Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Integra Corporation, had a dispute with the Florida Department of Revenue with respect to sales or use tax allegedly due in the amount of $605,305.70 on lease payments made on its rental of hotels from their owners. An assessment for taxes due was processed in the normal manner by the Department of Revenue. Integra Corporation filed a Protest of the assessment, and after the Department's Notice of Decision denied the Protest, Integra filed a timely Petition for Reconsideration. Ultimately the Department issued a Notice of Reconsideration which rejected the arguments of Integra Corporation. Integra Corporation agrees that the Notice of Reconsideration was transmitted on April 24, 1990, for it alleges that fact in paragraph 3 of its Petition. The Department's final rejection of the arguments made by Integra Corporation against the assessment of sales and use tax made in the Notice of Reconsideration dated April 24, 1990, prompted Integra Corporation to mail by certified mail, return receipt #P796 304 819, to the Division of Administrative Hearings on June 21, 1990, an original Petition challenging the Department's tax assessment. That petition was captioned Integra Corporation, Petitioner v. Department of Revenue, Respondent, and was filed by the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on June 25, 1990. No copy of the original Petition was served on the Department of Revenue, or its counsel. The opening paragraph states that Integra Corporation "hereby petitions the Department of Revenue for administrative proceedings. . ." The Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings realized that the Petition should not have been addressed to or filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings, and on that same day forwarded the Petition to the appropriate agency, the Department of Revenue, which received the Petition on June 27, 1990.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the petition filed by Integra Corporation be dismissed as untimely. DONE and ENTERED this 10th day of September, 1990, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of September, 1990.
The Issue Whether the "Additional Payment" made by Hernando HMA, Inc., d/b/a Brooksville Regional Hospital to Hernando County pursuant to a document entitled Lease Agreement, as amended, constitutes "rent" subject to sales tax under section 212.031, Florida Statutes.1/
Findings Of Fact Hernando HMA, Inc. (HMA) is a for-profit entity which operates Brooksville Regional Hospital, Spring Hill Regional Hospital, and other entities, as successor to an entity that was in Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings from 1993 to 1998, Regional Healthcare, Inc. (RHI). The Department is an agency of the State of Florida that has been delegated the responsibility to collect sales and use taxes imposed by chapter 212, Florida Statutes. In 1998, as part of RHI's bankruptcy plan, HMA and the County entered into various agreements, including a lease agreement (1998 Lease), regarding the use and operation of several RHI hospital properties and improvements owned by the County, and leased back to RHI. Under the 1998 Lease and other agreements, HMA agreed to continue to operate the hospital facilities for 30 years with possession of the real property and improvements to be returned to the County at the end of the lease term. Section 1.2W. of the 1998 Lease defined "Rental Payment" as follows: "Rental Payment" means all payments due from Lessee to Lessor or otherwise required to be paid by Lessee pursuant to the terms of this lease. The 1998 Lease further provided in section 3.3 under the heading "Rent": The annual rental payment of the Leased Premises for each year of the Lease Term (the "Rental Payment") shall be in the amount of Three Hundred Thousand and 00/100 Dollars ($300,000). This Rental Payment shall be paid to Lessor by Lessee on the Commencement Date and on each anniversary date of the Commencement Date during the Lease Term. The 1998 Lease also provided that HMA, as Lessee, would pay "all taxes, if any, prior to delinquency." Under the 1998 Lease, the County agreed to lease the premises in consideration of HMA’s timely payment of rent and timely performance of the other covenants and agreements required under the lease. It was an “event of default” under the lease if HMA failed to observe and perform any covenant, condition, or agreement on its part which could be cured by a payment of money. Remedies for default under the 1998 Lease included termination of the lease by the County and exclusion of HMA from possession of the leased premises. Even though the leased premises under the 1998 Lease were not subject to ad valorem taxes because they were owned by the County, during public discussions of the proposed 1998 Lease, an issue arose about HMA's responsibility for payment of fire assessments that would have been paid if the property was not immune or exempt from ad valorem taxes. HMA agreed, by separate agreement, to pay the fire assessments and buy a new ambulance to serve the community. The fire assessment agreement was by separate document that was included as part of the closing of the 1998 Lease and other agreements involving the hospital facilities in June 1998. The 1998 Lease was dated June 1, 1998. The 1998 Lease terms included a merger clause in section 15.6 entitled “ENTIRE AGREEMENT,” which provided: This lease may not be modified, amended or otherwise changed orally, but may only be modified, amended or otherwise changed by an agreement in writing signed by both parties. This Lease Agreement and its accompanying guaranty constitute the entire agreement between the parties affecting this Lease. This Lease Agreement supersedes and cancels any and all previous negotiations, arrangements, agreements, and understandings between the parties hereto with respect to the subject matter thereof, and no such outside or prior agreements shall be used to interpret or to construe this Lease. There are no promises, covenants, representations or inducements in addition to, or at variance with any of the terms of this Lease Agreement except the Guaranty. In 2001, the County and HMA began negotiations for relocation of the Brooksville Regional Hospital which was part of the leased premises described in the 1998 Lease. During the negotiations, HMA, through its attorney, Steven Mitchell, prepared a proposed comprehensive relocation agreement in consultation with former County Attorney Bruce Snow. Section 7.3 of the proposed relocation agreement contemplated revising the 1998 Lease and suggested the following preliminarily negotiated language for rental payments under a revised 1998 Lease: Rental Payments The Lessee shall pay to Lessor on the due date therefore as set forth in the Lease Agreement, the sum of Three Hundred Thousand and no/100 Dollars ($300,000.00) per annum. The Lessee shall pay to Lessor on an annual basis, either as rent or by virtue of a payment to Hernando County of the same sum to be used by Hernando County as it deems appropriate, an amount equal to the ad valorem taxes that would have been paid on the New Facility Site as improved with the New Facility if the New Facility Site were not owned by Hernando County but owned by a for-profit entity. In the event the New Facility Site and the New Facility located thereon are subsequently required by law to pay ad valorem taxes then the obligation to pay the amount described in Section 7.3(b) herein shall immediately terminate and Lessee shall be responsible for the payment of the appropriate ad valorem tax. The proposed comprehensive relocation agreement was discussed at public meetings held by the Hernando County Board of Commissioners on September 17 and September 25, 2001. The minutes of the September 25, 2001, meeting indicate that the County Administrator advised that the proposed relocation agreement contemplated that HMA would continue to pay $300,000 annually as rent, and “would make a payment-in-lieu of taxes annually to the County . . . .” The minutes also reflect that, in responding to a question from a commissioner regarding whether there should be language in the agreement that would protect the “payment-in-lieu of taxes” provision in the event the law changed: [Former County Attorney] Snow replied that it was his recommendation that there should be a provision that to the extent that the organic law of the State provided that facilities, such as the new hospital or other hospital under the lease, were taxable for ad valorem tax purposes, that that provision of the organic law would apply to ensure that that provision superseded. He explained that the lease provision to provide for an ad valorem tax payment was only to the extent that the organic law did not otherwise compel it so that the County would be receiving ad valorem tax under either scenario. The minutes from the September 25, 2001, meeting further state: Mr. Snow replied to County Attorney Garth Coller that there had been recent Supreme Court decisions which may have a bearing on the organic law to the extent that a decision of that nature indicated that the facilities were subject to ad valorem tax, notwithstanding the ownership issue, then they were subject to ad valorem tax and the lease would need to clarify that. He suggested that if the FS or Constitution should change, even in the absence of an interpretation of the Supreme Court decision, the change would obligate the payment of ad valorem taxes pursuant to the constitutional or statutory provisions. He explained that organic law pertained to provisions of FS or the Constitution as opposed to a Court decision. Mr. Snow’s reported reference to recent “Supreme Court decisions” regarding ad valorem taxes undoubtedly was referring the decision, among others, in Sebring Airport Authority v. McIntyre, 718 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 1998). In that decision, rendered a few months after the County entered into the 1998 Lease, the Supreme Court of Florida stated with regard to municipal (as opposed to county) property: [T]here is nothing in article VII, section 3 that allows the legislature to exempt from ad valorem taxation municipally owned property or any other property that is being used primarily for a proprietary purpose or for any purpose other than a governmental, municipal or public purpose. To the extent section 196.012(6) attempts to exempt from taxation municipal property used for a proprietary purpose, the statute is unconstitutional. Id. at 298. The Sebring case did not address tax immunity of county property as distinguished from the issue of tax exemptions for the proprietary use of municipal property. The proposed “Rental Payments” language for revisions to the 1998 Lease, however, demonstrates that the drafters of the comprehensive relocation agreement were aware of the possibility that the Sebring rationale could be expanded and applied to county property. The comprehensive relocation agreement was approved by the County, and executed in late 2001. Attached as to that relocation agreement as Schedule C was an unsigned document entitled “First Amendment to Lease Agreement” that was not to be executed until the new facility was completed and transferred to the County. Subsection 3.3 of the First Amendment to Lease Agreement entitled “Rental Payments” provided: Rental Payments The Lessee shall pay to the Lessor on the due date therefore as set forth in the Lease Agreement, the sum of Three Hundred Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($300,000.00) per annum. The Lessee shall pay to the Lessor on an annual basis, either as rent or by virtue of a payment to Hernando County of an amount (“Additional Payment”) equal to the sum of the following: An amount equal to that portion of the ad valorem taxes that would have been paid to Hernando County on the Leased Premises (as modified by the substitution of the New Facility Site for the Current Hospital Site) if the Leased Premises were not owned by Hernando County but owned by a for profit entity; and An amount equal to that portion of the ad valorem taxes that would have been paid to the Spring Hill Fire and Rescue District, the Township 22 Fire District and/or any other special taxing district that may be established pursuant to law; and An amount equal to all special assessments levied by Hernando County through any Municipal Service Benefit Unit created by Hernando County pursuant to the provisions of Section 125.01, Florida Statutes; and An amount equal to all ad valorem tax levied by Hernando County through any Municipal Service Taxing Unit created by Hernando County pursuant to the provisions of Section 125.01, Florida Statutes. In no event shall the Additional Payments exceed an amount equal to a full ad valorem tax assessment on the New Facility Site as determined annually by the Hernando County Property Appraiser. In the event the Lessee and/or Lessor is required by law to pay ad valorem taxes on the Leased Premises or any portion thereof, the obligation to pay to Lessor the Additional Payment described in this Section 3.3 shall immediately terminate (and/or be adjusted, whichever is applicable), and Lessee shall be responsible for payment of the appropriate ad valorem tax. The First Amendment to Lease Agreement further provided, “[e]xcept as expressly modified herein, all other terms and conditions set forth in the [1998] Lease Agreement are hereby ratified and confirmed.” The new hospital facility was completed and transferred to the County in 2005. On November 15, 2005, the County commission approved documents related to the transfer, including the First Amendment to Lease Agreement in the precise form as attached to the relocation agreement approved in 2001. The approval was obtained on a consent agenda, and the minutes reflect no further discussion by the commission or the public on the documents that were approved. In 2009, the Hernando County School District sued the County Property Appraiser, alleging that the properties subject to the 1998 Lease as amended by the First Amendment to Lease Agreement should not be exempt from ad valorem taxation. In a 13-page Order dismissing the School District’s action, Circuit Judge Daniel B. Merritt, Jr., distinguished the cases disallowing statutory ad valorem tax exemptions for properties owned by special tax districts or cities from the sovereign immunity against ad valorem taxes enjoyed by real estate owned by the State of Florida and its counties. In his ruling, Judge Merritt noted that Florida law specifically makes leasehold interests in governmental property subject to taxation, noting: The Legislature defines leasehold interests as intangible personal property and, hence, assessed by the Florida Department of Revenue, when: (1) rent is due; (2) the property is used for commercial purposes; (3) is not used for agriculture; (4) not financed with revenue bonds, and; (5) the lease is for an initial term of less than 100 years; §§196.199(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2008), 199.023(1)(d), Florida Statutes (2005), specifically preserved in Chapter 2006-312, Laws of Florida (2006). However, see below for further analysis with regard to presumed ownership of property leased for 100 years or more as set forth in §196.199(7), Florida Statutes. Judge Merritt also discussed those instances where “leased” property might not qualify as State or county property where lessees are the “equitable owners,” such as leaseholds of 100 years or more or where properties do not revert to the State until the end of a lease term. In his order, however, Judge Merritt noted that the tax immunity of the County was a fundamental attribute of county property and held that “under the terms of the Lease Agreements the Court concludes that HMA has merely the right to use and possession and is not the beneficial owner as a matter of law Hernando County’s immune property and improvements.” Judge Merritt’s Order was affirmed on appeal. School Board of Hernando County v. Mazourek, Case No. H-27-CA-2009-549 (5th Cir. 2009), per curiam aff’d, 2010 WL 4323055 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) In December, 2010, the Department notified the County it had been selected for a tax compliance audit under chapter 212, Florida Statutes, Sales and Use Tax. The audit period was from January 1, 2007, through December 31, 2009. The County’s personnel were cordial and receptive during the audit process and the Department’s auditor determined that the books and records kept by the County had adequate internal accounting controls in place and sufficient data integrity. Out of the approximately 19 tax registration accounts the County has with the Department, the Department’s auditor found exception with only tax account #12445797, the tax collected and remitted under its lease with HMA. In her record review, the Department’s auditor noticed invoices and worksheets from the County to HMA, titled “Payment in lieu of taxes.” In examining the First Amendment to the Lease Agreement, Section 3.3 “Rental Payments,” the Department’s auditor determined that the County was not collecting sales tax on a portion of the rent received under that section. The monthly tax return filed by the County under account # 12445797 reflected that it was collecting and remitting the sales tax calculated on the $300,000.00 annual rent payment, but was not collecting and remitting sales tax calculated on the additional payments in lieu of taxes. The Department’s auditor determined the additional payments, required under the lease and made as a condition of occupancy, constituted a taxable transaction as additional rent consideration. The amount of the additional payments, made January 2007 and March 2008, as revealed on the County’s “Payment in lieu of taxes worksheets,” was multiplied by 6.5 percent to arrive at the additional tax amount due of $78,710.17. On December 9, 2010, the Department issued a Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes, Form DR 1215, advising the County of its audit findings, which included $78,710.17 in taxes due, $14,526.37 in accrued interest through December 9, 2010, and a $19,677.55 late payment penalty. On December 21, 2010, the Department issued its Notice of Proposed Assessment, Form DR 831, showing an assessment of $78,710.17 in tax and $14,707.51 in accrued interest, for a total of $93,417.68 through December 21, 2010, with interest accruing thereafter at the rate of $15.10 per diem. All penalty amounts were waived. At the final hearing, the County argued that the additional payments from HMA under the First Amendment to Lease Agreement were not rent, but rather separate payments to pay for County services. While the actual language used in the First Amendment to Lease Agreement appears to unambiguously indicate that the additional payments were rent, the County offered additional evidence of facts and circumstances beyond the terms of the lease itself in support of its argument that the additional payments were not rent. That evidence was admitted, without objection, and has been considered in determining the intention of the parties to the lease with regard to the additional payments. In addition to evidence that the lease drafters were aware of certain cases decided on the issue of whether the leased premises would be subject to ad valorem taxes, the County offered the testimony of Mr. Mitchell regarding the “Rental Payments” language found in the First Amendment to Lease Agreement. When asked whether there had been much negotiation over the format or wording of the First Amendment to Lease Agreement, Mr. Mitchell recalled: No, there really wasn’t other than, you know, the concept – what this amendment does is what we had agreed to pay rental payment. The rental payment was $300,000. And then, we also had agreed independently just to go ahead and pay the County for certain services that they were providing to us. And then we specified those. Those were independent payments, not part of the rental payment. Mr. Mitchell further testified: [B]asically, this property is free of ad valorem tax. That is why the school board filed their lawsuit because, of course, they were not getting any of the ad valorem taxes. So, the property is free of payment of ad valorem taxes. We’re paying our 300,000. It was very, very clear. However, HMA felt that the County was providing certain services, the fire districts and whatnot. So, independent of the rent, we paid this amount. If you read the section dealing – it’s 3.3.[2], or whatever it is, which I’ll read it to you, it talks about, at the very end – and they did it for whatever reason the property became taxable, you know, it effectively became taxable and we had to pay full ad valorem taxes on the property, then the specialties – these additional payments we called, you know, would go away and they, effectively, be part of rent. That's why it talks about it as such, and it was either additional payment and/or rent. Contrary to Mr. Mitchell’s recollection, section 3.3.2 of the First Amendment to Lease Agreement does not speak in terms of “additional payment and/or rent” but rather states that another payment would be made “either as rent or by virtue of a payment to Hernando County of an amount ('Additional Payment') . . .". Mr. Mitchell makes a valid point regarding the fact that HMA was concerned about having to pay both the additional payment and ad valorem taxes. Consistent with this concern, the lease amendment made it clear that HMA would not have to pay the additional amount if the property ever became subject to ad valorem taxes. Mr. Mitchell’s testimony in support of the County’s contention that HMA’s payment in lieu of taxes under the First Amendment to Lease Agreement was not rent, however, is unpersuasive. Considering the extrinsic evidence offered by the County, especially evidence of the parties concern that the subject County property might someday be subject to ad valorem taxes, together with the 1998 Lease, language negotiated for the proposed relocation agreement, and the actual terms of the First Amendment to Lease Agreement, it is found that the parties intended the language under the "Rental Payments" section to assure that HMA did not have to pay the additional amount twice. The extrinsic evidence offered by the County, however, was insufficient to support a finding that the parties intended to differentiate between “rent” and the “additional payment” or that, however characterized, the payment in lieu of taxes was not rent subject to assessment by the Department. If the parties had wanted to provide language that designated the payment in lieu of taxes as a payment for services instead of rent they could have, as they did in the Second Amendment to Lease Agreement entered into on September 13, 2011, just ten days prior to the final hearing in this case.2/ That Second Amendment to Lease Agreement changed the name of section 3.3 from “Rental Payments,” as found in the First Amendment, to “Rent and Additional Payment for County Services.” Pertinent subsections of the Second Amendment further provided: 3.3.2 Additional Payment for County Services. The Lessee shall pay to Lessor on an annual basis, as an additional payment (“Additional Payment”) for services provided by Hernando County [in its role as a service provider and local taxing authority], . . . * * * The Additional Payment is not intended to constitute “rent” and is not intended to create an event subject to Florida sales tax – but rather is intended to constitute a separate payment for the provision of services, payable to the local taxing authority, as provided in § 212.031(1)(c), Florida Statutes (which allow parties by contractual arrangement to distinguish between payments which are intended to be taxable and payments which are intended to be nontaxable), as this section may be amended or renumbered from time to time.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that, consistent with the Notice of Proposed Assessment dated December 21, 2010, and this Recommended Order, the Department of Revenue enter a final order finding that Petitioner owes tax and interest due totaling $93,417.68 through December 21, 2010, with interest accruing thereafter at the rate of $15.10 per diem, without penalties. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of December, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of December, 2011.
Findings Of Fact In 1972 Petitioner received $743,982 of income from state and municipal bonds. On its federal income tax return the Petitioner allocated $471,229 of this amount to the policyholders' share as required by law and $272,753 to the company's share (Phase I). The Phase II figures were $359,669 and $384,313 respectively. Respondent has added back the entire $743,982 for purposes of computing Petitioner's Florida taxable income. Petitioner added back the $272,753 (Phase I) and $384,313 (Phase II). For 1972 Petitioner accrued $350,000 of Florida taxes on its federal income tax return. In computing its deductions on its federal income tax return 36.6612 percent of this amount was deducted in the Phase I computation and 51.6564 percent in the Phase II computation. Respondent has added back all of the Florida tax accrued in computing the Florida income tax owed by Petitioner. Petitioner's position is that only the company's percentages were deductible and only these amounts should be added back. The amount of additional Florida income tax assessment proposed for 1972 by the Respondent over that paid by Petitioner is $21,234. In 1973 Petitioner received $552,408 of income from state and municipal bonds. On its federal income tax return Petitioner allocated $335,662 of this amount to policyholders' share as required by law and $216,786 to the company's share (Phase I). The Phase II figures were $248,789 and $303,619 respectively. Respondent has added back the entire $552,408 for purposes of computing Petitioner's taxable income. Petitioner added back the $216,786 (Phase I) and $303,619 (Phase II). For 1973 Petitioner accrued $475,000 of Florida taxes on its federal income tax return. In computing its deductions on its federal income tax return 39.2438 percent of this amount was deductible in Phase I and 54.9628 percent in Phase II. Respondent has added back all of the Florida tax accrued. Petitioner's position is that only the company's percentages were deductible and only these amounts should be added back. The amount of additional Florida income tax assessment proposed for 1973 by Respondent was $20,184. It was further stipulated that the sole issues here involved are: The computation of the amount of tax exempt interest which is excludable from taxable income under section 103(a) Internal Revenue Code for purposes of the Florida corporate income tax; and The computation of the amount of Florida income tax accrued which is deductible for purposes of federal income tax and added back for purposes of computing the Florida income tax.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent should grant Petitioner's application for a sales tax exemption certificate as a charitable institution within the meaning of Section 212.08(7), Florida Statutes. 1/
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the governmental agency responsible for issuing sales tax exemption certificates in accordance with Section 212.08(7). Petitioner is a non-profit, Florida corporation and a charitable organization, within the meaning of Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, for purposes of the federal income tax. On December 29, 1995, Petitioner applied for an exemption from state sales and use tax ("sales tax") as a charitable institution. On February 8, 1996, Respondent denied Petitioner's application. The parties stipulated that Petitioner is a non-profit corporation. The parties further stipulated that the only exemption under which Petitioner may qualify for a sales tax exemption is the exemption for a charitable institution. In order to qualify as a charitable institution, Petitioner must provide one or more of seven services listed in Section 212.08(7). The parties stipulated that the only service Petitioner arguably provides as a charitable institution is that of raising funds for medical research within the meaning of Section 212.08(7)(o)2b(V). It is uncontroverted that Petitioner does not provide medical research directly. Petitioner raises funds for its national organization. The national organization then disburses funds raised by local affiliates. Petitioner failed to submit any competent and substantial evidence showing the disposition of funds by its national organization. Petitioner failed to show that its national organization either provides direct medical research or raises funds for one or more organizations that provide medical research.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order and therein DENY Petitioner's request for a sales tax exemption. RECOMMENDED this 4th day of June, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL S. MANRY, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of June, 1996.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner is liable for corporate income and excise taxes that have been assessed by Respondent.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a subsidiary of PBS Building Systems America, Inc. (PBS- A). PBS-A and Petitioner filed consolidated Florida income and excise tax returns during the time in question. During the years in question, PBS-A had no tax nexus with Florida, but incurred losses that were available to offset gross income. During the years in question, Petitioner had nexus with Florida and incurred taxable income. The filing of the consolidated return reduced the taxable income of Petitioner by the losses of PBS-A. On December 19, 1990, Respondent issued two notices of proposed assessment for years ending December 31, 1985, through March 31, 1989. One notice identifies $8273 of unpaid corporate excise tax, plus $2798 of interest through September 15, 1990. The notice states that interest would continue to accrue at the daily rate of $2.27. The second notice of proposed assessment identifies $55,480 of unpaid corporate income tax, plus $20,254 of interest through September 15, 1990. The notice states that interest continues to accrue at the daily rate of $15.20. Petitioner filed a notice of protest dated February 15, 1991. By notice of decision dated October 17, 1991, Respondent rejected the protest and sustained the proposed deficiencies. The claimed deficiency for unpaid corporate income tax, however, was revised to $75,039. A notice of reconsideration dated July 21, 1992, restates the conclusions of the notice of decision. By petition for formal hearing dated September 16, 1992, Petitioner requested a formal hearing concerning the tax liabilities in question and specifically the conclusion that PBS- A was ineligible to file a consolidated return in Florida due to the absence of tax nexus with Florida. The September 16 letter recites facts to establish tax nexus with Florida through the establishment of financing relationships. However, it is unnecessary to consider the sufficiency of these factual assertions because they represent mere allegations. Petitioner failed to produce any evidence in the case and, when noticed for a corporate deposition, failed to appear. Additionally, Petitioner's failure to respond to requests for admission results in admissions that, during the relevant period, PBS-A was not a bank, brokerage house, or finance corporation and did not lend money to Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order sustaining the above-described assessments against Petitioner. ENTERED on February 12, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of February, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Dr. James Zingale, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 Attorney Lisa Raleigh Department of Legal Affairs Tax Section, Capitol Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050 Kathryn M. Jaques Arthur Andersen & Co. Suite 1600 701 B Street San Diego, CA 92101-8195
Findings Of Fact On September 30, 2010, Petitioner submitted an online application for a tax registration as a new business entity. Respondent began the process of creating an internal "account" for Petitioner on October 1, 2010. On October 2, 2010, Respondent's database system created a delinquency notice advising Petitioner that sales and use tax returns for calendar years 2007, 2008, and 2009 had not been received. On October 4, 2010, Respondent received an envelope from Petitioner containing sales and use tax returns for calendar years 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010, as well as Petitioner's signed Tax Amnesty Agreement. No remittance accompanied the tax returns (or the remittance check was misplaced), so the Department's system generated a billing notice to Petitioner dated December 10, 2010, and a Notice of Final Assessment dated January 25, 2011. Petitioner advised Respondent that a check had been sent along with the tax returns. Discussions between the parties ensued, and Petitioner was asked to provide a replacement check. On or about March 11, 2011, Respondent received a replacement payment from Petitioner. Petitioner, by way of his replacement check, paid the Department the sum of one thousand eighty-nine dollars and forty-three cents ($1,089.43) in full settlement of all amounts due and owing under Petitioner's sales and use tax returns for calendar years 2007, 2008, 2009, and, although not included in the initial petitions, 2010. Respondent accepted the payment made by Petitioner in full settlement of the sales and use taxes owed for the years in question. Petitioner is not liable for any further penalties, interest, or other payments on the aforementioned tax returns.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, it is RECOMMENDED that the petitions for administrative hearing in this case be dismissed, as there are no further disputed issues of material fact. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of April, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of April, 2011. COPIES FURNISHED: Lisa Vickers, Executive Director Department of Revenue The Carlton Building, Room 104 501 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Marshall Stranburg, General Counsel Department of Revenue The Carlton Building, Room 204 501 South Calhoun Street Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 Patrick John McGinley, Esquire Law Office of Patrick John McGinley, P.A. 2265 Lee Road, Suite 100 Winter Park, Florida 32789 John Mika, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
Findings Of Fact On or about August 18, 1977, Respondent, Charles Leon Winkleman (Winkleman), filed an application with Petitioner, Office of the Comptroller, Department of Banking and Finance (Department) for registration as an associated person with Tax Favored Securities, Inc., now known as Global Investors Securities, Inc. Winkleman's application was granted November 1, 1977. On April 11, 1984, Winkleman pled guilty to an information filed in the United States District Court, Southern District of Florida (District Court) , Case No. 84-6043-Cr-JLK, which charged that he: did wilfully and knowingly aid assist in, and counsel, procure, and advise the preparation and presentation to the Internal Revenue Service of a United States Individual Income Tax Return (Form 1040) of William I. and Amy Steele Donner for the calendar year 1978 which was false and fraudulent as to a material matter, in that it represented that said William I. Donner was entitled under the provisions of the Internal Revenue laws to claim deductions in the sum of $83,313.00 representing an ordinary loss of income, as a result of being owner of a sole proprietorship managed by Charles L. Winkleman, whereas, as . Winkleman . . . then and there well knew and believed William I. Donner was not entitled to said deductions all in violation of Title 26 United States Code, Section 7206(2). 1/ On April 18, 1984, Winkleman filed an amended Form U-4 with the Central Registration Depository, and thereby advised interested parties that he had pled guilty to the information filed in the District Court. A copy of the amended Form U-4 was, contemporaneously, filed with the Department. 2/ On June 6, 1984, the District Court entered a judgment of guilt on Winkleman's plea. Winkleman was sentenced to six months imprisonment and fined $3,000.00. Winkleman failed, however, to notify the Department of such conviction until April 10, 1987, and offered no explanation at hearing for such failure. Following Winkleman's plea of guilty in the District Court, the Department of Commerce and Economic Development, Division of Banking, Securities and Corporations (Department of Commerce) in Juneau, Alaska, issued a notice of intent to revoke Winkleman's registration. This notice, dated June 4, 1984, sought revocation based primarily on Winkleman's plea of guilty to the charges filed in the District Court. Winkleman failed to notify the Department of the pendency of the Alaska proceeding until April 10, 1987, and offered no explanation at hearing for such failure. On March 10, 1987, the Department of Commerce entered an order revoking Winkleman's registration in Alaska based on his conviction in the District Court. By amended Form U-4, filed April 10, 1987, Winkleman advised the Department of his conviction in the District Court and the revocation of his registration by the State of Alaska. 3/ The order of the Department of Commerce, revoking Winkleman's registration, is currently on appeal. Winkleman seeks reversal of such order predicated on his assertion that the Department of Commerce breached an agreement to allow him to withdraw his registration in lieu of revocation. On July 20, 1987, the court, which is reviewing the Department of Commerce proceedings, entered an order staying the order of revocation pending the disposition of Winkleman's appeal. On April 1, 1987, a hearing was held before the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD), to consider whether Winkleman, because of his conviction, should be disqualified as a registered representative with Global Investors Securities, Inc. On August 13, 1986, NASD entered a "Notice Pursuant to Rule 19h-1 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934" whereby it proposed that Winkleman not be disqualified. On January 8, 1987, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rendered its decision that it would not invoke Section 15A(g)(2) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 to direct NASD to disqualify Winkleman.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the registration of Respondent, Charles Leon Winkleman, as an associated person under the Florida Securities and Investor Protection Act be REVOKED. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of October, 1987, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of October, 1987.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner owes State of Florida use tax and local government infrastructure tax on the alleged use of three airplanes.
Findings Of Fact Charles and Dorothy Tolbert own and operate American Aircraft International, Inc. (American). American is in the business primarily of selling and brokering aircraft sales. Most of American's business involves brokering in which American earns a commission or fee for putting together a seller and buyer and bringing the transaction to a conclusion. On a much less frequent basis, American will purchase an airplane for resale. American advertises the availability of its airplanes, both brokered and American-owned, for either sale or lease. However, American has not had occasion to lease one of its own aircraft except as part of a lease-purchase agreement. American does not make any other use of airplanes it offers for sale or lease, except as necessary for maintenance and repairs and for demonstration to prospective purchasers or lessees. Such use would be cost-prohibitive. Fuel, crew, and insurance costs would be well in excess of the cost of a ticket on a commercial airline. American's insurance policy only covers the use of the planes for demonstration and maintenance purposes. On February 6, 1990, American traded for a King Air 200, N56GR, serial number 059, at an acquisition value of $650,000. The King Air 200 was delivered to American from Carlisle, Kentucky, and held by American for resale purposes only and was flown only for purposes of maintenance and repairs and for demonstration to prospective purchasers. When it was sold in 1991 to an English company, BC Aviation, Ltd., American had flown the aircraft only 7 hours. The aircraft was delivered out-of- state in May 1991. In July 1991, American bought a kit for a home-built aircraft called the Renegade, serial number 445. The kit was manufactured and sold by a company in British Columbia, Canada. American's intent in purchasing the kit was to build the airplane and decide whether to become a dealer. It took a year and a half to build, and by the time it was completed, American decided not to pursue the dealership. In September of 1991, American sold the Renegage to the Tolberts. The Tolberts registered the Renegade in September 1994, under N493CT. At first, the Tolberts did not pay sales tax on their purchase of the Renegade. They thought that, since they owned American, no sales tax was due. When the Department audited American and pointed out that sales tax was due, the Tolberts paid the tax in December 1994. In 1991, American also purchased a King Air B90, N988SL, serial number LJ438, for $175,000. The King Air B90 was held by American for resale purposes only and was flown only for purposes of maintenance and repairs and for demonstration to prospective purchasers. In July 1991, American sold the aircraft to Deal Aviation of Chicago, Illinois. However, Deal could not qualify for its own financing, so American agreed to lease-sell the aircraft to Deal. Under the lease-purchase agreement entered into on July 21, 1991, the purchase price was $269,000, payable $4,747.85 a month until paid in full. (The agreement actually said payments would be made for 84 months, but that would amount to total payments well in excess of the purchase price; the evidence did not explain this discrepancy.) American continued to hold title to the aircraft and continued to make payments due to the bank on American's financing for the aircraft. The lease- purchase agreement must have been modified, or payments accelerated, because American transferred title to the aircraft in April 1993. The Department asserted that a Dolphin Aviation ramp rental invoice on the King Air B90 issued in August for the month of September 1991 reflected that the aircraft was parked at the Sarasota-Bradenton Airport at the time of the invoice, which would have been inconsistent with American's testimony and evidence. But the invoice contained the handwritten notation of Dorothy Tolbert that the airplane was "gone," and her testimony was uncontradicted that she telephoned Dolphin when she got the invoice and to inform Dolphin that the invoice was in error since the plane had not been at the ramp since Deal removed it to Illinois on July 21, 1991. As a result, no ramp rent was paid after July 1991. Indeed, the Department's own audit schedules reflect that no ramp rent was paid on the King Air B90 after July 1991. The Department also presented an invoice dated September 16, 1991, in the amount of $3400 for engine repairs done on the King Air B90 by Hangar One Aviation in Tampa, Florida. The invoice reflects that the repairs were done for American and that they were paid in full on September 19, 1991, including Florida sales tax. The Department contended that the invoice was inconsistent with American's testimony and evidence. But although American paid for these repairs, together with Florida sales tax, Mrs. Tolbert explained that the repairs were made under warranty after the lease-purchase of the airplane by Deal. A minor engine problem arose soon after Deal removed the airplane to Illinois. Deal agreed to fly the plane to Hangar One for the repairs, and American agreed to pay for the repairs. After the repairs were made, Hangar One telephoned Mrs. Tolbert with the total, and she gave Hangar One American's credit card number in payment. She did not receive American's copy of the invoice until later. She does not recall if she: noticed the Florida sales tax and did not think to question it; noticed it and decided it was not enough money ($179) to be worth disputing; or just did not notice the Florida sales tax. When American's certified public accountant (CPA), Allan Shaw, prepared American's federal income tax return for 1990, he included the King Air 200 as a fixed capital asset on the company's book depreciation schedule and booked $26,146 of depreciation on the aircraft for 1990 on a cost basis of $650,000. For federal tax purposes, he took the maximum allowable depreciation deduction on the aircraft ($92,857) by attributing a seven-year life to the aircraft and using the double declining balance method of calculating depreciation. The next year, 1991, Shaw included the both the King Air B90 and the Renegade as fixed capital assets on the company's book depreciation schedule. He booked $9,378 of depreciation on the B90 on a cost basis of $175,000 and $1,872 on the Renegade on a cost basis of $25,922 for part of the year 1991. For federal tax purposes, he took the maximum allowable depreciation deduction on the B90 ($12,507) by attributing a seven-year life to the aircraft and using the double declining balance method of calculating depreciation. This depreciation was subtracted from the "gross income from other rental activities" on Schedule K of the return in the amount of $22,796, which represented the payments from Deal under the lease-purchase agreement. The Renegade was depreciated for the same amount as its book depreciation, and no income was recorded as having been generated from use of the Renegade. The next year, 1992, Shaw again included the both the King Air B90 and the Renegade as fixed capital assets on the company's book depreciation schedule. He booked $35,613 of depreciation on the B90 and $5,555 on the Renegade. For federal tax purposes, he took the maximum allowable depreciation deduction on the B90 ($25,014) by attributing a seven-year life to the aircraft and using the double declining balance method of calculating depreciation. This depreciation was subtracted from the "gross income from other rental activities" on Schedule K of the return in the amount of $51,737, which again represented the payments from Deal under the lease-purchase agreement. The Renegade was depreciated for the same amount as its book depreciation, and no income was recorded as having been generated from use of the Renegade. It is not clear from the evidence why American's CPA decided American was entitled to claim depreciation on the three aircraft in question. (Shaw also depreciated another airplane in 1989 which was before the period covered by the Department's audit.) Shaw's final hearing and deposition testimony was confusing as to whether he recalled discussing the question with the Tolberts. He may have; if he did, he probably discussed it with Mrs. Tolbert. Meanwhile, Mrs. Tolbert does not recall ever discussing the question of depreciation with Shaw. In all likelihood, Shaw probably made his own decision that American could depreciate the airplanes to minimize income taxes by claiming that they were fixed capital assets used in the business and not just inventory items being held for resale. For the King Air B90, there were lease payments Shaw could use to justify his decision; but there were no lease payments for the King Air 200 or the Renegade. The evidence was not clear whether there were lease payments for the airplane Shaw depreciated in 1989. For the next year, 1993, Shaw included the Renegade as a fixed capital asset on the company's book depreciation schedule and booked $7,712 of depreciation on the Renegade. For federal tax purposes, the Renegade was depreciated for the same amount as its book depreciation, and no income was recorded as having been generated from use of the Renegade. When the Department audited American starting in July 1994, tax auditor William Berger saw the depreciation schedules and tax returns, both of which indicated to him that the three airplanes in question were used by the company, but no sales or use tax was paid on them. (He also pointed out the Tolberts' failure to pay sales tax on the purchase of the Renegade from American, and the Tolberts later paid the tax, as previously mentioned.) As a result, on July 26, 1995, the Department issued two notices of intent. One was to make sales and use tax audit changes which sought to assess American $56,097.77 in use taxes, together with delinquent penalties of $14,657.36 and interest through July 26, 1995, in the amount of $31,752.61, for a total of $102,507.74, with subsequent interest accruing at the rate of $18.44 per day. The second was to make local government infrastructure surtax audit changes which sought to assess American $609.99 in the surtax, together with delinquent penalties of $163.14 and interest through July 26, 1995, in the amount of $256.33, for a total of $1,029.46, with subsequent interest accruing at the rate of $.20 per day. It is not clear from the record how the Department arrived at the use tax and surtax figures. The alleged use tax assessment should have been calculated as $51,061.32 (six percent of the acquisition costs of the airplanes), and the alleged surtax assessment should have been calculated at the statutory maximum of $50 per item, for a total of $150. On August 28, 1995, American made a partial payment of $5,496.44 on the Department's use tax and surtax audit change assessments, intending to leave a disputed assessed amount of $51,061.32 in use tax and $150 in surtax. It is not clear from the record what American intended the $5,496.44 to apply towards. American filed an Informal Protest of the use tax and surtax audit change assessments on February 26, 1996. The Informal Protest contended that the use tax and surtax were not due and that the federal income tax depreciation schedules were "not determinative." On October 6, 1996, the Department issued a Notice of Decision denying American's protest primarily on the ground that the depreciation of the aircraft for federal income tax purposes constituted using them for use tax purposes. After receiving the Notice of Decision, on November 4, 1996, American filed amended tax returns to remove the depreciation of the airplanes (together with the "gross income from other rental activities" on Schedule K of the 1991 return). (Although CPA Shaw refused to admit it, it is clear that American's federal income tax returns were amended in order to improve its defense against the Department's use tax and surtax assessments.) As a result of the amended returns, American had to pay an additional $15,878 in federal income tax on the 1990 return; there was no change in the tax owed on any of the other returns. On November 6, 1996, American filed a Petition for Reconsideration on the ground that the returns had been amended and the additional federal income tax paid. On January 10, 1997, the Department issued a Notice of Reconsideration denying American's Petition for Reconsideration on the ground that "subsequent modifications made to the federal income tax returns will have no affect [sic] upon" the use tax and surtax assessments.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order withdrawing the assessment of use tax and local government infrastructure surtax, delinquent penalties, and interest against American. RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of October, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax FILING (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of October, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Harold F. X. Purnell, Esquire Rutledge, Ecenia, Underwood, Purnell & Hoffman, P.A. Post Office Box 551 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0551 Albert J. Wollermann, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Linda Lettera, Esquire Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the matters in issue here, Bellot Realty operated a real estate sales office in Inverness, Florida. The Department of Transportation was the state agency responsible for the operation of the state's relocation assistance payment program relating to business moves caused by road building operations of the Department or subordinate entities. Frank M. Bellot operated his real estate sales office and mortgage brokerage, under the name Bellot Realty, at property located at 209 W. Main Street in Inverness, Florida since July, 1979. He operated a barber shop in the same place from 1962 to 1979. He moved out in October, 1991 because of road construction and modification activities started by the Department in 1989. The office was located in a strip mall and the other tenants of the mall were moving out all through 1990. Mr. Bellot remained as long as he did because when the Department first indicated it would be working in the area, its representatives stated they would be taking only the back portion of the building. This would have let Mr. Bellot remain. As time went on, however, the Department took the whole building, including his leasehold, which forced him out. He received a compensation award from the Department but nothing from any other entity. Though the instant project is not a Federal Aid Project, the provisions of Section 24.306e, U.S.C. applies. That statute defined average annual net earnings as 1/2 of net earnings before federal, state and local income taxes during the two taxable years immediately prior to displacement. During 1988, Mr. Bellot's staff consisted of himself and between 3 and 5 other agents from whom he earned income just as had been the case for several prior years. In 1988 his Federal Corporate Income Tax return reflected gross income of $120,843.00 and his profit was reflected as $27,377.25. The Schedule C attached to his personal Form 1040 for that year reflected gross sales of $25,078.00 with deductions of $5,250.00 for a net income of $19,828.00. Two of his agents foresaw the downturn in business as a result of the road change and left his employ during 1989. A third got sick and her working ability, with its resultant income, was radically reduced. This agent was his biggest producer. For 1989, Petitioner's tax return reflected the company's gross receipts were down to $50,935.75 and his operating loss was $5,700.03. However, the Schedule C for the 1989 Form 1040 reflected gross revenue of $21,450 with a net profit of $14,503. In 1990, the Schedule C for the Form 1040 reflected gross receipts of $5,565.00 which, after deduction of expenses, resulted in a net profit of $1,665.00 for the year. The corporate return reflects gross receipts of $23,965.96 and a net income figure from operations of $1,282.21. Mr. Bellot contends that neither 1989 or 1990 were typical business years as far as earnings go. Aside from a loss of activity and a general decline in business in Inverness, his parents, who were always in the office due to a terminal illness, caused him lost work time as he was very busy with them. He was also involved in a move and in refurbishing a house. In 1990, Mr. Bellot decided he could no longer stay in his office location due to the fact that the Department decided to take his whole building. Even if the taking had been of only one-half the building, however, it still would have put him out of business because it would have taken his parking area. At that time, the Department was rushing Mr. Bellot to vacate the premises. He was in difficult financial straits, however, and it would not have been possible for him to move but for the Department's compensation payments. As it was, he claims, the compensation was after the fact, and he had to borrow $30,000.00 in his mother's name in order to rehabilitate the building he moved into. Instead of utilizing income figures from years in which business activity was normal, the Department chose to use the income figures from 1989 and 1990, both of which were, he claims, for one reason or another, extraordinary. In doing so, since the income in those years was much lower than normal, the compensation he received was also much lower, he claims, than it should have been. He received $8,725.50. Had the 1988 and 1989 years income been used, the payment would have been $20,000.00, the maximum. He also claims the Department used the incorrect operating expense figures concerning travel expense. The Schedule C reflects a higher deduction for automobile expense for both years, arrived at by the application of a standard mileage expense approved by the Internal Revenue Service. In actuality, the expense was considerably less and, if the real figures had been used, his income would have been increased substantially for both years. Mr. Bellot's appeal was reviewed by Ms. Long, the Department's administrator for relocation assistance who followed the provisions of departmental manual 575-040-003-c which, at paragraph (IV) on page 33 of 35, requires the displacee to furnish proof of income by tax returns or other acceptable evidence. At subparagraph (e) on page 31 of 35 of the manual, the requirement exists for the displaced business to "contribute materially" to the income of the displace person for the "two taxable years prior to the displacement." If those two years are not representative, the Department may approve an alternate two year period if "the proposed construction has already caused an outflow of residents, resulting in a decline of net income. " To grant an alternative period, then, the Department must insure that the loss of income is due to the Department's construction and not to other considerations. Here, the Department's District Administrator took the position it was not it's actions which caused the Petitioner's loss of income. Ms. Long took the same position. The Department's District 5 initially notified the people of Inverness of the proposed project somewhere around 1988. The project was to straighten Main Street out through downtown Inverness for approximately 2 miles. There is no evidence as to when the first affected party moved and Ms. Long does not know whether or not the project had an adverse effect on business in downtown Inverness. Petitioner's evidence does not show that it did.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's appeal of the Department's decision to refuse to use alternate tax years or actual mileage deduction in its calculation of a relocation assistance payment be denied. RECOMMENDED this 29th day of December, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of December, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: Accepted. & 3. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and, in part, incorporated herein. Rejected as not proven by competent, non-hearsay, evidence. Accepted. Not proven. Merely a statement of Petitioner's position. Accepted that Petitioner's business income dropped. It cannot be said that the road project's were the primary cause of the decline in Petitioner's business. There is no independent evidence of this. Accepted and incorporated herein. First sentence accepted. Balance not based on independent evidence of record. Not a proper Finding of Fact but a comment on the evidence. First sentence accepted. Second sentence rejected. Accepted and incorporated herein. Not a Finding of Fact but a restatement of and attempted justification of Petitioner's position. Accepted and incorporated herein. Rejected as argument and not Finding of Fact. Not a Finding of Fact but a recapitulation of the evidence. FOR THE RESPONDENT: Accepted. & 3. Accepted. - 6. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. & 10. Accepted. 11. & 12. Accepted. 13. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 James R. Clodfelter Acquisitions Consultant Enterprises, Inc. P.O. Box 1199 Deerfield Beach, Florida 33443 Ben G. Watts Secretary Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Thornton Jpp. Williams General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458
