BLACKWELL, Justice.
Daniel Prickett sued Imelda Zaldivar to recover money damages for injuries that he allegedly sustained in an October 2009 vehicular collision.
Commonly known as the "apportionment statute," OCGA § 51-12-33 requires the trier of fact in some cases to divide responsibility for an injury among all of those who "contributed to" it — parties and nonparties alike — according to their respective shares of the combined "fault" that produced the injury. The statute then requires the trier of fact to apportion any award of damages among the defendants with liability, limiting the liability of each to the extent to which she was assigned responsibility. Zaldivar gave notice under the apportionment statute that she intended to ask the trier of fact in this case to assign some responsibility to Overhead Door for any injuries that Prickett may have sustained in the collision. In response, Prickett filed a motion for partial summary judgment, asserting that OCGA § 51-12-33 does not require any assignment of responsibility to Overhead Door. The statute, Prickett argued, permits attributing "fault" to a nonparty only to the extent that the nonparty committed a tort that was a proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff. And negligent entrustment of a motor vehicle or other instrumentality never can be a proximate cause of an injury to the person to whom the instrumentality was entrusted, Prickett added, citing Ridgeway v. Whisman, 210 Ga.App. 169,
The trial court granted the motion for partial summary judgment, agreeing with Prickett about the meaning of the apportionment statute, and following Ridgeway to conclude that negligent entrustment on the part of Overhead Door could not possibly have been a proximate cause of any injuries that Prickett sustained. Zaldivar appealed, and in a split decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed. See Zaldivar v. Prickett, 328 Ga.App. 359, 762 S.E.2d 166 (2014). The majority of the Court of Appeals agreed with Prickett about the meaning of the statute, see id. at 361-362, 762 S.E.2d 166, and it adhered to its earlier decision in Ridgeway with respect to proximate cause. See id. at 362, 762 S.E.2d 166. Judge Branch dissented, and like Zaldivar, she urged that assignment of fault to a nonparty does not require that the nonparty itself have liability in tort for the injury to the plaintiff. See id. at 364-365, 762 S.E.2d 166 (Branch, J., dissenting). Moreover, Judge Branch said, if Overhead Door negligently entrusted Prickett with a company truck, its negligent entrustment could be a proximate cause of his injuries, even if Overhead Door might avoid liability to Prickett upon some other ground. Although she did not say so, Judge Branch implied that Ridgeway was wrong about proximate cause. See id. at 366, 762 S.E.2d 166 (Branch, J., dissenting).
We issued a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals. We now conclude that the majority of the Court of Appeals correctly understood OCGA § 51-12-33 to require the trier of fact to consider the "fault" of a nonparty only when the non-party is shown to have committed a tort against the plaintiff that was a proximate cause of his injury. We also conclude, however, that negligent entrustment of an instrumentality can be a proximate cause of an injury to the person to whom the instrumentality was entrusted, and the majority of the Court of Appeals erred when it relied on statements in Ridgeway to the contrary. We disapprove Ridgeway to the extent that it suggests that negligent entrustment never can be a proximate cause of an injury to the person entrusted, and we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
1. We address first what is meant by OCGA § 51-12-33 when it speaks of the "fault" of one who "contributes to" an injury, especially as it concerns nonparties. And to begin, we recall the familiar and settled principles that inform our consideration of statutory meaning. As we recently acknowledged, "[a] statute draws its meaning ... from its text." Chan v. Ellis, 296 Ga. 838, 839(1), 770 S.E.2d 851 (2015) (citation omitted). "When we consider the meaning of a statute, we must presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant," Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172(1)(a), 751 S.E.2d 337 (2013) (citation and punctuation omitted), and so, "we must read the statutory text in its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language would." FDIC v. Loudermilk, 295 Ga. 579, 588(2), 761 S.E.2d 332 (2014) (citation and punctuation omitted). "The common and customary usages of the words are important, but so is their context." Chan, 296 Ga. at 839(1), 770 S.E.2d 851 (citations omitted). "For context, we may look to other provisions of the same statute, the structure and history of the whole statute, and the other law — constitutional, statutory, and common law alike — that forms the legal background of the statutory provision in question." May v. State, 295 Ga. 388, 391-392, 761 S.E.2d 38 (2014) (citations omitted). With these principles in mind, we turn now to the statutory text in question.
We are principally concerned here with OCGA § 51-12-33(c), which directs the trier of fact in cases to which the apportionment statute applies to "consider the fault of all persons or entities who contributed to the alleged injury or damages." This provision, however, must be read in the context of the
In its entirety, the statute provides:
OCGA § 51-12-33.
In the cases to which the statute applies,
OCGA § 51-12-33(a). Subsection (g) refers back to this assignment of fault to the plaintiff, providing that "the plaintiff shall not be entitled to receive any damages if the plaintiff is 50 percent or more responsible for the injury or damages claimed." OCGA § 51-12-33(g). Together, subsections (a) and (g) codify the doctrine of comparative negligence,
Subsection (b) of the apportionment statute is addressed to the "fault" of defendants "who are liable" for the injury to the plaintiff, and it specifies that the "fault" of such a defendant — relative to the "fault" of all — is the measure and limit of her liability:
OCGA § 51-12-33(b).
In subsection (c), "fault" is used with reference to the "fault of all persons or entities who contributed to the alleged injury or damages," and so, it includes not only the "fault" of nonparties, but also the sort of "fault" attributable to plaintiffs under subsection (a), as well as the "fault" attributable to defendants with liability under subsection (b). "Fault" in subsection (a) refers, as we have said, to a breach of a legal duty that the plaintiff owes for his own protection that is a proximate cause of his injury, and "fault" in subsection (b) refers similarly to a breach of a legal duty that a defendant owes for the protection of the plaintiff that is a proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff. As used in subsection (c), then, "fault" that "contributed to the alleged injury or damages" must refer to a breach of a legal duty in the nature of tort that is owed for the protection of the plaintiff, the breach of which is a proximate cause of his injury. Understanding "fault" in this way — as the term is used in subsection (c) with respect to plaintiffs, defendants with liability, and others alike — comports with the particularized meanings of the "fault" described in subsections (a) and (b) that it is meant to encompass.
Moreover, this understanding of "fault" is consistent with the usual and customary meaning of the term as used in a legal context. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY at 725 (10th ed.2014) ("fault" means "[t]he intentional or negligent failure to maintain some standard of conduct when that failure results in harm to another person"). It fits comfortably with the definition of "fault" that we identified in Couch: "conduct done wrongly or negligently." 291 Ga. at 361-362(1), 729 S.E.2d 378 (citation and punctuation omitted). And it comports just as well with the way in which we described the scope of the apportionment statute as a whole in Couch: "OCGA § 51-12-33 addresses the two classes of people, the plaintiff(s) and tortfeasor(s), including nonparties, who are responsible" for the injury at issue. Id. at 360(1), 729 S.E.2d 378. A "tortfeasor," after all, is simply one who commits a tort. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY at 1718. In context, subsection (c) is most naturally and reasonably understood to require the trier of fact to consider any breach of a legal duty that sounds in tort for the protection of the plaintiff, the breach of which is a proximate cause of the injury about which he complains, whether that breach is attributable to the plaintiff himself, a defendant with liability, or another.
Before we conclude our consideration of the apportionment statute, however, we must address a provision of the statute that, according to Zaldivar, poses a problem for understanding "fault" in the way in which we have said it is most naturally and reasonably understood. Immediately following its provision that the trier of fact must "consider the fault of all persons or entities who contributed to the alleged injury or damages," subsection (c) adds that this is true "regardless of whether the person or entity was, or could have been, named as a party to the suit." OCGA § 51-12-33(c) (emphasis supplied). If the "fault" of a nonparty can be considered regardless of whether the nonparty "could have been named as a party to the suit," Zaldivar says, then the "fault" of a nonparty can be considered regardless of whether the nonparty has liability to the plaintiff. But if "fault" consists of a breach of a legal duty that sounds in tort and is owed with respect to the plaintiff, the breach of which is a proximate cause of the injury that the plaintiff has sustained, then the person in breach necessarily would be subject to liability to the plaintiff, Zaldivar argues. And so, she concludes, understanding "fault" as we have done would effectively write the "could have
Standing alone, the provision in subsection (c) about a nonparty that "could [not] have been named as a party to the suit" does not necessarily refer to a nonparty without liability. One certainly can be named as a defendant in a lawsuit but be without liability, precisely because the case is defended and tried, and in the end, a judge or jury absolves the defendant of liability; that happens in Georgia courtrooms all the time. For that reason, one could understand the statutory reference to those who "could [not] have been named as a party to the suit" to refer instead to those who could not have been properly named because of jurisdictional and procedural rules, such as the rules for personal jurisdiction, venue, or joinder. That said, another provision of the apportionment statute convinces us that Zaldivar and Judge Branch were right to think that the "fault" of nonparties without liability to the plaintiff in tort can be considered. In subsection (d)(1), the statute provides:
OCGA § 51-12-33(d)(1). Because a settlement agreement ordinarily extinguishes conclusively any potential liability that the settlement was meant to resolve, a nonparty with whom the plaintiff has settled usually would not have any continuing potential liability to the plaintiff in tort, having instead converted its potential liability to a contractual one. Just as Zaldivar and Judge Branch maintain, the apportionment statute contemplates the consideration of the "fault of all persons or entities who contributed to the alleged injury or damages," regardless of their liability or potential liability to the plaintiff in tort.
But how can that be, if "fault" — at least as applied to one other than the plaintiff himself — involves the commission of a tort as against the plaintiff that is a proximate cause of his injury, which amounts, of course, to proof of the essential elements of tort liability? The answer is simple: Proof of these essential elements is a necessary condition for tort liability, but it does not lead inevitably to liability. Not every tortfeasor can be held liable for his torts. A tortfeasor may have an affirmative defense or immunity that admits the commission of a tort that is the proximate cause of the injury in question. Although such a defense or immunity may cut off liability, a tortfeasor is still is a tortfeasor, and nothing about his defense or immunity means that he cannot be said to have committed a tort that was a proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Shekhawat v. Jones, 293 Ga. 468, 470-471(1), 746 S.E.2d 89 (2013) (state employee may have statutory immunity under the Georgia Tort Claims Act when the employee "commits a tort while acting within the scope of his employment with the State"). What happened, happened, and affirmative defenses and immunities do not change what happened, only what the consequences will be. As such, the apportionment statute permits consideration, generally speaking, of the "fault" of a tortfeasor, notwithstanding that he may have a meritorious affirmative defense or claim of immunity against any liability to the plaintiff.
Our understanding is confirmed as well by persuasive authority from Georgia and elsewhere. Starting at home, our own Court of
Other jurisdictions with apportionment statutes similar to ours have taken similar approaches. In Couch, we looked to judicial understandings of the Colorado apportionment statute, which, we said, refers to "fault" in much the same way as our own statute. 291 Ga. at 362 n. 6 (1), 729 S.E.2d 378. Construing the Colorado apportionment statute, courts have concluded that a nonparty can have "fault" that is to be considered, notwithstanding that the nonparty has a valid defense or immunity as against its own liability to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Doering v. Copper Mountain, Inc., 259 F.3d 1202, 1215(III)(D)(3) (10th Cir.2001) ("Even a person who is immune from suit, however, may be a nonparty designee so long as the person owes a duty of care to the injured plaintiff." (Citations omitted)); Williams v. White Mt. Constr. Co., 749 P.2d 423, 429(III)(B) (Colo. 1988) (notwithstanding exclusivity of workers' compensation remedy, "[t]ortfeasors sued by injured employees are now able to present evidence of employer [negligence or fault] at trial so as to reduce whatever damages may be assessed against them to a level proportionate to their liability"); Paris v. Dance, 194 P.3d 404, 408(I)(B)(2) (Colo.App. 2008) ("It does not undermine the policy of qualified parental liability to forbid the allocation of financial responsibility for the otherwise nonrecoverable negligence of that parent to another defendant." (Citation omitted)). Courts in other jurisdictions have reached the same conclusions under their own apportionment statutes. See, e.g., Millette v. Tarnove, 435 Fed.Appx. 848, 854(III)(A)(2) (11th Cir.2011) (under Florida apportionment statute, "[plaintiff's] inability to recover in tort from a nonparty due to the economic loss rule does not preclude apportioning fault to that nonparty"); Sedgwick Ins. v. CDS, Inc., 47 F.Supp.3d 536, 549(B)(2) (E.D.Mich.2014) (fault of nonparty-employer could be considered under Michigan apportionment statute, notwithstanding that employer would have defense as against plaintiff-employee under exclusive remedy provision of workers' compensation statute); Ovando v. County of Los Angeles, 159 Cal.App.4th 42, 71 Cal.Rptr.3d 415, 439 (2008) ("fault" could be allocated to nonparties under California Proposition 51 notwithstanding their governmental immunity); Fitzpatrick v. Allen, 24 Kan.App.2d 896, 955 P.2d 141, 148 (1998) ("The Kansas appellate courts have repeatedly held that even if some form of immunity shields a nonparty from liability, the jury may under [the Kansas apportionment statute] still consider the immune persons's fault."); DeBenedetto v. CLD Consulting Engineers, 153 N.H. 793, 903 A.2d 969, 981(I) (2006) (New Hampshire apportionment statute that requires damages to be awarded "in accordance with the proportionate fault of each of the parties" was interpreted to include "all parties contributing to the occurrence giving rise to an action, including those immune from liability or otherwise not before the court"); Pinnacle Bank v. Villa, 100 P.3d 1287, 1293 (Wyo.2004) (under Wyoming apportionment statute, a party or nonparty, "even though immune, can be included in the jury's comparative fault analysis").
2. We now turn to the particular theory of nonparty "fault" at issue in this case. To the extent that Overhead Door committed a tort as against Prickett by negligently entrusting him with a company truck, could that tort have been a proximate cause of his injuries? Ridgeway suggests that the answer is "no." Ridgeway involved a lawsuit against Victoria Ridgeway for the wrongful death of Linda Whisman, who had been killed while driving Ridgeway's car. The plaintiffs (Whisman's parents) alleged that Ridgeway had negligently entrusted Whisman with the car, and her negligent entrustment, they said, was a proximate cause of Whisman's death. The trial court denied summary judgment to Ridgeway, but the Court of Appeals reversed. In its opinion, the Court of Appeals appeared to conflate Whisman's own comparative negligence with proximate cause, finding as a matter of law that Whisman herself was negligent with respect to the events that led to her death. Apparently for that reason, the Court of Appeals held that any negligence on the part of Ridgeway could not have been a proximate cause of Whisman's death. Ridgeway, 210 Ga.App. at 170-171, 435 S.E.2d 624. That, at least, is how the majority of the Court of Appeals in this case understood Ridgeway, see Zaldivar, 328 Ga.App. at 362, 762 S.E.2d 166 (citing Ridgeway), and although Ridgeway is not perfectly clear about the connection
So understood, Ridgeway is simply wrong. Comparative negligence of the plaintiff, on the one hand, and the causal relationship between the wrongdoing of the defendant and the injury sustained by the plaintiff, on the other, are distinct questions. Comparative negligence is a defense that diminishes or bars the liability of the defendant notwithstanding that her conduct was a proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff; the defense does not necessarily eliminate the causal connection. That certainly is the case when the defendant is shown to have negligently entrusted the plaintiff with an instrumentality by which the plaintiff was injured.
For an intervening act "to become the sole proximate cause of a plaintiff's injuries, the intervening act must not have been foreseeable by [the] defendant, must not have been triggered by [the] defendant's act, and must have been sufficient by itself to cause the injury." Ontario Sewing Machine Co. v. Smith, 275 Ga. 683, 686(2), 572 S.E.2d 533 (2002) (citations and punctuation omitted). "[I]f the character of the intervening act ... was such that its probable or natural consequences could reasonably have been anticipated, apprehended, or foreseen by the original wrong-doer, the causal connection is not broken." Id. It is settled that liability for negligent entrustment is — by its very nature — based on "a negligent act of the owner in lending [an instrumentality] to another to [use], with actual knowledge that the [other] is incompetent or habitually reckless, and this negligence must concur, as a part of the proximate cause, with the negligent conduct of the [other] on account of his incompetency and recklessness." CGL Facility Mgmt. v. Wiley, 328 Ga.App. 727, 731(2)(b), 760 S.E.2d 251 (2014) (citation omitted). See also Butler v. Warren, 261 Ga.App. 375, 376(1), 582 S.E.2d 530 (2003); Smith v. Tommy Roberts Trucking Co., 209 Ga.App. 826, 830(3), 435 S.E.2d 54 (1993). Proof of the essential elements of negligent entrustment — including actual knowledge of the incompetence or recklessness of the person to whom the instrumentality in question is entrusted — necessarily proves that the negligence of the person entrusted was foreseeable to the one who entrusted that person. And that, in turn, means that the negligence of the person entrusted could not be an intervening act that would break the causal connection between the negligent entrustment and the injury sustained.
It is true that in a first-party negligent entrustment case — a case in which the plaintiff is the one who was negligently entrusted with the instrumentality in question — liability often will be cut off by the doctrine of comparative negligence. See OCGA § 51-12-33(g) ("the plaintiff shall not be entitled to receive any damages if the plaintiff is 50 percent or more responsible for the injury or damages claimed"). See also Dobbs et al., THE LAW OF TORTS § 422 (2d ed.) ("In a so-called first-party negligent-entrustment case, where the negligent entrustee herself is the plaintiff, principles of contributory or comparative negligence generally apply."); 57A AmJur2d Negligence § 313 ("[G]enerally an entrustee may bring an action to recover for physical harm to himself or herself resulting from a negligent entrustment.... However, such an action may be subject to the defenses of comparative negligence or contributory negligence." (Citations omitted)). And sometimes, the plaintiff's negligence may be so plain and indisputable that it can be found to cut off liability as a matter of law. See Lundy v. Stuhr, 185 Ga.App. 72, 75, 363 S.E.2d 343 (1987). But comparative negligence is an affirmative defense that does not eliminate altogether the "fault" of the tortfeasor, and first-party negligent entrustment actions do not always fail as a matter of law.
Indeed, as then-Judge Benham explained for the Court of Appeals in Pitts v. Ivester, 171 Ga.App. 312, 313(1), 320 S.E.2d 226 (1984), our law of negligent entrustment is consistent with the rule recognized in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 390:
(Emphasis supplied). A comment to this section of the Restatement identifies some circumstances in which a viable first-party negligent entrustment action may lie:
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 390, comment c.
In this case, the majority of the Court of Appeals relied on Ridgeway and concluded that, as a matter of law, any "fault" on the part of Overhead Door could not have "contributed to" the injuries allegedly sustained by Prickett because his own negligence necessarily would cut off the causal connection between his injuries and any negligent entrustment by Overhead Door. As we have explained, that conclusion rests on an improper conflation of proximate cause and the affirmative defense of comparative negligence. If Prickett had sued Overhead Door for negligent entrustment, he might well have lost as a result of comparative negligence that equals or exceeds that of Overhead Door, or as a result of some other affirmative defense (such as the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act). But an affirmative defense or immunity does not eliminate "fault" or cut off proximate cause, it only bars liability notwithstanding that the "fault" of the tortfeasor was a proximate cause of the injury in question. To the extent that Zaldivar can prove that Overhead Door breached a legal duty in tort that it owed Prickett, the breach of which is a proximate cause of the injury that Prickett sustained, the trier of fact in this case may be permitted under OCGA § 51-12-33(c) to assign "fault" to Overhead Door. Because the Court of Appeals concluded otherwise, its judgment must be reversed.
Judgment reversed.
All the Justices concur, except BENHAM, J., who dissents.
BENHAM, J., dissenting.
I write because I respectfully disagree with the majority opinion.
In a typical negligent entrustment case involving an automobile accident, the tortfeasor-defendant is the employee and the plaintiff is seeking damages from the employer and/or the employee. See Butler v. Warren, 261 Ga.App. 375, 582 S.E.2d 530 (2003). The
Prickett's employer will never be liable in tort for any injuries sustained by Prickett because of the workers' compensation statute which bars such actions. See OCGA § 34-9-11. Georgia's apportionment statute does not allow a defendant tortfeasor to apportion its damages vis-a-vis the plaintiff's immune employer. Specifically, OCGA § 51-12-33(b) allows for the apportionment of damages "among the persons who are liable according to the percentage of fault of each person." (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 51-12-33(c) goes on to provide that:
In order to reach its conclusion that the fault of Prickett's employer may be considered by the jury, the majority opinion reads subsection (c) to the exclusion of subsection (b), ignoring the language that apportionment of damages is to be among "persons who are liable" according to their percentage of fault. This goes against one of the most basic rules of statutory construction that statutes, including subsections therein, are to be read in pari materia to each other. See Chase v. State, 285 Ga. 693, 699, 681 S.E.2d 116 (2009) (Carley, J., dissenting); City of LaGrange v. Georgia Public Service Commission, 296 Ga.App. 615(2), 675 S.E.2d 525 (2009). The apportionment of damages to an employer without liability is simply not allowed under a plain reading of the statute.
Indeed, in Couch v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., 291 Ga. 359, 365, 729 S.E.2d 378 (2012), the majority of the Court stated that the "[t]he purpose of the apportionment statute is to have the jury consider all of the tortfeasors who may be liable to the plaintiff together, so their respective responsibilities for the harm can be determined." (Emphasis supplied.) The Court also explained that the statutory scheme works by "tak[ing] the total amount of damages to be awarded to the plaintiff, identify[ing] the persons who are liable, and apportion[ing] the damages to each liable person according to each person's percentage of fault." (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 361, 729 S.E.2d 378. Therefore, because the Overhead Door Company is not liable and can never be liable in tort for Prickett's injuries, the jury cannot consider the comparative fault of the Overhead Door Company for the purpose of limiting Zaldivar's damages. See Troup v. Fischer Steel Corporation, 236 S.W.3d 143, 146-149 (Tenn. 2007) (comparative fault of employer could not be considered in employee's tort action against third-party defendant where workers' compensation law precluded employer's liability in tort); Brodsky v. Grinnell Haulers, Inc., 181 N.J. 102, 115, 853 A.2d 940 (2004) (jury could not assign fault to employer in employee's suit against third-party tortfeasor no matter the comparative negligence as between the employer and third-party); Reynolds v. United States, 280 Mont. 191, 929 P.2d 844 (1996) (immune employer could not be apportioned liability or negligence as non-party); Ridings v. Ralph M. Parsons Company, 914 S.W.2d 79, 81-82 (Tenn.1996) (fault cannot be attributed to the plaintiff's employer as attribution of fault is limited to those who can be held liable for the plaintiff's damages); Varela v. American Petrofina Co. of Texas, Inc., 658 S.W.2d 561 (Tex.1983) (negligence of employer could not be considered for the purpose of reducing the damages in employee's action against third-party tortfeasor); Hamme v. Dreis & Krump Manufacturing Company, 716 F.2d 152 (3rd Cir.1982) (Pennsylvania law does not allow the consideration of an employer's negligence
Accordingly, for the reasons outlined in this dissent, I would affirm the judgments of the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
The dissent also points to a number of decisions from other jurisdictions, but those decisions are not persuasive with respect to the meaning of the Georgia apportionment statute. Some of these foreign cases are from jurisdictions without statutory authority for the assignment of fault to nonparties. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52 (Tenn.1992) (adopting comparative negligence in Tennessee by judicial decision, not statute); Plumb v. Fourth Judicial Dist. Ct., 279 Mont. 363, 927 P.2d 1011, 1019-1021 (1996) (statute permitting assignment of fault to nonparties was unconstitutional). The other foreign cases upon which the dissent relies involve contribution schemes, in which a joint tortfeasor not sued by the plaintiff can be made to contribute to any judgment against those tortfeasors who were sued by the plaintiff. See Brodsky v. Grinnell Haulers, Inc., 181 N.J. 102, 853 A.2d 940, 945-947(II)(B) (2004); Varela v. American Petrofina Co. of Texas, 658 S.W.2d 561, 562 (Tex.1983); Hamme v. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co., 716 F.2d 152, 154 (3rd Cir.1982). Georgia, of course, has abolished contribution from joint tortfeasors, see OCGA § 51-12-33(b), and the apportionment statute makes clear that an assignment of fault to a nonparty does not subject that nonparty to any liability, whether for contribution or otherwise. See OCGA § 51-12-33(f)(2).
