Wilder, J.

In this action to quiet title to a condominium unit, plaintiff, Trademark Properties of Michigan, LLC, appeals as of right an order granting summary disposition in favor of defendants, Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), and Bank of America (BOA). We reverse.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 16, 2003, Earl F. Strickfaden obtained a mortgage loan from GMAC Mortgage Corporation. MERS was the mortgagee under the security instrument (the MERS mortgage). The lender's interest was subsequently transferred to MERS. Strickfaden defaulted on his obligation. The MERS mortgage was foreclosed by advertisement and Fannie Mae purchased the property at a sheriff's sale on May 11, 2010. The sheriff's deed was recorded with the register of deeds on May 20, 2010. It is undisputed that the property was never redeemed. The MERS mortgage was extinguished.1

On December 6, 2010, the association where the condominium unit was located, Manor Homes of Troy Association (MHTA), filed a notice of lien for non-payment of condominium assessments. The lien was not satisfied and MHTA foreclosed by advertisement. On February 15, 2011, plaintiff purchased the property at a sheriff's sale for $6,761.45, and then recorded the sheriff's deed with the register of deeds on February 22, 2011. The last day to redeem the property was August 15, 2011.

On August 9, 2011, before the redemption period for the MHTA foreclosure expired, an attorney for GMAC Mortgage Corporation, the lender for the MERS mortgage, recorded an affidavit purporting to expunge the May 11, 2010 sheriff's sale to Fannie Mae. The affiant averred that, by virtue of this Court's decision in an unrelated case, Residential Funding Co., LLC v. Saurman, 292 Mich.App. 321, 807 N.W.2d 412 (2011) (Saurman I), the May 11, 2010 sheriff's deed was void ab initio, thereby leaving the MERS mortgage in full force and effect.2

Plaintiff thereafter filed this action to quiet title to the property, alleging that the MERS affidavit could not effectively revive the previously extinguished MERS mortgage and thereby invalidate plaintiff's interest in the property. The parties filed cross-motions for summary disposition. On October 31, 2012, the trial court denied plaintiff's motion and granted summary disposition in favor of defendants under MCR 2.116(C)(10). The trial court reasoned that, by filing the affidavit before the redemption period for the MHTA foreclosure had expired, the MERS foreclosure was expunged and MERS's interest was superior to plaintiff's interest. The trial court also ruled that plaintiff failed to establish it was a bona fide purchaser, reasoning that plaintiff had notice because the affidavit was filed before the redemption period ended and plaintiff had failed to pay sufficient value. Plaintiff appealed this order.

II. ANALYSIS

A. STANDING

As an initial matter, plaintiff contends that defendants lack standing to assert an interest in the property. We disagree. Whether a party has standing presents a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. Manuel v. Gill, 481 Mich. 637, 642, 753 N.W.2d 48 (2008). "The purpose of the standing doctrine is to assess whether a litigant's interest in the issue is sufficient to `ensure sincere and vigorous advocacy.'" Lansing Sch. Ed. Ass'n v. Lansing Bd. of Ed., 487 Mich. 349, 355, 792 N.W.2d 686 (2010), quoting Detroit Fire Fighters Ass'n v. Detroit, 449 Mich. 629, 633, 537 N.W.2d 436 (1995). That is, the objective of the standing requirement is to ensure that "only those who have a substantial interest" will be allowed to come in to court to complain. White Lake Improvement Ass'n v. City of Whitehall, 22 Mich.App. 262, 273, 177 N.W.2d 473 (1970). When a party's standing is challenged in a case, the question is whether that person is a proper party to request adjudication of the issue, not whether the issue is justiciable. Lansing Sch., 487 Mich. at 355, 792 N.W.2d 686; White Lake Improvement Ass'n, 22 Mich. App. at 273 n. 13, 177 N.W.2d 473. "Standing in no way depends on the merits of the case." Rogan v. Morton, 167 Mich.App. 483, 486, 423 N.W.2d 237 (1988); see also Lansing Sch., 487 Mich. at 357, 792 N.W.2d 686. When a cause of action exists under law, or when the Legislature has expressly conferred standing, those circumstances are sufficient to establish standing. Lansing Sch., 487 Mich. at 357, 792 N.W.2d 686.

In Lansing Sch., 487 Mich. at 372, 792 N.W.2d 686, our Supreme Court delineated the following approach to determine whether a litigant has standing:

MCL 600.2932(1) reflects the Legislature's intent to confer standing on individuals claiming an interest in real property. The statute authorizes "suits to determine competing parties' respective interests in land[.]" Republic Bank v. Modular One LLC, 232 Mich.App. 444, 448, 591 N.W.2d 335 (1998), overruled in part on other grounds in Stokes v. Millen Roofing Co., 466 Mich. 660, 649 N.W.2d 371 (2002). This litigation involves an action to quiet title filed by plaintiff because the parties dispute their respective interests in the condominium unit. Plaintiff's assertion that defendants cannot establish a superior interest in the property is premised on the merits of the litigation. Whether a party can succeed on the merits of the substantive claim is not the appropriate inquiry when reviewing standing. Lansing Sch., 487 Mich. at 357, 359, 792 N.W.2d 686. Accordingly, we reject plaintiff's argument regarding standing.

B. EFFECT OF THE MERS AFFIDAVIT

Plaintiff maintains its claim to the property was superior to any claim of defendants, and contends that the trial court erred by ruling that the MERS affidavit expunged the prior sheriff's sale to Fannie Mae and revived the previously extinguished MERS mortgage. We agree.

Questions of law, actions to quiet title in equity, as well as decisions to grant or deny summary disposition, are reviewed de novo. Ter Beek v. City of Wyoming, 495 Mich. 1, 8, 846 N.W.2d 531 (2014); Book-Gilbert v. Greenleaf, 302 Mich.App. 538, 542, 840 N.W.2d 743 (2013); Beach v. Lima Twp., 489 Mich. 99, 106, 802 N.W.2d 1 (2011). Summary disposition is proper under MCR 2.116(C)(10) when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment or partial judgment as a matter of law." "[T]he plaintiff in a quiet-title action has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of title, [but] summary disposition in favor of the defendant is properly entered if the plaintiff fails to carry this burden." Special Prop. VI LLC v. Woodruff, 273 Mich.App. 586, 590, 730 N.W.2d 753 (2007) (citations omitted).

Foreclosure of a mortgage containing a power of sale is permissible by advertisement, provided the proceedings are instituted in accordance with the foreclosure statutes. See Masella v. Bisson, 359 Mich. 512, 515, 102 N.W.2d 468 (1960). "A foreclosure of a mortgage extinguishes it.... [A]nd the purchaser becomes the owner of an equitable interest in the mortgaged premises which ripens into a legal title if not defeated by redemption as provided by law." Dunitz v. Woodford Apartments Co., 236 Mich. 45, 49, 209 N.W. 809 (1926); see also Senters v. Ottawa Savings Bank, FSB, 443 Mich. 45, 50, 503 N.W.2d 639 (1993), and MCL 600.3236. "Statutory foreclosures should not be set aside without some very good reasons therefor." Markoff v. Tournier, 229 Mich. 571, 575, 201 N.W. 888 (1925). A "strong case of fraud," irregularity, or "some peculiar exigency" is required to set aside a statutory foreclosure sale. Kubicki v. Mtg. Electronic Registration Sys., 292 Mich.App. 287, 289, 807 N.W.2d 433 (2011) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

It is undisputed that the MERS mortgage was foreclosed by advertisement, that Fannie Mae purchased the property at a foreclosure sale and received a sheriff's deed for the property, and that the property was never redeemed. The foreclosure extinguished the MERS mortgage and, because the property was not redeemed, all right, title, and interest in the property vested in Fannie Mae. Dunitz, 236 Mich. at 49-50, 209 N.W. 809; MCL 600.3236. Afterward, plaintiff purchased and recorded Fannie Mae's interest in the property. Months later, in an affidavit recorded under MCL 565.451a, MERS claimed the foreclosure by advertisement of its mortgage interest was void ab initio following Saurman I. MCL 565.451a, in part, provides:

MERS claims that the mere filing of an affidavit by a mortgagee attesting that a foreclosure sale was void ab initio establishes the mortgagee's interest in the foreclosed property. But we need not decide the effect of the filing of an affidavit when a foreclosure sale was void ab initio because, here, the foreclosure sale was not void.3

Again, in attesting that the foreclosure sale was void ab initio, MERS's affidavit relied on this Court's decision in Saurman I, 292 Mich.App. 321, 807 N.W.2d 412. In Saurman I, the defendants purchased and obtained financing for their respective properties from a financial institution. The mortgage instruments designated MERS as the mortgagee. Id. at 325-326, 807 N.W.2d 412. This Court held that MERS, because it was a mortgagee but not a noteholder, had no interest in the indebtedness secured by the mortgage under the foreclosure-by-advertisement requirements in MCL 600.3204(1)(d) and, therefore, MERS could not exercise a contractual right to foreclose by advertisement. Id. at 329-332, 807 N.W.2d 412. Because MERS lacked the ability to comply with the statutory requirements for foreclosure by advertisement, the foreclosure proceedings were void ab initio. Id. at 342, 807 N.W.2d 412. Just as in Saurman I, in this case MERS was a mortgagee but not a noteholder and would have had no interest in the indebtedness under this Court's decision in that case. This Court's decision in Saurman I was shortlived, however. On November 16, 2011, our Supreme Court reversed this Court's Saurman I decision and held that MERS's ownership of a security lien on the properties constituted an interest in the indebtedness that authorized it to foreclose by advertisement. Saurman II, 490 Mich. 909, 805 N.W.2d 183.

Even if the filing of the affidavit regarding Saurman I had some effect on the interest in the property here, plaintiff promptly filed the quiet title action to challenge that affidavit. "[T]he purpose of an action to quiet title is to determine the existing title to property by removing any cloud therefrom." Ingle v. Musgrave, 159 Mich.App. 356, 365, 406 N.W.2d 492 (1987). When the trial court resolved cross-motions for summary disposition, plaintiff presented a prima facie case of title based on the MHTA foreclosure and plaintiff's purchase at the sheriff's sale for $6,761.45. The sole basis for MERS's assertion of a continued mortgage interest in the property — that the MERS foreclosure sale was void ab initio under this Court's decision in Saurman I — was no longer sustainable because our Supreme Court had reversed that decision nearly a year before. A trial court is bound by the doctrine of stare decisis to follow the decisions of our Supreme Court. See Guerra v. Garrott, 222 Mich.App. 285, 293, 564 N.W.2d 121 (1997): Our Supreme Court's decision in Saurman II compelled the trial court to conclude that there was no question of fact that the MERS mortgage had been extinguished and plaintiff had the superior interest in the property.4 Thus, the trial court erred by ruling that the MERS affidavit was effective in reviving the MERS mortgage and in ruling that plaintiff's interest in the property was subordinate to the revived mortgage interest.

C. NOTICE

We reject Fannie Mae's alternative argument for affirmance of summary disposition in its favor. Fannie Mae asserts that the foreclosure by advertisement proceeding commenced by MHTA to foreclose on its lien for unpaid condominium assessments was invalid because MHTA did not provide notice of the lien in accordance with MCL 559.208(3)(c), or because MHTA did not properly calculate the amount of the lien. MCL 559.208 governs foreclosure of condominium assessment liens and provides, in relevant part:

Although Fannie Mae asserts that it did not receive "actual notice" of the MHTA lien, the statute does not require a showing of actual notice, but instead provides that notice must be sent by first-class mail "to the last known address of the co-owner at least 10 days in advance of commencement of the foreclosure proceeding." The MHTA complied with this requirement by sending notice of the lien to the address listed in the sheriff's deed that was issued to Fannie Mae. Smith v. Cliffs on the Bay Condo. Ass'n, 463 Mich. 420, 429, 617 N.W.2d 536 (2000).5

Fannie Mae's contention that the amount of the lien was improperly calculated is based on its position that it could not be held responsible for any condominium assessments that arose after it was issued the sheriff's deed, but before the redemption period expired. Given this Court's recent decision rejecting the same argument in Wells Fargo Bank v. Country Place Condo. Ass'n, 304 Mich.App. 582, 590-594, 848 N.W.2d 425 (2014) (holding that a purchaser at a foreclosure sale is liable for assessments arising after issuance of the sheriff's deed), this claim of error fails.

In light of our decision, it is unnecessary to address plaintiff's remaining issues on appeal.

Reversed. Plaintiff, as the prevailing party on appeal, may tax costs pursuant to MCR 7.219.

HOEKSTRA, P.J., and FORT HOOD, J., concurred with WILDER, J.