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MYRON FRIEDMAN vs. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 75-001304 (1975)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 75-001304 Latest Update: Jul. 26, 1976

Findings Of Fact In time sequence, the following transactions took place: a. Petitioner, Myron Friedman, executed a contract with Willow Industries, Inc., a New York corporation, on August 14, 1973, for the purchase of properties located in Manatee County, Florida. Conquistador Estates, Inc., a Florida corporation, for profit, was incorporated under the laws of the State of Florida on September 25, 1973. Petitioner, Myron Friedman, borrowed $650,000 from Franklin National Bank of Long Island, New York, on October 29, 1973. Mr. Friedman executed a personal note to the Florida National Bank on October 29, 1973. Myron Friedman made a loan to Conquistador Estates, Inc. in the amount of $400,000 to purchase the Manatee County property on October 30, 1973. Conquistador Estates, Inc. purchased the properties described in the contract from Willow Industries, Inc. to Myron Friedman on October 30, 1973. Conquistador Estates, Inc. executed a mortgage to Myron Friedman in the amount of $400,000 on October 30, 1973, in exchange for the herein before mentioned loan of $400,000 on October 29, 1973. Myron Friedman assigned the herein before mentioned mortgage to Franklin National Bank as security for the personal loan of $650,000 on October 30, 1973. Conquistador Estates, Inc. deeded the properties acquired by it from Willow Industries, Inc. to Myron Friedman on May 28, 1974. Additional facts: The notes and the mortgage herein described are still in existence. Conquistador Estates, Inc. is still a viable corporation although it owns no property and Myron Friedman is the sole stockholder. There were no payments made to Petitioner, Myron Friedman, as required by the terms of the promissory note of Conquistador Estates, Inc. to Myron Friedman. In an Audit of documents recorded in the office of the Circuit Clerk in and for Manatee County, Florida, Respondent, Department of Revenue, determined that insufficient documentary stamps and documentary surtax stamps were affixed to the warranty deed dated May 28, 1974, between Conquistador Estates, Inc. and Petitioner, Myron Friedman, an individual. Subsequent to the audit, the Respondent issued a "Proposed Notice of Assessment of Tax and Penalty Under Chapter 201, Florida Statutes, documentary surtax in the amount of $439.45, pursuant to Section 201.021, Florida Statutes, and penalties in the amount of $1,639.14 pursuant to Section 201.17, Florida Statutes. Attached to the said notice was "Schedule A," an explanation of the basis for the demand for additional documentary stamp tax and documentary surtax. It explained that the warranty deed to Petitioner, Myron Friedman, individually, from Conquistador Estates, Inc., satisfied the existing mortgage and which rendered the mortgage unenforceable as to the original mortgagor, Conquistador Estates, Inc., and cited Department of Administration Rule 12A-4.13(2) Florida Administrative Code. "Defaulting Mortgagor: Where a mortgagor, in full or partial satisfaction of the mortgage indebtedness, conveys the mortgaged premises to the mortgagee, documentary stamp taxes are due on the transaction." Petitioner, Myron Friedman, contends: That Conquistador Estates, Inc. was just a nominee used for the purpose of securing a mortgage loan; That he is the sole owner of the corporation; That there was no conveyance in full or partial satisfaction of the mortgage since he is the sole owner of the corporation, and he is the grantee and that, therefore, no documentary stamp tax or surtax or penalty is due; That the mortgage itself is assigned and is still in existence. The Respondent contends: That the clear wording of statute, Section 201.02(1), F.S., controls the transaction which was a conveyance by warranty deed; That because the corporation, Conquistador Estates, Inc. has no assets and made no payments to Petitioner, the conveyance by warranty deed was in full satisfaction of the mortgage indebtedness and canceled the written obligation of the corporation to pay $400,000, the unpaid portion of the obligation secured by the mortgage. The Respondent further contends that the partial indebtness of the corporation itself to Petitioner was canceled.

Recommendation Assess the documentary stamp and the documentary surtax against Petitioner, Myron Friedman. Do not assess penalties for failure to pay tax required, inasmuch as it is apparent that the taxes which were paid were paid in good faith and that the taxes which were due and owing were not paid because of a misunderstanding of the requirements of Chapter 201, F.S. DONE and ORDERED this 28th day of May, 1976. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of May, 1976. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert H. Carr, Esquire Post Office Box 3798 Sarasota, Florida 33578 Patricia Turner, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304

Florida Laws (4) 201.02201.17775.082775.083
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. GEORGE F. REILLY, 79-000548 (1979)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 79-000548 Latest Update: Oct. 19, 1979

Findings Of Fact Respondent married Barbara Hannon on October 31, 1970. On November 5, 1975, Barbara G. Reilly, as she was sometimes known during her marriage to respondent, executed a petition for dissolution of marriage and other relief in which she alleged that she "wishe[d] to resume her former surname of HANNON." On January 14, 1976, the marriage between respondent and Barbara Hannon was dissolved. Petitioner's exhibit No. 4. Effective October 1, 1973 through October 4, 1975, inclusive, respondent was registered as a real estate salesman in the employ of King's Point Realty, Inc. From October 5, 1975, to March 31, 1977, respondent was registered as a real estate broker at the same office. By deed dated May 1, 1975, Harry and Evelyn Litwin conveyed "CONDOMINIUM PARCEL NO. 508, KINGS POINT BRITTANY K" to "BARBARA HANNON, a single woman. Petitioner's exhibit No. 14. This deed reflects payment of documentary stamp tax in the amount of $49.50 and of documentary surtax in the amount of $1.65. By deed dated June 20, 1975, "BARBARA HANNON, a single woman" conveyed the same parcel to Robert and Meredith Nisenbaum. This deed reflects payment of documentary stamp tax in the amount of $52.50 and of documentary surtax in the amount of $19.25. Petitioner's exhibit No. 14. By deed dated September 29, 1975, Dorothy I. Fox, an un-remarried widow, conveyed "CONDOMINIUM PARCEL NO. 702, KINGS POINT SAXONY `O'" to "BARBARA HANNON, a single woman. Petitioner's exhibit No. 15. This deed reflects payment of documentary stamp tax in the amount of $34.50 and of documentary surtax in the amount of $2.20. By deed dated November 6, 1975, "BARBARA HANNON, a single woman," conveyed the same parcel to B & M Realty Trust II. This deed reflects payment of documentary stamp tax in the amount of $45.00 and of documentary surtax in the amount of $6.05. Petitioner's exhibit No. 15. By deed dated October 31, 1975, Myron and Sonia Spergel conveyed "Condominium Parcel No. 237 of FLANDERS `E'" to "BARBARA HANNON." Petitioner's exhibit No. 16. This deed reflects payment of documentary stamp tax in the amount of $45.60 and of documentary surtax in the amount of $17.05. By deed dated March 12, 1976, "BARBARA HANNON" conveyed the same parcel to Harry and Evelyn Tuckman. Petitioner's exhibit No. 8. This deed reflects payment of documentary stamp tax in the amount of $57.00 and of documentary surtax in the amount of $4.40. Mr. and Mrs. Tuckman, who still lived in the condominium at the time of the hearing, dealt with respondent when they acquired the property. In conversations with respondent, a price was agreed upon. The Tuckmans did not know who the seller was at the time they agreed to buy. By deed dated June 10, 1976, Ida Ellman, a widow, conveyed "Condominium Parcel No. 202 of Valencia `I' CONDOMINIUM" to "BARBARA HANNON, a single woman." Petitioner's exhibit No. 17. This deed reflects payment of documentary stamp tax in the amount of $57.00 and of documentary surtax in the amount of $8.25. On this deed, the grantee's post office address is stated as "P.O. Box 994, Delray Beach, Fl. 33444." According to post office records, respondent George F. Reilly rented Post Office Box 994 at the Delray Beach Post Office from on or about November 4, 1975, until on or about June 21, 1977. By deed dated August 4, 1976, "BARBARA HANNON, a single woman" conveyed the same property to Natale and June V. Lisi. Petitioner's exhibit No. 9. This deed reflects payment of documentary stamp tax in the amount of $69.00 and of documentary surtax in the amount of $25.30. Respondent represented the seller when Mr. and Mrs. Lisi purchased the condominium. Respondent never disclosed to Mr. and Mrs. Lisi that he and Barbara Hannon had been married. By deed dated September 30, 1976, Sidney and Jean Kessler and Charles and Sandra Bondar conveyed "Parcel No. 159 of TUSCANY `C' Condominium" to "BARBARA HANNON, a single woman. Petitioner's exhibit No. 5. The grantee's address appears on this deed as "P.O. Box 994, Delray Beach, Florida 33444." This deed reflects payment of documentary stamp tax in the amount of $67.50 and of documentary surtax in the amount of $7.70. Respondent asked John W. Hooker, Jr., to handle the transaction from the Kesslers and Bondars to Barbara Hannon. Mr. Hooker received a cashier's check drawn on the Barnett Bank of West Delray Beach in the amount of $6,305.37, petitioner's exhibit No. 6, and closed the transaction by mail. He never met Barbara Hannon and only learned afterwards that she and respondent had been married. Respondent never disclosed to the Kesslers or to the Bondars that he had been married to Barbara Hannon; and he later admitted this to Floyd M. Stevens, an investigator in petitioner's employ. The money used to purchase the cashier's check given to Mr. Hooker, petitioner's exhibit No. 6, came from respondent's savings account at the Barnett Bank of West Delray Beach. Petitioner's exhibit No. 19. By deed dated December 16, 1976, "BARBARA HANNON, A SINGLE WOMAN" conveyed "Parcel No. 169, of TUSCANY `C' CONDOMINIUM" to John L. Schmieder and James A. Schmieder. Petitioner's exhibit No. 10. In anticipation of the conveyance, John Schnieder had placed a deposit with respondent in the form of a money order in the amount of $1,000, payable to "GEORGE REILLY-KING'S POINT REALTY." Petitioner's exhibit No. 21. The seller's closing statement prepared on December 15, 1976, contains the item: "Brokerage Commission Kings Point Realty . . . [$]1,000.00." Petitioner's exhibit No. 11. According to the same closing statement, the balance due seller amounted to $9,200.64. Id. On December 16, 1976, respondent deposited $10,200.64 (1,000.00 + 9,200.64) to his savings account at the Barnett Bank of best Delray Beach. Petitioner's exhibits Nos. 20, 21 and 22. According to the Bank's records, respondent's mailing address was "P.O. Box 994, Delray Beach, Fla. 33444." Respondent never mentioned to the Schmieders that he and Barbara Hannon were in any way related. Respondent deposited the money order he had received from the Schmieders to his own savings account on December 16, 1976; and never earlier deposited the money order to any escrow account. On October 14, 1976, The Keyes Company mailed a check drawn in favor of Kings Point Realty, Inc. (Kings Point) in the amount of $500, to the offices of Kings Point in Delray Beach. This check never reached Kings Point's supervisor of accounts payable and was not processed through Kings Point's ordinary banking channels, although it was paid.

Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That petitioner revoke respondent's registration as a real estate broker. DONE and ENTERED this 19th day of July, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of July, 1979 COPIES FURNISHED: Kenneth M. Meer, Esquire Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 George F. Reilly 8671 Sunset Strip Sunrise, Florida 33322 George F. Reilly Post Office Box 4525 Old San Juan Station Puerto Rico 00905

Florida Laws (1) 475.25
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STEWART ARMS APARTMENTS, LTD. vs. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE AND OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER, 76-001330 (1976)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 76-001330 Latest Update: Apr. 25, 1977

Findings Of Fact Stewart executed a mortgage note dated February 3, 1972 in the amount of $2,943,400 payable to City National Bank of Miami. This note was secured by a mortgage executed by Stewart as mortgagor to City National Bank of Miami as mortgagee of same date. This mortgage was recorded on February 8, 1972 at which time documentary stamp tax and intangible taxes were paid. The note was designated a mortgage note in the face amount of $2,943,400 and taxes paid were predicated on this sum. The mortgage provided, inter alia, in item 24 thereof: "That the funds to be advanced herein are to be used in the construction of certain improvements on the land herein described, in accordance with a building loan agreement between the mortgagor and the mortgagee dated February 8, 1972, which building loan agreement (except such part or parts thereof as may be inconsistent herewith) is incorporated herein by reference to the same extent and effect as if fully set forth and made a part of this mortgage; if the construction of the improvements to be made pursuant to said building loan agreement shall not be carried on with reasonable diligence, or shall be discontinued at any time for any reason other than strikes or lockouts, the mortgagee, after due notice to the mortgagor or any subsequent owner, is hereby invested with full and complete authority to enter upon said premises, employ watchmen to protect such improvement from depredation or injury, and to preserve and protect the personal property therein, and to continue any and all outstanding contracts for the erection and completion of said building or buildings, to make and enter into any contracts and obligation wherever necessary, either in its own name or in the name of the mortgagor, and to pay and discharge all debts, obligations, and liabilities incurred thereby. All such sums so advanced by the mortgagee (exclusive of advances of the principal of the indebtedness secured hereby) shall be added to the principal of the indebtedness secured hereby and shall be secured by this mortgage and shall be due and payable on demand with interest at the rate of the same rate as provided in the note secured hereby, but no such advances shall be insured unless same are specifically approved by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development acting by and through the Federal Housing Commissioner prior to the making thereof. The principal sum and other charges provided for herein shall, at the option of the mortgagee or holder of this mortgage and the note secured hereby, become due and payable on the failure of the mortgagor to keep and perform any of the covenants, conditions, and agreements of said building loan agreement. This covenant shall be terminated upon the completion of the improvements to the satisfaction of the mortgagee and the making of the final advance as provided in said building loan agreement;" Prior to the completion of the project for which the note and mortgage were executed and before the full amount stated in the note had been advanced Stewart went into receivership. No advances were made under the note and mortgage subsequent to December, 1974, and only $1,935,378 had been disbursed to Stewart prior to foreclosure. On March 17, 1976 Stewart requested a refund in the amount of $1512 for documentary stamp taxes and $2016 for intangible taxes paid on the difference between $2,943,400 and $1,935,378.29. By letters dated June 16 and 17, 1976, each of the refund requests was denied by the Comptroller on the ground advanced by Department of Revenue that the claims were barred as not being timely filed. Vanguard executed a note in the amount of $2,000,000 payable to the Chase Manhattan Bank secured by a building loan mortgage from Vanguard as mortgagor to Chase as mortgagee. This mortgage was recorded and documentary stamp taxes and intangible taxes were paid on April 19, 1973. Other than the amount of the note and the total advanced prior to Vanguard going into receivership, the basic facts were the same as in Stewart. At the time of the last payment in May, 1975 Vanguard had received $1,388,008 of the $2,000,000 evidenced by the note. Vanguard's application for refund of $1224 for intangible taxes paid was denied by the Comptroller for the same reason Stewarts was denied. Here the application dated April 19, 1976 was postmarked in Miami on April 20, 1976 and received by Respondent on April 22, 1976. Worthington executed a building loan note dated October 25, 1972 in the amount of $2,750,000 payable to Trustees of C. I. Mortgage Group which was secured by a mortgage loan of same date. Worthington also went into receivership in December, 1974 after $1,962,750 had been advanced. Application for refund of documentary stamp taxes in the amount of $1180.80 and intangible taxes in the amount of $1574.50 filed March 17, 1976 was denied by the Comptroller on the grounds that the application was not timely filed. All of the above loans, for which the mortgages were recorded, were construction loans and provided for periodic payments to the mortgagor as the construction progressed. Provided the mortgagor complied with the terms of the building agreement the mortgagee was legally required to advance funds when due. In determining valuation for the purpose of computing the intangible taxes due clerks of the circuit court follow 199.122(7) F.S. which provides that obligations for payment of money secured by a mortgage shall be valued at the principal amount of indebtedness evidenced by such transactions. Accordingly in the cases at hand the clerks would have refused to record the mortgages unless the intangible taxes and documentary stamp taxes computed using the principal amount of the obligation were paid. An application for refund of the intangible tax representing the difference between the face amount of the mortgage to secure future advances, and the amount advanced, will be disapproved by the Department of Revenue so long as advances on the face amount of the loan are still being made.

Florida Laws (5) 201.08201.17212.17215.26697.04
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KBC DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER AND DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 76-001596 (1976)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 76-001596 Latest Update: Jun. 15, 1979

The Issue The sole issue posed herein is: Whether or not the transfer to Petitioner by individuals Hugh P. Conser, Stewart L. Krug and Sidney Barbane1 of certain real property located in Pinellas County, Florida, on or about October 26, 1974, constitutes a conveyance subject to the Documentary Stamp Tax Act, pursuant to Chapter 201, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact On or about October 26, 1974, the Petitioner received title to certain real property located Pinellas County, Florida, from Stewart L. Krug, Sidney Barbanel and Hugh P. Conser, the principals in KBC Development Corporation, which was recorded in Official Records Book 4229, page 1052, Public Records of Pinellas County, Florida. The only consideration, as evidenced by the deeds filed in the case, is that the conveyance was for "good and valuable consideration and ten dollars". This other good and valuable consideration, according to Petitioner and the other record evidence, consisted of the issuance of all one hundred shares of the authorized stock of KBC Development Corporation, Petitioner, as evidenced by the Minutes of the Shareholders Meeting of such corporation which was held on July 18, 1973. (See the minutes reflected in an attachment to Petitioner's Exhibit Number 1.) The issued stock had a par value of $5.00. The corporate entity, KBC, as Petitioner, was formed for the purpose of taking title to the property in question and, as evidenced by the record, had no other assets when the subject property was conveyed. On May 6, 1975, the Florida `Department of Revenue, Respondent, recorded in the office of the Circuit Court of Pinellas County, Florida, a warrant for collection of delinquent documentary stamp taxes in connection with the above-referenced transaction in the amount of $27,599.70, plus an identical amount of penalty, for a total sum of $55,212.40. Said warrant is recorded in O.R. Book 4286, page 31, Public Records of Pinellas County, Florida. Following a conference with the Department of Revenue, the taxes were paid by the Petitioner under protest. That payment set the stage for the Petitioner's filing of the claim for refund with the Respondent, the Comptroller of the State of Florida, pursuant to Florida Statutes section 215.26. The Petitioner argues that the only taxable consideration resulting from the subject conveyance was the par value of the stock, of which amount sufficient documentary stamps were affixed to the deeds in question. In support of this position, the Petitioner cites the fact that there are no income tax returns filed by the corporation, FIG; no business activities pursued by the corporation; no bank account of the corporation; and no assets held by the corporation, except as agents for the three individuals, Krug, Barbanel and Conser, all of which were acknowledged by all of the mortgagees. Additionally, the Petitioner urges that the bank and lending institutions involved regarded and held each individual personally liable for the indebtedness in connection with the loans advanced for the property in question. Finally, the Petitioner urges that, based on the conveyance in question, there was no shift in the economic burden to the corporation and, therefore, no taxable transaction occurred when the property in question was conveyed from the individuals, Krug, Barbanel and Conser, to FIG Development Corporation.

Conclusions The documentary stamp tax provided by Florida Statutes section 201.02 is an excise tax imposed on particularly described transactions, and in the case of instruments relating to realty, is based upon the total consideration involved in the transfer or conveyance. Thus, the key point in determining whether documentary stamps are to be affixed to an instrument transferring an interest in realty is in the presence or absence of consideration for the transfer. Rule 12A-4 .14, Florida Administrative Code, describes conveyances not subject to the documentary stamp tax as those "conveyances of realty without consideration, including. . .a deed to or by a trustee not pursuant to a sale . . . ." The facts of this case clearly do not illustrate an express or resulting trust relationship between KBC Development Corporation and its principals, Stewart L. Krug, Sidney Barbanel and Hugh P. Conser. When KBC took title to the property from Krug, Conser and Barbanel, the consideration was $10.00 and other valuable consideration and, based on the face of the instrument, the conveyance was not made to KBC subject to payment of any mortgages, etc., by KPC (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1). Section 201.02(1), Florida Statutes (1975). See Florida Department of Revenue v. De Maria, 338 So.2d 838 (Fla. 1976). Additionally, the facts herein reveal that the banks and lending institutions involved in the transaction required the personal guarantees of the individuals, Krug, Barbanel and Conser. No evidence was introduced indicating that Petitioner, KBC Development Corporation, was anything more than an entity whereby the lending institutions had advanced funds for the primary mortgages to Continental Investment and Development Company, which was in no way related to the present corporation, KBC, and that the corporate entity was used to protect the lending institutions from any possible violations of usurious transactions. As stated, the personal endorsements and/or guarantees of the individuals, Barbanel, Krug and Conser, were required by the lending institutions before the primary mortgagee, Continental Investment and Development Company, would be released. Krug, Barbanel and Conser were no more nor less obligated to pay and perform under the obligation, after the conveyance than before. Although there was a change in the form of the obligation, there was no change in the substance. See e.g., Straughn v. Story, 334 So.2d 337 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976) cert. discharged 348 So.2d 954 (1977). (See Petitioner's Exhibits 2, 3 and 4.) For all of these reasons, it is the considered opinion of the undersigned that the Respondents have failed to demonstrate that the consideration for the conveyances in question were anything more than the par value of the stock and, accordingly, documentary stamp taxes should only be assessed in the amount of $4.10. Accordingly, I shall recommend that the excess assessments which Petitioner paid under protest be refunded.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Petitioner be refunded the amount of taxes and penalties it paid to the Respondent, Department of Revenue, under protest, over and above the amount it should have paid on the par value of the stock of KBC Corporation when the abovedescribed conveyance was made during October, 1974. RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of April, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building MAILING ADDRESS: 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Donald R. Hall, Esquire Goza, Hall & Peacock, P.A. 100 North Belcher Road Clearwater, Florida 33518 Cecil L. Davis, Jr., Esquire Assistant Attorney General The Capitol, Room LL04 Tallahassee, Florida 32304 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA KBC DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 76-1596 GERALD LEWIS, as COMPTROLLER OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, AND DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Respondents. / NOTICE TO: DONALD R. HALL, ESQUIRE ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER GOZA, HALL & PEACOCK, P.A. 100 NORTH BELCHER ROAD CLEARWATER, FLORIDA 33518 CECIL L. DAVIS, JR., ESQUIRE ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENTS ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL THE CAPITOL LL04 TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32304 You will please take notice that the Governor and Cabinet, acting as head of the Department of Revenue at its meeting on the 12th day of June, 1979, approved the Respondent's Substituted Order, in lieu of the Division of Administrative Hearing's Recommended Order dated April 3, 1979. A copy of the Respondent's Proposed Substituted Order is attached. This constitutes final agency action by the Department of Revenue. JOHN D. MORIARTY, ATTORNEY DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATION DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE STATE OF FLORIDA ROOM 104, CARLTON BUILDING TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32301 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice was furnished by mail to Donald R. Hall, Esquire, Goza, Hall & Peacock, P.A. 100 North Belcher Road, Clearwater, Florida 33518, Attorney for Petitioner; by hand delivery to Cecil L. Davis, Jr., Esquire, Assistant Attorney General, The Capitol LL04, Tallahassee, Florida 32304, Attorney for Respondents and James E. Bradwell, Esquire, Hearing Officer, Division of Administrative Hearings, Department of Administration, Room 530, Carrolton Building, Tallahassee, Florida 32304, this 14th day of June, 1979. JOHN D. MORIARTY, ATTORNEY Attachment STATE OF FLORIDA

Florida Laws (3) 120.57201.02215.26
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58TH STREET, INC. vs. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 76-002191 (1976)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 76-002191 Latest Update: Jun. 23, 1977

Findings Of Fact On or about January 31, 1974, the Petitioner purchased a certain tract of property from Rio Branco Corporation. As a part of the purchase price, the Petitioner executed a secured promissory note, and a purchase money mortgage. A copy of the mortgage and the promissory note were received in evidence as Joint Exhibit 1. Although the promissory note is in the form of a direct obligation for the Petitioner to pay the face amount of the note to Rio Branco Corporation, its obligations were limited. The note provides in Paragraph 12 as follows: "Mortgagor, (Petitioner] assumes no corporate liability for the payment of the debt evidenced by this note and mortgage. Mortgagee [Rio Branco Corporation] waives any corporate liability and agrees to look solely to the property securing such debt for payment thereof." Petitioner apparently defaulted on the mortgage and the promissory note, and a foreclosure suit was initiated by Rio Branco Corporation. Petitioner was named as the defendant in this suit which was filed in Sarasota County, and given case number CA-75-1107. Prior to the completion of the foreclosure action, Petitioner executed a quitclaim deed conveying its interest in the subject property back to Rio Branco Corporation. The quitclaim deed was executed in lieu of foreclosure. A copy of the quitclaim deed was received in evidence as Joint Exhibit 2. The Petitioner stipulated that, it executed Joint Exhibit 2 in order to prevent any deficiency from being entered following a judicial sale in connection with the foreclosure proceeding. Despite the stipulation it is apparent that Rio Branco Corporation could not have enforced any such deficiency against the Petitioner due to the above quoted provision of the promissory note. The quitclaim deed was apparently recorded by a representative of Rio Branco Corporation. Through a proposed notice of assessment dated September 9, 1976, the Respondent is seeking to impose documentary stamp taxes, documentary surtaxes, penalties and interest in the total amount of $745.13 upon Petitioner. It is not clear whether the Respondent is also seeking to impose the same taxes upon the grantee of the quitclaim deed, Rio Branco Corporation. Respondent contends that the Petitioner is liable for the documentary stamp taxes on the quitclaim deed, and that the amount of consideration for the deed is the amount of mortgage debt extinguished as a result of execution of the deed. Petitioner contends that as the grantor of the instrument, it has no responsibility for paying documentary stamp taxes, and that further no consideration was given for the deed as a matter of law since no debt which the Petitioner could have been forced to pay was extinguished.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57201.01201.02
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VENICE NH, LLC, D/B/A SUNSET LAKE HEALTH AND REHAB CENTER vs AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, 14-000024 (2014)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Jan. 07, 2014 Number: 14-000024 Latest Update: Sep. 03, 2014

The Issue The issue in this case is whether a tax on a warranty deed is an allowable property cost, as claimed in Petitioner’s Medicaid cost report.

Findings Of Fact Venice operates Sunset Lake, a licensed nursing facility that participates in the Florida Medicaid program as an institutional provider. AHCA is the agency responsible for administering the Florida Medicaid program. On or about June 1, 2005, Venice (or an affiliate, which need not be distinguished from Venice for purposes of this proceeding) purchased the nursing facility that is now known as Sunset Lake from Bon Secours-Venice Healthcare Corporation. Venice filed its initial Medicaid cost report with AHCA for the fiscal period ending December 31, 2005. The initial Medicaid cost report for a nursing facility is used to set the per diem rates at which the Medicaid program will reimburse the facility, both retroactively for the initial period of operations, and prospectively until the next cost report is filed and used to set a new per diem rate. AHCA contracted with an outside auditing firm to audit Venice’s initial cost report. The auditing firm produced an audit report, which identified proposed adjustments to Venice’s cost report. The audit report was reviewed by AHCA analyst Steven Diaczyk before it was finalized and sent to Venice. Venice initially contested 17 adjustments in the final audit report. Before the final hearing, Venice withdrew its challenge to 16 of the 17 adjustments. The only remaining dispute to be resolved in this proceeding is whether audit adjustment number four, which disallowed $49,540.00 of costs in the category of “Property Taxes – Real Estate,” should be reduced by $12,203.80. The disallowed $12,203.80 represents one-half of the tax assessed pursuant to section 201.02, Florida Statutes (2005),1/ on the warranty deed conveying the Sunset Lake real property (including the land, land improvements, and the building) to Venice. Venice claimed one-half of the tax on its cost report because that is the amount paid by Venice; the other half was paid by the seller. Venice contends that this tax is an ad valorem tax and/or a property tax,2/ which is an allowable property cost on the Medicaid cost report. AHCA contends that the tax on the warranty deed is an excise tax, not a property tax, and, therefore, not an allowable property cost. The audit report did not explain the reason for disallowing the $12,203.80 tax, as part of the $49,540.00 adjustment. Instead, the audit report explained the entire $49,540.00 adjustment as necessary to “disallow unsupported costs,” suggesting a lack of documentation. However, no non- hearsay evidence was offered at hearing to prove that Venice failed to give the auditors sufficient documentation of the costs disallowed in adjustment number four. At least with respect to the disallowed $12,203.80 item, sufficient documentation was offered at hearing to support the cost as an actual cost incurred by Venice. The question is whether the documented cost is allowable as an ad valorem tax or property tax, as Venice claims. Documentation for the $12,203.80 tax on the warranty deed is found in the buyer/seller closing statement and on the face of the warranty deed. The closing statement sets forth the total purchase price of $7,500,000.00, which is also the amount of a mortgage loan from Bank of America. The closing statement allocates the total purchase price to the land ($477,000.00), land improvements ($496,500.00), the building ($2,513,250.00), FFE--furniture, fixtures, and equipment ($992,250.00), and personal property ($3,021,000.00). The closing statement also shows a separate category called credits and/or prorations, to appropriately account for items accruing over the calendar year. The first line item in this category is for “Ad Valorem Taxes.” If ad valorem taxes were due for calendar year 2005, they would have been prorated. However, the amount is shown to be zero. As confirmed at hearing, no ad valorem taxes were due for the Sunset Lake property in 2005, because as of January 1, 2005, the property was owned by a not-for-profit entity, making the property exempt from ad valorem taxes. The second line item in this category, for “Non-Ad Valorem Assessments,” for which there was no exemption, shows a total amount for 2005 of $8,235.29, which was prorated to credit the buyer for $3,270.65. The closing statement proration had the effect of charging the seller with its share of the assessments for the part of the year prior to closing.3/ A separate category on the closing statement addresses “Recording Fees.” The first line item in this category is for “Transfer Tax-snf [skilled nursing facility].” The taxable amount is shown as $3,486,800.00. The tax of $24,407.60 is split equally between buyer and seller, with $12,203.80 charged to each. The next line is for “Stamp Tax on mtg. [mortgage].” The taxable amount is shown as $7,500,000.00, the amount of the mortgage loan. The tax of $26,250.00 is charged to the buyer. Another line item is shown for “Intangible Tax on mtg.” Again, the taxable amount is shown as $7,500,000.00, and the tax of $15,000.00 is charged to the buyer. The top right corner of the warranty deed conveying the Sunset Lake property contains the following printed or stamped text in the space marked “(Space reserved for Clerk of Court):” RECORDED IN OFFICIAL RECORDS INSTRUMENT # 2005117710 7 PGS 2005 JUN 01 05:01 PM KAREN E. RUSHING CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT SARASOTA COUNTY, FLORIDA MMARSH Receipt#635187 Doc Stamp-Deed: 24,407.60 [Bar/Scan Code with instrument number] As Venice’s representative confirmed, the reference on the face of the warranty deed to “Doc Stamp-Deed: 24,407.60,” affixed by the clerk of the court in the official records entry, means that a documentary stamp tax on the deed in the amount of $24,407.60 was paid. Because the tax was split between buyer and seller, Venice actually paid $12,203.80. Although the closing statement shows that the tax at issue was called a transfer tax and categorized as a “recording fee,” and not an “ad valorem tax,” Venice contends here that the documentary stamp tax on the deed was an ad valorem property tax, because the tax was assessed on the value of the property. As Venice summarized its position: That irrespective of whether the transfer tax is called an excise tax, a doc stamp tax or any other type of tax, the fact that it is based solely on the value of the assets makes it an ad valorem tax, which is considered by the state of Florida in all cases under Medicaid cost reporting purposes [sic] as a property tax. (AHCA Exh. 3, p. 14). AHCA disagrees. AHCA contends that the documentary stamp tax on the deed is an excise tax, assessed on the consideration for the property transferred by the deed. The parties do agree that the documentary stamp tax rate, applied to either the value of the property or the consideration for the property, was 70 cents per $100.00.4/ The parties also agree that the “property” at issue, which was conveyed by the warranty deed, includes the land, land improvements, and the building. That being the case, it appears from the closing statement that the “taxable amount” used to determine the documentary stamp tax on the deed (referred to as the “transfer tax-snf”) was the sum of the purchase price allocations for the land ($477,000.00), land improvements ($496,500.00), and the building ($2,513,250.00).5/ The documentary stamp tax on the warranty deed was based on the consideration for the property stated in the closing statement.6/ Venice asserts that the documentary stamp tax was based on the “assessed value of the property (land, land improvements and the building) [of] $3,486.750.00[.]” (Venice PRO at ¶ 24, n. 1). However, Venice offered no evidentiary support for this assertion. The amount Venice calls the “assessed value” is actually the amount of the total purchase price allocated in the closing statement to the land, land improvements, and the building. In contrast, the “assessed value” for this property in 2005, according to the Sarasota County Tax Collector’s bill, was $3,724,300.00. The documentary stamp tax on the warranty deed was not based on the assessed value of the property. Venice also contends that subsequent action by the Department of Revenue supports Venice’s position that the documentary stamp tax on the deed was based on the value of the property and not on the consideration for the property. Venice offered in evidence portions of correspondence between representatives of Venice’s parent company with the Department of Revenue in 2008 that resulted in a determination that Venice owed additional documentary stamp tax on the Sunset Lake warranty deed. According to Venice, “the Department [of Revenue] did not agree with the value of assets that Venice had reported and paid taxes on.” (Venice PRO at ¶ 32). Contrary to Venice’s characterization, the portions of correspondence with the Department of Revenue in evidence confirm that the documentary stamp tax on the Sunset Lake warranty deed was based on the consideration for the real property (i.e., the land, land improvements, and the building). The Department of Revenue sought additional information from Venice to establish what the consideration was. The Department of Revenue “Official Request for Information” form asked for “Total Consideration (Purchase/Transfer Price)” for the property conveyed by warranty deed. The form completed on Venice’s behalf reported that the consideration was $3,486,750.00--the purchase price allocation in the closing statement to the land, land improvements, and the building. Along with the completed form, a letter of explanation on Venice’s behalf (with attachments not offered in evidence) went into great detail in an attempt to justify these purchase price allocations, and ended on the following note: We are hopeful that the enclosed documentation and the foregoing explanation of the purchase price allocations will provide sufficient information for the Department to determine that the correct amount of documentary stamp taxes was paid on each of the deeds, based in each case on the agreed consideration paid for the respective real estate assets. Thus, from the evidence offered by Venice, the focus of the Department of Revenue inquiry, as well as the Venice response to the inquiry, was entirely on the consideration paid for the property. The fact that the Department of Revenue ultimately determined that Venice owed more documentary stamp taxes on the warranty deed than was paid is not evidence that the tax was assessed on the “value” of the real property, as Venice argues. Instead, the material suggests that the Department of Revenue disagreed with what Venice contended was the total consideration and/or with Venice’s allocation of the total purchase price to the real property (the land, land improvements, and the building) and to the other assets acquired in the transaction, including furniture, equipment, and personal property. Venice also takes the position that the tax on the warranty deed is an allowable cost pursuant to two provisions in the federal Provider Reimbursement Manual (PRM), which is one of the sources used to determine allowable costs. First, PRM section 2122.1 provides the “general rule” that “taxes assessed against the provider, in accordance with the levying enactments of the several States and lower levels of government and for which the provider is liable for payment, are allowable costs.” Next, PRM section 2122.2 provides in pertinent part: Certain taxes . . . which are levied on providers are not allowable costs. These taxes are: * * * C. Taxes in connection with financing, refinancing, or refunding operations, such as taxes on the issuance of bonds, property transfers, issuance or transfer of stocks, etc. Generally, these costs are either amortized over the life of the securities or depreciated over the life of the asset. They are not, however, recognized as tax expense. Venice contends that the documentary stamp tax paid on the warranty deed must be allowed because it is a tax that meets the general rule in section 2122.1, and it is not an excluded tax under section 2122.2(C). The documentary stamp tax paid by Venice on the warranty deed satisfies the general elements of section 2122.1; AHCA does not contend otherwise. Instead, AHCA contends that the documentary stamp tax must be considered an excluded tax under section 2122.2(C). AHCA is correct that the documentary stamp tax on warranty deeds transferring real property is essentially a transfer tax. However, it is not a tax in connection with financing, refinancing, or refunding operations. An example of such a tax would be the documentary stamp tax that Venice paid on the mortgage on Sunset Lake, because it was a tax in connection with the financing for the property. Venice correctly points out that, grammatically, section 2122.2(C) suggests that the only taxes excluded under that subsection are taxes in connection with financing, refinancing, or refunding operations. The use of the phrase “such as” suggests that everything that follows that phrase must be considered an example of what precedes the phrase. AHCA acknowledges that consideration of the grammatical structure of section 2122.2(C) alone would support Venice’s interpretation. However, AHCA’s expert testified, reasonably and without contradiction, that Venice’s interpretation would render the phrase “property transfers” meaningless. As AHCA’s expert explained, a tax on a property transfer is not a tax on financing, refinancing, or refunding operations. Therefore, despite the grammatical structure, taxes on property transfers must be considered a separate type of excluded tax under section 2122.2(C). As further support for this interpretation, AHCA’s expert pointed to the second sentence, providing that the excluded costs referred to in the first sentence “are either amortized over the life of the securities or depreciated over the life of the asset.” AHCA’s expert explained that taxes on financing, refinancing, or refunding operations would all be amortized, whereas taxes on property transfers would be depreciated over the life of the depreciable assets transferred (i.e., the land improvements and the building). Venice relies solely on the grammatical structure of section 2122.2(C), offering no response to AHCA’s reasoning for interpreting the subsection in a way that is contrary to the meaning suggested only by grammatical structure. Venice did not explain how a tax on property transfers could be considered a tax on financing, refinancing, or refunding operations (so as to give meaning to the phrase “property transfers”), nor did Venice explain when taxes on financing, refinancing, or refunding operations would be depreciated over the life of the asset (so as to give meaning to that phrase in the second sentence).

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a Final Order disallowing $12,203.80 claimed as a property tax expense in Venice’s initial Medicaid cost report. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of July, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELIZABETH W. MCARTHUR Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of July, 2014.

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ANDEAN INVESTMENT COMPANY vs. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 76-000220 (1976)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 76-000220 Latest Update: May 16, 1991

Findings Of Fact On January 15, 1975, Gerardo Benesch, Jitka Benesch, H. Albert Grotte, Regina Grotte, Milorad Dordevic, Catalina Dordevic, Milodrag Savovic and Marina Savovic executed an agreement associating themselves in a general partnership, Andean Investment Company. The stated purpose of the partnership was to engage in the business of real estate development, selling, renting, and dealing generally in real estate of all kinds. It was recited in the agreement that, by forming the partnership, the parties wished to reduce their prior expense of managing separate properties through separate managerial agreements. To this end, they transferred certain real estate by quit-claim deed to the partnership, and these properties represented its capital. The agreement provided in Article IV that the net profits or net losses of the partnership would be distributed or chargeable, as the case might be, to each of the partners in percentage proportions based on the amount of their investment in the partnership. The property consisted of warehouses located in Deerfield Beach and Fort Lauderdale, Florida, from which rentals were derived (Petition and Exhibits thereto). All of the properties were encumbered by mortgages of varying amounts and all but two of the quit-claim deeds transferred title subject to the mortgage thereon. Two deeds provided specifically that the partnership assumed the existing mortgage. Although Petitioner's counsel states that this was not intended and was a "scrivener's error", Petitioner partnership has, in fact, made the mortgage payments on all of the properties since their transfer under the aforesaid deeds (Composite Exhibit 1, Stipulation). Petitioner paid only minimal documentary stamp tax on the deeds. Respondent thereafter issued four proposed Notices of Assessment of Documentary Stamp Tax, Surtax, and Penalty against the Petitioner on January 6, 1976, in the total amount of $3,797.00. The tax was computed under Rule 12A-4.13(10)(c), F.A.C., based on transfers of realty (Composite Exhibit 2, Testimony of Dahlem). At the hearing, Petitioner disputed the manner in which Respondent had computed the documentary stamp tax in that each assessment dealt with a husband and wife who held individual percentage interests in the net worth of the partnership. Respondent's computation did not take into consideration the double interest in each assessment. The parties therefore agreed that a recomputation would be made by Respondent and submitted as a late-filed exhibit. This was done and the new computation reflects a total tax liability, including surtax and penalty, in the total amount of $4,053.40 (Composite Exhibit 3).

Recommendation That Petitioner's request for relief from tax liability be denied, and that Petitioner's liability for documentary stamp tax, surtax, and penalties in the total amount of $4,053.40 be sustained. DONE and ORDERED this 26th day of May, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: E. Wilson Crump, II, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs Tax Division, Northwood Mall Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Allan F. Meyer, Esquire Suite 1500 Post Office Box 14310 Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33302 Zayle A. Bernstein, Esquire Post Office Box 14310 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33302

Florida Laws (2) 201.02201.17
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COHEN AGER, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION vs. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 84-001425 (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-001425 Latest Update: Jan. 16, 1986

Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the stipulation of the parties and documents attached thereto, the following relevant facts are found: On or about October 9, 1979, Dade County, a political subdivision of the State of Florida acting for the use and benefit of its Department of Housing and Urban Development, a public housing authority ("PHA"), entered into a Contract for Project Dade 8-10 ("Contract") with Irbye Giddens, Inc. and Cohen- Ager, Inc., a joint venture, for the construction of Project Dade 8-10, a/k/a Singer Plaza, a housing development for the physically handicapped. The Contract was granted to Cohen-Ager, Inc. and Irbye Giddens, Inc. pursuant to competitive negotiations based on a document titled Dade 8-10 Request for Proposals. Cohen-Ager, Inc. and Irbye Giddens Inc. were selected on the basis of their bid submission as modified by the agreement of the parties due to delay in commencing construction. As indicated by the original bid submission of Cohen-Ager, Inc. and Irbye Giddens, Inc. the original price of the project was $2,576,000; but at the request of Cohen-Ager Inc. and Irbye Giddens, Inc., the contract price was eventually raised to the amount found in Part II of the Contract, $2,970,000. On or about October 10, 1979, Dade County deeded the subject undeveloped property to Cohen-Ager Inc. and Irbye Giddens Inc., the joint venture, by "Quit-Claim County Deed Subject to Possibility of Reverter," ("Quit- Claim Deed"). The Quit-Claim Deed, which incorporated by reference the Contract described in paragraph "1," provided for automatic reverter to Dade County of all of the right, title, and interest of Cohen-Ager, Inc., in the property upon, among things, the termination, rescission or complete performance of the Contract. Cohen-Ager, Inc., and Irbye Giddens, Inc. having obtained title to the property by virtue of the Quit-Claim Deed, rightfully used the property as collateral to obtain financing to cover the cost of construction of project 8- 10. Cohen-Ager, Inc., and Irbye Giddens, Inc., were legally obligated under the Contract and the Quit-Claim Deed to complete construction of project 8-10 and to reconvey clear title to Dade County when the project was completed. Cohen-Ager, Inc., and Irbye Giddens, Inc., fully performed under the terms of the Contract and Quit-Claim Deed, and reconveyed the property to Dade County by Warranty Deed dated February 12, 1981, and recorded March 12, 1981 ("Warranty Deed"). The Warranty Deed is the instrument on which the State of Florida Department of Revenue seeks to impose the documentary stamp tax at issue here. The Warranty Deed was one step in a multi-step transaction used to finance the development and construction of project 8-10. Under this method of financing development of its property, Dade County transfers title to undeveloped property and "repurchases" developed property. Pursuant to the terms of the Contract, Dade County transferred title to the undeveloped property site to Cohen-Ager, Inc. and prohibited the transfer of the contract or property except (1) to an entity to which the contract is assigned with the written prior approval of the PHA and (2) to a mortgagee for the purpose of obtaining financing of the completion of the property. Dade County paid for the development of project 8-10 with the proceeds of Special Housing Revenue Bonds issued for that project pursuant to Chapters 159 and 166, Florida Statutes, Dade County Ordinance No. 79-49, and Dade County Board of County Commissioners' Resolutions R-1270-79 and R-1423-79. The Special Housing Revenue Bonds were issued under a Trust Indenture. When the property was reconveyed to Dade County by the Warranty Deed, Dade County paid to Cohen-Ager, Inc., and Irbye Giddens, Inc. the contract price, $2,970,000, from the proceeds of the bonds. The Department of Revenue seeks to impose the documentary stamp tax on the total amount of the contract price as the consideration for the Warranty Deed. The documentary stamp tax on $2,970,000 is $11,880.00, or $.40 per $100 of consideration. Article VII, paragraph (c), of the contract of Sale, attached to and made a part of the Contract, specifies in part that the Contractor (herein Cohen-Ager, Inc.) "shall pay all documentary stamps and taxes applicable to" the coveyance of the property to Dade County by warranty deed.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a Final Order assessing Cohen-Ager, Inc., for the documentary stamp tax due on the Warranty Deed to Dade County in the amount of $11,880.00, plus penalties and interest. DONE and ORDERED this 16th day of January, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of January, 1986. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 84-1425 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner and Intervenor Adopted in Finding of Fact Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 3 as regards the first two sentences of the proposed finding of fact. The last three sentences of the proposed finding of fact are rejected as unnecessary, as not supported by the evidence, as beyond the scope of the facts stipulated by the parties, and as being commentary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent Rejected as unnecessary and irrelevant. It is simply a recap of part of the history and issues in the case and is therefore unnecessary to a determination of the issues. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 1, 6, and 7. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 5 and 6. There is an apparent typographical error in that the last two lines of Proposed finding of fact 3 are incomplete and the subject of the incomplete sentence is omitted. However it may be that the substance intended by Respondent is adopted in Finding of Fact 13. There is no proposed finding of fact 4. It may be that the incomplete sentence referred to above was intended to be proposed finding of fact 4. If so, the ruling on it is incorporated above. 5. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 2, 11 and 12. COPIES FURNISHED: Lewis R. Cohen, Esquire 1428 Brickell Avenue Eight Floor Miami, Florida 33131 Linda Lettera, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs Room LL04 The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Joni B. Armstrong Assistant County Attorney 16th Floor 73 West Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33130 Randy Miller Executive Director 102 Carlton Building Tallahassee Florida 32301 William D. Townsend General Counsel 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =================================================================

Florida Laws (4) 120.57201.01201.02201.24
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PAN AMERICAN AND DEVELOPMENT CORP. vs. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 83-002156 (1983)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 83-002156 Latest Update: Mar. 14, 1986

The Issue Whether Documentary Stamp Taxes pursuant to Section 201.08(1), Florida Statutes, are due on that part of a written obligation to pay money which purports to renew, extend, restate, modify and consolidate the borrower's pre- existing debt to the same lender, where another part of the written obligation to pay money makes a new or additional loan to the borrower.

Findings Of Fact On October 1, 1981, a "Consolidated and Restated Revolving Loan Agreement" ("Agreement") was executed by Flagship National Bank of Miami ("Bank" or the "lender"), Petitioner (or the borrower), and Alberto Vadia and Rosario Vadia (the guarantors). The Documentary Stamp Tax consequences of this Agreement (and the obligation to pay money which it evidences) are what is at issue here. By this Agreement, the Bank extended a loan, which Petitioner promised to repay, in the principal amount of $1,900,000.00, of which $818,624.69 remained outstanding under previous loans which the Bank had extended to Petitioner under 1971, 1975, and 1978 loan agreements. The balance of the loan -$1,081,375.31 - was a new or additional loan. The Agreement, in pertinent part, provides: Bank, Borrower and Guarantors desire to enter into this Consolidated and Restated Revolving Loan Agreement and the various documents and instruments incorporated herein by reference to increase the maximum principal amount of the loan to One Million Nine Hundred Thousand Dollars ($1,900,000) and extend the term thereof, secured and guaranteed in the same manner as the prior loans and to consolidate into one document the 1971 Agreement, the 1975 Agreement and the 1978 Agreement. This Consolidated and Restated Revolving Loan Agreement and the documents and instruments incorporated herein by reference constitute a complete restatement, modification, amendment and consolidation of the prior agreements to reflect the parties present intentions and agreements regarding such existing debt and the readvance of a previously amortized portion thereof back to Borrower, and not a novation or substitution of a new debt or obligation for an existing debt or obligation. * * * Such advances as Bank shall elect to make pursuant to the credit facility herein agreed to (and all unpaid sums remaining from the 1971, 1975 and 1978 Agreements which indebtedness shall be represented and renewed by such Note) shall be evidenced by a Consolidated Master Revolving Credit Note in the form attached hereto as Exhibit "C," pursuant to which Borrower promises to pay Bank the sums set forth therein together with interest thereon in accordance with the repayment schedule set forth therein, all as more fully set forth therein, the provisions of which Note are incorporated herein by reference. (e.s.) Documentary Stamp Tax in the amount of $1,622.10 has been paid on that portion of the Agreement representing a new loan or advance. (This represents tax at a rate of $.15 per hundred dollars on $1,081,375.31.) Documentary Stamp Tax has not been paid on that portion of the Agreement which restated, renewed, modified, and consolidated the existing debt or outstanding loan balance of $818,624.69 from the previous 1971, 1975 and 1978 loan agreements. The Department claims Petitioner is obligated to pay Documentary Stamp Taxes in the amount of $1,227.90 (at the rate of $.15 per $100 of amount loaned), plus penalty and interest, on the amount of the outstanding loan balance of $818,624.69 from the 1971, 1975 and 1978 agreements. Petitioner claims that the Documentary Stamp Tax does not apply to the outstanding loan balances carried forward from the three prior agreements or notes. (Petitioner, however, no longer maintains that it is entitled to a refund of Documentary Stamp and Intangible Tax previously paid, as alleged in its initial request for hearing.)

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department enter a final order assessing Documentary Stamp Tax in the amount of $1,227.90, plus penalties and interest authorized by statute. DONE and ENTERED this 14th day of March, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of March, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Francis Marion Pohlig, Esquire 2121 Ponce de Leon Boulevard Suite 240 Coral Gables, Florida 33134 Linda S. P. Lettera, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs Tax Section, Capitol Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =================================================================

Florida Laws (5) 120.57201.08201.09201.21210.08
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RALPH MONROE, JOHN ELOIAN, ALLEN WOLFSON, ET AL. vs. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 78-000800 (1978)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 78-000800 Latest Update: Oct. 03, 1978

Findings Of Fact The individual taxpayers purchased a motel giving not secured by a mortgage on the motel as a portion of the consideration paid to the grantors. The individual taxpayers subsequently conveyed an undivided one-half interest in the motel to 6804 East, Inc., a corporation wholly owned by the individual taxpayers. Although no consideration was recited in the conveyance, the corporation assumed responsibility for 50 percent of the mortgage indebtedness which was stipulated to have been $96,250. Subsequently, 6804 East, Inc. transferred the property to 6804 Motel, Inc., another corporation wholly owned by the individual taxpayers. Again, no consideration was recited in the conveyance; however, 6804 Motel, Inc. assumed responsibility from 6804 East, Inc. for 50 percent of the indebtedness on the property. The Department of Revenue asserts that documentary stamp taxes are due on both of the transfers pursuant to Section 201.02, Florida Statutes, there having been only nominal documentary stamp taxes placed on the documents. The individual taxpayers and 6804 Motel, Inc., controvert the assessment of taxes on the basis that there was no consideration because the individual taxpayers were never relieved of any responsibility for the debt because they fully owned the two corporations and because they had such an equity investment in the purchase that they could not stand aside and see the corporations default. 6804 Motel, Inc. also questions the assessment of the taxes against it as the grantee in the transfer from 6804 East, Inc. In support of their arguments, the taxpayers introduced evidence that the individual taxpayers intended, prior to purchase, to convey an interest in the motel to 6804 East, Inc., and that after the transfer to 6804 Motel, Inc., the individual taxpayers paid all deficit operating expenses for the motel.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law the Hearing Officer recommends that the petition of the taxpayers in this case is denied and that the documentary stamp taxes, as proposed in assessments M-65 and M-66, together with a 25 percent penalty and 1 percent interest per month on the unpaid tax be assessed. DONE AND ORDERED this 3rd day of August, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of August, 1978. COPIES FURNISHED: Ralph Monroe 7211 North Dale Mabry Tampa, Florida 33614 Maxie Broome, Jr., Esquire Assistant Attorney General The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304

Florida Laws (1) 201.02
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