daniel Manry, Administrative Law Judge("ALJ"), Division of Administrative Hearings ("DOAH"). The parties and their witnesses attended the hearing in Orlando. The undersigned and the court reporter participated by videoconference from Tallahassee, Florida.
APPEARANCES
For Petitioner: Janis Sue Richardson, Esquire
Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes
Department of Business and Professional Regulation
Northwood Center
1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007
For Respondent: William S. Walsh, pro se
2156 Turnberry Drive,
Oviedo, Florida 32765
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The issues in this case are whether Respondent violated Section 721.11 (4)(a), (h), (j), and (k), Florida Statutes (1995), through misrepresentations in the sale of timeshare estates as further stated in the Notice to Show Cause and, if so, what, if any, penalty should be imposed. (All statutory references are to Florida Statutes (1995) unless otherwise stated.)
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Petitioner served Respondent with a Notice To Show Cause on June 26, 1999. On June 29, 1999, Respondent filed a Response to Charges in which Respondent requested an administrative hearing. On July 12, 1999, Petitioner referred the matter to DOAH for assignment of an ALJ to conduct the hearing.
At the hearing, Petitioner presented the testimony of five witnesses for admission in evidence and submitted 13 exhibits for admission in evidence. Respondent testified in his own behalf, called one witness, and submitted eight exhibits for admission in evidence.
The identity of the witnesses and exhibits, and the rulings regarding each, are set forth in the record of the administrative hearing. Neither party requested a transcript of the hearing.
Petitioner timely filed its proposed recommended order ("PRO") on March 28, 2000. Respondent timely filed his PRO on March 27, 2000.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Petitioner is the state agency responsible for regulating sellers of timeshare estates ("timeshares") within the meaning of Section 721.05 (27) and (28). Respondent is a seller of timeshares and a licensed real estate sales person in Florida with approximately 20 years' experience in timeshares.
Petitioner charges in the Notice to Show Cause that Respondent violated Section 721.11 (4)(a), (h), (j), and (k). The Notice to Show Cause charges that Respondent violated the respective statutes by misrepresenting: a fact or creating a false or misleading impression regarding a timeshare plan or promotion; the nature or extent of an incidental benefit, within the meaning of Section 721.05(17); the conditions of exchange; and the availability of a resale or rental program.
Vocational Corporation ("Vocational") developed a timeshare resort in Orlando, Florida, known as Club Sevilla ("Sevilla"). Vocational hired Respondent in July 1995 as Vocational's sales manager responsible for the sale of all timeshares at Sevilla. Vocational agreed to hire Respondent as an independent contractor and to pay Respondent up to 40 percent commission on cash sales and four to six percent commission on other sales. In 1996, Respondent earned between $380,000 and
$457,000 selling timeshares for Sevilla.
Respondent employed four or five salespersons to assist him in the sale of Sevilla timeshares. Some of those salespersons testified at the hearing.
During the time Respondent sold Sevilla timeshares, Respondent was the president and director of MPW Marketing, Inc. ("MPW"). Respondent's wife was the secretary and treasurer of MPW.
MPW employed at least one sales person to sell timeshares at Sevilla. MPW was dissolved in 1997 for failure to file its annual report.
As sales manager for Vocational and as an independent contractor, Respondent was solely responsible for the design and content of the salesprogram used to sell timeshares at Sevilla and for the conduct of salespersons employed by Respondent and MPW. When Vocational learned the particulars of Respondent's sales program through complaints from purchasers, Vocational made reasonable efforts to remedy the harm to purchasers and to eliminate the offending practices.
Respondent's sales program was directed at occupants of Sevilla. Occupants included owners of Sevilla timeshares, renters, and owners of other timeshare units who were occupying a timeshare at Sevilla through an exchange program.
When a new group of occupants arrived at Sevilla, the sales program began with a reception in the form of a pool party, a breakfast, or a dinner. Respondent assigned a salesperson to certain guests and sometimes assigned himself to a few guests.
At the reception, each salesperson and Respondent would meet their assigned guests and make appointments for a timeshare sales presentation and tour.
At the sales presentation, each salesperson sat at a table with prospective purchasers and performed the sales presentation designed and required by Respondent. Upon completion of the sales presentation, Respondent would come to the table to close the sale. Respondent would go over the sales presentation and emphasize certain points.
On October 24, 1995, Clarence and Maxine Shelt attended a sales presentation with their friends Raymond and Charlene Sindel from their respective home city of Delta, Ohio. The Shelts and Sindels owned other timeshares not located at Sevilla.
Maxine Shelt purchased a timeshare at Sevilla because Respondent promised her and her husband that they could use the exchange program for a timeshare anywhere in the world for $79,
52 weeks a year. The Shelts tried to use the exchange program through Tri Realty, Inc. ("Tri Realty") because that was the agency Respondent told the Shelts to use. Tri Realty denied any knowledge of such a program, and Tri Realty never offered such a program.
Respondent represented that the Shelts could sell their two timeshares relatively easily at a price stated in a price list Respondent provided to the Shelts. Based on Respondent's representation, the Shelts listed their two timeshares for resale with Tri Realty. The two timeshares never sold.
The Shelts attempted to discuss the sale of their units with Respondent several times. Respondent became unavailable to the Shelts after the second conversation. Mrs. Shelt went to
Orlando and complained to a representative of Vocational concerning her dissatisfaction with Respondent. Vocational refunded the Shelt's purchase money for the Sevilla timeshare.
Respondent also represented to the Sindels that the exchange program at Sevilla would allow them to exchange their Sevilla timeshare for a timeshare anywhere in the world for $79,
52 weeks a year. After purchasing a timeshare at Sevilla, the Sindels attempted to use the exchange program described by Respondent but found that no such exchange program existed.
Respondent also represented to the Sindels that their existing timeshares could be sold "before the end of the year" and that the sale proceeds would pay for the timeshare at Sevilla. Respondent provided the Sindels with a computer printout purporting to be the market value for the existing timeshares. Respondent represented that the timeshares would sell very quickly, especially those located on the resort coast. The Sindels listed their timeshares with Tri Realty, but the timeshares never sold.
The Sindels complained to Vocational about Respondent. Vocational refunded the purchase price of the Sevilla timeshare to the Sindels.
On June 26, 1996, Mildred and Eugene Plotkin attended a sales presentation from their home in Greenville, North Carolina. Respondent represented that the Plotkins would be able to obtain a credit card that they could use to pay for the Sevilla timeshare at a very low interest rate. Respondent further
represented that he could sell the Plotkin's existing timeshare in Las Vegas in two months so that they could use the sales proceeds to pay off the credit card.
The Plotkins used their two existing credit cards to pay for a Sevilla timeshare. The credit card promised by Respondent never came. The Las Vegas timeshare did not sell in the time promised.
The Plotkins did not get their low-interest credit card, found that the Las Vegas timeshare had not sold, and began receiving interest charges on their existing cards for the purchase of the Sevilla timeshare. Respondent paid the credit charges incurred by the Plotkins with checks issued on the MPW account.
On July 26, 1996, Susan Bailey attended a sales presentation from her home in Wiggins, Mississippi. Respondent represented that Ms. Bailey would receive a credit card with a credit line of $20,000 and an interest rate of 8.9 percent. Respondent gave Ms. Bailey what he represented to her as a confirmation of her right to the credit card.
Ms. Bailey purchased a Sevilla timeshare in reliance upon Respondent's representations but never received a credit card. She attempted to speak to Respondent but discovered that Respondent had resigned his position at Sevilla. She spoke to someone else at Sevilla and applied for a different credit card with a lower line of credit and a higher interest rate.
On December 11, 1996, Larry and Carla Eshleman attended a sales presentation from their home in Downingtown, Pennsylvania. Respondent represented that Mr. Eshleman would receive a credit card with a credit line of $25,000 and an interest rate of 8.9 percent. Respondent represented that the Eshlemans could use the credit card to pay for the Sevilla timeshare and that Respondent would sell the two timeshares already owned by the Eshlemans before the first payment was due on the new credit card. Respondent provided a computer printout purporting to be the market value of their existing timeshares.
Respondent told the Eshlemans that he would pay for families to stay in the Eshelmans' existing timeshares and make sales presentations to these families. Respondent represented that it was in his best interest to sell the timeshares quickly because it would cost Respondent $149 to send each family to each timeshare for eight days and seven nights. Respondent assured the Eshelmans that it would be no problem to sell the existing timeshares because Respondent had done it many times.
Respondent also told the Eshelmans that Respondent could rent the Sevilla timeshare for $875 for the lockout unit,
$1050 for the one bedroom unit, or $1,650 for both units in any year the Eshelmans did not use the Sevilla timeshare. Respondent represented that the Eshelmans could make money off the timeshare when they did not use it.
In reliance upon Respondent's representations, Mr. Eshelman purchased a Sevilla timeshare. Respondent never sold
the Eshelmans' existing timeshares. When the Eshelmans complained to Vocational, Vocational refunded their purchase money.
On September 19, 1996, Thomas and Betty Prussak attended a sales presentation from their home in Medina, Ohio. Respondent asked Mr. Prussak if Mr. Prussak wanted to buy a Sevilla timeshare. Mr. Prussak stated that he already owned two weeks of timeshares and wanted to sell those two. Respondent offered to sell the existing timeshares if Mr. Prussak purchased a timeshare from Respondent. Respondent represented that the sales proceeds from one of the existing timeshares would pay off the Sevilla timeshare and Mr. Prussak would have cash in hand from the sale of the second timeshare less a 10 percent commission to Respondent on both timeshares.
Respondent represented to Mr. Prussak that Respondent would sell the existing timeshares for market value. Respondent made a telephone call or fax communication to an unknown source and then told Mr. Prussak that the two existing timeshares were worth $12,000 each. Respondent represented to Mr. Prussak that Respondent would probably have one of the two existing timeshares sold by the end of the week because it was a "Five Star" unit. Respondent represented that his sales representatives would "get right on it" and that all they had to do was to take people there and "they'll go."
In June 1996, Mrs. Cynthia Richards and her now deceased husband attended a sales presentation at Sevilla.
Mrs. Richards now lives in Randolph, New Jersey. Respondent represented that if the Richards purchased a Sevilla timeshare, Respondent would sell their existing timeshare for $2,000 over the purchase price of the Sevilla timeshare. Respondent represented that he had buyers in mind from England. The extra cash appealed to the Richards to pay off existing bills.
The Richards purchased a Sevilla timeshare in reliance upon Respondent's representations. The existing timeshares never sold. Mrs. Richards attempted to telephone Respondent several times, but was never able to speak to Respondent.
Vocational received approximately 50 other complaints from purchasers of Sevilla timeshares describing representations by Respondent similar to those described in previous findings. Petitioner provided Respondent with notice that Petitioner intended to use six of these 50 complaints as similar fact evidence pursuant to Section 120.57(1)(d). Findings based on similar fact evidence are set forth in paragraphs 33-40.
In May 1996, Mr. and Mrs. Tim Malone attended a sales presentation from their home in Sturgeon Lake, Minnesota. Respondent represented that he would be able to sell the Malone's existing timeshare "by the end of the year" for its market value of $9,800. Respondent represented that he would pay for families to stay in the Malone's existing timeshare and attempt to sell the unit to them. Respondent assured the Malones that he would sell the existing unit before the end of the year because it cost Respondent to send potential buyers to the existing unit.
In reliance upon Respondent's representations, the Malones purchased a Sevilla timeshare. Respondent never sold the Malone's existing timeshare. Respondent never sent potential buyers to the Malone's existing timeshare. The market value was less than $5,000.
In July 1996, Mr. and Mrs. Phillip Lambert attended a sales presentation from their home in Sharon Hill, Pennsylvania. Respondent represented that he would be able to sell the Lambert's existing timeshare and that the Lamberts would receive a credit card they could use to pay for the Sevilla timeshare.
The Lamberts purchased a Sevilla timeshare in reliance upon Respondent's representations. The Lamberts never received a credit card. Respondent never sold their existing timeshare. Vocational refunded the purchase money for the Sevilla timeshare to the Lamberts.
In August 1996, Mr. Andrew Eger attended a sales presentation from his home in Orlando, Florida. Respondent represented that the exchange program at Sevilla would allow Mr. Eger to exchange his timeshare for another anywhere in the world for $149, 52 weeks a year. Mr. Eger discovered that the exchange program started at $149 for units available only in the following
59 days and that the least expensive exchange actually available any other time started at $350.
Mr. Eger cancelled the purchase of his Sevilla timeshare within the 10-day rescission period provided in the
written contract. Respondent threatened Mr. Eger with lawsuits and with refusing to refund the $8,000 due.
In February 1997, Mr. David and Margaret Maybloom attended a sales presentation from their home in Staten Island, New York. Respondent represented that he would sell their existing timeshare for $3,000 and thereby subsidize the cost of the Sevilla timeshare. Respondent's sales person also represented that the Mayblooms would receive a credit card with a credit limit of $20,000 that they could use to purchase the Sevilla timeshare.
The Mayblooms purchased a Sevilla timeshare in reliance upon Respondent's representations. They received a credit card with a credit limit of $6,000, but Respondent did not sell the existing timeshare.
Vocational did not offer a resale, exchange, or rental program with a purchase of a Sevilla timeshare. Vocational did not have a contract for resale, exchange, or rental with Tri Realty.
Vocational did not offer a credit card as an incidental benefit of purchasing a Sevilla timeshare. Vocational did not file the availability of a credit card as an incidental benefit pursuant to Section 721.075(1)(g).
At the beginning of Respondent's tenure as sales manager, Vocational did offer a credit card as an incidental benefit for a short period. Vocational terminated the credit card program shortly after Respondent became sales manager.
However, Respondent continued to offer the credit card to prospective purchasers as an inducement to purchase a Sevilla timeshare.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
DOAH has jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties. The parties were duly noticed for the administrative hearing.
Petitioner has the burden of proof in this proceeding. Petitioner must show by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent committed the acts alleged by Petitioner and the reasonableness of any proposed penalty. Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Securities and Investor Protection vs. Osborne Stern and Company, 670 So. 2d 932, 935 (Fla. 1996).
Petitioner satisfied its burden of proof. Petitioner showed by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated Section 721.11 (4)(a), (h), (j), and (k).
Section 721.11(4) provides, in relevant part:
No advertising or oral statement made by any seller shall:
Misrepresent a fact or create a false or misleading impression regarding the timeshare plan or promotion thereof.
* * *
(h) Misrepresent the nature and extent of any incidental benefit.
* * *
Misrepresent the conditions under which a purchaser may exchange the right to use accommodations or facilities in one location for the right to use accommodations or facilities in another location.
* * *
Misrepresent the availability of a resale or rental program offered by or on behalf of a developer.
Respondent violated Section 721.11(4)(a) through repeated oral misrepresentations that the timeshare plan at Sevilla included an exchange program, a resale program, a rental program, and a credit card benefit. Respondent violated Section
721.11 (4)(h) by orally misrepresenting that low-interest credit cards were available to purchasers as an incidental benefit of the timeshare program and promotion for Sevilla timeshares. Respondent violated Section 721.11 (4)(j) by orally misrepresenting that purchasers could exchange their Sevilla timeshares for $79 anywhere in the world, 52 days a week. Respondent violated Section 721.11 (4)(k) by orally misrepresenting that he could sell their existing timeshares and rent their Sevilla timeshares and by orally misrepresenting the terms and conditions under which he could do so.
In order for evidence to be clear and convincing:
. . . evidence must be found to be credible, facts to which witnesses testify must be distinctly remembered, testimony must be precise and explicit, and witnesses must be lacking in confusion . . . .
The evidence must be of such weight that it produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm . . . conviction, without hesitancy, as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.
Slomowitz vs. Walker, 429 So. 2d 797, 799 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983).
The evidence submitted by Petitioner was clear and convincing for the essential elements in the charges against
Respondent. The evidence submitted by Respondent was neither credible nor persuasive.
When Respondent testified during the hearing, he spent most of the opportunity to testify as a fact witness by commenting on the testimony of other fact witnesses called by Petitioner and by engaging in legal argument as to why the testimony of those witnesses should not be believed. The ALJ repeatedly instructed Respondent that he was not using his opportunity to testify in a manner that served Respondent's best interest because the ALJ could consider as evidence only Respondent's factual testimony and that Respondent would have an opportunity in his PRO to make legal argument as to why Petitioner's witnesses should not be believed. Nonetheless, Respondent had difficulty understanding the distinction between legal argument and fact testimony and the impropriety of a fact witness commenting on the testimony of other fact witnesses.
Respondent is not subject to a lesser standard of
conduct, as distinguished from legal competence, than a licensed attorney. A contrary rule would insulate a party from applicable standards of conduct by choosing lay representation. Cf. Jancyn Manufacturing Corporation v. Florida Department of Health, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D2232, 2233 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Burke v. Harbor Estate Associates, Inc., 591 So. 2d 1034, 1037-1038 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (party cannot avoid fees and costs in frivolous action by choosing lay representation). Accord Dolphins Plus v. Residents of Key Largo Ocean Shores, 598 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992).
Section 721.26 (5)(e) authorizes Petitioner to impose a fine up to $10,000 for each separate offense committed by Respondent and a cease and desist order barring Respondent from further conduct in violation of applicable statutes. Florida Administrative Code Rule 61B-41 provides guidance in imposing statutorily authorized penalties.
In addition, the reasonableness of any penalty imposed in this case should serve the legislative intent stated in Sections 721.02 and 721.03. In Section 721.02, the legislature made clear that full and fair disclosure in the sale of timeshares is necessary in order to protect the quality of Florida's timeshare plans and the consumers who purchase them and to safeguard the tourism industry that is vital to the state's economy.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is
RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating Section 721.11 (4)(a), (h), (j), and (k), entering a cease and desist order prohibiting Respondent from further violations of Chapter 721 in the sale of timeshares, imposing a civil penalty in the amount of $28,000, and requiring Respondent to pay the civil penalty within 45 days of the date of this Recommended Order by certified check made payable to the Treasurer, State of Florida, Department of Business and Professional Regulation which Respondent shall mail by certified
mail to Mr. John Floyd, Investigator Supervisor, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, 1940 North Monroe Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1030.
DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of April, 2000, Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.
DANIEL MANRY
Administrative Law Judge
Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building
1230 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060
(850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675
Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of April, 2000.
COPIES FURNISHED:
Philip Nowick, Director
Florida Land Sales, Condos, Mobile Homes Department of Business and
Professional Regulation Northwood Centre
1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Barbara D. Auger, General Counsel Department of Business and
Professional Regulation Northwood Center
1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Janis Sue Richardson, Esquire Division of Florida Land Sales,
Condominiums and Mobile Homes Department of Business and
Professional Regulation Northwood Center
1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007
William S. Walsh 2156 Turnberry Drive,
Oviedo, Florida 32756
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS
All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within 15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the final order in this case.
| Issue Date | Proceedings |
|---|---|
| Jul. 15, 2004 | Final Order filed. |
| Jul. 17, 2000 | Notice of Appearance (filed in the 5th DCA) filed. |
| Jul. 05, 2000 | Respondent`s Motion for Rehearing filed. |
| Jun. 28, 2000 | Ltr. to J. York from W. Walsh In re: final order filed. |
| May 03, 2000 | Petitioner`s Response to Respondent`s Exceptions to Recommended Order filed. |
| Apr. 28, 2000 | Letter to Judge Smith from William S. Walsh (RE: Judge Manry`s Recommended Order) filed. |
| Apr. 18, 2000 | Letter to Judge Manry from W. Walsh Re: Respondent`s last three motions have not been answered by the court filed. |
| Apr. 14, 2000 | Letter to Judge Manry from W. Walsh Re: Respondent`s last three motions filed. |
| Apr. 13, 2000 | Recommended Order sent out. CASE CLOSED. Hearing held 03/14/2000. |
| Apr. 11, 2000 | Petitioner`s Objection to Respondent`s Motion for Recusal of Agency Head (filed via facsimile). |
| Apr. 05, 2000 | Respondent`s Motion for Recusal of Agency Head filed. |
| Mar. 28, 2000 | Petitioner`s Proposed Recommended Order (For Judge Signature) w/cover letter filed. |
| Mar. 27, 2000 | Respondent`s Proposed Recommended Orders filed. |
| Mar. 24, 2000 | Petitioner`s Response to Respondent`s Motion for Continuance (filed via facsimile). |
| Mar. 23, 2000 | Respondent`s Motion for Continuance for Proposed Recommended Order (filed via facsimile). |
| Mar. 16, 2000 | (Petitioner) Hearing Exhibits; Exhibits filed. |
| Mar. 14, 2000 | CASE STATUS: Hearing Held. |
| Mar. 10, 2000 | Respondent`s Objection to Hearing by Teleconference (filed via facsimile). |
| Mar. 09, 2000 | Order sent out. (petitioner`s motion to accept petitioner`s uncontested statement of facts or to permit J. McBride to testify by telephone is GRANTED) |
| Mar. 09, 2000 | Order sent out. (respondent`s motion to dismiss is DENIED) |
| Mar. 09, 2000 | Order sent out. (petitioner`s motion to admit witnesses [sic] deposition testimony and respondent`s admissions into evidence is granted) |
| Mar. 09, 2000 | Amended Notice of Hearing by Video Teleconference sent out. (hearing set for March 14, 2000; 9:30 a.m.; Orlando and Tallahassee, FL, amended as to video) |
| Mar. 08, 2000 | Respondent`s Objection to Petitioner`s Motion to Accept Petitioner`s Uncontested Statement of Facts or to Permit Joseph McBride to Testify by Telephone at the Hearing filed. |
| Mar. 03, 2000 | Respondent`s Answer to Petitioner`s Request for Production of Documents filed. |
| Mar. 02, 2000 | Letter to J. Richardson from W. Walsh Re: Response to letter dated 2/23/00 filed. |
| Mar. 02, 2000 | Respondent`s Motion to Dismiss All Claims in the Probable Cause Hearing filed. |
| Mar. 02, 2000 | Petitioner`s Objection to Respondent`s Motion to Dismiss Claims in This Probable Cause Hearing (filed via facsimile). |
| Feb. 29, 2000 | Petitioner`s Motion to Accept Petitioner`s Uncontested Statement of Facts or to Permit Joseph McBride to Testify by Telephone at the Hearing (filed via facsimile). |
| Feb. 04, 2000 | (J. Richardson) Notice of Service filed. |
| Feb. 02, 2000 | Order Denying Respondent`s Motion to Reconsider the Disqualification of The Administrative Judge sent out. |
| Jan. 28, 2000 | Order sent out. (Respondent`s request to produce better meaning to charges is denied) |
| Jan. 26, 2000 | Respondent`s Motion for Order for Petitioner to Furnish Better Meanings to Charges (filed via facsimile). |
| Jan. 24, 2000 | Notice of Hearing sent out. (hearing set for March 14, 2000; 9:30 a.m.; Orlando, FL) |
| Jan. 20, 2000 | Parties` Joint Stipulation to Hearing Date; Petitioner`s Response to Respondent`s Request for Better Meaning to Charges filed. |
| Jan. 18, 2000 | Respondent`s Request to Produce Better Meaning to Charges (filed via facsimile). |
| Jan. 18, 2000 | Respondent`s Motion to Recosnider the Disqualification of the Administrative Judge; Fax cover sheet to Judge Manry from W. Walsh Re: New Address (filed via facsimile). |
| Jan. 13, 2000 | Order sent out. (respondent`s motion to disqualify ALJ and amended motion to disqualify ALJ are denied) |
| Dec. 22, 1999 | Respondent`s Response to Petitioner`s Objection to Disqualify Administrative Judge and Motion to Reschedule Hearing (filed via facsimile). |
| Dec. 20, 1999 | Amended Motion for Disqualification of Administrative Judge (Respondent) (filed via facsimile). |
| Dec. 16, 1999 | Respondent`s Answer to Petitioner`s Response to Respondent`s Motion for Summary Judgement; Respondent`s Motion to Disqualify Administrative Judge filed. |
| Dec. 13, 1999 | Petitioner`s Objection to Respondent`s Motion to Disqualify Administrative Judge and Motion to Reschedule Hearing (filed via facsimile). |
| Dec. 07, 1999 | Petitioner`s Amended Prehearing Statement filed. |
| Dec. 02, 1999 | Order sent out. (respondent`s motion for summary judgment is denied) |
| Nov. 17, 1999 | Telephone Deposition of Raymond Sindel ; Telephone Deposition of Cynthia Richards filed. |
| Nov. 17, 1999 | Telephone Deposition of Thomas J. Prussak ; Telephone Deposition of Maxine Shelt filed. |
| Nov. 17, 1999 | Telephone Deposition of Cheryl LaFontaine ; Telephone Deposition of Mildred Plotkin filed. |
| Nov. 17, 1999 | Deposition of: Susan Bailey (Telephonic Appearance) ; Deposition of: Larry Eshleman (Telephonic Appearance) filed. |
| Nov. 17, 1999 | Petitioner`s Motion to Admit Witnesses Deposition Testimony and Respondent`s Admissions Into Evidence filed. |
| Nov. 17, 1999 | Petitioner`s Rsponse to Respondent`s Motion for Summary Judgment filed. |
| Nov. 16, 1999 | Petitioner`s Prehearing Statement filed. |
| Nov. 12, 1999 | Respondent`s Motion for Summary Judgement (filed via facsimile). |
| Nov. 05, 1999 | Order Granting Continuance and Placing Case in Abeyance sent out. (Parties to advise status by February 7, 2000.) |
| Nov. 04, 1999 | Respondent`s Motion for Continuance (filed via facsimile). |
| Nov. 03, 1999 | Petitioner`s Response to Respondent`s Motion for Continuance filed. |
| Oct. 19, 1999 | (Petitioner) Notice of Taking Telephone Deposition filed. |
| Sep. 27, 1999 | (Petitioner) Re-Notice of Taking Telephone Depositions filed. |
| Sep. 02, 1999 | Order Granting Motion to Clarify Notice of Hearing sent out. |
| Sep. 02, 1999 | (Petitioner) Amended Notice of Taking Telephone Depositions filed. |
| Aug. 26, 1999 | Petitioner`s Objections and Responses to Respondent`s First, Second, and Third Requests for Production of Documents filed. |
| Aug. 20, 1999 | (Petitioners) Notice of Taking Depositions filed. |
| Aug. 20, 1999 | Petitioner`s Motion to Clarify Notice of Hearing filed. |
| Aug. 16, 1999 | Order sent out. (motion to set aside order of adoption is denied) |
| Aug. 13, 1999 | Notice of Hearing sent out. (hearing set for December 1, 1999; 9:30 a.m.; Orlando, FL) |
| Aug. 06, 1999 | (W. Walsh) Motion to Set Aside Order of Adoption filed. |
| Aug. 06, 1999 | Respondent`s Answer to Motion to Take Depositions of Non-Party Witnesses by Telephone filed. |
| Jul. 30, 1999 | Order of Adoption sent out. (order permitting depositions of non-party witnesses by telephone is adopted by this order) |
| Jul. 28, 1999 | Petitioner`s Motion to Take Depositions of Non-Party Witnesses by Telephone; Order Permitting Depositions of Non-Party Witnesses by Telephone (For Judge Signature) w/cover letter filed. |
| Jul. 15, 1999 | Initial Order issued. |
| Jul. 12, 1999 | Agency Referral Letter; Notice of Service of Petitioner`s First Set of Interrogatories; Notice to Show Cause; Request for Formal Hearing filed. |
| Issue Date | Document | Summary |
|---|---|---|
| Jun. 16, 2000 | Agency Final Order | |
| Apr. 13, 2000 | Recommended Order | Sales manager of a timeshare resort violated Section 721.11(4)(a), (h), (j), and (k), Florida Statutes, through oral misrepresentations and is liable for a civil penalty of $28,000. |
