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DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION vs. MELVIN WILLIAMS, 88-005829 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-005829 Latest Update: May 09, 1989

Findings Of Fact Respondent was born on February 4, 1957. He attended the Orlando Police Academy from March to June, 1980. Academically, he ranked eighth among the 47 recruits. He received the Mayor's Award for overall performance. In 1980, after graduating from the Orlando Police Academy, Respondent joined the Orlando Police Department. He completed his field training without incident and then was assigned to patrol duty. After about six months, Respondent, who was already serving as an instructor at the Orlando Police Department, was requested to be an assistant squad leader. An assistant squad leader performs all of the duties of the sergeant when the sergeant is absent. After about six months as an assistant squad leader, a major asked Respondent to become field training coordinator in the training section. After a year on this assignment, Respondent was promoted to sergeant and then spent another year on the road as a patrol sergeant. At this point, the major in charge of the field operations bureau of the patrol division, asked Respondent to become his administrative assistant. Respondent served two majors a total of about a year in this position. Respondent was on track toward entering management in the police department. After a year as an administrative assistant, Respondent was assigned to the criminal investigation division where he was in charge of the youth section. This was Respondent's position when he left the Orlando Police Department in the middle of 1986. In early 1985, Respondent met Donna Jackson while he was working off- duty. At this time, Respondent and his wife had been separated since late 1983 or early 1984. After the initial meeting and before any additional encounters, Respondent ran a background check on Ms. Jackson and found that she had been on probation about three years earlier for possession of a controlled substance. When Respondent informed Ms. Jackson that her background precluded any relationship due to his employment, she began crying and told him that she had been trying to put her life back in order. That evening, Respondent and Ms. Jackson commenced an intimate relationship. A few months into the relationship, Respondent learned that Ms. Jackson had been misleading him and was not trying to get her life back together. By August or September, 1985, the relationship began to deteriorate. Ms. Jackson began to consume alcohol heavily and having male visitors late at night. Respondent and Ms. Jackson began to fight. The domestic disputes occasionally involved some physical contact, but the contact was insubstantial. One evening, Respondent and Ms. Jackson had gone to a nightclub in Seminole County where they met a woman who invited them to a party at her residence. As they began to leave the parking lot of the nightclub, Ms. Jackson and the woman lit up a marijuana cigarette. Respondent immediately objected and insisted that he and Ms. Jackson go home, which they did. However, Respondent, who lacked the power to arrest Ms. Jackson and the woman because it was a misdemeanor outside of his jurisdiction, did not report the incident to the Seminole County Sheriff's Office. At this point, Respondent learned from Ms. Jackson's mother the severity of her past drug problems. Respondent broke off the relationship at this point, expressing a desire to remain friends only. By April, 1986, Respondent had not seen Ms. Jackson for a couple of months. Ms. Jackson's mother telephoned and told him that Ms. Jackson had taken a turn for the worse and had lost her apartment. Ms. Jackson, who was abusing drugs heavily again, and her young daughter were living on the streets. Ms. Jackson's mother begged Respondent to help them. At about this time, Ms. Jackson had been arrested in Orlando for driving without a license. She had asked that one of the officers contact Respondent. When he spoke with Ms. Jackson, Respondent assured her that he would try to help her as a friend. Released before her court appearance, Ms. Jackson failed to appear in court. Having spoken with Ms. Jackson's probation officer about the possibility of admitting her into a rehabilitation program, Respondent informed Ms. Jackson that he would arrest her if he saw her driving because he knew she no longer had a license. Respondent and the probation officer thought that such an arrest might help them find a place for Ms. Jackson in a program. Respondent later saw her driving an automobile, arrested her, and contacted her probation officer about placing her in a program. However, she bonded out, of jail before they could do anything. Shortly after Ms. Jackson was released from jail, the probation officer caused an arrest warrant to be issued for Ms. Jackson for violation of the conditions of her probation. Again, the intent was to use this means to find her a place in a rehabilitation program. The morning that the violation-of probation warrant was issued, which was on or about September 23, 1986, Ms. Jackson's mother telephoned Respondent and told him that she knew where Ms. Jackson was. At that point, the probation officer informed Respondent that a facility had a bed available for Ms. Jackson if they could detain her involuntarily. Respondent immediately found Ms. Jackson and arrested her. A minor scuffle occurred between Respondent and a female companion of Ms. Jackson, and Respondent soiled and tore his suit. Respondent then began to transport Ms. Jackson in an unmarked vehicle to the booking department. After learning that they did not yet have the violation-of-probation warrant, Respondent pulled the car over and he and Ms. Jackson began to talk about why she had refused his help. Ms. Jackson then asked if Respondent would take her to see her mother before taking her to jail. Although they were near the booking department at the time and Ms. Jackson's parents lived 5-10 miles away, Respondent agreed to take her to see her mother before going to jail. While at the parents' home, Respondent, who is a careful dresser, noticed for the first time the condition of his suit as a result of the earlier scuffle. When they left the parents' home, Respondent decided to drop by his apartment in order to change his clothes before taking her in for booking. While at the apartment with Ms. Jackson, Respondent was unable to resist her entreaties to have sex with her one more time. Following sex, he took her to the booking department where she was processed on the violation-of- probation warrant. Upset that Respondent had arrested her and refused to let her go, on October 9, 1986, Ms. Jackson falsely accused Respondent of raping her when they had intercourse in his apartment on the day of her arrest. Respondent cooperated fully with the internal investigation and candidly answered all questions asked of him. He resigned from the Orlando Police Department at that time. Shortly after this incident, Respondent began to see his estranged wife again and, about two or three months later, they were reconciled. Until Ms. Jackson's false charges were resolved, Respondent worked as a salesman for Cablevision of Central Florida where he quickly emerged as one of the top three sales representatives. He also underwent extensive counselling with his pastor at church and other ministers. Several of the ministers testified at the hearing as to Respondent's good moral character, notwithstanding the obvious mistakes he made with respect to his relationship with Ms. Jackson. The state attorney declined to prosecute the case and the charges were dropped in June, 1987 Respondent immediately began applying to other police departments for a position as an officer. After several unsuccessful attempts, he finally was offered an entry-level officer's position with the Titusville Police Department. Although he had made about $37,000 during the past ten months as a salesman, he agreed to an $18,000 annual salary with the Titusville Police Department because of his love for law enforcement. Respondent is currently assigned to the tactical unit of the Titusville Police Department. His record has been exemplary. His performance under pressure, including on one occasion the fatal shooting of another officer, has been outstanding, and he has assumed a significant leadership role among the officers in the department. Numerous law enforcement officers testified on behalf of Respondent. Several testified that domestic disputes of the type in this case are not uncommon among law enforcement officers. Several testified that they would have done nothing under the circumstances had they observed Ms. Jackson and the other woman smoking marijuana outside of their jurisdiction. The testimony of three witness has been given considerable weight. Ms. Jackson's parents testified to her manipulativeness and, more importantly, the positive effect that Respondent had had upon her. Regrettably, they testified that she has not recovered from her battle with drug abuse and they were, at the time of the hearing, unaware of where she was living. Titusville Police Chief Charles Ball, who has been in law enforcement for over 20 years and chief of the department for 10 years, testified that the revocation of Respondent's certificate would represent a loss to the Titusville Police Department and law enforcement generally. Chief Ball testified that Respondent is of good moral character, even considering the poor judgment described above.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing the Administrative Complaint. ENTERED this 9th day of May, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of May, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Stewart Cohen, Esq. Pilacek & Cohen 1516 East Hillcrest Street Suite 204 Orlando, FL 32803 Joseph S. White, Esq. Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302 Jeffrey Long, Director Criminal Justice standards and Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302 Daryl McLaughlin, Executive Director Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302 Rodney Gaddy, Esq. General Counsel Criminal Justice standards and Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302

Florida Laws (3) 120.57943.13943.1395
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GENNIE C. BAGLEY vs CITY OF TAMPA, FLORIDA, 06-000592 (2006)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Feb. 15, 2006 Number: 06-000592 Latest Update: Nov. 15, 2006

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner based on Petitioner's race.

Findings Of Fact Ms. Bagley, an African-American, was employed by the City from 1987 until her termination on July 9, 2004. At the time of her termination, she was employed as a Code Enforcement Officer II. On Monday, March 15, 2004,1 Ms. Bagley called her supervisor, Larry Canelejo (Mr. Canelejo), and advised him that she would be late to work because she had to assist her mother. Mr. Canelejo approved her absence. Ms. Bagley's normal work hours on March 15, 2004, were 8 a.m. to 5 p.m., Monday through Friday. On March 15, 2004, she arrived to work at 11 a.m. She did not work through her lunch on that day or stay later to make up the time that she was late. On Thursday, March 18, 2004, Ms. Bagley turned in a time and attendance sheet showing that she had worked from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. on March 15, 2004. Mr. Canelejo verbally asked Ms. Bagley to turn in a leave slip for the time that she was absent on March 15, 2004. Ms. Bagley did not turn in a leave slip, and Mr. Canelejo sent an e-mail to Ms. Bagley on March 18, 2004, requesting that she do so and indicating that disciplinary action would result for her failure to do so. Instead of turning in a leave slip for her three-hour absence, Ms. Bagley wrote a memorandum to Darrell Smith, Chief of Staff, complaining that she had been requested to submit a leave request for time she was absent from work when other workers who were absent were not required to submit a leave request for their absence. On the morning of Friday, March 19, 2004, Mr. Canelejo sent another e-mail to Ms. Bagley requesting that she submit her time card and leave slip by 11:30 a.m. Ms. Bagley retrieved the time card that she had previously submitted and covered her signature with white-out. She did not submit a leave slip as requested by her supervisor. Mr. Canelejo marked on Ms. Bagley's time sheet that she was absent without leave for three hours on March 15, 2004, and submitted a leave slip for Ms. Bagley showing that she was absent without leave for that time. The time card and leave slip was later changed by the City's personnel office to sick leave for others. On March 17, 2004, Mr. Canelejo received a complaint from the general manager of Wendy's Restaurant located on North 15th Street in Tampa, Florida. The general manager advised Mr. Canelejo that Ms. Bagley had come into the restaurant on three separate occasions demanding that she be given free food for food that she had purchased which she felt was bad. Ms. Bagley did not have receipts for the previously-purchased food, and indicated that other managers in the store had told her that she could get free replacements for the bad food. The general manager advised Mr. Canelejo that other managers at Wendy had not given authorization for Ms. Bagley to receive free food. A co-manager at Wendy's also wrote to the City confirming Ms. Bagley's actions in getting free food. The City's Department of Code Enforcement received a letter dated March 31, 2004, from Hazel Hill, who was the sales floor supervisor at Martin's Uniforms Retail Store (Martin's Uniforms). The City had a contract with Martin's Uniforms to supply uniforms and related items to City employees, including code enforcement employees. Ms. Hill related an incident involving Ms. Bagley on March 12, 2004. Ms. Bagley came to the store, requesting to return some shirts and pants, which she claimed to have received from Martin's Uniforms as part of the 2004 uniform allotment. Ms. Hill inspected the garments and determined that the uniforms could not have been received as part of the 2004 order because the shirts were not the same style as those that had been sent. The 2004 shirts were made of gabardine with two new-style patches, one on each arm. The shirts that Ms. Bagley was attempting to return were made of poplin with only one patch, which had been discontinued. The shirts also appeared to have a yellow tint, which could be attributed to age. The pants which Ms. Bagley was attempting to return had been altered in the waist. The pants which had been sent with Ms. Bagley's 2004 uniform order were not altered in the waist. Ms. Hill also advised that the incident concerning the 2004 uniform order was not the first time that Ms. Bagley had attempted to exchange old merchandise. About four months earlier, Ms. Bagley had tried to return an old jacket for a new one, but Ms. Hill refused to make the exchange. The previous year, Ms. Bagley came to exchange a pair of shoes for which she had no receipt and for which no record of the purchase could be found at the store. On July 9, 2004, the City dismissed Ms. Bagley from her employment. The final decision to terminate Ms. Bagley's employment was made by the Director of Code Enforcement, Curtis Lane, who is an African-American. Mr. Lane based his decision on Ms. Bagley's failure to submit a leave request for the three hours that she was absent on March 15, 2004; submission of a time sheet showing that she worked eight hours on March 15, 2004; the complaints from the employees at a Wendy's restaurant that Ms. Bagley had requested free food while she was in a City code enforcement uniform; and the complaint from Martin's Uniforms that Ms. Bagley tried to get new uniforms by falsely claiming that she was not sent the correct uniforms in her 2004 uniform order. The allegations against Ms. Bagley were investigated by City staff, and, based on the results of the investigations, Mr. Lane believed the allegations against Ms. Bagley and felt that Ms. Bagley's actions demonstrated a lack of honesty and integrity, two traits which are essential for a code enforcement officer. At the time of her termination, Ms. Bagley's employment with the City was subject to a collective bargaining agreement between the City and Amalgamated Transit Union. The collective bargaining agreement provided a grievance and arbitration procedure. Ms. Bagley filed a grievance contesting her termination, which she submitted to final arbitration. On February 15, 2005, an evidentiary hearing was held on Ms. Bagley's grievance before arbitrator Genellen Kelly Pike. On June 15, 2005, Ms. Pike denied Ms. Bagley's grievance. On July 26, 2005, Ms. Bagley filed a charge of discrimination with the Commission, claiming that she was terminated from her employment with the City on account of her race. Ms. Bagley claims that she was discriminated against based on her race because other employees of the Code Enforcement Department were allowed to come in late and either to make up the time on their lunch hours or after work or to not have to make up the time at all. Mr. Canelejo did have a practice of allowing employees to make up their time if they were 15 to 30 minutes late for work. The time could be made up during the employee's lunch hour or at the end of the employee's regularly scheduled work day. There was no practice or policy allowing employees to make up absences as long as three hours rather than requiring them to submit leave slips for the missed time. Ms. Bagley claims that both African-American and Caucasian employees were allowed to make up missed work. Not all employees in the Code Enforcement Department had the same work schedule. Some employees worked ten-hour shifts, Sunday through Wednesday; some employees worked 7:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., Monday through Friday; and some employees worked 8 a.m. to 5 p.m., Monday through Friday. Some employees were required to attend neighborhood meetings at night after their regularly scheduled hours, and were allowed to adjust their work schedule to avoid overtime as a result of the meetings at night. The code inspectors used City-owned vehicles in making their inspections. The vehicles were parked in a central location, and the employees picked up the City vehicles each day. Sometimes an inspector would schedule an inspection at the beginning of the inspector's shift. The inspector was not required to report into the office prior to making the inspection, but could pick up the City vehicle and leave from the parking lot. Ms. Bagley took it upon herself to begin keeping notes on when the inspectors would arrive at the office. She noted that some of the inspectors, both African-American and Caucasian, did not arrive at the office at the beginning of their regularly scheduled shift. However, Ms. Bagley had no knowledge if these inspectors had attended a night meeting during that week, if the inspectors had gone to an inspection prior to coming to the office, or if the inspectors had made up their tardiness by either working during their lunch hours or after the end of their regularly scheduled shift. Ms. Bagley just assumed that these employees were not putting in 40 hours per week. She produced no evidence at the final hearing that there were other employees who claimed they worked 40 hours per week, when they did not and were allowed to do so without taking leave. She presented no evidence at the final hearing that African-American employees were treated differently than Caucasian employees. In fact, she claims that both African- American and Caucasian employees were allowed to come in late without having to submit a leave slip for the missed time.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered dismissing the petition because the charge of discrimination was not filed timely and because Ms. Bagley failed to establish that the City discriminated against her based on her race. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of August, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of August, 2006.

Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.57760.10760.11
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IN RE: MIRIAM ALONSO vs *, 94-005524EC (1994)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Sep. 30, 1994 Number: 94-005524EC Latest Update: Apr. 26, 1995

The Issue Whether Respondent violated Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent, Miriam Alonso (Alonso), served as an elected member of the Miami City Commission. On February 24, 1993, the residence of Miriam Alonso-Miles, Alonso's daughter, was broken into. Judy Gonzalez, a former neighbor of Ms. Alonso- Miles, had been baby-sitting Ms. Alonso-Miles' three children, ages one, three, and five. She took them for a walk at about 7:10 p.m. and returned shortly thereafter, when she discovered two men apparently in the process of ransacking the house. When Ms. Gonzalez tried to enter the residence, one of the burglars shut the door, striking her on the forehead. The burglars then fled through the back door. Ms. Gonzalez called Alonso and spoke to Alonso's husband. She was screaming and crying and he understood her to say that his daughter had been stabbed and the children taken. Ms. Gonzalez does not recall telling Mr. Alonso that anyone had been injured or abducted, but says she was "freaking out' and does not even remember what she said. After Mr. Alonso relayed to his wife what he thought had occurred, the two got in their car and headed to their daughter's house. From the car, Alonso initiated the first of three telephone calls to Miami police 911 emergency. The tape submitted as evidence in this proceeding contains two calls to 911 that preceded Alonso's and her three calls. Alonso's first call was as follows: Communications Officer: Miami Police. Do you have an emergency? Respondent: This is Commissioner Miriam Alonso. I need someone right away! 682 S.W. 19th Road. It's my daughter's house and they tried to steal my grandchildren. I need the policemen right now! Officer: Hello. 682? Respondent: Yes, 682 S.W. 19th Road and I want the police right here in less than four minutes! Officer: OK. Who are you? Respondent: I am Commissioner Miriam Alonso. Officer: Maria Alonso? Respondent: Miriam, Miriam. Officer: I have it, Miriam. Miriam, I have it. (Inaudible) OK. Bye The second conversation went as follows: Officer: Miami Police. Do you have an emergency? Respondent: This is Commissioner Alonso again. Officer: Right, let me let you speak to the Complaint Sergeant. They have the call. They're trying to get someone to you now. Don't hang up and I'll let you speak to him. Respondent: Get them here and at the same time call the Chief of Police and tell him I need him here! Call the Chief of Police and let him know that they tried to get my grandchildren and I want him here! Shortly thereafter, Alonso called the Police a third time: Officer: Miami Police. Do you have an emergency. Respondent: Yes, this is Commissioner Alonso again. I would appreciate that you try to reach Chief Ross and let him know what happened. Officer: Right. Commissioner Miriam, let me check with the bridge because they are handling that for you. Can you hold for me? Respondent: Yes. Sergeant Robbins: Sgt. Robbins. Can I help you? Respondent: This is Commissioner Alonso. I need to reach Chief Ross. Sgt. Robbins: OK. Where can he reach you? Respondent: I'm in my car right now. I'm at the site where the problem happened and I need to talk to him directly. Sgt. Robbins: OK, can you give me your car phone number so I can have him call you? Respondent: 773-0984. Sgt. Robbins: 773-0984? Respondent: Yes, sir. Sgt. Robbins: I'll call him. Respondent: Thank you. Sgt. Robbins: You're welcome. Prior to the February 24 break-in, there had been other incidents of a suspicious nature directed toward Alonso and members of her family. Alonso had advised the Chief of Police that she believed herself to be the true target of these incidents. Additionally there were serious threats made against Alonso's life. In response, the Chief of Police told Alonso that if anything else suspicious happened she should call him directly instead of going through the police department. He wanted her to call him directly in order to maintain the confidentiality of an ongoing investigation of the incidents and threats to Alonso. To facilitate this, he gave her his pager number and home telephone number. While Alonso was City Commissioner, it was customary for her to be addressed as Commissioner Alonso and she always identified herself as Commissioner Alonso.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding that Miriam Alonso did not violate Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes and dismissing the Complaint against Miriam Alonso. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of January, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of January, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-5524EC To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat., the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Advocate's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraphs 1-8: Accepted. Paragraph 9: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraphs 10-11: Accepted. Paragraph 12: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1. Paragraphs 1-7: Accepted in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Virlindia Doss, Esquire Advocate For the Florida Commission on Ethics Department of Legal Affairs PL-01, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Charles Gener, Esquire 4100 West Flagler Street, Suite K Miami, Florida 33134-1640 Kerrie J. Stillman Clerk and Complaint Coordinator Ethics Commission Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Bonnie Williams, Executive Director Ethics Commission Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Phil Claypool, General Counsel Ethics Commission Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709

Florida Laws (5) 104.31112.312112.313112.322120.57 Florida Administrative Code (1) 34-5.0015
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JAMES BARNETT vs. DIVISION OF LICENSING, 81-003175 (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-003175 Latest Update: Apr. 19, 1982

The Issue At the commencement of the hearing, the parties stipulated that Petitioner had filed applications for Class "A" and Class "C" licenses and was qualified except for the failure to demonstrate good moral character. The bases for the dispute over Petitioner's character were: Petitioner's arrest record; Petitioner's alleged falsification of his applications as to his employment with the Pittsburgh Police Department; and Petitioner's check for the application fee was dishonored for insufficient funds.

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner duly filed applications with the Department of State, Division of Licensing for Class "A" and Class "C" licenses. Except for matters related to Petitioner's good moral character, Petitioner is qualified for licensure. Petitioner's application reflects that he answered the question whether he had been arrested affirmatively with the following comment: The Courts of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in all five cases from 1965 to 1974 - ruled that as a Police Officer, I acted within the scope of my authority - These cases stem from being an undercover Narcotics Officer. The Petitioner's arrest records as maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation reveal several juvenile offenses, not considered by the Department and not at issue. This record also reveals the following arrests of Petitioner as an adult: Date Place Charge Disposition 06/09/66* Pittsburgh VDD & CA Not guilty 08/15/66* Pittsburgh VUFA Not guilty 08/20/66* Allegheny County VDDCA 06/24/67* Allegheny County VUFA Unavailable per contra 06/30/70 *Only one offense with different charges made on different dates 09/05/74 Allegheny County Theft, VUFA Discharged 09/23/74 05/07/75 Allegheny County Fraud - imper- sonating a public servant 12/19/79 Office of Provost No charge No charge Martial Petitioner presented testimony and supporting documentary evidence that the arrests reported on the FBI criminal history for the dates 06/09/66 through 06/24/67 were all related to the same offense, and that these charges were resolved in favor of the Petitioner by a verdict of not guilty. See Petitioner's Exhibit #1. The judge arrested judgment of the two years' probation for the charge of 05/07/75. See Respondent's Exhibit #2. Petitioner stated that based upon his status as a capital police officer he was not guilty of fraud or impersonation of a public servant. The Petitioner's remaining arrest was on 09/05/74, and was discharged. Petitioner's explanation of these arrests is not consistent with the explanation stated on his application form. According to the resume accompanying his application, Petitioner was employed on the indicated dates in the following positions: Date Position 1963 to 1965 Globe Security 1965 to 1970 Pittsburgh Police Department, special patrolman 1970 to 1973 NAACP special investigator and Bucci Detective Agency 1972 to 1976 Commonwealth Property Police with State of Pennsylvania 1973 to 1974 Part-time security guard in addition to employment listed above May, 1976 January, 1977 Federal Civil Service guard March, 1977 September, 1977 Part-time security guard with A&S Security December, 1978 Sears, Roebuck and Company as to June, 1980 undercover security investigator February, 1979 Security guard to June, 1980 September, 1979 VA, guard at VA Hospital GS5 to June, 1980 June, 1980 Came to Florida Petitioner stated that his check for the application fee bounced because of his travel back and forth to Pennsylvania to try to develop the data to support his application, which depleted his bank account. He has since made the check good and paid the fees by money order.

Recommendation The Petitioner has failed to establish that he has the requisite good character for licensure; therefore, it is recommended that the Petitioner's applications for Class "A" and Class "C" licensure be denied. DONE and ORDERED this 19th day of April, 1982, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. James Barnett 758 Woodville Road Milton, Florida 32570 James V. Antista, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of State Division of Licensing R. A. Gray Building, Room 106 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of April, 1982. George Firestone, Secretary Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION vs ALLEN P. PERRY, 09-000042PL (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Myers, Florida Jan. 07, 2009 Number: 09-000042PL Latest Update: Sep. 11, 2009

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, Allen P. Perry, a law enforcement officer, committed the offenses set forth in the Administrative Complaint, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken.

Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent was certified by the Commission as a law enforcement officer, having been first certified in August 1999. The Commission issued to Respondent, Certificate No. 186964. At all times relevant hereto, Respondent was employed as a law enforcement officer by the Lee County Sheriff's Office ("Sheriff's Office"). Controlled Substances in Respondent's Patrol Car On or between January 1, 2007, and February 17, 2007, Respondent knowingly and actually possessed cocaine, less than 20 grams of cannabis and Alprazolam, all of which are controlled substances under Florida law. On or between January 1, 2007, and February 17, 2007, Respondent kept the cocaine, less than 20 grams of cannabis, and Alprazolam in a tackle box which was in the trunk of his assigned patrol car. Also, in the tackle box were scales, presumptive test kits, baggies, and a knife that had been issued to Respondent by the Sheriff's Office. During the time the cocaine, cannabis, and Alprazolam were in the tackle box in the trunk of Respondent's assigned patrol car, there was no active criminal investigation pertaining to those items. Moreover, there was no other lawful or bona fide reason for Respondent's having the controlled substances in the tool box in his assigned patrol car. Sheriff's Office Policy on Controlled Substances At all times relevant to this proceeding, the Sheriff's Office had a policy governing how law enforcement officers should handle the controlled substances that they confiscated or took into custody during the course of performing investigations or other job responsibilities. Pursuant to that policy, law enforcement officers were required to label and package the controlled substances that they confiscated or took into custody in the performance of their duties. On the label, the officers were to note the date, time, place, from whom, and the circumstances under which the controlled substances were confiscated. Furthermore, the officers were to indicate on the label the case number related to the specific controlled substances and whether the controlled substances were to be destroyed or preserved as physical evidence. Finally, the policy required that the law enforcement officers take any controlled substances they confiscated during their shifts to the Sheriff Office's drug repository at the end of their shifts. Notwithstanding the Sheriff's Office policy, officers sometimes did not comply fully with the policy. The most common infraction involved instances when an officer's shift ended late at night or very early in the morning and, his assigned work location was not close to the drug repository. In those instances, officers sometimes waited until later that day or the following day to take the confiscated controlled substances to the drug repository. This delay in an officer's taking the controlled substances to the drug repository is a violation of the policy. However, apparently because such delay is a relatively short one, the Sheriff's Office takes no disciplinary action against the officer in this situation. Respondent was aware of the Sheriff's Office policy concerning how controlled substances confiscated or taken into custody by officers should be handled. Nevertheless, with regard to the cocaine, cannabis, and Alprazolam which Respondent confiscated, he did not comply with that policy. Respondent did not label the cocaine, cannabis, and Alprazolam that were in the tackle box in the trunk of his assigned patrol car. Moreover, Respondent never took those controlled substances to the Sheriff Office's drug repository, but kept them in the trunk of his patrol car for about two months. In fact, the cocaine, cannabis, and Alprazolam remained in the trunk of Respondent's patrol car until an officer with internal affairs found them there during an investigation. Respondent testified that he confiscated the cocaine, cannabis, and Alprazolam during traffic stops he made while performing his duties with the Sheriff's Office. However, because the above-referenced controlled substances were not labeled or otherwise marked, the date and circumstances regarding how they came into Respondent's custody cannot be accurately determined. Respondent's Field Training Practice At all times relevant hereto, Respondent was assigned to the Sheriff's Office field training program as a field training officer ("FTO"). As an FTO, Respondent supervised and trained newly-hired recruits who were assigned to him for about a month. In February 2007, Respondent was assigned the task of serving as FTO for Deputy Kenneth Sherman, a recruit with the Sheriff's Office. During Phase Two field training, Deputy Sherman was required to accompany Respondent as he (Respondent) performed his normal patrol duties. While serving as FTO for Deputy Sherman, Respondent showed him the cocaine, cannabis, and Alprazolam in the tackle box in the trunk of his patrol car. Respondent's reason for doing so was that he thought Deputy Sherman should know what various controlled substances looked like. At the time Respondent showed Deputy Sherman the cocaine, cannabis, and Alprazolam, he also explained to him how to test for various drugs, narcotics, and/or controlled substances. At or near the time Respondent showed Deputy Sherman the controlled substances, he told Deputy Sherman that the "policy" required that drug/narcotics and/or controlled substances that had been confiscated and that were not needed as evidence should be turned in to the drug repository for destruction. However, Respondent stated that, notwithstanding that policy, he kept the cocaine, cannabis, and Alprazolam for training purposes. Respondent believed that recruits should know what narcotics and/or controlled substances looked like. Consistent with that belief, Respondent showed drugs/narcotics and/or controlled substances that were in the tackle box in his patrol vehicle to some of the recruits he was training. Respondent never sought or obtained authorization from any official at the Sheriff's Office to keep and use confiscated narcotics and/or controlled substances as training aids. Showing recently confiscated drugs/narcotics and/or controlled substances to a recruit or trainee may be lawful when such display occurs during the course of an active investigation or other official duties. However, to do so when there is no investigation, and/or after a case is closed, is not a bona fide lawful purpose. Law enforcement officers are not authorized to be in possession of controlled substances. The only time officers are allowed to be in possession of controlled substances is when they have been confiscated or taken then into custody during the course of their law enforcement duties (i.e., an active investigation pertaining to those controlled substances). In such cases, the officers are responsible for complying with the Sheriff Office policy discussed in paragraph 7. February 2007 Incidents On February 17, 2007, at about 2:00 a.m., Respondent and Deputy Sherman were patrolling a high crime area in Bonita Springs near an apartment complex. They observed a car or small sports utility vehicle in the middle of the apartment complex parking lot with several people standing around the vehicle. After Respondent drove his patrol car into the parking lot, almost everyone who had been standing near the vehicle scurried away. Because the vehicle in the middle of the parking lot belonged to Anthony Lattarulo, he approached the patrol car to explain the reason his vehicle was there. Mr. Lattarulo then told Respondent and Deputy Sherman that he needed a "jump" for his battery and/or that he needed gas for his Honda. When Mr. Lattarulo approached the patrol car, Respondent immediately began interrogating him. Meanwhile, at some point during the interrogation, Deputy Sherman checked Mr. Lattarulo's identification and also conducted a pat-down of him.2 During the interrogation, Respondent asked Mr. Lattarulo where he was coming from, what he was doing there, whether he did drugs, was he there to buy drugs, and when was the last time he smoked crack. Mr. Lattarulo told Respondent that he had been "hanging out" with a guy who lived in the apartment complex; he then pointed to a unit in a nearby building in the apartment complex, presumably the one in which the person he had been visiting lived. Mr. Lattarulo never told Respondent that he had been using crack cocaine or any other illegal drug or purchasing such drugs while visiting someone in the apartment complex. Nonetheless, Respondent seemed to believe or suspect that Mr. Lattarulo had not just been "hanging out," but had been at the apartment complex using and/or purchasing illegal drugs.3 After Mr. Lattarulo pointed to the apartment where he had been visiting, Respondent told him to knock on the door of that unit, and tell "those people" to come out because "Perry" wanted to talk to them. Mr. Lattarulo told Respondent more than once that he did not want to knock on the door and tell the occupant(s) that the "police" wanted to talk them. Nonetheless, he did so reluctantly after being threatened by Respondent. After no one came to the door of the unit, Mr. Lattarulo returned to the area where Respondent and Deputy Spencer were and told Respondent that no one was in the unit. Although no one answered the door of the unit when Mr. Lattarulo knocked, Respondent seemed unconvinced that no one was in the unit. Respondent then ordered Mr. Lattarulo to return to the unit where he had already been and knock on the door again. As he had done initially, Mr. Lattarulo told Respondent that he did not want to knock on the door and tell the occupants to come out. However, Mr. Lattarulo complied with Respondent's demand after Respondent threatened him. Still no one came to the door of the apartment unit. Mr. Lattarulo knocked on the door of the unit as described in paragraphs 25 and 26 only because of the threats made by Respondent. It is unclear which threat Respondent made first. However, in one instance, Respondent threatened to use Mr. Lattarulo or Mr. Lattarulo's head as a battering ram to "open that door." In the other instance, Respondent threatened Mr. Lattarulo by telling him if he refused to go to the apartment unit and knock on the door, "I'll go into my pharmaceutical refrigerator [and], let you pick the drug you want to go to jail for tonight." After no one answered the door of the apartment unit the second time, Mr. Lattarulo again returned to the area where Respondent and Deputy Sherman were located. At or about that time, Deputy Sherman apparently noticed a junction box on the side of the apartment building. Not knowing what the "box" was, Deputy Sherman asked Respondent. Respondent then instructed Mr. Lattarulo to go pull the lever and "we'll see what it is." As Mr. Lattarulo began walking toward the junction box, Respondent told Deputy Sherman that when Mr. Lattarulo pulled the lever of the junction box, the electrical power would go off in that apartment building. As Respondent had indicated, as soon as Mr. Lattarulo pulled the lever, the electricity went off in the entire apartment building. After several seconds, Respondent then ordered Mr. Lattarulo to turn the electricity on. Mr. Lattarulo then pulled the lever, and the electricity in the building came back on. Following the incident involving the junction box, Respondent and Deputy Sherman left the apartment complex. Internal Investigation Later on February 17, 2007, or the next day, Deputy Sherman called an unidentified person with the Sheriff's Office to share his concerns about the incident involving Mr. Lattarulo and to seek advice. As a result of the conversation between Deputy Sherman and the unidentified person, Sergeant Timothy Fisher of the Sheriff Office's internal affairs division was contacted and informed of the allegations made by Deputy Sherman. In response to the information given to Sergeant Fisher, an internal investigation was immediately commenced. As part of that investigation, Sergeant Fisher searched the trunk of Respondent's assigned vehicle and discovered the cocaine, less than 20 grams of cannabis, and Alprazolam in the tool box.4 After the controlled substances were found in the tackle box in the trunk of Respondent's patrol car, Sergeant Fisher interviewed Respondent. During those interviews and/or sworn statements, Respondent gave inconsistent statements regarding why the controlled substances were in the trunk of his patrol car. Respondent's stated reasons included the following: (1) He used the controlled substances as an aid for training recruits; (2) He forgot the controlled substances were in the tackle box in the trunk of his assigned patrol car; and (3) He was either too "lazy" or "stupid" to turn them in for destruction. Sergeant Fisher followed up on Respondent's explanation that he failed to take the drugs to the repository because he was lazy by reviewing files of the Sheriff's Office. The credible testimony of Sergeant Fisher was that those records documented that Respondent had gone to the Sheriff's Office drug depository three times to deposit drugs and/or other evidence after the date he reported confiscating the controlled substances that were in his patrol car. At this proceeding, Respondent also gave inconsistent statements regarding the controlled substances in the tool box. He testified that he used the above-referenced controlled substances for training recruits. Nonetheless, he stated that he intended to submit them for destruction, but had "no idea" when he would do so. Also, despite testifying that he used the controlled substances for training, Respondent testified that he never moved or touched the controlled substances from the tackle box or from the trunk of his patrol car. According to Respondent's testimony, he, instead, required Deputy Sherman to retrieve the test kit, scale, and controlled narcotics from the toolbox. Respondent was terminated as a deputy sheriff with the Sheriff's Office. Credibility of Witnesses With regard to the February 17, 2007, incident involving Mr. Lattarulo, Respondent testified that he never threatened to plant drugs or controlled substances to place charges on Mr. Lattarulo. Respondent also initially testified that he never threatened to use Mr. Lattarulo as a battering ram; however, on cross-examination, he acknowledged that he "may" have threatened to use Mr. Lattarulo's head as a battering ram. The testimony of Deputy Sherman regarding the events of February 17, 2007, including the threats made by Respondent to Mr. Lattarulo is more credible than that of Respondent. Moreover, Deputy Sherman's testimony is corroborated by the credible sworn statement of Mr. Lattarulo given on February 27, 2007.5 Respondent contends that Deputy Sherman made the allegations concerning the threats, because he may have been afraid that he was not going to pass the field-training phase. Respondent further contends that Deputy Sherman's fear was based on Respondent's documenting areas of concern (i.e., officer safety skills and radio skills) which could have jeopardized Deputy Sherman's passing the field-training phase. However, there is nothing in the record which indicates that Deputy Sherman had been notified or had reason to believe that he might not pass his Phase Two training.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission, enter a final order finding that Respondent, Allen P. Perry, failed to maintain good moral character as defined by the Commission and revoking his correctional certificate. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of September, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of September, 2009.

Florida Laws (14) 120.569120.57775.082775.083775.084836.05837.02837.021893.03893.13943.03943.12943.13943.1395 Florida Administrative Code (1) 11B-27.0011
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIVISION OF LICENSING vs U.S. SECURITY AND BAHRAN SEDAGHAT, VICE PRESIDENT, 90-004840 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Aug. 06, 1990 Number: 90-004840 Latest Update: Jan. 30, 1991

The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondents were negligent by failing to provide proper supervision and control of two security guard employees, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint filed against them, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against them, if any.

Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent U.S. Security has held a Class "A" Private Investigative Agency License No. A00-01448; a Class "B" Watchman, Guard or Patrol Agency License No. B00-01042; and a Class "DS" Guard School License No. DS89-00077. At all times material hereto, Respondent Bahram Sedaghat has held a Class "C" Private Investigator License No. C87-00645, a Class "DI" Guard Instructor License No. DI89- 00275, a Class "G" Statewide Gun Permit No. G88-00869, and a Class "M" Manager License No. M90-00046. At all times material hereto, Respondent Bahram Sedaghat has been the Vice-President of Respondent U.S. Security, and Juan Cabrera and Octavio Valdez were employees of Respondent U.S. Security. At all times material hereto, Respondent U.S. Security has provided supervision of its security guards (including Cabrera and Valdez) through patrol supervisors, assistant area managers, and area managers. Pursuant to that three-tier level of supervision, every guard post was checked by a supervisor almost every night as part of Respondent U.S. Security's regular supervisory procedures. For several years, Respondent U.S. Security had in effect a contract with Flamingo Plaza, an industrial complex in Hialeah, Florida, to provide unarmed guard services to Flamingo Plaza. That contract was in effect on October 23, 1989. When Cabrera was first employed by Respondent U.S. Security, he was assigned to perform unarmed guard services at a construction site for the Carnival Cruise Lines building. On his first day at that post, construction workers noticed that he was armed. When Brian Pierce, the area manager, came to the post approximately one hour later, the construction workers advised Pierce that Cabrera was armed. Pierce immediately reprimanded Cabrera, reminding Cabrera that the post was an unarmed guard post and that Cabrera was prohibited from being armed while on duty at that post. He made Cabrera lock his gun in his car. Thereafter, no one saw Cabrera with a firearm at that unarmed post. Cabrera was subsequently reassigned to perform guard services at the unarmed guard post located at Flamingo Plaza. On his first day at that assignment, James Cee, the property manager at Flamingo Plaza, saw Cabrera with a firearm while on duty and reported that to Brian Pierce. Pierce reprimanded Cabrera in front of Cee and instructed him not to return to the post with a firearm since it was an unarmed post. Thereafter, there were no further complaints regarding Cabrera carrying a firearm while at Flamingo Plaza although Cabrera continued his assignment at Flamingo Plaza for approximately three or four more months. After Pierce reprimanded Cabrera for appearing at Flamingo Plaza on his first day with a firearm, however, on one occasion Mark McCray, the assistant area manager, saw Cabrera at Flamingo Plaza wearing a jacket while on duty. Visible below the jacket was the bottom of a holster. Cabrera was specifically ordered by McCray not to wear a holster while on duty at an unarmed post. Cabrera was not armed on that occasion. There were no other reports that Cabrera wore a holster at Flamingo Plaza on any other occasion. On October 23, 1989, a shooting incident involving Cabrera took place at the Flamingo Plaza. Upon being notified of the incident Respondent U.S. Security immediately suspended Cabrera and fired him on the following day. Criminal charges were filed against Cabrera based on that shooting incident, and those charges remained pending at the time of the final hearing in this cause. Petitioner immediately conducted an investigation of the incident and of Respondent U.S. Security's procedures for supervision of its unarmed guard employees. At the conclusion of the investigation, Petitioner determined there were no violations of the statutes regulating the security guard industry and closed its file. Thereafter, Cabrera, while the criminal charges were pending against him, appeared on television and gave statements which directly contradicted the evidence obtained by Petitioner in its investigation. As a result of those statements made by Cabrera and pressure exerted by the news media, Petitioner reopened its investigation and subsequently issued the Administrative Complaint which is involved in this proceeding. Respondents were not aware that Juan Cabrera or Octavio Valdez had firearms in their possession while on duty on October 23, 1989, when their assigned duties did not require firearms. Further, there is no reason that Respondents should have known that Cabrera or Valdez had firearms in their possession on that occasion. It is standard procedure for Respondent U.S. Security's supervisors to provide all security guards with "post orders" prior to each guard beginning a new post assignment. Among other things, this document notifies the guard as to whether the post calls for armed or unarmed personnel. Respondent U.S. Security ensures that the guard reads and understands the post orders prior to beginning his shift. On October 23, 1989, Respondent U.S. Security had procedures set up for the hiring, training, and supervision of security guards, both armed and unarmed. Respondent U.S. Security had in place procedures for taking disciplinary action against employees. Those disciplinary guidelines included the exercise of judgment by the supervisory personnel involved. If an employee did something prohibited, the employee was specifically reprimanded and instructed not to engage in that conduct again. If the employee engaged in the same conduct again, he would be fired immediately for disobeying direct orders. Respondent U.S. Security did not have a specific policy directed at a guard appearing at an unarmed post with a firearm or with only a holster because such conduct simply did not occur. Respondent U.S. Security's procedures for supervision of security guards comply with or exceed the procedures utilized in the industry.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondents not guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint filed against them and dismissing that Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 30th day of January, 1991. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of January, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NO. 90-4840 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 1 and 3-7 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 2 and 10 have been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the credible evidence in this cause. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 8 and 9 have been rejected as being irrelevant to the issues involved in this cause. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 11 has been rejected as not constituting a finding of fact but rather as constituting argument of counsel. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-12 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Henri C. Cawthon, Esquire Florida Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, M.S. #4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Norman S. Segall, Esquire Bentata Hoet & Associates and Zamora Segall Lacasa & Schere 3191 Coral Way Third Floor, Madison Circle Miami, Florida 33145 The Honorable Jim Smith Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION vs JIMMY OSBORNE, 03-002391PL (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Winter Haven, Florida Jun. 30, 2003 Number: 03-002391PL Latest Update: Nov. 17, 2003

The Issue Whether Respondent violated Subsections 943.1395(6), 943.1395(7), and 943.13(7), Florida Statutes, and Rules 11B- 27.0011(4)(a), 11B-27.0011(4)(b), and 11B-27.0011(4)(c), Florida Administrative Code, and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact At all times material to this proceeding, Osborne was employed as a police officer with the Winter Haven Police Department. Approximately 15 times during 2001, Osborne picked up a prostitute, Sandra Cornell (Cornell), in his police vehicle and had sex with her while he was in his police uniform. The first time Osborne picked up Cornell, he was in his police car parked near a church in Winter Haven, Florida. Cornell was walking down the street, and Osborne called her over to the police car and asked her what she was doing that night. She told him that she was trying to make some money, and he told her to get in the back seat of the car. She got in the vehicle, and he drove to a spot near Publix and a nursing home. He told her, "Nobody will bother a police car." They got out of the car, and she performed oral sex on him. Osborne paid her $10 and gave her some cigarettes. The second time that she had sex with Osborne, he gave her $5. However, he discontinued paying Cornell for her services after their second encounter. Cornell continued to have sex with Osborne without payment, believing that he would arrest her if she did not continue to have sex with him. Another time Osborne picked Cornell up in the parking lot of the Regency Inn and told her to get in the back of the police car and lie down. She did as she was told. Osborne drove them to a water tower near the Regency Inn, where they had sex. Another time Osborne, while in his police uniform, picked Cornell up in the early morning hours and took her to Silver Lake in his police car. Osborne was on duty at the time. While the couple was having sex, Osborne received a police call. He left Cornell at Silver Lake so that he could respond to the call, and she had to walk back to town. The Winter Haven Police Department conducted an Internal Affairs investigation of Osborne's activities with Cornell. On July 19, 2002, Osborne was interviewed under oath by Lieutenant Katy Goddard and Lieutenant Jim Allen. During the interview, Osborne was asked the following questions and gave the following answers under oath: Q. Have you ever rode uh Sandy Cornell in your patrol vehicle . . . A. No, I have not. Q. . . . let me finish the question--in an unofficial business? A. No. * * * Q. Have you ever had sex with Sandy Cornell on duty? A. No, I have not. Q. Have you ever had sex with Sandy Cornell off duty? A. No, I have not. On December 6, 2002, the Department filed an Administrative Complaint against Osborne, alleging that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission had issued Osborne an auxiliary law enforcement certificate and a law enforcement certificate on December 28, 1994. Osborne filed an elections of rights form on January 8, 2003, requesting an administrative hearing and disputing only the factual allegations dealing with having sexual relations with Cornell and soliciting another prostitute for sex. Osborne has not contested that he is a certified auxiliary law enforcement officer and a certified law enforcement officer.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding that Jimmy Osborne did not violate Subsection 943.1395(6); finding that Jimmy Osborne did violate Subsection 943.13(7) and Rule 11B-27.0011(4)(a), (b), and (c), Florida Administrative Code; and revoking his certification as an auxiliary law enforcement officer and a law enforcement officer, pursuant to Subsection 943.1395(7). DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of October, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of October, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Linton B. Eason, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Jimmy Osborne 902 9th Street, Northeast Winter Haven, Florida 33881 Rod Caswell, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302

Florida Laws (8) 120.569120.57796.07837.02943.13943.133943.139943.1395
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CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION vs. CLAUDE ROGER SWEAT, 82-001956 (1982)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 82-001956 Latest Update: Sep. 06, 1990

The Issue The ultimate issue to be resolved in this proceeding is whether the Respondent violated provisions of the Department of Law Enforcement Act of 1974, and if so, what disciplinary action is appropriate. Petitioner contends that the Respondent has engaged in acts which demonstrate that he has not maintained good moral character, and that his certification as a law enforcement officer should be permanently revoked.

Findings Of Fact The Respondent holds a certificate issued by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission as a law enforcement officer. The certificate was issued in February, 1976. The Respondent was then employed with the City of Bunnell Police Department. The Respondent was a police officer with that department for a period of time, and was ultimately named Chief of Police. The Respondent is not presently employed with the Police Department in Bunnell, and is apparently not employed in the law enforcement field. During the time that he was employed as Chief of Police with the City of Bunnell Police Department, the Respondent engaged in immoral and illegal activities which included the use and distribution of marijuana, utilizing the services of prostitutes, and possession of moonshine whiskey. On at least two occasions, the Respondent delivered marijuana, apparently without charge, to a resident of Bunnell. On one of these occasions the Respondent was dressed in his police uniform, and made the delivery from his police car. Respondent smoked marijuana cigarettes with several residents of Bunnell. Respondent visited a house of prostitution in Daytona Beach with these same persons. The Respondent was observed haggling over price, and entering a private room with one of the residents of the house. On several occasions the Respondent openly displayed to his associates, a jar of what appeared to be moonshine whiskey, and what the Respondent stated was moonshine whiskey. The Respondent told an employee of the Flagler County Sheriff's Department, and an employee of the City's Corrections Department, that he had made the moonshine. In late 1978 or early 1979, approximately two pounds of marijuana was seized by officers of the Flagler County Sheriff's office. Four men who were apparently illegal aliens were arrested, and the marijuana and other matter were seized and placed in the vault at the Flagler County jail. The next day, the arresting officer returned to the vault in order to properly mark the marijuana as evidence. The Respondent had removed the marijuana from the vault. Respondent stated that he had disposed of it in a creek. Even if the Respondent did dispose of the marijuana in that manner, which is not a believable explanation, such action would be an improper manner of dealing with evidence that had been seized by law enforcement officers of another agency. While he was a police officer and Chief of Police with the City of Bunnell Police Department, the Respondent on several occasions disposed of stray dogs by shooting them and leaving their bodies in a creek. The Respondent apparently considered it easier and cheaper to dispose of stray dogs in this manner rather than taking them to an animal shelter. It is clearly an improper means of disposing of stray animals. While the Respondent was Chief of Police with the City of Bunnell, an officer with the Police Department advised the Respondent that he had observed gambling occurring at a tavern. The Respondent advised the officer to take no action regarding the matter as it was not a big deal and no one was complaining. The Respondent's actions, which include use of marijuana, prostitutes, and moonshine whiskey, illegally disposing of evidence and illegally shooting stray dogs, clearly demonstrate that the Respondent failed to maintain good moral character. His actions would inevitably have the effect of creating bad morale at the Police Department in the City of Bunnell and his actions did have that effect. It was alleged in the Complaint that the Respondent had marijuana that he kept in his closet at his home. This allegation was supported at the hearing by the testimony of a former baby sitter of the Respondent. The testimony has not been credited, and the allegation therefore has not been proven. It was six years ago that the baby sitter witness observed what she testified was marijuana, and she was at that time eleven years old. What she stated was marijuana was not identified by any other person. It was alleged in the Administrative Complaint that the Respondent observed an illegal drug transaction in process and failed to take any action with respect to it. These allegations are not supported by any credible evidence.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57943.13
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