The Issue Has Respondent committed an "unlawful employment practice" against Petitioner, pursuant to Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, based upon a Petition for Relief dated October 13, 1997, referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings by the Florida Commission on Human Relations?
Findings Of Fact Respondent stipulated to jurisdiction, and the evidence demonstrates that by number of employees, Respondent is an "employer" as defined in Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. Respondent is a freight company which ships and receives living nursery stock by truck through a depot/warehouse. Petitioner was employed there from 1993 until June 16, 1995. In the course of formal hearing, Petitioner waived his Charge of Discrimination on the basis of his national origin (United States citizen). (TR-116). There is no evidence the Respondent employs anyone other than United States citizens. The remainder of Petitioner's allegations were that Respondent failed to accommodate one or more handicaps and subjected Petitioner to disparate treatment from similarly situated black employees. Petitioner also related a series of remarks and one personnel action that he considered to be harassing and abusive due to his handicaps. The "handicaps" that Petitioner testified to were high blood pressure, an undefined heart condition requiring medication, "bad knees," and problems with his back. At formal hearing, no medical physician or health care professional corroborated the foregoing conditions. However, it is undisputed that on or about January 9, 1995, Petitioner presented a physician's excuse to Respondent's Warehouse Supervisor, Jeff Bradner. That physician's excuse stated that Petitioner could return to work on that date, working 10 hours per day, 5 days per week, doing medium lifting, that is, "lifting 30 pounds and frequently lifting and/or carrying objects weighing 25 pounds." The excuse further stated that Petitioner was to avoid squatting, kneeling, and climbing. Mr. Bradner informed Eddie Payne, Petitioner's immediate supervisor, that the foregoing January 9, 1995, medical restrictions were to be observed for Petitioner. Attached to both Petitioner's initial Charge of Discrimination and his later Petition for Review was another physician's letter dated January 29, 1993. It stated, in pertinent part: [Petitioner], patient of record, suffers from high blood pressure, anxiety, and arterial coronary disease. These conditions are aggravated by the stress caused by problems he has with his teenage son. Also attached was a March 3, 1994, doctor's letter stating that Petitioner had a spine and knee injury. It contains the same restrictions as the January 9, 1995, letter. Because the 1993 and 1994 letters are part of the record herein, (attached to the Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief), I have taken official recognition thereof and find that they supplement or explain Petitioner's oral testimony at formal hearing to the effect that Petitioner was suffering from high blood pressure, anxiety, and arterial coronary disease in 1993, and from a knee injury in 1994. However, these letters were not introduced in evidence at formal hearing, and Petitioner did not testify that he ever presented any such written medical confirmations of these conditions to any of Respondent Employer's supervisory personnel. Mr. Payne and Mr. Bradner denied that any oral or written requests for accommodation had been received from Petitioner other than the January 9, 1995, doctor's excuse listing specific restrictions. Contrary to Petitioner's testimony, Mr. Payne denied knowing of Petitioner's heart condition. There also is no corroboration of Petitioner's testimony that he orally requested any accommodation specifically because of his high blood pressure or heart condition at any material time. Furthermore, and most importantly, the 1993 letter places no restrictions on Petitioner in the workplace, and the 1994 letter imposes the same restrictions as the 1995 letter, which is in evidence. The only medical condition any of his co-workers ever heard Petitioner complain about was his "bad knees." Upon the record as a whole, it is inferred that Eddie Payne also knew Petitioner complained of "bad knees." At all times material, both before January 9, 1995, and afterwards, Petitioner worked for Respondent as a "checker." Checkers have the most physically non-taxing job in Respondent's operation. They make sure that "wheelers" or "loaders" place unloaded freight on pallets in the correct location in the warehouse and that "loaders" load the correct freight from the warehouse or warehouse dock into the correct truck. In this capacity, the bulk of Petitioner's work was carrying a clipboard, making notations thereon, and orally directing others where to put boxes. Petitioner testified that due to his blood pressure and back condition, he "needed" to sit down for 15 minutes' rest every 20 minutes after January 9, 1995. The evidence as a whole does not indicate that Petitioner clearly enunciated this "need" to any supervisor. Moreover, the credible evidence supports the inference that no one could work effectively as a checker while taking 15 minute breaks as frequently as every 20 minutes, because each truck needed to be loaded or unloaded as a component, so as to avoid shipping errors. Therefore, substituting other checkers every 20 minutes would have adversely affected Respondent's business and would constitute an unreasonable accommodation for Petitioner and undue hardship for the Employer. Either substituting another checker or waiting on Petitioner to rest every 20 minutes would have been unduly costly, burdensome, or substantially disruptive and would have altered the nature of Respondent's business. Prior to January 9, 1995, Petitioner worked at least a 40-50 hour week and was paid by the number of hours he worked. Due to the nature of Respondent's business and the hours when freight was received, Petitioner's usual hours before January 9, 1995, were from approximately 4:00-4:30 p.m. until 9:30 a.m. (17- 18 hours) three days a week, mostly Monday, Tuesday and Thursday. At all times material, both before and after January 9, 1995, only twenty-five percent as much freight came in on Wednesdays and Fridays as came in on the other three work days of each week. Therefore, all employees were not needed for a 17-18 hour day on those days, and employees had the option of working at whatever was available on those days to "make their hours" for pay purposes. At all times material, on Wednesdays and Fridays, all employees who wanted to work took turns digging weeds out of the cracks in the Respondent's paved parking lot with a claw on a broom handle or the edge of a shovel; picking the weeds up with a shovel; and throwing them away. Sometimes a blower was used. In accord with the January 9, 1995, physician's written restrictions, Eddie Payne accommodated Petitioner by assigning him to work from 10:00 p.m. until 8:00 a.m., so that Petitioner would only be working 10 hours per day. This assignment had Petitioner working the hours during which the employer needed the most men because those were the hours when the workload was the heaviest. Petitioner complained because Mr. Payne would not let him work his 10 hours from 4:30 p.m. to 2:30 a.m., a less busy time, but he complained only because those hours were more convenient for him. Petitioner related that after January 9, 1995, he was made to lift more than 30 pounds of parking lot weeds at a time, with the shovel, after getting on his hands and knees to dig the weeds out, and always in the hot sun, which aggravated his undisclosed heart condition. He also related that he never got to use the blower like other employees. His testimony on this issue is not credible in light of the contrary testimony of all the other witnesses. Even if credible, Petitioner was not forced to do this work. He was permitted to do this "make work" during slow days so that he would earn at least 40 hours per week. Witnesses confirmed that another "make work" project on a single occasion was digging muck out of a ditch. Petitioner testified that he was required to dig more than 30 pounds of muck in each shovelful that he lifted out of the ditch. His description was neither corroborated or refuted, but again, Petitioner was the one who controlled the content of each shovel, and he could have declined to work at that "make work" project. According to Petitioner's time cards, from which information Petitioner received his pay, Petitioner usually worked only 10 hours or less per day after January 9, 1995. Occasionally, he worked more than 10 hours, but less than 11 hours per day. Petitioner and Eddie Payne were fishing buddies outside of work, and on at least one occasion, Eddie Payne treated his subordinates, including Petitioner, to a night-clubbing expedition. Petitioner asserted that on the job, Eddie Payne had used derogatory and profane language to him, on account of his handicaps. Once, when Petitioner wanted to punch-out early, Mr. Payne supposedly said, "Go home if you need to, you crippled old pussy." Once, Mr. Payne allegedly called Petitioner "a crippled old Mother F-----." Mr. Payne denied ever using such language either socially or on the job. Mr. Bradner testified that he had instructed his subordinates against profanity on the job, and related that Mr. Payne had a reputation for not using profanity. No other witness corroborated Petitioner's testimony that any such language had ever been addressed to Petitioner. Petitioner called Matthew Hickox, a co-employee, as a witness. Mr. Hickox related that Petitioner would often "act goofy," by doing a "Quasimodo imitation," twisting his arm, making a face, and dragging one leg behind him. When Petitioner did this, other employees would "make cracks." Petitioner claimed that dragging his leg behind him was evidence of his handicap. Mr. Hickox's opinion was that "disabled don't give you the right to act like a nut and then people not make some comment." Petitioner testified that he had only become entirely disabled since leaving Respondent's employ June 16, 1995. Although Petitioner moved slowly and evidenced pain on rising and sitting, he was able to move around and approach the witness stand at formal hearing. The undersigned observed no twisted arm, facial contortions, or dragging leg. It is inferred from observing the candor and demeanor of all the witnesses, including Petitioner, and from the whole of the evidence, but particularly from Mr. Hickox's testimony, that on such occasions as Petitioner performed his imitation on the job, Mr. Payne or Mr. Bradner may have vehemently ordered Petitioner back to work and warned him to cut out the horseplay. Petitioner claimed to have received only a fifteen-cent per hour raise when other employees received more. According to Petitioner, the other employees, including Mr. Gonzalez, were raised by twenty-five cents per quarter hour for a $1.00 per hour raise. What anyone was being paid before this raise is not in evidence. Since no evidence indicates whether this raise occurred before or after January 9, 1995, when Respondent's management clearly knew of any of Petitioner's restrictions, there was no nexus between the lack of raise and handicap discrimination.2 Petitioner also developed no nexus between this raise and racial discrimination. According to Eddie Payne, Petitioner was a sub-average worker. According to Eddie Payne and Jeff Bradner, they frequently had to instruct Petitioner to resume work. Mr. Bradner related an incident when Petitioner was leaning on a shovel in the parking lot, so Mr. Bradner sarcastically commented, "You're not getting much work done leaning on that shovel," but this motivational comment was not directed at a handicap. No employee testified that any supervisor's instructions to Petitioner, which they observed or overheard, were offensive or otherwise inappropriate. On one occasion, Petitioner was told by Mr. Bradner to stop kicking a "basketball of tape" around; throw it away; and get back to work. No employee other than Petitioner found this instruction offensive. On another occasion, Petitioner was given a written reprimand when a truckload of freight was sent to the wrong location. Petitioner attributed the error to a black "loader" named James Oliver and perceived the reprimand as discriminatory because Mr. Oliver was not reprimanded. Petitioner's superiors reprimanded Petitioner as a formal personnel action instead of Mr. Oliver because they considered Petitioner responsible for the error and resultant costs since Petitioner was in the superior position of checker. Petitioner suffered no loss of pay, hours, or seniority as a result of the reprimand. Petitioner's assertions that he was required to climb tall ladders to change light bulbs in the warehouse, to squat to lift boxes, and to kneel to pull weeds were denied by management witnesses and uncorroborated by Petitioner's witnesses. On one occasion, Petitioner had just come on duty and was having a coke and a cigarette, when Mr. Bradner told him to get to work helping a black loader named "Willie T." unload a truck. On this single occasion, Petitioner may have been asked to lift boxes in excess of 30 pounds, but the boxes also may have weighed as little as 20 pounds. This incident may have occurred before Mr. Bradner knew of Petitioner's medical restrictions on January 9, 1995, but it was probably afterwards. If so, this single incident was contrary to Petitioner's doctor's instructions, but Petitioner admittedly never complained to Mr. Bradner about this one-time incident in terms of "lack of accommodation" for his physical limitations. On the same occasion, Willie T., who already had been loading the truck for three hours, took a coke and cigarette break a half an hour after Petitioner began to help him unload the truck. Willie T. asked Petitioner to join him on his break, which Petitioner did. Mr. Bradner spotted them and instructed Petitioner to return to loading the truck because he felt Petitioner was not entitled to a break after only a half an hour of work, but did feel that Willie T. was entitled to a break after three full hours of work. This was a bona fide business consideration of Respondent. Petitioner failed to establish a nexus of racially discriminatory intent on the basis of this incident. On June 16, 1995, Petitioner was sweeping the warehouse floor, leaving trails of residue behind. Petitioner intended to go back and sweep up the residue, but before he could do so, Mr. Bradner told him that he was leaving trails and that he should do a better job. Petitioner considered this instruction to be demeaning and discriminatory, but he did not reply to Mr. Bradner. Mr. Bradner noted that Petitioner began to do a better job of sweeping, and Mr. Bradner left the area. Petitioner perceived that his co-workers were laughing at the incident and became upset. Petitioner finished sweeping one section of the warehouse and asked Eddie Payne if he could clock-out. He assumed that Eddie Payne knew he was upset because of Mr. Bradner's comment but did not tell him so. Eddie Payne authorized Petitioner to clock-out. Petitioner clocked-out and never returned to work for Respondent
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Human Relations Commission enter a Final Order denying and dismissing the Petition for Relief on all issues. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of October, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of October, 1998.
The Issue Whether the Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction to hear a petition, brought pursuant to section 120.56(4), Florida Statutes (2010),1/ claiming that a state university's documents concerning the process and criteria for faculty performance evaluation; documents from the university's College of Business setting out a Framework and Standards for Contract Renewal and Promotion for faculty; and documents showing the university's organization structure and delegations of authority are "agency statements" that require rule-making under the Administrative Procedure Act.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a former associate professor with Florida Gulf Coast University. Florida Gulf Coast University is a member of the Florida state university system. Since November 2002, with the voter's adoption of article IX, section 7, Florida Constitution, the state university system has been overseen by a Board of Governors. Further, article IX, section 7, Florida Constitution, designated that each university, including Florida Gulf Coast University, would be managed by a local board of trustees. Thus, the Board of Governors and boards of trustees for universities derive power from the Florida Constitution, not legislative enactment. The Board of Governors enacted Regulation 1.001 that established power and duties for university boards of trustees. Among the Board of Governors' powers and duties delegated to the universities' board of trustees is the authority to manage university personnel and faculty. Dr. Hudson Rogers (Dr. Rogers), an associate provost with the University, testified that the University faculty are organized and represented by the United Faculty of Florida (UFF). The University and UFF are parties to a Collective Bargaining Agreement.2/ The Collective Bargaining Agreement between the Florida Gulf Coast University Board of Trustees and UFF addresses the evaluation of faculty members. Under Article 10 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, each college within the University is empowered to develop its faculty evaluation procedures and forms consistent with the criteria agreed upon in the Collective Bargaining Agreement. The colleges' promulgation and implementation of their respective evaluation frameworks are not subject to any special process other than that outlined in the Collective Bargaining Agreement. The University's College of Business developed its own evaluation framework for faculty evaluation, which was consistent with the Collective Bargaining Agreement. Further, Dr. Rogers credibly explained that the University faculty voted on and approved the Faculty Performance and Evaluation Document in 2003 that is used to evaluate faculty. In September 2008, the Petitioner signed a Professional Development Plan that included a performance improvement plan. The performance improvement plan identified objectives that the University expected the Petitioner to meet regarding her job duties. In August 2009, after completing a probationary period of the 2008-2009 academic year, the Petitioner was evaluated by her department chair. The department chair rated the Petitioner as not meeting expectations by failing to publish at least one journal article by the end of the 2008-2009 academic year to meet the College of Business scholarship standards. Based on the Petitioner's failure to publish, the department chair recommended that the Petitioner not be reappointed after the 2009-2010 academic year. A peer review committee for the University's College of Business also determined the Petitioner had failed to meet the minimum requirements. The peer review committee informed the Petitioner of its decision on September 12, 2009. On October 21, 2009, the Petitioner filed a grievance pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement. A review of the Petitioner's grievance shows that it alleged numerous violations of the Collective Bargaining Agreement concerning her faculty evaluation and decision not to re-appoint her as an associate professor. On October 22, 2009, the dean for the College of Business informed the Petitioner that "[a]fter reviewing your request and all documents provided me by you and the Peer Review Committee, my decision is that your contract will not be renewed." On November 20, 2009, the University representative, who reviewed the grievance, found that a majority of the claims were time barred or did not constitute a violation. The University representative found "a partial violation of [Collective Bargaining Agreement] Article 10.3A(1)" for failing to timely finalize the Petitioner's annual evaluation for the 2008-2009 academic year. The University representative noted that the Collective Bargaining Agreement did not "indicate any action to be taken in response to this violation." On December 10, 2009, the Petitioner filed a Request for Arbitration under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. On February 23, 2010, the University received the Petitioner's Notice of Intent to Arbitrate. On April 12, 2010, an arbitration hearing was held on the Petitioner's grievance. The arbitrator held that the Petitioner's Notice of Intent to Arbitrate was not timely under the Collective Bargaining Agreement; thus, it was considered withdrawn. On September 22, 2010, the Petitioner's supervisor, Dr. Robert O'Neill (Dr. O'Neill), wrote the Petitioner, confirming that her last date of employment at the University was December 17, 2010. The Petitioner's last day of employment with the University was December 17, 2010. On February 14, 2011, the Petitioner filed the Petition. The Petitioner alleged that the University is an "agency" within the definition of chapter 120 and is subject to the Administrative Procedure Act. Further, the Petitioner alleged that the University has made the following agency statements that are unadopted rules: (1) the Faculty Performance Evaluation Document for 2003 and 2008; (2) College of Business Framework and Standards for Contract Renewal and Promotion adopted on April 14, 2006, and revised on February 5, 2010 ("Framework"); (3) Delegation of Authority Memorandum accessed on October 7, 2010, from the University's web-site; and (4) Florida Gulf Coast University's organizational chart. The Petitioner also alleged that her substantial interests are affected "because her employment has been terminated based on several unadopted rules involving published documents from the [Florida Gulf Coast University] President, to the Provost, to the College." Further, a reading of the Petitioner's challenge here shows that she alleged that the University failed to the follow the "unadopted rules" when it evaluated her and decided not to re-appoint her to a teaching position. For example, the Petitioner claimed that the Florida Gulf Coast University Faculty Performance and Evaluation document is an agency statement that was not adopted as a rule under chapter 120. Next, the Petitioner alleged that Dr. O'Neill, who was her supervisor, failed to follow this Faculty Performance and Evaluation document when he evaluated her.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent should be terminated from employment for the reasons stated in the Final Disposition - Notice of Dismissal (Notice), dated October 11, 2017.
Findings Of Fact Background The College is a public institution of higher education charged with the responsibility of providing post-secondary education. Currently, there are approximately 33,000 students enrolled at the College. It has eight campuses, including the Tarpon Springs Campus. Seven of the campuses have Provosts, who report to the Senior Vice President of Student Services. The College is overseen by a five-member Board of Trustees (Board), each Trustee appointed by the Governor. In this contentious dispute, the College seeks to terminate Respondent from his position as Provost of the Tarpon Springs Campus, a position he has held since 2014 under an annual Contract for Employment for Administrative Personnel of Community Colleges. The contract has been renewed three times, most recently for a term beginning on July 1, 2017, and ending June 30, 2018. The College, however, can decline to renew his contract for no cause at the end of each term. The annual contract provides that "the Board may suspend or dismiss the Administrator [Provost] for cause pursuant to the applicable provisions of the Florida Statutes and the Board of Trustees' Rules and Colleges Procedures." Also, under Board Rule 6Hx23-2.2012 (rule 23-2.2012), the College can terminate contractual employees for "immorality, misconduct in office, incompetency, gross insubordination, willful neglect of duty, drunkenness or conviction of any crime involving moral turpitude." In this case, the College relies upon misconduct in office as the ground for dismissal. The contract requires Respondent to comply with all relevant statutes and rules of the State Board of Education, the State Board of Community Colleges, and the Board of Trustees. He also is required to comply with the terms of any College internal policies and procedures in effect at the time that his first contract became effective, and continuing throughout his term of employment. The position of Provost is a very high-ranking administrative position. The Provost is responsible for overseeing all aspects of student services, which includes student complaints of harassment and discrimination, as well as working in partnership with Academic Deans and the faculty. It is a highly visible position with the College and in the community. The College characterized the position as the "face" of the campus and the Tarpon Springs community. The Provost also serves on various community boards and organizations to represent the views of the College. At the time of Respondent's hire in 2014, the President was Dr. William Law, while Dr. Tonjua Williams served as Senior Vice President, Student Services. Dr. Williams is now the President and the one responsible for making the decision to terminate Respondent's employment, subject to confirmation by a majority of the Trustees. Shortly after his hire in 2014, the College became aware of allegations at his prior employment in Virginia, which involved an inappropriate relationship with a subordinate female employee. Dr. Law directed Dr. Williams to speak with Respondent about the allegations. Respondent acknowledged to her that the allegation was true, and, as a consequence, he was moved from a position on campus to a district office position. Dr. Law decided to give Respondent the opportunity to continue to serve at the College, but the expectations of the College with regard to his personal conduct were made very clear in a memorandum to Respondent from Dr. Williams. It stated in part that "it all boils down to exercising good judgment. Modeling good judgment is highly valued at [the College] and has a significant impact on staff morale, leadership effectiveness and student success." Respondent acknowledged in writing that he received the memorandum. According to the President, this established the expectation that he would always use good judgment in matters concerning the College. During his tenure at the College, Dr. Williams and Respondent had what she characterized as a "great relationship," "a very close working relationship," and one that was "open and transparent." She added "[t]here were no problems with us reaching each other when we needed to speak and talk." The Incident Around 1:30 a.m. on August 21, 2017, a physical altercation between Respondent and a female occurred at her apartment in New Port Richey. Although Respondent is married, the two had been involved in an affair for around two years. The female was not a student or employee of the College. On Thursday, August 31, 2017, Respondent was served with papers requiring him to appear for a hearing in circuit court on a domestic violence injunction involving the female. While attending the hearing on Friday, September 1, 2017, Respondent was arrested by the Pasco County Sheriff's Office and charged with two felonies, one for Burglary - Occupied Dwelling Unarmed (§ 810.02(3)(a), Fla. Stat.), and another for Battery - Commit Domestic Battery by Strangulation (§ 784.041(2)(a), Fla. Stat). Both charges related to the incident that occurred on August 21, 2017. After spending the night in jail, Respondent bonded out on Saturday, September 2, 2017. On October 26, 2017, the charges were dismissed by the State Attorney after he declined to prosecute the matter. Events After the Arrest The College was closed officially for Labor Day weekend on September 2, 3, and 4, 2017. On Tuesday morning, September 5, 2017, Respondent texted Dr. Williams asking, "can we talk privately tomorrow I have a home life situation but I need to converse with you." Respondent knew that Dr. Williams planned to attend a conference at the Tarpon Springs Campus the following day, and he intended to speak with her at that time. Dr. Williams responded "absolutely." Nothing in the text suggests the "home life situation" was related to a legal matter or criminal arrest or that there was any urgency in meeting with her. Nor did it suggest that the subject of the meeting involved something that could potentially affect the College's reputation or his continued employment. In fact, Dr. Williams assumed he wanted to discuss "a personal matter." Due to the threat of Hurricane Irma, then in the Gulf of Mexico and headed towards the state, Dr. Williams did not attend the conference the next day. Also, the College closed officially on September 6, 2017, due to the hurricane and did not reopen officially until September 18, 2017. With the approval of his supervisor, Dr. Rinard, Respondent flew to Maryland, where his wife and children reside. He did not return to Florida until September 13, 2017. During this intervening period, he did not attempt to contact his supervisor or the President regarding his arrest. Even though the College was closed for the hurricane, administrators continued to perform duties and responsibilities related to the safety and security of the College. Dr. Williams conducted at least two conference calls per day via telephone or Skype, where as many as 60 administrators would join in the call to discuss situations on the campuses. Although he was in Maryland much of the time, Respondent joined in the conferences on most, if not all, of those occasions. In fact, on Monday, September 11, 2017, he texted Dr. Williams regarding the situation on the Tarpon Springs campus, which had been conveyed to him by his staff. On September 12, 2017, Respondent texted Dr. Williams and advised he was returning from Maryland. The text stated in part: "I need to speak to you regarding a personal/family matter. I will discuss all in detail with you." Again, it made no reference to his arrest. After he returned to Florida the next day, Respondent and Dr. Williams agreed to meet on September 14, 2017, at a local restaurant. However, the President later informed Respondent that she was unable to make the meeting and needed to reschedule. She attempted to reach him later that day by telephone to reschedule the meeting but was unsuccessful. At that point, she assumed Respondent wished to discuss a personal family matter that did not involve the College. The two exchanged texts again on Sunday, September 17, 2017, but Respondent chose not to mention his arrest. Around noon on September 18, 2017, or 17 days after his arrest, Respondent telephoned Dr. Williams, and, in a 15-minute conversation, he advised her that he had been arrested on September 1, 2017, he was innocent of the charges, and he had retained counsel. He also told Dr. Williams that he was involved in a relationship with a woman that went awry, and the incident was not work-related. Respondent added that he had gone to court on September 1, 2017, to file a restraining order against the female, and he believed he was being scammed.1/ During the call, Dr. Williams told Respondent she needed more details. She specifically asked that he provide a police report with the details of the incident and the name of the victim to verify she was not a student. Dr. Williams also told Respondent that he needed to contact Dr. Rinard, his immediate supervisor, and tell him what had happened. Had Respondent been unable to reach Dr. Williams by telephone on September 18, 2017, his belated efforts to notify the President would be further delayed, as Respondent's first choice was to speak to her one-on-one, or if this was not possible, to discuss the incident by telephone. His actions also raise an inference that he always intended to speak with the President, and not his direct supervisor. Later that same day, September 18, 2017, Respondent spoke with Dr. Rinard by telephone. According to Dr. Rinard, Respondent "informed [him] that he had had an affair, that the woman he had an affair with had pressed charges, he was arrested, that these were all lies, that she was a thief, she had stolen property, [and he] admitted that he was wrong to have had an affair." Dr. Rinard asked Respondent if the incident involved a student or employee or occurred on College property. He was told it did not. He did not provide Dr. Rinard with the name of the victim. The following day, the two again spoke briefly while attending a Board meeting. Respondent asked if he needed anything more in reference to their conversation the previous day and Dr. Rinard answered "no." While at the Board meeting, Respondent spoke privately with a Board member, Trustee Gibbons, and disclosed that he had been arrested. On the evening of September 18, 2017, the President telephoned Respondent and commented that she was looking at the charges on a website. She said she needed more information regarding the incident, but Respondent told her he had no documentation regarding the arrest. During the call, Respondent asked the President to speak with his attorney who could provide any details that she wanted concerning the charges. Although Dr. Williams testified there was no agreement to speak with the attorney, Respondent's criminal attorney, Mr. Theophilopoulos, testified that he understood Dr. Williams had agreed to a conference call around 5:30 p.m. on September 20, 2017, so that he (the attorney) could answer any questions she had. Dr. Williams denies that a conference call was scheduled. Respondent contends otherwise and says he went to his attorney's office and waited for her to call at the scheduled time, and when she did not, they both attempted to call her from his office but were unsuccessful.2/ Whether or not such a call was scheduled, it is undisputed that it never took place. However, Dr. Williams telephoned Respondent around 6:11 p.m. on September 20, 2017, while he was driving home from his attorney's office. The Vice President of Administrative/Business Services & Information Technology, Mr. Miles, participated in the call. Mr. Miles has oversight of the Human Resources Department. During the call, Dr. Williams informed Respondent that he was being placed on administrative leave, with pay and benefits, effective that date. Again, she requested a copy of the police report or details of the incident, as the College needed more information so that it could properly assess the situation. Respondent replied that he had no written reports but his attorney had "new information" regarding the charges. Respondent was told to have his attorney contact the College General Counsel, Ms. Gardner. A few hours after the phone call, Respondent received a memorandum from Dr. Williams via email confirming that he was being placed on administrative leave, with pay and benefits, until further notice. According to Dr. Williams, this would give the College more time to thoroughly review the situation before deciding what action to take. At that time, the College still lacked the name of the victim and detailed information regarding the arrest. On September 20, 2017, Dr. Williams notified three of the five Trustees about the incident and shared with them the information she had gathered up to that point. She also told them she was still "working" on what action to take. Respondent decided to return to Maryland the same evening he was placed on administrative leave. He testified that while driving to Maryland, he received a call from Trustee Gibbons, who told him the Board had voted to not terminate him if he was cleared of the charges. This assertion was not corroborated, and there is no record of any Board meeting at which a vote would have taken place. The Termination Process On September 21, 2017, Dr. Rinard advised Tarpon Springs faculty and staff that Respondent had been placed on administrative leave and that an interim Provost had been appointed. That evening, Dr. Williams and Mr. Miles spoke with Respondent by telephone. They informed him that the College had not yet received information regarding the arrest and instructed Respondent to return his keys. Mr. Miles offered to meet with him to pick up the keys. However, Respondent, who by then was in Maryland, told them he had already mailed his keys to his attorney. The following day, September 22, 2017, through its own investigation, the College was able to obtain a copy of the Pasco County Complaint Affidavit providing additional details regarding the arrest. On Saturday, September 23, 2017, Mr. Miles left a voicemail for Respondent and reminded him that he wanted to meet with him to obtain the keys to College property. Mr. Miles also sent a text, which stated, "Dr. Williams asked me to obtain your work keys so I'm coming today," meaning that he (Mr. Miles) would drive to Respondent's home in Palm Harbor or the campus that day to retrieve the items. In response to Mr. Miles' request, Respondent replied by email that the keys had been sent to his attorney via Federal Express from Maryland. He added that if the College had any further questions, his attorney should be contacted. As of Monday, September 25, 2017, the College had not received any additional information from Respondent or his attorney regarding the arrest, and it had not received Respondent's keys or swipe card. On September 25, 2017, Dr. Williams determined that termination proceedings should begin. The same day, Dr. Rinard issued a memorandum recommending that Respondent be dismissed from employment. The basis for the recommendation was as follows: You have engaged in misconduct by not timely disclosing to the College your arrest and the charges pending against you. You have also engaged in misconduct by not providing the College with documentation related to your arrest and not returning the College's property upon request. You have also engaged in misconduct by not being truthful and forthcoming about the details of your arrest. The memorandum was actually prepared for Dr. Rinard's signature by Mr. Miles, who oversees the Human Resources Department and is also an attorney. According to the memorandum, Respondent's actions violated rule 23-2.2012, which authorizes the College to terminate an administrator for the offense of "misconduct in office." The recommendation also referred to rule 6Hx23-2.19, which outlines the procedure the College must follow when it proposes to terminate an employee. The following day, September 26, 2017, Respondent's attorney emailed the General Counsel asking for directions on where to return the keys and swipe card that were in his possession. She replied that all College property, including any electronic devices or computers, should be delivered to the security desk lobby of the district office in St. Petersburg. On September 28, 2017, five days after Dr. Williams' directive, the keys and swipe card were delivered and secured by the College. The College did not receive Respondent's college- owned laptop and other electronic devices until October 11, 2017. The Predetermination Hearing and Termination After the recommendation to terminate was issued, Respondent requested a predetermination hearing, which is afforded an employee before a decision is made regarding termination. On October 5, 2017, a hearing was conducted by the Senior Vice President of Instructional & Academic Programs, Dr. Anne Cooper, who had the authority to affirm, modify, or reject Dr. Rinard's recommendation. Respondent was accompanied by his attorney at the hearing. At the hearing, Respondent was provided a timeline of events. In response, Respondent presented his own timeline for reporting the arrest, as well as a written statement from the alleged victim in the incident which resulted in his arrest. On October 9, 2017, Dr. Cooper issued a recommendation to the President that Dr. Rinard's decision to terminate Respondent's employment be upheld. The recommendation is found in Petitioner's Exhibit 11. By letter dated October 11, 2017, the President advised Respondent that she was upholding the recommendation for dismissal because Respondent: Failed to timely advise supervisor and college administration of the arrest and nature of the charges; Failed to provide the college with information and requested documentation regarding the arrest and allegations; and Failed to immediately return college property as requested. These grounds differed slightly from those in the memorandum signed by Dr. Rinard on September 25, 2017. Whereas Dr. Rinard's memorandum stated that Respondent had failed to timely inform the College of his arrest and pending charges, Dr. Williams' Notice stated that Respondent had "[f]ailed to timely advise supervisor and college administration of the arrest and nature of the charges." Whereas the memorandum stated that Respondent had failed to provide the college with "documentation related to [his] arrest," the Notice stated that he had "[f]ailed to provide the college with information and requested documentation regarding the arrest and allegations." Finally, whereas the memorandum stated that Respondent had not returned the College's property upon request, the Notice stated that Respondent had "[f]ailed to immediately return college property as requested." Although Respondent contends he is prejudiced because the original charges were modified, the allegations in the memorandum and Notice are substantially the same, and Respondent did not demonstrate how he was prejudiced by the minor changes. No matter which set of charges apply, the College has established that the allegations are true. The College Regulations and Policies Both parties agree there is no specific College regulation that requires employees to immediately notify their supervisor or other College officials after they are arrested and charged with a crime. However, Dr. Williams stated there is an expectation that a high-ranking employee, such as a Provost, should immediately notify his supervisor, within one or two working days, given the repercussions to the College that might arise if and when the charges became public.3/ The College relies on rule 23-2.2012 as the "principal ground for prosecution in this case." That rule allows the College to dismiss an employee under written contract for "misconduct in office." The term is not further defined by rule or statute that is applicable to the College. Because Respondent is not a career service employee, the College cannot rely on procedures applicable to that category of employees. Analysis of Respondent's Conduct At hearing, Respondent characterized the incident as "a personal and private matter" that was unrelated to the College. However, he agreed he had an obligation to tell the President and Dr. Rinard about the incident so that the College would not be blind-sided if the incident became public. He contends he made good-faith efforts to contact Dr. Williams by texting her on several occasions to request a meeting. But none of the texts stated, or even suggested, that he needed to speak with her about a work-related matter or that he had been arrested for two felony charges. Moreover, these efforts evidence the fact that he knew he had an obligation to timely, completely, and candidly report anything that could impact his effectiveness as a Provost or the reputation of the College. He failed to fulfill this obligation. Respondent does not dispute the fact that he made no effort to notify his immediate supervisor, Dr. Rinard, regarding his arrest until Dr. Williams instructed him to do so on September 18, 2017. More than likely, this was because he had very little contact with Dr. Rinard, who had assumed his position in July 2017. On the other hand, he had a much closer relationship with the President, and she is the individual who makes the final decision. According to Respondent, it was important that he discuss the matter one-on-one with the President due to the "nature of the sensitivity of the situation itself, my accuracy of understanding the accusations and the false accusations, which were also racially motivated." After Respondent was unsuccessful in personally speaking with the President on September 6, 2017, he should have immediately disclosed his arrest by telephone. The record shows that he had ample opportunity to report the incident to the President by telephone beginning on the day after he was arrested. His failure to do so exhibits a lack of good judgment and trustworthiness. The delay in reporting the arrest from September 1 until September 18, 2017, was unreasonable in light of all circumstances. As Dr. Williams noted, "there is an expectation of good judgment for Provost and campus leaders, Deans, and others in that role. And you always expect your leaders, you know, [to] protect the Institution and make sure they are aware of what is going on." In the same vein, Mr. Miles pointed out that the College ended up having "to get the information ourselves" after Respondent failed to provide additional information regarding the arrest. This led him to ask whether he could "trust Dr. Bright to give me what I need to do the job that I need to do." He added that it was imperative that the College know "what exposure" it might have and how to "react to the situation" should the incident become public. Dr. Cooper, who conducted the predetermination meeting and is the chief academic officer of the College, testified that the Provost is a high-profile position and the face of the campus in the community. She noted that even though the College was closed for a hurricane, "there were multiple opportunities to report the incident to his direct supervisor, Dr. Rinard, and he failed to do so." She also testified that the incident could have blind-sided the President and Board of Trustees and put "the College in a very poor light in regard to the community." She added that "there was potential for multiple issues associated with not reporting it sooner," and "someone in that high-profile leadership position would know that." She summed it up by saying that even if there was not a specific written policy requiring Respondent to promptly report the incident to his superiors, an obligation to do so "is leadership 101." Besides failing to report the incident for 17 days, the evidence as a whole shows that, once the incident was reported, Respondent was non-responsive, uncooperative, and somewhat evasive in responding to Dr. Williams' direction to provide her additional information regarding the arrest and the name of the victim. The President had legitimate reasons for requesting additional information. Without this information, the College was at risk of having its reputation and credibility damaged. As the President pointed out, she asked for information, and when she did not receive it, this forced her to "go dig [herself] to find information" from another source. This should not be the job of the President. Finally, as previously found, Respondent did not promptly turn in all College keys and equipment, despite being told to do so on numerous occasions.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that St. Petersburg College enter a final order terminating Respondent's employment as Provost at the Tarpon Springs Campus. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of April, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of April, 2018.
The Issue May Petitioner proceed to a hearing on the merits of her charge of employment discrimination or does the untimeliness of her Petition for Relief bar her claim?
Findings Of Fact On March 10, 1997, Petitioner filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission), alleging that Respondent Department of State had discriminated against her because of her race (Black) when it had discharged her on October 1, 1996. The Commission concluded its investigation into the matter, and on January 31, 2000, the Commission issued its "Determination: No Cause." A "Notice of Determination: No Cause" was mailed by the Commission to Petitioner on January 31, 2000. It contained the following statements: Complainant may request an administrative hearing by filing a PETITION FOR RELIEF within 35 days of the date of this NOTICE OF
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief in this cause. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of July, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of July, 2000.
The Issue Whether Respondent County is guilty of an unlawful employment practice pursuant to Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, and if so, what is the appropriate remedy?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is female, and within a class protected by Section 760.10(1), Florida Statutes. Respondent County is an "employer" within the meaning of Section 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. Petitioner claimed that Respondent treated her disparately from male employees on the basis of her gender in the areas of pay during her probationary period, reprimands and discipline, provision of equipment, poor performance evaluations, and training. Petitioner's initial relationship with Respondent was as an independent contractor at Respondent's Sanitary Landfill under a written contract entered into on September 15, 1989. In this capacity, she acted as a "spotter." As an independent contractor, she received $250 per month and salvage rights to whatever material customers brought to the Respondent's Sanitary Landfill. Effective August 14, 1990, the State Division of Personnel and Retirement required Respondent to put all contractual people on the County payroll. Thereafter, Petitioner was paid $350 per month and continued to have salvage rights only at the sufferance of the Respondent. After that date, Petitioner earned retirement and social security benefits. Withholding of federal taxes and deduction of social security benefits were also provided.(P-12). The value of the salvage rights were never calculated by anyone. While she was employed as a "spotter," Petitioner was the only female "spotter." Petitioner was on probation as an employee from August to December 1990. Petitioner was paid $1.442 per hour from August 12, 1990 through October 1990, and $1.63 per hour from October 1990 through December 3, 1990. At that time, her rate of pay was raised to $3.85 per hour. The record contains no evidence of what was paid to any male employee similarly situated during this period. Without proof that similarly situated male spotters were consistently paid better, there is no proof of gender discrimination in pay during Petitioner's probationary period.3 Mark Hawes, a male, was hired as a spotter on June 1, 1993. He was paid $4.35 per hour while on probation. Willie George, also male, was hired as a spotter on October 1, 1993, and was paid $4.4805 per hour while on probation. There is no evidence of how much Petitioner was being paid during this period, so there is no means of assessing disparate treatment in pay, if any, during this period.4 During the period that Petitioner was employed as a "spotter," there was no statute or rule requiring that "spotters" receive formalized training or be certified in any field. During Petitioner's employment, no spotter were provided more than a printed Job Description and on-the-job oral instructions. They were expected to use courtesy and common sense in dealing with the public. Two employees (gender unspecified) who were not spotters were sent to train at a state "school" to become Certified Landfill Operators. A State Rule was enacted after Petitioner was terminated which required that all spotters must have eight hours of specialized training. Thereafter, the Respondent provided such training to spotters. At all times material to any Personnel Citations, Petitioner was a union member, and all benefits of her union's collective bargaining agreement with the Respondent accrued to her. No performance evaluations were submitted in evidence. With the exception of the events related within the following findings of fact, no witness found any fault with Petitioner in the performance of her job description as a "spotter" at Respondent's landfill. (P-1) Wayne Hardee, Director of the Landfill, issued a Personnel Citation against Petitioner early in her employment on the basis of lack of personal hygiene. The citation was later removed from Petitioner's personnel file as an act of good will. On or about January 16, 1994, Petitioner admitted to an immediate supervisor that her carelessness with a hand-held CB radio had resulted in loss of the radio. She offered to pay for the radio. Mr. Hardee did not require her to pay for the radio, but issued a written Personnel Citation to her on January 20, 1994 for her carelessness. This Personnel Citation simultaneously cited Petitioner because Mr. Hardee had received complaints that Petitioner was overly concerned about other spotters doing their jobs. In this Personnel Citation, Mr. Hardee warned Petitioner to do her job without complaining about other employees. Petitioner admitted that she signed this citation and that she did not grieve it through her union. The radio was later recovered, but the citation remained in Petitioner's personnel file. (P-2) On Saturday, July 9, 1994, Petitioner called her union's senior shop steward, Jessie Ellzey, to the landfill to complain about items left at her spotter station. Mr. Ellzey's perception was that Petitioner was accusing another employee of putting the items in the wrong place. Petitioner also told Mr. Ellzey that another employee had threatened her. After investigation and interviews the following week, Mr. Ellzey and Mr. Hardee determined that the items had been brought by a landfill customer to the landfill between shift changes. Mr. Hardee's and Mr. Ellzey's perception was that Petitioner had unfairly complained about another spotter, Willie George, not doing his job. At least three days and two meetings were involved in this investigation and counseling procedure. Mr. Hardee issued a written Personnel Citation against Petitioner for complaining about a co-employee. (P-3) Petitioner also was suspended without pay for one day and warned that if the problem was not corrected, further disciplinary action would be taken against her. Petitioner did not grieve this citation through her union. Based on all of Mr. Ellzey's credible testimony, due to reputation testimony about Mr. Ellzey's standard operating procedure, and because Petitioner was actually suspended for one day without pay, I reject as not credible Petitioner's testimony that she never knew of this citation in time to grieve it. On August 13, 1994, Ann Harrell, a landfill customer, filed a written complaint of rudeness against Petitioner. (P-9) A written complaint of rudeness by Petitioner was also filed by another customer, Mr. Richburg, at about the same time. Mr. Hardee considered courtesy to customers to be an unstated policy of County government and further perceived rudeness to customers to be an on-going problem in Petitioner's relationship with the public. Due to the foregoing written complaints and many similar oral complaints he had received, Mr. Hardee assigned Petitioner two days' suspension without pay by a written Personnel Citation issued August 15, 1994. The citation also warned Petitioner she would be terminated if there were another complaint about her. Petitioner refused to sign this citation. (P-4) On August 25, 1994, Petitioner grieved the August 15, 1994 Personnel Citation through her union. (P-5) A hearing was held in response to Petitioner's grievance. All concerned agree that Mr. Ellzey, the union representative advocating Petitioner's position, and not a representative of management, kept Petitioner from testifying. Chester Humphries testified on Petitioner's behalf at the grievance hearing that he had been unable to hear what Mr. Richburg said but could hear what Petitioner said to Mr. Richburg. From this, Mr. Hardee inferred that Petitioner had raised her voice to Mr. Richburg. Mr. Hardee assessed Petitioner's character witnesses in Petitioner's favor but noted that they knew nothing about the specific incident between Petitioner and Mr. Richburg. Ultimately, Mr. Hardee relied on Mr. Richburg's testimony concerning the incident. (P-6) Mr. Hardee denied Petitioner's grievance and disciplined Petitioner in accord with the August 15, 1994 Personnel Citation. Upon advice of her union steward, Petitioner did not appeal the grievance hearing result. It was further agreed that if Petitioner's behavior resulted in no more complaints against her for 30 working days, the August 15, 1994, citation would be removed from her personnel file. Petitioner met this requirement, and the citation was removed from her personnel file. (P-6; P-7). Petitioner's December 13, 1994, charge of discrimination before the Florida Commission on Human Relations listed August 11, 1994, as the last date of alleged discrimination. No witness at formal hearing herein, including Mr. Ellzey and Mr. Humphries, both of whom also had been present at the grievance hearing, confirmed Petitioner's perception that her gender had affected the result of her grievance hearing. Another female employee (not a landfill spotter) currently works in Respondent's administrative offices. That female employee also has had employment disputes with Mr. Hardee which she attributes to his gender bias, but the type of dispute was not clearly specified on this record. Therefore, no similarity to Petitioner's situation can be discerned and no pattern of gender bias was proven on that basis. This female employee is still employed by Respondent. A different female employee (also not a spotter) employed by Respondent's Emergency Medical Services (EMS) was terminated by Mr. Bill Beddow, EMS Director, for failing to timely report (or complain about) her immediate supervisor for "doing something [Mr. Beddow] thought he shouldn't be doing with drugs." The male supervisor resigned for "personal reasons." The female employee was rehired by Mr. Beddow after intercession by her union. This means another female not similarly situated to Petitioner was terminated for not complaining about a male employee's job performance and was then hired back, whereas Petitioner was progressively disciplined with reprimands and suspensions for repetitive unsubstantiated complaints about male employees' job performances. Petitioner seeks to have the conclusion drawn that female employees were disciplined both for reporting and for not reporting male employees' misbehavior. However, the two isolated situations are so dissimilar as to develop no pattern recognizable at law. I accept as credible and unrefuted Petitioner's testimony that all of the complaints she initiated about other employees were oral. However, Petitioner's testimony that she did not complain about other employees' performance of, or failure to perform, their jobs and her assertion that her complaints were only motivated by the requirements of her Job Description to "inspect loads" and "report all problems" was not corroborated by any other witness. Petitioner's testimony that her concerns were directed not at individual employees but at addressing hazardous wastes also was not corroborated by any other witness.5 Petitioner's middle level supervisor acknowledged that Petitioner told him that other employees had improperly handled hazardous materials as well as non-hazardous materials but that he did not cite anyone as a result of Petitioner's complaints about hazardous wastes because it was impossible to prove who was responsible. He counseled all subordinates about each incident whenever he considered counseling appropriate. Otherwise, all witnesses with reason to know the situation generally acknowledged that Petitioner's oral complaints were recurring almost daily and were directed to other employees' job performances rather than hazardous materials. It is the repetitive and personal nature of Petitioner's complaints rather than their being oral that management found offensive. The evidence also generally shows that all employees orally complained about each other and that Petitioner's two immediate supervisors, Felippe McCelroy and Robert Murray, orally reprimanded everybody who complained or who was complained about as they each saw fit within their supervisory discretion on individual occasions. No gender pattern is to be discerned from the foregoing. Only on those occasions that either an oral or written complaint reached Mr. Hardee was anyone written up and/or disciplined. Petitioner complained about not being assigned or provided with one of Respondent employer's trucks when other male employees were provided trucks. With the exception of the following findings related to the Respondent's trucks, there is no relevant evidence in this record concerning employees' use of trucks. All employees were cautioned against carelessness. Tommy Dean, a male employee, dented one of Respondent's trucks. He was not disciplined for careless driving. There is no evidence the dent was caused by Mr. Dean's careless driving. In February 1995, Charles Kennedy, a male spotter, filed a written complaint or incident report. Therein, he claimed that Petitioner had attempted to prohibit his bulldozing landfill material out of the way because Petitioner was trying to remove salvageable items. He further alleged that Petitioner had thrown a jar of grease at him. Petitioner was requested to file a written account of the incident. In her written account, she basically admitted the incident but not any intent to hit Mr. Kennedy with the grease jar. Mr. Kennedy was not disciplined for filing the written complaint/report. Petitioner was not disciplined for the actions complained about by Mr. Kennedy. Instead, as of February 3, 1995, landfill spotters were prohibited from salvaging at the landfill. (P-13) Petitioner desires that the conclusion be drawn that male spotters who complained in writing about other employees were not disciplined for complaining but that Petitioner, a female, was disciplined for making oral complaints. However, it appears Respondent addressed Mr. Kennedy's written complaint in much the same way as it had addressed Petitioner's oral complaint against Willie George, by giving each participant in the dispute a chance to state his or her position, before management decided who should be disciplined. The difference was that Mr. Kennedy was not a chronic complainer and management's investigation revealed some fault on both sides, so a neutral solution was found rather than discipline being imposed. There is no evidence beyond Petitioner's assertion that she was ever asked to do more work or heavier work than male spotters. From this point on, the dates that events occurred or their chronology is not entirely clear from the record. However, approximately April 14, 1995, there was an occasion when Petitioner was asked to move metal pieces in a wheelbarrow-sized pile over a three-hour period. The largest piece weighed 21 pounds. The next day, Petitioner reported a workers' compensation back injury or aggravation. She was then off work until approximately May 11, 1995, when she returned to "light duty." She worked for awhile for only four hours per day. Respondent hired someone to help her. It is disputed whether Petitioner was reinjured or whether Mr. Hardee just sent her home. However, on or about July 8, 1995, Mr. Hardee discussed the situation with "the workers' compensation people," and it was agreed there was not enough light duty work for Petitioner. Three months later, Petitioner returned to full duty. Because a spotter had been hired to do her work, Petitioner was assigned to a variety of jobs. She worked at the dog pound, the recycling building, and even washed Mr. Hardee's truck.6 One day, Petitioner's immediate supervisor ordered her to cut out the top of a metal drum. At formal hearing, Petitioner asserted that this was heavier work than she should have been required to do on light duty, but there is no evidence the supervisor's order was motivated by gender bias. There also is no evidence a full-time male spotter was never required to do similarly heavy work. Petitioner advised her supervisor that she had hurt her arms and elbows and she went home on sick leave. Petitioner had complained over the term of her employment about not being provided one of Respondent's trucks so that she could conveniently get from her sector of the landfill to a restroom. After her workers' compensation injury, Respondent arranged for male employees to drive Petitioner to the restroom. Eventually, Respondent provided Petitioner with a portable toilet in her work sector. Mr. Hardee maintained that no spotter had ever been assigned a truck but that all spotters, including Petitioner, had access to one. There is evidence to show that male employees drove the trucks and Petitioner did not, but insufficient evidence to show this was an active management decision or that Mr. Hardee acquiesced in male employees preempting trucks as a result of any gender bias. On or about November 13, 1995, Petitioner informed Mr. Hardee that she was permanently physically disabled and would have to be on light duty indefinitely. After consultation with his "workers' compensation people," Mr. Hardee terminated Petitioner as of that date. 7 At formal hearing, Petitioner admitted Respondent was still paying her workers' compensation benefits and that her workers' compensation claim has not been settled.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order finding no discrimination and dismissing the Petition for Relief. RECOMMENDED this 19th day of November, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of November, 1997.
The Issue Whether Petitioner, a member of a protected class, was denied promotion to the position of Secretary III with the Respondent in the Environmental Services Department on or about June 10, 1992, on the basis of her race (African- American), in violation of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1991).
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is a constitutionally created school district charged with the duty to operate, control, and supervise all free public schools in Brevard County, Florida, and is an employer under the Florida Human Relations Act of 1977, as amended. Petitioner was employed by the Brevard County School District as a Clerk-Typist in the Environmental Services Department during the relevant period of time including April 1992. Petitioner is an African-American, and a member of a protected class. She is the only African-American who is assigned to work in the Environmental Services Department. During April of 1992, Petitioner worked as a Clerk Typist in the Environmental Services Department, and the Secretary III position was held by Sylvana Wall. Subsequent to April of 1992, Sylvana Wall resigned, creating a vacancy in the Secretary III position in the Department. In the interim period from the time Sylvana Wall resigned, and the date the position was filled in July of 1992, Petitioner undertook to perform the duties of the Secretary III position, and in accordance with the applicable collective bargaining agreement, was paid for said period of time in the higher classification. Following creation of the vacancy, a job vacancy announcement was posted and advertised. Applications were received and reviewed by a selection committee composed of Irma Reinpoldt, Department Director, and Michael Rogers, Environmental Engineer. Petitioner submitted application for the vacant position. Subsequently, applicants except Petitioner, were interviewed by the committee, and a decision was made to employ applicant Rhonda Steward, a white female, for the Secretary III position in the Environmental Services Department. Petitioner was not personally interviewed for the Secretary III position by the committee. They based their decision on the fact that Petitioner had been working for the department as a clerk typist for a number of months, and she had also filled in as the Secretary III for several months when the vacancy was created until the position was filled. Both members of the committee knew the Petitioner, her capabilities and qualifications, and considered it "redundant" to interview her. There was no School Board policy, custom, or practice that required the employer to personally interview all applicants for vacancies. The candidate selected, Rhonda Stewart, was fully qualified to fill the Secretary III position. The evidence showed that during the relevant period there were certain conflicts in the Department, not related to race. There was evidence of personality disputes, such as name calling, and unwillingness by Petitioner to do secretarial functions for certain members of the Environmental Services Department, particularly an Environmental Specialist who was dyslexic. In addition, certain co-employees did not get along with the Petitioner and vice versa. However, there was no indication from the sworn testimony that race played a part in the decision made by the Respondent to hire someone else for the position. It was the practice of Respondent that the immediate supervisor and department head determine who was the best qualified for a job vacancy, subject to any review by the Personnel Division. The Petitioner presented no testimony including her own, that she did not get promoted to the Secretary III position because of her race, or that there was disparate treatment of African-Americans by the Respondent in the hiring or promotion of minorities.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order which DENIES the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of October, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of October, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-2650 The following constitute my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner did not submit proposed findings of fact. Proposed findings of fact submitted by Respondent: Accepted in substance: paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8(in part), 9, 10(in part), 11 Rejected as irrelevant, immaterial or as comment on the evidence: paragraphs 8(in part), 10(in part) COPIES FURNISHED: Cislyn Stephenson Emil Stephenson Qualified Representative 2298 September Street Melbourne, Florida 32935 Bill Walker, Esquire School Board of Brevard County 2700 St. Johns Street Melbourne, Florida 32940 Dana Baird General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Honorable Betty Castor Commissioner of Education Department of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Sydney H. McKenzie General Counsel Department of Education The Capitol, PL-08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue Whether or not Respondent appropriately denied Petitioner's retirement benefits and what, if any, amount Petitioner must repay.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Dr. Evelyn A. Sebree was employed by Lake-Sumter Community College (LSCC) for over 25 years. LSCC is an agency within the State of Florida Retirement System (FRS). Petitioner was employed by LSCC as an instructor and later as a part- time counselor. She was subsequently named the Director of Financial Aid and the Executive Director of the Foundation. She served simultaneously in both capacities for many years. The Foundation is the fund-raising arm of LSCC and a nonprofit corporation separate from LSCC with its own governing board, bylaws and constitution. Only an employee of the college can be Director of the Foundation, but the Foundation Board is not made up of LSCC employees. In her LSCC employment as Director of Financial Aid, Petitioner was responsible for administering the college's student financial aid program. Her immediate supervisor in this employment category was Dr. Dixie Lee, and Petitioner reported ultimately to the Dean of Student Services. In this employment capacity, she administered federal, state, institutional and private grants, loans, and scholarship programs, including but not limited to Pell Grants, the Basic Education Opportunity Grant Program, the GI Bill, and work- study programs. She supervised three work-study students, who were part-time LSCC employees, and a financial aid specialist, a full-time LSCC employee, and had her own private office on campus. As Executive Director of the Foundation, Petitioner was responsible for raising money for the college and for scholarships. She reported to the LSCC President, was responsible for fund raisers, making contacts with potential donors, and soliciting money from various wealthy people for the college. During her LSCC employment as Financial Aid Director and collateral service as Executive Director of the Foundation, Petitioner developed many influential contacts in the fields of higher education and financial administration. These contacts were not only statewide, but also national. Petitioner also served on many state and national boards, including: State Financial Aid Association, Board of Directors of the Southern Association of Student Financial Aid, National Board of Student Financial Aid Directors, and the Florida Association of Community College and College Board Council on Higher Education Services. After her retirement as an employee of LSCC, Petitioner could no longer serve as Executive Director of the Foundation, but Petitioner continued to serve on the Board of the Foundation, as a private citizen. As a result of her contacts with many influential people, Petitioner considered herself to be a mover and a shaker in the community. Petitioner decided to retire after 29 years of service at the college when she was offered an early retirement incentive package. The package included paid health insurance for three years and partial salary for three years. Prior to her retirement, DOR mailed Petitioner a brochure. The brochure advised the Petitioner of the re-employment limitations. Prior to receiving her first retirement warrant, DOR mailed Petitioner a letter, again advising her that benefits would be suspended if she was re-employed within twelve months of her retirement date. As an agency within the FRS, LSCC was mailed several numbered memoranda advising reporting agencies to avoid "sweetheart" arrangements by hiring recently retired employees to fill positions within the system. Petitioner retired, effective July 1, 1992. In the fall of 1992, the LSCC college president quit. Dr. Kenneth Stack was appointed acting president while the LSCC Board of Trustees mounted a search for a permanent replacement president. The LSCC Board of Trustees is the governing board of the college which, among other duties, hires and fires the college president, sets college policy and adopts a budget. The LSCC Board of Trustees decided the new college president should be someone from Florida. They desired a college president who would have knowledge of the Florida educational system. The LSCC Board of Trustees had previously hired two college presidents, one six years previously and one eleven years previously. In each instance, a search committee made up of faculty, students, trustees, townspeople and residents of the two counties, Lake and Sumter, had been formed, and the Board had contracted with an outside "facilitator" to focus the presidential search and assist the presidential search committee. The last facilitator had been hired in 1986 from a professional group of "consultants" from Washington, D.C. This time, in 1992, LSCC's Board of Trustees decided they needed to hire a facilitator with knowledge of LSCC, the geographic area, college personnel within the state, and the Florida Community College System. The Board also believed that an in-state facilitator would help achieve their ultimate desired result of obtaining a qualified Floridian to fill the vacant LSCC presidency. Petitioner was nominated for facilitator by Board of Trustees member, Randall Thornton, an attorney. Due to her past employment and community reputation, Petitioner's education, training, experience, and status in the community were well known to all Board members. The Board considered facilitator candidates from the University of Florida and Florida State University also, but Petitioner was selected instead. All Board members cast a vote for their choice of facilitator. One consideration in favor of Petitioner was that she would accept a contract capped at $5,000, while the last professional out-of-house facilitator's total cost to LSCC was nine times that figure, or roughly $45,000. Petitioner was appointed Presidential Search Committee Facilitator pursuant to a contract drawn by attorney Randall Thornton. This contract significantly paralleled the contract between LSCC and its last out-of-state facilitator in that Mr. Thornton used the old contract as his model for the new one. For purposes of this proceeding, the significant provisions of Petitioner's contract are that: Petitioner was to be paid at the rate of $40 per hour up to a maximum of $5,000, regardless of how long the search took to complete. Clearly, it may be inferred that Petitioner's services would end when a college president was selected. In order to be paid, Petitioner was to bill the Board of Trustees monthly for hours worked and for expenses. She was to be reimbursed for any expenditures or expenses in addition to her hourly fee for personal services. To minimize costs to LSCC, Petitioner's travel expenses were geared to Chapter 112 F.S., normally covering state employees. She also was required to use the college's Watts line "to the extent possible," but she would be reimbursed for all her out of pocket expenses, including but not limited to telephone calls, fax, express mail, travel, and similar items. Because this was a personal services contract, Petitioner could not delegate her duties except with express prior agreement of the Board, but there was no specific prohibition on her hiring subordinate support service helpers. Either LSCC or Petitioner could cancel the contract upon 30 days' written notice without incurring liability to each other. However, Petitioner agreed to indemnify and "hold harmless" the college both for her own negligence in conducting the search and for any other liability arising out of her activities during the search. She was required to comply with equity rules and regulations. This requirement may be inferred to reiterate the obvious, that she, like any other citizen, was bound to comply with all equal opportunity and labor laws for appropriate hiring practices. One contract clause specifically denied Petitioner any employee, servant, or agency authority to bind or incur liability for the college, and described her as an independent contractor. Mr. Thornton modeled LSCC's contract with Petitioner on the contract drafted by the 1986 facilitator from Washington, D.C., who was clearly an independent contractor. According to Dr. Kenneth Stack, the contract as finalized is similar to the standard contract by which LSCC contracts for outside labor, power, and such professional services as those of architects, normally considered to be independent contractors. This facilitator contract differs significantly from Petitioner's employment contract as Director of Financial Aid for LSCC prior to her retirement on July 1, 1992, the form of which employment contract is prescribed by the Florida Community College System. After negotiating with Mr. Thornton, who was acting for the Board in the place of the college's general counsel, Petitioner had input into the final version of the facilitator contract. Exactly what Petitioner's input was, is unclear. Although there is some testimony that the former facilitator was paid in a lump sum of $20,000, there is also testimony that the total payments to that facilitator by LSCC totalled $45,000. Although this fact, together with the contents of the final contract between Petitioner and LSCC is not sufficient to infer that the prior out-of-state facilitator was also paid at an hourly rate up to a certain capped amount plus an expense reimbursement, it is sufficient to infer that expense reimbursement was part of the prior out-of-state independent contractor's agreement with the college. Petitioner's $40/hour fee as "facilitator" constituted a higher hourly rate than she had been paid when employed by LSCC as its Financial Aid Director prior to retirement. Petitioner was not covered for health insurance or unemployment or workers' compensation benefits under her contract as presidential search facilitator. No social security, retirement, or income tax was withheld by LSCC from her hourly rate as facilitator. LSCC provides all its regular employees with these fringe benefits. In practice, as LSCC presidential search committee facilitator, Petitioner used her own telephone and the LSCC telephone. She worked out of an established office in her own home where she simultaneously cared for her 92 year old mother. She also had the use of, and occasionally utilized, the Board room at LSCC which the Board of Trustees had been made available to her and the search committee whenever the Board was not using it. Because there was no college president, the secretary assigned to the president was available for Petitioner's use, and this secretary did some minimal work for Petitioner, primarily copying materials for the search committee members. An employee of LSCC who regularly deals with equity matters also was available to Petitioner and the search committee for advice as needed. As facilitator, Petitioner utilized a comprehensive notebook compiled by a prior Chairman of the LSCC Board of Trustees in the course of the 1986 presidential search. She also utilized two professional books she specifically purchased in order to fulfill her contract with LSCC. Petitioner gave the Board-appointed search committee their direction, worked with a subcommittee to design the advertisement for position, received all applications, analyzed them, and copied and distributed them to the search committee. After the committee read and ranked the applications and selected the finalists, Petitioner did background checks on the finalists and held personal conversations with applicants' employers, prior employers, and colleagues to get a "feel" for each applicant's qualifications. She then reported these findings to the search committee, and apparently another "cut" was made. She coordinated all visits, receptions, and committee interviews for the last five presidential finalists. In this process, she took no direction from LSCC's Acting President, Dr. Kenneth Stack, who was an applicant, and the Board of Trustees' input was more in the nature of questions concerning what was she doing and what were the search committee's time frames, than directions on what to do or how to do it. On her own initiative, Petitioner gave interim reports on the search committee's progress, usually at the regularly scheduled monthly Board of Trustees meetings, until the final presidential candidates were chosen, at which time the Board met weekly for the specific purpose of selecting the college president. Petitioner was required to bill her hours and expenses monthly but was not required to appear before the Board of Trustees. She was never summoned to appear before the Board. She had to ask to be put on the Board agenda each time she gave a report. On the basis of her education, training, experience, investigation, and analysis, Petitioner made suggestions to the Board of Trustees as to search procedures, deadlines, the profile of the president, and advertising the college presidency position. The LSCC Board of Trustees voted on the selection of a college president in April 1993. By its terms, Petitioner's contract terminated with the selection of a college president. The presidential search was not a regularly established function of the college, although employment of a college president was integral to the college's function and purpose. The search committee and search committee facilitator were not regularly established job positions with the college. Petitioner did not incorporate because no state license or certification is required for her services. She also did not advertise her services because she planned to work only intermittently as an independent contractor/consultant in a variety of higher education/administrative fields, relying on her professional networking to get offers of specific projects. At the time of formal hearing, she had the potential for contracts to do financial aid counseling at Seminole Community College and to rewrite a policy and procedure manual for South Florida Community College. LSCC paid Petitioner approximately $435 for her work for LSCC during the month of October 1992, plus some reimbursed expenses. In November 1992, DOR advised Petitioner it had determined that she was an employee and not an independent contractor. Prior to advising Petitioner, DOR requested the federal Internal Revenue Service (IRS) render its opinion. This opinion concluded that Petitioner was an employee of LSCC rather than an independent contractor, but the IRS opinion is not binding upon DOR or dispositive of this instant de novo proceeding pursuant to Section 120.57(1) F.S. It is noted that the review sheets filled out by LSCC and Petitioner and utilized by DOR and the IRS were not as detailed as the evidence adduced at formal hearing, and in some respects the answers were unintentionally misleading. At some point, DOR demanded approximately $435 from Petitioner and $1,018.79 from LSCC for retirement benefits DOR had paid Petitioner during October 1992, but apparently DOR now seeks $2,037.58 solely from Petitioner. Because of the controversy with Respondent DOR, Petitioner did not accept any payment from LSCC pursuant to their facilitator contract after October 1992, when she was notified by DOR that any payment from LSCC for employment would result in a DOR repayment demand and/or withholding of her FRS benefits by DOR.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement enter a final order absolving Petitioner of any pay back to FRS for the month of October 1992. RECOMMENDED this 29th day of October, 1993, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The De Soto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of October, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER 93-1592 The following constitute specific rulings, pursuant to S120.59(2), F.S., upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF). Petitioner's PFOF: The factual matters are accepted. The legal argument is covered in the Conclusions of Law. Accepted (FOF 10). Rejected as argument only. Covered in substance in FOF 3 and 23 and the Conclusions of Law. Accepted (FOF 25). Accepted except as to Conclusion of Law which is covered in the Conclusions of Law. (FOF 22-25). Accepted except to the degree unnecessary, subordinate or cumulative (FOF 16-19). Accepted (FOF 12-15). Constitutes a request to rule certain evidence irrelevant. Not a PFOF. Covered in FOF 27 and the Conclusions of Law. Accepted except to the degree unnecessary or subordinate. (FOF 27). Rejected as related to matters outside the record which apparently occurred after formal hearing. Similar material covered in FOF 27. Respondent's PFOF 1-17 Accepted (FOF 1-16). Accepted in part and rejected in part upon the greater weight of the record as set forth in FOF 15. Accepted (FOF 23). Rejected as a Conclusion of Law. See, Conclusions of Law. Accepted (FOF 17, 22). Rejected because as stated it is misleading. Covered in FOF 17-19. 23-25 Accepted (FOF 17-25). 26-27 Accepted (FOF 9). 28-29 Accepted (FOF 29). 30 Accepted (FOF 30) COPIES FURNISHED: A. J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Bldg. C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Sylvan Strickland, Esquire General Counsel Department of Management Services Knight Building, Suite 309 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Larry D. Scott, Esquire Department of Management Services Division of Retirement 2639 North Monroe Street, Building C Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Ms. Evelyn A. Sebree Post Office Box 150 Umatilla, Florida 32784
The Issue Whether Respondent has committed an unlawful employment practice in violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, and if so, what remedy should be ordered?
Findings Of Fact Bonita Sneiderman, a/k/a Bonita Mattingly (Ms. Mattingly), is a Caucasian female born March 17, 1953. At the time of the events complained about in this proceeding, Ms. Mattingly was 53 years old. Ms. Mattingly was then known as Ms. Sneiderman and was single. Ms. Mattingly married and changed her name shortly before the hearing in this case. Dillards, Inc., is a corporation that operates a chain of department stores, referred to as Dillards. In many of the Dillards stores, there are styling salons. The Dillards department store at the Orange Park Mall in Orange Park, Florida is referred to as Store #232. During the time period relevant to this case, Susan Konstantatos was the Salon Manager of the salon at Store #232. On July 26, 2005, Ms. Konstantatos attended a manager's meeting, in which she received and discussed new policies for the salons. One such policy dealt with the schedules for salon employees and stated that all new hires would work five-day, full-time schedules. This policy, however, did not necessarily apply to employees already employed at the salons. For example, employees that worked in the Iveys salon before Dillards took over what used to be the Iveys store were considered to be "grandfathered in." Dillards honored whatever scheduling terms the employees had negotiated when taking their positions with Iveys. George Craywick, Cynthia Anderson and Marie Cox were three such salon employees. In September 2005, Ms. Mattingly applied for and received a position as a hair stylist in Dillards Store #232. Her application for employment with the store indicates that she applied for a full-time position. The application also indicates that she was hired for a full-time position. On September 21, 2005, Petitioner attended a new employee orientation session and signed the new employee orientation sheet, acknowledging that she had received orientation on Respondent's Associate Work Rules and Attendance Policy. Petitioner also signed an Associate Acknowledgment Form indicating that she received and understood Respondent's Associate Work Rules and General Policies. The Associate Work Rules and General Policies for Dillards reiterated the importance of attendance and provided notice that a "no show" would not be tolerated and would result in termination of employment. Among the stylists' job duties was an activity called "instant eventing." Instant eventing was an activity designed to generate interest in using the salon's services. Stylists could choose the type of instant eventing they would perform, such as handing out business cards, setting up a paraffin wax table and offering demonstrations, or setting up a color table with hair color swatches. Petitioner's chosen method of instant eventing involved setting up the paraffin wax demonstration. Instant eventing not only created interest in the salon, but hopefully helped new stylists to establish a following for their services. Stylists were expected to participate in instant eventing when they had no appointments. As a consequence, the more customers a stylist had, the less time he or she had to devote to instant eventing and the less stylists were expected to participate in the activity. Petitioner complains that George Craywick was not required to instant event and claims that she never saw him participate in any instant eventing activity. Mr. Craywick had more customers than any other stylist working at the Dillards salon. As a result of the number of repeat customers he served, he did not have the need for or the opportunity to engage in the same amount of instant eventing that Petitioner had. There is evidence that Mr. Craywick participated in a color table as an instant event, but it is unclear whether his participation in this activity was during the time that Petitioner was employed. Petitioner admitted that while she never saw Mr. Craywick participate in instant eventing, she had no knowledge as to whether he participated at times when she was not working with him. During May 2006, all of the salon's stylists at Store #232 were scheduled to work five days per week and one Sunday per month. When an employee worked on Sunday, Ms. Konstantatos attempted to schedule another day off for the employee during that week. Often the day off would be Monday, but the coverage needs of the salon would control. Mr. Craywick often worked on his scheduled days off at Ms. Konstantatos' request to ensure overage for the salon. Others sometimes did the same. Petitioner was scheduled to work Sunday, May 7, 2006. On or about May 1, 2006, Ms. Konstantatos checked the posted schedule and saw that Petitioner's name had been crossed off the schedule for Monday, May 8, 2006. Ms. Konstantatos had not removed Petitioner from the schedule and assumed that Petitioner had crossed her name off because she was working Sunday. Ms. Konstantatos needed Petitioner to work Monday, May 8, 2006, in order to ensure that the salon was adequately staffed. Petitioner had not worked the previous Monday. Ms. Konstantatos left Petitioner a note stating that Petitioner needed to work on Monday, May 8, 2006. After receiving the note, Petitioner called Ms. Konstantatos on Wednesday, May 3, 2006, and told her she could not work on Monday because she had made arrangements to go out of town that day. Petitioner's regular day off is Tuesday. Ms. Konstantatos advised that she needed Petitioner to work Monday to make sure that there was proper coverage for the salon, but that she could give Petitioner Wednesday off so that her days off would be consecutive. Petitioner insisted that she could not work on Monday, May 8, 2006. Ms. Konstantatos informed her that if she did not work on Monday, she would be considered to have abandoned her job and her employment would be terminated. Whether or not she worked on Monday, May 8, 2006, remained Petitioner's choice. Petitioner worked Thursday through Saturday, May 4-6, 2006. On Saturday evening, Petitioner packed up her belongings and left a note indicating that she had arranged for someone else to cover her shift on Sunday and would not be at work on Monday. She never returned to work because she considered herself to have been fired. On May 11, 2007, Respondent terminated Respondent for job abandonment. Between September 2005 and May 2006, Respondent terminated several other salon employees for job abandonment or excessive absenteeism. Those employees were both male and female, married and single. Their ages ranged from 21 to 35. After Petitioner's termination, Ms. Konstantatos hired Debra Doss as a stylist. At the time she was hired, Ms. Doss was a 49-year-old single female.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered dismissing Petitioner's complaint of discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of October, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of October, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Bonita Y. Mattingly 2040 Wells Road, Apartment 2-E Orange Park, Florida 32073 Grant D. Petersen, Esquire Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C. 100 North Tampa Street, Suite 3600 Tampa, Florida 33602 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a woman who suffered an aneurysm in 1987 which resulted in paralysis. Subsequently, she regained full use of her body except for her left hand. She possesses gross motor skills in her left hand but lacks fine motor skills. Respondent is a retail furniture store, which at times pertinent did about three million dollars in business annually. Respondent at times pertinent employed 23 to 26 full-time employees. Respondent went out of business on September 24, 2001. Petitioner interviewed with Doris Hudson and Cindy Gentry about three weeks prior to June 8, 2000. Petitioner was informed that she was hired and could begin work on June 8, 2000. The position she was hired for was accounts payable clerk. During the interview, the matter of the facility of Petitioner's left hand was not noted or discussed. Petitioner believed that the job consisted of mostly working on a keypad with numbers, in the accounts payable section of the bookkeeping office. Petitioner reported for work on June 8, 2000. Doris Hudson, Respondent's Comptroller, an employee of Respondent for over 41 years, provided her with a tour of the premises. Petitioner's first assignment was to type checks. She did this slowly because she could type only with her right hand. Typing checks is an important function of the accounts payable clerk. Most vendors were paid by checks which were prepared by data processing equipment but it was necessary to prepare many checks for local vendors on a typewriter. During the hour and a-half Petitioner worked at the typewriter, she correctly prepared three checks. Ms. Hudson expected an accounts payable clerk to prepare 25 to 35 checks in an hour and a-half. An accounts payable clerk, according to Ms. Hudson, should be able to type 55 words per minute; Petitioner could type only 30 words per minute on a good day. An accounts payable clerk's daily activities included kneeling on the floor and opening a large safe; swinging open a heavy door which has to be unlocked with two keys simultaneously; counting 30 to 50 checks per day and counting currency and coins; and printing out reports which were inserted in a large binder. A substantial part of the duties of the accounts payable clerk required excellent typing and data input skills. The accounts payable clerk was required to reload the printers and this required the coordination of two hands. The accounts payable clerk was required to prepare deposits which required that the employee flip each individual check with one hand and operate a calculator with the other. Ms. Hudson did not discover the deficiencies with regard to Petitioner's left hand until she made inquiry after noting the small number of checks which Petitioner prepared. Ms. Hudson could not use an employee who could not do the activities described in paragraph eight and nine, above. Ms. Hudson could not call others in the office away from their jobs to help a person who had limited use of one hand. She did not have enough employees. When Ms. Hudson's office was fully staffed there were many times when it was difficult to accomplish all necessary duties in an eight-hour day. It was Ms. Hudson's opinion that Petitioner could not perform the duties of accounts payable clerk and that it was impossible to accommodate her deficiencies without disrupting the orderly functioning of her office. After considering Petitioner's capabilities and the requirements of the accounts payable clerk, Ms. Hudson decided that Petitioner was not suitable for employment as an accounts payable clerk and as a result, discharged her. Petitioner was paid $22.61 for 2.66 hours of work. This reflected an hourly wage of $8.50. Petitioner worked as an administrative assistant at Century Boats in Panama City prior to obtaining the job with Respondent. She lost that job in February of 2000, due to a reduction in workforce. After Petitioner left Respondent's place of business she went to work at a clinic run by Bay Medical. She began working there on August 28, 2000, as an insurance coder and biller and was paid $8.00 per hour. She lost that job on February 28, 2001, when the facility closed. She was offered a job in the radiology section but it paid less so she elected to remain essentially unemployed for a year. She did work a one- week job with Cardiology Associates and worked for C-1 Medical Clinic for a month and a-half during that period. Petitioner, at the time of the hearing, was employed by Nextel Communications as a customer care representative and was paid $9.50 per hour. She started February 18, 2002. Petitioner has a hard time buttoning clothes but she can drive an automobile. She testified she could do, ". . . everything pretty much what everybody does." She can't throw a ball up with her left hand or play tennis anymore. She can lift heavy objects up to at least 75 pounds. She has no medical restrictions placed on the use of her left hand.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Human Relations Commission enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Amended Charge of Discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of July, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of July, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Linda Chesser 6802 Penny Road Panama City, Florida 32404 Michael Mattimore, Esquire Allen, Norton & Blue, P.A. 906 North Monroe Street, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4019 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Mary Harrison's charge of discrimination dated August 4, 1995, alleges that Jodan, Inc., doing business as Manpower (Jodan), discriminated on the basis of her race and for retaliation by constructively discharging her, giving her verbal and written reprimands and a poor performance rating, by denying her training and by intimidating her. The issues for disposition in this proceeding are whether the alleged discrimination occurred, and if so, what relief is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact Jodan, Inc., is a family owned franchise of Manpower Temporary Services. Jodan provides temporary staff to its clients. It has six offices in Central Florida: two in north Orlando; one in south Orlando; and one each in Deland, Daytona, and Melbourne. Dan Gavin, president, is responsible for the day to day operations; John Gavin, his brother, is a co-owner. In March 1994, Margaret Jones was Jodan's district manager for the north Orlando (Maitland) and south Orlando (Sand Lake Road) offices. She recruited and hired Ms. Harrison to work as a service representative in the Maitland office. Shortly before that time John Gavin had asked her to recruit specifically for a minority employee as it would be helpful for the office to have a more diverse staff to serve its clients. Ms. Harrison is an African-American woman. At the time that she was hired by Ms. Jones in March 1994, her substantial work experience was in real estate and property management. Service representatives at Jodan perform the intake process with temporary employees (application, interview and testing); they take orders from clients and place temporary employees with those clients. Jodan provides a detailed training program for its employees, including its service representatives. Upon the commencement of her employment with Jodan, Ms. Harrison began a training program known as Professional Service 1 (PS-1) under the supervision of Margaret Jones. PS-1 is a self study course where the employee learns the policies and procedures of a Manpower franchise through tapes and other training materials. It is the responsibility of the employee to keep track of and complete PS-1. Normally it takes between three and six months for an employee to complete PS-1; however, it can take longer, depending on the employee's office work load at the time. Disgruntled and upset by what she perceived as criticism of her management and hiring decisions, Ms. Jones left the employ of Jodan on or about August 1, 1994. Prior to that time, Ms. Harrison had completed all but three or four minor details in the PS-1 training. Ms. Harrison was satisfied by her training under Ms. Jones and she admits that no one at Jodan attempted to prevent her from completing PS-1. In September 1994, Ms. Harrison reported to Dan Gavin that her PS-1 materials were lost. He was surprised that one of his employees would lose her training materials and he assisted Ms. Harrison in looking for the materials by, among other things, looking in an off-site storage facility for them. Ms. Harrison's materials were never found and she includes the disappearance of her training materials as one of the basis for her charge of discrimination. There is no evidence that anyone took the materials but neither is there any explanation for their disappearance. Normally, when an employee completes PS-1, a checklist is sent to Manpower headquarters in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, indicating the employee has completed the training. On the checklist, the employee is required to record the dates that she completed each aspect of PS-1. Mr. Gavin contacted Manpower headquarters and obtained a new checklist. He also set up a schedule to meet with Ms. Harrison to go over the items on the checklist and verify that all of PS-1 had been completed. At their first meeting, Ms. Harrison assured Mr. Gavin that she had completed all of PS-1. Based on their conversation, he called Manpower headquarters and verbally confirmed that Ms. Harrison had completed PS-1. Manpower records indicate that she officially completed PS-1 as of December 1, 1994. Ms. Harrison's testimony at hearing with regard to whether she actually had an opportunity to finish the training was confused and unclear as she seemed to contend that there were materials that she was supposed to send to the home office, but could not, due to the lapse of time and loss of her training package. After an employee completes PS-1, the next step is to attend PS-2, which is a week-long training seminar at Manpower headquarters in Milwaukee. PS-2 reinforces what is learned in PS-1 and teaches additional marketing skills. Employees are given a list of dates during which PS-2 will be offered and, because the training requires them to be away from home for a week, they can schedule it at their convenience. Employees can schedule PS-2 before actually completing PS-1 but must have completed PS-1 before they actually attend PS-2. Ms. Harrison could have attended PS-2 any time after December 1, 1994. In January 1995, Mr. Gavin directed the area manager, Kathy Stanford, to ensure that all eligible employees, including Ms. Harrison, sign up for and attend PS-2. The PS-2 classes fill up quickly and it was a priority for Mr. Gavin to have his employees enroll. On more than one occasion, Ms. Stanford gave Ms. Harrison a list of available classes and the opportunity to attend PS-2. However, Ms. Harrison failed to sign up for PS-2. Jodan evaluates employees' performance and salaries on an annual basis. On January 30, 1995, Ms. Harrison was given her annual evaluation. Although the "Appraisal Period" on her evaluation is listed as March 21, 1994, to September 1994, the uncontradicted evidence was that this was a scrivener's error and the appraisal period was March 21, 1994, (Harrison's date of hire) through December 31, 1994. Her review was performed by Mr. Gavin, who was familiar with her performance, with input from Ms. Harrison's immediate supervisor, Gloria Michael. Ms. Stanford sat in on all evaluations done at that time, including Ms. Harrison's, because she was the new area manager and sitting in on the reviews was one way for her to become familiar with the staff and their performances. Ms. Harrison's overall score on the evaluation was a 2.66 on a scale of 1 to 5. A score of 2 means "Below Expectations" and a score of 3 means "Consistently Meets Expectations." A service representative learns all performance areas covered by the evaluation through PS-1. Although she claims that she was evaluated in areas in which she was not trained, Ms. Harrison did not raise this issue with Mr. Gavin and she did not write in any comments on the evaluation in the space provided for employee comments. Further, the uncontradicted testimony, including that of Margaret Jones, established that Ms. Harrison did receive training in all areas of her job in which she was evaluated. Ms. Harrison did not suffer any job detriment as the result of this evaluation or the unusual circumstances surrounding her PS-1 training. She received a pay increase following the evaluation and was then the highest paid service representative. On March 29, 1995, Ms. Harrison was presented with a memorandum by Ms. Michael that addressed concerns she had with Ms. Harrison's job performance. Specifically, the memorandum addressed the following areas: Failure to be responsive to customer needs; The high number of personal calls Ms. Harrison was receiving at the office; Failure to properly match an employee's skills with a client's needs; Failure to consistently enter and update employee information in the computer system each time she spoke with an employee; Failure to open the office on time in the morning; Failure to set up computer training for applicants when she opened the office in the morning. Neither Mr. Gavin nor Ms. Stanford played any role in the preparation or presentation of this memorandum. Ms. Harrison did not suffer any adverse employment action as the result of the March 29, 1995, memorandum. Ms. Michael followed up the March 29, 1995, memorandum with a memorandum on May 3, 1995, detailing Ms. Harrison's improvement in all of the areas discussed in the March 29, 1995, memorandum. On May 15-16, 1995, Ms. Harrison and Ms. Michael (who is white) failed to provide an important client with prompt and appropriate service. As a result, Ms. Stanford counseled both women and placed them both on 90 days probation. Ms. Harrison does not contend that this action was discriminatory. On July 17, 1995, Ms. Harrison submitted a letter of resignation. In the letter she stated that she enjoyed her position as service representative. She also stated that she felt she had been subjected to discriminatory treatment. Ms. Harrison's resignation and the allegations of discriminatory treatment came as a surprise to Ms. Stanford and Mr. Gavin as Ms. Harrison had never before told them she was unhappy or felt discriminated against. In her letter of resignation, Ms. Harrison offered to meet with Mr. Gavin and Ms. Stanford to discuss her resignation, but during her exit interview she refused to discuss her allegations. Although many of Jodan's temporary employees were minorities, Ms. Harrison was the only African-American service representative. There were, however, other minorities, including Hispanic-Americans. Ms. Harrison presented her case in an articulate organized professional manner. It is clear that she felt the work environment was stressful and uncomfortable. However, she did not prove that she was discriminated against or was the object of hostile or adverse employment actions. The temporary employment agency business is highly competitive. Jodan had several large corporate clients and it had to work hard to meet the needs of those clients, sometimes on short notice. This created pressure on Jordan's regular staff that was experienced by white or non-minority employees as well as Ms. Harrison.
Recommendation Based on the above, it is RECOMMENDED: that the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismiss Ms. Harrison's charge of discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of December, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of December, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Mary A. Harrison 2356 Carborn Street Orlando, Florida 32839 Kelly T. Blystone, Esquire Moran & Shams, P.A. Post Office Box 472 Orlando, Florida 32802-0472 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
