The Issue In this case, the Petitioner seeks to impose discipline against the Respondent's certificate to be employed as a correctional officer based upon the allegation that the Respondent has committed acts which evidence a failure to maintain the qualifications incumbent upon a correctional officer working in Florida. In particular, it is alleged that the Respondent committed acts which demonstrated a lack of good moral character.
Findings Of Fact Facts Deemed Admitted The Respondent was certified as a corrections officer by the Petitioner on or about August 16, 1985 and was issued Corrections Certificate No. 28-85- 502-02. The Respondent was employed as a sworn corrections officer with the Alachua County Department of Corrections from June 17, 1985 to August 8, 1991. The Respondent, on or about April 20, 1990, was found guilty by a jury for the crime of resisting arrest without violence, a misdemeanor. The court withheld adjudication and sentenced the Respondent to six months of probation. The Respondent, on or about July 8, 1991, entered a plea of nolo contendere to the criminal charges of resisting arrest without violence and battery, both misdemeanors. The court sentenced the Respondent to one year of probation and withheld adjudication. On or about August 6, 1991, the Respondent became involved in a dispute with members of his family at his residence. The Respondent had consumed one or more alcoholic beverages immediately prior to and/or during the above-referenced family dispute. The dispute turned into a verbal and physical disturbance involving the Respondent and members of his family. The police were called to the Respondent's residence due to the above- referenced disturbance. After the police arrived with regard to the above-referenced disturbance, the Respondent barricaded himself inside his residence by locking the doors. After barricading himself inside his residence, the Respondent armed himself with a knife. The Respondent threatened to kill the police officers at the scene of the above-referenced disturbance if the officers attempted to apprehend him. Other Facts The offense described in paragraph 3 to these facts is related to the allegations contained in paragraph 2.(a) to the Administrative Complaint. The offense described in paragraph 4 to these facts is related to the allegations contained in paragraph 2.(b) to the Administrative Complaint, with the exception that paragraph 2.(b) makes no mention that a battery was committed. The offense described in paragraph 4 to these facts was considered in the Circuit Court of Union County, Florida, Case No. 90-29-CF. In addition to the service of one year of probation, the Respondent was ordered to successfully complete Anger Management as instructed by the Respondent's probation officer. On August 2, 1989, at approximately 9:30 p.m., in Alachua, Florida, Officer Lisa Brown, in pursuing her duties as a sworn officer, stopped the Respondent for a traffic violation. The Respondent was stopped because he had run two stop signs in Alachua. The stop signs were run at Northeast 8th Avenue crossing over State Road 235 and at Northwest 8th Avenue at Main Street. Officer Brown is now Officer Lisa Brown Haefner. At times relevant, Officer Haefner was serving as a police officer with the City of Alachua. Officer Haefner made the traffic-violation stop on Northwest 8th Avenue, off of Main Street, in Alachua. When the traffic-violation stop was made, Officer Haefner was assisted by Sergeant Cindy Dennison of the City of Alachua. Sergeant Dennison and Officer Haefner were driving separate patrol units on that night. Both officers observed the Respondent run the stop signs. Officer Haefner and Sergeant Dennison did not know Respondent when the traffic stop was made. After the stop, Officer Haefner asked the Respondent to exit his vehicle. The Respondent exited the vehicle. At that time, Officer Haefner asked the Respondent for identification. The Respondent replied that he "had none". Officer Haefner asked the Respondent for his name. The Respondent stated that he "didn't have a name". When the Respondent was contacted about the traffic violations, Officer Haefner asked for his driver's license, and the Respondent told Officer Haefner that he did not have a driver's license. The Respondent was acting irrational and irritated in the presence of Sergeant Dennison and Officer Haefner. Officer Haefner detected an odor about Respondent's person which she believed to be cannabis. Officer Haefner determined to arrest the Respondent for resisting or obstructing arrest without violence based upon the Respondent's failure to give information concerning his identity and the belief that she had cause to arrest Respondent. After informing the Respondent that he was being arrested for resisting or obstructing arrest without violence, Officer Haefner and Sergeant Dennison attempted to place handcuffs on the Respondent. This was a normal procedure. The Respondent resisted the placement of the handcuffs by twisting and stiffening his body and leaving his arms in front of him, which obstructed the officers' ability to secure the Respondent's arms behind him, as they desired. Under the circumstances, Officer Haefner sought the assistance of Officer Clovis Watson, Jr. (later Sergeant Watson) and Officer VanHorn. The other officers who were summoned for assistance were employed by the City of Alachua Police Department. The Respondent was eventually handcuffed, placed in Officer Watson's patrol car, and taken to the police station. When at the police station, he continued to be irrational and irritated. At one point in the encounter between Officer Haefner, Sergeant Dennison, and the Respondent, the Respondent offered to obtain identification from the back seat of his vehicle. The officers declined that request in that the Respondent was acting irrational and irritated; and based upon a fear for her personal safety, Officer Haefner would not allow the Respondent to access his vehicle. Respondent's offer to obtain identification came about at the point in time at which Officer Haefner and Sergeant Dennison attempted to handcuff the Respondent. The nature of the Respondent's irrationality and irritability was manifested by his being "real vocal, not wanting to cooperate, agitated as far as being stopped" and asking the officers "why are you harassing me?". The Respondent manifested this attitude notwithstanding that Officer Haefner had told him that he was being stopped for a traffic violation. The Respondent also manifested his irritability by having an agitated appearance. Before the Respondent was arrested for resisting or obstructing arrest without violence, he had been told several times not to return to his vehicle; however, he continued to walk toward his vehicle. It is at that point that Officer Haefner and Sergeant Dennison physically grabbed the Respondent and tried to restrain and handcuff him. The Respondent's actions prohibited Officer Haefner and Sergeant Dennison from performing their law-enforcement duties in making the traffic- violation stop. The Respondent continued to struggle when the officers were attempting to place the handcuffs on him after Officer Watson arrived at the scene by swaying back and forth. In the course of that struggle, Sergeant Dennison fell to the ground and the Respondent and Officer Watson fell on top of her. As a consequence, Sergeant Dennison sustained a concussion. The Respondent held his hands close to his body as a means to restrict the ability of the officers to handcuff him. The Respondent shook back and forth and this caused the officers and the Respondent to fall, injuring Sergeant Dennison. While the officers were attempting to handcuff the Respondent, he did not strike out at the officers. The Respondent resisted, in part, because he did not wish to be taken to the jail where he worked. On May 5, 1990, the Respondent, together with his brother and a friend, went to Union County, Florida, to a nightclub. When they arrived they were confronted by a number of persons who were already at the club. A fight ensued and the Respondent's brother was injured. The Respondent then took his brother to Ramadan Hospital to have his brother treated for injuries sustained in the fight at the club. Ramadan Hospital was located in Lake Butler, Union County, Florida. Union County Sheriff Jerry Whitehead received a call on his beeper at around 1:00 to 1:30 a.m. on the morning in question. He called the Union County Jail and was told about the fight at the local nightclub. He was also told that all of the deputy sheriffs had been dispatched to the nightclub. In turn, Sheriff Whitehead got dressed and started toward Lake Butler. Ramadan Hospital is located between his home and the Union County Jail. About a mile from the hospital, Sheriff Whitehead received a call from the sheriff's office dispatcher indicating that there was a disturbance at the hospital. Sheriff Whitehead responded to that call. When Sheriff Whitehead entered the emergency room at the hospital, the Respondent, his brother and the friend were in the waiting area of the hospital. The Respondent was standing in the hallway at that time, cursing and saying that he had just contacted his supervisor, taken to mean supervisor at the Alachua Correctional Facility, and that the Respondent was "fixing to have some people come over and they were going to get the situation straight". Sheriff Whitehead identified himself to the Respondent and asked the Respondent what the problem was. The Respondent indicated that he had been involved in an incident at the local nightclub and that there had been a fight and his brother had been injured. The Respondent told Sheriff Whitehead that he was going to "take this thing into his own hands". The Respondent was also indicating "things" that he wanted to have done concerning the incident. Respondent was cursing and using foul language. Sheriff Whitehead told the Respondent that he had to calm down or leave the premises. Sheriff Whitehead repeated this remark a number of times. After a time Sheriff Whitehead went to a telephone in the hospital and called the sheriff's office dispatcher and asked that a deputy sheriff be sent. During the course of these circumstances, the Respondent was belligerent and had the smell of alcohol about his person. The Respondent was being very belligerent in telling the nurses something to the effect that he was going to "tear that place up if they didn't get this done." This related to the Respondent's concern that a doctor was not available to attend to his brother at the hospital. The disturbance which the Respondent was causing was primarily directed to the hospital staff. The Respondent continued his outbursts for several minutes. In the course of this event, the Respondent identified himself as a law enforcement officer. Sheriff Whitehead told the Respondent that he needed to calm down and to let the Union County Sheriff's Department take care of the situation. Finally, Sheriff Whitehead believed that he had lost control over the Respondent's conduct and told the Respondent that he was going to place the Respondent under arrest. The Respondent replied that "he did not need to be arrested, wasn't going to be arrested." Sheriff Whitehead then placed his arm on the Respondent's arm and the Respondent snatched his arm away from Sheriff Whitehead. At that point Sheriff Whitehead took the Respondent through a set of doors to exit the hospital emergency room. They struggled out onto a patio area and onto the asphalt parking lot and then onto a grassy area where Sheriff Whitehead took the Respondent down and held him until a deputy sheriff arrived to assist. Sheriff Whitehead told the Respondent that he was being arrested for breach of the peace, an offense which Sheriff Whitehead believed he had reasonable cause to arrest the Respondent for. After the Respondent had been subdued and handcuffs placed on him, the Respondent became cooperative and acted remorseful, again explaining to Sheriff Whitehead that he was a correctional officer and that he was afraid he was going to lose his job because of the incident. The Respondent was then taken by a deputy sheriff to be transported to the Union County jail. When Sheriff Whitehead was trying to talk to the Respondent, the Respondent would swing his arms and on several occasions made cursing remarks toward the nurses, which Sheriff Whitehead believed was because doctors were not available to attend the Respondent's brother at that time. On August 6, 1991, Officers Glen Hammond, Donald Rice and Price responded to an alleged domestic disturbance call at 305 N.E. Fifth Street in Alachua, Florida. Those officers were working for the City of Alachua Police Department when they made the response. The alleged domestic disturbance involved the Respondent, his mother, sister and brother. When the officers arrived at the scene the other family members told the officers that the Respondent had been involved in a physical altercation with them and had battered them. The Respondent's mother told Officer Hammond that the Respondent had been smoking crack cocaine prior to the arrival of the officers. The family members told the officers that the Respondent was located in a wooded area near the residence. The officers went to find the Respondent so they could talk to him concerning the complaint by his family. Officer Wallace located the Respondent and brought him back to the residence. While standing in front of the residence, the Respondent was arguing with his mother and using profanity. In addition, he yelled at Officer Hammond a few times to the effect that the Respondent wasn't going to be taken into custody. At that juncture there was no intention by the officers to arrest the Respondent. At this time Officer Hammond did not observe anything about the Respondent's demeanor to suggest that the Respondent had consumed alcoholic beverages. After a short period, the Respondent left the area adjacent to the residence and returned to the woods. The officers again went to find the Respondent so that they could discuss the complaint. While the officers were trying to locate the Respondent for the second time someone started yelling that the Respondent had returned to the residence and was inside the residence. The officers then returned to the residence. When Officer Hammond walked up to the front of the residence to an area adjacent to a porch on the front of the residence, the Respondent opened the door and stepped out holding a knife which appeared to be a steak knife. The Respondent told Officer Hammond that Officer Hammond was not going to arrest him and that if Officer Hammond tried to come on the porch, the Respondent would kill Officer Hammond. The Respondent also mentioned the possibility that he would do harm to himself. While standing on the porch, the Respondent was not acting in a rational manner. After the Respondent threatened to kill Officer Hammond, the officer backed away from the residence and called for assistance from other law enforcement officers. Officer Hammond did this being fearful for his safety. A second brother of the Respondent arrived at the residence when the Respondent went in the house from the front porch. The second brother went inside to try and talk to the Respondent to defuse the situation. The second brother managed to have the Respondent come out of the house, at which point, the Respondent was charged with disorderly intoxication. At about the time the Respondent was arrested, Officer Hammond was close enough to the Respondent to notice that the Respondent had an odor of alcohol about the Respondent's person. When Office Wallace found the Respondent in the woods on the first occasion, the Respondent did not resist the officer in any manner and agreed to go back to the residence with the officer. When the Respondent returned to the residence on the first occasion, he stated that he would kill somebody first before he would go to jail. It is at that point that the Respondent broke from the scene and ran into the woods. While on the porch, the Respondent stated that he would kill any officer or take his own life, and that the Respondent was not going to go to jail. When the Respondent was first approached in the woods, Officer Wallace did not have grounds to arrest the Respondent. When the Respondent came back from the woods the first time, Officer Hammond was trying to interview the Respondent concerning the circumstances between the Respondent and his family that had caused the officers to be summoned. When the Respondent returned to the woods for the second time, the officers did not have cause to arrest the Respondent. When the Respondent told the officers that he was not going to be arrested or go to jail, upon the conversation that the officers held with the Respondent after he returned from the woods on the first occasion, the Respondent had not been told that he was being arrested. When the Respondent went back in the house from the front porch, he locked the doors to the residence and still had possession of the steak knife. The residence in question was reported to the officers as being the Respondent's mother's residence.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent's Certificate No. 28-85-402-02 be revoked. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of October, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of October, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 94-5306 The following discussion is given concerning the proposed findings of fact by Petitioner. Petitioner's Facts: Paragraphs 1 through 3 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 4 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraphs 5 through 30 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraphs 31 and 32 are not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 33 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 34 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 35 constitutes a conclusion of law. Paragraph 36 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraphs 37 through the first sentence in Paragraph 42 are subordinate to facts found. The second sentence in Paragraph 42 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraphs 43 through 50 are subordinate to facts found. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul D. Johnston, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement P. O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302-1489 Joseph W. Little, Esquire 3731 Northwest 13th Place Gainesville, FL 32605 A. Leon Lowry, II, Director Department of Law Enforcement Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission P.O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302-1489 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement P.O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302-1489
The Issue Whether Respondent's certification should be revoked because he possessed cannabis?
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the holder of certificate number 14-84-502-09, issued by Petitioner on November , 1984. In September, 1984, Respondent, Mr. Reames, Mr. Eadie and Ms. Debbie Rutledge were enrolled in a correctional officer training class offered by the Florida Department of Corrections at the Correctional Training Institute. One late afternoon in September, 1984, the training class took a break and some of the members of the class walked outside. During the break, Mr. Reames and Mr. Eadie were standing with a group of other class members. Mr. Frasier and Ms. Rutledge were standing facing each other 20 to 30 yards from the group. Mr. Reames and Mr. Eadie saw Ms. Rutledge hand Mr. Frasier a clear plastic "baggie" of indeterminate size containing an indeterminate amount of a brown-green or dark substance. Mr. Frasier held the baggie up, placed a lit lighter behind the bag, and examined the bag's contents. Mr. Frasier placed the lighter in his pocket and stuffed the baggie inside the front of his shirt and pants. Mr. Frasier then handed Ms. Rutledge a roll of bill(s). The number of bills or the denomination of the bill(s) is unknown. At the conclusion of this exchange, Mr. Frasier and Ms. Rutledge walked away from each other.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner issue a Final Order dismissing the Administrative Complaint against Respondent. DONE and ENTERED this 19th day of May, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. JOSE A. DIEZ-ARGUELLES Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of May, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-3963 The Petitioner submitted proposed findings of fact which are addressed below. Paragraph numbers in the Recommended Order are referred to as "RO ." Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Petitioner's Paragraph Ruling and Recommended Order Paragraph Number Accepted. RO1 Accepted. RO2 Irrelevant Accepted. RO2 Accepted. RO3 Accepted. RO3 Accepted. RO3 First sentence, Accepted. RO4. Second sentence, Rejected. The exact size of the bag cannot be determined from the evidence presented in this case. Rejected. The exact color of the substance and the amount of the substance cannot be determined from the evidence presented in this case. 1O. First two sentences Accepted. RO4. Rest of paragraph is supported by the weight of the evidence, but do not serve to establish what the substance was. This behavior could also help identify other substances. Accepted. RO4 Accepted. RO4 13-16 Rejected as Recitation of Testimony 17-19 Irrelevant 20 Supported by the weight of the evidence, but Mr. Ball also testified that, given the facts of this case, the substance could be anything. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph S. White, Esquire Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Rodney W. Smith, Esquire Post Office Box 628 Alachua, Florida 32615 Rod Caswell, Director Criminal Justice Standards Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Robert R. Dempsey Executive Director Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Janet E. Ferris General Counsel Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent's certification as a Firefighter II Compliance should be permanently revoked for the reasons stated in the Administrative Complaint (Complaint), dated June 6, 2018.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating firefighters in the State. Respondent is certified in Florida as a Firefighter II Compliance. He holds Certificate No. 139586. Until the incident underlying this controversy arose, Respondent was employed by the Sarasota County Fire Department as a firefighter/paramedic. He now is working in the emergency room of a local hospital. The parties have stipulated that on March 21, 2018, Respondent entered a plea of nolo contendere to aggravated assault with a weapon, a third-degree felony punishable by imprisonment of one year or more under Florida law. Adjudication was withheld, Respondent was placed on probation for a period of two years, and he was ordered to pay court costs, fines, and fees in the amount of $1,525.00. See also Dep't Ex. 19. In response to the Complaint, Respondent essentially argues that: (a) he should not have been charged with the underlying criminal offense because he was defending himself against an aggressor in a road rage incident, and (b) he entered a nolo contendere plea based on bad advice from his attorney. At hearing, Respondent gave his version of the events resulting in his arrest. Also, two police officers involved with his arrest testified to what they observed and reported. Their testimony conflicts in many respects with Respondent's testimony. The undersigned will not attempt to reconcile the conflicts, as this proceeding is not the appropriate forum in which to relitigate the criminal charge. During the criminal case, Respondent was represented by a criminal law attorney who presented him with two options: enter into a plea arrangement or go to trial and risk a harsher penalty if he were found guilty. Respondent says he accepted his counsel's recommendation that he enter a plea of nolo contendere on the belief that he would not have a felony arrest on his record. After the plea agreement was accepted by the court, Respondent learned that the plea required revocation of his certification and loss of his job. Respondent also testified that even though he paid counsel a $15,000.00 fee, his counsel did little or no investigation regarding what happened, as he failed to depose a single witness before making a recommendation to take a plea.1/ In hindsight, Respondent says he would have gone to trial since he now believes he had a legitimate claim to the "castle defense," and the so-called victim in the incident (the driver of the other car) has a long criminal history and is now incarcerated. At this point, however, if Respondent believes an error in the legal process occurred, his only remedy, if one exists at all, is through the court system and not in an administrative proceeding. A felony plea constitutes noncompliance with the certification statute and requires permanent revocation of a certification. According to a Department witness, however, five years after all requirements of the court's sentencing have been met, the Department has the authority "in a formal process" to make a "felony conviction review" that may result in the reissuance of a certification. Except for this incident, Respondent has no other blemishes on his record. He served in the United States Marine Corps, with combat tours of duty in Iraq and Afghanistan, he was honorably discharged, and he was honored for saving a life at a Target store while off-duty. He has apologized for his actions, taken an anger management course, and received further treatment for Post-traumatic Stress Disorder at a local Veteran's Administration facility.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order permanently revoking Respondent's certification. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of February, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of February, 2019.
Findings Of Fact On or about October 1, 1990, in Case No. 90-233 CF, pending in the Circuit Court, Fifth Judicial Circuit, in and for Sumter County, Florida, the Petitioner pled nolo contendere to: one count of aggravated battery with a deadly weapon, a second degree felony under Section 784.045(1)(a)2., Florida Statutes; one count of battery on a law enforcement officer, a second degree felony under Section 784.07, Florida Statutes; and one count of resisting arrest with violence, a third degree felony under Section 843.01, Florida Statutes. On the same day, the Petitioner also was adjudicated guilty on all three charges. Sentence was withheld, and the Petitioner was placed in an adult community control program for two years subject to certain conditions. The Petitioner's nolo plea was entered notwithstanding a June 26, 1990, "No Information" filed in the case stating that the State Attorney's Office had taken testimony under oath at a State Attorney's investigation and that the facts and circumstances revealed did not warrant prosecution at the time. On July 28, 1991, the Petitioner was arrested for alleged spouse battery. As a result, the Petitioner was arrested and charged with violation of his community control conditions. On September 19, 1991, a "No Information" was filed in the battery case stating that the State Attorney's Office had taken testimony under oath at a State Attorney's investigation and that the facts and circumstances revealed did not warrant prosecution at the time. Nonetheless, an Order of Modification of Community Control was entered on October 28, 1991, adding a condition that the Petitioner attend and successfully complete marriage/family counseling. On or about April 19, 1992, the Petitioner again was arrested for alleged spouse battery. On July 21, 1992, a "No Information" was filed in the case stating that the State Attorney's Office had taken testimony under oath at a State Attorney's investigation and that the facts and circumstances revealed did not warrant prosecution at the time. Notwithstanding the April 19, 1992, arrest, there was no evidence that the Petitioner's community control program was further modified, and the Petitioner successfully completed the two-year program, as previously modified on October 28, 1991. On April 29, 1993, the Petitioner's civil rights, other than the right to possess and carry a firearm, were restored by Executive Order of the Office of Executive Clemency of the State of Florida. On or about October 4, 1993, the Petitioner again was arrested for alleged battery. (The record is not clear as to the identity of the alleged victim.) On November 29, 1993, a "No Information" was filed in the case stating that the State Attorney's Office had taken testimony under oath at a State Attorney's investigation and that the facts and circumstances revealed did not warrant prosecution at the time. There was no evidence of any other criminal arrests or convictions after October 4, 1993. The undisputed testimony of the Petitioner and his character witnesses was that there have been none. The Petitioner and his character witnesses also testified persuasively and without contradiction that, with the passage of time, the Petitioner has rehabilitated himself and that he is now a person of high character and integrity. The Petitioner now understands the importance of avoiding the circumstances that can lead to violations of the criminal law, he appears to have learned how to avoid them, and he appears to be determined to avoid them. Meanwhile, he also has proven himself to be a responsible and caring single father for his children and has made valuable contributions to his community as an adult volunteer, especially in community children's programs. It is found that, with the passage of time, the Petitioner has rehabilitated himself and that he is now a person of high character and approved integrity so as to qualify for licensure as a limited surety agent (bail bondsman).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Insurance and Treasurer enter a final order granting the Petitioner's application for licensure as a limited surety agent (bail bondsman). DONE and ENTERED this 4th day of June, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of June, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Alvie Edwards, pro se 1544 Bay Street Southeast St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Dickson E. Kesler, Esquire Department of Insurance and Treasurer 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Dan Sumner Acting General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue The issue presented is whether Petitioner James Joseph Richardson has met his burden of proving actual innocence, thereby entitling him to compensation under the Victims of Wrongful Incarceration Compensation Act.
Findings Of Fact On October 25, 1967, Petitioner's wife prepared a breakfast of grits for their seven children. In a separate pot she prepared the children's lunch of beans, gravy, rice, and hogs head meat. She also fried some fresh chicken which she used to make sandwiches for her and Petitioner's lunch. She and Petitioner then left to get a ride to the grove where they worked picking fruit. It was their routine for Petitioner's wife to cook the food. The eldest child, eleven-year-old Betty Jean Bryant, would later serve it to all the children after the Richardsons left for work. It is not clear whether the children actually ate their breakfast grits that day. The school-age children went to school while the younger children remained at home. It was the routine for Petitioner's neighbor Betsy Reese to look after them. Petitioner's family and Betsy Reese and her children lived in the same structure, assumedly similar to a duplex. There was a common porch across the front. There was also a shed in the back yard. The school-age children returned to the home at lunchtime. Reese divided the food in the second pot into seven equal portions, and the children ate lunch. Right after the children returned to school after lunch, they began exhibiting terrible symptoms, such as leaking from their orifices, twitching, and rigidity. Teachers began grabbing the Richardson children and rushing them to the hospital. One of the teachers, knowing there were younger children at home, drove to the Richardson home. Those children were on the shared porch, displaying the same symptoms. Reese was sitting on the porch, holding one of the children. The teacher took them to the hospital. Petitioner and his wife were summoned to the hospital. Six of the children died that same day, and the seventh child died early the next morning. At the hospital, medical personnel did not know what substance was causing the illness and deaths. Sheriff Frank Cline went to the Richardson home and conducted several searches of the home and the shed attempting to find what had poisoned the children. When Petitioner and his wife arrived at the hospital, Cline obtained from Petitioner the key to the refrigerator and searched again. The next morning Reese and Charlie Smith, who was described as the town drunk, found a bag of parathion, a highly- toxic insecticide, in the shed behind the house. Cline and his deputies had searched the shed approximately four times during the day the children became sick and Cline had searched the shed by himself late that night, and no bag of parathion had been seen by them. It was determined that parathion was present in the pot the grits were cooked in, the pot the lunch was cooked in, the frying pan the chicken may have been cooked in, flour, corn meal, sugar, and other substances found in the refrigerator. It was also determined that parathion is what killed the children. Petitioner had a key to the refrigerator as did his wife. Indications are that a third key was left on the refrigerator for the babysitter's use. Petitioner was tried for the first degree murder of the eldest child Betty Jean Bryant and was convicted. The jury did not recommend mercy, and he was sentenced to death. His conviction was reviewed by the Supreme Court of Florida. Richardson v. State, 247 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 1971). Petitioner's death sentence was commuted to life when Florida's death penalty was held to be unconstitutional the following year. In October 1988, 21 years after the seven children were murdered, the official file, which had been stolen ten years earlier from the office of the assistant state attorney who had prosecuted Petitioner, appeared in the office of the Governor of the State of Florida. Governor Bob Martinez ordered the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) to investigate the disappearance and re-appearance of the file and accompanying information. That investigation resulted in new information and admissions surrounding the circumstances leading to the arrest and conviction of Petitioner. The Governor entered an Executive Order on July 31, 1989, appointing Janet Reno, State Attorney for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida, to provide prosecutorial assistance to FDLE. That Executive Order further directed FDLE to continue its investigation into all statements and evidence concerning Petitioner's arrest and conviction and to also investigate any violations of the criminal laws or misconduct by public officials relative to the events surrounding the deaths of the children and the arrest and conviction of Petitioner. On February 13, 1989, another Executive Order, amending the first, was signed by the Governor assigning State Attorney Reno to the Twelfth and Twentieth Judicial Circuits to discharge the duties of the State Attorneys in those Circuits relating to the investigation and prosecution of Petitioner's case. On March 31, 1989, a third Executive Order was signed. It amended the first two and recited that Reno and FDLE had reported their findings to the Governor and that Reno had also advised the Governor that Petitioner had filed a motion for post-conviction relief in the Circuit Court for the Twelfth Judicial Circuit. The Executive Order directed Reno to assume and discharge the duties of the State Attorney relating to any post-conviction proceedings involving Petitioner. A fourth Executive Order was then entered amending the first three by adding to Reno's duties consideration of any further prosecution of Petitioner. As a result of the extensive investigations conducted by Reno and FDLE, Reno joined in Petitioner's pending motion for post-conviction relief. Petitioner's request that his conviction and sentence be vacated was granted, and Petitioner was released from prison. Reno also made the decision that Petitioner would not be re-tried for the murder of Betty Jean Bryant and would not be prosecuted for the murders of the six other children. On May 5, 1989, Reno issued a 35-page Nolle Prosse Memorandum explaining in detail the evidence she had reviewed, the conflicting evidence she had considered, the apparent- perjured testimony that had been given at Petitioner's trial, and the conflicting witness statements which the State had before trial but had not disclosed to Petitioner's attorneys despite a court order to do so. The Memorandum discussed additional problems she had encountered because the physical evidence from the trial 21 years earlier had been misplaced or destroyed, a witness had later recanted his trial testimony, and key witnesses had died since the trial had taken place. Further, as a result of the publicity surrounding her investigation a number of persons had come forward claiming to have evidence, but they had never come forward during the initial investigation. Reno and the two Assistant State Attorneys who worked with her on her investigation determined that in evaluating whether Petitioner should be given post-conviction relief and whether Petitioner should be re-tried, they would only consider the files, records, and evidence that existed at the time that Petitioner was tried. They considered the evidence that had not been disclosed to anyone for 21 years to be unreliable. Some of it was also conflicting. She signed the Nolle Prosse Memorandum as did the two Assistant State Attorneys Don L. Horn and Richard L. Shiffrin. At the final hearing in this cause Don Horn testified extensively as to the contents of the Memorandum. Although he, Shiffrin, and Reno had discussed the misconduct they discovered on the part of the Sheriff and the prosecuting attorneys, they knew that the statute of limitations prevented taking action against those public officials, so the Memorandum did not discuss any action to be taken against them. It only considered the evidence against Petitioner. The Memorandum concluded that a "totally inadequate and incomplete investigation" into the deaths of the seven children had been conducted. Obvious leads had not been pursued, inconsistencies were not resolved, and standard investigative procedures had not been followed. The Memorandum further opined that at the time that Petitioner was charged with murder, the State did not have sufficient evidence to prove his guilt beyond and to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt. The Memorandum concluded that Petitioner "was probably wrongfully accused" based upon the evidence that existed at the time. Three years later a 260-page Memorandum Opinion prepared by United States Attorney Robert Merkle and indicating a need for further investigation into the 1968 prosecution of Petitioner was presented to the Treasurer of Florida. The Opinion, which was not admitted in evidence, was described as a "scathing indictment" of Reno's investigation. As a result, Governor Lawton Chiles issued a confidential Executive Order on October 16, 1992, appointing State Attorney Reno to further investigate all matters pertaining to or arising from the issues raised in the Opinion involving Petitioner's prosecution. On October 30, 1992, the Governor issued a second Executive Order deleting the provisions of his prior Order requiring that it be sealed and confidential. Assistant State Attorney Richard L. Shiffrin, who participated in Reno's first investigation, and Gertrude M. Novicki, Reno's Chief Assistant for Special Prosecutions, were assigned to conduct this investigation. Both of those Assistant State Attorneys signed the Response of the State Attorney of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit. The Response is not dated but a word-processing notation suggests it may have been issued on or about April 30, 1993. At the final hearing, Novicki testified regarding her Response. Rather than responding to or explaining each of the details set forth in Merkle's Memorandum Opinion, Novicki and Shiffrin re-examined the propriety of both the vacating of the original judgment of guilty and the decision to enter a nolle prosse. In doing so, they reviewed the original prosecution in light of the evidence at trial and of the law as it existed in 1968 and also reviewed the ability to re-prosecute Petitioner in light of the evidence currently available and admissible. The Response concluded that the Order granting Petitioner's motion to vacate his conviction and sentence was supported by the facts and the law and that the decision to enter a nolle prosse reached in 1989 was proper. The Response's summary states that the physical evidence against Petitioner did not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the testimonial evidence as to Petitioner's admissions of culpability were of dubious admissibility and value, the evidence of motive was equivocal at best, and the decision to enter a nolle prosse was unquestionably correct. The summary ends as follows: "Whether or not [Petitioner] is guilty of this horrible crime is uncertain. What is certain is that proof beyond a reasonable doubt of guilt is lacking." The prior proceedings involving Petitioner and the prior reviews of those proceedings have focused on the criminal law standard of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. That standard, however, is not applicable to this proceeding. In this proceeding wherein Petitioner is seeking monetary compensation for his wrongful incarceration, Section 961.03, Florida Statutes, requires Petitioner to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he committed neither the act nor the offense that served as the basis for the conviction and incarceration and that he did not aid, abet, or act as an accomplice to a person who committed the act or offense. Further, he must prove his actual innocence by verifiable and substantial evidence in order to meet the definition of wrongfully incarcerated person. Petitioner testified that he did not poison his children, that he did not kill his children, and that he never told anyone that he did. He also testified that he did not aid or assist anyone in poisoning or killing his children. In order to provide verifiable and substantial evidence in support of his testimony that he is innocent, Petitioner has taken two approaches. The first is by relying on the investigation detailed in the 1989 Nolle Prosse Memorandum and the testimony of Don Horn, one of the authors. (In its defense, the State offered the 1993 Response and the testimony of Gertrude Novicki, one of its authors.) In so doing, Petitioner has offered clear and convincing evidence that the investigation leading up to Petitioner’s prosecution and conviction was incomplete. The investigation revealed conflicting evidence about whether Petitioner had obtained life insurance policies on his children the night before they were murdered, which he had not, and whether Petitioner believed that he had. The investigation did not determine how the parathion got into the pots and skillet and various food products in the refrigerator or when. The investigation appeared to focus only on Petitioner as a suspect and not also on others whose involvement was suspicious. Toward the end of the investigation and prior to Petitioner’s criminal trial, the prosecutors wrote memos expressing concern about the weakness of their case and their possible inability to present even a prima facie case. After those memos were written, the Sheriff produced three jailhouse informants to testify that Petitioner admitted to them his crimes. They also gave statements that Petitioner said he thought that Reese did it and gave details of different motives she might have had. Rather than resolving the conflicting statements, the prosecution withheld the conflicting statements from the defense. The Nolle Prosse Memorandum discusses these statements and informants and finds that one of the jailhouse informants recanted his testimony after Petitioner’s trial and one was drunk when he testified. The third one, whose statements were given under circumstances that made them highly doubtful, died before the trial, and his testimony given at the preliminary hearing was given to the jury in the form of five witnesses who testified as to their recollections of his testimony. The informants were not the only ones to provide perjured testimony at Petitioner’s trial; the Sheriff also appears to have done so. A review of the Nolle Prosse Memorandum and the detailed evidence it discusses makes it clear that Petitioner was wrongfully accused based upon the evidence and lack of evidence the prosecution had gathered. It is further clear that Petitioner’s conviction and sentence based upon that insufficient evidence should have been vacated, and they were. It is further clear that re-trying Petitioner would be fruitless because the evidence available 21 years after the murders was insufficient: the physical evidence was missing or destroyed, many of the key witnesses were dead, and the evidence that might have been admissible for a re-trial was conflicting. However, the inability of the State to prove Petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt does not prove that Petitioner is actually innocent of committing the murders or aiding in the commission. Petitioner’s second approach to providing verifiable and substantial evidence of his actual innocence is attempting to show that Reese, not the Petitioner, murdered the children. The 1989 investigation showed that, at the time the Richardson children were poisoned, Reese was on parole for killing her second husband with a gun. Although there was also a rumor that she had poisoned her first husband, no evidence was found to support that rumor. Parenthetically, there was also a rumor that Petitioner killed his three other children in Jacksonville, but that was also untrue. Similarly, there was a rumor that Sheriff Cline fathered Reese’s granddaughter and that was why he steered the investigation away from her. The blood tests of all concerned done as part of the 1989 investigation proved that rumor also untrue. Petitioner relies also upon the facts that Reese was the last person in the Richardson home on the day in question, the person who served the children the poisoned lunch, and the person who found the parathion in the shed. Her unconcerned behavior while the Richardson toddlers were exhibiting horrible symptoms on her porch and her lack of concern about whether her children who were playing there might be at risk from whatever was making the Richardson children so sick are suggested to be evidence that she knew why the Richardson children were sick and why her children would not be. It was also suggested that she must have been the murderer since her third husband had gone to Jacksonville with Petitioner and his wife but they had returned without Reese’s husband who never did return to her. Petitioner relies heavily on evidence which he suggests constitutes admissions of her guilt by Reese. The 1988 investigation considered an affidavit by one certified nursing assistant and a taped interview of another, both of whom worked at a nursing home where Reese became a patient in 1986. The affidavit by Belinda Romeo asserts that Romeo asked Reese on more than 100 separate occasions if she killed the seven Richardson children, that Reese replied that she did, and that Reese was competent at the times Romeo asked that question. On the other hand, the transcript of a taped interview of Doris Harris, who was present several times when Romeo questioned Reese, is clearly contrary to that affidavit. Harris states that by the time Reese was admitted to the nursing home, she was incontinent, unable to walk, unable to feed herself, only “half way aware,” unable to say what day or year it was, "back to a child's state," and suffering from Alzheimer’s. When Romeo would ask if she killed the children, she would say that she killed them, say the name Charlie, and then lapse into incoherent mumbling. Harris believed that Reese was saying she killed them because she was the one who fed them the poisoned food, and not because she was the one who put the poison in the food. Reese’s “admissions” are, therefore, ambiguous and not trustworthy. Petitioner also introduced into evidence a 1988 affidavit of Richard H. Barnard, the Chief of Police who began an investigation into the children’s deaths. After he got Reese to admit she was in the Richardson home that day and served the children their lunch, he was removed from the investigation by the “Governor’s office” in a phone call which he believes Sheriff Cline instigated. His affidavit undermines the statements of the jailhouse informants, expresses his concern that Sheriff Cline may have tampered with the jury, and states his opinion that Sheriff Cline framed Petitioner. He concludes with his opinion that Petitioner was innocent and Reese was guilty. The hearsay evidence and suggestions that Reese was guilty of the murders do not constitute verifiable and substantial evidence of Petitioner’s innocence. Opinion testimony does not constitute verifiable and substantial evidence of Petitioner's innocence. The Nolle Prosse Memorandum and the Response do not constitute verifiable and substantial evidence of Petitioner’s innocence. The testimony of Horn and Novicki as to what they considered during their investigations does not constitute verifiable and substantial evidence of Petitioner’s innocence. Lastly, Petitioner’s own testimony denying his guilt is not verifiable and substantial evidence of his innocence. Simply put, the evidence in this proceeding does not establish Petitioner’s actual innocence. Since Chapter 961, Florida Statutes, does not provide a definition of “actual innocence,” Petitioner argues that the definition should be that based upon the evidence it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him. That definition is found in Supreme Court of the United States and Supreme Court of Florida cases. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995); Tompkins v. State, 994 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 2008); Mills v. State, 786 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 2001). Petitioner’s argument is not persuasive. All of those cases involved motions for post-conviction relief, not claims for money damages. That definition of actual innocence was likely utilized when Petitioner was granted post-conviction relief by having his conviction and sentence vacated and being released from prison, which is the relief which results from meeting that definition. That definition of actual innocence tests the legal sufficiency of evidence. The Statute regulating this proceeding does not consider legal sufficiency; rather, it considers factual sufficiency by requiring the undersigned to make findings of fact as to Petitioner’s actual innocence if proven by verifiable and substantial evidence. In other words, proof of factual innocence is required. Perhaps the reason the Statute does not contain its own definition of actual innocence is that the Legislature intended the words to have their plain, ordinary meaning. A review of the two investigations of Petitioner’s prosecution clearly shows an absence of evidence proving Petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. However, a review of the two investigations does not show that Petitioner is actually innocent. Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to meet his burden of proving actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence and, thus, has failed to establish that he is a wrongfully incarcerated person eligible for compensation under the Victims of Wrongful Incarceration Compensation Act. RECOMMENDED DETERMINATION Based on the record in this proceeding and the above Findings of Fact, it is RECOMMENDED that an order be entered by the Circuit Judge determining that Petitioner has failed to meet his burden of proving actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence, denying Petitioner’s claim for compensation, and dismissing his Petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of August, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of August, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert I. Barrar, Esquire Law Offices of Ellis Rubin & Robert I. Barrar 6619 South Dixie Highway, No. 311 Miami, Florida 33143 Raul C. De La Heria, Esquire 2100 Coral Way, Suite 500 Miami, Florida 33145 Dennis Nales, Esquire Office of the State Attorney 2071 Ringling Boulevard, Suite 400 Sarasota, Florida 34237 Earl Moreland, Esquire Office of the State Attorney 2071 Ringling Boulevard, Suite 400 Sarasota, Florida 34237
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether there is a disputed issue of material fact to be resolved by an administrative hearing.
Findings Of Fact On October 30, 1991, the Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, issued an administrative complaint against Marilyn Mirus, the Petitioner herein. [Administrative complaint attached to motion to relinquish jurisdiction as Exhibit A, not disputed by Petitioner] The administrative complaint alleged three violations of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes: having been convicted or found guilty, regardless of adjudication, of a crime in violation of Section 475.25(1)(f), Florida Statutes; having been found guilty of a course of conduct which shows dishonesty in violation of Section 475.25(1)(o), Florida Statutes; and having failed to inform the FREC of having pled nolo contendere or having been convicted of a felony within thirty days of such conduct in violation of Section 475.25(1)(p), Florida Statutes. [Exhibit A to the motion, not disputed by Petitioner] The allegations arose as a result of a criminal case in Broward County, Florida (Case no. 91-4894CF) wherein the Petitioner was charged with 31 counts of grand theft. In connection with those charges, the Petitioner pled nolo contendere and received a five year probation. Additionally, the court withheld adjudication of guilt for all counts. [Exhibit A to the motion, not disputed by Petitioner] As an additional condition of the sentence, Petitioner was required to make restitution in the amount of $69,834.50 to the alleged victim. [Exhibit A to the motion, not disputed by Petitioner] To resolve the charges of the administrative complaint, Petitioner entered into a stipulation attached to the motion to relinquish jurisdiction as Exhibit B. [Not disputed by Petitioner] The stipulation provided, in pertinent part: Respondent [Petitioner herein] neither admits nor denies all the allegations of essential fact contained in the Administrative Complaint. Respondent admits that the allegations of fact contained in the Administrative Complaint, if true, support a finding of a violation of the Real Estate Practice Act. There is currently pending in the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal an appeal (hereafter, "the Appeal") of the Order dated March 2, 1992 (hereafter, "the Order"), denying the Respondent's Motion to Vacate and Set Aside Plea in Case No. 91-4894, Division FM, in the Circuit Court of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County, Florida. STIPULATED DISPOSITION * * * 8. The Respondent's license shall be suspended beginning on the filing date of the Final Order approving this Stipulation. Thereafter, the suspension shall remain in effect during the pendency of the Appeal. Immediately upon the conclusion of the Appeal, the Respondent's license shall be automatically and permanently revoked unless the Order is reversed as the direct and immediate result of the Appeal. In the event of such reversal, the suspension shall be lifted. * * * 13. The Respondent expressly waives all notice requirements and right to seek judicial review of or to otherwise challenge or contest the validity and enforcement of this Stipulation and resulting Final Order of the Commission adopting and incorporating this Stipulation. [Emphasis added.] A final order accepting the stipulation entered into by the parties was adopted on May 19, 1992. [Attached to the motion to relinquish jurisdiction as Exhibit C, not disputed by Petitioner] The District Court of Appeal rendered a decision on April 21, 1993, which denied Petitioner's request to set aside the nolo contendere plea. Her requests for a rehearing on that decision were also denied. [Attached to the motion to relinquish jurisdiction as Exhibits D and E, not disputed by Petitioner] Petitioner maintains [Response to order issued by Hearing Officer on November 29, 1995] she should be able to challenge the denial of licensure because of the following disputed matters: Did Petitioner commit the crimes of which she was accused, and to which she plead nolo contendere? The Courts have held that when there is a plea of nolo contendere filed, it raises the presumption that a crime had been [sic] convicted. However, the Courts have held that the Licensee has the opportunity to rebut this presumption and assert his or her innocence of the underlying criminal charges together with what the reasons and circumstances were to show why the plea of nolo contendere was raised. See Ayala v. Department of Professional Regulations, 478 So.2d 116 (1st DCA Fla. 1985) and Son v. Florida Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, 608 So.2d 75 (3rd DCA Fla. 1992). Was the Petitioner advised as to what the effect of her plea of nolo contendere would have as the same relates to the revocation of her license by the Department of Business and Professional Regulations? What was the effect of revocation of one's Real Estate License on April 7, 1992, at the time the stipulation was entered into by Petitioner? Has the effect of a revocation on a license changed from April 7, 1992 [to] today, if so, was her (sic) advise proper to enter into the Stipulation had she known what the law was today as it relates to the law of 1992? (It wasn't until October 1, 1992 that revocation became permanent. Prior to that date the laws of Florida were silent as to the term of a revocation. Section 455.227(4) F.S. 1992.) Was the adjudication withheld and was the file sealed as it relates to the criminal charges which were the subject of the original complaint against Marilyn Mirus? Is the Petitioner now held accountable for a crime that under the Florida law for all intents and purposes she did not commit nor was she even charged with such a crime? Petitioner has not challenged the authenticity or accuracy of the documents attached to the motion to relinquish jurisdiction.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order dismissing the request for hearing filed by Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of January, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of January, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Manuel E. Oliver Assistant Attorney General Suite 107 South Tower 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 William J. Haley, Esquire BRANNON, BROWN, HALEY, ROBINSON & BULLOCK, P.A. 10 North Columbia Street Lake City, Florida 32056-1029 Henry Solares Division Director Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Lynda L. Goodgame General Counsel Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
