The Issue Whether Respondent violated Sections 326.006(2)(e)1, 3, and 6 and 326.005, Florida Statutes, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this action, Respondent, Richard Spooner (Spooner), was licensed by the Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes (Department), as a yacht salesperson. In June 1998, Spooner worked for C & S Marine, Inc., (C & S), located in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Chris Saumsiegle, the owner of C & S, was Spooner's employing broker. In June 1998, Chris Saumsiegle was working with Angelo Dieguez, a client from South Carolina, to locate a yacht for Mr. Dieguez to purchase. Mr. Saumsiegle negotiated the purchase of a yacht for Mr. Dieguez; however, the deal was not consummated. After Mr. Saumsiegle's attempt to negotiate the purchase of the yacht for Mr. Dieguez failed, Mr. Saumsiegle put Spooner, as a salesperson for C & S, in touch with Mr. Dieguez to find him a yacht to purchase. Spooner and Mr. Dieguez discussed the purchase of a 1995, 33-foot Sea Ray yacht, and Mr. Dieguez became interested in buying the vessel. Mr. Dieguez was advised by Spooner that he was working at home while his wife recovered from surgery. Spooner drafted a Purchase Agreement, which was a C & S form agreement containing the title "C & S Marine Brokerage Purchase Agreement." Spooner crossed out the telephone and fax numbers for C & S on the form, wrote in his home fax number, and faxed the document to Mr. Dieguez for execution. The purchaser agreement contained the following paragraph: The purchase price of the Vessel is Eighty- Seven Thousand Dollars ($87,000.--) Upon signing this agreement by the PURCHASER, a deposit of Eight Thousand Seven Hundred Dollars ($8,700.--) shall be paid by the PURCHASER to (hereinafter called the BROKER) and shall be held in Escrow by the BROKER. This offer is withdrawn if not accepted by June 12, 1998. Mr. Dieguez executed the purchase agreement and returned it to Spooner by fax for Spooner to make an $87,000 offer on the yacht. The terms of the purchase agreement required Mr. Dieguez to send ten percent of the purchase price as earnest money. Pursuant to the purchase agreement, the seller had only one day to respond to the offer after Mr. Dieguez faxed the purchase agreement to Spooner. Thus, Mr. Dieguez asked Spooner where to electronic funds transfer (EFT) his earnest money. Spooner faxed Mr. Dieguez instructions to make his check out to the Boating Center of Fort Lauderdale (Boating Center), the seller's agent or the seller, and to send the funds to Boating Center. In Mr. Dieguez' previous attempt to purchase a yacht through C & S, he had been given instructions to send his deposit by EFT to C & S's escrow account. Mr. Dieguez contacted Mr. Saumsiegle and asked why he was supposed to send a check to Boating Center. Mr. Saumsiegle was unaware that Spooner was trying to sell Mr. Dieguez a boat through Boating Center and that he had directed Mr. Diequez to send a check to Boating Center. Ultimately, Mr. Dieguez did not send a deposit and did not purchase the yacht. Mr. Saumsiegle terminated Spooner's relationship with C & S Marine in July 1998. Boating Center is not a licensed yacht brokerage.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Richard Spooner violated Subsections 326.006(2)(e)1, 3, and 6, Florida Statutes; suspending his salesperson's license for two years; and imposing an administrative fine of $5,000. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of December, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of December, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Philip Nowick, Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Barbara D. Auger, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 William Oglo, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Richard J. Zaden, Esquire Zaden & Wardell, P.A. 1749 Northeast 26th Street, Suite 200 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33305
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether Respondent is guilty of the violation alleged in the Administrative Complaint; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony of the witnesses and the documentary evidence received at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact: At all times material to the allegations, Respondent was a licensed pilot in the State of Florida having been issued License No. 0000025. On January 15, 1986, Respondent boarded the ship Act 5 as her state pilot for approaching an intended berth at Port Everglades. The Act 5 was over 700 feet long, had a single handed screw, a single rudder and was equipped with bow thrusters. The ship drew 34 feet at her stern on the date in question. The ship had a bulbous bow which protruded outwardly under the forward waterline. A tugboat, the Captain Nelson, captained by John A. Cummings was beside the Act 5 to assist in the berthing maneuver. The approach to Port Everglades is negotiated through a narrow canal. Vessels seeking berth proceed through the canal, past a jetties area, and into a turning basin. Once inside the basin a turn is required in order to bring a ship parallel to the intended berth. On January 15, 1986, the Act 5 was to be berthed at a location on pier 3 identified as berth 17. In order to approach berth 17 a sweeping turn to port must be made. On that date the Captain Nelson was positioned off the starboard bow during the Act 5's swing to port. Once this swing had been initiated, the Respondent ordered the tug to proceed to the port stern quarter. It was intended that the tug would assist to breast the ship beside the docking area. After the tug had begun its trip from starboard bow to stern, Respondent realized that the ship's swing would not be sufficient to bring her parallel to the dock. Accordingly, the Respondent ordered the tug to hook up and to pull at full throttle to slow the ship and bring her parallel. Additionally, since it was apparent the ship might collide with the dock, the despondent ordered the Act 5 to reverse at full throttle. Despite the corrective efforts, the Act 5 did not swing sufficiently to port and her bulbous bow struck the underplatting of the dock at berth 17. The platting cracked and the fill behind it washed out. When the fill washed out, the road built on top collapsed and the dock eroded. Approximately sixty feet of dock surface was destroyed. Unpredictable surface and subsurface currents in Port Everglades very dramatically affect docking procedures. The tides, which are repetitive, also affect docking maneuvers. Given the fluctuating tides and currents within the Port Everglades turning basin, it is not uncommon for a ship's handling to be predictable. Given the tide and current conditions known to Respondent on the date at issue, the collision was unpredictable and unforeseeable by a reasonably prudent pilot. Given the times and speeds noted in the Act 5's "bell book," the Respondent approached the intended berth under prevailing standards used by other pilots at Port Everglades.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Pilot Commissioners enter a Final Order dismissing the Administrative Complaint against Respondent. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 26th day of May, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of May, 1988. APPENDIX Rulings on Petitioner's, DPR/Board of Pilot Commissioners, proposed findings of fact: Paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 are accepted. With regard to paragraph 4, the times and speeds noted in the Act 5's bell book are estimates which are within a reasonable range for approaching berth at Port Everglades. Distances are in unsubstantiated estimates and should not suggest Respondent used excessive speed. Three witnesses testified the ship approached at a reasonable rate. Such direct evidence controls over speculative estimates. Accordingly, paragraph 4 is rejected. Paragraphs 5 and 6 are accepted. Paragraphs 7 and 8 are accepted. With regard to paragraph 9, the cause of the collision is unknown. The ship did not swing to port sufficiently to become parallel to the dock. This lack of swing, coupled with the forward movement of the ship, resulted in the collision. As to why the ship did not continue its swing is speculative. Surface tides and currents as well as subsurface currents interfere with docking maneuvers and may have inhibited the swing. With regard to paragraph 10, the tides and currents noted were only surface ones. The subsurface currents which run deeper and which might effect a ship the size and draw of the Act 5 were not measured or charted. With that clarification, paragraph 10 is accepted. With regard to paragraph 11, it logically follows that Respondent's unforeseeable encounter would then serve as a warning to pilots involved in future docking procedures. That such pilots have benefitted from Respondent's incident does not suggest Respondent should have prejudged the problems. Accordingly, paragraph 11 is rejected as immaterial, irrelevant, and unnecessary. Rulings on Respondent's proposed finding of fact: Paragraphs 1-51 are accepted. Paragraph 52 is rejected as argumentative. Paragraph 53 is rejected a unnecessary, irrelevant or immaterial. Paragraphs 54-58 are rejected as unnecessary, irrelevant, immaterial, or argumentative. Paragraphs 59-62 are accepted. With regard to paragraphs 63 and 64, the Act 5 did collide with the underplatting at berth 17. The impact was felt by the tug Captain. Whether the dock was poorly maintained (and should have withstood the impact) or whether the fenders should have absorbed the shock is speculative but the touching was established. However, such touching was not caused by excessive speed or conduct falling below acceptable standards of safe pilotage. With that clarification, the paragraphs 63 and 64 are accepted. Paragraph 65 is accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: H. Reynolds Sampson, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Margaret Mathews, Esquire One Tampa City Center Suite 2600 201 N. Franklin Street Tampa, Florida 33602 William O'Neil, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Pat Guilford, Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation Board of Pilot Commissioners 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues for determination in this case are whether Petitioner has standing to bring this action and, if so, whether Respondent Stuart Yacht Corporation is entitled to the General Permit which the Department of Environmental Protection (Department) intends to issue.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner owns Lot 4 in St. Lucie Settlement, a subdivision in Stuart, Florida. The subdivision has one border along the South Fork of the St. Lucie River. The subdivision has a finger fill that extends to the South Fork with canals on both sides. There are four lots on the finger fill, Lots 1 through 4 of the subdivision. Lot 4 is farthest from the river. On the north side of Petitioner’s property he has a dock where he keeps a boat. The dispute in this case involves the canal on the south side of Petitioner’s property. All references to “the canal” hereafter, unless otherwise noted, will be to the canal on the south side of Lot 4. Between Lots 2, 3, and 4 and the canal is a road which provides access to the lots on the finger fill. Between the road and the canal is a narrow strip of land. Petitioner owns this narrow strip of land where it corresponds with his lot lines. In other words, the southern boundary of his Lot 4 abuts the canal. However, because the canal is artificial, having been created by dredging, Petitioner has no riparian rights associated with the canal. That was the holding of the circuit court for Martin County in the litigation between Stuart Yacht Corporation and Petitioner. It was also established in the circuit court litigation that St. Lucie Settlement, Inc., which is the homeowner's association for the subdivision, owns the northern half of the canal and Stuart Yacht Corporation owns the southern half of the canal. No subdivision documents were presented to show the extent of rights granted to homeowners within St. Lucie Settlement related to the construction of docks or other uses of water bottoms that are included within the subdivision. Petitioner testified that he terminated his membership in the homeowners association three-and-a-half years ago. Stuart Yacht Corporation owns and operates a marina on the south side of the canal which includes docks over the water. At some point in the past, but before Petitioner purchased Lot 4 in 1995, Stuart Yacht Corporation constructed a dock along the north side of the canal, over the water bottom owned by St. Lucie Settlement, Inc. The dock along the north side of the canal has been used for mooring large yachts. The portion of the dock that ran along the boundary of Lot 4 was recently removed by Stuart Yacht Corporation following the rulings in the circuit court. The balance of the dock along the north side of the canal would be removed as a part of the proposed permit that Petitioner has challenged. In addition to removing the dock along the north side of the canal, the proposed permit authorizes Stuart Yacht Corporation to construct a new dock that is four feet wide and runs 150 feet along the property boundary in the center of the canal. No part of the proposed new dock would be on the property of St. Lucie Settlement, Inc. St. Lucie Settlement, Inc., did not challenge the proposed permit. In his petition for hearing, Petitioner alleged that the proposed new dock would cause the following injuries to his interests: interference with ingress and egress to Petitioner’s shoreline; interference with Petitioner’s desire to obtain a permit in the future to construct a dock or to “harden” the southern shoreline; and interference with Petitioner’s riparian rights. Petitioner’s testimony about his past use of the canal was inconsistent. He said he moored his boat in the canal once in 1995. He said he boated into the canal to fish on several occasions. He said that (at least twice) when he attempted to enter the canal by boat, he was denied access by representatives of Stuart Yacht Corporation. However, in a deposition taken before the hearing, Petitioner said he had never attempted to use the canal. The only testimony presented by Petitioner to support his claim that the proposed permit would interfere with his navigation, fishing, and desire to obtain a dock permit in the canal was the following: I couldn’t get a boat in there with that proposed dock in the center line of the canal right on their side of the canal. It would be 150 feet long. It would be a huge Wall of China. My neighbor and I couldn’t get to our shoreline. The evidence presented was insufficient to prove that Petitioner would be unable to navigate into the canal in a small boat or to fish in the canal if the proposed dock is constructed. The evidence was also insufficient to prove that Petitioner would be unable to construct any kind of dock for any kind of watercraft if the proposed dock is constructed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department dismiss the petition for hearing based on Petitioner's failure to prove standing, and issue the proposed permit to Stuart Yacht Corporation. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of February, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BRAM D. E. CANTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of February, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Lea Crandall, Agency Clerk Department of Environmental Protection The Douglas Building, Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Tom Beason, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection The Douglas Building, Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Michael W. Sole, Secretary Department of Environmental Protection The Douglas Building 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Paul B. Erickson, Esquire Alley, Maass, Rogers & Lindsay, P.A. 340 Royal Poinciana Way, Suite 321 Palm Beach, Florida 33480 Amanda Gayle Bush, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection Office of the General Counsel 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard, Mail Stop 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Guy Bennett Rubin, Esquire Rubin & Rubin Post Office Box 395 Stuart, Florida 34995
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Petitioner was the state government licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility to prosecute Administrative Complaints alleging misconduct by practitioners of the real estate profession in this state. The Florida Real Estate Commission is the state agency responsible for licensing real estate sales persons and brokers in Florida and for regulating the real estate profession in this state. By Administrative complaint dated May 1, 1992, Respondent and Nicholas G. Patsios were charged with various violations of Section 475.25(1), Florida Statute. At the time, Respondent was a licensed real estate salesperson at Gulf Beaches Realty, Inc. (Gulf Beaches) in Holmes Beach. Gulf Beaches was licensed as a real estate broker for which Mr. Patsios was the qualifying broker. However, Respondent was actually the owner of Gulf Beaches and registered as an officer of the corporation. On January 16, 1992, an investigator for the Department had attempted to audit Gulf Beaches' escrow account but could not do so because the records were not in order. This was the impetus for the investigation into the operation which resulted in the filing of the Administrative Complaint. Respondent actually operated the brokerage, and in the Administrative Complaint was alleged to have been registered as an officer of a brokerage corporation while licensed as a salesperson. She was also charged with having operated as a broker while licensed as a salesperson. By Final Order dated August 18, 1992, the Florida Real Estate Commission found Respondent guilty of the alleged misconduct, fined her $100.00, reprimanded her and placed her on probation for one year conditioned, inter alia, upon her not violating any other provisions of Chapter 475. On May 21, 1993, the Department again charged Respondent with violations of Chapter 475, alleging that she: (1) continued to operate as a broker while licensed as a salesperson; (2) operated as a broker without holding a valid broker's license and (3) violated an order of the Commission. Though the matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings, Respondent failed to respond to the Administrative Complaint, and pursuant to a motion to relinquish jurisdiction, the matter was returned to the Commission. Thereafter, by Final Order dated November 7, 1993, the Commission revoked Respondent's license as a salesperson. In the interim between that action and the filing of the instant Administrative Complaint, Peggy Jean Lasser, a licensed broker, became the qualifying broker for Gulf Beaches. She allowed Respondent, the owner of the brokerage, to control its operations, including interfacing with clients. When the Commission initiated action against Ms. Lasser for that infraction, she did not dispute the allegations, and as a result, by Final Order of the Commission dated August 15, 1995, her license was suspended for two years. Ms. Lasser immediately ceased operating as the broker for Gulf Beaches. To the best of her knowledge, however, Gulf Beaches is still operating as a real estate office without a broker, and Respondent is still operating as a salesperson without a broker. On July 29, 1996, George Sinden, an investigator for the Department, went to Gulf Beaches' office accompanied by another investigator. He found the door to the office open and Respondent seated at a desk beside the door. She was alone in the office. There were office machines present and it appeared to Sinden that the office was operating as a real estate office. During his visit, Mr. Sinden could find no one with a valid license as a broker or salesperson. Respondent indicated she was trying to find a broker to qualify the company. She admitted she was currently operating a real estate business. Respondent also indicated she had four rentals which she was managing and for which she was depositing funds into a trust account for the owners. She also claimed to have an escrow account with over $2,000 in it. Sinden found that Respondent was not complying with the Commission's monthly reconciliation requirements and he could not determine to whom the funds in the escrow account belonged. Respondent claims this money was deposit money placed by a prospective purchaser in a sale between two parties, both of whom trusted her to hold the funds. She claims she was to receive a 5 percent fee. Records of Secretary of State's office showed Ms. Lasser as the only officer of Gulf Beaches. However, she no longer holds a valid broker's license. Respondent indicated she was the sole owner of Gulf Beaches. She claimed when Sinden interviewed her and at the hearing, where she again admitted the matters set forth above and in the Complaint, that she has not take in any new business since Ms. Lasser left. Respondent admits that she has attempted to divest herself of her clients but claims that because the Complaints filed against her by the Department have damaged her reputation, no broker will work with her or her business since the action in 1992. Respondent either cannot or will not accept the fact that she is operating illegally. Her primary concern seems to be the fact that this business is her way of making a living. She is 80 years old and seeks only to operate for two more years, at which time she will "meet her maker." The evidence is clear that since 1992, and before, Respondent has been the owner of Gulf Beaches. From the departure of Mr. Patsios to the incumbency of Ms. Lasser, and after the departure of that individual up to the present, Respondent has operated the corporation without a broker. It is also clear that since November 1993, Respondent has operated as a salesperson without a valid license.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of the misconduct alleged in the Administrative Complaint and, consistent with the provisions of Section 455.228, Florida Statutes, impose an administrative fine in the amount of $2,500.00. DONE and ENTERED this 3rd day of September, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of September, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven D. Fieldman, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street, N308 Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Geraldine Ruesel, pro se 5351 Gulf Drive Holmes Beach, Florida 34217 Lynda Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Henry M. Solares, Division Director Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900
The Issue Whether the Yacht Ship Salesman License issued to Arthur Lowe should be suspended or revoked for violation of Subsections 537.96(3)(a) and (i), and Section 537.06(4)(c), Florida Statutes. Whether the Yacht & Ship Brokers License issued to William L. Wescott should be suspended or revoked for violation of Section 537.06(3)(a)(1) and Section 537.06(4)(c), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent William L. Wescott is the holder of Florida Yacht Brokers License No. 12528 and Respondent Arthur Lowe is the holder of Florida Yacht Salesman License No. 13118. Upon joint motion of the parties the two cases were consolidated for hearing. On April 9, 1976, Respondents Wescott and Lowe were served Notice To Show Cause why the Yacht Ship Brokers and Salesman Licenses should not be suspended or revoked for violation of Chapter 537, Florida Statutes. This hearing is a result of that notice. On or about February 6, 1976, James Kinard, a resident of Columbia, South Carolina, responded to an advertisement in a boating magazine placed there by Daniel Yacht & Ship Brokerage, Ltd. depicting a Morgan sailboat. By telephone Mr. Kinard was informed that the Morgan sailboat advertised was no longer available but that a 41-foot Gulfstar was available. Mr. Kinard informed the Daniel Yacht Ship Brokerage, Ltd.'s representative that he had had a Gulfstar and had been unhappy with it. He became interested, however, in the 41-foot Gulfstar sailing yacht believing that it was designed by Sparkman and Stephens rather than Vince S. Lazzaro, the designer of the Gulfstar owned by him. Many people believe that a Sparkman and Stephens design hull is considered to be of the highest quality. As a result of the communication of Mr. Kinard, Respondent Arthur Lowe, a salesman for William Wescott, broker for Daniel Yacht Ship Brokerage, Ltd., Respondent, contacted another broker, Andrew Cilla, of Frank Gordon Yacht Sales, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, who informed Respondents that he had a listing of a vessel known as "Sea Lark IV." Frank Gordon Yacht Sales delivered a specification sheet to Mr. Wescott. Mr. Wescott photostated the letterhead of Daniel Yacht Ship Brokerage, Ltd. on to the top of the Frank Gordon Yacht Sales specification document and furnished it to Mr. Kinard. Said specifications listed Sparkman and Stephens as the designer of the vessel, although in fact, the Gulfstar 41-foot yacht was designed by Vince S. Lazzaro. The Driver Associates, Inc. prepared the document with specifications on the 41-foot Gulfstar "Sea Lark IV." On or about February 8, 1976, Mr. Kinard wired an offer of $45,000 to Daniel Yacht Ship Brokerage, Ltd. along with a ten percent deposit of $4,500. This amount was put in the escrow account of Daniel Yacht Ship Brokerage, Ltd. and remains in the escrow account. On or about February 22, 1976, Mr. Kinard and Mr. Lowe, together with others, took the yacht "Sea Lark IV" on a sea trial. Because of inclement weather the parties present huddled beneath the covering to the cockpit during the voyage. Mr. Hugh Furman was at the controls and called out the speed of the vessel as being 8, 9, 10 and 11 knots, respectively. The knot indicator in view to most of those present indicated that the vessel was proceeding at that speed. Mr. Kinard believed that in actuality the yacht was proceeding at the speed indicated by the knot indicator and that the speed the pilot was calling out was the correct speed. Mr. Lowe, a seaman, did not believe the ship was sailing at that speed and did not believe that others aboard thought that the ship was going at that speed. Mr. Kinard contends: That he believed the 41-foot Gulfstar was designed by Sparkman and Stephens; that the specifications furnished him by the Respondents indicated that Sparkman and Stephens was the designer. That he informed the Respondents that he did not like the Gulfstar he owned and did not like the designer Vince S. Lazzaro; that he believed the pilot of the ship who called out the speed of the ship and that he believed that the knot indicator on the ship was correct. That he was misled by the representations of the Respondents and by the specifications they furnished him and that he believed the ship would travel faster than it can in actuality; that the place in which he intended to use it requires a ship that will proceed faster than the "Sea Lark IV"; that he would not have put the $4,500 deposit down on the ship had he known that the hull was not designed by Sparkman and Stephens or had he known that the ship would not proceed at the rate of speed the pilot called out on the sea trial. That because he was misled he should be refunded the $4,500 that is his deposit on the "Sea Lark IV" and is in the escrow account of the Respondents. Respondents Arthur Lowe and William L. Wescott, contend: That during the sea trial Respondent Lowe believed that all persons on board the vessel knew that the speed called off by Mr. Furman was erroneous, and that if the knott indicator indicated the speed called off by Mr. Furman, it was erroneous and obvious to most persons familiar with yachts that such speed was not registered or called out correctly; that it was obvious the yacht was going at a much slower rate of speed. That the misrepresentation in the folder of the designer is not a substantial misrepresentation and that such misrepresentation was not intentional; that the advertisement and circulation of the specifications was by a second broker and its distribution to Mr. Kinard was in the ordinary course of business and was not meant in any way to mislead the buyer. The Petitioner Department of Business Regulation contends: That the delivery to the prospective buyer Kinard of an erroneous publication was an intentional and fraudulent act; that Respondents had been informed by tide buyer he did not like the designer Vince Lazzaro and the seller should have determined that Vince Lazzaro was the designer of subject vessel and notified the buyer; that such actions were intentional and fraudulent and a violation of Chapter 537, Florida Statutes. That the salesman and broker should have determined the true speed of the vessel and informed the prospective buyer; that failure to do so was intentional and fraudulent. That the actions of Respondents should result in the suspension of their licenses.
Recommendation Dismiss the charges. DONE and ORDERED this 22nd day of July, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Lawrence D. Winson, Esquire Division of General Regulation Department of Business Regulation The Johns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Gerhardt A. Schreiber, Esquire Fourth Floor, First Federal Building 1000 Northeast First Avenue Miami, Florida 33132
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations contained herein, Respondents were licensed real estate salesmen in the State of Florida, with Mr. Blanc's license being 0406481 and Ms. Kirkland's license being 0399466. The Division of Real Estate is a state government licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility of regulating the practice of real estate in this state. In November, 1985, Mr. and Mrs. William A. McKie were owners of Week 43 in Unit 1 of a time share condominium located at the Anchorage Resort and Yacht Club in Key Largo, Florida. About that time, they received a card issued by the Florida Bay Club to visit a time share condominium there. Because they were somewhat disappointed in the condition of their Anchorage unit, they went to see the Florida Bay Club facility and met with Respondent Kirkland who took them on a tour of the facility and the model apartment. Mrs. McKie was quite impressed with it, but indicated she could not afford it, because she and her husband already owned a time share unit at the Anchorage. When told that, Ms. Kirkland introduced the McKies to Respondent Blanc, who in the course of his sales presentation, suggested that the McKies use their ownership at the Anchorage as a trade-in worth $4,000 off of the in excess of $11,000 price of the Florida Bay Club unit. The McKies agreed and signed certain documents incident to the purchase including a worksheet, purchase agreement, disclosure agreement, and settlement statement, all prepared by Respondent Blanc. The worksheet reflected that the unit being purchased by the McKies, Week 44 in Unit A-5, had a purchase price of $6,500 toward which the McKies made a down payment of $650 by three separate charges to their Master Card and Visa cards, two for $300 each and one for $50. This left a mortgage balance to be financed of $5,850 payable for 7 years at 15 1/2 percent with monthly payments of $114.54. No reference was made in the worksheet to a trade in of the Anchorage unit. The purchase agreement also signed by the McKies and by Respondent Kirkland for the Florida Bay Club reflects a purchase price of $6,500 with a down payment of $650. The truth in lending form reflects that the amount financed would be $5,850 at 15.5% resulting in a finance charge of $3,771.36 with a total monthly payment amount of $9,621.36 which, when added to the $650 deposit, showed a total sales price of $10,271.36. The settlement statement signed by the McKies reflects a sales price of $6,500 with a $650 deposit. At no place, on any of the documentation, is the $4,000 trade-in for the Anchorage unit reflected. As a part of the transaction and at the suggestion of Respondent Blanc, the McKies were to sign a quitclaim deed to him as the representative of the seller to receive credit for the $4,000 trade-in. The documents, except for the quitclaim deed, were signed by the McKies on their first visit to Florida Bay Club on November 17, 1985. Mrs. McKie does not recall either Respondent signing the documentation, but there is evidence that Ms. Kirkland signed the purchase agreement and the worksheet and Mr. Blanc approved the worksheet. Neither the disclosure statement, the settlement statement nor the quitclaim deed, which was prepared by Respondent, Blanc, and furnished to the McKies on their second visit, was signed by either Respondent. The McKies went back to Florida Bay Club approximately a week later to sign for the prize they had been notified they had won and to sign the quitclaim deed, which had not been ready for them on their first visit. Respondent Blanc explained what the quitclaim deed was for and according to both McKies, they would not have purchased the property at Florida Bay Club had they not been able to trade-in their Anchorage unit. They definitely could not afford to pay for both units, a fact which was repeatedly explained to Respondents on both visits. Mrs. McKie believed that when she signed the quitclaim deed to the Anchorage unit, she would no longer be responsible for making payments there and in fact, the McKies notified the Anchorage Resort Club that Respondent Blanc had assumed their Week at the Anchorage, a fact which was confirmed by the Anchorage to Mr. Blanc by letter dated February 13, 1986. It is further noted that on January 30, 1986, Ms. Berta, general manager of the Florida Bay Club, by letter of even date, notified Mr. Blanc who was no longer an employee of Florida Bay, that the McKies' payment book, invoices for taxes due on the Anchorage property, and the quitclaim deed were being forwarded to him as evidence of the change of ownership of the Anchorage Resort unit from the McKies to Respondent Blanc. In this letter, Blanc was requested to notify the Anchorage of the change so the McKies would not be dunned for continuing payments. At the closing of the Florida Bay unit, when Mrs. McKie and her husband signed the quitclaim deed, Respondent Blanc told her she would continue to get payment notices from the Anchorage while the transfer was being processed, but she should bring those payment notices to him at the Florida Bay Club and he would take care of them. When Mrs. McKie received the first notice, she brought it to the Florida Bay Club to give to Mr. Blanc, but he was no longer located there. On this visit, she spoke to Ms. Berta, who advised her that the Florida Bay Club did not take trades. Ms. Berta called Respondent Blanc at his new place of business by phone in Mrs. McKie's presence and Respondent indicated at that time that he would buy the Anchorage unit himself and assume the payments. As a result, Mrs. McKie sent the delinquent notices to him at his new place of business, Gulf Stream Manor. In the meantime, she continued to make her new payments at the Florida Bay Club. Notwithstanding Respondent Blanc's agreement to assume payments, Mrs. McKie continued to receive mortgage payment delinquent notices from the bank for the Anchorage unit. During later negotiations with the bank regarding this, Mrs. McKie was told that she would still be responsible for making the payments even if Respondent Blanc took over and didn't pay and as a result, in order to relieve herself from this impending burden, she made arrangements to pay off the entire amount due for the Anchorage unit. After that she made several efforts to get Respondent Blanc to pay her back for the amount paid. Respondent Blanc agreed to make the payments and said he would pay the taxes on the unit, but he never reimbursed the McKies for any of the amount they had to pay. The McKies now own the Anchorage unit and have worked out a settlement agreement with the Florida Bay Club to get out of the responsibility for the unit there. Review of the quitclaim deed in question, prepared by Respondent Blanc and signed by the McKies, reflects that the McKies are both the grantors and grantees of the property and that Respondent Blanc's name nowhere appears on the document. It is of no force and effect. Respondent contends that when the McKies indicated they were unable to purchase a new unit since they still had a prior unit to pay for, relying on his understanding that the marketing organization selling the Florida Bay Club units had in the past taken a unit in trade, he discussed the matter with his supervisor who advised that he could offer up to $4,000 in trade on the unit. In order to do this, Respondent Blanc had to price the new unit at $10,500 and credit the McKies with $4,000. However, none of the documentation shows this was ever done. At no place on any of the documentations is the $4,000 trade-in referenced. It is clear the offer of a trade-in was a sham to induce the McKies to purchase a unit at Florida Bay Club. Ms. Berta, who was manager at Florida Bay Club at the time in question, indicated that no trade-ins were ever taken by the club. The prior trade-in referenced by Mr. Blanc was a unit which was completely paid for as opposed the McKies' which still had a substantial outstanding balance on it. Respondent Kirkland who was not a party to any of the negotiations subsequent to her initial interview with the McKies indicates that she "probably" quoted the McKies a price of $10,500. When Mrs. McKie indicated that they could not afford such a high price, she turned them over to Mr. Blanc who thereafter handled the entire transaction. Respondent Blanc tells a somewhat different story about the reaction of the McKies when his failure to assume responsibility for the trade-in unit at the Anchorage Bay Club came to light. He indicates that it was never intended that he would take title to this unit at first. The trade in was to be absorbed by the marketing company, Resort Sales International, for whom he worked, and he assumed, when he left the following week to go to a different facility, the company would follow through with its agreement to assume the McKie's Week at the Anchorage. He was quite surprised, he contends, to learn that this had not been done and since he wanted a unit in the Key Largo area anyway, he agreed to then assume it personally after first offering Mrs. McKie the opportunity to back out of the purchase. When she said that she wanted to be at Florida Bay Club, he was sent the payment books and the deed. He called the bank to notify them that he was going to assume responsibility for the loan, but the bank would give him no information regarding it and the bank official, Ms. Brown, was adamant in her representation that the McKies could not quitclaim deed the property to him. No reason was given for this, however. Mr. Blanc claims he made a series of telephone calls between January 30 and March 31, 1986, in an attempt to straighten out the difficulty involved. These included sixteen calls to Ms. Berta, eight calls to his former supervisor at Resort Sales, four calls to the Anchorage, three calls to the bank and three calls to Mrs. McKie. Mrs. McKie denies receiving calls from the Respondent and contends that her numerous calls to him remained unanswered. In a call he made after she paid off the loan on the Anchorage and settled with Florida Bay Club for approximately $2,183, Mrs. McKie advised Blanc to forget about it, that they were tired of messing with him and with the property. As a result, he admittedly gave up and did and heard nothing more regarding the property until he was contacted by a DPR investigator. On January 30, 1988, Mr. Blanc offered to buy Mrs. McKie's unit at the Anchorage for $2,900 which was exactly the amount owed on the property when she paid it off. She refused to accept that offer since she had paid $6,800 for the unit initially.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint against Respondent Sandra Kirkland be dismissed and that Respondent Blanc's license as a real estate salesman in Florida be suspended for six months. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee this 19th day of April, 1988. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of April, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Arthur R. Shell, Jr., Esquire Darlene F. Keller Department of Professional Acting Executive Director Regulation DPR, Division of Real Estate Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Orlando, Florida 32801 Sandra S. Kirkland Post Office Box 9264 Panama City, Florida 32407 John G. Blanc 17501 West Highway 98 Panama City, Florida 32407
The Issue Whether Respondent, a licensed yacht broker, committed the offenses set forth in the Notice to Show Cause dated June 20, 1994, and the penalties, if any, that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the agency of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility to administer and to enforce the Florida Yacht and Ship Brokers' Act, Chapter 326, Florida Statutes. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent has been a licensed Yacht and Ship Broker pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 326, Florida Statutes. Respondent resides in and has his principal place of business in Martin County, Florida. Respondent's corporation, Rampage of Stuart, Inc., has been licensed by Petitioner at all times pertinent to this proceeding. The parties stipulated that Respondent's corporation was, at times pertinent to this proceeding, doing business as Stuart Cay Marina, a fictitious name that had not been registered with the Petitioner. The parties stipulated that Respondent was guilty of violating the provisions of Section 326.004(2), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Notice to Show Cause dated June 20, 1994. The parties also stipulated that the appropriate penalty for this violation is an administrative fine in the amount of $500.00. James Withers began working for Respondent at Stuart Cay Marina in January 1994. At the time he began working at Stuart Cay Marina, Mr. Withers was not licensed under the Yacht and Ship Brokers' Act. Respondent knew or should have known that Mr. Withers was not licensed when he first became employed at Stuart Cay Marina. On January 27, 1994, Mr. Withers attended an educational seminar sponsored by Petitioner where the attendees received instruction as to the requirements for licensure as a salesman or a broker under the Yacht and Ship Brokers' Act. The successful applicant must submit a completed application form, a completed fingerprint card, the proper application fee, and a surety bond. The Petitioner's processing of the application includes having the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) run a fingerprint check on the applicant. The attendees of the educational seminar were told that the application fee had increased from $538.00 to $539.00 as of December 20, 1993, due to a $1.00 increase in the fee charged by the FBI to process fingerprint cards. Mr. Withers and the Respondent knew, or should have known, that Mr. Withers could not act as a salesman until after his license had been issued. In late January 1994, Mr. Withers applied for licensure as a salesman pursuant to the Yacht and Ship Brokers' Act. Because the application form used by Mr. Withers reflected the old application fee, Mr. Withers submitted a check in the amount of $538.00 with his application and fingerprint card. There was no evidence as to where Mr. Withers had obtained this application form. Mr. Wither's application package was received by Petitioner's Finance and Accounting Office on February 4, 1994. The check for the application was deposited and the application forwarded for further processing. On February 7, 1995, Mr. Withers was advised by mail that his application was deficient since the application fee was short by $1.00. This letter, from the Petitioner's Yacht and Ship Section, advised Mr. Withers that the $1.00 was needed to continue the application process. Mr. Withers forwarded his $1.00 check, dated February 9, 1994, to the Petitioner to correct this deficiency. This check was received and deposited by Petitioner's Finance and Accounting Office, which is located in the John's Building in Tallahassee, on February 17, 1994. The Finance and Accounting Office released the application package for further processing on February 18, 1994. From the Finance and Accounting Office, the application package went to the Division Director's Office located in the Warren Building in Tallahassee. From that office the application package was sent to the Yacht and Ship Section located in the Bloxham Building in Tallahassee, where it was received February 21, 1994. Licenses are not completely processed until after the Yacht and Ship Section receives notification that the entire application fee has been paid. Processing of Mr. Withers' application was completed by the Yacht and Ship Section and his license was issued on February 21, 1994. Mr. Withers and the Respondent knew, or should have known, that Mr. Withers had not received his license from the Petitioner as of February 18, 1994. 1/ There was no evidence that either man had reason to believe as of February 18, 1994, that the license had been issued and was being forwarded by mail. Both men correctly believed that Mr. Withers had substantially complied with the licensure requirements as of February 18, 1994, and that the license would be issued at some juncture since the only deficiency had been corrected. Mr. Withers represented Respondent at the Sixth Annual Miami Brokerage Yacht Show on February 18, 1994, where he acted as a salesman within the meaning of the Yacht and Ship Brokers's Act. Respondent permitted Mr. Withers to use his company name at this show. On Friday, February 18, 1994, James Courchaine and Peter Butler, in their official capacities as employees of the Petitioner, located Mr. Withers at the boat show and inquired as to whether he was licensed. Mr. Withers told them that he had completed his application package and was merely waiting to receive his license in the mail. Mr. Butler thereafter called his office in Tallahassee and learned that Mr. Withers' check for $1.00 may have been received, but that the application had not been received by the Yacht and Ship Section and that the license had not been issued. Mr. Butler informed Mr. Withers that the earliest his license could be issued was Monday, February 21, 1994.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order adopting the findings and conclusions contained herein, that imposes an administrative fine in the amount of $500.00 against Respondent for the violation of Section 326.004(2), Florida Statutes, and that imposes an additional administrative fine in the amount of $500.00 against Respondent for the violation of Section 326.06(2)(e)7, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of January 1996 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of January 1996.
The Issue The issue is whether Kenneth Baurley should be eligible to sit for the examination to become licensed as a real estate salesman.
Findings Of Fact On July 14, 1988, Mr. Baurley's application for licensure as a real estate salesman was received by the Florida Real Estate Commission (Commission). By letter dated October 3, 1988, the Commission notified Baurley that his application had been denied based on his answer to question 6 on the application. In responding to that question, Mr. Baurley disclosed that he had been involved in two criminal proceedings; in both an adjudication of his guilt had been withheld. The first case arose in 1982 on the charge of battery on a law enforcement officer, for which he received 18 months of supervised probation. The incident had its genesis in a shoving match involving Baurley and someone who turned out to be an off-duty police officer for a small municipality. The second was in 1983 for the municipal offense of prowling. Although under no obligation to do so, Mr. Baurley also stated that he had been arrested for driving under the influence in 1988. He was found not guilty on the last charge, so it has no bearing on the decision in this case. Mr. Baurley's response to question 6 was complete and truthful. At the time of these incidents, Mr. Baurley was 19 and 20 years of age. He successfully completed his probation. He has had no further relevant contacts with the criminal justice system for more than five years. Mr. Baurley is now 26 years old. He has resided in Pompano Beach, Florida since 1972, although he attended college in Tallahassee. He is employed currently as President of A Better Limousine Service, Inc. and as a supervisor at Baurley Marine Works, Inc., which is owned by his father. Prior to his employment in these two positions, Mr. Baurley worked in a business established by his brother, Baurley "No Frills" Auto Rental. Before he held these positions, Mr. Baurley attended college in Tallahassee and worked at Doc's Sports Bar and Grill and at Forest Meadows Athletic Club. He was also an adjunct instructor at Florida State University where he taught Tae Ywon Do for college credit. In the course of his employment in the positions set out in Findings 6 and 7 above, Mr. Baurley has been required to interact with patrons, sometimes under difficult circumstances. In all the positions delineated in Findings 6 and 7 (other than the position as adjunct instructor at Florida State University) Mr. Baurley has been required to handle other people's money on at least a weekly basis. Most of the positions have required him to deal with his employers' or customers' money on a daily basis. Petitioner has performed all his employment responsibilities honestly and without incident. Darlene Vlazeny, a real estate salesperson and housewife, met Mr. Baurley in a business capacity by telephone in October, 1988. At that time Mrs. Vlazeny was soliciting in-kind contributions on behalf of a school for hearing impaired children. Mrs. Vlazeny testified that Mr. Baurley's was the only limousine company which agreed to her request to provide limousine services in connection with a benefit for the school at reduced rates. Since the school benefit, Mrs. Valzeny has had social contact with Mr. Baurley. She is aware of the incidents detailed in his answer to question number 6 on his licensure application, but believes he is trustworthy, honest and has a high moral character based on her experiences with Baurley. Mrs. Vlazeny would have no reservation about working with Mr. Baurley in any professional capacity. John Belegesky, a practicing attorney for more than 30 years, has known Mr. Baurley since he was a small boy. Baurley and Mr. Belegesky's son have been friends since grade school. Mr. Belegesky is also aware of Mr. Baurley's past and believes that the acts disclosed in the response to question number 6 to be out of character for him, and the result of youthful indiscretion. Mr. Belegesky trusts Petitioner to have a key to his home, which contains many valuables, and to houseset when he and his wife are away for weeks at a time. Mr. Belegesky would have no reservation about referring his clients, including major developers, to work with Mr. Baurley, if he is licensed. Mr. Belegesky believes Mr. Baurley possesses a high moral character and is honest and trustworthy. Mr. Baurley has matured and regrets his past actions. Mr. Baurley is honest and trustworthy and is of good moral character.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner, Kenneth M. Baurley, be allowed to take the examination for licensure as a real estate salesman and if he passes the examination, be issued a real estate salesman license. DONE and ORDERED this 28th day of April, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of April, 1989. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 88-5537 The proposed findings of Mr. Baurley have generally been adopted. COPIES FURNISHED: Lawrence S. Gendzier, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs 400 West Robinson Street, Room 212 Orlando, Florida 32802 Marion E. Baurley, Esquire 1025 Vermont Avenue, North West Suite 915 Washington, D.C. 20005 Kenneth E. Easley General Counsel 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Darlene F. Keller Division Director 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32902
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the Notice to Show Cause and, if so, what action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with regulating yacht and ship brokers and salespersons pursuant to Chapter 326, Florida Statutes. At all times material hereto, Respondent was a licensed yacht broker.1 She is the yacht broker for Yachting Consultants, Inc. in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. In April 1999, Respondent was the listing broker of record regarding the sale of a 43-foot Pilgrim yacht. The selling broker was Mark Lipkus, a licensed yacht broker. John Pribik, a licensed salesperson, was Respondent's representative in the sale of the Pilgrim yacht. Mr. Pribik was under the supervision and control of Respondent and Respondent was responsible for his actions. Respondent had a buyer for the Pilgrim yacht, and the closing for the sale of the yacht was scheduled for April 13, 1999. The buyer was financing the purchase of the yacht. In a sale situation, a buyer and a seller have different responsibilities. The seller is responsible for providing all of the documents needed for a sale. The buyer is responsible for providing the funds for a sale. In the sale of the Pilgrim yacht, the responsibilities of the Seller and the Buyer did not change. There is a commission from the sale of a yacht, which is paid by the seller and, in accordance with standard industry practice, paid at closing. By standard industry practice, the commission split is 70/30, but can differ upon agreement. Mr. Lipkus received a down payment of $15,000.00 from the Buyer and placed the down payment in his escrow account. Mr. Lipkus was of the mistaken belief that the commission was payable by the Buyer, not the Seller. No co-broker agreement was entered into between Respondent or Mr. Pribik and Mr. Lipkus regarding commission. There was no discussion regarding the split of the commission between them. On a prior sale involving Mr. Pribik and Mr. Lipkus, the commission split was 60/40. Mr. Pribik and Respondent assumed the commission split of the sale of the Pilgrim yacht would again be 60/40. Considering the prior sale, it was not unreasonable for Respondent and Mr. Pribik to assume a 60/40 split of the commission. Mr. Lipkus assumed the commission split would be 70/30. A power of attorney had been prepared by the Seller who was unavailable for closing due to being in a remote area in the Philippine Islands. Mr. Pribik provided the power of attorney to the documenting agent who reviewed the power of attorney and found it to be satisfactory. The mortgage broker received a copy of the power of attorney prior to closing and forward a copy to the lending institution. The lending institution notified the mortgage broker at some point before closing that the power of attorney was unacceptable. In turn, the mortgage broker contacted the documenting agent regarding the unacceptability of the power of attorney and informed the documenting agent that a new power of attorney was required before closing could take place. Mr. Pribik was notified by the mortgage broker that a new power of attorney was required. The responsibility to obtain the new power of attorney was the responsibility of the listing broker, who was Respondent via Mr. Pribik. As far as Mr. Pribik was concerned, with the time remaining before closing2 and with the Seller being in the Philippine Islands, he believed that it was virtually impossible to obtain a new power of attorney by the time of closing. The mortgage broker, taking the position that he should do whatever he could to effectuate a closing, encouraged Mr. Pribik to attempt to contact the Seller. Complying, Mr. Pribik was able to make telephonic contact with the Seller and Mr. Pribik and the mortgage broker spoke with the Seller, who agreed to provide a new power of attorney. Based on the verbal assurance by the Seller to provide the new power of attorney, the lending institution agreed to proceed with the closing, which was re- scheduled for April 14, 1999. A new power of attorney was faxed to the Seller, and the Seller executed it and faxed it back. According to industry standard, all commissions are paid at closing when a seller receives the funds. Also, according to industry standard, closing is not delayed until a commission is paid. Mr. Lipkus mistakenly believed that the commission was paid by a buyer, coming out of a buyer's deposit. As a result, he expected to take the commission out of the Buyer's down payment, which was held in Mr. Lipkus' escrow account. After obtaining his commission, Mr. Lipkus was going to forward the remaining monies. On April 13, 1999, the original date for the closing, the closing could not take place because the financing from the lending institution was not available, based upon the absence of a new power of attorney. Also, Mr. Lipkus had not made arrangements for the deposit monies to be at closing or forwarded a settlement statement to closing, which were both needed for the closing. Respondent contacted Mr. Lipkus by fax regarding the commission monies and the settlement statement, demanding both items in order for closing to take place. The evidence is not clear and convincing as to whether Respondent demanded the monies held by Mr. Lipkus prior to closing or whether Respondent was threatening to delay the closing unless she had the monies prior to closing. The evidence suggests that Respondent was demanding the monies to be in place at closing. Additionally, on the original closing date, closing was to take place at the office of the mortgage broker. Mr. Pribik, the Buyer, and the mortgage broker were present for the closing. Mr. Lipkus did not intend to attend, and did not attend, the closing. Since the commission monies were not available at closing, Mr. Pribik telephoned Mr. Lipkus and demanded that the commission monies be available and, told him that if not made available, the closing could not take place. In Mr. Pribik's opinion, the monies were needed for closing. The evidence is not clear and convincing as to whether Mr. Pribik demanded the monies held by Mr. Lipkus prior to closing or whether Mr. Pribik was threatening to delay the closing if he did not have the monies prior to closing. The evidence suggests that Mr. Pribik was demanding the monies to be in place at closing. Furthermore, for the first time, Mr. Pribik and Mr. Lipkus, during the telephone conversation, became aware of their disagreement as to the proper commission split, whether 60/40 or 70/30. Believing that Mr. Pribik would prevent a timely closing, Mr. Lipkus agreed to Mr. Pribik's split of 60/40. Closing occurred on April 14, 1999. The necessary documents and finances were present. At the final hearing, Respondent expressed with sincerity that, if she did anything wrong, she wanted to know exactly what it was, so that she would not engage in the same conduct again. Furthermore, Respondent expressed the frustration that, prior to hearing, no one had explicitly told her what she had done wrong and that, at hearing, she continued to be unsure what she had done wrong because she had not been explicitly told what she had done wrong. Respondent has no prior disciplinary action.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes, enter a final order: Finding that Giovanna Gallottini did not violate Rule 61B-60.008(3)(a), Florida Administrative Code. Not sustaining the Notice to Show Cause. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of February, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of February, 2001.
The Issue Whether the Respondent operated as a salesperson without being the holder of a valid and current license as a real estate salesperson, in violation of Section 475.42(1)(a), Florida Statutes, and therefore in violation of Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a state licensing and regulatory agency charged with the duty to prosecute Administrative Complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular, Section 20.30, Florida Statutes, Chapters 120, 455, and 475, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. The Respondent is and was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate salesperson in the State of Florida having been issued license number 0475436 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license was issued to Respondent as a salesperson c/o Dolphin Realty Referral Inc., 2525 Pasadena Avenue, Suite L., South Pasadena, Florida 33707. On December 18, 1996, Respondent presented a written offer to listing agent Sharon Simms for property located at 3900 48th Avenue, South, St. Petersburg, Florida. In connection therewith, Respondent, who was the building contractor for buyer Joseph S. Sparra, accepted a $2,000 deposit which was placed in the escrow account of Dolphin Realty Referral Inc., of which Thomas J. Hassel was qualifying broker. Hassel drafted the contract and qualified Joseph S. Sparra with Sigmund Financial for a first mortgage. The Respondent was employed by Hassel as an independent contractor. Thomas Hassel, the Respondent's employing broker, advised him that he was not sure Respondent's license was active, but the Respondent made no attempt to contact the Petitioner to ascertain his licensure status. On January 24, 1997, the Respondent accompanied Joseph S. Sparra to the closing at Anclote Title Services, where the Respondent provided the escrow money and accepted a $5,780 commission check on behalf of Dolphin Realty Referral, Inc. During the entire transaction, Respondent was not properly licensed with Dolphin Realty Referral, Inc., nor with any other real estate brokerage. Respondent's license was involuntarily placed on inactive status from January 1, 1996, through July 20, 1997, due to no employing broker. Hassel later advised Respondent that his license was not transferred to the new corporation when the broker changed its name from Dolphin Realty of Pinellas County to Dolphin Realty Referrals, Inc. The Respondent did not accept a share of the commission on the house in St. Petersburg, Florida. Respondent did not participate as a real estate salesperson in any other transaction while his license was on inactive status.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED as follows: The Florida Real Estate Commission issue a Final Order finding the Respondent guilty of violating Subsections 475.25(1)(a) and (e), Florida Statutes, as charged in the Administrative Complaint; and, Impose an administrative fine of $500 and require Respondent to complete a 45-hour salesperson's post-licensure course, as prescribed by the Florida Real Estate Commission. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of December, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of December, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven W. Johnson, Senior Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 John A. Kitzmiller, pro se 2613 59th Street, South St. Petersburg, Florida 33707 James Kimbler, Acting Division Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
