Findings Of Fact This matter arose from the sale of a certain apartment building in Dunedin, Florida, known as Piper's Ten. This building was owned by two foreign corporations, the principals of which are represented by a Mr. Eugene Morgan of Boston, Massachusetts. Douglas S. Kennedy, Defendant, is a registered real estate salesman whose license was registered with Lockhart Realty, Inc., of Seawalls Point, Florida, the broker for which was his then wife Trude Kennedy. The Defendant and his wife were involved in domestic difficulties which eventually lead to a divorce. When the Defendant and his wife separated sometime in late 1972, he sought out his friend and business associate, Eugene Morgan, who suggested that the Defendant move to Dunedin, Florida and reside in the model apartment at Piper's Ten. The Defendant heeded the suggestion and took on the assignment as resident manager of the Piper's Ten Apartments at a final salary of approximately $1,000 per month. According to the Defendant and Mr. Morgan, his prime responsibility was seeing that Morgan and his co-investors in the property "receive a fair shake with the local people in and around Dunedin, Florida." At the time the property was registered with a real estate broker of Dunedin, Florida, whose name is Mr. Woodrow Register, and he had an exclusive listing on the sale of Piper's Ten Apartments. The initial arrangement between Morgan and the Defendant was that the Defendant would live in the apartment rent free and he would be paid an amount to defray his expenses for the management responsibility. When the Defendant became dissatisfied with this arrangement approximately 3 weeks later, he notified Mr. Morgan that he could no longer remain in Dunedin under that arrangement. This set the stage for the new arrangement referred to above whereby the Defendant was to be paid $1,000 per month payable out of the proceeds, when and if the building was sold. According to Morgan, this arrangement was to last for at least 4 to 5 months or until such time as a purchaser was located to purchase the apartment building. During April 1973, Kelly Prior Realty of Dunedin produced a proposed purchaser for the property at the purchase price of $400,000 which was the amount set by the owners who had agreed to pay a real estate commission of 5 percent. Kelly Prior Realty prepared a proposed contract of sale and purchase and submitted it to the offices of the attorney for the seller, Raymond Argyros, who after certain modifications, submitted the contract to the sellers for their approval. At the closing in May 1973, Kelly Prior, the selling broker, received a full commission of 5 percent as agreed upon by their sellers in their open listing of the property. According to attorney Argyros, the Defendant received a check for $5,000 as agreed upon between the Defendant and Morgan and according to him, the contract erroneously referred to such payment as a commission. It is this $5,000 payment which is the matter of controversy in this hearing. According to Morgan, Defendant was hired to "see if he could get Morgan and his associates a fair shake with the local people in Dunedin respecting the management of the apartment building." Originally the two story building was primarily an office space on the lower level and approximately ten apartments on the upper level. The plan was to rent the upper level as a condominium and to lease the office space on the lower level. Morgan was unable to sell the condominiums on the upper level based on the fact that prospective purchasers did not want to buy condominiums in a building approximately 50 percent comprised of office space. With this fact, Morgan and his associates made the decision to convert the lower level to apartments as well. When this was done, the Defendant saw to it that the building was properly managed and provided feedback to Morgan in order to keep him advised at all times of the situation with the apartment building. When the building was sold, Kelly Prior Realty Company received the commission of $20,000 which represented 5 percent of the total purchase price and the Defendant received $5,000 for his efforts. In this regard, the Defendant received a check drawn in the amount of $5,000 and the check bore a notation that the amount represented a commission. When the Defendant noted this, he changed the face of the check to reflect that the amount paid was intended to be an agency fee for the sale of Piper's Ten. The Defendant played no part in the drafting of the purchase and sales agreement. After the closing, the Defendant also was given the furniture from the model apartment and he thereafter departed for Puerto Rico. Trude Kennedy, the Defendant's former wife, testified that Lockhart Realty was in no way associated with the sale of Piper's Ten. Trude Kennedy had several conversations with Mr. Morgan regarding the sales and problems which he encountered with Piper's Ten. However the basis of these statements involved other businesses which she had with Morgan regarding the sale and subdivision of other properties in and around Dunedin. Mrs. Kennedy was unaware of the amount paid to the Defendent and she made no claim for such funds when the payment was disbursed. Morgan denied that the amount in any way reflected a commission but rather was payment for the services which the Defendant rendered in the general upkeep and management of the building such that he could be fully advised at all times of the progress, if any, that the local realtors were having with the sale of the apartment building. With these facts, the undersigned is of the opinion that the $5,000 sum given to Kennedy represented the amount as per the agreement he had with Morgan. There was no evidence that he participated in any way with the sale of the building other than to advise Morgan of any efforts that the other local realtors played in locating purchasers. It was noted that the check which represented payment for these services indicated that the amount originally was a commission. However, the Defendant, when noting that the designation of a commission was included on the check, immediately advised Mr. Argyros, the seller's agent, to correct that mistake by placing a designation that the amount represented was intended to be a "seller's agent" fee. This correction was made prior to the time the check was deposited and it was done with the consent of attorney Argyros. There was no evidence that the Defendant demanded such amount as a commission for his efforts as a salesman or that he showed the property to prospective purchasers as a real estate salesman. Thus it appears that the amount paid to the Defendant was an amount given him for his services as testified to by Morgan. The amount paid also appears to correspond with the arrangement as testified to by Morgan. I therefore find that the $5,000 sum paid the Defendant represented an amount for services that he rendered, not as a real estate salesman, but rather, as a property manager of the Piper's Ten Apartment building.
The Issue In this disciplinary proceeding, the issues are whether Respondents, who are licensed real estate brokers, committed acts of dishonest dealing or culpable negligence in a business transaction; failed to account for and deliver trust funds; failed to maintain trust funds in an escrow account as required; intermingled personal funds with trust funds; obstructed or hindered Petitioner's investigator in an official investigation; or committed any of these offenses, as alleged by Petitioner in its Administrative Complaint. If Petitioner proves one or more of the alleged violations, then an additional question will arise, namely whether disciplinary penalties should be imposed on Respondents, or either of them.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Respondent Marlene Montenegro Toirac ("Toirac") is a licensed real estate broker subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the Florida Real Estate Commission ("Commission"). Respondent Home Center International Corp. ("HCIC") is and was at all times material hereto a corporation registered as a Florida real estate broker subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the Commission. Toirac is an officer and principal of HCIC, and at all times relevant to this case she had substantial, if not exclusive, control of the corporation. Indeed, the evidence does not establish that HCIC engaged in any conduct distinct from Toirac's in connection with the transactions at issue. Therefore, Respondents will generally be referred to collectively as "Toirac" except when a need to distinguish between them arises. Petitioner Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, has jurisdiction over disciplinary proceedings for the Commission. At the Commission's direction, Petitioner is authorized to prosecute administrative complaints against licensees within the Commission's jurisdiction. The Ramirez Transaction On or about September 9, 2003, Toirac, in her individual capacity, entered into a Sale and Purchase Contract (the "Contract") with Andres Ramirez ("Ramirez"), whereby Toirac agreed to sell, and Ramirez to buy, certain real estate then owned by Toirac. The Contract called for Ramirez to make several deposits toward the purchase price. Accordingly, Ramirez tendered to Toirac a total of $14,000 in pre-closing payments. Toirac accepted these payments, which were deposited in HCIC's operating account. At some point, Toirac withdrew Ramirez's deposits from HCIC's operating account, taking the money in cash. She brought the $14,000 in cash to her attorney, Alix Montes, who agreed to hold the money in escrow pending the closing of the sale to Ramirez. Mr. Montes placed the cash in a safe located in his home. The sale to Ramirez fell through after Ramirez failed to obtain acceptable financing and exercised his right to cancel the Contract in consequence thereof. Ramirez requested that his deposits be returned. Within a short time (not more than about two weeks), Toirac gave Ramirez his money back——in cash. The parties dispute whether Toirac properly handled Ramirez's deposits. Petitioner asserts that the $14,000 should have been held in an escrow account maintained at a financial institution such as a bank or title company. Toirac responds that she complied with a "Financing and Deposit Addendum" (the "Addendum") to the Contract. The Addendum, which is part of the Contract that Petitioner offered into evidence (as Petitioner's Exhibit 4), provides in pertinent part as follows: Seller acknowledges that in the event that the Buyer is not approved for a mortgage loan or the terms and conditions of said mortgage loan are not acceptable to Seller, Seller within thirty (30) days from the date Seller receives Buyer's written request for the return of its deposit, shall refund Buyer's deposit in full. Upon Seller's refund of the deposit, this contract will terminate and all parties will be relieved from the obligations and liabilities. Buyer acknowledges that the Seller herein is a licensed Real Estate Broker in the state of Florida and That Home Center International Corp. will not be the "Escrow Agent" in this transaction nor will Home Center International Corp. or any of its affiliates, officers, directors, agents and/or employees will receive a Real Estate Brokerage fee in connection with this transaction. Buyer authorizes Home Center International Corp. to place any and all deposits herein in its operating account. Buyer further authorizes Home Center International Corp, at any time to withdraw and/or transfer Buyer's funds from the operating account. In the event a transfer of any and all funds is effected, such funds shall be held by Alix J. Montes, Esq., Attorney for the Seller. This Addendum supercedes the provisions of paragraph 2 (A)2(B)(1), 16(A)(B)(C), 17, 18, and 19 of the "As Is" Sale and Purchase Contract signed by all parties herein. (In the original, the text is written in all capital letters.) The Addendum is dated September 9, 2003, and bears the purported signatures of Ramirez and Toirac. Petitioner alleged in its Administrative Complaint that Ramirez had denied executing the Addendum. At hearing, however, Petitioner failed to offer any proof——such as Ramirez's testimony or the testimony of an expert disputing the authenticity of Ramirez's purported signature on the Addendum—— to establish this allegation. In contrast, Toirac testified that both she and Ramirez had, in fact, signed the Addendum. As a result, on this record, the undersigned is not clearly convinced that the Addendum is fraudulent. Moreover, the Addendum and Toirac's testimony, taken together, are sufficiently persuasive (in the absence of evidence to the contrary) to prevent the undersigned from being clearly convinced that Toirac mishandled Ramirez's deposits or otherwise dealt dishonestly or improperly with him. The January 2004 Audit On January 20, 2004, Tibizay Morales, who was then employed by Petitioner as an investigator, conducted an audit of Toirac's records. (The impetus for this audit was Petitioner's receipt of a complaint from Ramirez.) During the audit, Toirac reported to Ms. Morales that she no longer maintained an escrow account but instead relied upon her attorney to act as escrow agent for funds entrusted to her. Toirac also told Mr. Morales that Ramirez's deposits initially had been held in HCIC's operating account, before being handed over to Mr. Montes for safekeeping. Toirac was not able, at the time of the audit, to produce bank statements for HCIC's operating account, and apparently a listing agreement that should have been in the broker's file was not there. Toirac agreed to provide the missing documentation. By letter dated January 20, 2004, Toirac informed Ms. Morales that she would forward requested documentation within 10 days. For reasons unknown, Toirac failed to follow through with this, prompting the instant disciplinary action. The Charges In Counts I and VII, Petitioner alleges that Respondents are guilty of culpable negligence or breach of trust in any business transaction, either of which is a disciplinable offense under Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes. Petitioner's position is that Respondents mishandled Ramirez's deposits and misled him into believing that the money would be held in trust by HCIC as an escrow agent.1 In Counts II and VIII, Petitioner charges Respondents with failing to account for and deliver trust funds, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(d)1., Florida Statutes. Petitioner's position is unclear. What is clear, however, is that Respondents returned Ramirez's deposit money within a reasonable time after his demand therefor. In Counts III and IX, Petitioner accuses Respondents of having failed to maintain trust funds in the real estate brokerage escrow account until disbursement was properly authorized, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(k), Florida Statutes. In Counts IV and X of its Administrative Complaint, Petitioner accuses Respondents of having intermingled personal funds with funds being held in escrow. Petitioner's position is that by initially depositing Ramirez's deposits in HCIC's operating account, Respondents failed to comply with Florida Administrative Code Rule 61J2-14.008(2), and hence violated Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes. In Counts V and XI, Petitioner asserts that Respondents obstructed or hindered the enforcement of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, in violation of Section 475.42(1)(i), Florida Statutes, and therefore in violation of Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes. Petitioner's position is that Respondents willfully interfered with Morales's investigation by failing to provide documentation as promised.2 Ultimate Factual Determinations Toirac handled Ramirez's deposit money in accordance with the unambiguous terms of the Addendum. Petitioner failed to prove that the Addendum is fraudulent. Thus, the Addendum, when considered in conjunction with Toirac's unrebutted testimony that she and Ramirez signed the instrument, is fatal to Counts I, III, IV, VII, IX, and X of the Administrative Complaint. Respondents are not guilty of the offenses charged therein. Toirac did, in fact, return Ramirez's deposit money within a reasonable time after he demanded a refund. Respondents therefore are not guilty of the offenses charged in Counts II and VII of the Administrative Complaint. When Ms. Morales interviewed Toirac in January 2004 in response to Ramirez's complaint, Toirac admitted most, if not all, of the material facts pertaining to the circumstances under which Ramirez's deposits had been held. Further, the documents that Toirac neglected to provide Ms. Morales, i.e. HCIC's bank records and a listing agreement that had gone missing, were claimed by Toirac to be corroborative of her statements to the investigator. Toirac's failure to produce such documents cost Toirac an opportunity to bolster her credibility——and enabled Petitioner to draw adverse inferences against Toirac, e.g. that the questioned listing agreement did not exist after all.3 Given these facts, the undersigned is not convinced that Respondents obstructed or hindered Petitioner's investigation. Consequently, Respondents are not guilty of the charges set forth in Counts V and VI of the Administrative Complaint.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order finding Respondents not guilty of the offenses charged in the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of September, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of September, 2005.
Findings Of Fact Pursuant to a plea of guilty in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware to violations of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1010, 2, and 371, Petitioner, on January 8, 1975, was found guilty of such offenses and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment. (Exhibits 3, 4) Petitioner filed an application for registration with Respondent as a real estate salesman on July 8, 1976. He duly noted his previous charges and attached a letter of an Assistant United States Attorney, District of Delaware, dated April 19, 1976, that contained statements in mitigation of Petitioner's offenses. Specifically, the letter noted widespread corruption in the Federal Housing Administration in Wilmington, Delaware, and expressed the opinion that Petitioner's offenses were committed due to the atmosphere that existed in the Delaware real estate community at that time. It was further pointed out that Petitioner had cooperated with all federal investigative agencies in assisting the Office of the United States Attorney in bringing corrupt officials of the Department of Housing and Urban Development to justice. Further, it was stated that his testimony and cooperation led to indictments of top-level Federal Housing Administration officials. (Composite Exhibit 2)
Recommendation That the application of David Leslie Pierce for registration as a real estate salesman be DONE and ENTERED this 16th day of March, 1977 in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire Staff Attorney Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 David Leslie Pierce 891 West Tropical Way Plantation, Florida 33317
The Issue Whether Petitioner is eligible to recover from the Construction Industries Recovery Fund, and, if so, in what amount.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner entered into a contract with "Personalized Homes" to build his home located in Brevard County, on February 7, 1993. Jack Powell signed the contract on behalf of Personalized Homes. This contract required substantial completion on or before September 15, 1993. Respondent Ryan was the qualifying agent for Personalized Homes, Personalized Homes Corporation, Personalized Homes, Inc., and Personalized Homes of Brevard, Inc., during all times relevant hereto. Petitioner took the February 1993 Contract to the bank which approved a construction loan. Petitioner used a portion of the proceeds from the construction loan obtained in March 1993 to buy the lot upon which his house was eventually built. Petitioner could not have obtained the construction loan or purchased the lot upon which he built his home without the use of the February 1993 Contract. Petitioner had architectural plans drawn up in February/March 1993, after the February 1993 Contract was signed. Petitioner recorded in the official records of Brevard County a Notice of Commencement of the construction of a home in March 1993. The Notice of Commencement was for the plans drawn up for the house after the February 1993 Contract was signed. No actual construction was begun under the original plans. The initial plans were rejected and new plans were prepared in the summer of 1993. Petitioner sought bids from several contractors but settled on Personalized Homes to complete the project. Petitioner and Personalized Homes, Inc., entered into another written document relating to the construction of Petitioner's home which was dated September 5, 1993. Jack Powell and John Kingsley signed the September 5 Contract on behalf of Personalized Homes, Inc. An application for a building permit for the construction of Petitioner's house was filed on September 28, 1993, and construction commenced. Problems developed from the construction of Petitioner's house which led to Petitioner filing a civil action in Circuit Court in Brevard County against persons and entities, including Personalized Homes of Brevard, Inc., but not including Respondent Ryan. On August 6, 1996, Petitioner filed an Amended Complaint against Jack Powell, John Kingsley, Personalized Homes, Inc., and Personalized Homes of Brevard, Inc., but not including Respondent Ryan. The Defendants each filed answers and affirmative defenses stating that the February 7 Contract was for financing purposes only and that the September 5 Contract was the applicable contract. On January 8, 1998, the parties to the litigation entered into a settlement agreement. Pursuant to the settlement agreement, Jack Powell, John Kingsley, Personalized Homes, Inc., and Personalized Homes of Brevard, Inc., agreed to pay Petitioner $17,500. Paragraph 13 of the settlement agreement provides that Petitioner will not prosecute an administrative claim against Jack Powell, John Kingsley, and Personalized Homes of Brevard, Inc., including any claims with the Board. This covenant expressly does not prohibit any claim against Personalized Homes, Inc. Paragraph 13 further provides that Petitioner "will not institute, maintain, prosecute or continue to maintain or prosecute any claims against the license of qualifying agent for Personalized Homes, Inc., Robert Ryan, with the Construction Industry Licensing Board, however Humphrey shall not be prohibited from pursuing any claim with regard to the Construction Industry Recovery Fund." While Respondent Ryan was neither a named party in Petitioner's prior civil action nor a signatory to the settlement document effectuated therein, Respondent Ryan is specifically mentioned in that document, and the document specifically contemplates actions to be taken with regard to Respondent Ryan and his license with the Board. On January 9, 1998, a final judgment was entered in which the court found: Personalized Homes, Inc., and Petitioner entered into the September 5 Contract; Respondent Ryan was the qualifying agent for Personalized Homes, Inc., during the construction of Petitioner's home; Personalized Homes, Inc., commenced construction on or after September 5, 1993; the construction was defective and performed in such a way that Personalized Homes, Inc., knowingly violated applicable state and local building codes; Petitioner suffered damages in the amount of $96,041.75; and the February 7 Contract was not performed, was cancelled before performance began, and is not related to the September 5 Contract. However, in the prior civil action, Petitioner filed pleadings with the court characterizing Petitioner's September 1993 written document as a supplement to the February 1993 Contract. After the settlement of the civil action, Petitioner filed a claim with the Board in 1998 that sought payment of his claim under Chapter 489, Florida Statutes, from the Fund based upon Petitioner's unsatisfied judgment entered in the Circuit Court action in Brevard County. A prerequisite for being paid a claim from the Fund is to successfully obtain an order from the Board. In Petitioner's claim that was filed with the Board, Petitioner represented to the Board that the September 1993 written document is a supplement to the February 1993 Contract. In the Board proceeding in 1998, Petitioner's settlement was made a part of that record. Petitioner's claim was heard and denied by order of the Board, dated April 24, 1998. The Board rejected the claim when it found that (1) Petitioner's contract upon which the claim is based was entered into in February 1993 and his contract pre-dates the effective date (July 1993) of the Recovery Statute under which his claim is governed, and (2) Petitioner waived his claim against the Fund according to the terms of his settlement in the prior judicial action. Petitioner requested a formal administrative proceeding before DOAH relating to the Board's 1998 order. Respondent Ryan was joined in that action which was, upon Respondent Ryan's unopposed motion, abated and dismissed against Respondent Ryan. No party in that action appealed the ALJ order dismissing Respondent Ryan. The action was terminated by administrative order in 2000 when the remaining parties advised the ALJ that they had entered into a settlement agreement and that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that Petitioner was entitled to recover from the Fund. The Board entered an order in 2000 reversing its 1998 order, adopted the agreed settlement and entered an order approving Petitioner's claim. Respondent Ryan appealed this final agency decision and the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the order entered by the Board in 2000 and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing. Respondent Ryan has filed motions seeking to dismiss and abate this proceeding based upon the doctrines of the law of the case and collateral estoppel. Those motions were denied prior to the hearing and renewed at the formal hearing and again are denied.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's claim be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of April, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of April, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles L. Curtis, Esquire Doumar, Curtis, Cross, Laystrom & Perloff 1177 Southeast Third Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316 Bruce M. Harris, Esquire Gray, Harris & Robinson Post Office Box 3068 Orlando, Florida 32802 Elise Matthes, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1039 Suzanne Lee, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Hardy L. Roberts, III, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, respondent was licensed as a registered building contractor having been issued license number RB 00034797 by the State of Florida (see Petitioner's Exhibit 1). On or about January 11, 1982, respondent entered into a contract with Emil and Agnes Gerlt to construct a residence to be located at Singletary Road in Sarasota, Florida. The contract price was $57,420. The home construction agreement was to be part of a trade agreement between the contractor, the respondent, and the Gerlts. Under the terms of the trade agreement, respondent was to receive the Gerlts' existing home, located at 3376 South Seclusion Drive, Sarasota, Florida, in trade for constructing the Gerlts' home. The home was to be completed within one hundred fifty (150) days (see petitioner's Exhibit 6 and Transcript, page 105). By an addendum to the Home Construction Agreement executed by respondent and the Gerlts, the parties to the agreement further agreed that the contract price, $57,420.00, was to be paid as follows: $ 5,742.00 or 10 percent as a down payment $ 5,742.00 or 10 percent when slab is poured $ 8,613.00 or 15 percent when walls are up $14,355.00 or 25 percent when sub roof is on $14,355.00 or 25 percent when drywall is completed $ 8,613.00 or 15 percent when building is completed (see petitioner's Exhibit 6). Emil and Agnes Gerlt had contacted the respondent about construction of a new home through a newspaper ad placed in the Sarasota Herald Tribune. In the ad, respondent had offered to build residences in exchange for the purchaser's existing home. At the time, the Gerlts had been attempting to sell their existing home for some time without success. Mr. Gerlt's health required the relocation from the Gerlts' existing home, a multilevel home, to a single story home. After the Gerlts discussed their requirements with the respondent, a contract was drawn up by the respondent. The Gerlts submitted the contract to their attorney, Robert Johnson, and upon obtaining Johnson's approval, signed the Home Construction Agreement noted above. (See Transcript, pages 28-29). In or about February, 1982, Emil and Agnes Gerlt entered into a trade agreement with respondent to transfer the Gerlts' Seclusion Drive residence to Green. The agreement was subject to the construction, by respondent, of the Gerlts' new home on Singletary Road, in Sarasota County, Florida. As part of the agreement, respondent was to actively seek to sell the Seclusion Drive property. The first $70,000 received from the sale of that property was to go to the Gerlts. Respondent was to receive a 6 percent commission. Any amounts remaining were to go to the Gerlts. If respondent was unable to sell the Seclusion Drive property prior to June 30, 1982, or the date of occupancy for the Singletary Road residence, whichever occurred first, the Seclusion Drive property was to be the sole property of respondent subject to payment in the amount of $70,000 to the Gerlts. (See respondent's Exhibit 1). After the Gerlts and respondent signed the above described agreement, M. Daniel Poling, Nancy Poling and Ethel E. Weathers (Mrs. Poling's mother), came by the Seclusion Drive property, without an appointment, and asked if they could see the residence. Mrs. Gerlt showed the Polings and Weathers the home and then referred them to respondent as the person handling the sale of the home. (See Transcript, pages 37-38). After the Polings and Weathers contacted respondent, respondent drew up a Contract for Sale of Real Estate, dated February 4, 1982, whereby Ethel Weathers was to sell her residence to the Gerlts for the sum of $54,000. At this point a three-way trade was anticipated between the parties. The Gerlts would obtain Weathers' property as well as an additional cash payment in exchange for their own property which would be transferred to the Polings and Weathers. Then the Polings and Weathers' residence, located at Bouganvillea Street, in Sarasota, Florida, would take the place of the Seclusion Drive property in the transaction for construction of a new home between the Gerlts and respondent. The Contract for Sale of Real Estate, dated February 4, 1982, was never fully executed, because Robert Johnson, the Gerlts' attorney, did not approve the agreement. (See petitioner's Exhibit 10 and Transcript pages 109- 110). Subsequent to the time the February 4, 1982 Contract for Sale of Real Estate was prepared, Robert Johnson, as the Gerlts' attorney, prepared another Contract for Sale of Real Estate which was fully executed by the parties. The contract provided that the Gerlts would sell their Seclusion Drive property to the Polings and Weathers for the sum of $84,000. As a special condition of the contract the Polings and Weathers were to execute a Mortgage and Promissory Note in the sum of $42,000, at 15 percent per annum, on Weathers' residence located on Bougainvillea Street, Sarasota, Florida, in favor of the respondent and the Gerlts. In the event that the Mortgage and Promissory Note was not paid off by April 17, 1982, the Polings and Weathers would deed their Bougainvillea property to Green and the Gerlts as a $42,000 credit on the contract. (See petitioner's Exhibit 8). The contract described immediately above further provided that the closing should-occur on the entire transaction on April 17, 1982. However, the Polings and Weathers would remain in the Bougainvillea residence, and the Gerlts would remain in the Seclusion Drive residence until ten days after the respondent obtained a certificate of occupancy for the construction being performed on the Gerlts' Singletary Road residence. Upon completion of the Singletary Road residence the Gerlts were to either assign their interest in the mortgage or quit claim their interest in the Bougainvillea residence to James A. Green. (See petitioner's Exhibit 8). As compensation for his services in the transfer, Green received a transfer fee in the amount of $5,000. (See petitioner's Exhibit 9). On or about March 22, 1982, respondent applied for and obtained a building permit from the Sarasota County, Florida Building and Construction Department for the construction of the Gerlts' new residence at 16700 Singletary Road, in Sarasota County, Florida. (See petitioner's Exhibit 5). In April, 1982, respondent began to perform work on the Gerlts' new home. (See Transcript, page 47). On May 21, 1982, the Gerlts executed an Adjustable Mortgage Loan Note in the amount of $42,000 plus interest, at the rate of 15.75 percent per annum, in favor of Amerifirst Federal Savings and Loan Association. The mortgage was secured by the property located at 2304 Bougainvillea Street. The proceeds of the loan were to be used to pay for the construction of the Gerlts' new home. Under the terms of the original agreement between respondent and the Gerlts, dated February 1982, respondent was to pay all costs related to the financing of construction and he was to hold the Gerlts harmless from said construction mortgage and payments due thereon until the contract was fully completed. (See petitioner's Exhibits 4 and 8, respondent's Exhibit 1 and Transcript pages 48 and testimony of Robert Johnson). Although respondent made one payment of $1,669.02, on October 22, 1982, that check was dishonored and respondent made no further payments on the mortgage for the Bougainvillea property held by Amerifirst Savings and Loan Association. Under the terms of the Adjustable Mortgage Loan Note executed by the Gerlts, mortgage payments were to be made in monthly payments of $556.34 each. (See petitioner's Exhibit 4). Between approximately June 4, 1982 and December, 1982, respondent received the following payments from the Gerlts totaling $33,912: DATE AMOUNT June 4, 1982 $11,484 June 22, 1982 $ 8,613 June 23, 1982 $14,355 Unknown $14,355 (see petitioner's Exhibit 13 and Exhibit 12 and testimony of Johnson) In addition to the amounts noted above, respondent received payment for the following changes or "extras" in construction of the Gerlts' home: DATE AMOUNT WORK PERFORMED June 4, 1982 $ 250.00 Rough-in shower in workroom June 4, 1982 $2,250.00 Complete Porch Sept.3, 1982 $ 98.75 Change kitchen window from awning to slider Sept.3, 1982 $ 35.00 Change present kitchen window TOTAL $2,633.75 In addition to the changes or "extras" in construction noted above, respondent was to perform the following changes or "extras" in construction of the Gerlts home: The front porch area was removed making the front of the house straight across at no extra cost. The cabinets in the kitchen were changed. One set of cabinets and a countertop was changed to eighteen inches and another set was changed to twenty-four inches. There was also a change in the placement of the refrigerator. The Gerlts were to pay for this change. Completion of the shower in the workroom, at owner's expense. The family room was enlarged by two feet six inches resulting in two additional sheets of paneling, at owner's cost. There was an increased amount of tile in the guest bath area resulting in an additional cost of $18.00. The owners selected a more expensive tile for the master bathroom than specified in the contract specifications. The Gerlts were to pay Green $30-$40 to install the more expensive tile. The contractor was no longer obligated to furnish or install the floor covering or carpet. Therefore, the owner was to receive a $3,450 credit on the contract price. (See petitioner's Exhibit 26 and Transcript, pages 59 and 95-98). In approximately August 1982, a dispute arose between the Gerlts and respondent over the extras on the Gerlts new residence. The disputed items included the cost of renting an electric generator for one month, at a cost of $366.30. The Gerlts did not want to pay the rental fee because they had intended to furnish a generator for the project. At the time, Mr. Gerlt worked for a person who owned a distributorship and could easily have obtained a generator for the project. (See Transcript, page 92 and petitioner's Exhibit 21). Respondent asserted that there was a change in the fireplace which resulted in an increased cost on the Gerlts' project. From the beginning, both the Gerlts and the respondent had agreed that the fireplace was supposed to be placed directly on the slab. On March 18, 1982, the Gerlts sent respondent a letter confirming this fact. The respondent constructed the fireplace on a raised hearth and then attempted to charge the Gerlts for the cost of returning the hearth to its original position. (See Transcript, pages 61 and 98). On or about August 10, 1982, Overhead Door Company of Sarasota furnished two garage doors which were used in construction of the Gerlts' Singletary Road residence. The doors were furnished pursuant to an agreement with the respondent. Under the terms of his agreement with Overhead Door Company of Sarasota, respondent was to pay for the doors within thirty days of the invoice date. Inasmuch as respondent failed to timely pay for the doors, Overhead Door Company of Sarasota filed a Claim of Lien in the amount of $514.50 against the Gerlts' property. (See petitioner's Exhibits 17, 13, and 19, and Transcript, pages 76-82 and 132) The dispute between the Gerlts and Green brought work to almost a completed halt. After the receipt of the $14,355 payment due upon completion of the drywall, respondent did little work on the project. Eventually, Green hired an attorney, Frank Calabrese, to represent him in the dispute. On September 2, 1982, the parties and their attorneys met at the job site in an attempt to resolve the dispute. As a result of that meeting, the parties verbally agreed to the items which were changes or extras. The only items designated as changes resulting in an additional cost, to be borne by the Gerlts, were the shower in the workroom, cabinet changes, the additional paneling in the family room, and the changes in amount and quality of tile used in both the guest and master bathrooms. (See petitioner's Exhibit 26 and testimony of Johnson). Nothing was done on the project, despite the agreements of the Gerlts and respondent made on September 2, 1902. Although respondent had agreed to make certain corrections in the home, he did not do so. Finally, at this time the Gerlts discovered that respondent had made no payments on the Amerifirst Savings and Loan mortgage. Therefore, Robert Johnson wrote a letter to respondent's attorney, Calabrese, in attempt to obtain some satisfaction of the problems aforementioned. (See Transcript pages 116-117, 122 and petitioner's Exhibit Number 23). On September 20, 1982, the respondent wrote a letter to Robert Johnson wherein he stated that it was impossible to complete the Gerlts' home until two problems were resolved. Specifically, respondent wanted some written resolution of the amounts to be paid by the Gerlts for extra tile and the extra kitchen cabinets. Respondent further stated, falsely, that Interior Installation, from whom the original cabinets had been ordered, refused to build the cabinets because Mrs. Gerlt had threatened to sue the owner of Interior Installation. Respondent also asserted that the contract between the Gerlts and respondent was breached when the Gerlts refused to pay for the generator on the job. Finally, respondent said that the owners had requested additional outlets which had been installed, but for which the electrician had not been paid. (See petitioners Exhibit 24). In response to this letter from Green, Johnson drafted a letter to Calabrese, on October 4, 1982, on behalf of the Gerlts. By the letter, Johnson agreed to hold the extra amount owing because of changes in amount and quality of tile used on the Gerlts' home until completion of the job, at which time respondent would receive payment. Johnson denied categorically respondent's statements about Interior Installations. Interior Installations agreed to do the work if payment was made in advance. The Gerlts agreed to pay Interior Installations the cost of the cabinet changes. Finally, Johnson indicated that the generator problem could be dealt with in the final resolution of the contract. (See petitioner's Exhibit 25). At this time, respondent already had one other project where respondent had failed to pay Interior Installations for work performed. At the time, he was sixty days late in payment for that project. Inasmuch as Interior Installations was also aware of the conflict between the owners and contractor, they requested full payment prior to beginning the work. They did not receive payment and, therefore, did not do the work. There was no evidence that the Gerlts had threatened to sue the company. Subsequent to this time, a judgment was obtained against respondent for the full amount owing on the other project. (See Transcript, pages 84). On October 14, 1982, respondent talked with Robert Johnson and told him that respondent would order the cabinet work on October 14, 1982, and that the work would be done within two weeks. Respondent told Johnson that he would deliver the Gerlts' house for occupancy by November 4, 1982. Respondent also agreed to attend to the deficit with the Amerifirst Federal Savings and Loan Association Mortgage by October 15, 1982. (See petitioner's Exhibit 27 and Transcript, page 22). Despite his assurances, respondent did not complete those items which he told Johnson he would complete. Respondent did make one payment, by check dated October 18, 1982, to Amerifirst Savings and Loan Association of $1,669.02. However, the check was returned marked "insufficient funds". (See petitioner's Exhibit 4 and Transcript, pages 122-123). On October 28, 1982, Johnson again talked with the respondent. The respondent told Johnson that the paneling in the family room was supposed to be done that day. Respondent also told Johnson that the tile person was supposed to be at the job site that day. Respondent said that Amerifirst Federal Savings and Loan would be paid $1,660. Respondent further stated that he had hired R & M Cabinets to do the cabinetry work on the Gerlts' home. (See Transcript, page 124). Again respondent's promises were not fulfilled. Furthermore, when Johnson called R & M. Cabinets about the cabinetry work on the Gerlts' home, the company requested payment in advance before the work was performed. (See Transcript, page 124). On November 1, 1982, Johnson again spoke to Green about the construction of the Gerlts' residence. Respondent told Johnson that he would have to hire another bricklayer immediately and that the job would be finished by the following Wednesday. (See Transcript, page 124). Again the respondent did not do what he told Johnson he would do on the Gerlts' home. (See Transcript, page 124). On November 24, 1982, the Pollings and Weathers served an eviction notice on the Gerlts, who still resided in their Seclusion Drive residence. Although the Polings and Weathers had agreed to stay in their Bougainvillea residence until 10 days after a certificate of occupancy was issued on the Gerlts' new home, and to allow the Gerlts to remain in their Seclusion Drive residence until the same date, this was with the understanding that the Gerlts' new home would be finished by July, 1982. (See Transcript, page 125 and testimony of Mrs. Gerlt). After the Gerlts received the eviction notice, they contacted Robert Johnson who, in turn, contacted the respondent. According to respondent, the bathroom and the kitchen cabinets were ordered and would be installed by December 8, 1982. By December 10, 1982, the plumbing, air conditioning and cabinetry would be finished. Finally, respondent told Johnson that a certificate of occupancy would be issued by December 15, 1982 for the Gerlts' home. (See Transcript, page 126). On December 8, 1982, respondent told Johnson that the cabinetry in the Gerlts' home would be done by the following Wednesday. Again, however, the respondent failed to perform as promised. (See Transcript, page 127). Although attempts were made to delay eviction, the Gerlts were evicted from their home on December 16, 1982. (See testimony of Mrs. Gerlt). On December 17, 1982, Johnson wrote respondent a letter telling him to finish the Gerlts' home or to be prepared to deliver a cashiers' check. (See Transcript, page 127). On or about December 17, 1982, Generation Electric, Inc., filed a "Claim of Lien" against the Gerlts' Singletary Road property for electrical wiring performed on that residence between June 16, 1982 and December 14, 1982, pursuant to an agreement with the respondent. The Claim of Lien was for the sum of $852.50. (See petitioner's Exhibit 16). Respondent performed no further work on the Gerlts' home. Respondent furnished no notice to the Gerlts or their attorney of his intent to stop work on the Gerlts' home. (See testimony of the Gerlts and Johnson). The Gerlts assumed the completion of the construction project on or about January 14, 1983. At the time respondent ceased work on the Gerlts' home, the construction was only a little over 50 percent completed. The kitchen was not begun; the bathrooms were not begun, with the exception of one bathtub in one bathroom; there was no septic tank; and there was no heat or air conditioning installed in the Gerlts' home. (See Transcript, pages 23-24, 55 and 102). It cost the Gerlts approximately $10,611.60 in labor and materials to complete their home. Mr. Gerlt performed most of the actual work himself. (See Transcript, pages 63-64). At the time respondent ceased work on the Gerlts' property, the mortgage on the Bougainvillea property was in default. Respondent had made no payments on that mortgage even though payments were past due. The Gerlts had to satisfy the mortgage on the Bougainvillea property. (See petitioner's Exhibit 4 and testimony of Mrs. Gerlt).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that respondent's registered building contractor's license be suspended for a period of three (3) years. RECOMMENDED this 31st day of August, 1984 in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of August, 1984 COPIES FURNISHED: Stephanie A. Daniel, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. James A. Green 624 47th Street West Palmetto, Florida 33561 James Linnan Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Fred M. Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether the Applicant is entitled to compensation in the amount of $2,500, to pay for "fill dirt" which was installed on the Applicant's real estate in relocating his homestead, after his former homestead was bought as right-of-way for Interstate Highway 75. This claim is under the guise of a relocation appeal, in accordance with the Uniform Relocation Assistance And Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970 (42 USC, 4601 - 4655).
Findings Of Fact In November, 1974, the Florida Department of Transportation paid the Applicant $32,500 in a negotiated purchase for the Applicant's property which was located in the line of construction for Interstate Highway 75. This price was for a mobile home 24' wide and 40' long, with appurtenances to the mobile home, to include a screen room, privacy paneling and carport. Prior to the November, 1974 sale of the property to the Department of Transportation, the Applicant had purchased another parcel of land in late 1973 or early 1974. It was on this parcel of land that was purchased at that time, that the Applicant relocated his home. The amount of payment for the new lot was between $2,800 and $2,900. In order to comply with certain standards of the DeSoto County, Florida Health Department, ten inches of "fill dirt" were required to be implaced to have the septic tank meet requirements for a drain field. The cost of the application of the "fill dirt" was $2,500. The expenditure of $2,500 for "fill dirt" is the item of controversy between the Applicant and the Respondent. The Applicant is claiming that the $2,500 should be reimbursed to him as part of a relocation assistance payment. The Respondent denies that the $2,500 is a proper item of compensation under the governing law on relocation assistance payments. The Respondent's denial is based upon the fact that it believes that "fill dirt" is not a compensable item. More specifically, the Respondent regards the selection of this piece of property by the Applicant as being a matter of choice, which did not have to be made. The Respondent is persuaded that other parcels of property were available, which did not require "fill dirt" to be brought in, in order to comply with health requirements and the Applicant failed to purchase such a parcel, therefore, the Applicant must defray the expense of his selection, in terms of the $2,500 which was spent to bring the property up to health standards. The history of the payments that were made by the Respondent can be derived by the application of the formula utilized. The Respondent looked at three comparable pieces of land , one for $32,500, a second for $28,500 and a third for $32,900. The closest comparable to the home that the Applicant sold, was the comparable listed at $32,500. The Respondent compared these comparable figures with the so called, "carve out" figure of a typical mobile home with equipment, on a typical mobile home site, which would have been a price of $25,721. Based upon this figure for a "carve out", and taking the figure for the closest comparable $32,500, the amount of maximum relocation reimbursement would have been $6,779. This figure is arrived at by subtracting the amount of the "carve out" figure from the closest comparable. In fact the Respondent spent $27,372 for the land purchased and other compensable items, thus entitling him to $1,651 in relocation reimbursement, according to the Respondent's calculations. Although, in the course of the hearing the Applicant was questioned about taking $1,651 as settlement. The Applicant said that he was only interested in the $2,500 figure. It should be stated that the $1,651, is an amount which does not contemplate the payment for "fill dirt". It is in fact a figure arrived at for payment of other items considered to be compensable. The question then becomes one of whether or not the Applicant is entitled to a $2500 payment for "fill dirt" which is not associated with the $1,651 which the Respondent claims the Applicant is entitled to. One final factual comment should be made. That comment is that the Respondent's acquisition and relocation assistance officer, David Nicholson, saw the Applicant's new property after the twenty five hundred dollars worth of fill dirt had been installed. At that time, Mr. Nicholson said that the property appeared to meet the criteria for a decent, safe and sanitary dwelling. The witness, Nicholson had not seen the property prior to the installation of the "fill dirt". Consequently, the Respondent can not challenge the statement by the Applicant to the effect that the "fill dirt" was necessary in order to achieve a decent, safe and sanitary dwelling.
Recommendation It is recommended that the Respondent deny the payment of $2,500 to the Applicant for installation of "fill dirt" at the Applicant's present homesite. DONE and ENTERED this 4th day of April, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Herman A. Beyer Post Office Box 382 Punta Gorda, Florida 33950 Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Office of Legal Operations Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue Did Frederick Anthony III, Inc., employ persons who were not licensed? Did Benjamin Foster have knowledge that these individuals were employed? Was Benjamin Foster responsible for the employment of unlicensed individuals? Was Benjamin Foster liable for Anthony John Bascone's actions as a real estate salesman? Did Benjamin Foster violate Sections 475.42(1)(c) and 475.25(1)(a), Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact Notice of the formal hearing was given to all parties as required by the statutes and rules. Benjamin C. Foster is a real estate broker holding License No. 0151634 issued by the Board of Real Estate. Frederick Anthony III, Inc. (FA III), is a Florida corporate real estate broker holding License No. 0215470 issued by the Board. Foster was the active firm member of the corporation. Donald McDonald and Delores McDonald were employed by FA III. While so employed, both of these persons engaged in the sale of real estate. Neither Delores McDonald nor Donald McDonald were licensed at the times in question. Foster agreed to be the active firm member for FA III because Anthony John Bascone and Frederick Hall, a real estate salesman, wanted to start a brokerage firm. Bascone and Hall had business connections with whom Foster wanted to affiliate, and Foster concluded that his function as active firm member with FA III would lead to business opportunities for FA III and for Foster's other real estate business. Bascone and Hall were corporate officers of FA III and managed the day-to-day activities of the office. They hired Donald and Delores McDonald as salespersons. Foster never met Delores McDonald and did not employ her. Foster met with Donald McDonald, Delores McDonald's husband, who said he was selling real estate at that time. Foster sent Donald McDonald to Bascone and Hall to be interviewed. Under Foster's agreement with Bascone and Hall, they would make the initial hiring determinations for their sales personnel and Foster would process the personnel as salespersons affiliated with the company. According to Foster's agreement with Bascone, Bascone would not engage in real estate sales until after he was license. Bascone was seeking a brokerage license, and it was their intent that Bascone would become the active firm member. The allegations involving Bascone's acting as a real estate professional were based on a transaction which was undisclosed to Hall or Foster until after the fact. This transaction involved the payment of a commission directly to Bascone by the seller which was unreported to Foster or Hall. Foster did not exercise close supervision over the activities of FA III.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the license of Benjamin C. Foster be suspended for three months, and that the license of Frederick Anthony III, Inc., be revoked. DONE and ORDERED this 3rd day of March, 1982, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of March, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Xavier J. Fernandez, Esquire 2701 Cleveland Avenue, Suite 10 Post Office Box 729 Fort Myers, Florida 33902 Mr. Benjamin C. Foster 5354 Emily Drive, Southwest Fort Myers, Florida 33908 Frederick Anthony III, Inc. 3920 Orange Grove Boulevard North Fort Myers, Florida 33903 C. B. Stafford, Executive Director Board of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Samuel Shorstein, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue for consideration in this hearing is whether Respondent's license as a real estate broker in Florida should be disciplined because of the matters alleged in the Administrative Complaint filed herein.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issue herein the Petitioner, Division of Real Estate, and the Florida Real Estate Commission were the state agencies responsible for the licensing of real estate professionals and the regulation of the real estate profession in Florida. Respondent was licensed as a real estate broker with license number 0414476. Respondent was operating as a real estate broker and operated a real estate brokerage under the name Roney Realty located at 424 Beach Drive Northeast, Number 205, in St. Petersburg. In early 1995, Kathleen M. Mitchell, a single mother and licensed practical nurse, while attending a garage sale, noticed a two bedroom house for sale at 805 59th Street South in Gulfport and called the broker's telephone number shown on the sign. Respondent was the broker listed. On the basis of that telephone call, Respondent and Ms. Mitchell met at the house, owned by Respondent's sister. At the time, Ms. Mitchell advised Respondent that she had credit problems and was burdened with a previous FHA mortgage which was in default. In response, Respondent urged her not to worry and assured her he could get her financing even though she had undergone a prior bankruptcy. He also indicated that the selling price for the house was variable, depending on financing and the amount of the down payment. Ms. Mitchell contends that Respondent indicated to her that he would represent both buyer and seller in a dual agency arrangement, which he got her to acknowledge in writing, and claimed he would not take a commission on the sale. The initial contract signed in this case, however, lists a commission of $1,925.00 to be paid by the seller. This inconsistency was not explained. As a result of the initial negotiations which began in January, 1995, Ms. Mitchell signed a contract for the purchase of the property on February 13, 1995, which, she claims, was to be effective in March, 1995. This agreement, reflecting a sales price of $55,000 also indicates that Ms. Mitchell had made a $200.00 cash down payment, and called for an additional payment of $800.00 within 5 days of signing and an additional $650.00 at closing, to include buyer's closing costs and prepaid items or prorations. This left a balance to be financed of $53,350. There were no other handwritten clauses placed on the contract form. Ms. Mitchell paid the initial $200.00 and agreed to pay the additional $800.00 when she moved in. On the basis of that contract and the deposit made, Ms. Mitchell was allowed to move into the house. Approximately two weeks later, when it became obvious that her financing was going to be a problem, Mr. Roney brought a second contract to the house for her to sign. At this time, Mr. Roney suggested that while the parties were waiting for her financing to be approved, Ms. Mitchell could rent the house for $500.00 per month. Ms. Mitchell agreed to do this if all the defects in the house, which she had identified and reported to Respondent, were fixed. She claims that he verbally agreed to fix everything and she thereafter signed the second contract, which is undated as to signature, but which bears an effective date of April 20, 1995. The second contract reflects a purchase price of $56,650, a deposit of $2,832.50, and a balance to finance of $53,817.50. Ms. Mitchell admits to having made the $200.00 down payment, and it is not clear whether she also paid the $800.00, but at one point in her testimony indicated that is all she paid by way of down payment. She has no idea where the figure of $2,832.50 comes from. Yet, at another point in her testimony, she claims to have given Mr. Roney $1,650.00 on March 1, 1996, which money he put into Stewart Fidelity Title Company's escrow account. The contract also reflects that the deposit is being held in escrow by Stewart Fidelity Title Co. No information was presented as to the current state of the deposit. This contract shows substantial hand-written modification to the standard contract clauses which clearly reflect that changes were made on July 7, 1995, and were "added after signing." However, there are substantial, modifications to paragraph 21 of the contract form, "additional terms", which are confusing as to when they were added and what they mean. For example, one added clause calls for the buyer to make monthly payments of $600.00 until closing ($100.00 per month credited back to buyer at closing). Another provides that the buyer accepts the property as is from day of possession and agrees to maintain the property until closing. A third indicated that the seller agrees to credit $650.00 toward buyer's costs upon closing, and a fourth states that if the buyer cannot obtain a mortgage within one year of possession, the seller may convert the agreement to a lease. The difficulty in interpretation of the above rests in the fact that arrows pointing to various of the comments are not defining in their application. For example, one arrow comes from the word "closing" down the side of the paper into the Acceptance/Rejection section where is stated, "as is meant landscaping [sic]." Another arrow points to the word "may" in the last addition and reflects, "7-7-95 added." Ms. Mitchell adamantly contends that when she signed the second contract, none of the hand-written additions were on it. Mr. Roney admitted as much at hearing, but no informationwas presented to indicate if the additions were agreed to by Ms. Mitchell at any time. She contends that when she saw those post-signing additions, she took the document to her mortgage person who directed her to contact Respondent and stop further proceedings. When Ms. Mitchell did that, she claims, she wastold by Mr. Roney not to talk to her mortgage man again, and that his, Mr. Roney's, mortgage broker would handle the obtaining of her mortgage from then on out. When Ms. Mitchell recounted those instructions to her original mortgage broker, he advised her to contact Respondent's escrow agent, get her deposit back and cancel the contract. Respondent admits to having requested Ms. Mitchell use a different mortgage broker but asserts this was because her broker was not having any apparent success in getting her qualified. Ms. Mitchell lived in the house in question for two months before she moved out. Upon the advice of an attorney, she claims, she paid no rent while she occupied the premises. While she occupied the property, she paid $250.00 to have it appraised by a state certified residential real estate appraiser who opined that as of May 9, 1995 the property was valued at $49,500. In the addendum to the appraisal report, the appraiser stated: The roof has active leaks and improperly installed areas; The front soffit has loose conditions; The electrical system has unsafe wiring and improper size fuses; The heating and AC units are not operating properly ("No source of heat"); The plumbing system has some deficiencies and possible leaks; The pool is in need of "Major Repair", including repair of leaking conditions at the main drain and tiles; termite damage was noted; the water heater needs repair (or replacement), and it is exposed to weather conditions; Window and door screens are missing; The lawn sprinkler is damaged and partially disassembled The storage shed has rust conditions. Though at hearing Respondent attempted to dismiss this appraisal as being based on the home inspection reports done at Ms. Mitchell's request previously and given the appraiser, and not his personal inspection, a review of the document clearly indicates the conditions noted above were determined from review of that report "and/or observation by the appraiser." Ms. Mitchell experienced first hand many of the problem areas noted in the appraisal report. When she mentioned to Respondent that the screen door was missing, he reportedly told her it wasn't necessary. When she complained to Respondent that she had no hot water for several days, he sent over a repairman who ultimately corrected the problem. The repairman's statement, dated "May, 1995", reflecting a charge of $445.00 for his service, indicates he repaired a water leak on the hot water heater; unblocked a restriction in the hot water supply pipe; and replaced defective control knobs on the shower. He also cut the side of the kitchen counter to fit in a new stove and delivered a replacement refrigerator with an ice maker and reconnected the water line to it. This latter installation was the result of Ms. Mitchell's continuing complaint that the refrigerator did not work for quite a while which resulted in her losing a substantial amount of perishable food. The first time that happened, she though it might be her fault and she replaced the lost food. However, when it happened again, she complained to Respondent and he told her to get it fixed. She did, at a cost to her of $100.00, which Respondent did not pay back. Finally, a refrigerator repair man was sent to the property on both April 4 and April 19, 1995. He finally recommended the unit not be repaired but replaced. This was done. When Ms. Mitchell complained to Respondent that the heating and air conditioning unit in the living room did not work, and that the bedroom unit did not heat, she admits that Respondent had a repairman come out and look at the unit. Though she claims the repairman told her it would take $483.00 to repair it, she appears to have confused the appliances, as the repairman's statement, dated April 19, 1995, refers to an estimated cost of $483.00 to replace the compressor on the refrigerator, not the heater/air conditioner. There is no evidence to indicate how the problem with those units was resolved. Ms. Mitchell contends that when she first saw the swimming pool, before she contracted to buy the house, it was clear and the pump was running. When she thereafter heard a noise in the pump, in February, 1995, before she moved in, she reported this to the Respondent. Nothing was done about it. After she moved in, the pool rapidly became unusable. The pump motor was inoperative and the water turned green. Ms. Mitchel claims she called Respondent almost daily about the pool. He told her his sister had the motor removed for repairs and he would get it back. The motor was subsequently returned, along with the pool equipment which had been removed, but the pool leaked, requiring her to add water every day, and she could not keep the water clear. In late April, 1995, a pool man was sent to the property who, according to Ms. Mitchell, indicated that there was a need to replace loose tiles and mastic because of the age of the pool, and a leak at the main drain. It is not clear from the evidence presented if these repairs were made. When the appraisal report was rendered, showing a fair market price considerably less than what she had contracted to pay, Ms. Mitchell advised Respondent on several occasions that she to cancel the contract. On May 2, 1995, after she had seen an attorney and another real estate broker, she wrote to Respondent requesting either that he refund the deposit money she had placed with him and reimburse her in the amount of $500.00 for her personal expenses, in which case she would vacate the property within one week of receipt of the money, or return her deposit within one week, in which case she would vacate the property by June 1, 1995. In either case, she indicated she would pay no more rent. In that regard, it appears she had paid no rent up to that time, though she had agreed to pay rent in the event they could agree upon the terms of a contract and the property was repaired. She claims she did not expect to live in the property rent free, but believed that what she had paid out in repairs was fair rent for her occupancy. No clear total figure for what she paid out was provided. In response, Ms. Mitchell received a letter from the Respondent in which he demanded payment of the rent due. Thereafter, on June l, 1995, Ms. Mitchell received a second letter from the Respondent in which he stated he assumed she had agreed to deduct the amount due for rent from the deposit money she had placed with him and which he held in escrow. According to Respondent's calculations, Ms. Mitchell owed $1,271.56 in back rent after crediting her with $100.00 of the $600.00 per month rent payment she was to make. When this $1,271.56 was deducted from the $1,603.45 escrow balance held by him, $331.89 would be left in the escrow account. Respondent gave her the choice of doing that or of paying what was owed in case, leaving the entire escrow account untouched. He advised her she must make her choice and advise him and the escrow agent within forty-eight hours. Respondent did not satisfactorily explain his calculations at hearing. From the state of the evidence presented, it was impossible for the undersigned to determine exactly how much money Ms. Mitchell paid by way of deposit, rent, or repairs. Between the receipt of Respondent's first and second letters, Ms. Mitchell spoke with him about the condition of the house and what she wanted to do with regard to it. At no time did she authorize Respondent to make any deduction from the amount in escrow. In the interim, she began to look for another house and to seek alternative funding. She also tried to contact Respondent but she was unable to do so, reaching only his pager. Finally, she received a three-day notice dated June 20, 1995 to pay the rent due or vacate. In response, she wrote an undated letter to Respondent in which she said she was sending $1,000.00 to pay $500.00 rent for both May and June, 1995, but neither mailed the letter nor sent the money. Thereafter, she received a second three day notice dated June 30, 1995, directing her to pay the rent due or move out. This notice was left in her mail box by the Respondent. She neither paid the rent nor moved out at that time. Ms. Mitchell finally moved out of the property in issue on July 18, 1995 and thereafter, on a weekly basis, either verbally or in writing, demanded return of her deposit. She did not get it back. Mr. Roney's account of the beginning of the parties' relationship is consistent with that of Ms. Mitchell, except that Ms. Mitchell initially indicated the property could not be worth more than in the mid-forty thousand dollar range. In response, Respondent claimed to have done a market analysis on the property which supported the asking price, and because his sister had put a lot of money into the property, it could not be sold for a price as low as even in the high forty thousand dollar range. It would appear from the independent appraisal done of the property, the true value was closer to Ms. Mitchell's estimation rather than Respondent's. Nonetheless, Ms. Mitchell liked the property and agreed to buy it at the asking price, after she had looked it over with a contractor friend of hers. Respondent admits that Ms. Mitchell was forthright with him in disclosing her financial problems. She told him of her bankruptcy of several years previous, and in response to his questioning, noted several other problems, none of which, by her account, were her fault. When Ms. Mitchell called Respondent on February 13, 1995, indicating she was ready to sign, he referred her to a mortgage company which he felt could help her. Based on what information Ms. Mitchell had provided, Respondent had been told that her financial problems were "fixable". As a result, the first contract was signed and the financing process initiated. On March 18, 1995, Ms. Mitchell called Respondent and indicated she wanted to move into the house prior to closing because her current landlord would neither acknowledge nor fix defects in her property, and she had to get out. Therefore, on or about March 20, 1995, Respondent re-wrote the contract and requested she use another mortgage broker as a condition of taking possession prior to closing. Respondent claims that the seller's disclosure as to the condition of the property was accurate but Ms. Mitchell wanted an independent inspection done to which Respondent agreed. He insisted, however, that if she wanted to move in before closing, she would have to take the property "as is." He advised Ms. Mitchell that his sister had not lived in the property for a year. It was not clear from the evidence presented whether the property was vacant for that entire year or whether it had been rented out. Ms. Mitchell moved in after signing the second contract. Respondent claims Ms. Mitchell called almost daily with some complaint or other and he would have each one fixed. Finally, he met with her and the handyman and they went around to check everything out. She seemed satisfied. Nonetheless, after that Ms. Mitchell called to complain about the swimming pool. Respondent's sister and the handyman both went to the house to explain how to work the filtration system. To insure that there was no leak in the pool, Respondent gave Ms. Mitchell the name of the pool company which had serviced the pool for ten years so that if anything went wrong, she could contact them directly to have it checked and get instruction. While Respondent contends the pool company report indicated no leak and no major problems, Ms. Mitchell wrote on the invoice submitted by the repairman dated April 25, 1993, "... notified me and Mr. Rony [sic] of need to replace loose tiles and main drain leak and re- mastic due to extreme age of pool." Unfortunately, no direct evidence was presented which resolves the apparent inconsistency in the evidence. Mr. Roney claims he tried to remedy any problem Ms. Mitchell had with the house. For example, on April 3, 1995, she called to complain about the refrigerator. On April 4, 1995 he told her to call whomever she wanted, and if the estimate were reasonable, she could deduct the repair charge from the rent. If the charge were estimated to be major, she was instructed to call back. When she called and said the charge would be $100.00, he authorized it. However, a week later, Ms. Mitchell again called and complained about the refrigerator and Mr. Roney replaced it the next day. The problems with the refrigerator are documented by independent evidence of record. The replacement there was admitted by Ms. Mitchell. Respondent asserts that the delinquency notices and track toward the closing. When he found out that Ms. Mitchell was trying to get an appraisal done on the property, he tried to tell her that an appraisal would be done as a part of the mortgage process, but she wanted her own. The results of that independent appraisal were discussed previously. Sometime thereafter, Ms. Mitchell told Respondent she wanted out of the contract. The seller agreed to let her out if Ms. Mitchell would pay some rent for the period she occupied the property. As a result, Respondent tried to get her to pay. When she would not, he sent the eviction notices. Respondent admits he did not receive $2,853.00 in deposit money from Ms. Mitchell. That figure cited was the result of her representations to him that she could come up with it. When the contract was signed, she gave him a check for a part of it and said she'd come up with the balance, but she never came up with the full amount. Any deposit payments made by Ms. Mitchell were deposited with Stewart Title Company where it remains. It is impossible to determine how much was paid as deposit by Ms. Mitchell and how much, if any as rent. Respondent asserts Ms. Mitchell never made any claim to him for return of her deposit. Any claims for return were all made to Stewart Title. Ms. Roney, the owner, did not want to lease the property or sell it on a lease option. She wanted to sell it outright because she needed the money for other investments. She agreed to a lease-purchase arrangement only because the mortgage broker assured her Ms. Mitchell could clear her credit and the sale could go through. She also agreed because Ms. Mitchell had had the property inspected and appeared to be satisfied with its condition. Ms. Roney claims she had no problems with the pool when she lived there and also claims that since the property has been sold, the new owners have not contacted her regarding any problems with the pool. She would not approve a refund of deposit under the conditions of this dispute. Respondent contends there have been no complaints filed against him for the practice of his real estate profession in the 15 years he has been licensed. No evidence of prior misconduct was shown.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order finding Respondent not guilty of misrepresentation and breach of trust in a business transaction and dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of December, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of December, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven W. Johnson, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Paul H. Roney, Jr. 424 Beach Drive Northeast, Suite 205 St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Henry M. Solares Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Lynda L. Goodgame General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
