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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. JOE SOPOTNICK, 75-001867 (1975)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 75-001867 Latest Update: Sep. 07, 1976

The Issue Whether Respondent failed to deliver a deposit to the person entitled to said delivery in violation of Section 475.25(1)(c), Florida Statutes. Respondent appeared at the hearing without legal counsel and was advised of his rights to same at his own expense. He elected to represent himself at the hearing. He was further advised as to his rights under the Administrative Procedure Act including the right to testify on his own behalf if he so desired. He indicated his understanding of his rights. It was stipulated by the parties that Joseph Sopotnick, Joseph Sopotnick, Jr., and Joe Sopotnick are one and the same person.

Findings Of Fact At all pertinent times under consideration in these proceedings, Respondent was a registered real estate broker (Stipulation of parties, Exhibit 2) In March 1974, Alvin K. Whittington of Marietta, Georgia, upon the recommendation of his job supervisor, who had dealt with Respondent in the past, called the Respondent on the telephone concerning the possibility of purchasing land in Florida. Although the Respondent indicated that he had none available at that time, he called Whittington later on in the day and told him that he had certain property which was for sale and inquired as to when he could come down to Florida to look it over. Whittington informed him that he did not know when he would be able to visit Florida and Respondent advised him to send a deposit in order to hold the land since there was a contractor interested in the same property. Whittington told him that he did not like the idea of placing a deposit on property that he had not seen and inquired as to whether or not he could secure a return of the deposit if, after he had seen the land he did not wish to purchase it. Respondent told him "That's no problem. You can get your deposit back". He advised him to send the deposit and that he would hold it until he came to Florida. Accordingly, Whittington sent a check for $360.00, dated March 20, 1974, to the Respondent which indicated on its face that it was a "deposit on Fla. shore lots - N.W. corner Needle Palm & 18th". The check was signed by Mrs. Whittington on a joint account with her husband. The sum of $360.00 represented 10 percent of a purchase price of $3600.00. After talking to Whittington, Respondent on March 20 wrote to the owners of the property, advised that a deposit check would be forthcoming and enclosed a standard sales contract for the sellers to execute and return to him. This was accomplished and Respondent then forwarded the contract to the Whittingtons for execution and return which they received on April 1st. Mr. Whittington thereupon called the Respondent and told him that he could not sign the contract without seeing the property. On April 12th, he and his wife went to Florida, met with the Respondent, looked over the lots in question, and informed the Respondent that he would call him the following Monday as to whether or not he wished to make the purchase. On April 15th, Whittington called the Respondent, informed him that he did not wish to purchase the property and requested return of his deposit. Respondent informed him he could not return it and that disposition of the deposit would be a matter to be determined by the seller. Thereafter, on April 19th, Respondent wrote to the Whittingtons informing them that after careful consideration, he intended to treat the matter as a forfeiture of deposit situation, and unless he heard from them to the contrary he would disburse the deposit to the seller under the terms of the contract. However, he stated in the letter that he would apply the full deposit to any purchase that the Whittingtons might thereafter wish to make. After receipt of this letter, Whittington again called the Respondent concerning the situation at which time Respondent informed him that he would try to get 1/3 of the deposit returned if Whittington would send him a letter indicating that he would accept such an amount. Nothing further was heard from the Respondent and the deposit was never refunded (Testimony of Mr. & Mrs. Whittington, Composite Exhibit 1, Exhibits 3, 4). On or about July 2, 1974, Respondent remitted 1/2 of the deposit to sellers and retained 1/2 for himself (Stipulation of parties) Respondent testified that Whittington had insisted he accept the deposit and send the contract to the seller to insure that he would be able to purchase the property, and that the proposed deal was not contingent upon the buyer's satisfaction with the property. He denied telling Whittington he could get his deposit back. He also testified that after the Whittingtons viewed the property in Florida, he asked Whittington about the contract and the latter said that he had not brought it with him but would send it within a few days. That when he thereafter called upon his return to Georgia, he informed Respondent that he did not wish to make the purchase because his wife was about to have a baby. Respondent contended at the hearing that he was never sure that Whittington wanted his deposit back, however, conceded that Composite Exhibit 1f was his letter to the sellers advising that the Whittingtons had requested the return of the deposit. Respondent asserted that it was his impression that if a deposit had been made in good faith, it was proper to consider that there was a binding contract even though the depositor had not signed a sales contract. He further indicated that if he was wrong in this respect he would return the deposit. At no time did the Respondent ever discuss the transaction with the sellers. He was unaware of the provisions of Section 475.25(1)(c), by which a registrant may seek advice from the real estate commission if he entertains, in good faith, doubt concerning his duty to account and deliver a deposit. Respondent has been in the real estate business for twelve years (Testimony of Respondent, Composite Exhibit 1f).

Recommendation That Respondent's registration as a real estate broker be suspended for a period of 60 days. That the period of suspension in excess of 30 days be vacated if the Respondent returns the $350.00 deposit to Mr. & Mrs. Alvin K. Whittington prior to the expiration of the aforesaid period of 30 days from the original date of suspension. DONE and ENTERED this 20th day of February, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675

Florida Laws (2) 475.25725.01
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. DAVID JOSEPH WATSON, 75-002045 (1975)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 75-002045 Latest Update: Mar. 18, 1977

Findings Of Fact By Receipt for Deposit Offer to Purchase and Contract for Sale dated April 26, 1971 Michael J. and Mary Martha Solomon deposited with David J. Watson, Respondent herein, a $5,000 earnest money deposit on a house and tract of land in Polk County. This receipt for deposit became a contract for sale when executed by the seller and contained two special clauses that were disputed at the hearing. The first is "This contract is subject to a change in county zoning. The change is from residential to rural conservation for the purpose of keeping horses." The second special clause which purportedly led to the rescission of the contract is "Seller to convey all pumps, air conditioners, and septic tank in good condition." Michael Solomon (hereafter referred to as Solomon) apparently in response to an advertisement, entered Respondent's office to inquire about the property herein involved. Solomon was interested in purchasing the house which was advertised (Exhibit #6) provided he could buy additional land which he intended to develop as lakefront lots. His father, Dr. Solomon, expected to retire soon and move to Florida, and Solomon thought the house would be suitable for his parents who would provide a substantial part of the purchase money at the time of closing. Since his father raised Arabian horses as a hobby he wanted to be sure that he would be able to keep horses on the property. Respondent Watson, being a somewhat inexperienced broker, suggested the zoning change to rural conservation, and the special clause relating to zoning change was put in the contract. Prior to executing the contract Solomon and his wife inspected the premises and, on one occasion prior to the week in which one day was set for closing, Dr. Solomon flew down from Pennsylvania to look over the property. The testimony of the buyers and others involved in this transaction is in irreconcilable conflict with respect to the details leading to rescission of the contract by the buyers. Well prior to the date set for closing Respondent, while Solomon was in his office, called the County Zoning Department to inquire about the zoning on the property involved in the contract. He then learned that the zoning of the property was R-1 (Residential) and that horses could be kept on the property for personal use so long as the stables for feeding and housing were located not less than 100-feet from the residence. This was communicated to the buyer and he accepted this explanation. An official of the County Zoning Department confirmed at the hearing that the property was so zoned and that horses could be maintained on the premises for personal use. He also stated that an administrative determination could permit horses to be raised on the premises as a business venture; however, this issue was not raised at any time by any of the parties to the contract. Although the buyers testified that they requested the Respondent (or his salesman) to obtain in writing from the county zoning officials confirmation that horses could be kept on the property, neither the broker nor the salesman recall any issue being made of the zoning provision prior to the rescission of the contract. In view of the fact that the sale price of the entire parcel would amount to some $250,000 resulting in a commission to the brokers office of approximately $20,000 it is not conceivable that he would have risked losing such a commission by failure to ask the zoning officials for written confirmation that horses could be kept on the property if the buyers had so requested. Shortly before the day set for the closing Solomon's parents arrived and inspected the house. Apparently Mrs. Solomon was not satisfied with the house so Solomon requested a formal inspection the following day. Conditions found at this inspection rest in the eye of the beholder. The buyers all testified the house had been vandalized, paint was thrown in the garage, screens had been ripped off, windows broken, the basement was flooded, the sprinkler system and the air conditioner were inoperative. Others who visited the premises acknowledged that paint had been spilled on the concrete floor of the garage when a paint can had been turned over, but none had ever seen water in the basement, there was no evidence of vandalism, and all equipment was operable. Respondent produced a bill for repairs to the air conditioner, dated prior to the preclosing inspection, which showed charges only for installing new filters. Neither the Respondent nor anyone other than the buyers recall any complaint by the buyers during this inspection. They did recall that the elder Mrs. Solomon did not like the house. The salesman could not point out the location of the septic tank but there was no evidence that it was not functioning properly. At a preclosing conference held in the office of the attorney representing both parties to this transaction the elder Solomons became quite upset regarding the cost of title insurance on the property and indicated then that they would not close as scheduled. Apparently there are only two law offices in Auburndale and one of the lawyers in Auburndale is one of the four sellers of the property. The buyers accepted the attorney in the other office as their attorney with knowledge that he was representing both parties. The evening before the date set for closing Michael Solomon called Respondent Watson to tell him that his mother hated tide house and that he would be unable, to close. Watson advised him that he would forfeit his deposit if he didn't go through with the contract as the sellers were not the type to refund any of the deposit. Clause 11 of the contract provides that the seller may elect to retain the deposit as liquidated damages if he does not choose to sue for specific performance. At the termite inspection conducted prior to closing, termite infestation was noted and treated at the expense of the seller. N indication was raised by any witness that this issue affected the of the contract. After the date set for the closing had passed, Michael Solomon never requested return of his earnest money deposit from Respondent. Approximately one year later mesdames Solomon requested Respondent Watson to return the deposit and he advised them he was unable to do so. Some six weeks after the July 15, 1971 closing date the attorney- seller demanded that Respondent disburse funds due sellers pursuant to Clause 11 of the contract and offered to file suit against ham unless he did so. Respondent contacted the attorney representing sellers and buyers in this transaction for legal advice regarding his responsibilities. He was advised to disburse the funds. He obtained authorization: from the sellers to pay for the air conditioner repairs and for some work done in the yard at the request of Solomon. By checks dated September 7, 1971 Respondent disbursed $502.45 to each of the four sellers. This represented their share of the deposit less expenses.

Florida Laws (1) 475.25
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs EDWARD D. ARMBRUSTER, COLLEEN MICHELE ARMBUSTER, AND ARMBUSTER REALTY, INC., 97-004950 (1997)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Defuniak Springs, Florida Oct. 22, 1997 Number: 97-004950 Latest Update: Nov. 24, 1998

The Issue The issue is whether Respondents' real estate licenses should be disciplined on the ground that Respondents allegedly violated a rule and various provisions within Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, as charged in the Administrative Complaint.

Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: When the events herein occurred, Respondents, Edward D. Armbruster and Colleen Michele Armbruster, were licensed real estate brokers having been issued license numbers 0002159 and 0362890, respectively, by Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (Division). Respondents served as qualifying brokers and officers of Respondent, Armbruster Realty, Inc., a corporation registered as a real estate broker and located at 1031 West Nelson Avenue, DeFuniak Springs, Florida. The corporation holds license number 0211855, also issued by the Division. On July 10, 1996, Gerald and Joyce Singleton, who had just relocated to California, entered into a contract with James B. and Joyce Patten to sell their single-family residence located on Madison Street in the City of Freeport, Florida, for a price of $78,000.00. The contract called for the Pattens to pay $1,000.00 as an earnest money deposit, to be held in escrow by Respondents. The contract further provided that "[c]losing shall be within 30 days (more or less) after acceptance of this contract," and that "[i]n the event that buyer defaults and deposit is forfeited, it is agreed said deposit shall be divided equally between seller and broker." The transaction was handled by Geraldine Dillon (Dillon), a salesperson in Respondents' office, who is now retired. Because the Pattens had recently moved to Walton County from Washington State, and they were temporarily living with a relative in a mobile home, the time for closing was of the essence. Accordingly, the Pattens inserted into the contract a provision requiring that a closing be held within "30 days (more or less)." This meant that a closing should be held on or about August 10, 1996, give or take a few days. The parties acknowledge that property boundary problems were somewhat common in certain areas of Freeport, including the area where the subject property was located. To satisfy the bank and title company, a surveyor was engaged to prepare a survey of the property. However, the parties agree that the surveyor noted problems with the boundaries of the lot. When a second surveyor would not undertake the survey because of similar boundary problems, Joyce Patten, who was the principal negotiator for the couple, notified Dillon that they did not wish to close because of potential title problems and wanted a refund of their deposit. Notwithstanding this concern, Dillon advised Joyce Patten that a third surveyor would be hired, at the seller's expense, and he could "certify" the property. Although Joyce Patten expressed concern that the bank might not accept a third survey after two earlier ones had failed, and she did not want to pay for another survey, she did not instruct Dillon to stop the process. Accordingly, Dillon engaged the services of Tommy Jenkins, a local surveyor, to perform another survey. After a certified survey was obtained by Jenkins on August 12, 1996, which Respondents represent without contradiction satisfied the lender and title company, a closing was scheduled within the next few days. This closing date generally conformed to the requirement that a closing be held by August 10, 1996, "more or less." The seller, who by now had relocated to California, flew to Florida for the closing, and the title company prepared a closing statement and package. Just before the closing, however, Respondents learned through a representative of the title company that the Pattens were "cancelling the closing," apparently in violation of the contract. Shortly after the aborted closing, Joyce Patten requested that Dillon return their deposit. By this time, the Pattens had already entered into a second contract to buy another home in the same area and closed on that property before the end of August. Respondents were never informed of this fact by the Pattens. On August 21, 1996, Colleen Armbruster prepared a rather lengthy letter to the Pattens (with a copy to the sellers) in which she acknowledged that they had orally requested from Dillon that their escrow deposit be returned. The letter has been received in evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 4. Armbruster stated that she was "perplexed" that they were demanding a refund of their earnest money deposit, given the fact that the seller had "met the terms and conditions of the sale." Armbruster outlined the three reasons in the contract which would allow the Pattens to withdraw without forfeiting their deposit, but noted that none were applicable here. Accordingly, she advised them that the seller would be consulted as to his wishes regarding the deposit, and that the Pattens should contact her if they had any questions. Through oversight, however, she did not include a notice to the Pattens that they must respond to her letter within a stated period of time reaffirming their demand for the trust funds, or the deposit thereafter would be disbursed pursuant to the contract. By failing to include this specific language, and sending the letter by regular rather than certified mail, return receipt requested, Respondents committed a technical, albeit minor, violation of an agency rule. Even so, the Pattens acknowledged receiving the letter, and there is no reason to believe that they did not understand its import, especially the requirement that they contact the broker if they disagreed with the proposed disbursement of the money. It can be reasonably inferred that the Pattens did not respond because they "figured [they weren't] going to be able to get [their] money back" due to their failure to perform. On September 13, 1996, the seller's attorney advised the Pattens by letter that the seller considered the deposit forfeited pursuant to paragraph 15(a) of the contract, which pertains to the "Default" provisions. The Pattens never responded to either letter, and they also failed to respond to telephone calls made by Respondents or their agents regarding this matter. In view of the Pattens' lack of response or reaffirmance of their demand, and the fact that they had already closed on another property, Respondents logically and fairly assumed that the Pattens were in agreement with the disbursement procedures outlined in Coleen Armbruster's letter of August 21. Accordingly, on September 17, 1996, Edward Armbruster, who had not been involved in this transaction to date, in good faith signed two disbursement checks giving $697.50 to the seller and retaining the balance for his firm. This division was consistent with the terms of the contract. In making this disbursement, there was no intent on the part of Respondents to trick, deceive, breach their trust, or in any way unlawfully deprive the Pattens of their deposit. Respondents did not notify the Florida Real Estate Commission (Commission) that they had received conflicting demands for a deposit, nor institute any other procedures regarding the deposit, since they no longer had any good faith doubt as to whom was entitled to their trust funds. This was because the Pattens had failed to respond to letters and telephone calls regarding the sellers' claim to the deposit. There is no evidence that Respondents have ever been the subject of prior disciplinary action during their lengthy tenure as licensees. At the same time, it is noted that Respondents acted in good faith throughout the process and genuinely believed that there was no dispute. It should also be recognized that, for at least part of the time, the Pattens were working two contracts simultaneously without advising the realtors.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a Final Order finding Respondents guilty of a technical violation of Rule 61J2-10.032(1), Florida Administrative Code, and Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes, and that they be given a reprimand. All other charges should be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of July, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of July, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Henry M. Solares, Director Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Christine M. Ryall, Esquire 400 West Robinson Street Suite N-308 Orlando, Florida 32801-1772 Edward D. Armbruster Colleen M. Armbruster Post Office Box 635 DeFuniak Springs, Florida 32433 Lynda L. Goodgame, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792

Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57475.25 Florida Administrative Code (2) 61J2-10.03261J2-24.001
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FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION vs. HARRIET M. ARNDT, 88-001472 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-001472 Latest Update: Jul. 22, 1988

Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated to facts set forth in paragraphs 1-8, below. Stipulated Facts The Petitioner is the Division of Real Estate of the Department of Professional Regulation. As such, Petitioner acts as the licensing and regulatory agency for real estate broker licensees. The Respondent is Harriet M. Arndt, holder, at all times pertinent to these proceedings, of license number 0002216 issued by Petitioner. Her address of record is One South Ocean Boulevard, Suite 322, Boca Raton, Florida 33431. On January 28, 1987, Respondent received in trust an earnest money deposit in the amount of $39,000 from a buyer for a piece of property listed with another realtor, Merrill Lynch Realty, Inc. At closing of the sales transaction on February 25, 1987, Respondent delivered a check drawn on her trust account in the amount of $15,600 and made payable to Merrill Lynch Realty, Inc. This payment represented payment of one half of the $31,200 real estate brokerage commission. The check was subsequently returned to Merrill Lynch Realty, Inc. due to "non-sufficient funds." On March 27, 1987, Respondent delivered a cashier's check in the amount of $15,600 to Merrill Lynch Realty, Inc., to replace the February 25, 1987, check. The Respondent's real estate brokerage trust account was overdrawn from January 8, 1987 through March 4, 1987, by amounts ranging from $12,991.39 to $14,306.53 on various days during that period. The Respondent failed to maintain the $39,500 earnest money deposit in her trust account from February 2, 1987 until February 25, 1987, because the trust account's daily balance was less than that amount during that period. The Respondent subsequently failed to maintain the $15,660 due to Merrill Lynch Realty Inc., in the trust account from February 25, 1987, through March 25, 1987, because the trust account's daily balance was less than $15,600. From March 19, 1987, through October 29, 1987, Petitioner's investigator requested Respondent to produce for inspection and copying those books and papers relating to Respondent's trust account which are maintained in connection with Respondent's real estate activities. The Respondent failed to make the requested trust account books and records available at any time. Other Facts The Respondent offered mitigating testimony establishing that she was initially licensed in 1978 and has never been censured by Petitioner for any professional violations. She is 57 years of age and her real estate license is her sole source of support. Further, Respondent has borrowed money from her children to make up the deficit in her trust account. The testimony of Respondent also established that she was introduced to a gentleman named Robert H. Lajoie by another realtor in December of 1986. Subsequently, on or about December 8, 1986, Respondent entered into a nefarious arrangement with Lajoie. Under terms of the arrangement, Lajoie gave Respondent a check for $25,500 as a deposit to purchase a property listed with Respondent. In turn, Respondent gave Lajoie back a cash deposit of $10,000 from her trust fund in connection with a contract between the two of them whereby Respondent was to purchase a property of Lajoie's. The closing of the sale of Lajoie's property to Respondent would not take place until May, 1987. Lajoie returned to his native Canada shortly after receiving the $10,000 cash payment from Respondent and died. Shortly thereafter, payment on Lajoie's $25,500 check to Respondent was stopped. The Respondent is not sure whether this action was taken by Lajoie prior to his death or by his estate subsequent to that event. It is Respondent's contention that the loss of the $10,000 cash deposit to Lajoie resulted in a negative net balance in her trust account and eventually all of her financial difficulties in this case. The Respondent was sent an overdraft notice by her bank on January 8, 1987, stating that her trust account was overdrawn by $13,500 and that a check for $25,500 had been returned. Subsequent overdraft notices dated January 13, 1987 and January 21, 1987, were received by Respondent noting the rejection of two of Respondent's checks; one in the amount of $294.90 and the other in the amount of $34.35. The notice of January 13, 1987, indicated a hold on the account in the amount of $2,862.94 against the account's balance of $3,006.19. The January 21, 1987, notice continued this hold on the account's balance of $2,891.45. The Respondent related a series of personal matters at hearing that had prevented her from keeping appointments with Petitioner's investigators to inspect her records. She agreed to make access to those records immediately available.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding Respondent guilty of the offenses charged in the administrative complaint, imposing an administrative fine of $1,000 and suspending her license for a period of six months. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 22nd day of July, 1988, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of July, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-1472 The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings 1-2. Included in finding 1. 3-8. Included in findings 3-8 respectively. Respondent's Proposed Findings 1. Included in finding 2. 2-5. Included finding 10. Included in finding 3. Included in finding 4, 5, and 10. Included in finding 8 and 12. 9-10. Rejected. 11. Included in finding 9. COPIES FURNISHED: Steve W. Johnson, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Robert E. Gordon, Esquire 2601 Tenth Avenue North Suite 314 Lake Worth, Florida 33461-3197 William O'Neil, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Darlene F. Keller, Acting Director Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750

Florida Laws (2) 120.57475.25
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. ROBERT MARRIOTT, 82-003337 (1982)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 82-003337 Latest Update: Jul. 09, 1984

Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent Robert Marriott has been a licensed real estate broker/salesman under the laws of the State of Florida, trading as Marriott Realty. In February of 1980, in his capacity as a real estate broker/salesman, Respondent obtained an offer to purchase commercial property in Miami from Orlando Villacis, a resident of Ecuador, as purchaser, for a total purchase price of $500,000. In conjunction with the offer, Villacis paid a $20,000 earnest money deposit to be held by Marriott Realty in escrow under the terms of the offer. Villacis' deposit check in the amount of $20,000 was deposited into the Marriott Realty escrow account on February 22, 1980. By March 11, 1980, Villacis' $20,000 had been withdrawn, leaving an escrow account balance of $40. This fact was never reported to Villacis. Having heard nothing definite from Respondent with regard to the offer, and because he spent most of his time out of the country, Villacis engaged the services of attorney Rafael Penalver. Prior to July 1980, Penalver contacted the Respondent and inquired as to the status of the offer. Each time, Respondent told him that the seller was still considering the offer. In July of 1980, Respondent told Penalver that the $500,000 offer had been rejected by the seller and recommended that Villacis present an offer for $570,000. Penalver prepared the offer in the amount of $570,000, again calling for a $20,000 earnest money deposit, which Penalver and Villacis assumed was still in the Marriott Realty escrow account. Receiving no response from Respondent on the second offer, Penalver attempted to contact Respondent by telephone on numerous occasions. When Penalver was successful, Respondent told him that the seller was reviewing the offer. In early September 1980, Respondent advised Penalver that the $570,000 offer had been rejected by the seller. By letter dated September 11, 1980, Penalver raised the offer to $600,000, set a deadline of September 19 for the acceptance of the offer, and directed Respondent to return the $20,000 immediately should the offer not be accepted. After September 19, having heard nothing from the Respondent, Penalver called him, at which time Respondent advised that the offer was being considered by the seller. Penalver then wrote a letter dated October 7, 1980, to Respondent demanding that Respondent deposit the $20,000 into Villacis' account. Again hearing nothing from Respondent, Penalver on numerous occasions attempted to contact him by telephone in order to again demand the immediate return of the $20,000 deposit. Being unsuccessful, Penalver wrote the Respondent on November 20, 1980, and January 22, 1981, both times demanding the return of the $20,000 earnest money deposit. After the letter of January 22, 1981, Respondent agreed to meet with Penalver in Penalver's office. On February 2, 1981, the Respondent and his wife met with Penalver. During that meeting, Respondent advised Penalver that the $20,000 was no longer available and that he and his wife had used the money to make mortgage payments and cosmetic improvements on their personal residence. Respondent challenged Penalver to sue him to get the money back. After discussing Respondent's position with Villacis, Penalver filed a civil action for return of the $20,000. In his Answer to the Complaint filed in that litigation, Respondent admitted that he had used the $20,000 deposit for mortgage payments and other personal household expenses and for payment of his IRS tax deficiency. Villacis obtained a Final Judgment in the civil action in the amount of $20,000 plus interest and costs on October 6, 1982. Respondent testified that he did not return the $20,000 earnest money deposit because, in approximately October 1980, Villacis verbally agreed to loan the $20,000 to Respondent. Villacis strongly denied making any offer of a loan to Respondent. The purported loan agreement would have occurred after Penalver had twice written Respondent regarding immediate return of the $20,000 and seven months after the $20,000 had disappeared from the escrow account. Further, after Penalver sent his November demand letter, Respondent wrote Villacis in December of 1980 asking that Villacis consider loaning Respondent the $20,000 in exchange for an unrecorded mortgage on Respondent's personal residence. Clearly, Respondent's testimony is not credible. As of the date of the formal hearing in this cause, the Final Judgment in favor of Villacis and against Respondent remained unpaid and Respondent had still not returned to Villacis the $20,000 earnest money deposit.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent guilty of the allegations contained within the Administrative Complaint filed against him and revoking his license as a real estate broker/salesman. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 30th day of April, 1984, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of April, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Tina Hipple, Esquire Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 David I. Schlosberg, Esquire 525 North 27th Avenue, Suite 100 Miami, Florida 33125 Frederick Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Harold Huff, Executive Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801

Florida Laws (2) 120.57475.25
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DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs LEA MICHELE TAYLOR, 03-004097PL (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Nov. 05, 2003 Number: 03-004097PL Latest Update: Mar. 24, 2005

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent is guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme, or device, culpable negligence, or breach of trust in any business transaction, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Respondent was first licensed as a real estate salesperson in Florida in 1997. She has been licensed continuously since that time, although she did not reside or work in Florida for one year in 1998 and 1999. Her license has never been disciplined. Having entered into a contract to purchase, as her personal residence, a townhouse in Palm Beach Gardens for $85,000, Respondent contacted a licensed mortgage broker, Gary Carlson. Respondent and Mr. Carlson had previously worked together, in their respective professions, while employed by a large residential real estate business. Respondent asked Mr. Carlson to find her a mortgage lender, and Mr. Carlson agreed to do so. Mr. Carlson obtained a mortgage loan application from Respondent and submitted it to an institutional mortgage lender that Mr. Carlson represented. At all times in this transaction, Mr. Carlson served as the agent of the mortgage lender, not Respondent. After examining the application and related information on the proposed mortgage loan, the lender directed Mr. Carlson to obtain additional information, including an affidavit to the effect that Respondent had never been known as Lea Taylor Nola and that she had never been married. Respondent disclosed to Mr. Carlson that she had been known as Lea Taylor Nola and she had been married, although she was now divorced. Mr. Carlson assured her that the requirements were unimportant and advised her to sign statements that she did not know Lea Taylor Nola and that she had never been married. Respondent did so. Upon examination of the closing documents, including the unattested statements described in this paragraph, the lender funded the mortgage loan, and Respondent purchased the townhouse. The mortgage loan remains in good standing two years later.

Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of June, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of June, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Jauna Watkins, Acting Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Suite 802, North Orlando, Florida 32801 Leon Biegalski, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 James P. Harwood Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Suite 802, North Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Richard L. Robbins Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, LLP 999 Peachtree Street, Northeast Atlanta, Georgia 30309-3996

Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57475.25
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. EVON E. BREWTON, 80-000915 (1980)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 80-000915 Latest Update: Oct. 12, 1981

Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant facts are found. Respondent, Evon E. Brewton, is a licensed real estate broker/salesman whose license has been in an inactive (dormant) status for approximately one year. Respondent has been a resident of Bay County since approximately 1924. On March 29, 1978, Respondent assisted Mildred C. Webber, a real estate developer, in the search of property suitable for development purposes in Bay County, Florida. Such efforts led Respondent to seek out Walter 13. West, who had a parcel of property in Bay County that he desired a "quick sale". To accomplish such a sale, local T.V. advertisements were used. Respondent's efforts resulted in a contract between Mildred C. Webber and Walter B. West (Seller) for the purchase and sale of the West property for a purchase price of $115,500.00. Mr. West, the Seller, in unequivocal terms and conditions, made clear to Respondent that he was desirous of selling the property to the first purchaser who was able to tender an acceptable cash offer. Seller West also made clear to Respondent that all offers must contain a sizeable cash deposit to secure the property and which deposit he would consider forfeited provided the transaction failed to close. These conditions were made clear to Ms. Webber by Respondent and she agreed to place a $5,000.00 deposit in the form of a check which was turned over to the Seller. Mr. West accepted Ms. Webber's offer to purchase the property described as Parcel No. 1 for the price of $115,500.00. The $5,000.00 deposit check tendered by Ms. Webber was signed over to the Seller and was immediately negotiated by Mr. West. Also on March 29, 1978, Respondent secured a contract from Seller West for Ms. Webber to purchase a second parcel of property for which Ms. Webber placed a $500.00 earnest money deposit to secure the offer. Although Mr. West granted Ms. Webber two extensions of time to secure funds to finance the purchase of the two parcels of property, she was unable to secure financing to close the transaction. As a result, Seller West considered Ms. Webber's deposits to be forfeited and, accordingly, he retained the deposit monies. Real estate salesmen R. B. Ballard and J. K. Watts appeared and expressed their familiarity with the West/Webber real estate transactions. Witnesses Ballard and Watts corroborated the pertinent testimony of Respondent respecting the facts that prospective purchaser Webber understood Seller West's conditions and the resulting consequences should she be unable to secure financing to purchase the property. In this regard, testimony herein indicates that Ms. Webber, a knowledgeable real estate developers has not made any demands upon Mr. West to obtain a refund of the deposit monies, nor has any litigation been instituted by her to recover such deposit monies.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings or Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That the complaint allegations charging that Respondent violated Subsection 475.25(1)(a) and (i) Florida Statutes, be DISMISSED. RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of December, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Collins Building Room 101 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of December, 1980.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57475.25
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. C. H. CHAPMAN AND CHAPMAN REALTY CORPORATION, 80-001037 (1980)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 80-001037 Latest Update: Jun. 11, 1981

Findings Of Fact On May 18, 1978, the Respondents, C. H. Chapman and Chapman Realty Corporation (hereafter Respondents or Chapman) through a registered real estate salesman in the employ of the Respondents, negotiated and obtained a sales contract between Gerry and Ada Ball, as buyers or purchasers and Joseph Winston, as seller, for the sale of property located at 305 Ben Avon Drive, Tampa, Florida. Pursuant to the terms of the sales contract, the Respondents' salesman received a $1,000.00 deposit from the purchasers which was placed in the Respondents' trust account on May 5, 1978. Prior to the date of the scheduled closing, the purchasers inspected the property and requested the seller to make certain repairs and/or replacements to rectify defects which included wood borer damage, structural roof problems and an inoperable pool heater. The seller refused to make the repairs and/or replacements demanded and the offer was formally withdrawn by the purchasers on July 28, 1978, via letter to Chapman Realty requesting return of their $1,000.00 earnest money deposit. Prior to formal withdrawal of the offer, verbal demands were made by Mr. Hall upon Chapman Realty for the return of his deposit. The demand for repairs and/or replacements and withdrawal of the offer was predicated on a provision of the sales contract which provided: Buyers themselves, or at their expense may have property inspected to ensure that there are no structural, electrical or plumbing defects. If any are found, buyers have the right to withdraw their offer and have all of their earnest deposit refunded to them. Thereafter, Respondent Chapman disbursed the $1,000.00 as follows: $350.00 via check dated September 6, 1978, made payable to Robert A. Carbonell, an attorney-at-law in Florida. $500.00 via check dated January 9, 1979, made payable to purchasers Hall. $150.00 via check dated January 10, 1979, made payable to Robert A. Carbonell. Prior to any disbursal the Respondent Chapman discussed with Mr. Hall the possibility of placing the escrowed funds with the Clerk of the Circuit Court. Respondent Chapman contacted his attorney, Robert Carbonell, regarding the conflicting demands of the parties. Mr. Carbonell was introduced to Mr. Hall by the Respondent over the telephone. The Respondent met with Mr. Carbonell on a regular basis since Mr. Carbonell was employed by the Respondent to handle real estate transactions involving Chapman Realty. Respondent was never authorized by the purchasers to pay a fee to Mr. Carbonell directly from the $1,000.00 deposit held in trust. The $500.00 was paid directly by the Respondent to Attorney Carbonell from the Chapman Realty escrow account without oral or written authorization of the seller or the purchasers and in the absence of a settlement agreement between the Hall's and Mr. Winston. Although Mr. Carbonell and the Respondent Chapman believed that Mr. Carbonell was representing Mr. Hall, neither Mr. Hall nor the seller, Mr. Winston, were under the same impression. Both Mr. Hall and Mr. Winston believed that Mr. Carbonell was representing the Respondents rather than Mr. Hall. Such an impression was reasonable in light of Mr. Carbonell's regular employment by the Respondent, the absence of a written agreement between Mr. Hall and Mr. Carbonell coupled with the lack of discussion or agreement concerning fees and the potential conflicting positions which existed between the parties and the Respondents. If any fee were due to Attorney Carbonell for his efforts in securing the return of the $1,000.00 deposit, this was a matter between Mr. Carbonell and Mr. Hall. Neither Mr. Carbonell nor the Respondent Chapman discussed the amount of the fee with the Halls. Mr. Carbonell arrived at the amount he thought was reasonable, $500.00, and Respondent Chapman diverted such amount to Mr. Carbonell from the Respondent's escrow account.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Respondents', C. H. Chapman and Chapman Realty Corporation licenses to practice real estate be suspended until restitution is made to Gerry and Ada A. Hall, as follows: $500.00 plus interest at 12 percent accrued since July 28, 1978, and Interest on $500.00 accrued at 12 percent for the period from July 28, 1973 until January 9, 1979. Respondents' licenses to be reinstated upon submission and acceptance by the Board of Real Estate of satisfactory evidence of payment. DONE and ORDERED this 7th day of April, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. SHARYN L. SMITH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of April, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire Staff Attorney Department of Professional Regulation Staff Attorney 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Dale W. Vash, Esquire DIXON, LAWSON & BROWN 620 Twiggs Street Tampa, Florida 33602

Florida Laws (1) 475.25
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs MARTHA M. BUSTILLO AND VIRMAR INVESTMENTS, INC., 93-003328 (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Jun. 17, 1993 Number: 93-003328 Latest Update: May 23, 1994

Findings Of Fact Respondent Martha M. Bustillo is a real estate broker licensed in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0401092. At all times material hereto, she has been the qualifying broker for Respondent Virmar Investments, Inc. Respondent Virmar Investments, Inc., is a real estate brokerage corporation licensed in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0237551. At no time material hereto has Respondent Olga Venedicto been licensed in the State of Florida as either a real estate broker or as a real estate salesperson. In July of 1992 Thomas F. Sevilla contacted Virmar Investments, looking for a house to buy. Olga Venedicto took his phone call and told him that she would help him. Sevilla went to Venedicto's "office" at Virmar Investment and began working with her. Venedicto gave Sevilla her business card which represented that she is the vice president of Virmar Investments, Inc., and carries the notation "registered real estate brokers." In addition to giving him her card which carried her name, Virmar's name, and the word "brokers" in the plural form rather than the singular form, Venedicto specifically told Sevilla that she was a broker. Venedicto and Bustillo took Sevilla to see a house which he decided to buy. He gave Venedicto his check for $2,000 as a deposit and instructed her and Bustillo to make an offer on that house. Venedicto told him she would put the money in Virmar's escrow account. Instead, the money was deposited in Virmar's operating account. Sevilla did not buy that house, and Venedicto and Bustillo took him to see a second house. Sevilla decided not to make an offer on that house and asked Venedicto to refund his money. It took a month before Sevilla received a check from Venedicto. Although the check was marked "deposit return," the check was not written from Virmar's account but rather was a check from a Mega Group Corp. for only $1,675. When Sevilla attempted to cash that check, it was dishonored three times, with the notation "N. S. F." Finally, the check was honored by the bank. Sevilla had expected to receive his entire $2,000 deposit. Neither Venedicto nor Bustillo had ever told him in advance that they would keep part of his money. Although Respondents' attorney during the final hearing implied that his clients may have kept part of Sevilla's money to pay for a survey and credit report, Sevilla had not agreed in advance to pay for a credit report, and no evidence was offered as to what house Sevilla might have purchased a survey on or for what reason. Further, neither Venedicto nor Bustillo gave him a copy of any survey or credit report nor was he ever shown one or advised that either would be obtained. When Sevilla inquired as to why he was reimbursed the lesser amount, only then did Venedicto tell him that Respondents were keeping part of his money for a credit report. Respondents Bustillo and Virmar authorized and assisted Venedicto in her performance of acts and services requiring licensure as a salesperson relative to the transaction with Sevilla. Rita and Carlos Benitez listed their house for sale with Pedro Realty. Gladys Diaz was the listing agent at Pedro Realty. Respondents Bustillo and Venedicto brought Carlos Martinez and his wife to look at the Benitez house. Gladys Diaz was present at the time. Respondents Bustillo and Venedicto subsequently came to Diaz' office and presented to Diaz and Carlos Benitez an offer on behalf of Mr. and Mrs. Martinez. Respondent Venedicto represented herself to be a realtor and Respondent Bustillo to be Venedicto's partner and broker. Respondent Venedicto discussed the contract and price with Diaz and Benitez while Respondent Bustillo observed Venedicto's presentation. The offer had previously been signed on behalf of Respondent Virmar by Respondent Venedicto who represented to Diaz that the signature on the offer was that of Respondent Venedicto. Mr. Benitez signed the document, and Diaz then took the offer to Mrs. Benitez to obtain her signature. Mrs. Benitez also signed the offer, thereby completing the contract. Thereafter, delays ensued because Mr. and Mrs. Martinez were not in a financial position to be able to purchase the home. Respondent Venedicto contacted Mrs. Benitez and attempted to re-negotiate the contract. During those negotiations which were not successful, Respondent Venedicto represented herself to Mrs. Benitez as being a licensed real estate agent. In response to Mrs. Benitez' inquiries, Respondent Venedicto gave Benitez her business card carrying the names of Venedicto and Virmar and the notation "registered real estate brokers." As to the portion of the transaction involving Mrs. Benitez, all of her contact with the three Respondents in this cause was with Respondent Venedicto. Venedicto gave Benitez advice regarding proceeding with the sale and handled the negotiations. Prior to September 24, 1992, Hector F. Sehweret, an investigator for the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, requested that Respondents Bustillo and Virmar produce certain records for inspection by him. He spoke with Respondent Bustillo on a number of occasions to no avail. He offered to give her time to gather the records if necessary, but she never did. On September 24, 1992, he served Respondent Bustillo with a subpoena for those records. She still failed to produce them. Thereafter, she would not return his phone calls, and when he came to the office of Virmar Investments, Respondent Bustillo would hide from him. Neither Respondent Bustillo nor Respondent Virmar have ever produced the records subpoenaed. Further, no explanation has been given for the failure of Respondents Bustillo and Virmar to produce their records. Although the attorney for Respondents implied during the final hearing that the records may have been destroyed by Hurricane Andrew, there is no evidence to support that implication; rather, the evidence is uncontroverted that the building housing the real estate office of Respondents Virmar and Bustillo was not damaged by Hurricane Andrew. Ileana Hernandez is a realtor and a mortgage broker licensed in the State of Florida. She met Respondents Bustillo and Venedicto during a real estate transaction. In November of 1991 Respondents Bustillo and Venedicto contacted Hernandez regarding obtaining money in exchange for a second mortgage on certain real property. At the time, Respondents did not tell Hernandez the identity of the owner of the property, but Hernandez was given the address of the property and was advised that the market value of the property was approximately $79,000. Hernandez was subsequently advised that Respondent Venedicto (a/k/a Olga Bichara) was the owner of the property. It was agreed that Respondent Venedicto would execute and record the promissory note and mortgage in the amount of $15,500. Hernandez, who knew that Respondent Bustillo was the president of Terra Title, gave her a personal check payable to Terra Title in the amount of $15,000 on November 26, 1991. Respondent Venedicto, who had promised Hernandez that the promissory note and second mortgage would be recorded, never recorded those documents. Further, Respondents never delivered the original copy of the promissory note and mortgage to Hernandez despite her repeated demands. Hernandez later discovered that Respondent Venedicto was not the sole owner of the property which she had attempted to mortgage but jointly owned the property with her son. Accordingly, Respondent Venedicto's signature would not be sufficient to perfect a mortgage on the property. Hernandez also discovered that the mortgage, represented by Bustillo and Venedicto to be a second mortgage, was not. There were already two mortgages on the property. Had Hernandez known the true ownership and the true encumbrances on the property, she would not have loaned Venedicto the $15,000 because that raised the total amount of mortgages on the property to be in excess of the value of the property. Three checks which were subsequently written by Respondent Bustillo from the operating accounts of Respondent Virmar and of Mega Group Corp. were dishonored by the bank with the notation "N. S. F." As a result of those checks, Hernandez obtained default final judgments against Respondent Virmar and against Mega Group Corp., which final judgments are still unsatisfied. Prior to that time, however, Respondents Venedicto and Bustillo approached Hernandez regarding their need to borrow $35,000 to be re-paid in 30 days in conjunction with some real estate development in which Respondents Venedicto and Bustillo were involved. Respondent Venedicto and Respondent Bustillo each individually represented that Hernandez would have her money back in 30 days. Respondent Bustillo told Hernandez that Respondent Venedicto was in business with Bustillo and was selling real estate in Mexico. Bustillo asked Hernandez to make the check payable to Bustillo's company Terra Title. Hernandez went to the offices of Respondent Virmar and handed her personal check made payable to Terra Title to Respondent Venedicto. When the 30 days had passed with no payments to Hernandez, she went to Virmar Investments and made Respondent Venedicto sign a promissory note for $35,000. By the time of the final hearing in this cause, Hernandez had recovered only $15,000 of the $35,000 loan made to Respondent Venedicto and had recovered only the principal amount of the money supposed to have been secured by a second mortgage on real property. Hernandez is still owed $20,000 in principal alone.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered revoking the license of Respondent Martha M. Bustillo, revoking the license of Respondent Virmar Investments, Inc., and requiring Respondent Olga Venedicto to pay an administrative penalty in the amount of $5,000 within 30 days from the entry of the Final Order. DONE and ENTERED this 31st day of January, 1994, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of January, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NO. 93-3328, 93-3329, and 93-3330 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 2-18, 20-29, and 31-33 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 1 has been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting argument of counsel, conclusions of law, or recitation of the testimony. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 19 has been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the evidence in this cause. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 30 has been rejected as being unnecessary to the issues involved herein. Respondents' proposed findings of fact numbered 1, 4, 5, 8, 9, 18, 25, 26, 28, 37, 42, 49-52, 55, 57, 62, 63, 69, 71, and 73 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondents' proposed findings of fact numbered 2, 6, 11-17, 19-22, 30- 36, 43, 46-48, 53, 54, 56, 58, 60, 67 and 68 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting argument of counsel, conclusions of law, or recitation of the testimony. Respondents' proposed findings of fact numbered 7, 10, 23, 29, 61, 64, 65, 70, 72, and 75 have been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the evidence in this cause. Respondents' proposed findings of fact numbered 3, 24, 27, 38-41, 44, and 45 have been rejected as being unnecessary to the issues involved herein. Respondents' proposed findings of fact numbered 59, 66, 74, and 76-78 are rejected as being irrelevant to the issues under consideration in this cause. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven W. Johnson, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street, Suite N-308A Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Ofer M. Amir, Esquire Amir & Associates, P.A. 8751 West Broward Boulevard, Suite 500 Plantation, Florida 33324 Darlene F. Keller, Division Director Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Jack McRay, Acting General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792

Florida Laws (4) 120.57455.228475.25475.42 Florida Administrative Code (1) 61J2-24.001
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