The Issue Whether Petitioner is eligible to recover from the Construction Industries Recovery Fund, and, if so, in what amount.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner entered into a contract with "Personalized Homes" to build his home located in Brevard County, on February 7, 1993. Jack Powell signed the contract on behalf of Personalized Homes. This contract required substantial completion on or before September 15, 1993. Respondent Ryan was the qualifying agent for Personalized Homes, Personalized Homes Corporation, Personalized Homes, Inc., and Personalized Homes of Brevard, Inc., during all times relevant hereto. Petitioner took the February 1993 Contract to the bank which approved a construction loan. Petitioner used a portion of the proceeds from the construction loan obtained in March 1993 to buy the lot upon which his house was eventually built. Petitioner could not have obtained the construction loan or purchased the lot upon which he built his home without the use of the February 1993 Contract. Petitioner had architectural plans drawn up in February/March 1993, after the February 1993 Contract was signed. Petitioner recorded in the official records of Brevard County a Notice of Commencement of the construction of a home in March 1993. The Notice of Commencement was for the plans drawn up for the house after the February 1993 Contract was signed. No actual construction was begun under the original plans. The initial plans were rejected and new plans were prepared in the summer of 1993. Petitioner sought bids from several contractors but settled on Personalized Homes to complete the project. Petitioner and Personalized Homes, Inc., entered into another written document relating to the construction of Petitioner's home which was dated September 5, 1993. Jack Powell and John Kingsley signed the September 5 Contract on behalf of Personalized Homes, Inc. An application for a building permit for the construction of Petitioner's house was filed on September 28, 1993, and construction commenced. Problems developed from the construction of Petitioner's house which led to Petitioner filing a civil action in Circuit Court in Brevard County against persons and entities, including Personalized Homes of Brevard, Inc., but not including Respondent Ryan. On August 6, 1996, Petitioner filed an Amended Complaint against Jack Powell, John Kingsley, Personalized Homes, Inc., and Personalized Homes of Brevard, Inc., but not including Respondent Ryan. The Defendants each filed answers and affirmative defenses stating that the February 7 Contract was for financing purposes only and that the September 5 Contract was the applicable contract. On January 8, 1998, the parties to the litigation entered into a settlement agreement. Pursuant to the settlement agreement, Jack Powell, John Kingsley, Personalized Homes, Inc., and Personalized Homes of Brevard, Inc., agreed to pay Petitioner $17,500. Paragraph 13 of the settlement agreement provides that Petitioner will not prosecute an administrative claim against Jack Powell, John Kingsley, and Personalized Homes of Brevard, Inc., including any claims with the Board. This covenant expressly does not prohibit any claim against Personalized Homes, Inc. Paragraph 13 further provides that Petitioner "will not institute, maintain, prosecute or continue to maintain or prosecute any claims against the license of qualifying agent for Personalized Homes, Inc., Robert Ryan, with the Construction Industry Licensing Board, however Humphrey shall not be prohibited from pursuing any claim with regard to the Construction Industry Recovery Fund." While Respondent Ryan was neither a named party in Petitioner's prior civil action nor a signatory to the settlement document effectuated therein, Respondent Ryan is specifically mentioned in that document, and the document specifically contemplates actions to be taken with regard to Respondent Ryan and his license with the Board. On January 9, 1998, a final judgment was entered in which the court found: Personalized Homes, Inc., and Petitioner entered into the September 5 Contract; Respondent Ryan was the qualifying agent for Personalized Homes, Inc., during the construction of Petitioner's home; Personalized Homes, Inc., commenced construction on or after September 5, 1993; the construction was defective and performed in such a way that Personalized Homes, Inc., knowingly violated applicable state and local building codes; Petitioner suffered damages in the amount of $96,041.75; and the February 7 Contract was not performed, was cancelled before performance began, and is not related to the September 5 Contract. However, in the prior civil action, Petitioner filed pleadings with the court characterizing Petitioner's September 1993 written document as a supplement to the February 1993 Contract. After the settlement of the civil action, Petitioner filed a claim with the Board in 1998 that sought payment of his claim under Chapter 489, Florida Statutes, from the Fund based upon Petitioner's unsatisfied judgment entered in the Circuit Court action in Brevard County. A prerequisite for being paid a claim from the Fund is to successfully obtain an order from the Board. In Petitioner's claim that was filed with the Board, Petitioner represented to the Board that the September 1993 written document is a supplement to the February 1993 Contract. In the Board proceeding in 1998, Petitioner's settlement was made a part of that record. Petitioner's claim was heard and denied by order of the Board, dated April 24, 1998. The Board rejected the claim when it found that (1) Petitioner's contract upon which the claim is based was entered into in February 1993 and his contract pre-dates the effective date (July 1993) of the Recovery Statute under which his claim is governed, and (2) Petitioner waived his claim against the Fund according to the terms of his settlement in the prior judicial action. Petitioner requested a formal administrative proceeding before DOAH relating to the Board's 1998 order. Respondent Ryan was joined in that action which was, upon Respondent Ryan's unopposed motion, abated and dismissed against Respondent Ryan. No party in that action appealed the ALJ order dismissing Respondent Ryan. The action was terminated by administrative order in 2000 when the remaining parties advised the ALJ that they had entered into a settlement agreement and that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that Petitioner was entitled to recover from the Fund. The Board entered an order in 2000 reversing its 1998 order, adopted the agreed settlement and entered an order approving Petitioner's claim. Respondent Ryan appealed this final agency decision and the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the order entered by the Board in 2000 and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing. Respondent Ryan has filed motions seeking to dismiss and abate this proceeding based upon the doctrines of the law of the case and collateral estoppel. Those motions were denied prior to the hearing and renewed at the formal hearing and again are denied.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's claim be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of April, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of April, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles L. Curtis, Esquire Doumar, Curtis, Cross, Laystrom & Perloff 1177 Southeast Third Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316 Bruce M. Harris, Esquire Gray, Harris & Robinson Post Office Box 3068 Orlando, Florida 32802 Elise Matthes, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1039 Suzanne Lee, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Hardy L. Roberts, III, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202
The Issue Whether Respondent, Brenda W. Smith, violated sections 475.25(1)(b) and 475.25(1)(d)1., Florida Statutes (2013),1/ as alleged in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute real estate licensees, pursuant to section 20.165 and chapters 120, 455, and 475, Florida Statutes. Respondent is licensed by Petitioner as a real estate broker in the state of Florida, license BK 534400. Respondent’s address of record with Petitioner is Post Office Box 15453, Panama City, Florida 32406. Respondent’s brokerage, Spirits Realty, Inc., is a registered for-profit corporation in the state of Florida with its principal place of business listed as 3812 Dolphin Drive, Panama City Beach, Florida 32408, and a mailing address listed as Post Office Box 15453, Panama City, Florida 32406. On May 31, 2012, Respondent, on behalf of her brokerage, Spirits Realty, Inc., entered into a property management agreement (Property Management Agreement) with Ronald W. Roberts to manage the rental of Mr. Roberts’ property located at 3803 Long John Drive, Panama City Beach, Florida 32408.3/ The term of the Property Management Agreement was for one year, beginning May 31, 2012, and provided: THIS PROPERTY MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT is made on the 31st day of May 2012 and is effective 31 May 2012 by and between Ronald W. Roberts whose address is 3555 Walden Land, Acworth, Ga 30102, hereinafter referred to as “Owner” and SPIRITS REALTY INC., BRENDA SMITH, LICENSED REAL ESTATE BROKER, Post Office Box 15453, Panama City, Florida 32406, hereinafter referred to as “Agent”. WITNESSETH in consideration of the mutual promises and covenants herein contained, the Owner and Agent agree as follows: The Owner represents to the Agent as follows: (a) The Owner is the sole owner and holder of marketable record title to the following described property: 3803 Long John Drive, Panama City Beach, Florida 32408. The Owner hereby appoints the Agent as the sole and exclusive Agent to Lease and manage the premises known as 3803 Long John Drive. This Agreement is for 1 year beginning 31 May 2012. Agent to enter into an agreement for 1 year lease, $1000 per month rental, tenant to pay Jun/July rent in advance (non-refundable); & $1000 security deposit. The owner agrees to the following: Spirits Realty Inc. Commission of 10% of the rents collected in each calendar month (which shall be deducted from rents collected each month). Spirits Realty Inc., Hancock Bank, holds the security deposit (for liquidated damages) and advanced last months [sic] rent in Escrow. If Agent is not available, Jesse Smith, Admin, is authorized signer. 4. [sic] Owner authorizes the broker to secure tenant; and enter into a 1 year lease. Manage tenant relations collecting, give receipts, holding and disbursing rents to owner, serving notices, initiating eviction & damage actions. Agent will receive and forward $2500 check from tenant to Ron Roberts, for sale agreement of furniture and furnishings, on site. The Property Management Agreement was signed by Ronald W. Roberts and notarized in Cherokee County, Georgia, on May 31, 2012. Notably, the Property Management Agreement does not require advanced notice on the part of the Owner to terminate the Property Management Agreement. On May 31, 2012, Respondent and/or Spirits Realty Inc., ostensibly acting on behalf of Mr. Roberts, entered into a four- page residential lease agreement drafted by Respondent (Lease) with Allen Pridgen and Lori Roark (n/k/a Lori Pridgen), as tenants, for the rental of Mr. Roberts’ property located at 3803 Long John Drive, Panama City Beach, Florida 32408 (the Premises). The term of the Lease was for one year, from June 1, 2012, through June 30, 2013. Curiously, instead of naming Mr. Roberts as the lessor, the first sentence on the first page of the Lease names “Spirits Realty Inc., Brenda Smith, Lic. Real Estate Broker, Agent” as “Lessor.” The bottom of the first page of the Lease states “Page 1 of 1.” In addition, page four of the Lease submitted by Respondent as part of her Exhibit R-7 (which page was not included in the copy of the Lease submitted by Petitioner as part of Exhibit P-2) is signed by Respondent and Spirits Realty, Inc., on and below the signature line labeled “Lessor,” respectively. By comparing the signatures of the “Lessees” on the last page of the Lease (page four) with the signatures on the exhibit entitled “Security Deposit/Advance Last Months [sic] Rent Receipt” (Deposit Receipt), it is apparent that Allen and Lori Pridgen both signed page four of the Lease on May 31, 2012, as Lessees. As documented by the Deposit Receipt, on May 31, 2012, Respondent collected from Allen and Lori Pridgen a $1,000 cash security deposit, plus $1,000 as the last month’s rental payment under the Lease. The Deposit Receipt, signed by both of the Pridgens, as well as Respondent, provides that the monies collected would be held in a “non-interest bearing account Spirits Realty, Inc. Escrow” with Hancock Bank in Panama City Beach, Florida. Mr. Roberts signed a typed statement on May 31, 2012, printed on paper with a fax number, date, and time in the top margin, stating: “The four page Residential Lease on Long John Drive, Panama City Beach, Florida, is hereby agreed upon and approved by the property owner Ronald W. Roberts.” The next year, Respondent prepared a document entitled “Lease Renewal Agreement” (Lease Renewal) for renewal of the Lease for another seven months, from June 1, 2013, to January 1, 2014. The initial paragraph of the Lease Renewal listed the parties as: Lessor4/: Allen Pridgen & Lori [Pridgen] Agent: Spirits Realty Inc., Lic. Real Estate Broker The Lease Renewal kept all terms of the Lease in effect and provided that the Security Deposit and last month’s rent would continue to be held in Hancock Bank. The Lease Renewal also stated: That tenants shall pay a monthly rental of $1,000 for each month by the 1st of each month to Spirits Realty, Inc., for the Renewal Term. Tenants agree to give 60 days written notice prior to vacating property, Or give notice of intent to renew lease for up to one year. According to dates next to their signatures, the Lease Renewal was signed by Alan and Lori Pridgen on May 30, 2013; by Brenda Smith for “Spirits Realty Inc and Brenda Smith, Lic Real Estate Broker” on May 31, 2013; and by Dorothy and Ronald Roberts as “Property Owner” on June 4, 2013. In late 2013, the Roberts decided to terminate the Property Management Agreement and manage the rental of the Premises themselves. The decision to terminate the agreement was made a short time after the tenants had a problem with a water leak and a faulty water heater. Because the tenants considered the problem to be an emergency, they dealt directly with the Roberts, who, as owners, authorized the tenants to pay for the required repairs directly and take the payment off the rent. On December 1, 2013, Mr. Roberts spoke to Respondent on the telephone and advised her that the Roberts no longer wanted to use Respondent’s brokerage, Sprits Realty, Inc., for property management services and that they were going to terminate the Property Management Agreement. Ms. Roberts was present with her husband during the telephone conversation and overheard the discussions. During the conversation, Respondent told Mr. Roberts that they needed to give her at least a 60-day notice of termination, and Mr. Roberts advised Respondent that their termination of the Property Management Agreement would be effective February 1, 2014. The next day, December 2, 2013, the Roberts sent a letter by certified mail to Respondent, at her address, and to Spirits Realty, Inc., at its address. The letter was signed by both Mr. and Ms. Roberts, witnessed and notarized, and stated: Dear Mrs. Smith, Per our conversation on December 1, 2013, please accept this letter as a 60 day formal notification that we wish to terminate the contract we currently have with Spirit Realty for Property Management Services. As of 2/1/2014, we will no longer require your services in handling the property management for 3803 Long John Drive, Panama City, Florida, 32408. Please forward the security deposit that you collected from the tenant, Alan Pridgen in 2012 and are currently holding in an escrow account. You can mail it to Ronald & Dorothy Roberts at 3555 Walden Lane, Acworth, Georgia 30102. We appreciate your time and services since Mr. Pridgen began occupying the property. Although multiple attempts were made to deliver the letters, they were returned unaccepted. The Roberts made additional attempts to contact Respondent by telephone, but were unable to do so. By another letter sent by certified mail to Respondent dated January 16, 2014, Mr. and Ms. Roberts again requested in writing that Respondent forward to them the $2,000 identified in the Deposit Receipt. The letter reiterated the fact that in a telephone conversation on December 1, 2013, Respondent was advised that the Roberts were terminating the Property Management Agreement. The letter was returned unaccepted. Although the Roberts letters to Respondent dated December 1, 2013, and January 16, 2014, were returned unaccepted, Respondent’s own exhibit, a copy of a certified letter that Respondent allegedly sent to the tenants on December 11, 2013, acknowledges that Mr. Roberts called on December 1, 2013, regarding both the Lease and the Property Management Agreement. The first paragraph on the third page of Respondent’s December 11, 2013, letter to the tenants states: 1 Dec 2013 Ron Roberts called SRI [Spirits Realty, Inc.] agent saying Alan [Pridgen] paid over $900 in improvement costs having to do with the air conditioner and hot water heater - & Alan would not be paying rent due 1 Jan 2014 – SRI would not receive a management fee – triggering liquidated damages clause. Breach of lease. Lease – Agreement/relationship of landlord & tenant (real property) or lessor and lessee – specifes [sic] 10% rent compensation. Further, during her cross-examination of Ms. Roberts at the final hearing, Respondent acknowledged that she had spoken on the telephone with Mr. Roberts on December 2, 2013, and that during the conversation the subject of breaking a contract with a real estate person was discussed. While it is found that the telephone conversation occurred on December 1, 2013, as opposed to December 2, 2013, it is evident that the conversation indeed occurred. Based on the evidence, it is found that on December 1, 2013, the Roberts effectively communicated their desire to terminate the Property Management Agreement, effective February 1, 2014. Further, although the certified letters were refused, it is found that the Roberts timely asked Respondent for return of the $2,000 reflected in the Deposit Receipt. In addition to the letters that the Roberts sent to Respondent, after speaking to the Roberts, Ms. Pridgen prepared a letter, at the Roberts’ request, for her husband to send to Respondent, dated December 1, 2013, which stated: Brenda, This letter is to inform you that I no longer wish to continue my contract with you and the Roberts. I have been renting this property since June of 2012, the original contract was for one year. I agreed to rent the property for an additional 6 months which is now up. I no longer wish to continue this contract with Spirits Realty Inc. Thank you Allen D. Pridgen The letter was sent to Respondent by certified mail on December 4, 2013, but Respondent never picked it up. Shortly after her conversation with Mr. Roberts on December 1, 2013, Respondent called the police and tried to have the Pridgens evicted from the Premises. The Roberts explained over the phone to the police officer that they, not Respondent, were the owners of the Premises. The Pridgens were not evicted. Ms. Pridgen’s credible testimony explained that they did not intend to vacate the Premises, but rather planned to continue to rent it directly from the Roberts. As of the date of the final hearing, the Pridgens were still leasing the Premises from Ms. Roberts. To date, Respondent has not returned to Ms. Roberts, as owner with responsibilities over the Lease, either the $1,000 Security Deposit or the $1,000 Advanced Rent she collected from the tenants. Instead, Respondent has retained the entire $2,000 and characterizes the funds as “liquidated damages” for the Roberts’ wrongful termination of the Property Management Agreement. The Property Management Agreement has no specific requirement for the manner in which it is to be terminated. Nevertheless, Respondent transferred the $2,000 reflected in the Deposit Receipt into Spirits Realty, Inc.’s, operating account at Hancock Bank. Respondent argues that she is entitled to retain the $2,000 because Ms. Roberts did not make a timely claim upon the escrow deposit following receipt of Respondent’s expressed intent to keep the escrow monies as “liquidated damages.” Respondent bases her argument on the Roberts’ alleged breach of the Property Management Agreement. As there was no breach and the Roberts’ request for return of the escrow funds was timely made, Respondent’s belief that she is entitled to liquidated damages has no merit. Respondent also suggests that she is entitled to retain the $2,000 reflected in the Deposit Receipt because the tenants failed to give 60 days’ notice of their intent to terminate the Lease. Respondent’s suggestion is premised upon the fact that she and her brokerage are erroneously named as the “Lessor” in the Lease that Respondent drafted. Respondent’s argument evinces that she either has a misunderstanding of her role as agent for the Roberts, or intended to take advantage of her position in a manner inconsistent with her obligations under the Property Management Agreement. Although erroneously listed as the “Lessor” under the Lease, neither Respondent nor her brokerage was a proper party to the Lease. Rather, in accordance with the Property Management Agreement, Respondent and her brokerage were only authorized as agents for Mr. Roberts in dealing with the Premises. Under the circumstances, even if the tenants had breached the Lease (which they did not), Mr. Roberts and his successor in interest, Ms. Roberts, not Respondent and her brokerage, would be entitled to make a claim against the tenants as the owners and actual lessors under the Lease. Incredibly, at the final hearing, Respondent submitted into evidence a copy of a document entitled “Lease Addendum” dated May 31, 2012, which was purportedly signed by the tenants, Alan Pridgen and Lori Pridgen. The purported “Lease Addendum” provides: Lease Addendum 31 May 2012 FS 83.575, 83.595 breach, liquidated damages, and termination FS 83.595(4) Tenant statue [sic] contains two liquidated damages provisions allowing the landlord (Lessor) an opportunity to impose liquidated damages on the tenant for early termination or for failure to give notice of intent not to renew lease. Lessor, Spirits Realty Inc. will receive the $2,000 advance fees, “early termination fee”, out of escrow, if a breach of the lease occurs. X I agree as provided in the lease agreement, $2,000 security (an amount that does not exceed 2 months rent) as liquidated damages or an early termination fee if I elect to terminate the lease agreement and Lessor waives the right to seek additional rent beyond the month in which landlord takes possession. FS 83.575 Lessee is required to give 60 days notice of intent not to renew the lease or Lessor, Spirits Realty Inc will receive the $2,000 advance fees security deposits as “liquidated damages”. Spirits Realty Inc is entitled to 5% real estate fee at close. In addition, Respondent submitted into evidence a second document entitled “Lease Addendum” purportedly signed by the now-deceased Mr. Roberts. That second “Lease Addendum” provides: Lease Addendum 31 May 2012 I agree with the Lease Addendum. Spirits Realty Inc will receive the $2,000 security deposits advanced fees out of escrow if there is a breach in the lease. Spirits Realty Inc will receive 5% real estate fee when the property closes. Lessor is acting as a Transaction Broker to lease/sale property. Ms. Roberts and Lori Pridgen credibly testified during the hearing that neither they nor Mr. Roberts, prior to his death, signed a separate Lease Addendum. Ms. Pridgen testified that she would not have signed any type of document which essentially gave up any and all rights to the escrow monies. Further, Ms. Roberts explained that her late husband, Mr. Roberts, who had an understanding of real estate matters, would not have signed such a document. Moreover, the documents presented as lease addenda are suspect. The type font is remarkably different from other documents obtained on May 31, 2012, in connection with the Lease and Property Management Agreement. Further, the paper signed by Mr. Roberts on May 31, 2012, in which he agreed to the Lease, has a fax number, date, and time at the top, but the purported lease addendum does not. Finally, the signatures on the lease addenda appear to have been copied from other signatures and taped into place. While reviewing the purported lease addendum during her cross-examination by Respondent at the final hearing, Ms. Pridgen testified: Okay. First of all, this is not the –- this has never been seen in our paperwork. The whole time that we’ve been doing paperwork with you for all these years, this was never ever seen till Brande sent it up here in the paperwork she had. And besides that, the print is not the same as any of your paperwork. And also, you can tell by the signature that they have been copied and paste onto the amendment. If the – somebody will just look at them, you didn’t clean up your work under your tape before you put it right there. So you - - you needed to clean your work up when you tape something like that because we’ve done it before. You have to clean up your work, or people can tell it when you look at it. Other than evincing Respondent’s nefarious intent to justify her retention of the $2,000, the purported lease addenda are given no evidentiary value. The evidence does not justify Respondent’s retention of the $2,000. The evidence adduced at the final hearing otherwise clearly and convincingly showed that Respondent wrongfully retained the $2,000 identified in the Deposit Receipt.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Florida Real Estate Commission, finding that Respondent violated sections 475.25(1)(b) and 475.25(1)(d)1. as charged in the Administrative Complaint, imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $3,500, assessing reasonable costs pursuant to section 455.227(3)(a), and revoking Respondent’s license to practice real estate. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of July, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of July, 2016.
The Issue The issue presented for decision herein is whether or not the Respondent, Morton Schultz, failed to supervise, direct, inspect and control all work on a construction project for which he was the qualifying agent and whether he made misleading and deceptive representations in contracting in violation of Sections 489.129(4)(c), (d) and (j), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received, Respondent's written response filed herein and the entire record compiled, I hereby make the following relevant factual findings. By its Administrative Complaint dated September 17, 1981, Petitioner seeks to take disciplinary action against Respondent as licensee and against his licenses as both a registered general contractor and registered pool contractor. During times material herein, Respondent was the qualifying agent for National Builders, Inc., and is the holder of license number CG C001944. On September 15, 1980, Respondent, as qualifying agent for National Builders, Inc., contracted to build a five-story condominium in Miami Beach, Dade County, Florida, with Joel Amstell d/b/a Amstell, Inc. Pursuant to the contract, Mr. James Rosen was to be the on-site supervisor for National Builders. (Petitioner's Exhibit 2) Mr. Rosen is not a registered or licensed contractor. The contract price for the construction of the condominium herein was $328,000 including all labor and materials. Additionally, the job was to be bonded and the premium for issuance of the bond was to be borne by National Builders, Inc. (Petitioner's Exhibit 2, paragraph, 3) Pursuant to the contract, the entire job will be finished six months after the pilings are in place. If the job takes longer, the interest charge paid by the developer to the lender will be deducted from the amount due National Builders, Inc. If the job is finished in less than six months, half the interest the developer saves will be paid to National Builders, Inc. (Petitioner's Exhibit 2, page 2) The pilings were completed and erected at the end of January, 1981. The project was not completed at the end of July, 1981 as is set forth in the contract. Mr. Amstell made repeated requests for Respondent to spend some time on this project to supervise or otherwise see that the project was completed as agreed. Despite Mr. Amstell's repeated prodding of Respondent, Respondent refused to spend any time on the project and demanded an increase in the contract price to complete the project. At that point, Mr. Amstell attempted to get the bonding company to complete the construction for the building and, at that point, found that the project was not bonded as Respondent agreed pursuant to the contract. (Testimony of Amstell, TR. p. 13) Respondent failed to perform the duties required of a qualifying agent in that he failed to supervise, direct, inspect and control the progress of the work on this project. (TR. pp. 15-18 and 34-38) To complete construction of the project, owner Amstell expended an additional $108,000. This figure was not caused by any changes or other deviations from the drawings and plans which were submitted to Respondent and which he (Respondent) agreed to perform. Supervisor Rosen left the project during June of 1981. From the period January through June of 1981, supervisor Rosen saw Respondent on the construction site no more than three times. Supervisor Rosen concluded that Respondent failed to provide him with the guidance and assistance he needed to complete this project as agreed. At the time that Respondent left the project, the beams and walls were not properly aligned as agreed and owner Amstell had to expend monies to paint the building adjacent to his building due to the fact that concrete had spilled on the property next door and was never cleaned as promised by Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Respondent's registered general contractor's license number CG C001944 be REVOKED. RECOMMENDED this 25th day of January, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of January, 1985.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Ezell Realty, Inc., was a licensed corporate real estate broker having been issued license number 0231943 by petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate. Respondent, Winfield Ezell, Sr., held real estate broker's license number 0309739 issued by petitioner and was the sole qualifying broker and officer of Ezell Realty, Inc. The firm is located at 1512 West Gore Street, Orlando, Florida. Grover Crawford was an acquaintance of Ezell who was interested in purchasing certain rental property on Coretta Way in Orlando, Florida. When he was unable to purchase the property Crawford told Ezell to let him know if anything else became available in that area. Ezell happened to own a rental house at 1121 Coretta Way which he had just purchased several months earlier in a foreclosure proceeding, and the two eventually began discussions concerning a possible sale. At all times relevant thereto, the house was rented to tenants, and Crawford intended the property to remain as investor-owned property rather than owner-occupied property. Ezell initially agreed to sell the property for $70,000 and the two entered into a contract on January 8, 1983, using this sales price. However, the lender's appraisal of the residence came in far below this figure, and the parties eventually agreed on a sales price of $55,450. A second contract for sale and purchaser was executed on June 22, 1983. Although the contract provided that Crawford would pay a cash deposit of $2,300 to be held in escrow by Ezell Realty, none was paid since Ezell was given $2,300 by the tenants of the house to make needed repairs to the property prior to the sale. This arrangement was agreeable with Crawford. The contract also required the seller (Ezell) to pay all closing coats. Therefore, Crawford was not required to pay any "up front" costs in order to buy the property. Under the terms of the second contract, Crawford was to obtain FHA financing on the property in the amount of $53,150. This type of financing is the most desirable from an investor standpoint since the mortgage can be easily transferred to another buyer for a small transfer fee without lender approval. After executing the first contract on January 8, 1983, Ezell and Crawford executed an "Addendum to Contract For Sale and Purchase" on the same date which provided in pertinent part: This contract is for the sole purpose of having the buyer obtain an assumable FHA mortgage for the seller and reconveying title to the seller. The seller hereby irrevocably assumes the said FHA mortgage from the buyer immediately after closing and the buyers hereby agree to that assumption. For this, Crawford was to receive $1,000. The parties agreed that this addendum would apply to the second contract executed on June 22, 1983. At the suggestion of Ezell, Crawford made application for a $53.150 FHA loan with Residential Financial Corporation (RFC) in Maitland, Florida, a lending institution which Ezell had done business with on a number of prior occasions. However, Ezell was not present at any meetings between Crawford and RFC. When Crawford applied for the mortgage, he indicated the property would be used for investment purposes and would not be owner-occupied. For some reason, RFC assumed the property would be owner-occupied and structured the-loan in that manner. Because of this, Crawford's down payment was slightly less than 5% of the value of the property with the remainder being financed by the institution. Had RFC treated the loan as an investor-loan, the down payment would have been increased to around 15%. Neither Crawford or Ezell advised RFC of the Addendum to the contract which required Crawford to reconvey the property to Ezell for $1,000 once the FHA mortgage was obtained. Had RFC known of this it would not have approved the loan. There was no competent evidence that such an agreement was illegal or violated any federal laws or contravened any real estate industry standard or ethical consideration. The loan was eventually approved, and a closing held on September 22, 1983. After closing, Crawford retained the property in his name with Ezell making all payments from the rent proceeds. This was consistent with an oral agreement between the two that such an arrangement would last for an indefinite period as long as the payments were current. When Crawford later received several notices from the lender stating that mortgage payments were in arrears, he hired an attorney and demanded that Ezell fulfill the terms of the Addendum. He also filed a complaint against Ezell with petitioner which precipitated the instant proceeding. After the closing, Ezell had intended for the tenants to assume the mortgage since they had expressed an interest in buying the property. However, such a sale never materialized. In July, 1984, the property was reconveyed to Ezell, and Ezell paid Crawford $1,000 as required by the Addendum.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the administrative complaint be dismissed, with prejudice. DONE and ORDERED this 7th day of August, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of August, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Arthur R. Shell, Jr., Esq. P. O. Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802 Julius L. Williams, Esq. P. O. Box 2629 Orlando, FL 32802 ================================================================ =
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Petitioner has been in the business of manufacturing and selling extruded aluminum patio furniture. Petitioner is owned by Robert L. Gass, Jr., who was also the owner of the real estate which Petitioner occupied as a tenant. It was necessary for the Department to acquire the real property owned by Gass and to relocate Petitioner as a result of a federally-funded highway construction project, I-595 in Broward County, Florida. Accordingly, Gass and Petitioner became entitled to benefits pursuant to the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970. Pursuant to a contract with the Department, employees of Kaiser Engineers were responsible for both the acquisition of real property and the relocation of personal property of businesses and persons displaced by the I-595 project. Some of Kaiser's employees were involved with acquisition (acquiring ownership of real property) and different employees were responsible for relocation assistance (relocating personal property). An appraisal of the land and improvements at the manufacturing site was performed on behalf of the Department. The Department's real estate appraiser called in a machinery and equipment appraiser to appraise certain "immovable business fixtures and special purpose process systems." The machinery and equipment appraiser prepared an appraisal containing 20 categories/items, consisting primarily of the components of Petitioner's painting machinery and assembly line. A three-page listing of those 20 categories/items was compiled and became entitled "Inventory." Gass and the Department entered into negotiations for the acquisition of his real property. Gass was concerned about the "down time" Petitioner would incur if Petitioner were required to disassemble, move, reassemble, and install its assembly line and painting system process. It was important to Gass that Petitioner have a replacement assembly line and painting system process operational before moving to the relocation site. Gass was aware of the relocation benefit under which a displaced business might be eligible to purchase new equipment and machinery and have it fully installed and operational before the business is physically relocated. On August 22, 1988, Gass entered into a Right-of-Way Purchase Agreement with the Department under which the Department purchased from Gass the real property which was Petitioner's manufacturing site. Exhibit "A" to the Right- of-Way Purchase Agreement was the Inventory of the 20 categories/items prepared by the machinery and equipment appraiser. Petitioner subsequently made application to the Department for relocation benefits to purchase replacement items for the categories/items contained in the Inventory. The Department denied that claim for relocation benefits, and Petitioner timely requested a formal hearing regarding the Department's determination. The matter was thereafter transferred to the Division of Administrative Hearings where it was assigned DOAH Case No. 90-8112. In that dispute, the Department took the position that the 20 items in the Inventory were immovable trade fixtures and, therefore, items of real property, that those items had been purchased by the Department as part of its acquisition of the real property, and that Petitioner was entitled to no relocation benefits relative to those items. Petitioner, on the other hand, contended that the Inventory items were personal property, that they were not converted into real property because the Right-of- Way Purchase Agreement referred to them, and that Petitioner, through Gass, had specifically reserved its right to receive relocation benefits regarding those items due to negotiated language which Gass had required and which was included in the Addendum to the Right-of-Way Purchase Agreement. The threshold issue to be adjudicated in the underlying proceeding was whether the items of property listed in the Inventory were items of personal property, as Petitioner contended, or trade fixtures and items of real property, as the Department contended. Expert real property appraisers and expert machinery and equipment appraisers testified in the evidentiary hearing. The one area of agreement among them was that whether a piece of equipment is considered real property or personal property is a "gray area." On September 12, 1991, a Recommended Order was entered in DOAH Case No. 90-8112. That Recommended Order determined that all of the items listed in the Inventory were items of personal property, that the Right-of-Way Purchase Agreement was ambiguous, and that Petitioner was entitled to relocation benefits for substitute personal property in the amount of $275,900. On December 10, 1991, the Department entered its Final Order essentially adopting the Recommended Order. The Final Order specifically held that all of the items listed in the Inventory were items of personal property and that Petitioner was entitled to relocation payments for substitute personal property in an amount not to exceed $275,900 upon submission of the appropriate documentation. At the time that the Department denied Petitioner's claim for relocation benefits regarding those items listed in the Inventory and advised Petitioner of its right to request an administrative hearing regarding that determination, the Department believed, in good faith, that it had purchased the 20 categories/items listed in the Inventory as part of its acquisition of the real property at Petitioner's manufacturing site. At that same time, the Department believed, in good faith, that the 20 categories/items listed in the Inventory were not items of personal property and that Petitioner was not, therefore, entitled to relocation benefits for that personal property. At the time, the Department's decision to deny Petitioner's claim for relocation benefits was substantially justified. At the time, the Department's determination had a reasonable basis in law and in fact. When the Department and Gass entered into the Right-of-Way Purchase Agreement and Addendum and attached the Inventory as Exhibit "A" thereto, the Department believed that it had paid Petitioner, through Gass, those monies to which Petitioner was entitled related to the 20 categories/items listed in the Inventory. The Department did not foresee that Petitioner would be entitled to additional payments regarding those same items because language added to the Department's standard form contract increased the ambiguity in that document so that there was never a "meeting of the minds" as to whether the 20 categories/items listed in the Inventory were agreed to be real property acquired by the Department in the Right-of-Way Purchase Agreement or were agreed to be personal property and the subject of relocation benefits. Accordingly, circumstances exist which would make the award of attorney's fees and costs in this proceeding unjust.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Shirley Holland was registered with Petitioner as a real estate salesman in January, 1976, associated with Vern Duncklee Real Estate and Insurance, Inc., Naples, Florida. He is presently registered as a real estate broker. (Stipulation) On January 5, 1976, W. H. Ragan gave the Duncklee firm a listing to sell real property consisting of approximately one and one-quarter acres located in Collier County, Florida, for a selling price of $7,500. Respondent was the listing salesman. (Testimony of Respondent, Ragan, Duncklee, Petitioner's Exhibit 6). Respondent also was a builder who operated as Holland Investment Company. It was his practice to purchase various properties, remodel existing structures on the same, and thereafter sell them at a profit. There was a two- room shed located on the Ragan property that had no inside finishing work, electricity, or septic tank. Respondent decided to take an option on the property in order to remodel it by adding a room and to place it in a habitable condition. He broached the subject to Ragan on January 6, 1976, and Ragan told him on January 7, that he was agreeable to such a contract. On January 8, Respondent and Ragan and his wife entered into a Sales Contract and Option to Buy for $7,500. The contract provided that closing would take place within twelve months and that the seller would give possession of the property to the purchaser on January 8, 1976. This was pursuant to an accompanying rental agreement dated January 8, 1976, between the parties for a period of twelve months which provided that Respondent could exercise his option at any time within the stated twelve-month period whereby all rents paid would be applied toward the down payment on the property of $1,900 which was to be made at closing of the sale. The rental agreement further provided that if Respondent did not exercise his option within the required time, any improvements made by him on the property during that period would be considered liquidated damages of the owner. Pursuant to these agreements, Respondent made a payment of $100 at the time they were executed, which represented an initial deposit on the contracts and as rent for first month of the term. The Option Agreement also gave Respondent authority to remodel the building on the property and it further reflected that Respondent was a registered real estate salesman and would be selling the property for profit. (Testimony of Respondent, Duncklee, Petitioner's Exhibits 5, 7) On January 5, 1976, Respondent showed Harold and Ruby Stacy several houses in the area that were for sale. On January 9, Respondent went by the Stacy residence to see if they were interested in any of the houses he had shown them. They were not interested in those houses and Respondent told them of property that he had recently acquired which was the Ragan property. He showed it to Mr. Stacy that night and the next day Mrs. Stacy went with him to look at the premises. During the course of their conversations, Respondent offered to rent the property to them for $100 for the period January 10 to February 1, 1976. It was his intention to rent it to them for $125 per month commencing in February on the condition that they clean and fix up the property. They also discussed the possibility of purchase at a later date. Respondent told them that he would sell to them for $13,000 if Harold Stacy would do the remodeling work on the shed with Respondent supplying the materials. Respondent quoted a possible sales price of $14,500 if he was obliged to provide both labor and materials for renovating the shed and providing for utility services. Respondent and the Stacys entered into a rental agreement on that day for the initial period of some three weeks and Ruby Stacy gave him a check dated January 10 for $100 with a notation thereon that it was a deposit on land. Respondent explained to Mrs. Stacy that he was merely renting the property at that time and added the word "rent" at the bottom of the check. (Testimony of Respondent, Petitioner's Exhibit 1, 2) Thereafter, the Stacys proceeded to clean the premises and commence installing a ceiling in the building located on the property. They also installed a septic tank. At some undisclosed date, Ragan came to the property to obtain some of his belongings and found the Stacys there. He learned that they supposedly had purchased the property from Respondent, Ragan was of the opinion that Respondent had purported to sell the property before he had obtained the option thereon and that he had therefore defrauded the Stacys. Ragan thereupon filed a complaint against Respondent with the local Board of Realtors in latter January, 1976. About the same time, Respondent had been in the process of obtaining local permits to install the septic tank and do the other work. He discovered that the Stacys had installed a septic tank without his authorization and without obtaining a permit. He thereupon, by letter of January 21, 1976, informed the Stacys that they had done work on the property without a building permit or approval of the County Health Department and therefore was refunding the rental payment of $100. He enclosed his check in that amount, dated January 21, 1976. Although Respondent later attempted to exercise his option to purchase the property, Ragan refused to fulfill the agreement and later sold the property to the Stacys himself for $7,500. (Testimony of Respondent, R. Stacy, Ragan, Petitioner's Exhibits 3,4) Mrs. Stacy testified at the hearing that she was under the impression that she and her husband had purchased the property in question on January 10, 1976, and that the $100 payment had been a deposit for such purchase. She was under the further impression that they were to make a $2,500 down payment in February to consummate the deal. She further testified that they made the improvements on the land because of their understanding that they were going to purchase it. Mrs. Stacy had never been involved in a prior purchase of real property and is unfamiliar with contract documents and terminology. It is found that Mrs. Stacy honestly believed that she and her husband had a valid agreement to purchase the property. Her testimony that she and her husband entered into the rental arrangement in January to enable them to work on the property until they could make the down payment in February is deemed credible. (Testimony of R. Stacy) Ragan and Respondent had been involved in a prior real estate transaction and Respondent testified that Ragan had not been satisfied with that transaction, but Ragan testified to the contrary. However, Ragan talked to Respondent's broker in January, 1976, about the Stacy situation, at which time Ragan stated that he had a chance to get even with Respondent for the prior transaction and that he was going to do so. (Testimony of Respondent, Ragan, Duncklee, D. Holland)
Recommendation That the Administrative complaint be dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 8th day of March, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph A. Doherty, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Ed R. Miller, Esquire Suite 212 - 1400 Gulf Shore Boulevard Naples, Florida 33940
Findings Of Fact At all times referred to in these findings of fact, Carlson was a licensed real estate salesman having been issued License Number 0187184. The last license issued was as a salesman, c/o Pauls Real Estate and Investments, Inc., 441 East Shore Drive, Clearwater Beach, Florida 33515. From October 13, 1982, to June 28, 1983, Carlson was licensed as a real estate salesman in the employ of corporate real estate broker Alliance Real Estate, Inc. of which Nicholas G. Mastro was a qualifying broker and officer. During her employment, Carlson was employed to solicit and obtain landlords and tenants in connection with the rental property management brokerage business of Alliance Real Estate, Inc. Carlson worked out of Alliance's Clearwater Beach office, ten miles from the main office on Gulf-to-Bay Boulevard, Clearwater. Generally, Alliance's official policy was that the originals of property listings, property management agreements and rental agreements were to be maintained at the main office, with work copies filed at the Beach office. Correspondence and miscellaneous property management papers, such as invoices, frequently are maintained exclusively at the Beach office. Funds were to be deposited into, and checks were to be written out of, Alliance's operating account by Alliance's staff at the main office. However, due to the distance between the main office and the Beach office, it was inefficient and inconvenient for Carlson to follow the official policies and procedures. Instead, Carlson began using her own personal bank account as a conduit for funds flowing to and from Alliance (including brokerage fees to Alliance). She also ceased following the procedure for maintaining certain original papers at the main office and even began maintaining files at her home. Alliance knew or should have known that Carlson was using her personal bank account as a conduit for Alliance funds. Alliance's ledgers showed these transactions, and Alliance's bookkeeper wrote reimbursement checks to Carlson for some of them. Since Ronald Lohr, Alliance's qualifying broker with supervisory responsibility over the Beach office, did not testify, the evidence did not preclude the possibility that he had actual or constructive knowledge of this deviation from official policy. Regarding Carlson's maintenance of files (including original papers normally kept at the main office) at her house, Alliance did not have actual or constructive knowledge of this deviation from official policy. Rather, Alliance's minimal supervision of the Beach office gave Carlson the opportunity to deviate from that official policy without detection. Through the combined effect of these circumstances, Carlson was able to operate as a salesman for Alliance in connection with the following transactions while concealing the transactions from her employer and wrongfully retaining brokerage commissions which properly should have been paid over to Alliance. At the conclusion of these transactions (except one), Carlson "pitched" her file on it. In February, 1983, Carlson solicited and obtained $1,000.00 as rental payments from William Russ, as a tenant, for the rental of Unite 908, Clearwater Point Condominium, 830 S. Gulfview Blvd., Clearwater Beach, Florida owned by Bernhardt Elsen. In March, 1983, Carlson solicited and obtained $680 from Carl Dotterman, as a tenant, for the rental of Elsen's condominium. Notwithstanding that Carlson had received $1,680, Carlson advised Bernhardt Elsen that she had only received $1,600. Carlson disbursed $1,513.30 to Bernhardt Elsen, calculated as $1,600, minus $160 being a 10 percent management fee, plus $73.39 as reimbursement for payment of an electric bill. Carlson collected, received and disbursed the Russ and Dotterman rental money in her own name. She engaged in the Elsen rental property management activities and received compensation for the performance of real estate brokerage services all without the prior knowledge and consent of her employing broker, Alliance Real Estate, Inc., or any of its qualifying brokers. In February and March, 1983, Carlson negotiated for her son Martin Carlson, as tenant, and Dr. Rolando Perez, as owner, for the rental of Unit 207, Commodore Building, Clearwater Point Condominiums, Clearwater Beach, Florida, owned by Dr. Rolando Perez. Rent was to be $800. Carlson, for her son, paid Dr. Rolando Perez $720 calculated as $800 minus $80 being a 10 percent management fee. Carlson collected, received and disbursed the Carlson rental money in her own name. She engaged in the Perez rental property management activities and received compensation for the performance of real estate brokerage services all without the prior knowledge and consent of her employing broker, Alliance Real Estate, Inc., or any of its qualifying brokers. In April, 1983, Carlson solicited and obtained $500 as rental payment from a Mr. and Mrs. Scalise, as tenants, for the period April 9, 1983, to April 15, 1983, for the rental of Unit 701, Sailmaster Building, Clearwater Point Condominiums, Clearwater Beach, Florida, owned by Anthony and Jeanette Eman. On or about April 14, 1983, Carlson solicited and obtained a $100 rental deposit from Mr. and Mrs. Scalise for the rental of Eman's condominium for a period in 1984. On or about April 15, 1983, Carlson disbursed to Mr. and Mrs. Eman the $100 deposit and $200 of the $500 rental payment with $300 thereof being retained by Carlson as a management fee. Carlson collected, received and disbursed the Scalise rental money in her own name. She engaged in the Eman rental property management activities and received compensation for the performance of real estate brokerage services all without the prior knowledge and consent of her employing broker, Alliance Real Estate, Inc., or any of its qualifying brokers. In January and February, 1983, Carlson solicited and obtained $2,400 as rental payments from Ernest Pfau, as a tenant, for the rental of Unit 605, Shipmaster Building, Clearwater Point Condominiums, Clearwater Beach, Florida, owned by Joseph Seta. Carlson disbursed to Joseph Seta $2,160 calculated as $2,400 minus $240 being a 10 percent management fee. Carlson collected, received and disbursed the Pfau rental money in her own name. She engaged in the Eifert rental property management activities and received compensation for the performance of real estate brokerage services all without the prior knowledge and consent of her employing broker, Alliance Real Estate, Inc., or any of its qualifying brokers. On or about June 7, 1983, Carlson solicited and obtained a $100 rental deposit from Lawrence Augostino, as a tenant, for the rental of Unit 706, 450 Gulf Blvd., South Building, Clearwater Beach, Florida, owned by Dr. Donald F. Eifert. Carlson was to hold the deposit until she was able to obtain a listing on the rental property. While waiting for a listing on the Eifert property, Alliance, through Mr. Mastro, became aware of one of Carlson's "secret clients," Mr. Elsen, and confronted Carlson about it. In response to Mastro's demand, she retrieved the entire Elsen file from her home. When Mastro learned about a second "secret client," Dr. Perez, a short time later, Mastro immediately terminated Carlson from her employment on June 15, 1983. Carlson did not advise Alliance of the Augostino deposit and was not able to get a good address for Augostino to return the deposit before she left the Clearwater area to go to Michigan for a month. Carlson collected and received the Augostino deposit in her own name. She engaged in the Eifert rental property management activities without the prior knowledge and consent of her employing broker, Alliance Real Estate, Inc., or any of its qualifying brokers. As previously alluded to, Carlson produced evidence of having used her personal checking account as a conduit for funds flowing between Alliance and its customers (including brokerage fees payable to Alliance) with the actual or constructive knowledge of Lohr and Alliance's bookkeeper. But Carlson was unable to produce any similar evidence (such as Alliance's ledgers or her cancelled checks) in response to the absence of any Alliance corporate records indicating that Carlson paid any of the brokerage fees generated in the foregoing transactions over to Alliance. Carlson's self-serving and vague testimony that she did not owe Alliance any money was insufficient in this respect.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Commission enter a final order suspending respondent's license for two (2) years for violating Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1983). RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of July, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of July, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: John Huskins, Esquire Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32002 Bruce M. Harlan, Esquire 110 Turner Street Clearwater, Florida 33516 Harold Huff, Director Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Fred M. Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether the Applicant is entitled to compensation in the amount of $2,500, to pay for "fill dirt" which was installed on the Applicant's real estate in relocating his homestead, after his former homestead was bought as right-of-way for Interstate Highway 75. This claim is under the guise of a relocation appeal, in accordance with the Uniform Relocation Assistance And Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970 (42 USC, 4601 - 4655).
Findings Of Fact In November, 1974, the Florida Department of Transportation paid the Applicant $32,500 in a negotiated purchase for the Applicant's property which was located in the line of construction for Interstate Highway 75. This price was for a mobile home 24' wide and 40' long, with appurtenances to the mobile home, to include a screen room, privacy paneling and carport. Prior to the November, 1974 sale of the property to the Department of Transportation, the Applicant had purchased another parcel of land in late 1973 or early 1974. It was on this parcel of land that was purchased at that time, that the Applicant relocated his home. The amount of payment for the new lot was between $2,800 and $2,900. In order to comply with certain standards of the DeSoto County, Florida Health Department, ten inches of "fill dirt" were required to be implaced to have the septic tank meet requirements for a drain field. The cost of the application of the "fill dirt" was $2,500. The expenditure of $2,500 for "fill dirt" is the item of controversy between the Applicant and the Respondent. The Applicant is claiming that the $2,500 should be reimbursed to him as part of a relocation assistance payment. The Respondent denies that the $2,500 is a proper item of compensation under the governing law on relocation assistance payments. The Respondent's denial is based upon the fact that it believes that "fill dirt" is not a compensable item. More specifically, the Respondent regards the selection of this piece of property by the Applicant as being a matter of choice, which did not have to be made. The Respondent is persuaded that other parcels of property were available, which did not require "fill dirt" to be brought in, in order to comply with health requirements and the Applicant failed to purchase such a parcel, therefore, the Applicant must defray the expense of his selection, in terms of the $2,500 which was spent to bring the property up to health standards. The history of the payments that were made by the Respondent can be derived by the application of the formula utilized. The Respondent looked at three comparable pieces of land , one for $32,500, a second for $28,500 and a third for $32,900. The closest comparable to the home that the Applicant sold, was the comparable listed at $32,500. The Respondent compared these comparable figures with the so called, "carve out" figure of a typical mobile home with equipment, on a typical mobile home site, which would have been a price of $25,721. Based upon this figure for a "carve out", and taking the figure for the closest comparable $32,500, the amount of maximum relocation reimbursement would have been $6,779. This figure is arrived at by subtracting the amount of the "carve out" figure from the closest comparable. In fact the Respondent spent $27,372 for the land purchased and other compensable items, thus entitling him to $1,651 in relocation reimbursement, according to the Respondent's calculations. Although, in the course of the hearing the Applicant was questioned about taking $1,651 as settlement. The Applicant said that he was only interested in the $2,500 figure. It should be stated that the $1,651, is an amount which does not contemplate the payment for "fill dirt". It is in fact a figure arrived at for payment of other items considered to be compensable. The question then becomes one of whether or not the Applicant is entitled to a $2500 payment for "fill dirt" which is not associated with the $1,651 which the Respondent claims the Applicant is entitled to. One final factual comment should be made. That comment is that the Respondent's acquisition and relocation assistance officer, David Nicholson, saw the Applicant's new property after the twenty five hundred dollars worth of fill dirt had been installed. At that time, Mr. Nicholson said that the property appeared to meet the criteria for a decent, safe and sanitary dwelling. The witness, Nicholson had not seen the property prior to the installation of the "fill dirt". Consequently, the Respondent can not challenge the statement by the Applicant to the effect that the "fill dirt" was necessary in order to achieve a decent, safe and sanitary dwelling.
Recommendation It is recommended that the Respondent deny the payment of $2,500 to the Applicant for installation of "fill dirt" at the Applicant's present homesite. DONE and ENTERED this 4th day of April, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Herman A. Beyer Post Office Box 382 Punta Gorda, Florida 33950 Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Office of Legal Operations Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue Did Frederick Anthony III, Inc., employ persons who were not licensed? Did Benjamin Foster have knowledge that these individuals were employed? Was Benjamin Foster responsible for the employment of unlicensed individuals? Was Benjamin Foster liable for Anthony John Bascone's actions as a real estate salesman? Did Benjamin Foster violate Sections 475.42(1)(c) and 475.25(1)(a), Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact Notice of the formal hearing was given to all parties as required by the statutes and rules. Benjamin C. Foster is a real estate broker holding License No. 0151634 issued by the Board of Real Estate. Frederick Anthony III, Inc. (FA III), is a Florida corporate real estate broker holding License No. 0215470 issued by the Board. Foster was the active firm member of the corporation. Donald McDonald and Delores McDonald were employed by FA III. While so employed, both of these persons engaged in the sale of real estate. Neither Delores McDonald nor Donald McDonald were licensed at the times in question. Foster agreed to be the active firm member for FA III because Anthony John Bascone and Frederick Hall, a real estate salesman, wanted to start a brokerage firm. Bascone and Hall had business connections with whom Foster wanted to affiliate, and Foster concluded that his function as active firm member with FA III would lead to business opportunities for FA III and for Foster's other real estate business. Bascone and Hall were corporate officers of FA III and managed the day-to-day activities of the office. They hired Donald and Delores McDonald as salespersons. Foster never met Delores McDonald and did not employ her. Foster met with Donald McDonald, Delores McDonald's husband, who said he was selling real estate at that time. Foster sent Donald McDonald to Bascone and Hall to be interviewed. Under Foster's agreement with Bascone and Hall, they would make the initial hiring determinations for their sales personnel and Foster would process the personnel as salespersons affiliated with the company. According to Foster's agreement with Bascone, Bascone would not engage in real estate sales until after he was license. Bascone was seeking a brokerage license, and it was their intent that Bascone would become the active firm member. The allegations involving Bascone's acting as a real estate professional were based on a transaction which was undisclosed to Hall or Foster until after the fact. This transaction involved the payment of a commission directly to Bascone by the seller which was unreported to Foster or Hall. Foster did not exercise close supervision over the activities of FA III.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the license of Benjamin C. Foster be suspended for three months, and that the license of Frederick Anthony III, Inc., be revoked. DONE and ORDERED this 3rd day of March, 1982, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of March, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Xavier J. Fernandez, Esquire 2701 Cleveland Avenue, Suite 10 Post Office Box 729 Fort Myers, Florida 33902 Mr. Benjamin C. Foster 5354 Emily Drive, Southwest Fort Myers, Florida 33908 Frederick Anthony III, Inc. 3920 Orange Grove Boulevard North Fort Myers, Florida 33903 C. B. Stafford, Executive Director Board of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Samuel Shorstein, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
