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LEE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD vs MARIA BURNS, 12-003903TTS (2012)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Myers, Florida Dec. 05, 2012 Number: 12-003903TTS Latest Update: Jun. 04, 2013

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner, Lee County School Board (School Board or Petitioner), has just cause to dismiss Respondent, Maria Burns, from her employment as a school teacher for immorality and misconduct in office.

Findings Of Fact Respondent holds a Florida Educator Certificate and has been a teacher at Pine Island Elementary School in Lee County since August 27, 1990. Prior to that, she taught for four years in DeSoto County. The evidence was that she has been a good and effective teacher. On May 21, 2012, Respondent resided with a female housemate in a home Respondent owned in Charlotte County. The two women had a disagreement or altercation, and the housemate threatened Respondent, who left the premises to get help from the housemate's mother. When her mother arrived, the housemate became more violent and threatening. The Charlotte County Sheriff's Office (Sheriff's Office) was called and responded to the home. The housemate barricaded herself in the house, fired shots, and stood off law enforcement for several hours. When the stand-off ended, and before Respondent returned to the house, the Sheriff's Office arrested the housemate and executed a warrant to search the premises. During the search, law enforcement found 25 to 30 small suspected marijuana plants in five flower pots in open view on chairs on the second floor balcony of the house. The plants tested positive for cannabis. It appeared to law enforcement that the plants were being tended by someone and that leaves were being harvested from the plants. A cigar-type box was found on a kitchen counter amid debris from the stand-off, during which tear gas canisters were shot through the windows of the home. The box had a hinged lid and contained suspected marijuana residue and seeds and a glass smoking pipe (drug paraphernalia). Because Respondent was the owner and a resident in the house, she was arrested and charged with marijuana possession, marijuana cultivation, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Respondent entered into a pre-trial diversion agreement, which she completed by the time of the hearing in this case. On February 25, 2013, the charges against her were dropped by nolle prosequi. No other evidence was presented from which it could be inferred that Respondent knew the marijuana plants were in her house. When found, the plants were in an open and obvious location, but there was no evidence how long they had been there prior to their discovery by law enforcement. The cushions of the chairs they were on were not designed to be left outside in the elements. There was no evidence as to where the plants were kept when not on the chairs on the balcony. Even if the plants were seen by Respondent, there was no evidence that she knew they were marijuana plants. There was no evidence that Respondent tended to the plants, harvested leaves from them, or used the leaves in any way. There also was no evidence that the drug paraphernalia belonged to Respondent, or that she knew the drug paraphernalia was in the house. No inferences are drawn simply from Respondent's decisions, made on advice of counsel based on Fifth Amendment privilege, not to appear at the final hearing and not to address certain aspects or give her explanation of the incident during the pre-determination hearing. The local media reported Respondent's arrest. The reports gave Respondent's name, age, and Charlotte County address, and included a photograph, but did not identify her as a teacher. Pine Island is a small community, and everyone at Respondent's school and in the community probably knows about her arrest and prosecution. There was no other evidence as to any adverse effect that knowledge might have on Respondent's service to the community or effectiveness as a teacher. Lee County School Board Policy 5.02 requires the School Board to "establish high standards and expectations for its professional faculty and staff, including: (1) Compliance with applicable federal and State laws, rules, codes, regulations and policies concerning professional credentials and employment; (2) Dedication to high ethical standards; [and] (3) Establishment of high standards in educational practice." It also requires employees to meet the standards and expectations established by the School Board. Lee County School Board Policy 5.04 requires criminal background checks to determine suitability for employment and provides that failure to be truthful on an employment application about prior criminal history will be grounds for ineligibility or dismissal from employment. Id. § (1)(a). It also provides that the School Board will not hire a teacher: who is "on probation or has a pending case"; with "[o]ther offenses listed in §§ 435.04 and 1012.315, Florida Statutes" (which includes, under section 435.04(2)(rr), Florida Statutes, a chapter 893 felony drug prevention and control offense, such as cultivation of marijuana); or with a misdemeanor drug and/or drug paraphernalia offense less than five years old. Id. § (7)(a)-(c). Lee County School Board Policy 5.29(1) provides that "[a]ll employees are expected to exemplify conduct that is lawful and professional " Lee County School Board Policy 5.37(2)(a) "prohibits the use, distribution, manufacture, possession, sale, cultivation, or attempt to sell illegal controlled substances at any time whether on or off duty . . . ." Violation of the prohibition subjects an employee to "disciplinary action up to and including termination." This policy is set out in the School Board's Employee Handbook. There is a Collective Bargaining Agreement between the School Board and the Teachers Association of Lee County. It prohibits possession, consumption, or being under the influence of illegal drugs on the job or in the workplace. It does not negate Lee County School Board Policy 5.37(2)(a).

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the School Board enter a final order: finding no just cause for dismissal on charges of immorality or misconduct in office; and reinstating Respondent with back pay from February 26, 2013, forward. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of April, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of April, 2013.

Florida Laws (5) 1012.221012.3151012.33435.04435.06
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MIAMI-DADE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD vs JEFFREY ESKRIDGE, 10-009326TTS (2010)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Sep. 28, 2010 Number: 10-009326TTS Latest Update: Nov. 08, 2019

The Issue Whether Respondent committed the acts alleged in the Notice of Specific Charges and, if so, the discipline, if any, that should be imposed against Respondent’s employment.

Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner is the authorized entity charged with the responsibility to operate, control, and supervise the public schools within Miami-Dade County, Florida. Respondent was hired by Petitioner as a school security monitor in March of 1993. Although Respondent was initially assigned to Miami Northwestern High School, he was transferred to Norland High in April 1994, where he remained until the incident that is the subject of this proceeding. Respondent's employment is governed by the collective bargaining agreement between Petitioner and United Teachers of Dade ("UTD"). Pursuant to Article XXI, Section 3.D of the UTD contract, Respondent may only be discharged for "just cause," which includes, but is not limited to, "misconduct in office, incompetency, gross insubordination, willful neglect of duty, immorality, and/or conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude." The Allegations It is undisputed that during the 2009-2010 school year, an unknown number of students staged a series of unauthorized boxing matches1 at various locations on the grounds of Norland High. Of the multiple boxing incidents, this proceeding concerns only one: a match that took place in Norland High's wrestling room at some point between the beginning of the school year and February 2010. On that occasion, approximately 20 students gathered in the wrestling room (a location where the students were not authorized to be) during the second lunch period to view a match between D.L. and another student. Respondent, who was present2 during the entire incident, neither orally directed the students to stop fighting, nor did he physically intervene.3 A videotape of the incident, which was introduced into evidence during the final hearing, depicts the following: 00:07 - D.L. and unidentified student, both of whom are wearing boxing gloves, begin fighting. 00:19 - Several student "referees" separate D.L. and other participant. 00:30 - Respondent, wearing green golf- style shirt (the standard uniform for security monitors), standing in corner of room. 01:07 - Fighting resumes. 01:35 - D.L. and other participant broken up by students; match concludes. 02:00 - Respondent standing near unidentified student participant. 02:25 - Students begin to leave. 02:32 - Video ends. As the forgoing timeline indicates, D.L. and the unidentified student boxed for a total of 40 seconds. Although both students threw a number of punches during that span, most of the blows were wild and either missed or did not land cleanly. Nevertheless, the undersigned finds that the episode presented a condition that was potentially harmful to the physical health or safety of D.L. and the other student participant. Although the boxing incident detailed above is one that should have been reported, at no time did Respondent notify any member of Norland High's administration of what occurred. Respondent's explanation, which the undersigned credits with some reluctance, is that he unsuccessfully attempted to contact school administration upon discovering the incident, only to be informed by a front office worker that the administrators were in a meeting. After the students dispersed, Respondent went to lunch and forgot to follow up on the matter.4 Eventually, one of Norland High's assistant principals, Peter Melton, learned of the incident after a student told him to search YouTube for "Norland fights." Mr. Melton promptly notified the principal of Norland High, and an investigation ensued on or around February 2010. During the initial stages of the investigation, Petitioner suspected that Respondent had organized multiple boxing matches between students on Norland High's campus, charged admission, and awarded prizes to the winners.5 Ultimately, however, Petitioner determined that no probable cause existed to support such allegations, and instead charged Respondent with failing to intervene in the match involving D.L. and with not informing school administration of the incident. Although Norland High's administration faced some level of parental backlash as a result of the boxing incidents, Petitioner did not demonstrate that the backlash was attendant to the charges ultimately filed against Respondent, as opposed to the initial, more serious allegations that Petitioner could not substantiate. Petitioner failed to establish by a greater weight of the evidence that Respondent's effectiveness as a school security monitor has been impaired as a result of his conduct.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Miami-Dade County School Board enter a final order: (1) finding that just cause does not exist to terminate Respondent's employment; and (2) imposing an appropriate punishment other than dismissal based upon Respondent's failure to make reasonable effort to protect students from conditions harmful to their physical health or safety. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of April, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S EDWARD T. BAUER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of April, 2011.

Florida Laws (3) 1012.40120.569120.57
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SCHOOL BOARD OF INDIAN RIVER COUNTY vs ALVA GREEN, 93-000327 (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Vero Beach, Florida Jan. 19, 1993 Number: 93-000327 Latest Update: Oct. 31, 1994

The Issue The central issue in this case is whether or not Respondent should be suspended retroactively without pay from his non-instructional position and terminated from his employment as a custodian.

Findings Of Fact At all times material to the allegations of this case, Respondent was employed as a custodian at VBHS. At the beginning of the 1992-93 school year, Anthony Dissis, a deputy employed by the Indian River County Sheriff's Department, was assigned to be an undercover officer at VBHS. Deputy Dissis enrolled at the school, attended classes with other students, and in all respects attempted to give the appearance of being a student at the school. To that end, he met and talked with other students. During the course of his school experience, Deputy Dissis met Respondent who was known on the campus and who was frequently in student areas. In late October, 1992, Deputy Dissis approached Respondent and sought to purchase marijuana. Despite some initial delays, Deputy Dissis and Respondent came to an understanding whereby the officer gave $50.00 to the Respondent for marijuana. Later, Respondent told Deputy Dissis to meet him at a parking lot on campus and the delivery would take place. At the appointed time, Deputy Dissis went to the parking lot and Respondent handed him an envelope in which the contents were later tested and confirmed to be marijuana. Such testing was performed by Bob Parsons, an analyst with the regional crime laboratory. Marijuana is a controlled substance as defined by Florida law. Subsequently, the Respondent was suspended from his employment. When tried on the criminal charges which arose from the same incident complained of herein, Respondent was found not guilty by a jury.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That Indian River County School Board enter a final order confirming the suspension without pay of the Respondent, and terminating his employment as a school custodian. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 30th day of July, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of July, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-0327 Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner: Paragraph 1 is accepted; however Respondent's age and place of birth are irrelevant to these proceedings. Paragraph 2 is rejected as irrelevant to the allegations of this case. With the deletion of the third sentence which is rejected as irrelevant, paragraph 3 is accepted. With regard to paragraph 4, it is accepted that Dissis paid Respondent $50.00 for marijuana on school grounds and near the gym class; it is not established that other students viewed the transaction as suggested by the paragraph and such finding is rejected as not supported by the evidence presented. With regard to paragraph 5, it is accepted that Dissis and Respondent worked out the details of the marijuana delivery while Respondent was working, on school property, and near the gym. It is further accepted that the delivery was to take place later in the day at a location on campus; otherwise, the paragraph is rejected as not supported by the evidence presented or irrelevant. See comment to paragraph 4 above. Paragraphs 6 through 11 are accepted. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent: Paragraph 6 (Respondent's paragraphs 1 through 5 were preliminary, not proposed findings of fact) is accepted. Paragraphs 7 and 8 are accepted. Paragraph 9 is rejected as argument, or not supported by the weight of credible evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: G. Russell Petersen G. RUSSELL PETERSEN, P.A. 3426 Ocean Drive Vero Beach, Florida 32963 Thomas E. Shafovaloff 411 North Park Avenue Suites 12-14 Winter Park, Florida 32789

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SCHOOL BOARD OF DADE COUNTY vs. DARRELL T. COX, 77-001048 (1977)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 77-001048 Latest Update: Jan. 10, 1978

Findings Of Fact Prior to May 18, 1977, the Respondent was employed by the School Board as a driver education teacher and head football coach at Miami South Ridge High School. At approximately 3:00 A.M. on May 15, 1977, the Respondent left his home in Miami, Florida, and drove to the back of a business located at 7211 S. W. 40th Street in Miami, Florida. John F. Allen operates a boat, motor, and trailer sales, service, and repair business at that location. In the back of the building there is a work area that is surrounded by a chain link fence. Customers' boats and motors are stored in this area while work is done on them in the shop. The Respondent walked down an alleyway along the fenced area, and climbed over the fence. He removed an outboard motor from a boat, and pulled it away from the boat toward the fence. The Respondent did not work in the boat yard, and he was not authorized to be there after regular business hours. There was no direct evidence as to the Respondent's intentions. The circumstance of his being in the fenced in portion of the boat yard at between 3:00 A.M. and 4:00 A.M. and the circumstance of his removing an outboard motor from a boat, and carrying it toward the fence, lead inescapably to the conclusion that the Respondent was seeking to steal the engine. The Respondent did not remove the engine from the boat yard. For unknown reasons, he abandoned his effort to steal the engine and left the boat yard. The Respondent was not armed with any weapon, and no other person was in the boat yard while he was there. The outboard engine which the Respondent was attempting to steal was a 40 horsepower Johnson outboard engine. The weight of the engine is approximately 140 pounds. The engine has a wholesale value of approximately $250. Even if the engine were in the worst possible operating condition, it would still be worth approximately $150. While the Respondent was in the boat yard, two police officers employed by the Dade County Public Safety Department were undertaking a routine patrol of the area in an unmarked car. They observed the Respondent's automobile parked adjacent to the boat yard. One of the officers walked along the chain link fence in back of the boat yard and observed the Respondent inside the yard holding an engine. There was heavy vegetation along the fence, but the police officer was able to see through it at one point. The officer went back to his car, and told his partner what he had witnessed. Shortly thereafter the Respondent came out of the alley, got into his car, and drove away. The police officers turned on a flashing light in their car, pulled up behind the Respondent's car, and stopped him. The Respondent was placed under arrest. The police officer read the Respondent his rights from a "Miranda card". During interrogation after the arrest the Respondent pointed out the motor that he had removed from the boat, and told the officers were he had gotten it. The Respondent was then taken to a police station where he was fingerprinted, and later released on bail. A criminal action is now pending against the Respondent in the courts in Dade County. Tools of a sort which could have been used in perpetration of a burglary were found in the Respondent's pockets and on the floor of the Respondent's automobile by the police after they stopped him. There was no evidence presented that these tools were used by the Respondent in breaking into the boat yard or in removing the outboard engine from the boat. There was no evidence that the Respondent intended to use the tools for these purposes. There was evidence presented that the tools were put in the automobile by a friend of the Respondent's wife. There is insufficient evidence from which it could be concluded that the Respondent intended to use the tools to commit any trespass or burglary. The School Board acted promptly to suspend the Respondent from his position at South Ridge High School. The instant proceeding ensued.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57810.02810.06
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JOHN WINN, AS COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION vs TROY BOWE, 05-000769PL (2005)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Key West, Florida Mar. 02, 2005 Number: 05-000769PL Latest Update: Jun. 30, 2024
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PINELLAS COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD vs QUAN R. BROWN, 11-003380TTS (2011)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Largo, Florida Jul. 11, 2011 Number: 11-003380TTS Latest Update: Jan. 12, 2012

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner has just cause to terminate Respondent's employment.

Findings Of Fact Mr. Brown has been employed by the School Board since September 5, 2000, working in various maintenance positions. In 2004, he took the position of "night lead" at Fairmont Park Elementary School, in which he was responsible for supervising the night cleaning and maintenance crew at the school. On February 8, 2010, Mr. Brown was arrested by an officer with the St. Petersburg Police Department and charged with two felony counts, one for sale of cocaine and one for possession of cocaine. The same charges were set forth in a Felony Information filed by the state attorney for Pinellas County on March 17, 2010. Mr. Brown self-reported the arrest and charges to the OPS. Based on that information, he was transferred from his position at an elementary school setting to a similar position at a non-student site that was a warehouse, while the charges worked their way through the criminal justice system. However, after Respondent was called to a meeting at OPS and he refused to answer any questions regarding the investigation, the decision was made to proceed with disciplinary action, even though the criminal case was still pending. The superintendent issued a letter on October 19, 2010, notifying Respondent of the decision to recommend termination of his employment at the November 9, 2010, School Board meeting, unless Respondent requested an administrative hearing, in which case the recommendation would be to suspend Respondent without pay pending the conclusion of the administrative hearing process. As stated in the agenda item attached to the letter, which served as the administrative complaint, the basis for the recommended action was that Mr. Brown had been arrested and charged with sale of cocaine and possession of cocaine, both felonies. The OPS obtained copies of the police reports describing the circumstances of the arrest and made the determination that Mr. Brown violated the following provisions of School Board Policy 4140 (Policy 4140): A.2.a. (illegal possession or use of drugs, or being under the influence of illegal drugs, while on or off duty); A.2.b. (illegal sale of drugs whether on or off duty); A.2.c. (possession, use, or being under the influence of illegal drugs while off duty); A.3. (committing or conviction of a criminal act--felony); A.21 (conduct unbecoming a board employee that brings the district into disrepute or that disrupts the orderly process of the district); and A.22. (misconduct or misconduct in office). On November 9, 2010, the School Board adopted the superintendent's recommendation. Because of Mr. Brown's request for an administrative hearing, he was suspended without pay pending the outcome of this hearing process. The circumstances leading to Mr. Brown's arrest, as described in police reports considered by OPS in its investigation, were described, in large part, at the final hearing by Officer Doug Dilla. Officer Dilla is currently employed in the uniform service division of the St. Petersburg Police Department. However, from early 2008 until recently in 2011, he was in the narcotics and vice division. At some point in 2008, he began working as an undercover agent. He obtained information from a confidential informant, whom he believed to be reliable, that the confidential informant had purchased narcotics from Respondent. The confidential informant gave Officer Dilla Respondent's name and address. Officer Dilla conducted surveillance at Respondent's address, where he recorded the license tag numbers from cars parked there. His trace of those tag numbers identified members of Respondent's family, including a silver Nissan Altima registered in Respondent's mother's name. Officer Dilla also was able to retrieve a photograph of Respondent through drivers' license records and had the confidential informant positively identify Respondent as the person from whom he had purchased narcotics, whom he knew as "Quan." On August 4, 2008, Officer Dilla arranged for the confidential informant to join him and, while they were together, to contact Respondent and try to arrange a purchase of powder cocaine from Mr. Brown. Officer Dilla picked up the confidential informant and they parked at a gas station, where the confidential informant called Mr. Brown on his cell phone number. The cell phone number called by the confidential informant is admittedly Mr. Brown's; the number, in the police report prepared by Officer Dilla, is the same as Mr. Brown's phone number on file with the School Board. In the phone conversation, the confidential informant told the person on the line that he wanted two "sacks" or two "50s," to indicate two small bags of powder cocaine and to meet him and the person with him, who wanted to make the purchase, at a Hess station located a few blocks from where Mr. Brown lived. Within 20 minutes of that phone call, the silver Nissan Altima registered to Respondent's mother pulled into the station and parked over by the car vacuum machine. Officer Dilla and the confidential informant got out of the car and approached Respondent in the Nissan Altima. Respondent got out of his car and walked around to the passenger door, and Officer Dilla met Respondent by the passenger door. Respondent gestured to the front passenger seat and said, "go ahead and take it." There were two small zip-lock baggies of white powder which Officer Dilla believed to be powder cocaine. He reached in and got the two baggies and gave Respondent $100. Respondent got back in his car and drove away. Officer Dilla put the baggies in his pocket, then drove away with the confidential informant, dropped him off, and then proceeded back to the police department. Back at the police department, Officer Dilla performed a field test on the powder in the baggies. He identified the field test as the Scott Reagent Modified System Test Kit "G," and he described how the test was performed. The results were "presumptively positive" for powder cocaine. After conducting the field test, Officer Dilla weighed the baggies, deposited them in a heat-sealed evidence bag, and secured them in a locked evidence locker. According to Officer Dilla, the material was then sent off to a lab for further confirmatory testing. However, Officer Dilla did not testify that he personally removed the material from the evidence locker and delivered it to the lab. According to Officer Dilla's police report, after he deposited the evidence in an evidence locker, he took no further action. While a better predicate could have been laid for the extent of Officer Dilla's experience or training in administering field tests generally and the specific field test he used, there was no objection to Officer Dilla's testimony regarding the field test results, which he described with confidence and without hesitancy. Respondent denied many of the details to which Officer Dilla testified, but there were some details he could not deny. Respondent acknowledged that it was his cell phone number that was written in the police report, which was prepared by Officer Dilla two days after the purchase. Respondent testified that many people know his phone number and perhaps someone who had been "busted" by Officer Dilla gave the officer his phone number for some reason. Respondent then testified that it must have come from the confidential informant, but Respondent could not explain why the confidential informant would have given the officer Respondent's phone number. Respondent also admitted that he drove his mother's silver Nissan Altima. He claimed that the officer must have gotten the tag number and the car description because he goes to that Hess station "every day" and that he was probably there on the day in question to buy gas. Respondent, therefore, admitted two key components of Officer Dilla's testimony and police report: that the telephone number that Officer Dilla said was called by the confidential informant to arrange a drug purchase was Respondent's phone number; and that Respondent did drive the silver Nissan Altima to the Hess station on the day in question. Having admitted that much, Respondent failed to explain the rest of Officer Dilla's testimony. Respondent said that Officer Dilla made up the story, that it was a case of mistaken identity. Yet neither the phone number, nor the vehicle's presence was a case of mistaken identity. It would be necessary to conclude that Officer Dilla intentionally fabricated every detail, except for the phone number and the vehicle in order to falsely accuse Respondent of selling him cocaine. Respondent offered no reason, much less a credible reason, why Officer Dilla would fabricate the details of his report. The greater weight of the credible evidence does not support a finding of any fabrication. The undersigned accepts Officer Dilla's more credible version of the events of August 4, 2008. Respondent came quickly to the Hess station after receiving a telephone call from someone saying that he had someone who wanted to buy two "50s"--two baggies of powder cocaine. Respondent complied by selling two baggies of white powder for $50 each, for a total of $100. Based on the totality of the evidence, including Officer Dilla's clear, credible testimony regarding the details of the arrangements made for him to purchase cocaine from Respondent, his actual purchase of white powder from Respondent for $100 and the results of the field test that were presumptively positive for powder cocaine, the undersigned finds that it is more likely than not that the white powder that Respondent sold to Officer Dilla was, in fact, powder cocaine. The School Board sought to buttress its evidence regarding the substance that was sold to Officer Dilla by attempting to establish that the same two baggies of powder were later tested by the Pinellas County Forensic Laboratory and that the results confirmed that the substance was, in fact, cocaine. However, no chain of custody evidence was offered to establish that the substance tested by the lab was, in fact, the two baggies of white powder purchased from Respondent and secured by Officer Dilla in a locker after he completed his field test. The lab analysis evidence was even more attenuated from Officer Dilla's purchase because what purported to be the substance purchased from Respondent was tested once in 2008 at the lab, and then retested in 2010; however, only the 2010 reanalysis and results were sufficiently supported by testimony of the lab director who conducted reanalysis and prepared the lab report and back-up work papers admitted in evidence. The original 2008 test was done by a lab technician who moved out of state, and there was no witness who could testify from personal knowledge of what tests were done or how the report was prepared in 2008. Accordingly, as explained in Endnote 2, the 2008 lab report was not admitted in evidence. No chain of custody evidence was offered to trace the apparent movement of the two baggies of powder purchased by Officer Dilla from the evidence locker to the lab in 2008, from the lab in 2008 to one or more unidentified holding places for a two-year period, then back to lab in 2010 for reanalysis. The evidence established that the substance in two baggies delivered to the lab in 2010 for testing did, in fact, test conclusively positive for cocaine. The credentials and expertise of the lab director and the reliability of her methodologies used to test the substance three different ways, each test corroborating the other tests and increasing the reliability of the outcome, were established and accepted. However, the School Board failed to prove that the two baggies of powder tested in 2010 were, in fact, the same two baggies of powder that Officer Dilla purchased from Respondent two years earlier and locked in a locker after conducting the field test. Therefore, the undersigned cannot make a finding that the white powder purchased from Respondent was conclusively cocaine, beyond any reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of any other substance. However, the totality of the credible evidence meets a lower threshold of proof, establishing as explained above, that the white powder obtained from Respondent was more likely than not cocaine. Officer Dilla credibly explained the lapse in time between his purchase of cocaine from Respondent and Respondent's arrest. After making the purchase, Officer Dilla's intent was to try to make additional purchases to increase the total weight of the drugs purchased so as to reach a quantity that would constitute the more serious offense of trafficking. However, he was called off of that matter to work on a larger-scale investigation. Therefore, he prepared a probable cause packet on the case so that the results of his investigation could be utilized, alone or in conjunction with additional information, to bring charges against Respondent, because Officer Dilla believed that there was sufficient evidence to arrest Respondent and charge him. Respondent's criminal case was set for trial several different times with witnesses subpoenaed by the state, but Respondent's attorney successfully moved for continuances four times. In May 2011, the matter was finally resolved without a trial, by a plea agreement whereby Respondent pled guilty to two counts of possessing drugs without a prescription, second-degree misdemeanors, in exchange for the prosecution amending the information to drop the original charges of possession and sale of cocaine, both felonies, and change the charges to two misdemeanor counts of possessing drugs without a prescription. Respondent's employment record was summarized in the evidence. Apparently, up until 2008, his record with the School Board was unblemished. On March 5, 2008, Respondent received a "needs improvement" evaluation based on attendance. Respondent received another "needs improvement" evaluation the next year, this time based on quality of work. Also during this same timeframe, on November 14, 2008, Respondent received a reprimand from the principal of the elementary school for "misconduct in office." No details of this disciplinary incident were provided, but Respondent did not dispute that he had received the reprimand for misconduct in office that is noted in evidence in the summary of his employment record.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby: RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Pinellas County School Board, enter a final order terminating the employment of Respondent, Quan R. Brown. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of November, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELIZABETH W. MCARTHUR Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of November, 2011.

Florida Laws (7) 1001.321012.221012.271012.331012.40120.57120.65
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GERARD ROBINSON, AS COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION vs ADAM BENJAMIN BRINSON, 12-003855PL (2012)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lauderdale Lakes, Florida Nov. 27, 2012 Number: 12-003855PL Latest Update: Jun. 30, 2024
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JOHN L. WINN, AS COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION vs JODI SINGER, 05-002335PL (2005)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Jun. 29, 2005 Number: 05-002335PL Latest Update: Jun. 30, 2024
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JIM HORNE, AS COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION vs ELLIS SCOTT WILLIAMS, 04-003561PL (2004)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Defuniak Springs, Florida Sep. 29, 2004 Number: 04-003561PL Latest Update: Jun. 30, 2024
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CHESTER K. LEWIS vs. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, EDUCATION PRACTICES COMMISSION, 87-000506 (1987)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 87-000506 Latest Update: Jul. 08, 1987

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Chester K. Lewis (Lewis), applied to the Respondent, Department of Education (Department), for a Florida teacher's certificate. By letter of January 15, 1987, the Department advised Lewis that his application had been denied, and Lewis filed a timely request for formal hearing. Pertinent to this case, the application for teacher's certificate posed the following questions, and Lewis gave the following answers: - FULL TIME TEACHING EXPERIENCE Grades taught or No months Type School State District School if departmental- taught in Certi- Year (County) ized subjects school ficate taught term Held * * 1982 to Florida Dade Edison 1983 Park Elem. 9 1983 to Florida Dade Edison 1984 Park 9 1984 to Florida Dade Edison 1985 Park 9 1985 to Florida Dade Edison Varied 1986 Park Elem. 9 PLEASE CHECK ONE YES X NO Have you ever been convicted or had adjudication withheld in a criminal offense other than a minor traffic violation or are there any criminal charges now pending against you other than minor traffic violations? If yes, you must give complete details for each charge. Please attach a separate sheet if additional space is needed. Where Arrested Dates Nature of Charge(s) Disposition(s) Trespassing Resist- Nolo Contendere Dade County 5/6/82 ing Arrest 9 mos served 1/19/83 NOTARIZATION I hereby certify that I subscribe to and will uphold the principles incorporated in the Constitutions of the United States of America and the State of Florida. I understand that Florida Statutes provide for revocation of a teacher's certificate if evidence and proof is established that the certificate has been obtained by fraudulent means. I further certify that all information pertaining to this application is true, correct and complete. /s/ Chester K. Lewis Signature of Applicant Sworn to and subscribed before me this 3rd day of June , 1986. My Commission Expires Seal and Signature of Notary Public Contrary to the sworn representations in part IV of the application, that he had been employed full time by the Dade County School Board for the school years 1982-83 through 1985-86, the proof established that Lewis was employed by the Dade County School Board as follows: For the 1982-83 school year Lewis was employed as a per diem (daily) substitute teacher, and worked only 29 days between March 1983 and June 1983. For the 1983-84 school year Lewis was employed as a daily substitute teacher, and worked at 5 different schools between November 1983 and June 1984 for a total of only 5 1/2 days. For the 1984-85 school year Lewis was employed as a daily substitute teacher, and worked at 5 different Schools between October 1984 and June 1985 for a total of only 15 days. For the 1985-86 school year Lewis was employed as a daily substitute teacher, and worked only 1 day during that school year. With respect to Lewis' response to part V of the application, the proof established that by Information filed May 27, 1982, in the Circuit Court of Dade County, Florida, Case No. 82-11708, he was charged with aggravated assault (Section 784.021(1)(a), Florida Statutes), battery upon a law enforcement officer (Sections 784.03 and 784.07, Florida Statutes), and resisting an officer with violence to his person (Section 843.01, Florida Statutes). On January 19, 1983, Lewis entered a plea of nolo contendere, and the court sentenced him to a term of imprisonment of nine months. Regarding the substance of the charges, the proof established that on May 6, 1982, at or about 11:00 p.m., in Dade County, Florida, Lewis did commit the crimes of aggravated assault (Section 784.O2l(1)(a), Florida Statutes), battery upon a law enforcement officer (Sections 784.03 and 784.07, Florida Statutes), and resisting an officer with violence to his person (Section 843.01, Florida Statutes). At the aforesaid time and date, a uniformed Florida Highway Patrol Officer (trooper) responded to a request for assistance at the home of a female complainant (complainant) who professed a fear that Lewis would harm her. While at the complainant's residence, the trooper took a telephone call from Lewis, identified himself as a trooper with the Florida Highway Patrol, and asked Lewis what the problem was. Lewis replied: I don't care who the fuck you are. If I get over there in 15 minutes and you're there I'm going to kill you. Approximately 15 minutes later, Lewis drove up to the residence. The trooper then told Lewis: Look, we don't need a problem Just leave. She doesn't want to be bothered with you. Just leave so we don't have a problem with you. Lewis responded, "Fuck you", sped down the street, and turned the car to face the trooper. Lewis then sped his car at the trooper, who barely avoided injury by jumping out of the way of Lewis' vehicle. Lewis then drove his car into an alley, and as the trooper approached from the rear Lewis attempted to back his car over the trooper. Again the trooper barely avoided injury. Subsequently, Lewis jumped from the car, and ran toward the complainant's residence. At that time the trooper removed the keys from the ignition of Lewis' car, and pursued Lewis. Fortunately, a backup unit from the Metro-Dade Police Department arrived and Lewis fled to his car and tried to lock himself inside. The trooper, noting that the front passenger door was open, entered the vehicle to arrest Lewis. During the course of the trooper's efforts to arrest him, Lewis repeatedly punched and kicked the trooper. Lewis' conduct demonstrated gross immorality or an act involving moral turpitude. His conduct was inconsistent with the standards of public conscience, and was sufficiently notorious to bring himself and his profession into public disgrace or disrespect. Due to such notoriety, Lewis' service in the community, as well as his effectiveness in the school system, has been severely impaired.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the application of Petitioner, Chester K. Lewis, for a Florida teacher's certificate be DENIED. DONE AND ORDERED this 8th day of July, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of July, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: J. David Holder, Esquire Post Office Box 1694 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Mr. Chester K. Lewis 1028 N.W. Third Avenue, #1 Miami, Florida 33136 Marlene T. Greenfield, Administrator Professional Practices Services 319 West Madison Street, Room 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Karen Barr Wilde, Executive Director Education Practices Commission 125 Knott Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Honorable Betty Castor Commissioner of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Sydney McKenzie, General Counsel Department of Education Knott Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399

Florida Laws (4) 784.021784.03784.07843.01
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