Petitioner: SHERRI CRILLY
Respondent: JULIA FONDRIEST AND STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
Judges: CATHY M. SELLERS
Agency: Department of Environmental Protection
Locations: Tallahassee, Florida
Filed: May 26, 2020
Status: Closed
Recommended Order on Thursday, February 18, 2021.
Latest Update: Dec. 23, 2024

Summary: The issue in these consolidated proceedings is whether the proposed single-family residential dock meets the requirements for a letter of consent for use of sovereignty submerged lands pursuant to chapters 253 and 258, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Chapters 18-20 and 18-21, such that the Consolidated Regulatory Exemption and Letter of Consent for Department of Environmental Protection File No. 0319584-003EE, as amended on September 30, 2020, should be granted.Applicant for pr

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STATE OF FLORIDA

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

BARRY ROBERTS AND )

GLORIA MEREDITH TRUST, )

)

Petitioner, )

) OGC CASE NO. 19-1865

v. ) DOAH CASE NO. 20-2473

)

JULIA FONDRIEST AND STATE OF )

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF )

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, )

)

Respondents. )

__________________________________________/

)

SHERRI CRILLY, )

)

Petitioner, )

) OGC CASE NO. 20-0071

v. ) DOAH CASE NO. 20-2474

)

JULIA FONDRIEST AND STATE OF )

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF )

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, )

)

Respondents. )

__________________________________________/ JENNIFER DEMARIA, )

)

Petitioner, )

) OGC CASE NO. 20-0004

v. ) DOAH CASE NO. 20-2535

)

JULIA FONDRIEST AND STATE OF )

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF )

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, )

)

Respondents. )

__________________________________________/

CONSOLIDATD FINAL ORDER

An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) with the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) on February 18, 2021, submitted a Recommended Order (RO) to the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP or Department) in the above-captioned administrative proceeding. A copy of the RO is attached hereto as Exhibit A. Petitioners, the Barry Roberts and Gloria Meredith Trust (the Trust), Sherri Crilly (Crilly), and Jennifer DeMaria (DeMaria) (collectively the Petitioners, or individually, the Trust, Crilly, or DeMaria) timely filed exceptions on March 4, 2021. The Respondents Julie Fondriest (Fondriest or Respondent) and DEP timely filed a joint response to the Petitioners’ exceptions on March 10, 2021.

This matter is now before the Secretary of the Department for final agency action. 1

BACKGROUND

On December 10, 2019, DEP issued an environmental resource general permit and sovereignty submerged lands letter of consent to Respondent Julia Fondriest, approving an

800-square-foot dock from which to launch non-motorized vessels (2019 Approval). Pursuant to extensions of time, Petitioners the Trust filed a petition for administrative hearing on January 30, 2020; Petitioner DeMaria filed a Verified Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing on January 31, 2020; and Petitioner Crilly filed a Verified Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing on February 27, 2020. The petitions were referred to DOAH on May 26, 2020, and respectively assigned Case Nos. 20-2473, 20-2535, and 20-2474. On June 4, 2020, the ALJ consolidated the cases for hearing and issuance of her RO.

1 The Secretary of the Department is delegated the authority to review and take final agency action on applications to use sovereignty submerged lands when the application involves an activity for which the Department has permitting responsibility. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-21.0051(2)(2020).

The ALJ scheduled the final hearing for July 9 and 10, 2020, in Key West, Florida. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the parties request for a continuance, the ALJ continued the hearing until September 14 and 15, 2020, to be conducted by Zoom Conference.

On September 8, 2020, DEP filed a motion for continuance to enable DEP to conduct a re-review of the project for compliance with the aquatic preserve statutes and rules.

On September 11, 2020, Fondriest filed a revised application with DEP, requesting to reduce the size of the proposed structure to under 500 square feet (the Dock); a verification of exemption from an ERP permit under section 403.813(1)(b), Florida Statutes,2 and Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-330.015(5)(b); and authorization to use sovereignty submerged lands in accordance with chapters 253 and 258, Florida Statutes, and chapters 18-20 and 18-21 of the Florida Administrative Code.

On October 9, 2020, the Trust, DeMaria and Crilly filed amended Petitions.

DOAH held the final hearing on October 19, 22, and 29, and November 10, 2020, by Zoom Conference. Respondent Fondriest presented the testimony of Hans Wilson and Sandra Walters. DEP presented the testimony of Nicole Charnock and Megan Mills. Petitioners presented the testimony of Sherri Crilly, Barry Roberts, Michael Czerwinski, Gloria Meredith, Julia Fondriest, Jennifer DeMaria, and Harry Appel.

The parties timely filed proposed recommended orders on November 30, 2020. The ALJ gave due consideration to the proposed recommended orders in preparing the RO.

2 The Petitioners stipulated that the Dock qualified for the permitting exemption under section 403.813(1)(b) of the Florida Statutes.

SUMMARY OF THE RECOMMENDED ORDER

In the RO, the ALJ recommended that the Department issue a final order granting Respondent Fondriest’s application for a Letter of Consent to Use Sovereignty Submerged Lands and verifying that the Dock is exempt from the requirement to obtain an environmental resource permit pursuant to section 403.813(1)(b), Florida Statutes. (RO at p. 55). In doing so, the ALJ found that the Dock will meet the applicable requirements of chapters 18-20 and 18-21 of the Florida Administrative Code. (RO ¶¶ 230, 256). The ALJ concluded that the applicant, Julia Fondriest, demonstrated by competent, substantial evidence that the proposed Dock meets the applicable statutory and rule standards and requirements to authorize a private residential single- family dock in an RPA 3 area of an aquatic preserve.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW OF DOAH RECOMMENDED ORDERS

Section 120.57(1)(l), Florida Statutes, prescribes that an agency reviewing a recommended order may not reject or modify the findings of fact of the ALJ “unless the agency first determines from a review of the entire record, and states with particularity in the order, that the findings of fact were not based on competent substantial evidence.” § 120.57(1)(l), Fla. Stat. (2020); Charlotte Cnty. v. IMC Phosphates Co., 18 So. 3d 1079, 1082 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009); Wills

Fla. Elections Comm’n, 955 So. 2d 61, 62 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). The term “competent substantial evidence” does not relate to the quality, character, convincing power, probative value or weight of the evidence. Rather, “competent substantial evidence” refers to the existence of some evidence as to each essential element and as to its admissibility under legal rules of evidence. See e.g., Scholastic Book Fairs, Inc. v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 671 So. 2d 287, 289 n.3 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996); Nunez v. Nunez, 29 So. 3d 1191, 1192 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010).

A reviewing agency may not reweigh the evidence presented at a DOAH final hearing, attempt to resolve conflicts therein, or judge the credibility of witnesses. See, e.g., Rogers v.
Dep’t of Health, 920 So. 2d 27, 30 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005); Belleau v. Dep’t of Env’t. Prot., 695 So. 2d 1305, 1307 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); Dunham v. Highlands Cnty. School Bd., 652 So. 2d 894, 896 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). If there is competent substantial evidence to support an ALJ’s findings of fact, it is irrelevant that there may also be competent substantial evidence supporting a contrary finding. See, e.g., Arand Constr. Co. v. Dyer, 592 So. 2d 276, 280 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Conshor, Inc. v. Roberts, 498 So. 2d 622, 623 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).
The ALJ’s decision to accept the testimony of one expert witness over that of another expert is an evidentiary ruling that cannot be altered by a reviewing agency, absent a complete lack of any competent substantial evidence of record supporting this decision. See, e.g., Peace River/Manasota Reg’l Water Supply Auth. v. IMC Phosphates Co., 18 So. 3d 1079, 1088 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009); Collier Med. Ctr. v. State, Dep’t of HRS, 462 So. 2d 83, 85 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Fla. Chapter of Sierra Club v. Orlando Utils. Comm’n, 436 So. 2d 383, 389 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983). In addition, an agency has no authority to make independent or supplemental findings of fact. See, e.g., North Port, Fla. v. Consol. Minerals, 645 So. 2d 485, 487 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Fla. Siting Bd., 693 So. 2d 1025, 1026-1027 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).
Section 120.57(1)(l), Florida Statutes, authorizes an agency to reject or modify an ALJ’s conclusions of law and interpretations of administrative rules “over which it has substantive jurisdiction.” See Barfield v. Dep’t of Health, 805 So. 2d 1008, 1012 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001); L.B. Bryan & Co. v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty., 746 So. 2d 1194, 1197 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); Deep Lagoon Boat Club, Ltd. v. Sheridan, 784 So. 2d 1140, 1141-142 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). If an ALJ improperly labels a conclusion of law as a finding of fact, the label should be disregarded and the

item treated as though it were actually a conclusion of law. See, e.g., Battaglia Properties v. Fla. Land and Water Adjudicatory Comm’n, 629 So. 2d 161, 168 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). However, the agency should not label what is essentially an ultimate factual determination as a “conclusion of law” to modify or overturn what it may view as an unfavorable finding of fact. See, e.g., Stokes v. State, Bd. of Prof’l Eng’rs, 952 So. 2d 1224, 1225 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). Furthermore, agency interpretations of statutes and rules within their regulatory jurisdiction do not have to be the only reasonable interpretations. It is enough if such agency interpretations are “permissible” ones. See, e.g., Suddath Van Lines, Inc. v. Dep’t of Env’t. Prot., 668 So. 2d 209, 212 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). The Department is charged with enforcing and interpreting chapter 373, Florida Statutes, and chapters 253 and 258, Florida Statutes, on behalf of the Board of Trustees. As a result, DEP has substantive jurisdiction over interpretation of these statutes and the Department’s rules adopted to implement these statutes.
Agencies do not have jurisdiction, however, to modify or reject rulings on the admissibility of evidence. Evidentiary rulings of the ALJ that deal with “factual issues susceptible to ordinary methods of proof that are not infused with [agency] policy considerations,” are not matters over which the agency has “substantive jurisdiction.” See Martuccio v. Dep’t of Prof’l Regulation, 622 So. 2d 607, 609 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Heifetz v. Dep’t of Bus. Regulation, 475 So. 2d 1277, 1281-82 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). Evidentiary rulings are matters within the ALJ’s sound “prerogative . . . as the finder of fact” and may not be reversed on agency review. See Martuccio, 622 So. 2d at 609.
RULINGS ON EXCEPTIONS

In reviewing a recommended order and any written exceptions, the agency’s final order “shall include an explicit ruling on each exception.” See § 120.57(1)(k), Fla. Stat. (2020). The

agency, however, need not rule on an exception that “does not clearly identify the disputed portion of the recommended order by page number or paragraph, that does not identify the legal basis for the exception, or that does not include appropriate and specific citations to the record.” Id.
A party that files no exceptions to certain findings of fact “has thereby expressed its agreement with, or at least waived any objection to, those findings of fact.” Env’t. Coal. of Fla., Inc. v. Broward Cnty., 586 So. 2d 1212, 1213 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); see also Colonnade Med.
Ctr., Inc. v. State of Fla., Agency for Health Care Admin., 847 So. 2d 540, 542 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). However, an agency head reviewing a recommended order is free to modify or reject any erroneous conclusions of law over which the agency has substantive jurisdiction, even when exceptions are not filed. See § 120.57(1)(l), Fla. Stat. (2020); Barfield, 805 So. 2d at 1012; Fla. Pub. Emp. Council, v. Daniels, 646 So. 2d 813, 816 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).
RULINGS ON THE PETITIONERS’ EXCEPTIONS

The Department will address the Petitioners’ exceptions to paragraphs from the Recommended Order in the order presented in the exceptions.
Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraphs 73-78 and 226-230.

The Petitioners take exception to the findings of fact in paragraphs 73-78 and the mixed findings of fact and conclusions of law in paragraphs 226-230 of the RO that relate to the ALJ’s finding that the Dock is located within a Resource Protection Area 3 as defined in rule 18-20.003 of the Florida Administrative Code.
Rule 18-20.003 defines three categories of Resource Protection Areas (RPA) for the purpose of imposing restrictions and conditions on the use of sovereign submerged lands within aquatic preserves:
1. “Resource Protection Area (RPA) 1” – Areas within the aquatic preserve which have resources of the highest quality and condition for that area. These resources may include, but are not limited to corals; marine grassbeds; mangrove swamps; salt-water marsh; oyster bars; archaeological and historical sites; endangered or threatened species habitat; and colonial water bird nesting sites.
2. “Resource Protection Area 2” – Areas within the aquatic preserves which are in transition with either declining resource protection area 1 resources or new pioneering resources within resource protection area 3.
3. “Resource Protection Area 3” – Areas within the aquatic preserve that are characterized by the absence of any significant natural resource attributes.

Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-20.003(54)–(56)(2020) (emphasis added).

The Petitioners take exception to the ALJ’s finding that the Dock is located in an RPA 3, contending that the ALJ should have found that the Dock is located in an RPA 1. The Petitioners also allege that the “ALJ improperly adds words that are not in the Rule, (i.e., ‘significant’ habitat), to the FAC Rule definition in Findings 73-78 and Conclusions of Law 226 and 230 . . . The definition of RPA 1 in the Rule does not use the words(sic) ‘significant’ nor does it require endangered species habitat to be ‘significant’ on a statewide basis to qualify as an RPA 1.” Petitioners Exceptions at p. 2. The Petitioners contend that the Dock must be classified as an RPA 1, because the ALJ acknowledged in paragraph 64 of the RO that two types of endangered sea turtles use the beach above the mean high water line (MHWL) along Long Beach Drive for nesting at a relatively low nesting density.

The Petitioners’ analysis is flawed and not consistent with chapter 18-20’s definitions of RPA 1, RPA 2 and RPA 3. Contrary to the Petitioner’s exception, the ALJ did not add words that are not in the rule. Instead, the ALJ used the term “significant” as it appears in the definition of RPA 3 areas. As defined in rule 18-20.003(54), and recited above, RPA 1 areas are defined to have “resources of the highest quality ” Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-20.003(54)(2020)

(emphasis added). Conversely, rule 18-20.003(56) defines RPA 3 areas as ones that have “the

absence of any significant natural resources attributes.” Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-20.003(56)

(2020) (emphasis added).

The Petitioners appear to take exception to the finding in paragraph 73 that “although sea turtles nest on the beach along Long Beach Drive, this area does not constitute significant sea turtle nesting habitat, and there is no significant food source for adult or juvenile sea turtles in the vicinity of the Dock.” RO ¶ 73. Contrary to the Petitioners’ exception, the ALJ’s findings in paragraph 73 are supported by competent substantial evidence. (Walters, T. Vol. 6, pp. 913-14, 914-15).

The Petitioners appear to take exception to the findings in paragraph 74 that “The biological resource assessments also showed that no transitioning resources are present at the location, or in the vicinity, of the Dock. Thus, the evidence shows that the Dock will not be

located in an RPA 2.” RO ¶ 74. Contrary to the Petitioners’ exception, the ALJ’s findings in paragraph 74 are supported by competent substantial evidence. (Walters, T. Vol. 2, pp. 234, 247-48).

The Petitioners take exception to the findings in paragraph 75 of the RO, which reads in its entirety that “Because there are no significant natural resource attributes or transitioning resources in the footprint and the immediate vicinity of the Dock, it is determined that the Dock will be located in an RPA 3.” RO ¶ 75. Contrary to the Petitioners’ exception, the ALJ’s findings in paragraph 75 are supported by competent substantial evidence. (Walters, T. Vol. 2, pp. 244-47; Carnock, T. Vol. 3, pp. 349-50; Mills, Vol. 3, pp. 396-398).

The Petitioners’ title to this section identifies that they take exception to the findings in paragraph 76; however, their exception does not reference any facts or concepts in paragraph 76 of the RO. An agency need not rule on an exception that does not identify the legal basis for the

exception. § 120.57(1)(k), Fla. Stat. (2020). This alone is a sufficient basis to reject the Petitioners’ exception to paragraph 76 of the RO.

The Petitioners take exception to the findings in paragraph 77 of the RO, which reads in its entirety that “These rules make clear that determining whether an activity will be located in an RPA 1, 2, or 3 necessarily entails a site-specific resource assessment to determine the type and quality of habitat, and the conditions present, at that specific site.” RO ¶ 77. Contrary to the Petitioners’ exception, the ALJ’s findings in paragraph 77 are supported by competent substantial evidence. (Mill, T. Vol. 3, p. 389). Moreover, their exception does not reference any facts in paragraph 77 of the RO. An agency need not rule on an exception that does not identify the legal basis for the exception. § 120.57(1)(k), Fla. Stat. (2020). This alone is a sufficient basis to reject the Petitioners’ exception to paragraph 77 of the RO.

The Petitioners take exception to the findings in paragraph 78 of the RO, which reads in its entirety that “As discussed above, the site-specific biological assessments conducted show that the Dock will be located in an RPA 3, and Petitioners did not present any site-specific evidence to rebut that classification.” RO ¶ 78. The Department concludes that paragraph 78 of the RO contains mixed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Contrary to the Petitioners’ exception, the ALJ’s findings in paragraph 78 are supported by competent substantial evidence. (Walters, T. Vol. 2, pp. 234-35; Mills T. Vol. 3, pp. 392: 3-5, 395-98, Joint Ex. 1, Bates p. 2979- 82). Moreover, the Department concurs with the ALJ’s application of her findings to the definitions of RPA 1, RPA 2 and RPA 3 located in rule 18-20.003.

The Petitioners take exception to the conclusion of law in paragraph 226 of the RO, which concludes that the proposed Dock will meet all applicable standards and requirements in

rule 18-20.004. RO ¶ 226. The Department concludes that paragraph 226 of the RO is a mixed statement of law and fact.

The Petitioners disagree with the ALJ’s findings and conclusion that the Dock will meet all applicable rule requirements in rule 18-20.004 and seek to have DEP reweigh the evidence. However, DEP is not authorized to reweigh evidence presented at a DOAH final hearing, attempt to resolve conflicts therein, or judge the credibility of a witness. See, e.g., Rogers, 920 So. 2d at 30; Belleau, 695 So. 2d at 1307. If there is competent substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s findings of fact, it is irrelevant that there may also be competent substantial evidence supporting a contrary finding. See, e.g., Arand Construction Co., 592 So. 2d at 280; Conshor, Inc., 498 So. 2d at 623. Contrary to the Petitioners’ exception, the ALJ’s findings in support of conclusion of law paragraph 226 are supported by competent substantial evidence. (Mills, T. Vol. 3, pp. 385, 389-95). The Department also concurs with the ALJ’s conclusion of law that based on the findings in the RO, the proposed Dock will meet all applicable rule requirements in rule

18-20.004.

The Petitioners take exception to the conclusion of law in paragraph 230 of the RO, which concludes that the proposed Dock will meet all applicable requirements of chapter 18-20. The Department concludes that paragraph 230 of the RO is a mixed statement of law and fact.

The Petitioners disagree with the ALJ’s findings and conclusion that the Dock will meet all applicable requirements in chapter 18-20 and seek to have DEP reweigh the evidence.

However, DEP is not authorized to reweigh evidence presented at a DOAH final hearing, attempt to resolve conflicts therein, or judge the credibility of a witness. See, e.g., Rogers, 920 So. 2d at 30; Belleau, 695 So. 2d at 1307. If there is competent substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s findings of fact, it is irrelevant that there may also be competent substantial evidence supporting

a contrary finding. See, e.g., Arand Construction Co., 592 So. 2d at 280; Conshor, Inc., 498 So. 2d at 623. Contrary to the Petitioners’ exception, the ALJ’s findings in support of conclusion of law paragraph 230 are supported by competent substantial evidence. (Wilson, T. Vol. 1, pp.

126-56; Mills, Vol. 3, p. 385, 434). The Department also concurs with the ALJ’s conclusion that based on the foregoing findings in the RO, the proposed Dock will meet all applicable rule requirements in chapter 18-20, Florida Administrative Code.

The Petitioners disagree with the ALJ’s findings in paragraphs 73-78, and 226-230 of the RO, and seek to have DEP reweigh the evidence. However, DEP is not authorized to reweigh evidence presented at a DOAH final hearing, attempt to resolve conflicts therein, or judge the credibility of a witness. See, e.g., Rogers, 920 So. 2d at 30; Belleau, 695 So. 2d at 1307. If there is competent substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s findings of fact, it is irrelevant that there may also be competent substantial evidence supporting a contrary finding. See, e.g., Arand Construction Co., 592 So. 2d at 280; Conshor, Inc., 498 So. 2d at 623.

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners’ exception to paragraphs 73-78 and 226-230 is denied.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 70.

The Petitioners take exception to the findings of fact in paragraph 70 of the RO. Paragraph 70 merely summarizes the definition of RPA 1 as quoted above. Paragraph 70 of the RO reads, in its entirety:

70. The RPA 1 classification applies to areas within an aquatic preserve that have resources of the highest quality and condition. Areas classified as RPA 1 are characterized by the presence of corals, marine grassbeds, mangrove swamps, salt marshes, oyster bars, threatened or endangered species habitat, colonial water bird nesting sites, and archaeological and historical sites.

RO ¶ 70. While contained within the Findings of Fact section of the RO, paragraph 70 of the RO is a recitation of the RPA 1 definition in rule 18-20.003(54); and thus, is in reality a conclusion of law consistent with the definition of RPA 1 in rule 18-20.003(56) of the Florida Administrative Code.

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners’ exception to paragraph 70 is denied.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraphs 73-78.

The Petitioners reiterate their exception to the findings of fact in paragraphs 73-78 of the RO that relate to the ALJ’s finding that the Dock is located within a Resource Protection Area 3 as defined in rule 18-20.003 of the Florida Administrative Code.

As explained above, the Petitioners take exception to the ALJ’s finding that the Dock is located in an RPA 3, contending that the ALJ should have found that the Dock is located in an RPA 1. Contrary to the Petitioners’ exception, the ALJ’s findings in paragraph 78 are supported by competent substantial evidence. See the Departments identification of the competent substantial evidence identified above in response to the Petitioners’ initial exception to the findings of fact in paragraphs 73-78 of the RO.

The Petitioners disagree with the ALJ’s findings and seek to have DEP reweigh the evidence. However, DEP is not authorized to reweigh evidence presented at a DOAH final hearing, attempt to resolve conflicts therein, or judge the credibility of a witness. See, e.g., Rogers, 920 So. 2d at 30; Belleau, 695 So. 2d at 1307. If there is competent substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s findings of fact, it is irrelevant that there may also be competent substantial evidence supporting a contrary finding. See, e.g., Arand Construction Co., 592 So. 2d at 280; Conshor, Inc., 498 So. 2d at 623.

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners’ exception to paragraphs 73-78 is denied.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 75, footnote 7.

The Petitioners take exception to the findings of fact in footnote 7 to paragraph 75 of the RO. Footnote 7 to paragraph 75 of the RO reads, in its entirety:

7. Some portions of the CBAP do contain seagrass beds, offshore coral patch reefs, and mangrove swamp communities, and provide habitat for protected species, including the Key Deer and colonial water birds, and, thus, merit an RPA 1 classification. By contrast, none of these habitats and conditions are present at the location, or in the vicinity, of the Dock.

RO ¶ 70, footnote 7.

Contrary to the Petitioners’ exception, the ALJ’s findings in footnote 7 to paragraph 75 are supported by competent substantial evidence. (Walters, T. Vol. 2, pp. 244-47; Carnock, T. Vol. 3, pp. 349-50; Mills, Vol. 3, pp. 396-398).

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners’ exception to paragraph 75, footnote 7 is

denied.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 66.

The Petitioners take exception to the findings of fact in paragraph 66 of the RO, which reads, in its entirety: “No competent, credible evidence was presented showing that significant sea turtle food sources are present in the footprint, or immediate vicinity, of the Dock.” RO ¶ 66.

Contrary to the Petitioners’ exception, the ALJ’s findings in paragraph 66 of the RO are supported by competent substantial evidence. (Walters, T. Vol. 2, pp. 913-15).

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners’ exception to paragraph 66 is denied.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraphs 63 and 67.

The Petitioners take exception to the findings in paragraph 63 of the RO that the proposed Dock will not affect the ability of the Key Deer to traverse and forage on the beach. The Petitioners also take exception to the findings in paragraph 67 of the RO that the proposed Dock will not adversely affect the habitat value of the beach on Fondriest’s property for nesting sea turtles and their hatchlings.

The Petitioners present other record evidence, including the Federal Endangered Species Act that is not applicable to issuance of this state authorization, and request the Department to reweigh the evidence. Contrary to the Petitioners’ exception, the ALJ’s findings of fact in paragraphs 63 are supported by competent substantial evidence. (Wilson, T. Vol. 1, pp. 116-17; Walters, T. Vol. 2, pp. 295-98). In addition, the ALJ’s findings of fact in paragraph 67 are supported by competent substantial evidence. (Walters, T. Vol. 2, pp. 218-19).

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners’ exception to paragraphs 63 and 67 is

denied.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraphs 56 and 101.

The Petitioners take exception to the findings in paragraphs 56 and 101 of the RO that the Dock site does not contain hard bottom communities. Contrary to the Petitioners’ exception, these findings are supported by competent substantial evidence. (Walters, T. Vol. 2, pp. 248,

314-15).

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners’ exception to paragraphs 56 and 101 is

denied.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 74.

The Petitioners appear to take exception to the findings in paragraph 74 of the RO that no transitioning resources are located at the Dock site or within its vicinity. Contrary to the Petitioners’ exception, this finding is supported by competent substantial evidence. (Walters, T. Vol. 2, pp. 248-49).

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners’ exception to paragraph 74 is denied.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraphs 55-56.

The Petitioners take exception to the findings in paragraph 55 regarding low dissolved oxygen levels and the existence of specific marine life that indicate poor water quality in the location and surrounding vicinity of the Dock. Contrary to the Petitioners’ exception, this finding is supported by competent substantial evidence. (Walters, T. Vol. 2, pp. 248, 314-315).

Petitioners also take exception to the findings in paragraph 56 that “that there are no resources of significant value in the footprint, or immediate vicinity, of the Dock. Contrary to the Petitioners’ exception, this finding is supported by competent substantial evidence. (Walters, T. Vol. 2, pp. 248; Charnock, T. Vol. 3, pp. 349-50).

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners’ exception to paragraphs 55-56 is denied.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraphs 64, 66 and 73.

The Petitioners take exception to the findings of fact in paragraphs 64, 66 and 73 of the RO. Paragraph 64 of the RO reads in its entirety:

64. The competent, credible evidence establishes that the Loggerhead Sea

Turtle and Green Sea Turtle, both of which are listed as endangered species, use the beach above the MHWL along Long Beach Drive, including the beach on Fondriest’s property above the MHWL, for nesting. The FFWCC has determined, through its Florida Sea Turtle Nesting Beach Monitoring Program, that the shore along Long Beach Drive has a relatively low nesting density – i.e., within the lower 25% of nesting density values – for both of these sea turtle species.

RO ¶ 64.

The Petitioners’ object to the ALJ’s finding that Long Beach is a low nesting density beach for the endangered Loggerhead Sea Turtle and the Green Sea Turtle, citing to their own expert’s testimony. Petitioner’s Exceptions at pp. 10-11. The Petitioners disagree with the ALJ’s findings and seek to have DEP reweigh the evidence. Contrary to the Petitioners’ exception, the ALJ’s findings of fact in paragraph 64 are supported by competent substantial evidence. (Walters, T. Vol. 2, pp. 288-90).

The Petitioners also take exception to the findings of fact in paragraph 66 of the RO, which reads, in its entirety: “No competent, credible evidence was presented showing that significant sea turtle food sources are present in the footprint, or immediate vicinity, of the Dock.” RO ¶ 66. The Petitioners again cite to their own expert testimony. Contrary to the Petitioners’ exception, the ALJ’s findings in paragraph 66 of the RO are supported by competent substantial evidence. (Walters, T. Vol. 2, pp. 913-14, 914-15).

The Petitioners appear to take exception to the finding in paragraph 73 that “although sea turtles nest on the beach along Long Beach Drive, this area does not constitute significant sea turtle nesting habitat, and there is no significant food source for adult or juvenile sea turtles in the vicinity of the Dock,” contending that the Dock area should be classified as an RPA 1 area. RO

¶ 73. Contrary to the Petitioners’ exception, the ALJ’s findings in paragraph 73 are supported by competent substantial evidence. (Walters, T. Vol. 2, pp. 268-90; Walters, T. Vol., pp. 913-14, 914-15).

In the Petitioners’ exceptions to all three paragraphs, they disagree with the ALJ’s findings and seek to have DEP reweigh the evidence. However, DEP is not authorized to reweigh evidence presented at a DOAH final hearing, attempt to resolve conflicts therein, or judge the credibility of a witness. See, e.g., Rogers, 920 So. 2d at 30; Belleau, 695 So. 2d at 1307. If there is competent substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s findings of fact, it is irrelevant that there may also be competent substantial evidence supporting a contrary finding. See, e.g., Arand Construction Co., 592 So. 2d at 280; Conshor, Inc., 498 So. 2d at 623.

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners’ exception to paragraphs 64, 66 and 73 is

denied.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 5.

The Petitioners take exception to the findings in paragraph 5 of the RO, which reads in its entirety: “Appel owns two other upland properties located on Long Beach Drive, neither of which is located immediately adjacent to Fondriest’s property.” RO ¶ 5. The Petitioners’ claim that DeMaria and Appel own the property located at 1997 Long Beach Drive but Appel does not “own two other upland properties located on Long Beach Drive.” (emphasis added).

The Department has been unable to locate competent substantial evidence to support the RO’s finding in paragraph 5 that Appel owns three upland properties on Long Beach Drive.

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners’ exception to paragraph 5 is granted.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 7.

The Petitioners take exception to the findings in paragraph 7 of the RO, which reads in its entirety: “As stated above, on December 10, 2019, DEP issued a regulatory general permit and letter of consent to Fondriest, approving the 2019 Approval, which was then proposed as an

800-square-foot structure for use as a pier for non-motorized vessels.” RO ¶ 7.

The Petitioners contend that the finding should read: “On December 10, 2019, the Department erroneously issued applicant Julia Fondriest (“Fondriest”) a General Permit and Letter of Consent for construction of an 800 square foot swim platform.” Petitioners’ Exceptions at p. 12. Contrary to the Petitioners’ exception, the ALJ’s findings of fact in paragraph 7 are supported by competent substantial evidence. (Joint Ex. 1, Bates pp. 2965- 2978).

to support the ALJ’s findings of fact, it is irrelevant that there may also be competent substantial evidence supporting a contrary finding. See, e.g., Arand Construction Co., 592 So. 2d at 280; Conshor, Inc., 498 So. 2d at 623. Moreover, an agency has no authority to make independent or supplemental findings of fact to those contained in the RO. See, e.g., North Port, Fla., 645 So. 2d at 487; Fla. Power & Light Co., 693 So. 2d at 1026-1027.

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners’ exception to paragraph 7 is denied.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 12.

The Petitioners take exception to the finding of fact in paragraph 12 of the RO, which reads in its entirety: “DEP’s agency action proposing to approve the Dock supersedes all prior DEP agency action with respect to the Dock, and constitutes the proposed agency action at issue in these proceedings.” RO ¶ 12. The Petitioners contend that DEP was prohibited from issuing “a Notice of Proposed Changes to Agency Action while the action was pending at DOAH without relinquishing jurisdiction from DOAH back to DEP,” citing to section 120.569(2)(a) of the Florida Statutes. Petitioners Exceptions p. 12.

The Department concludes that paragraph 12 of the RO is, in reality, a conclusion of law and rejects the Petitioners’ conclusion that DOAH must relinquish jurisdiction back to DEP for DEP to modify its agency action, i.e., the ERP/BOT authorization in this case. Subsection 120.57(1) of the Florida Statutes, titled “Additional Procedures Applicable to Hearings Involving Disputed Issues of Material Fact,” reads in pertinent part that “All proceedings conducted under this subsection shall be de novo.” § 120.57(1)(k), Fla. Stat. (2020) (emphasis added).

The current case is a de novo proceeding under subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes intended to formulate final agency action. See Fla. Dep’t of Transp. v. J.W.C. Co., Inc., 396 So. 2d 778, 786-787 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Capeletti Bros., Inc. v. Dep’t of Gen. Servs., 432 So. 2d

1359, 1363 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). The First District Court of Appeal in McDonald v. Department of Banking and Finance articulated that “Section 120.57 proceedings are intended to formulate final agency action, not to review action taken earlier and preliminarily.” McDonald v. Dep’t of Banking and Finance, 346 So. 2d 569, 584 (Fla. 1st. DCA 1977).

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners’ exception to paragraph 12 is denied.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 20.

The Petitioners take exception to the finding in paragraph 20 of the RO that “The berm is frequently overtopped by water during high tides and storms.” RO ¶ 20. Contrary to the Petitioners’ exception, the ALJ’s finding of fact in paragraph 20 is supported by competent substantial evidence. (Wilson, T. Vol. pp. 85-6; Walters, T. Vol. 2, pp. 319-20; Fondriest Ex. No. 325, Bates 4429). The Petitioners disagree with the ALJ’s findings and seek to have DEP reweigh the evidence. However, DEP is not authorized to reweigh evidence presented at a DOAH final hearing, attempt to resolve conflicts therein, or judge the credibility of a witness.

See, e.g., Rogers, 920 So. 2d at 30; Belleau, 695 So. 2d at 1307. If there is competent substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s findings of fact, it is irrelevant that there may also be competent substantial evidence supporting a contrary finding. See, e.g., Arand Construction Co., 592 So. 2d at 280; Conshor, Inc., 498 So. 2d at 623.

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners’ exception to paragraph 20 is denied.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 21.

The Petitioners take exception to the finding in paragraph 21 of the RO that the beach is disturbed by sea turtle monitors. The Department has been unable to locate competent substantial evidence to support the RO’s finding in paragraph 21 that the beach is disturbed by sea turtle monitors.

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners’ exception to paragraph 21 is granted.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 30.

The Petitioners take exception to the findings of fact in paragraph 30 of the RO, which reads in its entirety: “The Dock will be used solely for the water-dependent activities of launching vessels and swimming.” RO ¶ 30. Contrary to the Petitioners’ exception, the ALJ’s findings of fact in paragraph 30 are supported by competent substantial evidence. (Fondriest, T. Vol. 5, pp. 765-66; Joint Ex. 1, Bates p. 2995).

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners’ exception to paragraph 30 is denied.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 36.

The Petitioners take exception to the finding in paragraph 36 of the RO that competent credible evidence establishes that the five foot elevation of the Dock above the mean high water line will provide sufficient clearance for sea turtle monitor to pass under the dock as they traverse the beach. Contrary to the Petitioners’ exception, the ALJ’s finding of fact in paragraph 36 is supported by competent substantial evidence. (Wilson, T. Vol. 1, pp. 116-17; Walters, T. Vol. 2, pp. 301-02; Fondriest Ex. No. 325, Bates 4429). The Petitioners disagree with the ALJ’s findings and seek to have DEP reweigh the evidence. However, DEP is not authorized to

reweigh evidence presented at a DOAH final hearing, attempt to resolve conflicts therein, or judge the credibility of a witness. See, e.g., Rogers, 920 So. 2d at 30; Belleau, 695 So. 2d at 1307. If there is competent substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s findings of fact, it is irrelevant that there may also be competent substantial evidence supporting a contrary finding. See, e.g., Arand Construction Co., 592 So. 2d at 280; Conshor, Inc., 498 So. 2d at 623.

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners’ exception to paragraph 36 is denied.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 39.

The Petitioners take exception to the finding of fact in paragraph 39 of the RO that reads “the Dock will be of sufficient height to enable persons using non-motorized watercraft to pass under it.” RO ¶ 39. Contrary to the Petitioners’ exception, the ALJ’s finding of fact in paragraph 39 is supported by competent substantial evidence. (Wilson, T. Vol. 1, pp 117-18; Fondriest Ex. No. 325, Bates 4429).

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners’ exception to paragraph 39 is denied.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 40.

The Petitioners take exception to the finding of fact in paragraph 40 of the RO that reads “The credible, persuasive evidence establishes that in a storm, the decking and stringers on the

Dock will be washed off the pilings and will not become windborne projectiles.” RO ¶ 40. Contrary to the Petitioners’ exception, the ALJ’s finding of fact in paragraph 40 is supported by competent substantial evidence. (Wilson, T. Vol. 1, p. 169).

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners’ exception to paragraph 40 is denied.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraphs 43-44.

The Petitioners take exception to the finding of fact in paragraph 43 of the RO that reads “because the Dock will be constructed in an open waterbody, the noise generated by piling installation is anticipated to be insignificant.” RO ¶ 43. Contrary to the Petitioners’ exception, the ALJ’s finding of fact in paragraph 43 is supported by competent substantial evidence. (Wilson T. Vol. 1, pp. 149-55).

Moreover, the Petitioners exception to paragraphs 43-44 does not object to any finding in paragraph 44 that reads in its entirety: “Construction of the Dock may only be conducted outside of sea turtle nesting season, which runs from April 15 to October 31.” RO ¶ 44. An agency need not rule on an exception that does not identify the legal basis for the exception. § 120.57(1)(k), Fla. Stat. (2020). This alone is a sufficient basis to reject the Petitioners’ exception to paragraph 44 of the RO. Moreover, contrary to the Petitioners’ exception, the ALJ’s finding of fact in

paragraph 44 is supported by competent substantial evidence. (Walters T. Vol. 2, p. 215, Fondriest Ex. No. 323, Bates 4503).

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners’ exception to paragraphs 43-44 is denied.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 53.

The Petitioners take exception to the findings of fact in paragraph 53 of the RO that reads in its entirety: “Much of the shoreline along Long Beach Drive below the MHWL, including that along Fondriest’s property, consists of bare, hard rock. The water is extremely shallow, and the bare rock is exposed at low tide” RO ¶ 53. Contrary to the Petitioners’ exception, the ALJ’s findings of fact in paragraph 53 are supported by competent substantial evidence. (Mills, T, Vol. 3, pp. 387-88; Fondriest Ex. No. 323, Bates 4489).

evidence supporting a contrary finding. See, e.g., Arand Construction Co., 592 So. 2d at 280;

Conshor, Inc., 498 So. 2d at 623.

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners’ exception to paragraph 53 is denied.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 55.

The Petitioners take exception to the findings of fact in paragraph 55 of the RO, present other record evidence and request the Department to reweigh the evidence. The Petitioners object to the ALJ’s finding that the Dock area contains low dissolved oxygen levels which indicates poor water quality. Contrary to the Petitioners’ exception, the ALJ’s findings of fact in paragraph 55 are supported by competent substantial evidence. (Walters, T. Vol. 2, pp. 248,

314-15).

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners’ exception to paragraph 55 is denied.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 56.

The Petitioners take exception to the findings of fact in paragraph 56 of the RO, present other record evidence and request the Department to reweigh the evidence. Specifically, the Petitioners take exception to the findings regarding the lack of significant aquatic resources in the footprint and immediate vicinity of the Dock. Based on the findings in this paragraph of the

RO, the ALJ concluded that “the competent, credible evidence shows that there are no aquatic resources of any significant value in the footprint, or immediate vicinity, of the Dock.” RO ¶ 56. Contrary to the Petitioners’ exception, the ALJ’s findings of fact in paragraph 56 are supported by competent substantial evidence. (Walters, T. Vol. 2, pp. 244-47; Carnock, T. Vol. 3, pp.

349-50, 396, 398; Fondriest Ex. No. 323, Bates 4492).

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners’ exception to paragraph 56 is denied.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 57.

The Petitioners take exception to the findings of fact in paragraph 57 of the RO, citing to other record evidence referenced in their earlier exceptions, and request the Department reweigh the evidence. Specifically, the Petitioners allege that the finding in paragraph 57 that “a small seagrass bed is located near the terminal platform” contradicts the findings in paragraphs 54, 56, and 60. Contrary to the Petitioners’ exception, the finding in paragraph 57 is consistent with the findings in paragraphs 54, 56, and 60 of the RO. Paragraph 54 does not mention seagrass resources at all; paragraph 56 finds “there are no aquatic resources of any significant value in the

footprint, or immediate vicinity, of the Dock” (emphasis added); and paragraph 60 finds that

none of the resources discussed “exist in the footprint, or immediate vicinity of the Dock.” RO

¶¶ 54,56 60. (Emphasis added). Ultimately, the ALJ found that while a “small seagrass bed is located near the terminal platform of the Dock, the small seagrass bed is not in the “immediate vicinity” of the Dock. Moreover, the ALJ’s findings of fact in paragraph 57 are supported by competent substantial evidence. (Walters, T. Vol. 2, pp. 248, 314-15; Fondriest Ex. No. 323, Bates 4492).

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners’ exception to paragraph 57 is denied.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 58.

The Petitioners allege that they take exception to findings of fact in paragraph 58 of the

RO, which reads, in its entirety:

58. The evidence establishes that the area waterward of the MHWL along Long Beach Drive generally supports a rich aquatic community. Fish and aquatic invertebrates inhabit the water in the vicinity, and numerous bird species use the area waterward of the MHWL, including that bordering Fondriest’s property, as feeding and foraging habitat.

RO ¶ 58.

While the Petitioners’ allege they take exception to the findings of fact in paragraph 58; they do not dispute any of the findings in paragraph 58. Instead, they allege that the findings in

paragraph 58 help support their position that the Dock area should be classified as an RPA 1 instead of an RPA 3.

The Petitioners’ exception fails to articulate an exception to the findings in paragraph 58 of the RO. An agency need not rule on an exception that does not identify the legal basis for the exception. § 120.57(1)(k), Fla. Stat. (2020). This alone is a sufficient basis to reject the Petitioners’ exception to paragraph 98 of the RO.

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners’ exception to paragraph 58 is denied.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraphs 59-61.

The Petitioners take exception to the finding of fact in paragraph 59 of the RO, present other record evidence from their expert and request that the Department reweigh the evidence. Specifically, the Petitioners take exception to the finding in paragraph 59 that reads “no non- speculative evidence was presented to show that the construction, presence, and use of the Dock will result in adverse effects to this aquatic community. . . .” RO ¶ 59. While not clear, the Petitioners may have also intended to take exception to the finding in paragraph 60 of the RO that reads “the competent credible evidence shows that none of these resources exist in the footprint, or immediate vicinity, of the Dock, and conditions have been imposed in the letter of consent to ensure that the construction and use of the Dock will not adversely affect these resources.” RO ¶ 60. Moreover, the Petitioners’ expert witness testimony in this exception did not contain testimony that the construction, presence or use of the Dock will result in adverse effects to this aquatic community. The Petitioners merely recited their expert’s testimony about the presence of birdlife, juvenile lobster and several other species in the region. Contrary to the Petitioners’ exception, the ALJ’s findings of fact in paragraphs 59 and 60 are supported by

competent substantial evidence. (Wilson, T. Vol. 1, pp. 154; Walters, T. Vol. 2, pp. 212, 218-19,

227, 248, 330-31; Charnock, T. Vol. 3, pp. 349-50).

The Petitioners exception to paragraphs 59, 60, and 61 did not identify any finding in paragraph 61 of the RO to which they had an exception. An agency need not rule on an exception that does not identify the legal basis for the exception. § 120.57(1)(k), Fla. Stat. (2020). This alone is a sufficient basis to reject the Petitioners’ exception to paragraph 61 of the RO.

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners’ exception to paragraphs 59-61 is denied.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 63.

The Petitioners take exception to the findings of fact in paragraph 63 of the RO, present other record evidence and request the Department to reweigh the evidence. Specifically, the Petitioners take exception to the ALJ’s finding that “[no] credible evidence was presented showing that the Dock would adversely affect the ability of Key Deer to traverse and forage on the beach on, or adjacent to, Fondriest’s property.” RO ¶ 63. The ALJ found that the height of the Dock is sufficient to allow Key Deer to pass underneath without being impeded or trapped. Contrary to the Petitioners’ exception, the ALJ’s findings of fact in paragraph 63 are supported

by competent substantial evidence. (Walters, T. Vol. 2, pp. 297-98; Fondriest Ex. No. 325, Bates 4429).

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners’ exception to paragraph 63 is denied.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 64.

The Petitioners take exception to the findings of fact in paragraph 64 of the RO, which reads in its entirety:

64. The competent, credible evidence establishes that the Loggerhead Sea Turtle and Green Sea Turtle, both of which are listed as endangered species, use the beach above the MHWL along Long Beach Drive, including the beach on Fondriest’s property above the MHWL, for nesting. The FFWCC has determined, through its Florida Sea Turtle Nesting Beach Monitoring Program, that the shore along Long Beach Drive has a relatively low nesting density – i.e., within the lower 25% of nesting density values – for both of these sea turtle species.

RO ¶ 64.

The Petitioners do not contend that the findings in this paragraph are not supported by competent substantial evidence. Instead, they contend “it is important not to ignore the nesting beaches for any species of listed turtles in the Keys. . . .” Petitioner’s Exceptions p. 21.

The Petitioners disagree with the ALJ’s findings and seek to have DEP reweigh the evidence. However, DEP is not authorized to reweigh evidence presented at a DOAH final

hearing, attempt to resolve conflicts therein, or judge the credibility of a witness. See, e.g., Rogers, 920 So. 2d at 30; Belleau, 695 So. 2d at 1307. If there is competent substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s findings of fact, it is irrelevant that there may also be competent substantial evidence supporting a contrary finding. See, e.g., Arand Construction Co., 592 So. 2d at 280; Conshor, Inc., 498 So. 2d at 623. Contrary to the Petitioners’ exception, the ALJ’s findings of fact in paragraph 64 are supported by competent substantial evidence. (Walters, T. Vol. 2, pp.

288-90; Fondriest Ex. 323, Bates p. 4517-4519).

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners’ exception to paragraph 64 is denied.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 67.

The Petitioners take exception to the findings of fact in paragraph 67 of the RO, present other record evidence and request the Department to reweigh the evidence. Specifically, the Petitioners take exception to the finding that “[t]he competent, credible evidence does not show that the Dock will adversely affect the habitat value of the beach on Fondriest’s property for sea turtle nesting, or that it will otherwise adversely affect nesting sea turtles and hatchlings.” RO

¶ 67. Contrary to the Petitioners’ exception, the ALJ’s findings of fact in paragraph 67 are supported by competent substantial evidence. (Walters, T. Vol. 2, pp. 218-19).

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners’ exception to paragraph 67 is denied.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 70.

70. The RPA 1 classification applies to areas within an aquatic preserve

that have resources of the highest quality and condition. Areas classified as RPA 1 are characterized by the presence of corals, marine grassbeds, mangrove swamps, salt marshes, oyster bars, threatened or endangered species habitat, colonial water bird nesting sites, and archaeological and historical sites.

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners’ exception to paragraph 70 is denied.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 72.

The Petitioners take exception to the findings of fact in paragraph 72 of the RO. Paragraph 72 of the RO merely summarizes the definition of RPA 2 as quoted above. Paragraph 72 of the RO reads, in its entirety: “72. The RPA 2 classification applies to areas within an aquatic preserve that are in transition, either having declining RPA 1 resources, or new pioneering resource within an RPA 3.” RO ¶ 72. While contained within the Findings of Fact section of the RO, paragraph 72 of the RO is a recitation of the definition for the term RPA 2; and thus, is in reality a conclusion of law that is consistent with the definition of RPA 2 in rule 18-20.003(57) of the Florida Administrative Code.

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners’ exception to paragraph 72 is denied.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 73.

The Petitioners appears to take exception to the finding in paragraph 73 that “although sea turtles nest on the beach along Long Beach Drive, this area does not constitute significant sea turtle nesting habitat, and there is no significant food source for adult or juvenile sea turtles in the vicinity of the Dock,” contending that the Dock area should be classified as an RPA 1 area. RO

¶ 73. Contrary to the Petitioners’ exception, the ALJ’s findings in paragraph 73 are supported by competent substantial evidence. (Charnock, T. Vol. 3, pp. 344-46).

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners’ exception to paragraph 73 is denied.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 74.

The Petitioners take exception to the finding of fact in paragraph 74 of the RO that Hurricane Irma struck the Long Beach Drive area in Florida in 2013. The Petitioners request that paragraph 74 be corrected to read that Hurricane Irma hit Florida in 2017, and not 2013. The Department concludes that the exception merely requests correction of a scrivener’s error. Moreover, the exception is supported by competent substantial evidence from one of Fondriest’s experts. (Wilson, T. Vol. 1, p. 83, 171).

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners’ exception to paragraph 74 is granted.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 75, Footnote 7.

The Petitioners reiterate their exception to the findings of fact in footnote 7 to paragraph 75 of the RO. Footnote 7 to paragraph 75 of the RO reads, in its entirety:

RO ¶ 70, footnote 7.

The Petitioners disagree with the ALJ’s findings, cite to their own expert’s testimony and portions of the Coupon Bight Aquatic Preserve Management Plan, and seek to have DEP reweigh the evidence. However, DEP is not authorized to reweigh evidence presented at a DOAH final hearing, attempt to resolve conflicts therein, or judge the credibility of a witness.

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners’ exception to footnote 7 for paragraph 75 is denied.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 78.

The Petitioners take exception to the findings in paragraph 78 of the RO, which reads in its entirety that “As discussed above, the site-specific biological assessments conducted show

that the Dock will be located in an RPA 3, and Petitioners did not present any site-specific evidence to rebut that classification.” RO ¶ 78. The Department concludes that paragraph 78 of the RO contains mixed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Contrary to the Petitioners’ exception, the ALJ’s findings in paragraph 78 are supported by competent substantial evidence. (Walters, T. Vol. 2, pp. 234-35; Mills T. Vol. p. 392: 3-5, 395-98). Moreover, the Department concurs with the ALJ’s application of her findings to the definitions of RPA 1, RPA 2 and RPA 3 located in rule 18-20.003.

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners’ exception to paragraph 78 is denied.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraphs 80-85.

The Petitioners take exception to the findings of fact in paragraphs 80-85 of the RO, present other record evidence from their expert and request the Department to reweigh the evidence. Specifically, the Petitioners take exception to the ALJ’s summary of the cumulative impact analysis of Fondriest’s expert witness, Sandra Walters, set forth in paragraphs 80-85 of the RO. The Petitioners do not allege that there is not competent substantial evidence to support expert Walters’ testimony; the Petitioners’ merely prefer their expert’s testimony. The ALJ’s

findings of fact in paragraphs 80-85 are supported by competent substantial evidence. (Walters, T. Vol. 2, pp. 269-70, 271-77).

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners’ exception to paragraphs 80-85 is denied.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 92.

The Petitioners take exception to the finding of fact in paragraph 92 of the RO that Monroe County issued a permit authorizing construction of the Dock, which “[e]vidences that the Dock is permissible under the Monroe County comprehensive plan.” RO ¶ 92. Contrary to the Petitioners’ exception, the ALJ’s findings in paragraph 92 are supported by competent substantial evidence. (Fondriest’s Ex. No. 303; Fondriest Ex. No. 323, Bates 4516).

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners’ exception to paragraph 92 is denied.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 93.

The Petitioners take exception to the findings of fact in paragraph 93 of the RO, present other record evidence and request the Department to reweigh the evidence. Specifically, the Petitioners take exception to the findings regarding the lack of significant biological resources in the footprint or the immediate vicinity of the Dock. Based on the findings in this paragraph of the RO, the ALJ concluded that “[thus], the Dock will not cause the loss of beneficial biologic functions that would adversely impact the quality or utility of the CBAP.” RO ¶ 93. Contrary to the Petitioners’ exception, the ALJ’s findings of fact in paragraph 93 are supported by competent substantial evidence. (Wilson, T. Vol. 1, pp. 154; Walters, T. Vol. 2, pp. 212, 218-19, 227, 248,

330-31; Charnock, T. Vol. 3, pp. 349-50).

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners’ exception to paragraph 93 is denied.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 98.

The Petitioners take exception to the findings of fact in paragraph 98 of the RO. As with most of the Petitioners’ exceptions, they do not allege the findings of fact are not based on competent substantial evidence. Moreover, the Petitioners’ exception is vague and fails to cite to

any record to support its claims. The Petitioners’ exception fails to articulate an exception to the findings in the paragraph; but instead contains a rant against the Department’s aquatic preserve management plan, which reads: “apparently the ‘case by case’ basis is zero review, zero surveys, zero maintenance, zero oversight, zero inspections, but rather streamlining of all the docks on Long Beach, none of which meet their own criteria, but for 1 dock.” Petitioners’ Exceptions at p. 30.

An agency need not rule on an exception that does not identify the legal basis for the exception. § 120.57(1)(k), Fla. Stat. (2020). This alone is a sufficient basis to reject the Petitioners’ exception to paragraph 98 of the RO.

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners’ exception to paragraph 98 is denied.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 100.

The Petitioners take exception to the findings of fact in paragraph 100 of the RO. As with most of the Petitioners’ exceptions, they do not allege the findings of fact are not based on competent substantial evidence. Moreover, the Petitioners’ exception fails to articulate an exception to the findings in paragraph 100 of the RO. An agency need not rule on an exception that does not identify the legal basis for the exception. § 120.57(1)(k), Fla. Stat. (2020). This alone is a sufficient basis to reject the Petitioners’ exception to paragraph 98 of the RO.

While extremely unclear, the Petitioners appear to seek to have DEP add more evidence to this paragraph by citing extensively to their own expert’s testimony. However, an agency has no authority to make independent or supplemental findings of fact to those contained in the RO. See, e.g., North Port, Fla., 645 So. 2d at 487; Fla. Power & Light Co., 693 So. 2d at 1026-1027.

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners’ exception to paragraph 100 is denied.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraphs 102 and 104.

The Petitioners take exception to the findings of fact in paragraphs 102 and 104 of the RO, which read in their entirety:

102. Furthermore, private single-family residential docks are expressly identified as an allowable use in the Management Area. SF/1.

. . .

104. Based on the foregoing, it is determined that the Dock is consistent with the CBAP Management Plan. 8

8. Rule 18-20.004(7) states, in pertinent part: “[t]he aquatic preserve management plans shall be used by [DEP] to preserve and restore the distinctive characteristics identified by the inventories for each aquatic preserve. The management plans for each aquatic preserve are available for guidance purposes only.” Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-20.004(7)(emphasis added). Thus, to the extent a rule provision in chapter 18-20 conflicts with an aquatic preserve management plan, the rule controls. See Decarion v. Martinez, 537 So. 2d 1083, 1084 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)(an agency must follow its own rules).

RO ¶¶ 102, 104 (including footnote 8).

The Petitioners disagree with the ALJ’s finding in paragraph 102 of the RO and seek to have DEP reweigh the evidence. However, DEP is not authorized to reweigh evidence presented at a DOAH final hearing, attempt to resolve conflicts therein, or judge the credibility of a witness. See, e.g., Rogers, 920 So. 2d at 30; Belleau, 695 So. 2d at 1307. If there is competent substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s findings of fact, it is irrelevant that there may also be competent substantial evidence supporting a contrary finding. See, e.g., Arand Construction Co., 592 So. 2d at 280; Conshor, Inc., 498 So. 2d at 623. Contrary to the Petitioners’ exception, the ALJ’s finding of fact in paragraph 102 is supported by competent substantial evidence. (Mills, T. Vol., p. 933-34).

The Petitioners also take exception to paragraph 104 of the RO, alleging that the proposed Dock is not consistent with the CBAP Management Plan’s Minimum Criteria for Allowable Uses that requires the terminal platform for a private residential dock to access a

minimum of -4 feet depth at MLW. The Department concurs with the ALJ’s conclusion of law set forth in footnote 8 to paragraph 104 that rule 18-20.004(7) states that aquatic management plans are available for guidance purposes only. To the extent that a rule provision in chapter

18-20 conflicts with the CBAP Management Plan, the rule controls. Contrary to the Petitioners’ exception, the ALJ’s finding of fact in paragraph 104 that the Dock is consistent with the Coupon Bight Aquatic Preserve Management Plan is supported by competent substantial evidence. (Walters, T. Vol. 6, pp. 933-34).

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners’ exception to paragraphs 102 and 104 is

denied.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 117.

The Petitioners take exception to the findings in paragraph 117 of the RO, which reads in its entirety: “Appel owns two other parcels on Long Beach Drive, neither of which is located immediately adjacent to Fondriest’s property.”

The Petitioners disagree with the ALJ’s finding in paragraph 117 of the RO and seek to have DEP reweigh the evidence. However, DEP is not authorized to reweigh evidence presented at a DOAH final hearing, attempt to resolve conflicts therein, or judge the credibility of a witness. See, e.g., Rogers, 920 So. 2d at 30; Belleau, 695 So. 2d at 1307. If there is competent substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s findings of fact, it is irrelevant that there may also be competent substantial evidence supporting a contrary finding. See, e.g., Arand Construction Co., 592 So. 2d at 280; Conshor, Inc., 498 So. 2d at 623. Contrary to the Petitioners’ exception, the ALJ’s finding of fact in paragraph 117 is supported by competent substantial evidence. (Fondriest Ex. No. 323, Bates 4477).

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners’ exception to paragraph 117 is denied.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 145.

The Petitioners take exception to the findings of fact in paragraph 145 of the RO, present other record evidence and request the Department to reweigh the evidence. Specifically, the Petitioners take exception to the finding that the Dock will not cause adverse impacts to the aquatic preserve. Contrary to the Petitioners’ exception, the ALJ’s findings of fact in paragraph 145 are supported by competent substantial evidence. (Walters, T. Vol. 2, pp. 302-303).

The Petitioners disagree with the ALJ’s finding and seek to have DEP reweigh the evidence. However, DEP is not authorized to reweigh evidence presented at a DOAH final hearing, attempt to resolve conflicts therein, or judge the credibility of a witness. See, e.g., Rogers, 920 So. 2d at 30; Belleau, 695 So. 2d at 1307. If there is competent substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s findings of fact, it is irrelevant that there may also be competent substantial evidence supporting a contrary finding. See, e.g., Arand Construction Co., 592 So. 2d at 280; Conshor, Inc., 498 So. 2d at 623.

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners’ exception to paragraph 145 is denied.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraphs 156-59.

The Petitioners take exception to the findings of fact in paragraphs 156-59 of the RO, present other record testimony from the hearing and request the Department to reweigh the evidence. Specifically, the Petitioners take exception to the ALJ’s mixed findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding how the Dock will meet the public interest requirements in chapters 18-21 and 18-20 of the Florida Administrative Code. The Petitioners do not allege there is no competent substantial evidence to support paragraphs 156-59; instead, the Petitioners present their own personal opinions regarding why the Dock will be contrary to the public interest. The

ALJ’s findings of fact in paragraphs 156-59 are supported by competent substantial evidence. (Charnock, T. Vol. 3, pp. 389-95).

In paragraph 156 of the RO, the ALJ quotes the definition of “public interest” in rule 18-21.003(53). In paragraph 157 of the RO, the ALJ quotes language in rule 18-21.004(1) that specifies activities on sovereignty lands must be “not contrary to the public interest.” In addition, in paragraph 158 of the RO, the ALJ quotes from article X, section 22 of the Florida Constitution, which concludes that “Private use of portions of such [sovereignty] lands may be authorized by law, but only when not contrary to the public interest.” Fla. Const., art. X, §11. The Department has no authority to reject the quotation of applicable rule or constitutional language and concurs that these legal quotations are accurate.

Paragraph 159 of the RO reads in its entirety: “Chapters 253 and 258, and the implementing rules codified in chapters 18-20 and 18-21, authorize the use of sovereignty submerged lands for private residential single-family docks when not contrary to the public interest.” RO ¶ 158.

Section 120.57(1)(l), Florida Statutes, authorizes an agency to reject or modify a judge’s conclusions of law and interpretations of administrative rules “over which it has substantive

jurisdiction.” See § 120.57(1)(l), Fla. Stat. (2020); MacPherson v. Sch. Bd. of Monroe Cnty, 505 So. 2d 682, 683 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); Siess v. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 468 So. 2d 478, 478 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); Alles v. Dep’t of Prof’l Regulation, 423 So. 2d 624, 626 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). If an ALJ improperly labels a conclusion of law as a finding of fact, the label should be disregarded and the item treated as though it were actually a conclusion of law. See, e.g., Battaglia Properties, 629 So. 2d at 168.

On behalf of the Board of Trustees, the Department administers and enforces the provisions of chapters 253 and 258, Florida Statutes, and the implementing rules codified in chapters 18-20 and 18-21, Florida Administrative Code, including those applicable to aquatic preserves. As a result, the Department may modify the ALJ’s conclusions of law regarding the above cited administrative rules.

The Department seeks to clarify the public interest test for chapter 18-20 set forth in paragraph 159 of the RO. Chapter 18-20 provides additional requirements to the requirements in chapter 18-21 to authorize use of sovereign submerged lands in Florida Aquatic Preserves. Rule 18-20.004(1)(b) reads, in pertinent part: “(b) There shall be no further sale, lease or transfer of sovereignty lands except when such sale, lease or transfer is in the public interest. ” Fla.

Admin. Code R. 18-20.004(1)(b)(2020). Rule 18-20.003(68) defines transfer as follows: “(68) ‘Transfer’ means the act of the Board by which any interest in lands, including easements, other than sale or lease, is conveyed.” Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-20.003(68)(2020). Rule

18-20.004(4)(c) reads, in pertinent part: “For the purpose of this rule, a private residential, single-family docking facility which meets all the requirements of subsection 18-20.004(5), F.A.C., shall be deemed to meet the public interest requirements of paragraph 18-20.004(1)(b), F.A.C.” Fla. Admin. Code. R. 18-20.004(4)(c). Thus, the public interest test for the Dock in the

Coupon Bight Aquatic Preserve is deemed to be met provided the Dock meets all the requirements of rule 18-20.004(5) of the Florida Administrative Code.

Conclusion of law paragraph 226 of the RO concludes “that the Dock, as proposed to be constructed and used subject to the conditions imposed in the letter of consent, will meet all applicable standards and requirements in rule 18-20.004, including the aquatic preserves public interest requirement established in rule 18-20.004(4)(c).” As a result, the ALJ found that the Dock meets all the requirements of rule 18-20.004(5) and was thus deemed to meet the “in the public interest” test for activities conducted in aquatic preserves.

The Department’s interpretation of the public interest test for aquatic preserves is as or more reasonable than that set forth in paragraph 159 of the RO. Moreover, the Department’s clarification is consistent with the ALJ’s interpretation of the public interest test for aquatic preserves set forth in paragraphs 224 and 226, including the footnote to paragraph 226 of the RO. See § 120.57(1)(l), Fla. Stat. (2020). The ALJ’s conclusions in paragraph 159 of the RO are accordingly modified in this Final Order to reflect that the public interest test for activities in aquatic preserves is whether the activity is “in the public interest.”

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners’ exception to paragraphs 156-59 is denied. However, the public interest test for aquatic preserves in paragraph 159 is modified as set forth above.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraphs 36 and 161.

The Petitioners take exception to the finding of fact in paragraph 36 that the sea turtle monitors will have sufficient clearance to pass under the Dock as they traverse the beach and the finding in paragraph 161 of the RO that reads “the competent, persuasive evidence established that Petitioners will be able to duck under the Dock, or walk around the end of the terminal

platform where the water is relatively shallow.” RO ¶ 161. Contrary to the Petitioners’ exception, the ALJ’s findings of fact in paragraph 36 are supported by competent substantial evidence. (Wilson, T. Vol. 1, pp. 98, 113, 116-17, 208-09; Walters, T. Vol. 2, pp. 301-02;

Fondriest Ex. No. 325, Bates 4429).

Moreover, the ALJ noted that “Petitioners did not cite any statutory or rule provisions affording completely unencumbered access, by the general public, to all sovereignty submerged lands.” RO ¶ 161. In footnote 10 to paragraph 161 of the RO, the ALJ also noted that “A key purpose of chapters 18-20 and 18-21 is to establish standards for approval of private uses of sovereignty submerged lands which may, to a certain extent, hinder the general public’s access to those sovereignty lands. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-21.004 (2020). Thus, the public’s access to sovereignty lands is not without limitations.

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners’ exception to paragraphs 36 and 161 is

denied.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraphs 162-65.

The Petitioners take exception to the ultimate findings of fact in paragraphs 162-65 of the RO, present other record evidence from their expert and request the Department to reweigh the

evidence. Specifically, the Petitioners take exception to the ALJ’s summary of the cumulative impact analysis of Fondriest’s expert witness, Sandra Walters, set forth in paragraphs 162-65 of the RO. The Petitioners do not allege that there is no competent substantial evidence to support expert Walters’ testimony; the Petitioners merely prefer their expert’s testimony. The ALJ’s findings of fact in paragraphs 162-65 are supported by competent substantial evidence. (Walters, T. Vol. 2, pp. 269-80, 280-81, 283-84, 284-85; Fondriest Ex. Nos. 303, 323).

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners’ exception to paragraphs 162-165 is

denied.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 195.

The Petitioners take exception to the findings of fact in paragraph 195 of the RO, present other record evidence and request the Department to reweigh the evidence. Specifically, the Petitioners take exception to the finding that the Dock will not interfere with the public easement for traditional uses of sandy beaches, as provided in section 161.141, Florida Statutes, because the sandy beach areas on Long Beach Drive are privately owned. Contrary to the Petitioners’ exception, the ALJ’s findings of fact in paragraph 195 are supported by competent substantial evidence. (Wilson, T. Vol. 1, pp. 116-17; Walters, T. Vol. 2, pp. 301-02; Crilly, T. Vol. 3, pp.

444-45, 456; Roberts, T. Vol. 3, p. 508; Czerwinski, T. Vol. 5, p. 759: 11-15; Appel, T. Vol. 6,

pp. 875-76).

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners’ exception to paragraph 195 is denied.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraphs 226 and 230.

The Petitioners take exception to the conclusions of law in paragraphs 226 and 230 of the RO, which read, in their entirety:

226. For the reasons addressed above, it is concluded that the Dock, as proposed to be constructed and used subject to the conditions imposed in the letter of consent, will meet all applicable standards and requirements in rule 18-20.004, including the aquatic preserves public interest requirement established in rule

18-20.004(4)(c).

. . .

230. Based on the foregoing, it is concluded that the Dock will meet all applicable requirements of chapter 18-20 such that Fondriest is entitled to issuance of a letter of consent authorizing the construction and operation of the Dock.

RO ¶ 226. The Petitioners contend in their exception to paragraph 226 that the proposed single- family Dock will not meet the public interest requirement for activities conducted in aquatic preserves. Petitioners’ Exceptions at p. 44.

Rule 18-20.004(4)(c) reads, in pertinent part: “For the purpose of this rule, a private residential, single-family docking facility which meets all the requirements of subsection

18-20.004(5), F.A.C., shall be deemed to meet the public interest requirements of paragraph

18-20.004(1)(b), F.A.C.” Fla. Admin. Code. R. 18-20.004(4)(c)(2020). Accordingly, the public interest test for the Dock in the Coupon Bight Aquatic Preserve is deemed to be met provided the Dock meets all the requirements of rule 18-20.004(5) of the Florida Administrative Code.

Paragraph 226 of the RO concludes that based on the findings above “the Dock, as proposed to be constructed and used subject to the conditions imposed in the letter of consent, will meet all applicable standards and requirements in rule 18-20.004, including the aquatic preserves public interest requirement established in rule 18-20.004(4)(c).” RO ¶ 226. The ALJ’s findings of fact in support of conclusion of law paragraph 226 are supported by competent substantial evidence. (Walters, T. Vol. 2, pp. 225-226). Because the ALJ in paragraph 226 of the RO concluded that the proposed Dock meets all the requirements of rule 18-20.004(5), the Dock is deemed to meet the public interest test for activities conducted in aquatic preserves. See Fla.

Admin. Code. R. 18-20.004(4)(c)(2020).

The Petitioners appear to take exception to the conclusions of law in paragraph 230 that the Dock will meet all applicable requirements of chapter 18-20. Paragraph 230 of the RO concludes that based on the foregoing findings “it is concluded that the Dock will meet all applicable requirements of chapter 18-20 such that Fondriest is entitled to issuance of a letter of consent authorizing the construction and operation of the Dock.” RO ¶ 230. Contrary to the Petitioner’s exception, the ALJ’s findings in support of conclusion of law paragraph 230 are supported by competent substantial evidence. (Wilson, T. Vol. 1, pp. 126-56; Walters, T. Vol. 2, pp. 225-26; Mills, T. Vol. 3, pp. 385, 434).

The Petitioners appear to base this exception on their conclusion that the Dock is located in an RPA 1 and not an RPA 3. The Department concurs with the ALJ’s interpretation of the RPA 1, RPA 2, and RPA 3 categories in aquatic preserves, and the ALJ’s conclusion that the Dock will meet all applicable requirements of chapter 18-20.

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners’ exception to paragraphs 226 and 230 is

denied.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 226.

The Petitioners take exception to the conclusions of law in paragraph 226 of the RO, which reads, in its entirety:

18-20.004(4)(c).

RO ¶ 226. The Petitioners contend that the proposed single-family Dock will not meet the public interest requirement for activities conducted in aquatic preserves. Petitioners’ Exceptions at p.

For the reasons recited in response to the Petitioners’ exception immediately above, the Department rejects the Petitioner’s exception to paragraph 226 of the RO.
Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners’ exception to paragraph 226 is denied.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 229.

The Petitioners take exception to conclusion of law paragraph 229 of the RO, which reads in its entirety: “For the reasons discussed in detail above, it is concluded that the Dock will not result in adverse cumulative impacts to the resources of the CBAP.” RO ¶ 229. The Department concludes that paragraph 229 of the RO is a mixed statement of law and fact.

The Petitioners disagree with the ALJ’s findings and conclusion that the Dock will not result in adverse impacts to the resources of the aquatic preserve and seek to have DEP reweigh the evidence. However, DEP is not authorized to reweigh evidence presented at a DOAH final hearing, attempt to resolve conflicts therein, or judge the credibility of a witness. See, e.g., Rogers, 920 So. 2d at 30; Belleau, 695 So. 2d at 1307. If there is competent substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s findings of fact, it is irrelevant that there may also be competent substantial evidence supporting a contrary finding. See, e.g., Arand Construction Co., 592 So. 2d at 280; Conshor, Inc., 498 So. 2d at 623. Contrary to the Petitioners’ exception, the ALJ’s findings in paragraph 229 are supported by competent substantial evidence. (Walters, T. Vol. 2, pp. 268- 287, 142, 921-22).
Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners’ exception to paragraph 229 is denied.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 230.

The Petitioners take exception to conclusion of law paragraph 230 of the RO, which reads in its entirety: “Based on the foregoing, it is concluded that the Dock will meet all applicable requirements of chapter 18-20 such that Fondriest is entitled to issuance of a letter of consent authorizing the construction and operation of the Dock.” RO ¶ 230. The Department concludes that paragraph 230 of the RO is a mixed statement of law and fact.
The Petitioners disagree with the ALJ’s findings and conclusion that the Dock will meet all the applicable requirements of chapter 18-20 and seek to have DEP reweigh the evidence.
However, DEP is not authorized to reweigh evidence presented at a DOAH final hearing, attempt to resolve conflicts therein, or judge the credibility of a witness. See, e.g., Rogers, 920 So. 2d at 30; Belleau, 695 So. 2d at 1307. If there is competent substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s findings of fact, it is irrelevant that there may also be competent substantial evidence supporting

a contrary finding. See, e.g., Arand Construction Co., 592 So. 2d at 280; Conshor, Inc., 498 So. 2d at 623.
The Petitioners take exception to the conclusion of law in paragraph 230 that the Dock will meet all applicable requirements of chapter 18-20. Paragraph 230 of the RO concludes that based on the foregoing findings “it is concluded that the Dock will meet all applicable requirements of chapter 18-20 such that Fondriest is entitled to issuance of a letter of consent authorizing the construction and operation of the Dock.” RO ¶ 230. Contrary to the Petitioner’s exception, the ALJ’s findings in support of conclusion of law paragraph 230 are supported by competent substantial evidence. (Wilson, T. Vol. 1, pp. 126-56; Walters, T. Vol. 2, pp. 225-26; Mills, T. Vol. 3, pp. 385, 434).
Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners’ exception to paragraph 230 is denied.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 253.

The Petitioners take exception to conclusion of law paragraph 253 of the RO, which reads in its entirety: “For the reasons discussed herein, it is concluded that the Dock, as proposed to be constructed and used, subject to the conditions imposed in the letter of consent, will meet all applicable standards and requirements of rule 18-21.004.” RO ¶ 253. The Department concludes that paragraph 253 of the RO is a mixed statement of law and fact.
The Petitioners disagree with the ALJ’s findings and conclusion that the Dock will meet all the applicable requirements of rule 18-21.004 and seek to have DEP reweigh the evidence. However, DEP is not authorized to reweigh evidence presented at a DOAH final hearing, attempt to resolve conflicts therein, or judge the credibility of a witness. See, e.g., Rogers, 920 So. 2d at 30; Belleau, 695 So. 2d at 1307. If there is competent substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s findings of fact, it is irrelevant that there may also be competent substantial evidence supporting

a contrary finding. See, e.g., Arand Construction Co., 592 So. 2d at 280; Conshor, Inc., 498 So. 2d at 623. Contrary to the Petitioner’s exception, the ALJ’s findings in support of conclusion of law paragraph 253 are supported by competent substantial evidence. (Wilson, T. Vol. 1, pp.
126-56; Walters, T. Vol. 2, pp. 225-26; Mills, Vol. 3, p. 385-88, 434).

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners’ exception to paragraph 253 is denied.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 288.

The Petitioners take exception to conclusion of law paragraph 288 of the RO, which reads in its entirety: “In sum, it is concluded that the Dock will meet all applicable statutory and rule standards and requirements for issuance of the Dock Approval.” RO ¶ 288.
If the reviewing agency modifies or rejects a conclusion of law set out in the ALJ’s recommended order, it must state with particularity the reasons for the modification or rejection, and must find that its substituted conclusion of law "is as or more reasonable than that which was rejected or modified." § 120.57(1)(l), Fla. Stat. (2020). The Petitioners failed to identify any legal basis for its exception to the conclusion of law in paragraph 288 of the RO and failed to offer a substitute legal conclusion that is “as or more reasonable” than that which it proposes be rejected. § 120.57(1)(l), Fla. Stat. (2020). Instead, the Petitioners summarily reject the ALJ’s conclusion of law in paragraph 288 without providing any legal basis for the exception or citation to the record. See § 120.57(1)(j) and (k), Fla. Stat. (2020).
Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners’ exception to paragraph 288 is denied.

Petitioners’ Exception to the RO’s History of the Case.

The Petitioners take exception to the ALJ’s history of the case on pages three through five of the RO, identified in the RO as the “Preliminary Statement.” (RO at pp. 3-5). The Petitioners’ exception to the ALJ’s Preliminary Statement is improper and must be denied,

because parties may only file an exception to findings of fact and conclusions of law. Fla. Admin. Code R. 28-106.217 (2020).
Moreover, the Petitioners do not allege there is no competent substantial evidence to support the statements in the Preliminary Statement of the RO; instead, the Petitioners contend that the ALJ left out details that should have been included in the Preliminary Statement.
However, an agency has no authority to make independent or supplemental findings of fact to those contained in the RO. See, e.g., North Port, Fla., 645 So. 2d at 487; Fla. Power & Light Co., 693 So. 2d at 1026-1027.
Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners’ exception to the Preliminary Statement in the RO is denied.
Petitioners’ Exception to the ALJ’s Ruling to Exclude Certain Evidence.

The Petitioners take exception to the ALJ’s ruling that their expert’s resource protection area survey and report were excluded from the hearing, because they were filed untimely. The Petitioners acknowledge that they untimely filed these expert documents, and they were filed the next business day. In accordance with rule 28-106.104(3), “[a]ny document received by the office of the agency clerk before 5:00 p.m. shall be filed as of that day but any document received after 5:00 p.m. shall be filed as of 8:00 a.m. on the next regular business day.” Fla.
Admin. Code R. 28-106.104(3) (2020). The ALJ excluded these exhibits in accordance with the above cited rule contained in the Uniform Rules of Procedures that regulate DOAH, and which rules are located on DOAH’s website.
Moreover, the Department does not have jurisdiction to reject the ALJ’s rulings on the admissibility of evidence. Evidentiary rulings of the ALJ that deal with “factual issues susceptible to ordinary methods of proof that are not infused with [agency] policy

considerations,” are not matters over which the agency has “substantive jurisdiction.” See Martuccio, 622 So. 2d at 609; Heifetz, 475 So. 2d at 1281-82.
Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners’ exception to the ALJ’s ruling to exclude certain of the Petitioners’ exhibits is denied.
CONCLUSION

Having considered the applicable law and standards of review in light of the findings and conclusions set forth in the RO, and being otherwise duly advised, it is
ORDERED that:
1. The Recommended Order (Exhibit A) is adopted, except as modified by the above rulings on Exceptions, and incorporated by reference herein;
2. A Letter of Consent to Use Sovereignty Submerged Lands is GRANTED to Julia Fondriest to construct and operate the proposed Dock at 1953 Long Beach Drive in Big Pine Key, Florida; and
3. The Department verifies that Julia Fondriest’s proposed Dock is exempt from the requirement to obtain an environmental resource permit pursuant to section 403.813(1)(b), Florida Statutes.

JUDICIAL REVIEW

Any party to this proceeding has the right to seek judicial review of the Final Order pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes, by the filing of a Notice of Appeal pursuant to Rule 9.110, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, with the clerk of the Department in the Office of General Counsel, 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard, M.S. 35, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000; and by filing a copy of the Notice of Appeal accompanied by the applicable filing fees with the

Docket for Case No: 20-002474

Issue Date	Proceedings
Apr. 05, 2021	Respondents, Julia Fondriest and Florida Department of Environmental Protection's Joint Response to Petitioners' Exceptions to Recommended Order filed.
Apr. 05, 2021	Petitioners' Exceptions to Recommended Order filed.
Apr. 05, 2021	Consolidated Final Order filed.
Feb. 18, 2021	Recommended Order (hearing held October 19, 22, and 29, and November 10, 2020). CASE CLOSED.
Feb. 18, 2021	Recommended Order cover letter identifying the hearing record referred to the Agency.
Dec. 14, 2020	Respondent's Proposed Exhibits filed (exhibits not available for viewing, flashdrive contains all exhibits).
Nov. 30, 2020	Petitioners' Proposed Recommended Order filed.
Nov. 30, 2020	Respondent, Julia Fondriest's Proposed Recommended Order filed.
Nov. 30, 2020	Florida Department of Environmental Protection's Proposed Recommended Order filed.
Nov. 16, 2020	Order Establishing Deadline For Filing Proposed Orders.
Nov. 16, 2020	Notice of Filing Transcript.
Nov. 16, 2020	Notice of Filing Transcript.
Nov. 16, 2020	Transcript of Proceedings (not available for viewing) filed.
Nov. 13, 2020	Transcript of Proceedings (not available for viewing) filed.
Nov. 12, 2020	Respondent, Julia Fondriest's Notice of Filing Late filed Exhibit RF-343.
Nov. 10, 2020	CASE STATUS: Hearing Held.
Oct. 29, 2020	CASE STATUS: Hearing Partially Held; continued to date not certain.
Oct. 29, 2020	Notice of Filing Transcript.
Oct. 28, 2020	Transcript of Proceedings (not available for viewing) filed.
Oct. 26, 2020	Order Rescheduling Hearing by Zoom Conference (hearing set for October 29 and November 10, 2020; 8:30 a.m., Eastern Time).
Oct. 21, 2020	Petitioner's Proposed Exhibits filed (exhibits not available for viewing).
Oct. 19, 2020	CASE STATUS: Hearing Partially Held; continued to date not certain.
Oct. 19, 2020	Respondent, Florida Department of Environmental Protection's Notice of Filing Objections to Petitioners' Exhibits filed.
Oct. 16, 2020	Respondent, Julia Fondriest's Notice of Filing Objections to Petitioners' Exhibits filed.
Oct. 16, 2020	Respondent's Proposed Exhibits filed (exhibits not available for viewing).
Oct. 16, 2020	Petitioner's Proposed Exhibits filed (exhibits not available for viewing).
Oct. 16, 2020	Petitioners' Response to: Fondriest's Motion to Strike and Motion in Limine regarding Petitioners' Notice of Filing Expert Supplemental Opinion and Report on Revised Application filed.
Oct. 15, 2020	Respondent, Julia Fondriest's Notice of Filing Proposed Exhibits filed.
Oct. 15, 2020	Petitioners' Notice of Filing Paper Copy of Exhibits filed.
Oct. 15, 2020	Joint Pre-Hearing Stipulation filed.
Oct. 14, 2020	CASE STATUS: Status Conference Held.
Oct. 14, 2020	Respondent, Julia Fondriest's Motion to Strike and Motion in Limine regarding Petitioners' Notice of Filing Expert Supplemental Opinion and Report on Revised Application filed.
Oct. 12, 2020	Petitioners' Motion to Compel Expedited Responses to Petitioners Second Request for Production to DEP filed.
Oct. 12, 2020	Order regarding Dates of Final Hearing.
Oct. 12, 2020	Petitioners' Notice of Filing Expert Supplemental Opinion & Report on Revised Application filed.
Oct. 09, 2020	Respondent, Julia Fondriest's Motion for Reconsideration filed.
Oct. 09, 2020	Petitioner's Amended Notice of Taking Deposition: Nicole Charnock FDEP ENV Specialist II filed.
Oct. 09, 2020	Petitioner "Barry Roberts and Gloria Meredith Trust" Amendment to Petition filed.
Oct. 09, 2020	Amended Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing & Petition to Intervene in Related Case(s) filed.
Oct. 09, 2020	Petitioners' Additional Witness Disclosure List for New DEP NOI Use - Amended Petition filed.
Oct. 08, 2020	Notice of Telephonic Conference (status conference set for October 14, 2020; 3:00 p.m., Eastern Time).
Oct. 08, 2020	CASE STATUS: Pre-Hearing Conference Held.
Oct. 07, 2020	Petitioner's Amended Notice of Taking Deposition of Corporate Representative of Respondent, Department of Environmental Protection Pursuant to Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.310(b)(6) filed.
Oct. 05, 2020	Petitioner's Notice of Taking Deposition of Corporate Representative of Respondent, Department of Environmental Protection Pursuant to Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.310(b)(6) filed.
Oct. 05, 2020	Petitioner's Notice of Taking Deposition of Katy E. Cummings, FDEP Florida Keys Aquatic Preserves Manager filed.
Oct. 05, 2020	Petitioner's Second Request for Production of Documents to Respondent, Department of Environmental Protection filed.
Oct. 05, 2020	Petitioner's Second Request for Production of Documents to Respondent, Julia Fondriest filed.
Oct. 02, 2020	Order Establishing Timeframe for Filing Amended Petitions for Hearing .
Oct. 01, 2020	Florida Department of Environmental Protection's Notice of Proposed Changes to Agency Action filed.
Sep. 15, 2020	Order Invalidating Subpoena.
Sep. 15, 2020	Order Amending Deadlines In Order of Prehearing Instructions.
Sep. 15, 2020	Notice of Hearing by Zoom Conference (hearing set for October 19 and 22, 2020; 9:00 a.m.; Tallahassee).
Sep. 15, 2020	Amended Notice of Availability filed.
Sep. 14, 2020	Notice of Availability filed.
Sep. 11, 2020	Letter from Hugh Schratwieser Regarding Subpoena filed.
Sep. 10, 2020	Order Granting Continuance (parties to advise status by September 14, 2020).
Sep. 09, 2020	CASE STATUS: Motion Hearing Held.
Sep. 09, 2020	Notice of Telephonic Conference (status conference set for September 9, 2020; 12:00 p.m.).
Sep. 09, 2020	Petitioners' No Objection to Respondent DEP's Motion for Continuance filed.
Sep. 08, 2020	Respondent Florida Department of Environmental Protection's Motion for Continuance, Response to Petitioners' Corrected Motion to Amend by Interlineation Reference, and Request for Status Conference filed.
Sep. 04, 2020	Respondent, Julia Fondriest's Response in Opposition to Petitioners' Corrected Motion to Amend by Interlineation Reerence to Add Fact that Project is Within Coupon Bight Aquatic Preserve and Citation to Applicable Rule 18-20, FAC (Aquatic Preserves) Petition filed.
Sep. 03, 2020	Respondent, Julia Fondriest's Responses to Petitioners' First Request for Production of Documents to Respondent, Julia Fondriest filed.
Sep. 03, 2020	Respondent, Julia Fondriest's Notice of Service of Objections and Responses to Petitioners' First Set of Interrogatories filed.
Sep. 02, 2020	Petitioners? corrected Motion to Amend by Interlineation Reference to Add Fact that Project is within Coupon Bight Aquatic Preserve and Citation to Applicable Rule 18-20 FAC (Aquatic Preserves) filed.
Sep. 02, 2020	Petitioners' Motion to Amend by Interlineation Reference to Add Fact that Project is within Coupon Bight Aquatic Preserve and Citation to Applicable Rule 18-20 FAC (Aquatic Preserves) filed.
Aug. 28, 2020	Respondent, Julia Fondriest's, Second Amended Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of Michael Czerwinski filed.
Aug. 25, 2020	Respondent, Julia Fondriest's, Amended Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of Michael Czerwinski filed.
Aug. 24, 2020	Florida Department of Environmental Protection's Witness Disclosure filed.
Aug. 24, 2020	Petitioners' Final Witness Disclosure List filed.
Aug. 21, 2020	Florida Department of Environmental Protection's Amended Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of Sherri Crilly (amended as to time change) filed.
Aug. 21, 2020	Amended Florida Department of Environmental Protection's Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of Barry Roberts (amended as to deponent name in document title) filed.
Aug. 21, 2020	Florida Department of Environmental Protection's Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of Sherri Crilly filed.
Aug. 21, 2020	Florida Department of Environmental Protection's Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of Sherri Crilly (Barry Roberts) filed.
Aug. 21, 2020	Respondent, Julia Fondriest's, Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of Harry Appel filed.
Aug. 21, 2020	Respondent, Julia Fondriest's, Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of Michael Czerwinski filed.
Aug. 21, 2020	Respondent, Julia Fondriest's, Notice of taking Deposition Duces Tecum of Jennifer Demaria filed.
Aug. 19, 2020	Amended Notice of Hearing by Zoom Conference (hearing set for September 14 through 16, 2020; 9:30 a.m.; Tallahassee; amended as to Zoom Hearing).
Aug. 17, 2020	CASE STATUS: Status Conference Held.
Aug. 17, 2020	Notice of Telephonic Status Conference (status conference set for August 17, 2020; 3:30 p.m.).
Aug. 14, 2020	Respondent, Julia Fondriest's Witness List filed.
Aug. 14, 2020	Petitioners' Joint Expert Witness Disclosure List filed.
Aug. 14, 2020	Florida Department of Environmental Protection's Expert Witness Disclosure filed.
Aug. 03, 2020	Order Dismissing Petitioner Kimberly K. Oxendale, Trustee of The Kimberly K. Oxendale Trust Agreement, As A Party.
Jul. 31, 2020	Petitioner Kimberly K. Oxendale, Trustee of the Kimberly K. Oxendale Trust Agreement's Notice of Agreed Voluntary Dismissal filed.
Jul. 31, 2020	Petitioner Kimberly K. Oxendale, Trustee of the Kimberly K. Oxendale Trust Agreement's Notice of Agreed Voluntary Dismissal (filed in Case No. 20-002535).
Jul. 28, 2020	Respondents', Julia Fondriest and the Florida Department of Environmental Protection, Joint Motion to Dismiss Petitioner, Kimblery K. Oxendale, as Trustee for the Kimberly K. Oxendale Trust filed.
Jul. 28, 2020	Notice of Service & Consolidated Response(s) to Fondreist Interrogatories filed.
Jul. 28, 2020	Petitioners Consolidated Response to Julia Fondreist's First Requests for Production of Documents filed.
Jul. 28, 2020	Petitioners' Barry Roberts and Gloria Meredith Trust, Sherri Crilly, Jennifer Demaria and Kimberly K. Oxendale, Trustee of the Kimberly K. Oxendale Trust Agreement Notice of Service & Response(s) to DEP Interrogatories filed.
Jun. 23, 2020	Order Granting Continuance and Rescheduling Hearing (hearing set for September 14 and 15, 2020; 9:30 a.m.; Key West).
Jun. 23, 2020	Notice and Certificate of Serving Respondent Julia Fondriest's First Set of Interrogatories to Petitioner Sherri Crilly filed.
Jun. 23, 2020	Notice and Certificate of Serving Respondent Julia Fondriest's First Set of Interrogatories to Petitioner Kimberly K. Oxendale, as Trustee of the Kimberly K. Oxendale Trust Agreement filed.
Jun. 23, 2020	Notice and Certificate of Serving Respondent Julia Fondriest's First Set of Interrogatories to Petitioner Jennifer Demaria filed.
Jun. 23, 2020	Notice and Certificate of Serving Respondent Julia Fondriest's First Set of Interrogatories to Petitioner Gloria Meredith, as Trustee of the Barry Roberts and Gloria Meredith Trust filed.
Jun. 23, 2020	Notice and Certificate of Serving Respondent Julia Fondriest's First Set of Interrogatories to Petitioner Barry Roberts, as Trustee of the Barry Roberts and Gloria Meredith Trust filed.
Jun. 22, 2020	Respondent, Julia Fondriest's First Request for Production of Documents to Petitioner Sherri Crilly filed.
Jun. 22, 2020	Florida Department of Environmental Protection's Motion for Continuance filed.
Jun. 22, 2020	Respondent, Julia Fondriest's First Request for Production of Documents to Petitioner Kimberly K. Oxendale, as Trustee of the Kimberly K. Oxendale Trust Agreement filed.
Jun. 22, 2020	Respondent, Julia Fondriest's First Request for Production of Documents to Petitioner Jennifer Demaria filed.
Jun. 22, 2020	Respondent, Julia Fondriest's First Request for Production of Documents to Petitioner Gloria Meredith, as Trustee of the Barry Roberts and Gloria Meredith Trust filed.
Jun. 22, 2020	Respondent, Julia Fondriest's First Request for Production of Documents to Petitioner Barry Roberts, as Trustee of the Barry Roberts and Gloria Meredith Trust filed.
Jun. 19, 2020	Notice and Certificate of Serving Respondent, Florida Department of Environmental Protection's First Set of Interrogatories to Petitioner Barry Roberts, as Trustee of the Barry Roberts and Gloria Meredith Trust filed.
Jun. 19, 2020	Notice and Certificate of Serving Respondent, Florida Department of Environmental Protection's First Set of Interrogatories to Petitioner Kimberly K. Oxendale, Trustee of the Kimberly K. Oxendale Trust Agreement filed.
Jun. 19, 2020	Notice and Certificate of Serving Respondent, Florida Department of Environmental Protection's First Set of Interrogatories to Petitioner Jennifer Demaria filed.
Jun. 19, 2020	Notice and Certificate of Serving Respondent, Florida Department of Environmental Protection's First Set of Interrogatories to Petitioner Sherri Crilly filed.
Jun. 19, 2020	Notice of Hearing (hearing set for July 9 and 10, 2020; 9:30 a.m.; Key West).
Jun. 19, 2020	Order of Pre-hearing Instructions.
Jun. 18, 2020	CASE STATUS: Status Conference Held.
Jun. 18, 2020	Notice of Telephonic Conference (status conference set for June 18, 2020; 3:30 p.m.).
Jun. 16, 2020	Notice of Transfer.
Jun. 15, 2020	Joint Response to Initial Order filed.
Jun. 12, 2020	Joint Response to Initial Order (filed in Case No. 20-002535).
Jun. 11, 2020	Order Granting Extension of Time.
Jun. 11, 2020	Notice of Appearance (Deborah Madden) filed.
Jun. 11, 2020	Notice of Appearance (Luna Phillips) filed.
Jun. 04, 2020	Order of Consolidation (DOAH Case Nos. 20-2473, 20-2474, 20-2535)
Jun. 03, 2020	Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Initial Order filed.
May 27, 2020	Initial Order.
May 26, 2020	Agency action letter filed.
May 26, 2020	Verified Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing filed.
May 26, 2020	Request for Assignment of Administrative Law Judge and Notice of Preservation of Record filed.
	Petitioner's Proposed Exhibits filed (exhibits not available for viewing).
	CASE STATUS: Status Conference Held.
	CASE STATUS: Status Conference Held.
	CASE STATUS: Hearing Partially Held; continued to date not certain.
	Transcript of Proceedings (not available for viewing) filed.
	Transcript of Proceedings (not available for viewing) filed.

Orders for Case No: 20-002474

Issue Date	Document	Summary
Apr. 05, 2021	Agency Final Order
Feb. 18, 2021	Recommended Order	Applicant for private single family residential dock in aquatic preserve met all applicable requirements for issuance of letter of consent to use sovereignty submerged lands. Activity is exempt from regulatory permitting.

Source: Florida - Division of Administrative Hearings

SHERRI CRILLY vs JULIA FONDRIEST AND STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, 20-002474 (2020)

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraphs 73-78 and 226-230.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 70.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraphs 73-78.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 75, footnote 7.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 66.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraphs 63 and 67.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraphs 56 and 101.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 74.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraphs 55-56.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraphs 64, 66 and 73.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 5.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 7.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 12.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 20.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 21.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 30.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 36.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 39.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 40.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraphs 43-44.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 53.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 55.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 56.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 57.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 58.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraphs 59-61.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 63.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 64.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 67.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 70.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 72.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 73.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 74.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 75, Footnote 7.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 78.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraphs 80-85.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 92.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 93.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 98.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 100.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraphs 102 and 104.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 117.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 145.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraphs 156-59.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraphs 36 and 161.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraphs 162-65.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 195.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraphs 226 and 230.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 226.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 229.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 230.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 253.

Petitioners’ Exception to Paragraph 288.

Petitioners’ Exception to the RO’s History of the Case.

Petitioners’ Exception to the ALJ’s Ruling to Exclude Certain Evidence.

Docket for Case No: 20-002474

Orders for Case No: 20-002474

Lawyers who claimed

Ralf Gunars Brookes

Luna Ergas Phillips

Deborah Kay Madden

Paul Joseph Polito

Counsels

Cites

Florida Laws (14)

Florida Administrative Code (15)

DOAH Case (9)

Cited By (6)

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