Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Ben L. Bryan, Jr., has been a member of the Florida Bar since 1962 and has continually engaged in the private practice of law in Fort Pierce since 1965. His offices are located at 101 1/2 South Second Street, Fort Pierce, Florida. In January, 1971, Petitioner was retained by the St. Lucie County School Hoard to represent it in the capacity of school board attorney. He remained in that position until October, 1974. During that period of time he was a member in good standing of the Florida Retirement System (FRS) and made the required contributions into the program. Bryan was credited with 3.83 years of service credit for that period. Since January 1, 1980, Petitioner has been retained by the St. Lucie County School Board as its attorney under a succession of written agreements which are substantially similar in form. He also re-enrolled as a participant in the FRS and began making the necessary contributions to the plan. On October 4, 1982, Respondent, Department of Administration, Division of Retirement, advised Petitioner by letter that because he failed to comply with current FRS membership requirements, he was being removed from FRS membership effective January 1, 1980. The letter prompted the instant proceeding. Under the written agreements of employment, Petitioner is generally responsible for the handling of all legal matters of the school board. He devotes approximately thirty to forty hours per month to school board work while the remainder of his time is spent in his private law practice. A part of the school board work is performed at its administrative offices; however, the majority is done at Petitioner's law office. He is paid from a regular salaries and wage account. Either the superintendent or the board controls Petitioner's hours by assignment of the work to be done, including requests for advice, research and opinions. The board determines which cases will be settled, defended or appealed. Bryan is required to accept any case or matter assigned, and does not reject assignments. He is furnished the Education Law Reporter and other materials, including stationery and envelopes, by the school board. Additionally, dues are paid to various professional associations on his behalf. Bryan receives no pay for vacations, holidays or illnesses. He is, however, reimbursed for traveling expenses, and is covered by the school's health and life insurance and workers' compensation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the petition of Ben L. Bryan, Jr., be DENIED. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 5th day of April, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of April, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Ben L. Bryan, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box 3230 Fort Pierce, Florida 33454 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., Esquire Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street Suite 207C, Box 81 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Nevin G. Smith, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue This case is presented for consideration based upon a claim by the Petitioner, E. R. Brannon, Sr. against the Respondent, Brevard County Sheriff's Department, contending that the Respondent, by its employment practices, has unlawfully discriminated against the petitioner Brannon related to an alleged handicap, in violation of Subsection 23.167(1)(a), Florida Statutes. In view of this purported violation, Petitioner Brannon requests money damages in the way of back salary payments and benefits, together with attorney's fees, in keeping with Subsection 23.167(13), Florida Statutes. The Petitioner Brannon declines the opportunity for any reinstatement in his former employment with the Brevard Sheriff's Office. In defending against these accusations, the Respondent has plead certain affirmative defenses and contends that its action dismissing the Petitioner Brannon was lawful in view of the provision, Subsection 23.167(8)(a), Florida Statutes, specifically related to the portion of that provision dealing with taking action based upon the need for an absence of a particular handicap as related to a "bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary for the performance of the particular employment to which such action or inaction is related."
Findings Of Fact Case History On April 2, 1979, the Petitioner, F. R. Brannon, Sr., executed a form complaint of discrimination with the Petitioner, Florida Commission on Human elations, which challenged his dismissal by the Brevard County Sheriff's Department, which occurred on January 5, 1979. After reviewing the complaint, the Petitioner Commission, by action of September 11, 1980, as filed on September 16, 1980, made its determination of case, i.e., reasonable cause to believe an unlawful employment practice had occurred reference the Brevard County Sheriff's Department's dismissal of the Petitioner Brannon. A separate notice of the determination of cause was forwarded to the complainant Brannon and the Respondent, Brevard County Sheriff's Department, on September 16, 1980. Efforts were then made to reach conciliation between the contesting parties and these efforts were unsuccessful and notification of this failure of conciliation was forwarded by the Commission on October 21, 1980. On November 21, 1980, counsel for the Petitioner Brannon made known his appearance before the Commission through written Notice of Appearance and filed a Petition for Relief on the subject of the aforementioned claim brought by the Petitioner Brannon. By document dated November 25, 1990, and placed on file November 26, 1980, the Commissioners of the Florida Commission on Human Relations were notified of the filing of Brannon's Petition for Relief from alleged unlawful employment practice. Subsequent to that notification, Brannon's Petition was transmitted to the State of Florida, Division of Administrative Hearings for consideration of the claim. This transmittal was made on November 26, 1980, and received by the Division of Administrative Hearings on December 1, 1980. On December 1, 1980, counsel for the Respondent, Brevard County Sheriff's Department, filed its answer to the Petition and statement of affirmative defenses. The Respondent also, by motion of that date, moved to dismiss the Petition. The Motion to Dismiss was denied on December 12, 1980. On December 31 1980, the Respondent, in the person of its former counsel, Charles F. Broome, Esquire, wrote to the Hearing Officer to advise that there had been a change in administration in the Brevard County Sheriff's Office and that the newly elected sheriff wished to have a substitution of counsel. There ensued a series of contacts on the part of this Hearing Officer to establish a hearing date which would accommodate the change in administration and substitution of counsel. After consultation with the parties, the month of March, 1981, was tentatively selected as a time for hearing. This determination was made upon consultation with counsel for the parties, to include Catherine Riley, Esquire, the substituted counsel for the Brevard County Sheriff's Office. The case was subsequently scheduled for hearing on March 9, 1981. Prior to the time for hearing, a letter was written by counsel for the Respondent on January 16, 1981, to advise that one of her witnesses was unable to attend the hearing until after March 30, 1981. By correspondence dated January 22, 1981, in response to the letter of January 16, 1981, which had been addressed to counsel for the Petitioner, counsel for the Petitioner acquiesced in the continuance of the hearing and asked that the matter be set at the first available date beyond March 29, 1981. The correspondence was treated as a motion to continue the case on behalf of the Brevard County Sheriff's office, and the matter was reset for hearing on April 9, 1981. The Respondent, Brevard County Sheriff's Department, had also moved to file an additional affirmative defense, and this motion was granted on February 2, 1981. The initial session of the hearing was held on April 9, 1981, and continued until May 29, 1981, allow the hearing to be concluded. The hearing was concluded on May 29, 1981, and this Recommended Order is being entered after such hearing. In the way of argument, the parties have submitted written memoranda through counsel and have suggested proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommended disposition in this matter. To the extent that those proposals, conclusions and recommendations are consistent with the Recommended Order, they have been utilized. To the extent that the proposals, conclusions and recommendations are inconsistent with this Recommended Order, they are hereby rejected. Material Facts The Petitioner, E. R. Brannon, Sr., is an individual who was forty- three (43) years of age at the time of the formal hearing. In the course of his adult life he has worked primarily in law enforcement for a period of sixteen (16) to seventeen (17) years, to include service to the Lake City, Florida, police Department; Eau Gallie, Florida, Police Department: Melbourne, Florida, Police Department; two periods of service with the Brevard County, Florida, Sheriff's Office; the Orange County, Florida, Sheriff's Office and the Marion County, Florida, Sheriff's Office. On July 4, 1974, while working for the Marion County Sheriff's Office as a line deputy, the Petitioner Brannon was shot in his left side and left hand in an attempt to apprehend a felon. He was given a period of convalescence by his employer and then returned as an investigator for the Marion County Sheriff's Office. In September, 1976, after being returned to duty, the condition in his left hand was exacerbated by another job related injury, leading to the eventual amputation of his left hand on November 9, 1980, after the hand had become gangrenous. This final treatment intervention followed a series of approximately twenty (20) operations over the period of time following the initial gunshot wound. The Petitioner Brannon left his employment with Marion County and in January of 1977, took employment with the Brevard County Sheriff's Office where he was hired as a Lieutenant in charge of the division dealing with communications and vehicle maintenance. At all pertinent times to this inquiry, his employer, the Brevard County Sheriff's Office, was an employer with fifteen (15) or more persons working for that entity, for a period of twenty (20) weeks or more during the year. While Brannon was working for the Brevard County Sheriff's Office, he was placed in the position of Captain, awaiting pay adjustment to that grade. At the time of his dismissal from the Brevard County Sheriff's Office on January 5, 1979, he was receiving a salary of approximately $1,260.00 per month, with an additional $175.77 per month contributed for the benefit of his retirement. While serving as the Division Commander of the Communications and Maintenance Unit of the Brevard County Sheriff's Office, Brannon had as many as thirty (30) persons under his supervision. Brannon bad been hired by Sheriff Ronald W. Zimmerman and worked for that individual until September, 1978, when Zimmerman was suspended. Following Zimmerman's suspension from September, 1978, until January 5, 1979, the date of his discharge, Brannon worked for Sheriff David U. Strawn. During the course of Brannon's service under the command of Sheriff Strawn, the problem with Brannon's hand caused him mild to severe pain and led to frequent usage of Demerol and Vistaril to accommodate this problem. Although the visits were not made during working hours per se, Brannon made numerous visits to a local hospital during the September, 1978, to January 5, 1979, time frame, for purposes of treatment. The degree of his discomfort and the effect on Brannon was such that by January 30, 1979, his treating physician, Dr. Maurice Hodge, was of the opinion that Brannon was "totally disabled because he is unable [sic] to use his hand for any gainful purpose. See Petitioner's Exhibit No. 6, admitted into evidence and attachment identified as Respondent's No. 1. Notwithstanding the physical discomfort, Brannon attempted to perform his role as Deputy Sheriff and supervisor; however, there were numerous absences from duty during the time of the Strawn administration, to include a period December 18, 1978, through December 30, 1978. All of these absences were accounted for as authorized holidays, annual leave or sick leave. James H. Garvin, presently a Captain in the Brevard County Sheriff's Office, in the position of Jail Supervisor, was emoloyed with that Sheriff's Office during Sheriff Strawn's tenure. At that time, his office in the Sheriff's complex building was located adjacent to that of Brannon and to the extent that the two officers had contact, Garvin did not have difficulty with work coordination involving Brannon. Other officers who had association with Brannon during the time of Strawn's service as Sheriff, included Johnny L. Manis, who was a Captain in 1978, in the Brevard County Sheriff's Office. The communication section was included in his area of responsibility and upon Brannon's dismissal, Manis took over the responsibilities which Brannon had fulfilled in the communications section. Upon taking over, Captain, now Lieutenant, Manis, found the morale in that section to be less than acceptable and the turnover rate to be, in his estimation, excessive. Captain Charles Tenvooren who served as a Major in the Strawn administration, had supervisory responsibility for Brannon in that time period and recalls that Brannon was in the hospital at times. Tenvooren knew that Brannon was being treated for the condition related to his arm and hand and observed impairment in Brannon's job function. As supervisor, he spoke with Sheriff Strawn about the medication that Brannon was taking. Tenvooren also spoke with Brannon about the problem of impairment related to the injury to the arm, as described by the witness Tenvooren. Brannon, in talking with Tenvooren, mentioned the pain which he was experiencing. Lieutenant Harmon B. Wisby testified in the course of the hearing. When Strawn was Sheriff, Lieutenant Wisby was the coordinator of the reserve auxiliary group of the Sheriff's Department. During that time sequence, Wisby was aware of the fact that Brannon was under medication, information he gained from conversations he had with Brannon. Brannon indicated ythat he was having pain and that he was to go back to the hospital. Brannon also indicated to Wisby that he had been given medication to assist him in coping with the pain. Wisby recalls several times when Brannon did not seem aware of his surroundings while he was in the office building, in that Brannon would not respond to him when spoken to in the form of a greeting. Alice Alderman who is a Communications Officer with the Brevard County Sheriff's Office, who worked in the communications section while Brannon was supervisor during the Strawn administration, testified at the hearing. She admits that she had a personality conflict with Brannon. Nonetheless, she testified that during this time sequence he seemed to be "distant." Another employee within the communications section who testified at the hearing was Debbie Walden who was a Communications Dispatcher in the Brevard Sheriff's Office at the time that Strawn was Sheriff. Brannon was her shift supervisor and she recalls numerous absences by Brannon, who from her recollection worked on the same shift on which she was employed. She also indicated that morale was a problem at the time that Brannon was in charge of the section. On January 5, 1979, through correspondence, Sheriff Strawn dismissed Brannon. A copy of the dismissal may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 5, admitted into evidence. In the course of the hearing, Strawn indicated that his decision to dismiss no basis for the correspondence was premised on evidence gained from other personnel in the Sheriff's Office; the medical reports pertaining to the Petitioner's physical condition related to his hand; the prognosis on that condition; the uses of pain medication; a few personal observations of the Petitioner in which Strawn felt the Petitioner to be "spacey"; the belief that the Petitioner was not capable of line duty, i.e., responsibilities as an armed deputy; the problem which Brannon appeared to have approaching his job with a "clear head"; the high turnover in the communications section, indicating a problem with management by Brannon; a property control problem related to equipment which Brannon had in his charge and Brannon's lack of ability as an administrator and supervisor. All of Strawn's background reasons and observations were an accurate depiction of the circumstance with the exception that there was insufficient proof in the course of the hearing to demonstrate that Brannon had acted inappropriately on the subject of property control of equipment in the communications section. Likewise, reported observations by coworkers are correct. In particular, the use of pain medication for the handicap related to the injured arm and hand was such that Brannon was incapable of performing the duty of a line officer charged with the direct protection of the public and the possibility of use of force to effect that purpose. This medication also compounded Brannon's problems as an administrator. When the dismissal letter was drafted, the prime focus of that letter was to the effect that the Sheriff's Office was concerned about Brannon's return to employment duties because of the belief by the Department that there would be exposure for liability in terms of workmen's Compensation claims by Brannon, in that the Sheriff's office believed that they would be entirely liable for physical disability if Brannon suffered an "industrial accident" while acting in the scope and capacity of his position within the Department. In further explanation, it was stated that the Department believed the health circumstance of Brannon was intense in view of the pain and associated use of special medications. For these reasons, Strawn was concerned that any negligent act by Brannon could result in liability for the Department, apparently from claims by third parties. The letter of dismissal went on to say that his duties were not being performed as well as expected because of Brannon's physical condition and the necessity for taking drugs to cope with those problems and further concern for fellow officers and members of the public. This statement can be related to Brannon's potential abilities as a lane officer and his primary function as supervisor of the communications and maintenance section. (Notwithstanding the fact that Brannon was not serving on a day-to-day capacity as a line officer, as a Deputy Sheriff he could reasonably be expected to be pressed into service in the eventuality of some emergency which called upon all appointees within the Sheriff's Office who are deputies to serve in that capacity, and as Brannon himself stated at the hearing, Sheriff's deputies are technically on duty twenty-four (24) hours a day.) Finally, the impression was created in the hearing process that the Strawn administration had been concerned about Brannon's absenteeism and morale in his section. Although this is not expressly stated in the letter of dismissal, the facts presented in evidence bear out the contention that Brannon was absent an inordinate number of times, notwithstanding the fact that the absences were taken under legitimate leave principles, and there were problems related to morale in the communications section. In addressing Strawn's worries, there was no procedure undertaken for formal evaluation of Brannon's performance. Sheriff Strawn did discuss Brannon's physical condition with him and what the Sheriff perceived to be a problem with the communications equipment inventory control system. On January 8, 1979, Brannon began to look for alternative employment and gained such employment with the Brevard County Public Safety Division, within the Brevard County Board of County Commissioners on march 26, 1979, and was employed by them until January 14, 1981. During the course of his employment, he received $16,812.40 in gross earnings, and was provided life insurance commensurate with his annual salary, as well as health insurance. In addition, this employer "paid-in" at the rate of 9.1 percent of annual salary, into a retirement system. This payment to the retirement system was not made during leave without pay between July 1, 1980, and August, 1980. Following his employment with the Brevard Counts' Public Safety Division, Brannon worked for the Sheriff of Lake County, Florida, eighteen (18) to twenty (20) days, a month maximum. Following Brannon's dismissal from the Brevard County Sheriff's Office, he also requested social security disability benefits in the summer of 1980, and that claim is now pending.
Conclusions The complaint alleges, the Respondent admits and I find that it is a public employer within the meaning of Section 447.203(2) of the Act. The complaint alleges, the Respondent admits and I find that the Charging Party is now and has been at all times material herein, an employee organization within the meaning of Section 447.203(10) of the Act. The complaint alleges, the Respondent admits and I find that on or about December 2, 1976, the Public Employees Relations Commission issued a certification certifying the Charging Party as the exclusive bargaining representative for the public employees in the following unit: INCLUDED: Patrolmen, Patrolmen 1st class, Master Patrolmen, Evidence Technician, and Traffic Enforcement officer. EXCLUDED: All other employees of the Ocala Police Department including Sergeants who are shift commanders. The pleadings establish that during 1972, the Respondent, by and through its City Council, promulgated a City Ordinance (Chapter 13B of the Ocala Code) which regulates labor relations for its employees. Chapter 13B has remained in full force and effect and has never been approved by the Public Employees Relations Commission pursuant to Section 447.603, Florida Statutes (1975). Among other things, the ordinance provides that: "Solicitation for membership in a labor organization or the collection of dues therefor, or other internal affairs of a labor organization shall not be con- ducted by employees on working time, or on city premises. Labor organization literature, pamphlets, handbills and the like shall not be distributed in the work areas of the city premises at any time." (See Section 13B-8.) A summary review of the parties' joint exhibits demonstrate that Chapter 13B attempts to regulate nearly all aspects of a collective bargaining relationship. In PERC v. The City of Naples, 327 So.2d 41 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1976) the court determined that an entity may not assume jurisdiction of a public employee bargaining procedure until PERC has approved that procedure. In this case, no such approval has been granted by PERC as it is required pursuant to 447.603, Florida Statutes (1975). Further comparison of the provisions of Chapter 13B of the Ocala Code and Chapter 447, Florida Statutes, lends support to the conclusion that Respondent's employees' collective bargaining rights are not on a parity with those rights guaranteed them by Chapter 447, Florida Statutes. For example, 13B-1(c) of the ordinance defines "supervisor" and section 13B-1(b) defines "employee". Supervisors are excluded from the definition of employee and thereby from collective bargaining whereas Chapter 447 contains no definition of supervisor and the Commission consistently determines that supervisors are entitled to protections guaranteed by Chapter 447. See CWA and Hillsborough County Hospital and Welfare Board, case no. 8H- RC-752-0175, 2 FPER 46 (1976); Hillsborough County PBA and Florida State Lodge, FOP and City of Tampa, 2 FPER 72 (1976). Additional distinctions are found respecting the definition of confidential employees and the determination by despondent in its code of "bargainable" subjects. It was noted that Respondent does not consider itself required to negotiate with respect to wages, hours and terms and conditions of employment. See the May Department Stores Co., 191 NLRB 928 (1972). While Chapter 447 vests all authority respecting appropriate unit placement of employees with PERC, Chapter 13B-2(b)(1) authorized Respondent's City Manager to make such determinations. A further examination of Chapter 13B of the Ocala Code reveals that it makes a striking distinction between the authority guaranteed employees respecting the proper bounds for solicitation-distribution rules. Chapter 447.509, Florida Statutes, provides in pertinent part that during an employee's lunch hour, an employer may not restrict solicitation and distribution whereas Chapter 13B of the Respondent's Code restricts solicitation and distribution during working time and on the premises of the City, making no exception or distinction for lunch breaks and therefore Respondent's maintenance of such provisions amounts to unlawful interference, restraint and coercion within the meaning of Section 447.501(1)(a), Florida Statutes. Although the Respondent defends in part on the fact that no employee had been disciplined for violating the above referenced rules, legions of cases have held that the maintenance, without enforcement of an overly broad solicitation-distribution rule constitutes an unfair labor practice. (See for example Essex International, Inc., 211 NLRB 934, 86 LRRM 1411; Dreis and Krump Manufacturing, Inc., 221 NLRB 309, 90 LRRM 1647 (1975).
Recommendation Having found that the Respondent has violated the Act as stated above, I shall therefore recommend that it be ordered to: A. Post at its facilities, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are usually posted, on forms to be provided by the Commission, a notice substantially providing: that it will not in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce its employees in the exercise of any of the rights guaranteed them under the Florida Public Employees Relations Act; that it will upon request of the above-named employee organization, rescind the applicability of Chapter 13B of the Ocala Code as it relates to the regulation of organizational rights of employees, without having been first approved by the Commission. RECOMMENDED this 30th day of June, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Seymour H. Rowland, Jr., Esquire 105 Legal Center 19 N.W. Pine Avenue Ocala, Florida 32670 Jane Rigler, Esquire Staff Attorney Public Employees Relations Commission 2003 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 300 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Donald D. Slesnick, II, Esquire 2540 N.W. 29th Avenue Miami, Florida 33142
