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CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION vs BEN C. CRAMER, 09-003530PL (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Blountstown, Florida Jul. 02, 2009 Number: 09-003530PL Latest Update: Oct. 22, 2009

The Issue Whether the Respondent committed the offenses alleged in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty?

Findings Of Fact At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent was certified as a correctional officer, having been issued Correctional Certificate Number 276769. On or about July 3, 2008, Respondent was driving his vehicle on State Road 20 in Calhoun County. Trooper Philip Spaziante of the Florida Highway Patrol observed Respondent speeding and conducted a traffic stop of Respondent’s vehicle. After Respondent pulled to the side of the road and stopped, Trooper Spaziante explained to Respondent why he had stopped him. As he spoke to Respondent, he noticed that Respondent appeared to be exceptionally nervous. Respondent told Trooper Spaziante that he was on his way to Port St. Joe to spend the weekend at the beach. Trooper Spaziante then asked Respondent if he would consent to a search of his vehicle. Respondent consented to the search. Trooper Spaziante found a purple cloth “Crown Royal” bag in the driver’s side door of Respondent’s vehicle. Trooper Spaziante found a small quantity, less than 20 grams, of cannabis (marijuana) inside a Skoal (chewing tobacco) container which was inside the Crown Royal bag. Trooper Spaziante is trained in the recognition of the smell of burnt cannabis. During his nine years as a State Trooper, he has encountered cannabis many times, during traffic stops in particular. Based upon his experience, Trooper Spaziante was able to identify the substance in the Skoal can as cannabis. Trooper Spaziante then placed Respondent under arrest for possession of a controlled substance. After finding the marijuana, Trooper Spaziante contacted Deputy William Dalton of the Calhoun County Sheriff’s Office and requested that he come to the scene and assist. After Deputy Dalton arrived, the two officers continued the search of Respondent’s vehicle. Deputy Dalton is a police canine handler. Deputy Dalton is also trained in recognition of cannabis and cannabis paraphernalia. He is the handler for Gina, a K-9 dog certified in narcotics investigation by the American Canine Police Association. Deputy Dalton deployed Gina to conduct an exterior “sniff” of Respondent’s vehicle. Gina "alerted" as a result of her sniff of Respondent’s vehicle, indicating that narcotics were in the vehicle. Deputy Dalton then continued to search Respondent’s vehicle. The officers found a marijuana “blunt,” which is a cigar with some of the tobacco removed and replaced with marijuana. Trooper Spaziante observed some loose tobacco that appeared to have been removed from the cigar. The officers found a duffle bag in the back seat of the vehicle. The Respondent told the officers that the bag was his and that it contained clothing and personal items for his trip to Port St. Joe. Deputy Dalton took the duffle bag out of the vehicle where Gina “alerted” as a result of her sniff of Respondent’s duffle bag. Deputy Dalton then searched the duffle bag. Inside the duffle bag was a small smoking pipe commonly used to smoke marijuana. Deputy Dalton also observed marijuana residue in the bowl of the pipe. Respondent stated that he had forgotten that the pipe was in the duffle, and that it had been in there a long time. Respondent was arrested and charged with possession of less than 20 grams of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Criminal Justice Standards Commission enter a final order revoking the corrections certificate of Respondent, Ben C. Cramer. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of October, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of October, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph S. White, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Ben C. Cramer Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Crews, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302

Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57893.13893.147943.13943.1395 Florida Administrative Code (3) 11B-27.001111B-27.00411B-27.005
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PALM BEACH COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD vs LESLIE BUTLER, 98-004649 (1998)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Oct. 20, 1998 Number: 98-004649 Latest Update: Nov. 08, 1999

The Issue Whether Petitioner has cause to terminate the Respondent's employment as alleged in the Administrative Complaint dated October 20, 1998.

Findings Of Fact On August 14, 1998, Respondent, a teacher employed by Petitioner, entered a plea of guilty to the charge of exploitation of an elderly person, which is a first degree felony pursuant to Section 825.103, Florida Statutes. At the same time, Respondent also entered a plea of guilty to the charge of petit theft over $100.00, which is a first degree misdemeanor. In entering these pleas, Respondent advised the court, pursuant to Rule 3.172(d), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, that she believed the pleas were in her best interest and that she was maintaining her innocence to the charges. The court withheld adjudication of guilt as to the charge of exploitation of an elderly person, adjudicated her guilty of petit theft, sentenced her to one day of time served, placed her on probation for 20 years, and required that she pay restitution to the Estate of Lillie Keller in the amount of $52,000.00. 1/ By letter dated October 21, 1997, Petitioner reassigned Respondent to a position with no direct contact with children pending the outcome of the criminal charges. Following an investigation, the superintendent of schools recommended to the school board that Respondent's employment be suspended without pay and terminated. On October 7, 1998, the school board voted to adopt that recommendation. The recommendation and the subsequent vote to adopt the recommendation were based on Respondent's plea of guilty to the charge of exploitation of an elderly person. Petitioner followed its procedural rules in investigating this matter and in voting to terminate Respondent's employment. As of October 7, 1998, Respondent held a professional services contract and had been employed by Petitioner for approximately 13 years as a teacher. Section 231.02(1), Florida Statutes, requires school board employees to be of good moral character. Respondent, as a teacher, is required by Section 231.02(2), Florida Statutes, to be fingerprinted and screened by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. Section 435.03(2), Florida Statutes, provides, in pertinent part, as follows: (2) Any person for whom employment screening is required by statute must not have been found guilty of, regardless of adjudication, or entered a plea of nolo contendere or guilty to, any offense prohibited under any of the following provisions of the Florida Statutes or under any similar statute of another jurisdiction: * * * (v) Section 825.103, relating to exploitation of an elderly person or disabled adult, if the offense was a felony. Petitioner's Rule 3.12, pertaining to criminal background checks of current and prospective employees, has been duly enacted and provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Definitions: For the purposes of this policy: * * * b. "Conviction" means a determination of guilt that is the result of a plea or a trial regardless of whether adjudication is withheld. * * * 3. A prospective or current employee may be disqualified or may be terminated from continued employment if the prospective or current employee has been convicted of a crime classified as a felony or first degree misdemeanor directly related to the position of employment sought or convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude or any of the offenses enumerated in Chapter 435, Florida Statutes. Section M of the collective bargaining agreement between the Petitioner and the Palm Beach County Classroom Teachers' Association provides for progressive discipline of covered employees such as Respondent. Section M provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Without the consent of the employee and the Association, disciplinary action may not be taken against an employee except for just cause, and this must be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence which supports the recommended disciplinary action. * * * 7. Except in cases which clearly constitute a real and immediate danger to the District or the actions/inactions of the employee constitute such clearly flagrant and purposeful violations of reasonable school rules and regulations, progressive discipline shall be administered as follows: Verbal Reprimand With a Written Notation. . . . Written Reprimand. . . . Suspension Without Pay. A suspension without pay may be issued to an employee when appropriate, in keeping with the provisions of this Section, including just cause and applicable law. ... Dismissal. An employee may be dismissed (employment contract terminated or non-renewed) when appropriate in keeping with provisions of this Section, including just cause and applicable law. Section 435.06(2), Florida Statutes, requires an employing agency, such as the Petitioner, to take the following action when an employee has failed to meet the requirements of Section 435.03(2), Florida Statutes: The employer must either terminate the employment of any of its personnel found to be in noncompliance with the minimum standards for good moral character contained in this section or place the employee in a position for which background screening is not required unless the employee is granted an exemption from disqualification pursuant to s. 435.07. 2/

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order that terminates Respondent's employment based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained herein. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of August, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of August, 1999.

Florida Laws (6) 120.57435.03435.06435.07825.103942.04 Florida Administrative Code (2) 6B-1.0016b-4.009
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DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION vs LORI A. DEFISHER, 97-002451 (1997)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Panama City, Florida May 21, 1997 Number: 97-002451 Latest Update: Feb. 24, 1998

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent is guilty of introducing or possessing contraband on the grounds of a state correctional institution, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner certified Respondent as a correctional officer on October 24, 1995. Respondent holds correctional certificate number 159550. At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent was employed as a correctional officer at the Bay Correctional Facility, a state correctional institution. During her employment, Respondent had contact with Zachary Richards, an inmate at Bay Correctional Facility. On August 23, 1996, Captain Ronnie Holland spoke to Inmate Richards regarding a complaint that Inmate Richards had made disrespectful remarks about an official. In order to avoid a disciplinary report for disrespecting the official, Inmate Richards gave Captain Holland a brown paper bag on which a personal letter had been written. Inmate Richards indicated that Respondent wrote the personal letter and gave it to him. Captain Holland gave the brown paper bag to Inspector Chris Hubbard along with his report. Inspector Hubbard interviewed Inmate Richards who claimed that he and Respondent had been writing letters to each other for some time. Inmate Richards signed a sworn affidavit in support of his claim that he received the letter written on the brown paper bag from Respondent. Inspector Hubbard interviewed Respondent who denied any knowledge concerning the letter on the brown paper bag. Inspector Hubbard obtained Respondent's known handwriting samples from the portion of the master control log which she maintained during her employment. He submitted these samples along with the brown paper bag to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement laboratory for comparison. Donald G. Pribbenow is a forensic document examiner employed by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement at the Pensacola Regional Crime Laboratory. He is an expert with 17 and 1/2 years of experience in comparing handwriting samples to determine their authorship. Mr. Pribbenow examined the writing on the brown paper bag and compared it to Respondent's known handwriting samples. Mr. Pribbenow determined that the person who wrote the submitted known writings was the same person who wrote the questioned writing on the brown paper bag. The result of Mr. Pribbenow's examination is persuasive evidence that Respondent wrote the letter to Inmate Richards on the brown paper bag. On September 16, 1996, Respondent was terminated from Bay Correctional Facility for being involved in an improper relationship.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that Petitioner enter a Final Order suspending Respondent's certification as a correctional officer for a period not to exceed two years. RECOMMENDED this 31st day of December, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of December, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: A. Leon Lowry, II, Director Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Karen D. Simmons, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Lori DeFisher 4123 West 21st Street Panama City, Florida 32405

Florida Laws (4) 120.57943.13943.1395944.47 Florida Administrative Code (2) 11B-27.001111B-27.005
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RANDALL B. JOHNSON vs DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 15-001803F (2015)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Apr. 02, 2015 Number: 15-001803F Latest Update: Nov. 30, 2016

The Issue Whether pursuant to section 120.595, Florida Statutes (2015),1/ Petitioner, Randall B. Johnson (Johnson), should be awarded reasonable costs and attorney’s fees incurred in defense of an administrative proceeding initiated by Respondent.

Findings Of Fact The procedural history of the underlying action is set forth in the PERC Order, and includes a majority of the relevant facts, which are not in dispute. Findings of Fact 2 through 9 below are taken directly from the PERC Order. On September 19, 2014, the Department of Corrections (Agency) dismissed Randall B. Johnson pursuant to the extraordinary dismissal procedure in section 110.227(5)(b), Florida Statutes. The final action letter (September 19 Letter) alleged that, four years earlier, on or about September 19, 2010, Johnson inappropriately participated in a use of force incident that resulted in the death of an inmate. Johnson was also informed that a copy of the investigation upon which the charge was based would be available when it was completed. On September 24, 2014, Franklin Correctional Institution Warden, Christopher G. Atkins, contacted Johnson and informed him that the September 19 Letter was inaccurate and the Agency needed to send him a corrected final action letter (September 24 Letter). Atkins did not read the letter to Johnson or tell him the substance of the allegations against him. The amended final action letter was sent to Johnson by certified mail. On September 29, 2014, Johnson filed an appeal with the Commission challenging his dismissal, based on the September 19 Letter. Johnson stated in his appeal: "I was not involved in a use of force incident that resulted in the death of an inmate, as I was not working on September 19, 2010." A hearing officer was appointed and a hearing was scheduled. On October 1, 2014, the Agency filed a Notice of Corrected Final Action Letter with the Commission asserting "that due to a clerical error, certain information contained in the letter issued to the Employee on September 19, 2014, was incorrect . . . ." The amended final action letter, dated September 24, 2014, deleted the factual allegations from the September 19 Letter and substituted the following: Specifically, on or about June 6, 2013, the Office of the Inspector General received information alleging improper conduct of some of its officers. Further investigation into the allegation revealed that you submitted an inaccurate or untruthful report, introduced contraband into Franklin Correctional Institution, and engaged in an unprofessional relationship with former inmate and current supervised offender, Luke Gruver/U01117. The basis for these charges is contained in an on-going investigation by the Inspector General's Office, Case Number 13-7092; copy available upon completion. On October 6, 2014, Johnson filed a motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings and a motion for attorney's fees and costs. On October 22, 2014, the hearing officer issued an order which, among other things, denied the motions filed by Johnson on October 6, 2014. On October 28, 2014, Johnson filed a motion to dismiss and motion for attorney's fees. This pleading was followed on November 4, 2014, by an amended motion to dismiss and motion for attorney's fees. A hearing on Johnson's motions was held on February 2, 2015. On February 4, 2015, the hearing officer issued an order concluding that the September 24 Letter was vague and that Johnson was prejudiced in his ability to defend himself by its vagueness. Therefore, he denied the Agency's attempt to amend the September 19 Letter with the September 24 Letter. The hearing officer also determined that the September 19 Letter was sufficiently detailed to provide Johnson with notice of the charges against him. The Agency was directed to respond and state whether it intended to proceed to a hearing on the allegations in the September 19 Letter. Finally, the hearing officer deferred ruling on whether the Agency violated section 112.532(6), Florida Statutes, the Law Enforcement Officers' and Correctional Officers' Bill of Rights, and whether Johnson was entitled to an award of attorney's fees pursuant to section 120.595. On February 11, 2015, the Agency filed a notice with the Commission that it was rescinding the September 19 Letter, marking it void, and reinstating Johnson on February 13, 2015, to the position of correctional officer at Franklin Correctional Institution. The Agency also requested that the Commission schedule a back-pay hearing. On February 13, 2015, Johnson filed an objection to the Agency's request for a back-pay hearing and renewed his request for an award of attorney's fees and costs. On February 17, 2015, the hearing officer issued his recommended order concluding that Johnson was entitled to reinstatement, back pay, and other benefits, as well as interest at the lawful rate, commencing on September 19, 2014. He also determined that the Commission did not have jurisdiction to consider the issue of attorney's fees pursuant to section 120.595, because that statute only authorizes fee awards to be made by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). However, he recommended two alternative methods for the attorney's fees issue to be referred to an ALJ at DOAH. On February 25, 2015, Johnson filed five exceptions to the recommended order. A transcript of the February 2, 2015, motion hearing was filed. In one of his exceptions to the recommended order, Johnson challenged the hearing officer’s conclusion that PERC does not have jurisdiction to award attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to section 120.595, because such a determination can only be made by an ALJ. The PERC Order sustained the hearing officer’s conclusion that PERC does not have the authority to consider an attorney’s fees request made pursuant to section 120.595. It also adopted the hearing officer’s recommendation that the request for attorney’s fees and costs be referred to DOAH for consideration by an ALJ. Accordingly, the PERC Order “shall serve as the Commission’s referral to DOAH of Johnson’s request for attorney’s fees and costs from the Agency pursuant to Section 120.595, Florida Statutes.” The Notice of Corrected Final Action Letter filed by DOC with PERC dated October 1, 2014, sought to replace the September 19 Letter with the September 24 Letter. The Corrected Final Action Letter stated DOC was filing a “corrected final action” necessitated by a “clerical error.” In fact, the September 24 Letter does not correct clerical errors but rather makes completely different factual allegations and charges against Johnson and references the date of the incident (or incidents) as 2013. The extensive procedural history of this case, which includes a recitation of all the pleadings filed by the parties and the arguments therein, is set forth in the Commission’s Order Vacating Agency Action and Referring Attorney’s Fees Petition to DOAH. As noted, the PERC Order refers this case to DOAH for consideration of the issue of attorney’s fees and costs. All pleadings filed by Johnson in both the disciplinary case and the back-pay case before PERC were prepared and filed on his behalf by the law firm of Flury & Atkins. The billing statements admitted into evidence during the DOAH proceeding reflect the time spent by counsel researching and drafting motions and proposed orders in the discipline and back-pay cases, as well as the time spent reviewing the pleadings of the Agency, and the orders of the PERC hearing officer. Attorney Elizabeth Willis, a former PERC hearing officer, testified that the issues presented in Johnson’s cases before PERC were unique and difficult. Ms. Willis testified she reviewed the pleadings and orders of the underlying cases before PERC, as well as the Billing Statement of Flury & Atkins, LLC. Based upon her review and her knowledge of PERC proceedings and the law in this area, she concluded the hours expended by counsel and the hourly rates charged were reasonable. While DOC asserted in its Proposed Recommended Order that the amount of attorney’s fees and costs being sought by Johnson is excessive, it presented no evidence to support its contention. Rather, the unrebutted evidence of record established that the reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred by Johnson in the proceedings before PERC was $12,431.00.

Florida Laws (6) 110.227112.532120.569120.57120.595120.68
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF PHARMACY vs ARLENE VERIZZO, R.PH., 03-004781PL (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Sarasota, Florida Dec. 22, 2003 Number: 03-004781PL Latest Update: Sep. 28, 2024
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ALVIE EDWARDS vs DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, 95-005041 (1995)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:St. Petersburg, Florida Oct. 12, 1995 Number: 95-005041 Latest Update: Jul. 29, 1996

Findings Of Fact On or about October 1, 1990, in Case No. 90-233 CF, pending in the Circuit Court, Fifth Judicial Circuit, in and for Sumter County, Florida, the Petitioner pled nolo contendere to: one count of aggravated battery with a deadly weapon, a second degree felony under Section 784.045(1)(a)2., Florida Statutes; one count of battery on a law enforcement officer, a second degree felony under Section 784.07, Florida Statutes; and one count of resisting arrest with violence, a third degree felony under Section 843.01, Florida Statutes. On the same day, the Petitioner also was adjudicated guilty on all three charges. Sentence was withheld, and the Petitioner was placed in an adult community control program for two years subject to certain conditions. The Petitioner's nolo plea was entered notwithstanding a June 26, 1990, "No Information" filed in the case stating that the State Attorney's Office had taken testimony under oath at a State Attorney's investigation and that the facts and circumstances revealed did not warrant prosecution at the time. On July 28, 1991, the Petitioner was arrested for alleged spouse battery. As a result, the Petitioner was arrested and charged with violation of his community control conditions. On September 19, 1991, a "No Information" was filed in the battery case stating that the State Attorney's Office had taken testimony under oath at a State Attorney's investigation and that the facts and circumstances revealed did not warrant prosecution at the time. Nonetheless, an Order of Modification of Community Control was entered on October 28, 1991, adding a condition that the Petitioner attend and successfully complete marriage/family counseling. On or about April 19, 1992, the Petitioner again was arrested for alleged spouse battery. On July 21, 1992, a "No Information" was filed in the case stating that the State Attorney's Office had taken testimony under oath at a State Attorney's investigation and that the facts and circumstances revealed did not warrant prosecution at the time. Notwithstanding the April 19, 1992, arrest, there was no evidence that the Petitioner's community control program was further modified, and the Petitioner successfully completed the two-year program, as previously modified on October 28, 1991. On April 29, 1993, the Petitioner's civil rights, other than the right to possess and carry a firearm, were restored by Executive Order of the Office of Executive Clemency of the State of Florida. On or about October 4, 1993, the Petitioner again was arrested for alleged battery. (The record is not clear as to the identity of the alleged victim.) On November 29, 1993, a "No Information" was filed in the case stating that the State Attorney's Office had taken testimony under oath at a State Attorney's investigation and that the facts and circumstances revealed did not warrant prosecution at the time. There was no evidence of any other criminal arrests or convictions after October 4, 1993. The undisputed testimony of the Petitioner and his character witnesses was that there have been none. The Petitioner and his character witnesses also testified persuasively and without contradiction that, with the passage of time, the Petitioner has rehabilitated himself and that he is now a person of high character and integrity. The Petitioner now understands the importance of avoiding the circumstances that can lead to violations of the criminal law, he appears to have learned how to avoid them, and he appears to be determined to avoid them. Meanwhile, he also has proven himself to be a responsible and caring single father for his children and has made valuable contributions to his community as an adult volunteer, especially in community children's programs. It is found that, with the passage of time, the Petitioner has rehabilitated himself and that he is now a person of high character and approved integrity so as to qualify for licensure as a limited surety agent (bail bondsman).

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Insurance and Treasurer enter a final order granting the Petitioner's application for licensure as a limited surety agent (bail bondsman). DONE and ENTERED this 4th day of June, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of June, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Alvie Edwards, pro se 1544 Bay Street Southeast St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Dickson E. Kesler, Esquire Department of Insurance and Treasurer 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Dan Sumner Acting General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300

Florida Laws (9) 112.011120.57120.68648.34648.45775.16784.07843.01943.13
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF NURSING vs HARVEY JOHNNIE PRICE, L.P.N., 08-004380PL (2008)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Gainesville, Florida Sep. 03, 2008 Number: 08-004380PL Latest Update: Sep. 28, 2024
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JAMIE CHAPMAN vs FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, 09-000646 (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Myers, Florida Feb. 09, 2009 Number: 09-000646 Latest Update: Jun. 19, 2009

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent should deny an application for a real estate sales associate license on the alleged grounds that, in violation of Subsections 475.17(1)(a), 475.181, and 475.25(1)(f), Florida Statutes (2008),1 the application discloses two felony convictions for crimes of moral turpitude, the initial application omitted a misdemeanor conviction for driving under the influence (DUI), and the applicant’s explanation in mitigation of the incidents is allegedly unpersuasive.

Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency responsible, in relevant part, for licensing real estate sales associates in the State of Florida, pursuant to Chapter 475. Petitioner applied for a real estate sales associate license on March 8, 2007, and Respondent proposes in this de novo proceeding to deny the application. Respondent states several grounds for the proposed denial of Petitioner’s application. First, the application discloses two felony convictions for crimes of moral turpitude, and the crimes would have been grounds for revoking or suspending a real estate license. Second, Petitioner omitted a DUI misdemeanor conviction from the initial application before the application was complete. Third, Respondent claims the applicant has not demonstrated honesty, truthfulness, trustworthiness, good character, and a good reputation for fair dealing. Finally, Respondent considers the applicant’s testimony in explanation or mitigation of the crime and omission in his initial application to be unpersuasive. The application discloses two felony convictions on November 23, 1993. When Petitioner was approximately 18 years old, Petitioner and three other teenagers committed aggravated battery with a deadly weapon and armed robbery against two male adults in Lee County, Florida. One of the teenagers struck each victim with a baseball bat; took articles of clothing, jewelry, wallets, and fishing rods and reels from each victim; and divided the articles among the perpetrators. Each teenager was under the influence of alcohol and controlled substances, including marijuana and other drugs. The victims required hospital treatment. The two felony convictions involve crimes of moral turpitude. The crimes exhibit inherent baseness or depravity in the private social relations or duties owed by man to man or by man to society. The two felony convictions are grounds for revoking or suspending a real estate license. On March 29, 1995, Petitioner pled nolo contendere to two counts of robbery with a deadly weapon and two counts of aggravated battery. The court adjudicated Petitioner guilty, sentenced Petitioner to 10 years’ imprisonment, to be followed by two years of probation, and ordered Petitioner to pay $1,500.00 in restitution to the victims. When the court convicted Petitioner on March 29, 1995, Petitioner was not qualified for a real estate sales associate license within the meaning of Subsection 475.17(1)(a). The statute deems that Petitioner is not qualified for a real estate sales associate license today, unless by lapse of time and subsequent good conduct and reputation or other sufficient reason, it appears the interest of the public and investors will not likely be endangered by licensing Petitioner. For reasons stated hereinafter, a preponderance of evidence shows the crimes in 1993 do not make it likely that licensing Petitioner as a real estate sales associate will endanger the public. The testimony of Petitioner in explanation and mitigation of the crimes committed in 1993 is persuasive. Petitioner did not inflict physical harm on either of the victims. Petitioner’s participation was limited to driving the vehicle, which was his mother’s car, used in the commission of the crimes and accepting a portion of the stolen property. Petitioner was intimidated by the teenager who used the baseball bat on the victims, and that teenager was under the influence of alcohol and controlled substances. When arrested, Petitioner admitted his guilt to police and cooperated fully in the investigation. When sentenced, Petitioner faced the victims in open court, admitted his guilt, accepted responsibility, and apologized to the victims and their family members. Sufficient time has lapsed for Petitioner to be rehabilitated and to overcome the statutory presumption of unfitness. Approximately 15 and 14 years have passed, respectively, from the dates of the commission and conviction of the crimes. Almost six years have passed from the successful completion of probation on June 5, 2003. Petitioner’s subsequent good conduct after 1993 demonstrates his rehabilitation. Petitioner paid the $1,500.00 in restitution ordered by the court. Petitioner was released from prison in late 1999, after serving four years and eight months of his 10-year sentence. While in prison, Petitioner took classes in drafting, anger management, and life skills. Petitioner also attended alcoholics anonymous and narcotics anonymous. Petitioner taught other inmates and read extensively. Petitioner also assisted with the development of a volley ball team for prisoners. Upon release from prison in late 1999, Petitioner moved to North Carolina for approximately two years, primarily to avoid contact with his former peer group. Petitioner worked two jobs and attended college where he continued to study drafting. In North Carolina, Petitioner was injured in an automobile accident and suffered severe head injuries. Petitioner was in a coma for nine days. After recovering from his injuries, Petitioner returned to his family in Lee County, Florida. Petitioner has been gainfully employed, self-supportive, and has been working for the past couple of years in a real estate office as an unlicensed assistant. Petitioner has earned a reputation for honesty, truthfulness, trustworthiness, and good character and has earned a good reputation for fair dealing in a relationship of trust and confidence with safety to investors. Petitioner’s girlfriend and grandmother are each licensed by Respondent as real estate brokers. Both licensees recommend Petitioner for licensure. Two disinterested licensees also recommend Petitioner for licensure.2 On February 14, 2007, Petitioner was convicted of a DUI misdemeanor. Petitioner paid the court-ordered fine and satisfactorily completed his sentence of community service and probation. A preponderance of evidence does not show that the misdemeanor conviction for DUI is a crime of moral turpitude or one that directly relates to the duties of a real estate sales associate. Respondent did not cite any legal authority to show that the DUI conviction would be a ground for license revocation or suspension, if Petitioner were licensed. Finally, the DUI conviction does not evidence a lack of honesty, truthfulness, trustworthiness, good character, or fair dealing. The initial application from Petitioner omitted the DUI conviction. Petitioner corrected the omission before the application became final and before Respondent formulated any proposed agency action. Respondent notified Petitioner by letter dated August 5, 2008, of the omission. The letter notified Petitioner that the application was incomplete without documentation of the DUI conviction and requested the documentation needed to complete the application. Petitioner promptly complied and provided the requested documentation on August 22, 2008. If the initial application had disclosed the DUI conviction, Respondent cited no legal authority that would make the DUI conviction a ground for denying the application. Petitioner did not omit the DUI conviction from the initial application through a lack of candor. The testimony of Petitioner was credible and persuasive.3 The omission of the DUI conviction from the initial application evidences a lack of diligence. Any incompetence or lack of diligence that remains after August 22, 2008, when Petitioner completed the license application, can be corrected through a probationary license authorized in Florida Administrative Code Rule 61J2-24.001(2).

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order granting a probationary salesperson license to Petitioner consistent with the terms of this Recommended Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of April, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of April, 2009.

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57455.201475.17475.25 Florida Administrative Code (1) 61J2-24.001
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CONTINENTAL MEDICAL LABORATORIES, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 93-003951BID (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jul. 16, 1993 Number: 93-003951BID Latest Update: Oct. 08, 1993

The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services improperly awarded a contract to National Health Laboratories, Inc. for the reasons set forth in the petition.

Findings Of Fact By Invitation to Bid mailed March 26, 1993 (ITB), the Dade County Public Health Unit requested bids on an annual contract for the performance of clinical laboratory test services. The Dade County Public Health Unit is under the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS). The contracting agency shall hereafter be referred to as HRS. The ITB called for the opening of bids on April 12, 1993. Six bids were timely submitted. The apparent low bid was submitted by National Health Laboratories, Inc. (NHL). The NHL bid was $202,271. The second low bid was submitted by Continental Medical Laboratory, Inc. (CML). The CML bid was $241,100. HRS issued a notice of intent to award the contract to NHL. CML timely protested. There is no issue as to the responsiveness of the CML bid. The only issue as to the responsiveness of the NHL bid concerns the matters raised by CML. CML's petition alleges that the bid of NHL was defective because the Sworn Statement Pursuant to Section 287.133(3)(a), Florida Statutes, on Public Entity Crimes (Public Entity Crime Affidavit) was incomplete, an agreement attached to the Public Entity Crime Affidavit did not relieve NHL from disqualification concerning CHAMPUS fraud, and NHL should be disqualified from bidding because it failed timely to inform the Department of Management Services of the company's conviction of a public entity crime. Paragraph 10 of the General Conditions of the ITB allows HRS to "waive any minor irregularity or technicality in bids received." However, special conditions provide, in part: PUBLIC ENTITY CRIMES Any person submitting a bid or proposal in response to this invitation must execute the enclosed [Public Entity Affidavit], including proper check(s), in the space(s) provided, and enclose it with the bid/proposal. Failure to complete this form in every detail and submit it with your proposal will result in immediate disqualification of your bid. The Public Entity Crime Affidavit completed by NHL and submitted with its bid was executed and notarized on April 9, 1993. Paragraph six of the form affidavit states: Based on information and belief, the statement which I have marked below is true in relation to the entity submitting this sworn statement. [Indicate which statement applies.] Neither the entity submitting this sworn statement, nor any of its officers, directors, executives, partners, shareholders, employees, members, or agents who are active in the management of the entity, nor any affiliate of the entity has been charged with and convicted of a public entity crime subsequent to July 1, 1989. The entity submitting this sworn statement, or one or more of its officers, directors, executives, partners, shareholders, employees, members, or agents who are active in the management of the entity, or an affiliate of the entity has been charged with and convicted of a public entity crime subsequent to July 1, 1989. The entity submitting this sworn statement, or one or more of its officers, directors, executives, partners, shareholders, employees, members or agents who are active in the management of the entity, or an affiliate of an entity has been charged with and convicted of a public entity crime subsequent to July 1, 1989. However, there has been a subsequent proceeding before a Hearing Officer of the State of Florida, Division of Administrative Hearings and the Final Order entered by the Hearing Officer determined that it was not in the public interest to place the entity submitting this sworn statement on the convicted vendor list. [attach a copy of the final order] The next paragraph of the Public Entity Crime Affidavit form states: I UNDERSTAND THAT THE SUBMISSION OF THIS FORM TO THE CONTRACTING OFFICER FOR THE PUBLIC ENTITY IDENTIFIED IN PARAGRAPH I (ONE) ABOVE IS FOR THAT PUBLIC ENTITY ONLY AND, THAT THIS FORM IS VALID THROUGH DECEMBER 31 OF THE CALENDAR YEAR IN WHICH IT IS FILED. I ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT I AM REQUIRED TO INFORM THE PUBLIC ENTITY PRIOR TO ENTERING INTO A CONTRACT IN EXCESS OF THE THRESHOLD AMOUNT PROVIDED IN SECTION 287.017, FLORIDA STATUTES FOR CATEGORY TWO OF ANY CHANGE IN THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS FORM. In completing the Public Entity Crime Affidavit, NHL penned in, just over the second alternative that discloses a conviction, "See Attached." The attachment was a copy of an Agreement dated December 31, 1992, between NHL and the "state of Florida" (Settlement Agreement). The agreement was executed by an NHL officer and the Director, Medicaid Fraud Control Unit of the Auditor General Office. The Auditor General's Office is not part of the Department of Management Services. The Settlement Agreement concerns invoices from NHL to the Florida Medicaid program for certain cholesterol and iron tests from January 1, 1987, through November 30, 1992. The Settlement Agreement requires NHL to pay as restitution to the State of Florida $1,470,917. In return, the state of Florida, for itself and on behalf of its agents and assigns, will release and forever discharge NHL, its current or former officers, directors, employees, agents, shareholders, affiliates, assigns and successors from any and all claims, actions, demands or causes of action including penalties or interest against any of them, either civil or criminal, as regards Medicaid reimbursement [for certain cholesterol and iron tests] between January 1, 1987 and November 30, 1992, except that nothing contained in this Settlement Agreement shall preclude the state Medicaid program from seeking recoupment of payments made [for certain cholesterol tests] during the period covered by this Settlement Agreement, subject to the understanding that NHL will contest any such recoupment action on the grounds that such payments were appropriate. The Settlement Agreement also provides: The state of Florida agrees that neither the Settlement Agreement nor any federal criminal conviction or other sanction of the corporation or a current or former officer or employee of NHL as regards claims for Medicaid reimbursement [for certain cholesterol and iron tests] [b]etween January 1, 1987 and November 30, 1992 will be the basis for a state exclusion of NHL from the Florida Medicaid program. NHL is a company that provides laboratory testing nationally and receives payment for many of its services from government sources, such as Medicaid, Medicare, or CHAMPUS. CHAMPUS is the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services. During the period of 1987 through 1992, NHL supplied certain cholesterol and iron testing, in addition to that specifically requested by the health-care provider, at little or no cost to the health-care provider. But NHL invoiced various government payors at higher rates. On December 18, 1992, NHL entered guilty pleas to two counts of criminal fraud involving these practices as they concern the CHAMPUS program. These pleas were the bases of a conviction and sentence that included a criminal fine of $1,000,000. One or two former officers entered guilty pleas to charges of criminal fraud involving these practices as they concern the Medicaid program. As part of the settlement, NHL paid the United States the sum of $100,000,000. At the same time, NHL was negotiating with various states, including Florida, with respect to the above-described billing practices. On December 8, 1992, the Director of the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit in the Florida Office of the Auditor General wrote a letter to NHL confirming a proposed settlement. The conditions of the settlement are incorporated in the above- described Settlement Agreement. On December 17, 1992, the Assistant Secretary for Medicaid in HRS mailed a letter to NHL agreeing that HRS would not take administrative action for the above-described cholesterol and iron claims submitted for reimbursement by NHL to the Florida Medicaid program. NHL did not inform the Department of Management Services of the guilty plea, conviction, and $1,000,000 criminal fine. However, based probably on information received in early February 1993 from another governmental entity in Florida, the Department of Management Services, on February 8, 1993, sent a letter to NHL advising it that the Department had received information that NHL had been convicted of a public entity crime and requesting copies of the charges and final court action. NHL complied and the Department's investigation is continuing. On February 18, 1993, HRS Deputy Secretary for Health, sent a memorandum to all of the County Public Health Units directors and administrators advising them of concerns about laboratory fraud and attaching a recent report concerning the NHL case. The report described the NHL guilty pleas, conviction, and sentencing, as well as the business practices that led to the prosecution. By memorandum dated March 18, 1993, HRS Assistant Secretary for Medicaid informed HRS Depute Secretary for Health that the Auditor General had entered into the Settlement Agreement. The memorandum states that, on December 17, 1992, the Assistant Secretary signed an agreement with NHL not to terminate it from the Florida Medicaid program, which was the "same treatment afforded many other providers--including [County Public Health Units]--who overbilled the Medicaid program. The Assistant Secretary's memorandum describes the settlement as requiring NHL to make "full restitution," although the $1.4 million in restitution involves only the iron test and the State of Florida and NHL may still litigate whether any reimbursement is due for the cholesterol tests. The failure of NHL to check the second alternative on the Public Entity Crime Affidavit did not confer an economic advantage on NHL in the subject procurement. The material attached to the affidavit sufficiently informed HRS of the criminal conviction of NHL. Likewise, the omission of any mention of CHAMPUS claims in Paragraphs two and three of the Settlement Agreement did not confer any economic advantage on NHL in the procurement. The purpose of mentioning only Medicaid in the Settlement Agreement is that Florida has no jurisdiction over the CHAMPUS program. NHL was concerned only that Florida not terminate NHL's participation in the program over which Florida had jurisdiction--the Medicaid program. These references to "Medicaid reimbursement" are merely descriptive and are not intended to limit the scope of the exoneration purportedly effectuated in the Settlement Agreement.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a final order dismissing the bid protest of Continental Medical Laboratory, Inc. ENTERED on August 24, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of August, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-3951BID Treatment Accorded Proposed Findings of Respondent and Intervenor 1-8 and 11: adopted or adopted in substance. 9-10 and 12-15: rejected as subordinate. 16-31: adopted or adopted in substance. 32-37: rejected as subordinate and irrelevant. 38-43 and 45-48: rejected as irrelevant and legal argument. 44: adopted. 49-50: adopted as to absence of material variations. 51: rejected as subordinate and recitation of evidence. Treatment Accorded Proposed Findings of Petitioner 1-14 and 16-17: adopted or adopted in substance. 15: rejected as legal argument and unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 18-21: rejected as subordinate, repetitious, and legal argument. 22-27: adopted in substance. 28: rejected as irrelevant. 29 (first sentence): rejected as repetitious and irrelevant. 29 (second sentence): rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 30: adopted, but the period of the delay of DMS review in this case was too short to make any difference. 31: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence with respect to a delay of such a short duration. 32: rejected as legal argument inviting a remedy far in excess of any remedy provided for or envisioned by 287.133. 33: rejected as legal argument inviting a remedy far in excess of any remedy provided for or envisioned by 287.133, at least under the facts of the present case. 34: rejected as irrelevant. 35: rejected as legal argument and unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Geoffrey Kirk Adorno & Zeder, P.A. 2601 S. Bayshore Dr., Ste. 1600 Miami, Florida 33133 Morton Laitner, District Counsel District 11 Legal Office 401 NW 2d Ave., Ste. N-1014 Miami, Florida 33128 Thomas F. Panza Seann Michael Frazier Panza, Maurer 3081 E. Commercial Blvd., Ste. 200 Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33308 John Slye, General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Robert L. Powell Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700

Florida Laws (4) 120.53120.57287.017287.133
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