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BEACHSIDE INN DESTIN, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 05-001262 (2005)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Shalimar, Florida Apr. 08, 2005 Number: 05-001262 Latest Update: Jul. 27, 2006

The Issue Whether the Petitioners are liable for sales tax, penalties and interest as assessed by the Department of Revenue (the Department) and if so, in what amount?

Findings Of Fact The parties have stipulated to the facts stated in paragraphs 2-59.1/ The Department of Revenue is an agency of the State of Florida, pursuant to Section 20.21, Florida Statutes, and is authorized to administer the tax laws of the state, pursuant to Section 213.05, Florida Statutes. The Department was authorized to conduct an audit of each of the Petitioners and to request information to determine their liability for taxes pursuant to Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. Legendary Holding, Inc. (Holding) is a corporation organized under the laws of Florida effective October 23, 1996, and was so organized from 1999-2003. Holding's corporate address is 4100 Legendary Drive, Suite 200, Destin, Florida 32541. Holding was subject to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 as amended and in effect (IRC) during 1999-2003 and for federal income tax purposes, Holding was a subchapter "s" corporation during this time. Holding was also subject to Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, during 1999-2003. Petitioner Harry T's, Inc. (Harry T's), is a corporation organized under the laws of Florida effective November 9, 1998, and was so organized during Harry T's Audit Period, defined as December 1, 1999 through March 31, 2003. Harry T's was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Holding. During its Audit Period, Harry T's corporate address was 4460 Legendary Drive, Suite 400, Destin, Florida. Harry T's was subject to the IRC and for federal income tax purposes was a qualified subchapter S subsidiary of the s-corporation parent, Holding. Petitioner Beachside Inn Destin, Inc. (Beachside) was a corporation organized under the laws of Florida effective March 6, 2000, and was so organized during the Beachside Audit Period, defined as May 1, 2000, through May 31, 2003. Beachside, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Holding, was administratively dissolved on October 14, 2004, for failure to file an annual report. During the Audit Period, Beachside's principle place of business was 2931 Scenic Highway 98, Destin, Florida, 32541. Its corporate address was 4460 Legendary Drive, Suite 400, Destin Florida. Beachside was subject to the IRC and for federal income tax purposes was a qualified subchapter S subsidiary of the s-corporation parent, Holding, during the Beachside Audit Period. Petitioner Legendary Restaurant Associates, Inc. (Restaurant) is a corporation organized under the laws of Florida effective October 7, 1999, and was so organized during Restaurant's Audit Period, defined as December 1, 1999, through March 31, 2003. During this time Restaurant was a wholly owned subsidiary of Holding and Restaurant's corporate address was 4460 Legendary Drive Suite 400, Destin, Florida. Restaurant was subject to the IRC and for federal income tax purposes was a wholly-owned, qualified subchapter S subsidiary of the s-corporation parent, Holding, during the Restaurant Audit Period. Legendary, Inc. (Legendary) is a corporation organized under the laws of Florida during 1999-2003, and its corporate address was also 4460 Legendary Drive, Suite 400, Destin, Florida, during this time. Legendary was also a wholly-owned subsidiary of Holding. Legendary was subject to the IRC and for federal income tax purposes, was a qualified subchapter S subsidiary of the s-corporation parent, Holding. Legendary Resorts, LLC (Resorts), is a limited liability company organized under the laws of Florida and was so organized during 2000-2003. Resorts, whose corporate address was also 4460 Legendary Drive, Suite 400, Destin, Florida, was administratively dissolved on September 16, 2005, for failure to file an annual report. Legendary entered into a cooperative business agreement (CBA) with certain subsidiaries of Holding prior to or during 1999-2003. The terms of the CBA between Legendary and these subsidiaries were identical other than the name of the "manager" subsidiary and the percentage of compensation paid to Legendary and the formula for sharing profits varied from time to time. Legendary also entered into a management agreement with certain other of Holding's subsidiaries, and the terms of these agreements were identical. FACTS RELATED TO PETITIONER HARRY T'S AUDIT Harry T's was a registered dealer who filed form DR- 15 (Sales Tax Return) with the Department for each month of Harry T's Audit Period. Harry T's used the cash basis of accounting during its Audit Period. The Department sent Harry T's a Notification of Intent to Audit Books and Records (Form DR-840) to conduct an audit of Harry T's books and records for this purpose. The Department and Harry T's entered into an Audit Agreement agreeing that a sampling method is the most effective, expedient, and adequate method in which to conduct an audit of Harry T's books and records. Gina Imm, a Department tax auditor, examined and sampled the available books and records of Harry T's to determine whether it properly collected and remitted sales and use tax in compliance with Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. Harry T's was the tenant party in a lease with Legendary for the property upon which Harry T's operated its business prior to January 1, 2000. Under the terms of the lease agreement between Harry T's and Legendary, Harry T's paid rent equal to eight percent of the gross sales to Legendary. On January 1, 2000, the lease was terminated. On January 1, 2000, Harry T's entered into a CBA with Legendary, which was effective throughout Harry T's Audit Period. Harry T's operated a business on property owned by Holdings during Harry T's Audit Period. Accounting entries were made each month during the Audit Period to record the amount of CBA compensation that was accrued by Harry T's to Legendary under the CBA. However, no rent was recorded on the income tax or accounting books of either Harry T's or Legendary during the Audit Period. Further, no amount of money labeled as CBA compensation was transferred from Harry T's to Legendary during Harry T's Audit Period and no payments labeled as "rent" were transferred from Harry T's to Legendary. Based upon the business decisions of the Chief Financial Officer of Legendary, cash was transferred periodically from Harry T's to Legendary during the Audit Period. Based upon the business decisions of the Chief Financial Officer of Legendary, cash was also transferred from Legendary to Harry T's. During Harry T's Audit Period cash was also transferred from Legendary to Holdings. These amounts were reflected as dividend distributions and varied in amount and time from (a) Holdings insurance and mortgage indebtedness obligations associated with the property used by Harry Ts and owned by Holding, and (b) the amounts accrued under the CBA's. Any amounts collected by Harry T's and not paid directly to third parties were distributed periodically to Holdings as corporate dividends. The Department determined that the transfers of cash from Harry T's to Legendary reflected rental consideration paid as CBA compensation, and directed the Department's auditor to assess sales tax against the amounts recorded as CBA compensation accounting entries. Harry T's paid ad valorem taxes due on the property on which Harry T's operated during each year of Harry T's Audit Period. The Department auditor assessed sales tax on the amounts of ad valorem taxes paid by Harry T's on behalf of Holding. The Department determined that Harry T's owed $58,844.02 in additional sales tax for the CBA compensation and ad valorem taxes paid, plus statutory interest and penalties. On September 5, 2003, the Department issued to Harry T's a Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes (form DR- 1215) for Audit No. A0233016246, stating that Harry T's owed $69,249.79 in taxes, $29,422.03 in penalties, and $6,612.44 in interest for a total of $94,330.64, and that interest continued to accrue on the unpaid assessment. By letter dated October 9, 2003, Harry T's agreed to the portions of the assessment related to food and beverage, but objected to the assessment for all other amounts including the CBA fees. Harry T's paid $10,953.62 for the uncontested assessment amounts. The Department issued its Notice of Proposed Assessment (NOPA) for audit number A0233016246 on January 27, 2004. The NOPA stated that the total owed by Harry T's was $69,249.79 in taxes, $29,422.03 in penalties, and $11,831.88 for a total of $110,501.72. The NOPA reflected a payment of $10,953.62 paid for the uncontested amounts of the audit assessment, and showed a balance due of $99,548.10 as of the date of the NOPA. The Department received Harry T's formal written protest on April 23, 2004. FACTS RELATED TO RESTAURANT'S AUDIT Petitioner Restaurant was a registered dealer who filed form DR-15 (Sales and Use Tax Return) with the Department for each month of the Restaurant Audit Period. Restaurant used the cash basis of accounting. The Department sent Restaurant a Notification of Intent to Audit Books and Records (Form DR-840) to conduct an audit of Restaurant's books and records for the purposes of Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. The Department and Restaurant entered into an Audit Agreement stipulating that a sampling method is the most effective, expedient, and adequate method by which to conduct an audit of Restaurant's books and records. Gina Imm examined and sampled the available books and records of Restaurant to determine whether Restaurant properly collected and remitted sales and use tax in compliance with Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. Restaurant was the tenant party in leases for the property upon which Restaurant operated its business prior to January 1, 2000. On January 1, 2000, Restaurant terminated its leases for these properties. Restaurant entered a CBA with Legendary prior to the beginning of Restaurant's Audit Period, December 1, 1999 through March 31, 2003. The CBA between Restaurant and Legendary was effective throughout the Restaurant Audit Period. Restaurant operated the "Crystal Beach Coffee Company" and "Tony's By the Sea" on property owned by Floridian Homes of Crystal Beach, Inc. (FHCB), an unrelated third party, during the Restaurant Audit Period. Restaurant operated "Blues" on property owned by an individual, Mr. Peter H. Bos, during the Restaurant Audit Period. 37. Restaurant operated "Rutherford's 465" on property owned by Regatta Bay Investor, Ltd., a Florida limited partnership, during the Restaurant Audit Period. Accounting entries were made each month during the Restaurant Audit Period to record the amount of CBA compensation that was accrued by Restaurant to Legendary under the CBA; however, no rent was recorded on the income tax or accounting books of either Restaurant or Legendary during the Restaurant Audit Period. No amount of money labeled as CBA compensation was transferred from Restaurant to Legendary and no payments labeled as "rent" were transferred from Restaurant to Legendary. Based upon the business decisions of the Chief Financial Officer of Legendary, cash was transferred periodically from Restaurant to Legendary, and cash was also transferred from Legendary to Restaurant during the Restaurant Audit Period. Any amounts collected by Restaurant during the Restaurant Audit Period and not paid directly to third parties were distributed periodically to Holdings as corporate dividends. The Department determined that the transfers of cash from Restaurant to Legendary reflected rental consideration paid as CBA compensation, and directed the Department's auditor to assess sales tax against the amounts recorded as CBA compensation accounting entries. Restaurant paid ad valorem taxes due on the property on which Restaurant operated during each year of the Restaurant Audit period. The Department assessed sales tax on the amounts of ad valorem taxes paid by Restaurant on behalf of Holding. The Department determined that Restaurant owed $17,880.71 in additional sales tax for the CBA compensation and ad valorem taxes paid, plus statutory interest and penalties. On September 5, 2003, the Department issued the Restaurant a Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes (Form DR- 1215) for audit number A0231102584, stating that Restaurant owed $26,092.10 in taxes, $8,940.31 in penalties, and $1.808.87 in interest for a total of $36,841.28. The Department noted Restaurant's payment of $8,745.53 for the portions of the assessment related to food and beverage sales, leaving a balance due as of that date of $28,095.75. The Department informed Petitioner Restaurant that interest continued to accrue on the unpaid assessment. The Department issued its NOPA for audit number A0231102584 on March 17, 2004, to Restaurant. The total owed by Restaurant as stated in the NOPA was $26,092.10 in taxes, $8,940.34 in penalties, and $3,378.99 in interest for a total of $38,411.43, less the $8,745.53 already paid, for a total balance due on that date of $29,665.90. Restaurant protested the NOPA, and the Department referred the matter to the Department's Technical Assistance and Dispute Resolution Section. On March 28, 2005, the Department issued its Notice of Decision upholding the assessment of tax for the CBA fees and ad valorem taxes paid by Restaurant, and on April 6, 2005, the Department received the Restaurant's formal written protest. FACTS RELATED TO BEACHSIDE'S AUDIT Petitioner Beachside Inn Destin, Inc. (Beachside) was a registered dealer who filed form DR-15 (Sales and Use Tax Return) with the Department for each month during the Beachside Audit period, May 1, 2000, through May 31, 2003. Beachside used the cash basis of accounting during the Beachside Audit Period. Beachside and the Department entered into an Audit Agreement stipulating that a sampling method is the most effective, expedient, and adequate method by which to conduct an audit of Beachside's books and records. Gina Imm, a Tax Auditor for the Department, examined and sampled the available books and records of Beachside to determine whether Beachside properly collected and remitted sales and use tax during the Audit Period in compliance with the requirements of Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. Legendary Resorts, LLC (Resorts) entered into an Asset Purchase Agreement with FHCB and Lester J. Butler, Timothy Fulmer and Mitt Fulmer, three of Resorts' shareholders (the Shareholders), in April 2000, for the acquisition of the Beachside Inn assets by Resorts. Subsequent to the execution of the Asset Purchase Agreement, the parties discovered that a condition precedent to the agreement, i.e., the assumption by Resorts of the major indebtedness of FHCB could not be accomplished as contemplated because it would cause the existing lender to violate its loan consideration limits with respect to the Legendary Group. After discovering this problem, Resorts entered into a Triple-net Lease dated March 1, 2000, with the Shareholders for a beachfront lot and entered into a Triple-net Lease dated March 1, 2000, with FHCB for the Beachside Inn assets that were originally the subject of the Asset Purchase Agreement. These Triple-net Leases were designed to transfer control, and the benefits and burdens of ownership, of the Beachside Inn assets to Resorts pending resolution of the financing contingency and the closing under the Asset Purchase Agreement. Beachside entered into a CBA with Legendary prior to the beginning of the Beachside Audit Period, which was effective throughout the Beachside Audit Period. Although Resorts was the party entitled to all rights, and subject to all obligations, under the Triple-net Leases and Asset Purchase Agreement, the financial accounting and cash management functions and activities during the terms of the Leases were handled by and recorded in Beachside because these leases were designed to permit the Legendary Group to take over the operations of the Beachside Inn assets pending closing and because the Legendary Group intended to place the assets in Beachside under the Asset Purchase Agreement upon the closing of the asset purchase. Resorts and Beachside operated the Beachside Inn assets on property owned by FHCB and the Shareholders during the Beachside Audit Period. Accounting entries were made each month to record the amount of CBA compensation that was accrued by Beachside to Legendary under the CBA but no rent was recorded on the income tax or accounting books of either Beachside or Legendary during the Beachside Audit Period. No money labeled as CBA compensation was transferred from Beachside or Resorts to Legendary and no payments labeled as "rent" were transferred from Beachside or Resorts to Legendary. Based on the business decisions of the Chief Financial Officer of Legendary, cash was transferred periodically from Resorts and/or Beachside to Legendary and from Legendary to Resorts and/or Beachside during the Beachside Audit Period. After Resorts and Beachside operated the Beachside Inn assets for a period of time at a material loss, Resorts was not able to arrange for suitable substitute financing to close on the purchase of the Beachside Inn assets under the Asset Purchase Agreement. Resorts, FHCB and the Shareholders reached an agreement on or about August 15, 2003 (the Termination Date), whereby Resorts terminated its rights under the Asset Purchase Agreement and the two leases. In exchange, the Shareholders transferred ownership of the beachfront lot to Resorts. Federal income tax returns for calendar years 2000, 2001, and 2002 were filed by Resorts which reflected the results of operating the Beachside Inn assets. Following the Termination Date, all of the historic accounting entries made by Beachside reflecting the operation of the Beachside Inn assets were moved from its books and records to the books and records of Resorts for administrative reasons and consistency with the legal documents. Beachside and Resorts made insurance payments on behalf of the owners of the property upon which Resorts operated its business for each year of the Beachside Audit Period. They also made payments for loans on behalf of the owners of the property and paid ad valorem taxes due on the property upon which Resorts operated for each year of the Beachside Audit Period. The Department assessed Beachside sales tax on the amounts of ad valorem taxes, insurance payments and loan payments paid by Beachside on behalf of FHCB and the Shareholders. On October 27, 2003, the Department issued Beachside a Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes (form DR- 1215) for audit number A030582778, stating that Beachside owed $69,436.01 in taxes, $30,606.77, and $7,635.33 for a total of $107,678.11. The Department noted Beachside's payment of $8,936.01 for the portions of the assessment related to sales of good and beverage, and reflected a balance due after payment of $98,742.10, with interest continuing to accrue.2/ Beachside made an additional payment of $8,936.01 toward the balance due on the uncontested amount of the assessment. On February 19, 2004, the Department issued its Notice of Proposed Assessment for audit number A030582778, stating that the total amount owed by Beachside was $69,436.01 in taxes, $30,606.77 in penalties and $8,917.55 in interest for a total of $108,960.33, less $17,872.02 previously paid by Beachside, for a balance as of that date of $91,088.31. On April 16, 2004, Beachside protested the NOPA, and the Department referred the matter to the Department's Technical Assistance and Dispute Resolution Section. On March 28, 2005, the Department issued its Notice of Decision upholding the assessment of tax for the payment of ad valorem taxes, insurance and loans by Beachside on behalf of Holding. On April 6, 2005, the Department received the Beachside's formal written protest of audit number A030582778. ADDITIONAL FACTS In addition to the Stipulated Facts submitted by the parties, the undersigned makes the following findings based upon the stipulated exhibits submitted. With respect to the CBAs, the documents provided "the Co-Operator and Manager have agreed to enter into this Agreement for each to provide certain assets to the Business and for Manager to provide, on a cost effective basis, Management Services as required from time to time by the Business." The Agreements state that "each have various assets including fixtures, employees, contractual relationships, knowhow and real estate which they wish to combine to operate a restaurant and bar (the Business)." The CBAs do not name a physical location and do not have provisions for care and repair of the premises; for rights of access and inspection; for eminent domain or condemnation; for default; for provision of utilities or for subletting, all provisions typically seen in a commercial lease. By contrast, the Triple-Net Lease for the Beachside Inn Assets (Stipulated Exhibit 10) contains all of these provisions. The CBAs provide for payment of management services, expenses of the business, and all services and assets necessary for the operations of the business. They are clearly not limited to provision of a location. With respect to the Beachside Assets, the Triple-Net Lease (the Beachside lease) was entered after the Asset Purchase Agreement and expressly acknowledges the existence of that document. However, the Beachside lease by its terms does not provide a right of purchase at a nominal sum at the end of the lease. It provides options to extend the term of the three-year lease for five additional terms of three years each, governed by the same terms and provisions. It also provides a right to purchase the premises at any time during the term of the lease and up to six months after any extensions of the lease which shall be exercised by affecting a closing under the Asset Purchase Agreement. The Beachside Lease for the Beachside Inn assets has other provisions that are relevant to these proceedings. For example, the Beachside Inn lease defines the term "rent" as including the base rent ($100 per month) plus any state sales tax imposed "upon any and all rents or other payments provided in this lease." It provides for surrender of the premises at the expiration of the lease, including terms for removal of any trade fixtures, personal property and signs. Most importantly, the Beachside Inn lease expressly states the following: 26. a. The Lease does not create the relationship of principal and agent or of partnership or of joint venture or of any association between Landlord and Tenant, the sole relationship between the parties hereto being that of Landlord and Tenant. * * * c. This Lease and the Exhibits, if any, attached hereto and forming a part hereof, constitute the entire agreement between Landlord and Tenant affecting the Premises and there are no other agreements, either oral or written, between them other than are herein set forth. . . .

Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Revenue enter a final order finding that: The Department's assessment for additional sales tax, penalties and interest against Petitioner Harry T's is sustained for the portion attributable to payment of ad valorem taxes only; The Department's assessment for additional sales tax, penalties and interest against Petitioner Legendary Restaurant Associates, Inc., is sustained for the portion attributable to payment of ad valorem taxes only; and The Department's assessment for additional sales tax penalties and interest against Petitioner Beachside Inn, Inc., be sustained in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of July, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ___________________________________ LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of July, 2006.

Florida Laws (10) 120.569120.57120.8020.21212.02212.031213.05422.03742.10872.02
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FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION vs. THOMAS C. PLUTO, KATHLEEN M. PLUTO, AND PLUTO REALTY, INC., 87-003084 (1987)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 87-003084 Latest Update: Feb. 04, 1988

Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations contained here, the Respondents, Thomas C. Pluto, Kathleen M. Pluto, and Pluto Realty, Inc., were licensed as real estate brokers and a brokerage corporation respectively. On October 23, 1985, Karen S. Hicks, listed certain property owned by her, located at 1537 Oak Park Avenue, Sarasota, Florida, for sale with Allstar Realty of Sarasota, Inc., (Allstar), utilizing Annette Schmidt as broker. On or about November 25, 1985, Respondent Thomas C. Pluto entered into a contract for sale between himself/or assigns as buyer and Karen Hicks as seller. The contract was for the sale of the property mentioned above. Respondent, Thomas Pluto was representing an investor who was to be the actual buyer and Mr. Pluto neither intended nor desired to purchase the property for himself. Because of the unfavorable interest rate then existing on the mortgage in effect on the property, which resulted in a negative amortization and a less favorable purchase opportunity, the warranty deed, mortgage deed, and closing statement to be executed in closing of the contract of sale herein were to be back dated to September 12, 1985 in order to take advantage of certain peculiarities of the federal income tax law pertinent thereto. By Respondent's own admission, had this sale been consummated in this fashion, it would have constituted at least a conspiracy to defraud the U.S. Closing was held on December 27, 1985. Prior to the closing, the intended buyer of the property, Mr. Pluto's investor, backed out of the deal and Mr. Pluto so informed Ms. Hicks through her agent, Ms. Schmidt. Because Ms. Hicks was anxious to close, because of the Christmas season, and because Mr. Pluto felt that he still might be able to find an investor to take over the property, Mr. Pluto agreed to go through with the purchase and as a part of the closing, paid Ms. Schmidt a $1,000.00 split commission. When the documentation was prepared for the December 27, 1985 closing, Thomas C. Pluto was shown as the buyer, but the mortgage deed, the warranty deed, and the closing statements all reflected a date of September 12, 1985. These documents were drafted and prepared by Respondent, Kathleen Pluto, who received her instructions as to what date to utilize thereon from Respondent, Thomas C. Pluto. The date of September 12, 1985, was initially dictated by the accountant for the original proposed investor who stipulated that date be used in order to take advantage of certain tax advantages possibly involved. According to Mr. Pluto and Mrs. Pluto, independent of each other, Mr. Pluto never thought to change it, and she merely assumed the back date was still to be used. This back dating of documents was, however, even by admission by the Respondent, Thomas Pluto, an improper act. Since the closing did not go through, however, the significance of the back dating relates only to the issue of the intent of Mr. Pluto at the time he took title to the property. By the middle of February, 1986, Mr. Pluto was still unable to secure another buyer for the property and on February 21, 1986, he submitted a written request for an assumption package to the mortgagee, Cameron-Brown, Incorporated. This written request was followed up by a verbal request on February 24 and again on March 18 and April 8, 1986. The mortgage assumption package was ultimately received by Mr. Pluto on April 11, 1986 and was completed and returned to the mortgagee on April 15, 1986. It was, however, either never received or was misplaced by Cameron-Brown. On June 27, and again on July 8 - 21, 1986, another assumption package was requested which was received on July 23, 1986, and returned completed to the mortgage company on July 25, 1986. The assumption was ultimately finalized on August 12, 1986, with credit being given back to September 12, 1985, at the reguest of Ms. Hicks. In the interim, all mortgage payments were timely made by Mr. Pluto. The Respondents did not claim a tax deduction or any tax advantage on the basis of this transaction nor was it ever their intent that they gain a personal tax advantage from it. Petitioner alleges that Mr. Pluto left the original back date on the deed when he took title to the property to make the property more attractive to another buyer to whom the property could have been transferred and who could have taken advantage of the earlier date for tax purposes. Mr. Pluto, on the other hand, contends that was not his intention and that if that had been his intention, he would not have taken title to the property when he did in his own name because that would require another complete closing and the resultant additional fees and charges inherent therein. This would have made the property less desirable because of the already high interest rate, the negative amortization and other financial problems. In light of the above, it appears that Mr. Pluto was quite willing to participate in a potentially illegal scheme and at the time he executed the documents for the final closing, notwithstanding he claims he did not realize the date had not been changed, he was guilty of at the very least, culpable negligence and dishonest dealing by scheme. The fact that he paid the selling broker a commission after alleging he went through with the purchase as a favor to her, tends to weaken the credibility of his story.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Thomas C. Pluto's, license be suspended for 90 days and that he be reprimanded but that the execution of the suspension be stayed for one year with provision for automatic remission at the end thereof; that Respondent, Kathleen M. Pluto, be reprimanded; and that the charges relating to Pluto Realty, Inc., be dismissed. RECOMMENDED this 4th day of February, 1988, at Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of February, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-3084 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. BY THE PETITIONER 1 Accepted and incorporated herein. 2&3 Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. 6&7 Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. 10&11 Accepted. 12 Accepted and incorporated herein. BY THE RESPONDENTS 1-3 Accepted and incorporated herein. 4&5 Accepted. 6-10 Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted except for the words, "through inadvertence, oversight, or mistake" Rejected as contra to the evidence. Accepted except for the words, "by oversight and error" Accepted. 19&20 Accepted and incorporated herein. 21 Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: James R. Mitchell, Esquire DPR, Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Robert P. Rosin, Esquire 1900 Main Street, Suite 210 Sarasota, Florida 34236 Kathleen M. Pluto, pro se 8415 Midnight Pass Road Sarasota, Florida 34242 Darlene F. Keller Acting Executive Director DPR, Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801

Florida Laws (2) 120.57475.25
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HERNANDO COUNTY, A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA vs DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 11-002786 (2011)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Brooksville, Florida Jun. 01, 2011 Number: 11-002786 Latest Update: Feb. 27, 2013

The Issue Whether the "Additional Payment" made by Hernando HMA, Inc., d/b/a Brooksville Regional Hospital to Hernando County pursuant to a document entitled Lease Agreement, as amended, constitutes "rent" subject to sales tax under section 212.031, Florida Statutes.1/

Findings Of Fact Hernando HMA, Inc. (HMA) is a for-profit entity which operates Brooksville Regional Hospital, Spring Hill Regional Hospital, and other entities, as successor to an entity that was in Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings from 1993 to 1998, Regional Healthcare, Inc. (RHI). The Department is an agency of the State of Florida that has been delegated the responsibility to collect sales and use taxes imposed by chapter 212, Florida Statutes. In 1998, as part of RHI's bankruptcy plan, HMA and the County entered into various agreements, including a lease agreement (1998 Lease), regarding the use and operation of several RHI hospital properties and improvements owned by the County, and leased back to RHI. Under the 1998 Lease and other agreements, HMA agreed to continue to operate the hospital facilities for 30 years with possession of the real property and improvements to be returned to the County at the end of the lease term. Section 1.2W. of the 1998 Lease defined "Rental Payment" as follows: "Rental Payment" means all payments due from Lessee to Lessor or otherwise required to be paid by Lessee pursuant to the terms of this lease. The 1998 Lease further provided in section 3.3 under the heading "Rent": The annual rental payment of the Leased Premises for each year of the Lease Term (the "Rental Payment") shall be in the amount of Three Hundred Thousand and 00/100 Dollars ($300,000). This Rental Payment shall be paid to Lessor by Lessee on the Commencement Date and on each anniversary date of the Commencement Date during the Lease Term. The 1998 Lease also provided that HMA, as Lessee, would pay "all taxes, if any, prior to delinquency." Under the 1998 Lease, the County agreed to lease the premises in consideration of HMA’s timely payment of rent and timely performance of the other covenants and agreements required under the lease. It was an “event of default” under the lease if HMA failed to observe and perform any covenant, condition, or agreement on its part which could be cured by a payment of money. Remedies for default under the 1998 Lease included termination of the lease by the County and exclusion of HMA from possession of the leased premises. Even though the leased premises under the 1998 Lease were not subject to ad valorem taxes because they were owned by the County, during public discussions of the proposed 1998 Lease, an issue arose about HMA's responsibility for payment of fire assessments that would have been paid if the property was not immune or exempt from ad valorem taxes. HMA agreed, by separate agreement, to pay the fire assessments and buy a new ambulance to serve the community. The fire assessment agreement was by separate document that was included as part of the closing of the 1998 Lease and other agreements involving the hospital facilities in June 1998. The 1998 Lease was dated June 1, 1998. The 1998 Lease terms included a merger clause in section 15.6 entitled “ENTIRE AGREEMENT,” which provided: This lease may not be modified, amended or otherwise changed orally, but may only be modified, amended or otherwise changed by an agreement in writing signed by both parties. This Lease Agreement and its accompanying guaranty constitute the entire agreement between the parties affecting this Lease. This Lease Agreement supersedes and cancels any and all previous negotiations, arrangements, agreements, and understandings between the parties hereto with respect to the subject matter thereof, and no such outside or prior agreements shall be used to interpret or to construe this Lease. There are no promises, covenants, representations or inducements in addition to, or at variance with any of the terms of this Lease Agreement except the Guaranty. In 2001, the County and HMA began negotiations for relocation of the Brooksville Regional Hospital which was part of the leased premises described in the 1998 Lease. During the negotiations, HMA, through its attorney, Steven Mitchell, prepared a proposed comprehensive relocation agreement in consultation with former County Attorney Bruce Snow. Section 7.3 of the proposed relocation agreement contemplated revising the 1998 Lease and suggested the following preliminarily negotiated language for rental payments under a revised 1998 Lease: Rental Payments The Lessee shall pay to Lessor on the due date therefore as set forth in the Lease Agreement, the sum of Three Hundred Thousand and no/100 Dollars ($300,000.00) per annum. The Lessee shall pay to Lessor on an annual basis, either as rent or by virtue of a payment to Hernando County of the same sum to be used by Hernando County as it deems appropriate, an amount equal to the ad valorem taxes that would have been paid on the New Facility Site as improved with the New Facility if the New Facility Site were not owned by Hernando County but owned by a for-profit entity. In the event the New Facility Site and the New Facility located thereon are subsequently required by law to pay ad valorem taxes then the obligation to pay the amount described in Section 7.3(b) herein shall immediately terminate and Lessee shall be responsible for the payment of the appropriate ad valorem tax. The proposed comprehensive relocation agreement was discussed at public meetings held by the Hernando County Board of Commissioners on September 17 and September 25, 2001. The minutes of the September 25, 2001, meeting indicate that the County Administrator advised that the proposed relocation agreement contemplated that HMA would continue to pay $300,000 annually as rent, and “would make a payment-in-lieu of taxes annually to the County . . . .” The minutes also reflect that, in responding to a question from a commissioner regarding whether there should be language in the agreement that would protect the “payment-in-lieu of taxes” provision in the event the law changed: [Former County Attorney] Snow replied that it was his recommendation that there should be a provision that to the extent that the organic law of the State provided that facilities, such as the new hospital or other hospital under the lease, were taxable for ad valorem tax purposes, that that provision of the organic law would apply to ensure that that provision superseded. He explained that the lease provision to provide for an ad valorem tax payment was only to the extent that the organic law did not otherwise compel it so that the County would be receiving ad valorem tax under either scenario. The minutes from the September 25, 2001, meeting further state: Mr. Snow replied to County Attorney Garth Coller that there had been recent Supreme Court decisions which may have a bearing on the organic law to the extent that a decision of that nature indicated that the facilities were subject to ad valorem tax, notwithstanding the ownership issue, then they were subject to ad valorem tax and the lease would need to clarify that. He suggested that if the FS or Constitution should change, even in the absence of an interpretation of the Supreme Court decision, the change would obligate the payment of ad valorem taxes pursuant to the constitutional or statutory provisions. He explained that organic law pertained to provisions of FS or the Constitution as opposed to a Court decision. Mr. Snow’s reported reference to recent “Supreme Court decisions” regarding ad valorem taxes undoubtedly was referring the decision, among others, in Sebring Airport Authority v. McIntyre, 718 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 1998). In that decision, rendered a few months after the County entered into the 1998 Lease, the Supreme Court of Florida stated with regard to municipal (as opposed to county) property: [T]here is nothing in article VII, section 3 that allows the legislature to exempt from ad valorem taxation municipally owned property or any other property that is being used primarily for a proprietary purpose or for any purpose other than a governmental, municipal or public purpose. To the extent section 196.012(6) attempts to exempt from taxation municipal property used for a proprietary purpose, the statute is unconstitutional. Id. at 298. The Sebring case did not address tax immunity of county property as distinguished from the issue of tax exemptions for the proprietary use of municipal property. The proposed “Rental Payments” language for revisions to the 1998 Lease, however, demonstrates that the drafters of the comprehensive relocation agreement were aware of the possibility that the Sebring rationale could be expanded and applied to county property. The comprehensive relocation agreement was approved by the County, and executed in late 2001. Attached as to that relocation agreement as Schedule C was an unsigned document entitled “First Amendment to Lease Agreement” that was not to be executed until the new facility was completed and transferred to the County. Subsection 3.3 of the First Amendment to Lease Agreement entitled “Rental Payments” provided: Rental Payments The Lessee shall pay to the Lessor on the due date therefore as set forth in the Lease Agreement, the sum of Three Hundred Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($300,000.00) per annum. The Lessee shall pay to the Lessor on an annual basis, either as rent or by virtue of a payment to Hernando County of an amount (“Additional Payment”) equal to the sum of the following: An amount equal to that portion of the ad valorem taxes that would have been paid to Hernando County on the Leased Premises (as modified by the substitution of the New Facility Site for the Current Hospital Site) if the Leased Premises were not owned by Hernando County but owned by a for profit entity; and An amount equal to that portion of the ad valorem taxes that would have been paid to the Spring Hill Fire and Rescue District, the Township 22 Fire District and/or any other special taxing district that may be established pursuant to law; and An amount equal to all special assessments levied by Hernando County through any Municipal Service Benefit Unit created by Hernando County pursuant to the provisions of Section 125.01, Florida Statutes; and An amount equal to all ad valorem tax levied by Hernando County through any Municipal Service Taxing Unit created by Hernando County pursuant to the provisions of Section 125.01, Florida Statutes. In no event shall the Additional Payments exceed an amount equal to a full ad valorem tax assessment on the New Facility Site as determined annually by the Hernando County Property Appraiser. In the event the Lessee and/or Lessor is required by law to pay ad valorem taxes on the Leased Premises or any portion thereof, the obligation to pay to Lessor the Additional Payment described in this Section 3.3 shall immediately terminate (and/or be adjusted, whichever is applicable), and Lessee shall be responsible for payment of the appropriate ad valorem tax. The First Amendment to Lease Agreement further provided, “[e]xcept as expressly modified herein, all other terms and conditions set forth in the [1998] Lease Agreement are hereby ratified and confirmed.” The new hospital facility was completed and transferred to the County in 2005. On November 15, 2005, the County commission approved documents related to the transfer, including the First Amendment to Lease Agreement in the precise form as attached to the relocation agreement approved in 2001. The approval was obtained on a consent agenda, and the minutes reflect no further discussion by the commission or the public on the documents that were approved. In 2009, the Hernando County School District sued the County Property Appraiser, alleging that the properties subject to the 1998 Lease as amended by the First Amendment to Lease Agreement should not be exempt from ad valorem taxation. In a 13-page Order dismissing the School District’s action, Circuit Judge Daniel B. Merritt, Jr., distinguished the cases disallowing statutory ad valorem tax exemptions for properties owned by special tax districts or cities from the sovereign immunity against ad valorem taxes enjoyed by real estate owned by the State of Florida and its counties. In his ruling, Judge Merritt noted that Florida law specifically makes leasehold interests in governmental property subject to taxation, noting: The Legislature defines leasehold interests as intangible personal property and, hence, assessed by the Florida Department of Revenue, when: (1) rent is due; (2) the property is used for commercial purposes; (3) is not used for agriculture; (4) not financed with revenue bonds, and; (5) the lease is for an initial term of less than 100 years; §§196.199(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2008), 199.023(1)(d), Florida Statutes (2005), specifically preserved in Chapter 2006-312, Laws of Florida (2006). However, see below for further analysis with regard to presumed ownership of property leased for 100 years or more as set forth in §196.199(7), Florida Statutes. Judge Merritt also discussed those instances where “leased” property might not qualify as State or county property where lessees are the “equitable owners,” such as leaseholds of 100 years or more or where properties do not revert to the State until the end of a lease term. In his order, however, Judge Merritt noted that the tax immunity of the County was a fundamental attribute of county property and held that “under the terms of the Lease Agreements the Court concludes that HMA has merely the right to use and possession and is not the beneficial owner as a matter of law Hernando County’s immune property and improvements.” Judge Merritt’s Order was affirmed on appeal. School Board of Hernando County v. Mazourek, Case No. H-27-CA-2009-549 (5th Cir. 2009), per curiam aff’d, 2010 WL 4323055 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) In December, 2010, the Department notified the County it had been selected for a tax compliance audit under chapter 212, Florida Statutes, Sales and Use Tax. The audit period was from January 1, 2007, through December 31, 2009. The County’s personnel were cordial and receptive during the audit process and the Department’s auditor determined that the books and records kept by the County had adequate internal accounting controls in place and sufficient data integrity. Out of the approximately 19 tax registration accounts the County has with the Department, the Department’s auditor found exception with only tax account #12445797, the tax collected and remitted under its lease with HMA. In her record review, the Department’s auditor noticed invoices and worksheets from the County to HMA, titled “Payment in lieu of taxes.” In examining the First Amendment to the Lease Agreement, Section 3.3 “Rental Payments,” the Department’s auditor determined that the County was not collecting sales tax on a portion of the rent received under that section. The monthly tax return filed by the County under account # 12445797 reflected that it was collecting and remitting the sales tax calculated on the $300,000.00 annual rent payment, but was not collecting and remitting sales tax calculated on the additional payments in lieu of taxes. The Department’s auditor determined the additional payments, required under the lease and made as a condition of occupancy, constituted a taxable transaction as additional rent consideration. The amount of the additional payments, made January 2007 and March 2008, as revealed on the County’s “Payment in lieu of taxes worksheets,” was multiplied by 6.5 percent to arrive at the additional tax amount due of $78,710.17. On December 9, 2010, the Department issued a Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes, Form DR 1215, advising the County of its audit findings, which included $78,710.17 in taxes due, $14,526.37 in accrued interest through December 9, 2010, and a $19,677.55 late payment penalty. On December 21, 2010, the Department issued its Notice of Proposed Assessment, Form DR 831, showing an assessment of $78,710.17 in tax and $14,707.51 in accrued interest, for a total of $93,417.68 through December 21, 2010, with interest accruing thereafter at the rate of $15.10 per diem. All penalty amounts were waived. At the final hearing, the County argued that the additional payments from HMA under the First Amendment to Lease Agreement were not rent, but rather separate payments to pay for County services. While the actual language used in the First Amendment to Lease Agreement appears to unambiguously indicate that the additional payments were rent, the County offered additional evidence of facts and circumstances beyond the terms of the lease itself in support of its argument that the additional payments were not rent. That evidence was admitted, without objection, and has been considered in determining the intention of the parties to the lease with regard to the additional payments. In addition to evidence that the lease drafters were aware of certain cases decided on the issue of whether the leased premises would be subject to ad valorem taxes, the County offered the testimony of Mr. Mitchell regarding the “Rental Payments” language found in the First Amendment to Lease Agreement. When asked whether there had been much negotiation over the format or wording of the First Amendment to Lease Agreement, Mr. Mitchell recalled: No, there really wasn’t other than, you know, the concept – what this amendment does is what we had agreed to pay rental payment. The rental payment was $300,000. And then, we also had agreed independently just to go ahead and pay the County for certain services that they were providing to us. And then we specified those. Those were independent payments, not part of the rental payment. Mr. Mitchell further testified: [B]asically, this property is free of ad valorem tax. That is why the school board filed their lawsuit because, of course, they were not getting any of the ad valorem taxes. So, the property is free of payment of ad valorem taxes. We’re paying our 300,000. It was very, very clear. However, HMA felt that the County was providing certain services, the fire districts and whatnot. So, independent of the rent, we paid this amount. If you read the section dealing – it’s 3.3.[2], or whatever it is, which I’ll read it to you, it talks about, at the very end – and they did it for whatever reason the property became taxable, you know, it effectively became taxable and we had to pay full ad valorem taxes on the property, then the specialties – these additional payments we called, you know, would go away and they, effectively, be part of rent. That's why it talks about it as such, and it was either additional payment and/or rent. Contrary to Mr. Mitchell’s recollection, section 3.3.2 of the First Amendment to Lease Agreement does not speak in terms of “additional payment and/or rent” but rather states that another payment would be made “either as rent or by virtue of a payment to Hernando County of an amount ('Additional Payment') . . .". Mr. Mitchell makes a valid point regarding the fact that HMA was concerned about having to pay both the additional payment and ad valorem taxes. Consistent with this concern, the lease amendment made it clear that HMA would not have to pay the additional amount if the property ever became subject to ad valorem taxes. Mr. Mitchell’s testimony in support of the County’s contention that HMA’s payment in lieu of taxes under the First Amendment to Lease Agreement was not rent, however, is unpersuasive. Considering the extrinsic evidence offered by the County, especially evidence of the parties concern that the subject County property might someday be subject to ad valorem taxes, together with the 1998 Lease, language negotiated for the proposed relocation agreement, and the actual terms of the First Amendment to Lease Agreement, it is found that the parties intended the language under the "Rental Payments" section to assure that HMA did not have to pay the additional amount twice. The extrinsic evidence offered by the County, however, was insufficient to support a finding that the parties intended to differentiate between “rent” and the “additional payment” or that, however characterized, the payment in lieu of taxes was not rent subject to assessment by the Department. If the parties had wanted to provide language that designated the payment in lieu of taxes as a payment for services instead of rent they could have, as they did in the Second Amendment to Lease Agreement entered into on September 13, 2011, just ten days prior to the final hearing in this case.2/ That Second Amendment to Lease Agreement changed the name of section 3.3 from “Rental Payments,” as found in the First Amendment, to “Rent and Additional Payment for County Services.” Pertinent subsections of the Second Amendment further provided: 3.3.2 Additional Payment for County Services. The Lessee shall pay to Lessor on an annual basis, as an additional payment (“Additional Payment”) for services provided by Hernando County [in its role as a service provider and local taxing authority], . . . * * * The Additional Payment is not intended to constitute “rent” and is not intended to create an event subject to Florida sales tax – but rather is intended to constitute a separate payment for the provision of services, payable to the local taxing authority, as provided in § 212.031(1)(c), Florida Statutes (which allow parties by contractual arrangement to distinguish between payments which are intended to be taxable and payments which are intended to be nontaxable), as this section may be amended or renumbered from time to time.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that, consistent with the Notice of Proposed Assessment dated December 21, 2010, and this Recommended Order, the Department of Revenue enter a final order finding that Petitioner owes tax and interest due totaling $93,417.68 through December 21, 2010, with interest accruing thereafter at the rate of $15.10 per diem, without penalties. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of December, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of December, 2011.

Florida Laws (7) 120.57120.80125.01196.012196.199212.03172.011
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DANE LUCAS, D/B/A RIVER ENTERTAINMENT AND RIVER CRUISES, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 99-000246 (1999)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Jacksonville, Florida Jan. 15, 1999 Number: 99-000246 Latest Update: Aug. 12, 1999

The Issue The issue is whether Petitioners are liable for the sales and use tax audit assessment and charter transit system surtax audit assessment, as reflected in Respondent's Notices of Reconsideration dated March 17, 1998.

Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: From 1988 through 1993, Petitioner, Dane W. Lucas (Lucas), operated the Annabelle Lee, a cruise boat, under the name of River Entertainment. On January 1, 1994, Lucas incorporated his business under the name of River Cruises, Inc. (the corporation), which is also a Petitioner in this cause. In 1996, Respondent, Department of Revenue (DOR), conducted an audit of the records of both Petitioners to determine whether all sales and use taxes and charter transit system surtaxes had been properly reported and paid. As a result of the audit, DOR issued two proposed assessments dated January 28, 1997, against Lucas individually and two assessments dated July 22, 1997, against the corporation. However, the latter two assessments reflect the combined liability of both Lucas individually as well as the corporation and cover the five-year audit period from March 1, 1990, through February 28, 1995. After a protest letter was filed by Petitioners, DOR issued two Notices of Reconsideration on March 17, 1998. As to Lucas individually, the Notice of Reconsideration reflects that as of March 11, 1998, he owed $44,083.56 for sales and use taxes, with interest to accrue from that date at the rate of $7.26 per day. It further asserted that he owed $3,290.35 in charter transit system surtaxes as of the same date, with interest to accrue at the rate of $.058 per day. As to the corporation, the Notice of Reconsideration reflects that as of March 11, 1998, it was liable for $17,906.53, with interest to accrue as of March 11, 1998, at the rate of $2.97 per day. Also, it asserts that as of March 11, 1998, the corporation was liable for $5,839.94 for charter transit system surtaxes, with interest to accrue at the rate of $0.25 per day. On April 24, 1998, Petitioners remitted a check in the amount of $9,626.92, which represented what they believed was the proper tax assessment. As to the remaining portion, they deny that any moneys are owed; alternatively, they have requested that the amounts be compromised on the basis that they have no ability to pay the amount claimed by DOR.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order sustaining its original assessment against Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of July, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of July, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Eric J. Taylor, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs 28 West Central Boulevard, Suite 310 Orlando, Florida 32801 Dane W. Lucas 1511 Montana Avenue Jacksonville, Florida 32207-8642 Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100

Florida Laws (2) 120.569120.57
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AMERICAN TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY vs. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 81-001601 (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-001601 Latest Update: Aug. 09, 1982

Findings Of Fact The parties have stipulated to all facts in this proceeding. Those facts found relevant to a determination of the issue are as follows: Petitioner, American Telephone and Telegraph Company, is a New York corporation and is functionally divided into two divisions: the Long Lines Department and the General Department. Through its Long Lines Department, petitioner is a federally regulated public utility and common carrier which furnishes interstate and international telecommunications services. Long Lines is responsible generally for the construction, operation and maintenance of a nationwide system of interstate telecommunications facilities and related equipment which serve to interconnect the facilities of over 1700 operating telecommunications companies in the United States as well as telecommunications systems abroad. Some of these facilities extend into and through the State of Florida. In performing this interstate business, Long Lines operates, and thus has property or employees or both in 49 states, including Florida. Through its General Department, petitioner is the parent corporation of 21 operating telecommunications companies (known as "Associated Companies"), Western Electric Company, Inc. ("Western") and Bell Telephone Laboratories, Inc. ("Bell Labs"). The General Department holds and manages the stock owned in these subsidiaries and two minority owned companies, and provides capital. advice and assistance to them. It conducts these activities principally in New York and New Jersey and conducts no business and has no property or employees in Florida. The only business activities in the State of Florida during 1972, 1973 and 1974 were conducted through petitioner's Long Lines Department in connection with the operation of the interstate and international long distance telecommunications network. None of the Associated Companies is organized under the laws of Florida or has its headquarters in Florida. The Only Associated Company which conducts business or has property or employees within Florida is the Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company (hereinafter "Southern Bell"), a wholly owned subsidiary of petitioner. Southern Bell files its own separate Florida income tax returns and during the period 1972-1974 paid approximately $10 million in income tax to Florida. The respondent concurs that petitioner is entitled to deduct 100 percent of the dividends paid by Southern Bell to petitioner. Western, also a wholly owned subsidiary of petitioner, is a manufacturing corporation with its own Board of Directors and officers, doing business in all 50 states. During the period 1972-1974 Western paid approximately $1.7 million in income tax to Florida. The respondent concurs that petitioner is entitled to deduct 100 percent of the dividends paid by Western to petitioner. For each of the 1972, 1973 and 1974 tax years, petitioner has filed a federal consolidated income tax return, and has made a valid election under Section 243 of the Internal Revenue Code for each of those years. That provision of the federal tax law permits a domestic corporation to deduct 100 percent of the dividends received from its wholly-owned domestic subsidiaries. Petitioner's federal income tax returns were audited by the Internal Revenue Service and the respective tax liabilities were determined and paid for each of the years in question. The Internal Revenue Service did not tax dividends received by petitioner from its affiliates. Petitioner timely filed its Florida corporate income tax returns for the years ending December 31, 1972, December 31, 1973 and December 31, 1974. Petitioner did not elect and was not required to file a Florida consolidated income tax return under Section 220.131, Florida Statutes. For each of the years in question, petitioner reported on line 1--"federal taxable income (line 30, Form 1120 or corresponding line on related form 1120 series, 990C or 990T)"- -of its Florida corporation income tax return (Form F-1120) its taxable income for federal income tax purposes computed as if petitioner had filed a separate federal income tax return for each of the years in question and for each preceding taxable year for which it was a member of an affiliated group. These amounts were: 1972 $ 94,020,281 1973 $213,364,165 1974 $110,770,402 On its Florida corporation income tax return for each of the years in question, petitioner made the additions and subtractions required by the form of the return in computing "adjusted federal income" and apportioned this amount by the prescribed three-factor formula to obtain "Florida net income." The Department of Revenue adjusted the amount of "federal taxable income" and hence "Florida net income" of petitioner for each of the years in question by adding thereto 15 percent of the dividends received from subsidiaries which were deductible for federal income tax purposes under Section 243 of the Internal Revenue Code. On April 10, 1978, the Department issued a notice of proposed deficiency for petitioner's tax years ended December 31, 1972, December 31, 1973 and December 31, 1974. The total amount of the proposed deficiency was $1,131,158, computed as follows: YEAR AUDITED TAX TAX AS FILED DEFICIENCY 1972 $426,468 $122,365 $304,103 1973 668,597 281,168 387,429 1974 594,300 154,674 439,626 Total $1,689,365 $558,207 $1,131,158 After a timely protest to the proposed deficiencies was filed by the petitioner, correspondence and an informal conference between the parties was had. Finally, on April 16, 1981, the Department issued a letter denying the protest and petitioner petitioned for an administrative hearing. Through correspondence and discussions with the petitioner, the Department of Revenue has taken the position that it would allow only an 85 percent dividend deduction for the dividends received by petitioner from those affiliates which were not subject to the Florida corporate income tax code. Petitioner is seeking to take a 100 percent deduction of all dividends which it received from its subsidiaries, as it did on its federal income tax returns. The dividends received by petitioner which the Department is attempting to subject to Florida tax by its proposed deficiency assessment are derived from its equity investment in its subsidiaries and they represent to petitioner a return on such investment. Since the actual capital, however, for that investment is furnished primarily by public investors, the principal use of the dividends received by petitioner is to meet its obligation to its shareholders and bondholders for the payment of dividends and interest. For example, in 1974 petitioner received dividends from the Associated Companies, Western and other affiliates in the amount of $2,538,443,000 and paid dividends to shareholders in the amount of $2,039,800,000 and interest on its long and intermediate term debt of $475,670,000. Petitioner, therefore, serves as the investor interface between the investing public and its subsidiary companies, whereby the purchase of petitioner's stock or debt issues actually represents an investment in the earnings of the Bell System. Petitioner, acting through its General Department, thus provides the avenue by which the subsidiaries pass their net earnings to the investing public. The income which the Department seeks to tax is derived from dividends received by petitioner primarily from earnings generated by the property and employees of the Associated Companies which are devoted to furnishing intrastate and interstate telecommunications services in their operating territories in states other than the State of Florida. These earnings are subject to income taxes in all states in which the Associated Companies provide telecommunications services that impose income taxes on corporations. The dividends received by petitioner do not contribute to the funding of Long Lines since (1) the pervasive regulation under which petitioner's subsidiaries operate limits their earnings to that amount sufficient for the needs of their own operations and effectively prevents those earnings from being available for use in other businesses and (2) earnings paid out as dividends by petitioner's subsidiaries are principally required to be passed to the public investors in the Bell System, through petitioner's General Department, in order to meet dividend and interest obligations to these outside shareholders and bondholders. During the tax years in question, the Department of Revenue had not promulgated any rule with respect to the disallowance of a deduction for 100 percent of dividends received as provided for under Section 243 of the Internal Revenue Code, and the Florida corporate income tax return forms did not require any such add-back or adjustment. During the 1980 legislative session, an amendment to Chapter 220, Florida Statutes, was proposed which would have changed the definition of "affiliated group of corporations." Such proposed legislation was not passed and did not become law.

Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that that portion of the Department's proposed assessment of deficiencies for the 1972, 1973 and 1974 tax years as is based upon dividends received by the petitioner from its affiliates be withdrawn as being contrary to law and invalid. Respectfully submitted and entered this 28th day of April, 1982. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of April, 1982.

Florida Laws (7) 120.56220.02220.11220.12220.13220.131220.43
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STAN MUSIAL AND BIGGIE`S, INC. vs. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 75-001112 (1975)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 75-001112 Latest Update: Dec. 23, 1977

The Issue Broadly stated, the issue in this proceeding the validity of the proposed deficiency in petitioner's corporate income in the amount of $25,712.80 for the 1972 fiscal year. More specifically, the issue is whether Florida may lawfully tax for the gain it realized on the sale of securities in the of $941,418.00. Included within this issue is the question of whether the apportionment formula set forth in Florida Statutes is applicable to petitioner.

Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the pleadings, the stipulations the parties and the record in this proceeding, the following relevant During the calendar year 1972, petitioner was a foreign " Corporation subject to the Florida Corporate Income Tax, imposed Chapter 220, Florida Statutes. Petitioner also operated a business in St. Louis, Missouri. January 1, 1972, petitioner held a 95 percent interest in Bal Harbour Joint Venture, which owned and operated the Ivanhoe Hotel and Restaurant in Bal Harbour, Florida. On December 15, 1972, petitioner was the sole owner of the Ivanhoe Hotel and Restaurant. November 16, 1972, the petitioner acquired by merger 100 percent interest in the Clearwater Beach Hilton, a motel and restaurant business located in Clearwater, Florida, and continued to own this interest on December 31, 1972. The Clearwater and Ivanhoe hotel and restaurant businesses in Florida and the petitioner's business in Missouri have separate, individual general managers. There is no central purchasing by the hotels and no centralized operating records are maintained by petitioner. There are no central reservation services available between the hotels and the hotels advertise separately and unilaterally in local publications in the cities in which they are located. No standardized product lines exist. On November 2, 1972, petitioner sold certain securities which resulted in a realized gain to petitioner for federal income tax purposes of $941,418.00. Said securities were purchased, located and sold in the State of Missouri, and had no relationship to petitioner's Florida transactions. Petitioner timely filed its 1972 Florida corporate income tax return on which it subtracted from its federal taxable income the gain realized from the sale of the securities. Its "Florida net income" and its "total tax due" were thus reported as "none." On or about May 8, 1974, respondent advised petitioner of a proposed deficiency in petitioner's 1972 tax in the amount of $29,392.00. In accordance with the provisions of Florida Statutes Sec. 214.11, petitioner timely filed with respondent its protest of the proposed deficiency assessment. After a hearing, respondent issued to petitioner its Notice of Decision in which the proposed, deficiency was reduced to $25,712.80, and the reasons therefor were set forth. Petitioner requested reconsideration by respondent. On March 11, 1975, the parties stipulated that further proceedings in this cause would be, processed under the Florida Administrative Procedures Act. The petition for hearing was forwarded by respondent to the Division of Administrative Hearings, the undersigned was duly assigned as the Hearing Officer.

Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is recommended that: the proposed deficiency assessment in the amount of $25,712.80 be vacated and set aside; and The respondent permit petitioner to file an amended 1972 return utilizing, within the discretion of the respondent, the employment of either separate accounting, a monthly averaging formula or another method which would effectuate an equitable apportionment of petitioner's income to the State of Florida. Respectfully submitted and entered this 8th day of August, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Donald A. Pleasants Shackleford, Farrior, Stallings and Evans Post Office Box 3324 Tampa, Florida 33601 Louis de la Parte, Jr. 725 East Kennedy Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33602 Patricia S. Turner Assistant General The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER =================================================================

Florida Laws (4) 220.11220.12220.14220.15
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TROYCORP, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 93-001365 (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Mar. 09, 1993 Number: 93-001365 Latest Update: Sep. 06, 1994

Findings Of Fact Stipulated Facts Respondent conducted an audit of Petitioner's business records for the period July 1, 1985, through June 30, 1990. Respondent determined a deficiency in sales tax of $174,823.96, including penalty and interest through August 22, 1990. Petitioner objected to the deficiency. Respondent reviewed the audit, and made audit changes that are the subject of this proceeding. The audit changes determined a deficiency in use tax of $76,035.60, including tax ($47,910.10), penalty ($11,977.68), and interest through March 12, 1991 ($16,147.60). Interest accrues daily in the amount of $15.75. A First Revised Notice Of Intent To Make Sales Tax Changes, for the reduced assessment of $76,035.60, was issued on March 21, 1991. A Notice Of Proposed Assessment was issued on July 2, 1991. The Notice Of Proposed Assessment became a Final Assessment on August 31, 1991. Respondent made a prima facie showing of the factual and legal basis for the use tax assessment. Section 120.575(2), Florida Statutes. 1/ The audit and assessment are procedurally correct. Tax, interest, and penalty are correctly computed. Formation Petitioner was incorporated in Florida, in January, 1983, by Mr. B. Theodore Troy, president and sole shareholder. Petitioner's principal place of business is 101 Wymore Road, Suite 224, Altamonte Springs, Florida. Petitioner conducted business as American Advertising Distributors of Central Florida. Mr. Troy and his wife operated the business until liquidating Petitioner's assets in 1992. Operation Petitioner sold direct mail advertising to Florida businesses. Petitioner operated pursuant to a franchise agreement with American Advertising Distributors, Inc., of Mesa, Arizona ("AAD"). AAD was Petitioner's franchisor until AAD filed for bankruptcy in 1990. Petitioner solicited orders from Florida businesses 2/ for advertising coupons designed and printed by AAD in Arizona. AAD mailed the advertising coupons to addressees in Florida who were potential customers for Florida businesses. Florida businesses placed orders with Petitioner on written contracts, or sales agreements, labeled "advertising orders." AAD was not a party to advertising orders. Advertising orders identified "AAD" as American Advertising Distributors of Central Florida, and were imprinted with the name and address of "AAD" in Central Florida. Advertising orders specified the total charges, color and stock of paper, number of addressees, and areas of distribution. Petitioner assisted businesses with rough layout for art work. The rough layout was forwarded to AAD. AAD prepared finished art work and sent copies back to Petitioner for approval by Florida businesses. AAD then printed, collated, and mailed advertising coupons to addressees in Florida, without charge to addressees. Florida businesses paid non-refundable deposits when placing advertising orders. The remaining balance was paid upon approval of final art work. AAD did not submit invoices to Florida businesses. AAD submitted invoices to Petitioner for the amount due from Petitioner. 3/ Petitioner paid AAD 10 days before advertising coupons were mailed. Some advertising coupons were produced by Laberge Printers, Inc., in Orlando, Florida ("Laberge"). Coupons from Laberge were designed, printed, and distributed in the same manner as coupons from AAD. Two types of advertising coupons were provided by AAD and Laberge. The majority of coupons were distributed in coop mailings, or "bonus express" envelopes, containing coupons for up to 20 businesses. Bonus express envelopes were mailed approximately eight times a year. Advertising coupons were also distributed in "solo" mailings. A solo mailing was an individualized, custom printed coupon, or flyer, mailed to individual addressees. The total charges stated in advertising orders included the cost of services provided by Petitioner, AAD, and Laberge. Services included typesetting, art work, printing, inserting envelopes, and mailing. Florida imposed a tax on services, from July 1, 1987, through December 31, 1987. Petitioner collected and remitted tax imposed on the cost of services included in the total charges stated on advertising orders. Except for the services tax, neither Petitioner, AAD, nor Laberge collected and remitted sales or use tax to Florida or to Arizona. Petitioner never utilized resale certificates for any tax other than the tax on services. Collectibility Petitioner was financially able to pay the use tax assessment during 1990 and 1991. No later than August 22, 1990, Mr. Troy knew of the sales tax deficiency of $174,823.96. By March 21, 1991, Mr. Troy knew of the reduced use tax assessment of $76,035.60. During 1990 and 1991, Petitioner made discretionary payments to Mr. Troy of $110,389. Petitioner reported federal taxable income of $58,279 in 1990 and 1991. 4/ In arriving at taxable income, Petitioner deducted payments to Mr. Troy of $59,430 for compensation to officers, management fees, and salary. 5/ From taxable income of $58,279, Petitioner paid approximately $50,959 to Mr. Troy in nondeductible shareholder loans. 6/ Discretionary payments of $110,389, 7/ made to Mr. Troy in 1990 and 1991, were more than adequate to pay the use tax assessment of $76,036.60. At the end of 1991, Petitioner reported fixed assets with a book value of $14,933, a customer list valued at $104,447.72, and retained earnings of $102,605. The book value of intangible assets was $82,943, comprised primarily of the franchise, valued at $35,000, and goodwill of $45,000. Termination Of Operations But Continued Existence AAD petitioned for bankruptcy in 1990. Petitioner subsequently determined that its franchise and goodwill were worthless. In 1992, Petitioner reported a loss of $99,726 for federal tax purposes. All of Petitioner's assets, including its customer lists, were sold or transferred for $1,330 to Florida Mail, Inc. ("Florida Mail"). Florida Mail is a Florida corporation wholly owned by Mr. Troy. Florida Mail sells direct mail advertising; and shares Petitioner's principal place of business. Since 1992, Petitioner has been a shell corporation with $579 in assets.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order upholding the assessment of tax and interest and waive all of the penalty included in the assessment. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 2nd day of June, 1994. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of June, 1994.

Florida Laws (11) 11.02120.57212.02212.05212.0596212.06212.07212.08213.217.017.04 Florida Administrative Code (3) 12A-1.02412A-1.02712A-1.091
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AEROSPACE WORKERS, INC. vs. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, DIVISION OF AD VALOREM TAXES, 75-001142 (1975)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 75-001142 Latest Update: Oct. 04, 1975

Findings Of Fact Having heard oral argument on the issues and considered the evidence presented in this cause, it is found as follows: Petitioner, Aerospace Workers, Inc., is a non-profit Florida corporation, which owns record title to the Union Lodge 166, located at 171 Taylor Avenue in Cape Canaveral, Florida. For the 1974 tax year, the Brevard County Property appraiser or Tax Assessor assessed the petitioner's lodge at full market value without allowance of any exemption. The reason given by the assessor for the disapproval of exempt status was that there is no provision under the Florida Statutes for the exemption of labor organizations. The petitioner, through its financial secretary, William J. Boydstun, then appealed the Tax Assessor's denial exempt status to the Brevard County Board of Tax Adjustment, claiming that the building should be tax exempt as one used for charitable purposes. Mr. Boydstun informed the BTA that the building in question "at any time we are not using it, has been thrown open to the public." The BTA was further informed that the building "has been used by the Brevard County Beach Erosion Control District by the Narc Aid Society, by the Avon and Winslow Beach Residents Assn., by the Roosevelt Garden Condominium Apartments, Inc. We have let local weddings take place. It has been used by the concerned Democrats and also by the County Commissioners in a couple of instances. Tomorrow we are letting the County use our building as a polling place." Mr. Boydstun also stated that petitioner's members donated $225,000.00 to the United Fund in Brevard County and had helped support the Brevard Junior Deputies, the Brevard Mental Health Center and various other organizations in the County. Also submitted to the BTA by Mr. Boydstun was a list of persons or groups who had used the building since December of 1973. Included in this list were the Mark Age Society (which petitioner stated during the hearing is a religious group), the Brevard County Beach Erosion Control District, the Avon by the Sea and Winslow Beach Residents' Association, the Roosevelt Garden Condominium Apartments, Inc., Concerned Democrats, political meetings for Senator Lawton Chiles, Mallory Horne and Governor Reubin Askew, and a minister for a local wedding. It was also stated that the building has been used as a polling place and for meetings for the United Fund Drive. The Tax Assessor represented to the BTA that he denied the exemption because labor unions are not given exemptions according to the Florida Law, and that the Department of Revenue denied an exemption for petitioner for that reason the previous year. At the meeting of the BTA on October 4, 1974, Chairman Hurdle moved that petitioner be granted a 50 percent charitable exemption on the basis that the property is used for charitable purposes. The motion carried by a vote of 2 to 1. The Tax Assessor did not concur. In its notice to the Executive Director of the Department of Revenue, the BTA explained its reasons for granting the Petitioner a fifty percent charitable exemption by stating that: "the Board found that the property should receive a 50 percent tax exemption because they felt that the use of the property provided a service which was of such a community service that its discontinuance could result in the allocation of public funds for the continuance of said services. The Board basically found that the use of the building by the general public met the requirements in the description of charitable purposes found in Chapter 196.012(6) of the Florida Statutes and therefore granted a 50 percent charitable tax exemption for the property described in Petition No. 11." In its "Notice of Proposed Agency Action to Invalidate Relief Granted by Board of Tax Adjustment," the Department of Revenue concluded in its "Staff Recommendation" that the BTA's findings and the evidence and testimony upon which they were based, were insufficient to support the ultimate finding that petitioner qualifies for a fifty percent exemption, and that the BTA had not come up with sufficient evidence to overcome the Property Appraiser's presumption of correctness. It was further concluded in said "Staff Recommendation" that there was no showing that the use of the property by the various community organizations was a use of more than 51 percent, and that the BTA's granting of a 50 percent exemption is expressly contrary to F.S. Section 196.012(3). SUMMARY OF ORAL ARGUMENTS The above factual findings constitute the record to which oral argument was limited at the hearing. It was the petitioner's position at the hearing that inasmuch as the Tax Assessor gave an invalid reason for denying the charitable exemption, there is no presumption of correctness attaching to his assessment. It was further contended that, given the reason for denial by the assessor (i.e., that labor organizations could not be exempt), petitioner did not believe it acceded to make a showing of predominant charitable usage. In the alternative, petitioner asserts that there was sufficient evidence before the BTA to permit the BTA to conclude that the property was used predominantly for charitable purposes. It was the respondent's position at the hearing that, regardless of the reason given by the assessor for his denial of exempt status, petitioner failed in its burden to prove the assessment wrong. In other words, it is the assessment itself which carries the presumption of correctness, and not the reasoning behind the assessment. Respondent contended that the record of the proceedings before the BTA is devoid of any evidence entitling petitioner to a charitable exemption.

Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is my recommendation that the action taken by the Brevard County Board of Tax Adjustment be invalidated and that the denial of exempt status made by the Brevard County Tax Assessor be affirmed. DONE and ORDERED this 4th day of October, 1975, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Collins Building, Room 104 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675

Florida Laws (3) 193.122196.012196.192
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