Findings Of Fact The parties agreed at the hearing that there were no issues of fact which remained to be determined. The parties stipulated that the relevant facts are as set out in paragraph 5 of the Petition for Administrative Hearing. The following findings are quoted directly from paragraph 5 of the Petition. Petitioner is a federally chartered savings and loan association. Petitioner initially employed the cash receipts and disbursements method of accounting for Federal Income Tax purposes. In a desire to more clearly reflect income, Petitioner applied for and received permission from the Internal Revenue Service allowing Petitioner to change its method of tax accounting from the cash to the accrual method, pursuant to Revenue Procedure 70-27. This change was to commence with the calendar year 1971. Consistent with this accounting method change, all net accrued income as of January 1, 1971, was recorded in its entirety in Petitioner's financial statements as of December 31, 1970. The total net adjustment required to convert to the accrual method was $758,911.00. Pursuant to an agreement entered into with the Internal Revenue Service, an annual adjustment of $75,891.00 was required. The annual adjustment spread the effect of the accounting change over a 10-year period, despite the fact that all the income was realized prior to January 1, 1971. On January 1, 1972, the Florida Income Tax Code became effective. Petitioner timely filed its 1970 and 1971 Florida Intangible Personal Property Tax Returns. Upon subsequent review of Petitioner's records, it became apparent that the intangible tax had been overpaid and a refund claim was submitted. The refund was issued to Petitioner by the State of Florida during the calendar year 1973 and reported in Petitioner's 1973 Federal Corporate Income Tax Return. On December 16, 1975, Respondent notified Petitioner that Petitioner was deficient in its payment of Florida Corporate Income Tax in the amount of $25,386.84. The total deficiency consisted of $3,267.00 for the year ended December 31, 1972; $19,202.00 for the year ended December 31, 1973; and $2,916.84 for the year ended December 31, 1974. Included in the alleged total deficiency of $25,386.84 is a tax in the amount of $14,696.70 for the year 1973. This tax is attributable to Petitioner's apportionment of a part of its 1973 income to sources outside of the State of Florida. Petitioner is no longer protesting this deficiency. On February 9, 1976, Petitioner filed its protest against Respondent's determination that a deficiency in tax existed. By letter dated March 9, 1976, Respondent denied Petitioner's protest filed on February 9, 1976.
The Issue Whether the Department of Revenue's ("Department") assessment for sales and use tax, penalty, and interest is valid, correct, and should be upheld.
Findings Of Fact The undersigned makes the following findings of relevant and material fact: The Department is the agency responsible for administering Florida's revenue laws, including the imposition and collection of state sales and use taxes. §§ 20.21 and 213.05, Fla. Stat. Cellular is a Florida S-corporation, having a principal address and mailing address of 11050 Pembroke Road, Miramar, Florida 33025. Resp. Ex. 4, Bates stamped p. 031. Cellular is a "dealer" as defined under section 212.06(2), Florida Statutes, and is required to collect and remit sales and use taxes to the State. § 212.06(2), (3)(a), Fla. Stat. The Department notified Cellular of its intent to conduct an audit by written notice and the request for specific records mailed on or about October 3, 2014. Resp. Ex. 2. The audit period is September 1, 2011, to August 31, 2014. Resp. Ex. 2, Bates stamped p. 279. Cellular has several locations in Florida where it sells cellular phones, accessories, phone repair services, and minutes for international calling cards to its customers. Cellular also provides services such as money transfers and accepts payments on behalf of Metro PCS. Store locations are in neighborhood business centers and in malls. During the audit period, Cellular had 11 store locations operating in Florida. Resp. Ex. 4, Bates stamped p. 031. Julia Morales is a tax auditor for the Department. She has been employed with the Department for 11 years. Initially, Morales worked as a tax collector. She has held the position of tax auditor since 2011. Morales has a bachelor's degree in finance and also engages in ongoing training with the Department in order to stay current with Florida Statutes and Department rules. Morales performed the audit and prepared the assessment in this case. Early in the audit, Cellular informed the Department that most of its sales were exempt from Florida's sales tax. Morales explained that insufficient sales records were supplied by Cellular to enable the Department to establish the exempt nature of sales transactions, and, therefore, exempt sales were disallowed by the Department. Resp. Ex. 4, Bates stamped p. 033. On September 3, 2015, the Department issued an initial Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes ("DR-1215") in the total sum due, as of that date, of $463,677.61 (i.e., $327,257.39 tax, $81,814.34 penalty, and $54,605.88 interest). After receiving the DR-1215, Cellular requested a conference with Morales to review the assessment. The conference was held on November 9, 2015. Resp. Ex. 1, Bates stamped pp. 007-008; Resp. Ex. 4, p. 030; Resp. Ex. 15, Bates stamped p. 131; Resp. Ex. 16, Bates stamped pp. 130-189. After the November 9, 2015, conference, Cellular provided Morales with sales invoices and detailed sales reports for the audit period. Morales explained that the supplemental records established that Cellular's reported tax exempt sales were properly exempt from sales tax, and, therefore, audit assessment Exhibits A01 to A11 were deactivated. Resp. Ex. 4, Bates stamped pp. 029-031; Resp. Ex. 18, Bates stamped pp. 058- 068. Audit assessment Exhibit A12 was also deactivated because Cellular provided records needed to reconcile the difference between gross sales reported on its 2012 federal tax return and gross sales reported on the sales and use tax returns for the same period. Resp. Ex. 18, Bates stamped p. 069. Among the supplemental records supplied by Cellular to establish the tax-exempt basis for some of its sales, its monthly Sales Transaction Detail reports showed that six of Cellular's 11 stores did not remit to the Department all the sales tax they collected during the audit period. Consequently, Morales added audit assessment Exhibits A13 through A18 to document the sales tax collected but not remitted, detailed by store. Resp. Ex. 4, Bates stamped pp. 029-030; Resp. Ex. 18, Bates stamped pp. 070- 110. Morales testified that one of Cellular's stores that under-remitted sales tax, namely the Northwest Store, was operating but not registered with the Department for the entire audit period. Morales discovered that the Northwest Store collected sales tax on its sales and did not start to remit collected tax to the Department until September 2014, which was after the audit period. Of the remaining five stores, Cellular remitted to the Department approximately 50 percent of the sales tax it collected from July 2012 to August 2014. Resp. Ex. 18, Bates stamped pp. 075, 082, 088, 095, 102, and 109. As to consumable purchases (audit assessment Exhibit B01) during the audit, Cellular failed to provide records to establish that it paid use tax on consumable purchases. The sums expensed in Cellular's federal tax returns, which could have a sales tax implication, were relied upon by the auditor to create Exhibit B01. Resp. Ex. 4, Bates stamped p. 034; Resp. Ex. 18, Bates stamped pp. 111-125. Based upon the supplemental records supplied after the November 2015 conference, on February 4, 2016, the Department issued a revised Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes ("DR-1215"), reducing the total sum due, as of that date, to $277,211.42 (i.e., $194,346.98 tax, $48,586.76 penalty, and $34,277.68 interest). Resp. Ex. 18, Bates stamped p. 053. Penalty considerations were reviewed by the Department. Resp. Ex. 19. Due to Cellular's failure to remit to the State collected sales tax, penalty was not waived by the Department. In addition, accrued statutory interest was also imposed as required by section 213.235, Florida Statutes. Resp. Ex. 18, Bates stamped pp. 054-056; Resp. Ex. 29, Bates stamped p. 2. On February 15, 2016, the Department issued a Notice of Proposed Assessment ("NOPA") in the total sum due, as of that date, of $277,620.29 (i.e., $194,346.98 tax, $48,586.76 penalty, and $34,686.55 interest). Resp. Ex. 23. On March 18, 2016, Cellular submitted a timely protest letter to the Department's Technical Assistance and Dispute Resolution ("TADR"). Resp. Ex. 25. Martha Gregory also testified for the Department. She has been employed with the Department for 20 years. Gregory currently holds the position of taxpayer services process manager in TADR. Gregory holds a bachelor's degree in accounting and has also taken master's level courses. TADR manages an assessment after a taxpayer submits a protest of a NOPA with the Department. Gregory is familiar with TADR's involvement in Cellular's case. Gregory testified that despite repeated efforts by TADR during the protest period, Cellular submitted no new information to the Department for review. Consequently, on April 17, 2017, TADR issued a Notice of Decision ("NOD"), sustaining the assessment in its totality. Because of accruing interest, the total sum due, as of that date, increased to $293,353.77. Resp. Ex. 24. On June 16, 2017, Cellular timely filed its petition for a chapter 120, Florida Statutes, hearing. In its petition, Cellular contests all taxes, penalty, and interest that have been assessed. (See petition filed with the Division on December 5, 2017.) After receiving the petition, the Department made repeated attempts to obtain information from Cellular to support the claims raised in their petition. Resp. Ex. 28. Because no additional information was submitted by Cellular, the petition was referred to the Division on December 5, 2017. Prior to this final hearing of June 28, 2018, Cellular provided additional records relevant to the sales tax assessed on consumable purchases (audit assessment Exhibit B01). Based upon the newly supplied supplemental records, the Department also deactivated Exhibit B01 from the assessment and issued a revised reduced assessment. As a result, on June 12, 2018, the Department issued a revised assessment, which reduced the additional sales and use tax owed to $158,290.02, plus $39,572.50 for a penalty and $55,040.52 in interest, for a total sum owed, as of that date, of $252,903.04. Resp. Ex. 29, Bates stamped p. 2. Erica Torres appeared at the hearing as Cellular's corporate representative and testified on Cellular's behalf. Torres is employed by Cellular as a manager in charge of sales personnel, commissions, schedules, and bookkeeping. She has been employed by Cellular since 2001. Torres admitted that the reports relied upon by the Department in determining that Cellular collected and failed to remit sales tax were correct. Cellular introduced no credible or persuasive evidence to support that the assessment was incorrect. The undersigned finds that more credible and reliable evidence is in favor of the Department. Cellular failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the assessment or proposed penalty and interest proven by the Department are incorrect.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order denying Cellular's requests for relief and sustaining the assessment in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of August, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT L. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of August, 2018. COPIES FURNISHED: Mark S. Hamilton, General Counsel Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 (eServed) Randi Ellen Dincher, Esquire Office of the Attorney General Revenue Litigation Bureau The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Carlos M. Samlut, CPA Samlut and Company 550 Biltmore Way, Suite 200 Coral Gables, Florida 33134 (eServed) Leon M. Biegalski, Executive Director Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 (eServed)
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent, Alachua County Tax Collector, discriminated against Petitioner based upon her race, in violation of section , Florida Statutes,1 and/or whether Respondent retaliated against Petitioner for the exercise of protected rights under section 760.10.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: The Tax Collector is an employer as that term is defined in section 760.02(7). Ms. Tyson is an African American female who worked for the Tax Collector from 1993 until her employment was terminated on June 22, 2017. John Power is the elected Alachua County Tax Collector. Below him in the chain of command is Jon Costabile, the Chief Deputy Tax Collector. Directly below Mr. Costabile is Executive Director Donna Johnson. The Tax Collector has four offices in Gainesville: Downtown, Southwest, Northwest, and a Communication and Processing Center (the “CPC”). Each of these offices is supervised by a branch Director who reports to Ms. Johnson. Two supervisors called Coordinators directly report to each Director. At the time of her dismissal, Ms. Tyson was a Coordinator at the Downtown office. The other Coordinator at the Downtown office was Veronica Taylor, also an African American female. Ms. Tyson’s employee evaluations over the years were generally positive as to her performance. However, she had a reputation, at least among her fellow supervisory employees, of being temperamental and difficult to work with. Her ultimate dismissal was based on her insubordinate conduct, not her job performance. The series of events leading to Ms. Tyson’s dismissal began in Spring 2017, when the decision was made to move Lori Carmichael, the Director of the Downtown office, to the CPC facility. This move created a vacancy in the Downtown office. For supervisory positions, the Tax Collector seeks to promote internally. Mr. Costabile testified that the pool for the vacant Director position comprised the current branch Coordinators, including Ms. Tyson. Mr. Costabile and Ms. Johnson consulted the Directors regarding their recommendations for the position. Mr. Costabile testified that Venus McCray, a Coordinator in the Southwest office, was the clear number one choice for the Downtown Director position. All of the Directors agreed on the choice of Ms. McCray, who is African American. Not only was Ms. McCray the unanimous choice of the other Directors, but she was senior to Ms. Tyson in the Tax Collector’s office. Mr. Costabile testified that the Directors are a close knit group that works closely together. Two of the Directors told him point-blank that they did not want to work with Ms. Tyson. There were no specific complaints about Ms. Tyson, just a general feeling that she was “standoffish” and people had to “walk on eggshells” around her. Ms. Tyson testified that Ms. Carmichael recommended her for the Downtown Director position. In her testimony, Ms. Carmichael was generally positive about Ms. Tyson but did not confirm that she recommended her as Director. Ms. Carmichael did confirm Ms. Tyson’s testimony that, upon learning of Ms. McCray’s promotion, Ms. Tyson asked Ms. Carmichael why she was passed over for promotion. Ms. Carmichael agreed to take up the issue with Ms. Johnson, who told her that Ms. Tyson had a propensity for ignoring the Directors and needed to make an effort to be more interactive and look people in the eye. Ms. Carmichael passed this information on to Ms. Tyson. Ms. Tyson testified that Ms. Johnson was referring to occasions when Directors from other offices would visit the Downtown office. She stated that these were four white women who would not acknowledge her when she spoke to them, or at best would “smirk” at her. Ms. Tyson felt insulted by their behavior. She told Ms. Carmichael that Ms. Johnson’s advice was demeaning, inhumane, and “slave-ish.” Ms. McCray testified that she had “bumped heads” with Ms. Tyson in the past and therefore had some reservations about accepting the Downtown position. Her misgivings appeared justified when she went to the office to shadow Ms. Carmichael before taking over her position. Ms. Carmichael was not there when Ms. McCray arrived, so she spoke to Ms. Tyson and Ms. Taylor, the two Coordinators in the Downtown office. Ms. Tyson asked Ms. McCray why she had not personally contacted her to tell her about her promotion. Ms. McCray responded that she had been told not to discuss the promotion before the official announcement. This answer did not satisfy Ms. Tyson. The conversation was uncomfortable enough that Ms. Taylor felt compelled to walk away and give privacy to the other two women. After taking over as Director, Ms. McCray would have regular meetings with her Coordinators. She testified that Ms. Taylor was positive and cooperative but Ms. Tyson was consistently disagreeable. Ms. McCray testified that she dreaded coming to work in the morning knowing she had to deal with Ms. Tyson. At a meeting on June 19, 2017, Ms. McCray was questioning her Coordinators about the duties of office personnel, trying to get a feel for the daily operation of the Downtown office. Ms. McCray testified that Ms. Tyson studiously avoided making any eye contact with her. Ms. Tyson sat with her head down. She doodled on a piece of paper while Ms. McCray spoke. Ms. McCray asked Ms. Tyson to please do her the courtesy of looking her in the eye. Ms. Tyson said, “I don’t have to,” and continued scribbling on the paper. Ms. Tyson testified that she was taking thorough notes during the meeting. She stated that she takes pain medications for carpal tunnel syndrome and wants to be sure she gets things right because she does not want her superiors blaming mistakes on her medications. Ms. Tyson testified that when Ms. McCray asked her to look her in the eye, she looked up and asked Ms. McCray why she needed to look her in the eye while taking notes. Ms. McCray’s version of the June 19, 2017, meeting is more believable. Ms. McCray is credited with knowing the difference between avid notetaking and idle scribbling. It is noted that even Ms. Tyson’s version of the meeting presents Ms. Tyson as defensive and somewhat truculent toward her superior. Mr. Costabile testified that after she had been at the Downtown office for a couple of weeks, Ms. McCray requested a meeting with Ms. Johnson and him to discuss her difficulties with Ms. Tyson. Ms. McCray stated that she might have to go back to being a Coordinator in a different office if the situation did not improve. Mr. Costabile recalled Ms. McCray stating that she did not want to be a Director if it was going to affect her health. Mr. Power testified that Ms. Johnson came to him with concerns about Ms. Tyson’s acceptance of Ms. McCray as her Director. Ms. Johnson reported that Ms. Tyson was being very disrespectful and difficult to work with. Mr. Power testified that he took this matter seriously because Ms. Johnson does not come to him with personnel matters unless they are important. Mr. Power testified that Ms. McCray herself spoke to him after a morning meeting at the Northwest office. She told him that things were not going well and he responded that he had heard about the problem. Ms. McCray told him that Ms. Tyson was being disrespectful, embarrassing, and disruptive. Mr. Power advised her to give the situation some time to sort itself out. The Downtown office opened to the public at 8:30 a.m. It was Ms. McCray’s practice to hold an all-employees meeting at 8:15 each morning. On the morning of June 22, 2017, Mr. Power, Mr. Costabile, and Ms. Johnson happened to be present at the meeting. Ms. McCray stood at the front of the group, flanked by her Coordinators, Ms. Tyson and Ms. Taylor. Ms. McCray convened the meeting and announced that she wanted the employees to set personal and professional goals for themselves. She distributed “goal sheets” for each employee to fill out. This exercise served the dual purpose of helping the employees establish priorities and helping Ms. McCray get to know them better. The general feeling in the room was enthusiastic support for Ms. McCray’s idea. The meeting lasted about 15 minutes. Everyone in the room was oriented toward, and listening to, Ms. McCray, except for Ms. Tyson. Ms. Tyson stood with her arms folded across her chest, ostentatiously turned away from Ms. McCray. She stared at the ceiling, apparently uninterested, while Ms. McCray spoke. At the conclusion of her presentation, Ms. McCray turned to her Coordinators to ask if they had anything to add. She first asked Ms. Taylor, who responded that she thought the goal setting exercise was a good idea. Ms. McCray then asked Ms. Tyson if she had anything to add. Without looking away from the ceiling or turning toward Ms. McCray, she said, “Nope.” The testimony of Mr. Power, Mr. Costabile, Ms. McCray, and Ms. Taylor all agreed on the facts as set forth in the previous two paragraphs. Ms. Tyson stood in front of all the Downtown employees and all her superiors in the Tax Collector’s office in a manner clearly intended to convey contempt for Ms. McCray. Each of these witnesses heard Ms. Tyson answer “nope” to Ms. McCray’s question.2 Ms. Tyson testified that she was turned away from Ms. McCray because she was speaking to another employee. She stated that her arms are always crossed because of her severe pain. She testified that the state of her C5 and C7 vertebrae make it impossible for her to look at the ceiling for 15 minutes. She stated that it is “not my nature” to turn away from Ms. McCray and that “‘nope’ is not in my vocabulary.” Given the unanimity of the contrary testimony, Ms. Tyson’s version of the June 22, 2017, meeting cannot be credited. Mr. Power testified that Ms. Tyson’s behavior at the meeting left him aghast. Her body language indicated she was removing herself from the meeting, though as a supervisor she was expected to set an example for the front line employees. Mr. Power stated that he “about fell on the floor” when Ms. Tyson said “nope” in answer to Ms. McCray’s question. After the meeting, Mr. Power retired to his office to ponder his options as to Ms. Tyson. He had been hearing reports about Ms. Tyson’s behavior for the past month and now he had seen it with his own eyes. Ms. Tyson was a leader in the organization and had blatantly shown disrespect to a member of senior management in front of all the Downtown staff. She was advertising her opinion that no one should listen to Ms. McCray. Mr. Power decided that Ms. Tyson’s employment should be terminated. He directed Mr. Costabile to release Ms. Tyson from the Tax Collector’s office. Mr. Costabile prepared the paperwork and convened the termination meeting with Ms. Tyson. Also present at the meeting was Human Resources Administrator Linda Power, whose only function was to serve as a witness. 2 It is possible to answer “nope” in a way that conveys a positive attitude toward the questioner. However, each of these witnesses demonstrated the contemptuous manner in which Ms. Tyson spoke the word. The meeting was brief. Mr. Costabile told Ms. Tyson that her insubordination was a serious matter. He stated that every employee needs to accept change, but Ms. Tyson was apparently unable to accept Ms. McCray’s promotion. Ms. Tyson was a member of management and was expected to set an example for her subordinates. The Tax Collector’s policy is to offer an employment resignation agreement, waiver, and release when a long-term employee is terminated for cause, in lieu of termination. The agreement includes a severance package. Ms. Tyson declined to accept the offer to resign. Mr. Costabile terminated her employment effectively immediately. Ms. Tyson testified that Mr. Costabile told her that she was being fired for failing to look Donna Johnson in the eye at the morning meeting. Ms. Tyson responded that Donna Johnson wasn’t speaking at the meeting. “Why would I be looking her in the eye?” She testified that Mr. Costabile told her she was bringing down the morale of the office and that people were complaining. Mr. Costabile credibly denied telling Ms. Tyson she was being fired for not looking someone in the eye. Ms. Tyson’s position as Coordinator was ultimately filled by Christie Tyson, a white woman who is not related to Ms. Tyson. Ms. McCray testified that Ms. Johnson asked her whether she thought the job should go to Christie Tyson or to Regina Gainey, an African American woman. Ms. McCray testified that she recommended Christie Tyson, based on prior experience of working with her. Ms. Taylor, the other Coordinator in the Downtown office, also recommended Christie Tyson.3 3 Ms. Tyson made an issue of the fact that Christie Tyson and Donna Johnson share a grandson. However, given the unanimity of the recommendation, it is found that Ms. Johnson did not improperly favor Christie Tyson. Furthermore, whether Ms. Tyson’s replacement had a familial relationship with one of her former superiors has nothing to do with whether Ms. Tyson was terminated on the basis of her race. Ms. Tyson believed that her dismissal had been in the works since April, and that Christie Tyson had been “groomed” to take her place. She saw a nefarious connection between Ms. Johnson’s advice that she greet and look the Directors in the eye and Ms. McCray’s request that she look her in the eye at the June 19 meeting. She offered no supporting evidence for her intuitions. Ms. Tyson testified that because the Tax Collector’s office was planning to fire her, a black woman, they needed another black woman to take her place in order to fend off public complaint. She further testified, without support, that Ms. McCray was a useful pawn in that regard, willing to lie about her interactions with Ms. Tyson to advance her own career. Ms. Tyson testified that after being told multiple times to look people in the eye, she was sure that something was up. She stated that she went to Veronica Taylor’s office and told her she knew she would not be around much longer. Ms. Taylor did not confirm this incident in her testimony. Ms. Tyson testified that, a day or so after her conversation with Ms. Taylor, she accidentally bumped into Mr. Power in the office, and he said to her, “You look like the type that will fight.” Ms. Tyson stated that this scared her because she did not know why he would say that. She went to her office and scoured her notes looking for what she had done wrong. She tearfully phoned her mother and asked for her prayers because she was about to be fired. Mr. Power flatly and credibly denied telling Ms. Tyson that she looked like she would fight. Ms. Tyson presented the testimony of other Tax Collector employees who believed there was an element of racism in the running of the office. Isaiah Minter, an African American male, worked in the Tax Collector’s office in a non-supervisory capacity from 2013 to 2015. Ms. Tyson was his Coordinator. He testified that he came to the job with a bachelor’s degree from the University of Florida and experience as a driver’s license examiner. He expected to advance quickly. He was upset when Ms. Johnson told him that he would have to prove himself and that it might take five years for him to be promoted into a supervisory job. He was offended that Mr. Power told him he was needed at the front desk. Mr. Minter left the Tax Collector’s office in good standing to take a job at the Veterans Administration. Moranda Bethley, an African American female, worked in the Tax Collector’s office from December 2003 until March 2017. She worked with Ms. Tyson at the Northwest and Downtown offices. Ms. Bethley described Ms. Tyson as a “saint,” always friendly, personable, positive, and helpful. Ms. Bethley testified that there was no room for black people to advance in the Tax Collector’s office. The supervisors would tell the black employees they were doing a good job, keep up the good work, but would never offer a promotion. The white supervisors were less interested in helping than in pointing the finger at the employee seeking help. Ms. Bethley would seek out the assistance of Ms. Tyson rather than her own supervisor because of the latter’s negativity. Ms. Bethley resigned in lieu of termination as a result of her persistent practice of disruptive behavior in the workplace, culminating in a weeks-long conflict with a fellow employee that could not be resolved and that escalated to the point that management concluded that Ms. Bethley’s employment was no longer tenable. The weight given to Ms. Bethley’s testimony as to the atmosphere of the office is lessened by the evidence of her own unprofessional behavior. Toya Williams, an African American female, worked at the Tax Collector’s office from 2013 until May 11, 2017. Ms. Tyson supervised her for at least part of that time. She found it unsettling that in her two interviews for positions with the agency, she met with two white males and five white females. She asked questions about the racial mix of personnel and was assured that progress would come. Ms. Williams testified that in her four years, she never served under a Director of color. Ms. Williams initially worked at the Southwest office, where there was a lot of “cliquish foolery.” The Director was incompetent, unable to explain the work they were doing. Venus McCray was one of the Coordinators and was the only knowledgeable supervisor in the office. At one point, Ms. McCray asked the employees to stop coming to her for help so often, because the Director and the other Coordinator had noticed that no one ever sought their assistance. Ms. Williams immediately felt a difference when she moved to the Downtown office. There were frequent morning meetings and Ms. Tyson went out of her way to greet everyone in the morning. Ms. Tyson was good for morale. If an employee made a mistake, she used it as a teaching method rather than an opportunity to castigate the employee. Ms. Williams testified to being shocked when Mr. Power referred to the Downtown office as the “ghetto office” at a morning meeting. She wondered whether he gave it that name because it was in a decrepit old building, or because it was the only office with two black Coordinators and was located in a part of town where many black people lived. Ms. Williams resigned from the Tax Collector’s office as an employee in good standing to accept another job. Amber Allen, an African American female, worked as an intern at the Tax Collector’s office from 2013 through March 2016. Ms. Allen testified that she worked with Ms. Tyson at the Downtown office and that Ms. Tyson was the only reason she stayed as long as she did. Ms. Tyson encouraged her to focus on her work instead of office politics and the racism of the white supervisors. Ms. Allen testified that one day she changed into flat shoes before going out into the street for her lunch hour. Ms. Johnson told her that her overall demeanor, appearance, and hairstyle were too relaxed for the Tax Collector’s professional environment. Ms. Allen stated that on that day, she had pinned up her hair on one side. The other side was in an Afro style. Ms. Allen testified that she spent the rest of that lunch hour on the phone crying to her mother, asking why she was required to gauge how black she was allowed to look at work. She wanted to quit the job, but Ms. Tyson took her into her office and counseled her to advocate for herself in the office, but not in a disrespectful or demeaning way. Ms. Allen testified that Ms. Johnson never made any more comments about her relaxed appearance but that she did make comments about her hair. Ms. Allen found this especially galling because her white counterparts would arrive at work with hair so wet that it soaked the backs of their chairs and their shirts, but Ms. Johnson said nothing. Ms. Allen stated that Ms. Johnson’s comments made her feel small. Ms. Allen testified that she was also at the meeting at which Mr. Power referred to the Downtown office as the ghetto office. Mr. Power stated that the office dealt with many different types of people, many of them unsavory. He also mentioned that much of the Downtown client base came from the east side of Gainesville, known as a minority area. Ms. Allen was certain that Mr. Power was not referring to the physical condition of the building, but the people who were being served in the building. She testified that a number of black employees found the comments “disgusting.” Mr. Power testified that he indeed referred to the Downtown office as the ghetto office at a morning meeting. He stated that he used that term because the building was in a “deplorable condition,” like a building in a ghetto. It was embarrassing to the staff. One day, a rat fell through the ceiling in the middle of work. Mr. Power testified that his use of “ghetto” referred only to the building, not to any of the building’s customers. He stated that he would not use “east side” as a pejorative term, if for no other reason than because he lives on the east side. Copious evidence was presented attesting to Mr. Power’s personal and professional involvement in the African American community of Alachua County. There is little question that Mr. Power does not harbor any animosity or personal discriminatory feelings toward African Americans. However, this finding is not inconsistent with Ms. Tyson’s allegation that there is an element of institutional racism at work in the Tax Collector’s office. The testimony of Petitioner’s supporting witnesses should not be minimized. It is clear that the Tax Collector has at least a perception problem. Rightly or wrongly, some African American employees believe that their working environment and path to advancement are tainted by racism. It might prove fruitful for Mr. Power to institute a program of institutional soul-searching on the question. That being said, the purpose of this proceeding is not to undertake a systemic analysis of racism in the Tax Collector’s office. This proceeding is limited to the question of whether the adverse employment action taken against Ms. Tyson was an act of racial discrimination. The overwhelming evidence is that it was not. Ms. Tyson presented no persuasive evidence that comparable employees outside of her protected group were treated differently. She alleged that a white supervisor named Valerie Jerkins had a practice of clocking in to the workplace then leaving without clocking out, thus stealing time from the Tax Collector, without being subject to any adverse employment action. Ms. Tyson had no firsthand knowledge of this alleged behavior. The only employee claiming direct knowledge of Ms. Jerkins’s behavior was Ms. Bethley, who claimed that she reported the matter to Ms. Johnson. None of the supervisory employees who testified, including Ms. Johnson, had any recollection of having received a report or complaint of Ms. Jerkins stealing time. Mr. Costabile testified as to a former employee named Tracy Jones, a Caucasian woman who held several positions in the Tax Collector’s office and was a Director at the time her employment was terminated in June 2018. Ms. Johnson had asked Ms. Jones to accept a reassignment. Ms. Jones proceeded to announce her displeasure to other employees and customers. Ms. Jones was dismissed for insubordination. In summary, it is found that the decision to terminate Ms. Tyson’s employment was based entirely on her own behavior. It is clear that Ms. Tyson’s bitterness at being passed over for the Director’s job poisoned her relationship with Ms. McCray and led her to behave in a manner so startlingly unprofessional that Mr. Power saw no option but to dismiss her.4 Ms. Tyson offered no evidence that, prior to her termination, she opposed any discriminatory practices at the Tax Collector’s office, or that she participated in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing challenging discriminatory practices at the Tax Collector’s office. Ms. Tyson offered no evidence to support her allegation that the Tax Collector retaliated against her for engaging in protected activity. Ms. Tyson offered no credible evidence disputing the legitimate, non- discriminatory reason given by the Tax Collector for her termination. Ms. Tyson offered no credible evidence that the Tax Collector’s stated reason for her termination was a pretext for discrimination based on her race or color. Ms. Tyson offered no credible evidence that the Tax Collector discriminated against her because of her race or color in violation of section 760.10.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that the Alachua County Tax Commissioner did not commit any unlawful employment practices and dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 31at day of March, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of March, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) William H. Andrews, Esquire Gray Robinson Suite 1100 50 North Laura Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202-3611 (eServed) Salana Tyson 21812 Northwest 210th Avenue High Springs, Florida 32643 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed)
Findings Of Fact Having listened to the testimony and considered the evidence presented in this cause, it is found as follows: Petitioner is a domestic corporation. Petitioner provided medicare services to patients in the 1969-70 fiscal year. An on-site audit by the medicare auditing team was concluded in December of 1971, and petitioner received $56,131.00 of medicare reimbursements in January of 1972, for the services provided in the 1969-70 fiscal year. The petitioner did not file an amended federal income tax return for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1979. The adjusted federal income reported on petitioner's federal income tax return for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1972, included the $56,131.00 of medicare reimbursements received by petitioner in January of 1972. On petitioner's Florida income tax return for its fiscal year ending September 30, 1972, petitioner did not include the $56,131.00 figure in its adjusted federal income. On March 31, 1975, the respondent notified petitioner of a proposed deficiency in the amount of $2,100.99 arising from the petitioner's omission of the medicare reimbursements from its adjusted federal income as shown on its Florida corporate income tax return for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1972. Further correspondence ensued between the petitioner and the Corporate Income Tax Bureau of the respondent and the petitioner filed the present petition requesting a hearing on the issue. The respondent requested the Division of Administrative Hearings to conduct the hearing.
Recommendation Based upon the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is my recommendation that there is no legal basis for affording the petitioner any relief from the proposed deficiency and that said deficiency in the amount of $2,100.00 be sustained. Respectfully submitted and entered this 17th day of September, 1975, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: E. Wilson Crump, II, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs Tax Division, Northwood Mall Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Homer E. Ward, N.H.A. Administrator/President University Park Convalescent Center 1818 E. Fletcher Avenue Tampa, Florida 33612
Findings Of Fact The parties have agreed that there are no issues of fact to be determined in this matter, and that the relevant facts are set out in Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Petition which was received in evidence at the hearing as Hearing Officer's Exhibit 1. This matter involves a determination for Florida corporate income tax purposes of the net income derived by the Petitioner in connection with the purchase, development, and sale of certain property in Dade County, Florida. Petitioner purchased the property prior to January 1, 1972, the date upon which the Florida Income Tax Code became effective. Petitioner expended, through a subsidiary corporation, $369,058 in developing the property. These expenditures also occurred prior to January 1, 1972. For Federal income tax purposes the Petitioner had deducted these expenditures as business expenses during the years that they were incurred. Petitioner sold the property during 1972. Because the Petitioner had deducted the expenditures as business expenses, the expenditures could not properly have been included in the base price of the property for Federal income tax purposes, and the net income for Federal tax purposes was computed by subtracting the original purchase price from the sale price. Since the Florida Income Tax Code was not in effect at the time the expenditures were made, the Petitioner received no Florida tax benefit for the expenditures. In computing the net income for Florida tax purposes derived from the sale, the Petitioner included the expenditures in the base price of the property, and calculated its net income by subtracting the sum of the purchase price of the property and the expenditures from the sale price. The Department, contending that the $369,058 should not have been included in the base price of the property, issued a deficiency assessment which reflected the net income from the sale of property as the difference between the sale price and the purchase price. Petitioner originally contended that it was entitled to add the amount that the property appreciated prior to January 1, 1972 to the base price of the property. Petitioner is no longer contesting the deficiency assessment based upon a disallowance of that addition to the base price of the property. The Department was originally contending that it was entitled to interest at 12 percent per annum calculated retrospectively from the due date of the alleged deficiency. The Department has agreed to abandon its effort to impose that rate of interest. The issue raised in this case is whether the development expenses incurred by the Petitioner and deducted for Federal income tax purposes as business expenses prior to 1972 can be subtracted from Federal taxable income for the purpose of determining taxable income derived from the sale for Florida tax purposes.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent properly conducted a sales and use tax audit of Petitioner's books and records; and, if so, whether Petitioner is liable for tax and interest on its purchases of materials used for improvements to real property.
Findings Of Fact During the audit period, Petitioner was a Florida corporation with its principal place of business located at 7820 Professional Place, Suite 2, Tampa, Florida. Petitioner's Florida sales tax number was 39-00-154675-58, and Petitioner's federal employer identification number was 59-3089046. After the audit period, the Florida Department of State administratively dissolved Petitioner for failure to file statutorily required annual reports and filing fees. Petitioner engaged in the business of providing engineering services and fabricating control panels. Petitioner fabricated control panels in a shop Petitioner maintained on its business premises. Petitioner sold some of the control panels in over-the- counter sales. Petitioner properly collected and remitted sales tax on the control panels that Petitioner sold over-the-counter. Petitioner used other control panels in the performance of real property contracts by installing the panels as improvements to real property (contested panels). Petitioner was the ultimate consumer of the materials that Petitioner purchased and used to fabricate the contested panels. At the time that Petitioner installed the contested panels into real property, the contested panels became improvements to the real property. Petitioner failed to pay sales tax at the time Petitioner purchased materials used to fabricate the contested panels. Petitioner provided vendors with Petitioner's resale certificate, in lieu of paying sales tax, when Petitioner purchased the materials used to fabricate the contested panels. None of the purchase transactions for materials used to fabricate the contested panels were tax exempt. The audit is procedurally correct. The amount of the assessment is accurate. On October 23, 2000, Respondent issued a Notification of Intent to Audit Books and Records (form DR-840), for audit number A0027213470, for the period of October 1, 1995, through September 30, 2000. During an opening interview, the parties discussed the audit procedures and sampling method to be employed and the records to be examined. Based upon the opening interview, Respondent prepared an Audit Agreement and presented it to an officer and owner of the taxpayer. Respondent began the audit of Petitioner's books and records on January 22, 2001. On March 9, 2001, Respondent issued a Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes (original Notice of Intent). At Petitioner's request, Respondent conducted an audit conference with Petitioner. At the audit conference, Petitioner provided documentation that the assessed transactions involved improvements to real property. At Petitioner's request, Respondent conducted a second audit conference with Petitioner's former legal counsel. Petitioner authorized its former legal counsel to act on its behalf during the audit. At the second audit conference, the parties discussed audit procedures and sampling methods, Florida use tax, fabricated items, and fabrication costs. Respondent revised the audit findings based upon additional information from Petitioner that the assessed transactions involved fabricated items of tangible personal property that became improvements to real property. Respondent assessed use tax on the materials used to fabricate control panels in those instances where Petitioner failed to document that Petitioner paid sales tax at the time of the purchase. Respondent also assessed use tax on fabrication costs including the direct labor and the overhead costs associated with the fabrication process, for the period of October 1, 1995, through June 30, 1999. Respondent eliminated use tax assessed on cleaning services in the original Notice of Intent because the amount of tax was de minimis. On August 29, 2001, Respondent issued a Revised Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes (Revised Notice of Intent). On September 18, 2001, Petitioner executed a Consent to Extend the Time to Issue an Assessment to File a Claim for Refund until January 25, 2002. On October 18, 2001, Petitioner executed a second Consent to Extend the Time to Issue an Assessment to File a Claim for Refund until April 25, 2002. On February 6, 2002, Respondent issued a Notice of Proposed Assessment for additional sales and use tax, in the amount of $21,822.27; interest through February 6, 2002, in the amount of $10,774.64; penalty in the amount of $10,831.12; and additional interest that accrues at $6.97 per diem. Petitioner exhausted the informal remedies available from Respondent. On April 29, 2002, Petitioner filed a formal written protest that, in substantial part, objected to the audit procedures and sampling method employed in the audit. Respondent issued a Notice of Decision sustaining the assessment of tax, penalty, and interest. Respondent correctly determined that the audit procedures and sampling method employed in the audit were appropriate and consistent with Respondent's statutes and regulations. Respondent concluded that the assessment was correct based upon the best available information and that Petitioner failed to provide any documentation to refute the audit findings. Petitioner filed a Petition for Reconsideration that did not provide any additional facts, arguments, or records to support its position. On May 16, 2003, Respondent issued a Notice of Reconsideration sustaining the assessment of tax and interest in full, but compromising all penalties based upon reasonable cause.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and the conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's request for relief and sustaining Respondent's assessment of taxes and interest in full. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of December, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of December, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Carrol Y. Cherry, Esquire Office of the Attorney General Revenue Litigation Section The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Michael E. Ferguson Control Design Engineering, Inc. 809 East Bloomingdale Avenue, PMB 433 Brandon, Florida 33511 Bruce Hoffmann, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 James Zingale, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue The issues in this case are: (1) whether portions of Florida Administrative Code Rules 12D-9.020 and 12D-9.025 constitute invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority; (2) whether sections of Modules Four and Six of the 2010 Value Adjustment Board Training are unpromulgated rules; and (3) whether Property Tax Oversight Bulletin 11-01 is an unpromulgated rule.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner Turner is the Property Appraiser for Hillsborough County, Florida. Petitioners Crapo, Higgs, and Smith are the Property Appraisers for Alachua, Monroe, and Okaloosa Counties, respectively. Respondent, the Department of Revenue ("DOR"), is an agency of the State of Florida that has general supervision over the property tax process, which consists primarily of "aiding and assisting county officers in the assessing and collection functions." § 195.002(1), Fla. Stat. DOR is also required to prescribe "reasonable rules and regulations for the assessing and collecting of taxes . . . [to] be followed by the property appraisers, tax collectors . . . and value adjustment boards." § 195.027(1). Petitioner-Intervenor Roger A. Suggs is the Clay County Property Appraiser. Petitioner-Intervenor Gary R. Nikolitis is the Palm Beach County Property Appraiser. Petitioner-Intervenor PAAF is a statewide nonprofit professional association consisting of 35 property appraisers in various counties throughout Florida. Petitioner-Intervenor FAPA is a statewide nonprofit professional organization of Florida property appraisers. Respondent-Intervenor FUTMA is a statewide nonprofit association consisting of 46 of the largest property taxpayers in Florida. Ms. Cucchi, the second Respondent-Intervenor, is a property owner and taxpayer in Hillsborough County. Background of Florida's Property Tax System Article VII, Section Four of the Florida Constitution mandates that all property be assessed at "just value," and further requires that the Legislature prescribe, by general law, regulations that "shall secure a just valuation of all property for ad valorem taxation." Pursuant to chapters 192 through 196 of the Florida Statutes, locally elected property appraisers in each of Florida's 67 counties develop and report property assessment rolls. The assessment rolls——which property appraisers prepare each year and submit to DOR by July 1——contain information such as the names and addresses of the property owners, as well as the just, assessed, and taxable values of the properties within each appraiser's respective county. DOR is responsible for reviewing and ultimately approving or disapproving the assessment rolls. § 193.1142, Fla. Stat. Once DOR approves the assessment rolls, the property appraiser mails a "Notice of Proposed Property Taxes and Non-ad Valorem Assessments" (known as a "TRIM" notice) to each property owner. § 200.069, Fla. Stat. The notices advise each owner of his property's assessment for that year, the millage (tax) rate set by the taxing authorities, and the dates of the budget hearing for those authorities. After receiving a TRIM notice, a property owner may request an informal conference with the property appraiser's office to discuss the assessment of his or her property. Alternatively, or in addition to the informal conference, a property owner may challenge the assessment by filing a petition with the county value adjustment board or by brining a legal action in circuit court. § 194.011(3), Fla. Stat.; § 194.171, Fla. Stat. Value Adjustment Boards Pursuant to section 194.015(1), Florida Statutes, each of Florida's 67 value adjustment boards is composed of two members of the county commission, one member of the school board, and two citizen members.1 Of particular import to the instant case, section 194.015(1) requires value adjustment boards to retain private counsel to provide advice regarding legal issues that may arise during value adjustment hearings.2 In counties with populations greater than 75,000, the value adjustment board must appoint special magistrates3 to conduct hearings and issue recommended decisions. § 194.035(1), Fla. Stat. Hearings in counties with 75,000 citizens or fewer may be conducted by either magistrates or the value adjustment board itself. Id. DOR has no involvement in the appointment or removal of board attorneys, magistrates, or the members of value adjustment boards. Should a property owner choose to contest an assessment through the value adjustment board process, the board's clerk schedules an administrative hearing and sends a notice of hearing to the property owner and the property appraiser. § 194.032(2), Fla. Stat. At the hearing, the determinative issue is whether the assessment of the particular property at issue exceeds just value. In the event that a property owner is dissatisfied with the outcome of a value adjustment hearing, an appeal may be taken to the circuit court, where a de novo hearing will be conducted. § 194.036(2) & (3), Fla. Stat. Under certain conditions, the property appraiser may likewise appeal an adverse value adjustment board decision to the circuit court. § 194.036(1).4 2008 Legislative Reforms Prior to 2008, DOR was not charged with the responsibility of training value adjustment boards or their magistrates. However, pursuant to chapter 2008-197, Laws of Florida, the Legislature enacted a series of changes to the VAB process, including a new requirement that DOR "provide and conduct training for special magistrates at least once each state fiscal year." See § 194.035(3), Fla. Stat. Immediately after enactment of the law, DOR initiated rulemaking and developed 2008 interim training for value adjustment boards and special magistrates. Persons required to take the training include all special magistrates, as well as value adjustment board members or value adjustment board attorneys in counties that do not use special magistrates. § 194.035(1) & (3), Fla. Stat. In addition to the new training requirement, chapter 2008-197 mandated that DOR develop a Uniform Policies and Procedures Manual for use by value adjustment boards and magistrates. The Uniform Policies and Procedures Manual ("The Manual"), which is posted on DOR's website and is separate and distinct from DOR's training materials for value adjustment boards, consists of relevant statutes, administrative rules, provisions of the Florida Constitution, as well as forms. The Manual is also accompanied by two sets of separate documents, which are likewise available on DOR's web page: (1) "Other Legal Resources Including Statutory Criteria; and (2) "Reference Materials Including Guidelines," consisting of guidelines and links to other reference materials, including DOR's value adjustment board training materials, bulletins, and advisements. The introduction to the "Reference Materials Including Guidelines" reads in relevant part as follows: The set of documents titled "Reference Materials Including Guidelines," contains the following items: Taxpayer brochure General description and internet links to the Department's training for value adjustment boards and special magistrates; Recommended worksheets for lawful decisions; The Florida Real Property Appraisal Guidelines; * * * 7. Internet links to Florida Attorney General Opinions, Government in the Sunshine Manual, PTO Bulletins and Advertisements, and other reference materials. These reference materials are for consideration, where appropriate, by value adjustment boards and special magistrates in conjunction with the Uniform Policies and Procedures Manual and with the Other Legal Resources Including Statutory Criteria. The items listed above do not have the force or effect of law as do provisions of the constitution, statutes, and duly adopted administrative rules. Revisions to Value Adjustment Board Procedural Rules Pursuant to section 194.011, Florida Statutes, the Legislature charged DOR with the responsibility to prescribe, by rule, uniform procedures——consistent with the procedures enumerated in section 194.034, Florida Statutes——for hearings before value adjustment boards, as well as procedures for the exchange of evidence between taxpayers and property appraisers prior to value adjustment hearings. On February 24, 2010, following a 12-month period of public meetings, workshops, and hearings, the Governor and Cabinet approved the adoption of chapter 12D-9, Florida Administrative Code, which is titled, "Requirements for Value Adjustment Board in Administrative Reviews; Uniform Rules of Procedure for Hearings Before Value Adjustment Boards." As discussed in greater detail in the Conclusions of Law of this Order, Petitioner Turner contends that portions of Florida Administrative Code Rule 12D-9.020, which delineate the procedures for the exchange of evidence between property appraisers and taxpayers, contravene section 194.011. Petitioner Turner further alleges that section 194.011 is contravened by parts of Florida Administrative Code Rule 12D- 9.025, which governs the procedures for conducting a value adjustment hearing and the presentation of evidence. 2010 Value Adjustment Training Materials In 2010, following the adoption of Rule Chapter 12D-9, DOR substantially revised the value adjustment board training materials. After the solicitation and receipt of public comments, the 2010 VAB Training was made available in late June 2010 on DOR's website. The 2010 VAB Training is posted on DOR's website in such a manner that an interested person must first navigate past a bold-font description which explains that the training is not a rule: This training is provided to comply with section 194.035, Florida Statutes. It is intended to highlight areas of procedure for hearings, consideration of evidence, development of conclusions and production of written decisions. This training is not a rule. It sets forth general information of which boards, board attorneys, special magistrates and petitioners / taxpayers should be aware in order to comply with Florida law. (Emphasis in original). The 2010 VAB Training consists of eleven sections, or "modules," portions of two of which Petitioners allege constitute unadopted rules: Module 4, titled "Procedures During the Hearing"; and Module 6, titled "Administrative Reviews of Real Property Just Valuations." While words and phrases such as "must," "should," and "should not" appear occasionally within the materials, such verbiage is unavoidable——and indeed necessary——in carrying out DOR's statutory charge of disseminating its understanding of the law to magistrates and value adjustment board members. Although DOR is required to create and disseminate training materials pursuant to section 194.035, the evidence demonstrates that the legal concepts contained within the 2010 VAB Training are not binding. Specifically, there is no provision of law that authorizes DOR to base enforcement or other action on the 2010 VAB Training, nor is there a statutory provision that provides a penalty in situations where a value adjustment board or special magistrate deviates from a legal principle enumerated in the materials. Further, the evidence demonstrates DOR has no authority to pursue any action against a value adjustment board or magistrate that chooses not to adhere to the legal concepts contained within the training. PTO Bulletin 11-01 On January 21, 2011, DOR issued Property Tax Oversight Bulletin 11-01, titled "Value Adjustment Board Petitions and the Eighth Criterion," to the value adjustment board attorneys for all 67 counties. DOR also disseminated courtesy copies of the bulletin by e-mail to over 800 interested parties. The bulletin, the full text of which is reproduced in the Conclusions of Law section of this Summary Final Order, consisted of a non-binding advisement regarding the use of the eighth just valuation criterion (codified in section 193.011(8), Florida Statutes5) in administrative reviews. The bulletin advised, in relevant part, that the eighth just value criterion: "must be properly considered in administrative reviews"; "is not limited to a sales comparison valuation approach"; and "must be properly considered in the income capitalization and cost less depreciation approaches" to valuation. The bulletin further advised that when "justified by sufficiently relevant and credible evidence, the Board or special magistrate should make an eighth criterion adjustment in any of the three valuation approaches." Although certain interested parties (i.e., a special magistrate in Nassau County, the director of valuation for the Hillsborough County Property Appraiser's Office, and legal counsel for the Broward County value adjustment board) perceived the bulletin to be mandatory, the evidence demonstrates that value adjustment boards and magistrates were not required to abide by the bulletin's contents. As with the training materials, DOR possesses no statutory authority to base enforcement action on the bulletin, nor could any form of penalty be lawfully imposed against a magistrate or value adjustment board that deviates from the legal advice contained within the document. Further, there is no evidence that DOR has taken (or intends to take) any agency action in an attempt to mandate compliance with the bulletin.
The Issue The issue presented is what is Peaches' basis in the Sterling stock?
Findings Of Fact There is no dispute as to the material facts in the instant case, Exhibit 1 presented at the hearing is a composite exhibit which is comprised of the Petitioner's U.S. Corporate Income Tax Return and Florida Corporate Income Tax Return for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1973. Exhibit 3 is the Respondent's document entitled "Income Tax Audit Changes" which reflects the adjustments made by the Respondent based upon a review of the Petitioner's return and the reasons for assessing the deficiency. Exhibit 2 is a composite exhibit comprised of the Petitioner's Amended Protest of the proposed deficiency and the Respondent's letter denying the same. Petitioner's federal return (Exhibit 1) Schedule D, Part II, reflects the 31,500 shares were acquired in 1958 at a cost basis of $10,191.00. These shares were subsequently sold by Peaches in 1972 for $1,160,131.00 or a gain of $1,149,940.00. This gain was reported on line 9(a) of the federal tax return as a portion of the "net capital gains." On its 1973 Florida Corporate Income Tax Return, Petitioner computed the income using the basis for the stock as of January 2, 1972, thereby reducing its reported income by $1,013,040.00 from the federal tax. The $1,013,040.00 reflects the amount of appreciation in the value of the stock between the transferrer's acquisition and January 1, 1972, the effective date of the Florida corporate income tax code. The shares of stock of Sterling Drugs were acquired by Peaches in 1971 from the controlling stockholder who made a contribution to capital to the corporation.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Petitioner's petition be denied and that the assessment against the Petitioner in the amount of $29,435.00 together with interest be assessed. DONE and ORDERED this 22nd day of January, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Edwin J. Stacker Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 James S. Moody, Jr., Esquire Trinkle and Redman, P.A. 306 West Reynolds Street Plant City, Florida 33566 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA PEACHES OF FLORIDA, INC. Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 78-1433 STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Respondent. / NOTICE TO: JAMES S. MOODY, JR., ESQUIRE ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER TRINKLE AND REDMAN, P. A. 306 WEST REYNOLDS STREET PLANT CITY, FLORIDA 33566 E. WILSON CRUMP, II, ESQUIRE ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL POST OFFICE BOX 5557 TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32304 You will please take notice that the Governor and Cabinet of the State of Florida, acting as head of the Department of Revenue, at its meeting on the 5th day of April, 1979, approved the Recommended Order of the Hearing Officer dated January 22, 1979, with paragraph 3 of the "Findings of Fact" therein amended to read as follows: "The shares of stock of Sterling Drugs were acquired by Peaches in 1972 from the controlling stockholder who made a contribution to capital to the corporation", in accordance with Stipulation of the Petitioner and Respondent filed in the case on March 1, 1979. This constitutes final agency action by the Department of Revenue. JOHN D. MORIARTY, ATTORNEY DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATION DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE STATE OF FLORIDA ROOM 104, CARLTON BUILDING TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32304 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice was furnished by mail to James S. Moody, Jr., Esquire, Trinkle and Redman, P. A., 306 West Reynolds Street, Plant City, Florida 33566, Attorney for Petitioner; by hand delivery to Wilson Crump, II, Esquire, Assistant Attorney General, Post Office fox 5557, Tallahassee, Florida 32304, Attorney for Respondent and Stephen F. Dean, Hearing Officer, Division of Administrative Hearings; Room 530, Carlton Building, Tallahassee, Florida this 5th day of April, 1979. JOHN D. MORIARTY, ATTORNEY
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated to findings of fact set forth in paragraphs 1-5, below. Zurich is an insurer domiciled in the State of New York. Zurich is authorized to do insurance business in the State of Florida. Zurich pays insurance premium taxes to the State of Florida. As a foreign insurer doing business in Florida, Zurich is subject to the provisions of Florida's retaliatory tax, Section 624.5091, Florida Statutes. Respondent Department of Revenue (Revenue) is the state agency charged with the duty to implement and enforce Section 624.5091, Florida Statutes. Zurich's interests are substantially affected by Revenue's Rule 12B- 8.016(3)(a)(4), Florida Administrative Code, by virtue of the tax assessment made against Zurich pursuant to the rule. OTHER FACTS Prior to 1989, the Department of Insurance administered insurance taxation. Now, Revenue has that responsibility. Section 213.05, Florida Statutes, directs Revenue to administer provisions of Sections 624.509 through 624.514, Florida Statutes. Section 213.06(1), Florida Statutes, authorizes Revenue to promulgate rules to implement those responsibilities. Rule 12B-8.016 was first promulgated by Revenue in December of 1989 to implement statutory authority of Section 624.429 (currently renumbered as 624.5091). This statute authorized retaliatory taxation against non-domiciled insurers in the amount by which their state of domicile would tax Florida insurers in excess of Florida's comparable tax. The statute provides in pertinent part: When by or pursuant to the laws of any other state or foreign country any taxes, licenses, and other fees, in the aggregate, and any fines, penalties, deposit requirements, or other material obligations, prohibitions, or restrictions are or would be imposed upon Florida insurers or upon the agents or representatives of such insurers, which are in excess of such taxes, licenses, and other fees, in the aggregate, or other obligations, prohibitions, or restrictions directly imposed upon similar insurers, or upon the agents or representatives of such insurers, of such other state or country under the statutes of this state, so long as such laws of such other state or country continue in force or are so applied, the same taxes, licenses, and other fees, in the aggregate, or fines, penalties, deposit requirements, or other material obligations, prohibitions, or restrictions of whatever kind shall be imposed by the department upon the insurers, or upon the agents or representatives of such insurers, of such other state or country doing business or seeking to do business in this state. As it existed in 1989 and currently, the statute contains an exclusionary provision expressly excluding from the retaliatory tax any special purpose assessments in connection with insurance other than property insurance. This exclusionary provision is part of Subsection 3 of the current statute, 624.5091, and reads as follows: (3)This section does not apply as to personal income taxes, nor as to sales or use taxes, nor as to ad valorem taxes on real or personal property, nor as to reimbursement premiums paid to the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund, nor as to emergency assessments paid to the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund, nor as to special purpose obligations or assessments imposed in connection with particular kinds of insurance other than property insurance, except that deductions, from premium taxes or other taxes otherwise payable, allowed on account of real estate or personal property taxes paid shall be taken into consideration by the department in determining the propriety and extent of retaliatory action under this section. The parties concede that Revenue's Rule 12B-8.016 accurately tracts the first part of the retaliatory taxation statute. But a subpart of the Rule, 12B- 8.016(3)(a)(4), is challenged by Zurich in this proceeding because that subpart provides for inclusion of the assessment for administration of workers compensation in Florida and comparable assessments in other states. The rule subpart states: (3)(a) Other items which shall be included in the retaliatory calculations are: * * * 4. The workers compensation administrative assessment imposed by s. 440.51, F.S., as well as comparable assessments in other states. The State of Florida imposes assessment on workers compensation carriers such as Zurich in accordance with authority contained in Section 440.51, Florida Statutes, which is entitled "Expenses of Administration." Section 440.51 provides for the pro-rata assessment of all insurers and self- insurers of workers compensation to cover expenses of administering the workers compensation program. The assessment is a "special fund" that does not involve appropriated funds or general state revenues. Zurich's home state of New York imposes a comparable assessment. In accordance with Rule 12B-8.016(3)(a)(4), Florida Administrative Code, Revenue includes calculations for the Worker's Compensation Board Administrative Fund in the state of New York in Zurich's retaliatory tax calculation. In drafting the rule in 1989, Revenue relied upon Attorney General Opinion 057-173, which advised that Florida's Worker's Compensation Administrative Assessment should be considered a "tax" for purposes of retaliatory tax calculation. On this basis, Revenue's rule requires that such assessments be considered as "taxes" and included in the retaliatory tax calculation. However, following the issuance of Attorney General Opinion 057-173, the Florida legislature in 1959 enacted the present Subsection 624.5091(3), Florida Statutes, specifically excluding the consideration of "special purpose obligations or assessments imposed in connection with particular kinds of insurance other than property insurance" in retaliatory tax calculations. Following the 1959 enactment of the exclusionary language contained in Subsection 624.5091(3), Florida Statutes, the Department of Insurance did not include comparable worker compensation assessments of other states. The Department of Insurance administered insurance taxation until 1989. Department of Insurance forms introduced into evidence for 1986 showed that the Florida assessment, pursuant to Section 440.51 Florida Statutes, was treated as a deduction against Florida's premium tax and added back in on the Florida side of the retaliatory tax calculation. But the assessment was not included in a manner to inflate the calculation of the domiciliary state's comparative tax base. When Revenue assumed administration of insurance taxation in 1989, a proposed rule and an emergency rule were promulgated. Neither provided for inclusion of foreign states' special purpose administrative assessments in retaliatory tax calculation. In the course of the promulgation process, the determination to treat the worker compensation administrative assessment as a tax became a part of the rule. The purpose of Florida's retaliatory statute is to influence other states' legislative discretion to lower the tax burden on Florida insurers doing business in those other states. The items to be compared for retaliatory purposes are determined by the legislature and not by Revenue, Revenue auditors, or other states.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Background Petitioner, Gainesville Amateur Radio Society, Inc. (GARS or petitioner), a Florida non-profit corporation, was incorporated on December 31, 1975. Its stated purpose is to promote an interest in amateur radio operation. Among other things, GARS provides preparation for Federal Communication Commission licensing examinations, supports community activities with free communication services, and encourages public awareness of ham radio activities through the publication of a monthly newsletter called the GARS-MOUTH. Respondent, Department of Revenue (DOR), is charged with the responsibility of administering and implementing the Florida Revenue Act of 1949, as amended. It has the specific task of collecting sales taxes and enforcing the state tax code and rules. By law, certain transactions are exempt from the state sales and use tax. Among these are sales or lease transactions involving "scientific organizations." In order for an organization to be entitled to an exemption, it must make application with DOR for a consumer's certificate of exemption and demonstrate that it is a qualified scientific organization within the meaning of the law. Once the application is approved, the certificate entitles the holder to make tax exempt purchases that are otherwise taxable under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. In the case of petitioner, a certificate would enable it to save a hundred or so dollars per year. Claiming that it was entitled to a certificate of exemption as a charitable organization, GARS filed an application with DOR on December 21, 1993. After having the application preliminarily disapproved by DOR on the ground it did not expend "in excess of 50.0 percent of the . . . organization's expenditures toward referenced charitable concerns, within (its) most recent fiscal year," a requirement imposed by DOR rule, GARS then amended its application to claim entitlement on the theory that it was a scientific organization. Although DOR never formally reviewed the amended application, it takes the position that GARS still does not qualify for a certificate under this new theory. Is GARS a Scientific Organization? Under Section 212.08(7)(o)2.c., Florida Statutes, a scientific organization is defined in relevant part as an organization which holds a current exemption from the federal income tax under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. A DOR rule tracks this statute almost verbatim. Accordingly, as a matter of practice, in interpreting this statutory exemption, DOR simply defers to the final determination of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). If the IRS grants an organization a 501(c)(3) status based on the determination that it is a scientific organization, then DOR accepts this determination at face value. DOR does not make an independent determination whether the organization is "scientific" or question the decision of the IRS. This statutory interpretation is a reasonable one and was not shown to be erroneous or impermissible. GARS received a federal income tax exemption from the IRS regional office in Atlanta, Georgia by letter dated August 12, 1993. The record shows that GARS was granted an "exempt organization" status as a "charitable organization" and as an "educational organization" under Treasury Regulation Section 1.501(c)(3). However, GARS did not receive an exempt status as a "scientific organization" nor did the IRS make that determination. Therefore, GARS does not qualify as a scientific organization within the meaning of the law. While petitioner submitted evidence to show that it engages in what it considers to be a number of scientific endeavors, these activities, while laudable, are irrelevant under Florida law in making a determination as to whether GARS qualifies for a sales tax exemption as a scientific organization. Therefore, the application must be denied.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent enter a final order denying petitioner's application for a consumer certificate of exemption. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of June, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of June, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-1200 Petitioner: 1-2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 3. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. 4. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. 5. Rejected as being irrelevant. 6. Rejected as being unnecessary. 7. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. 8-9. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 10. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. 11. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 12. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. 13. Rejected as being unnecessary. 14. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. Respondent: 1. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. 2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 3. Rejected as being unnecessary. 4. Rejected as being cumulative. 5-12. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 13-14. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 15. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. 16. Covered in preliminary statement. 17. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 18-19. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. 20-21. Rejected as being unnecessary. 22. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. 23-24. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. Note - Where a proposed finding has been partially accepted, the remainder has been rejected as being irrelevant, unnecessary for a resolution of the issues, not supported by the evidence, cumulative, subordinate, or a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Larry Fuchs Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 Linda Lettera, Esquire General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 Sidney Schmukler, Esquire 3922 N. W. 20th Lane Gainesville, Florida 32605-3565 Olivia P. Klein, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol-Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
