The Issue Whether the Respondent committed the violation alleged in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility of regulating persons engaged in the business of private investigation. At all times material to the allegations of this case, Respondent was licensed as a class "CC" private investigator intern, license number CC97-00449. Respondent also holds a class "G" statewide firearms license, license number G97-01406. During some period prior to September 3, 1997, Respondent was employed by J.R. Investigative Agency. Mr. Onativia owns and operates J.R. Investigative Agency. In August 1997, Mr. Onativia filed a complaint with the Department that Respondent was conducting private investigations without a license. Ms. Robinson, an investigator for the Division of Licensing, was assigned to review the complaint. Ms. Robinson contacted Respondent and advised him that the agency had received a complaint that he was conducting investigations on his own without an agency license. Respondent admitted he was doing investigations but claimed Mr. Onativia knew of his activities. He further admitted to Ms. Robinson that he was doing investigations on his own for attorneys in order to support his family. Respondent had also admitted to the investigation activities to John Esposito. After Ms. Robinson confirmed the information with Mr. Esposito as to the admissions made by Respondent, investigation of the complaint stopped.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of State, Division of Licensing, enter a Final Order revoking Respondent's class "CC" license. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of April, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of April, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Katherine Harris, Secretary of State Department of State The Capitol, Plaza 02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Deborah K. Kearney, General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, Lower Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Steve Bensko, Esquire Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, Mail Station 4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 David C. Rash, Esquire Law Offices of Johnson and Rash 1509 Northeast Fourth Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33304
Findings Of Fact On June 22, 1987, Petitioner submitted to Respondent an application for a Class "C" private investigator license. After review of the application and verification of the previous work experience listed in it, Respondent determined the work experience did not meet the statutory requirement of section 493.306 (4), Florida Statutes, that an applicant for the Class "C" license have two years training or experience in private investigative work or related work areas providing equivalent experience. The Respondent denied Petitioner's application on October 5, 1987. The Petitioner is presently employed as a process server. He was employed for varying periods of time between July, 1984, and May of 1987, by four law firms. In the course of this employment, Petitioner sometimes assisted lawyers and witnesses prepare for trial by retrieval of information from records within the particular firm where he was working, or from public records at various public institutions. Among the public records he is accustomed to reviewing are those of Respondent's Division of Corporations. On one occasion, he did, pursuant to instructions from his employer, search through a garage in Tampa, Florida, for certain records. In the course of his work experience, Petitioner has never conducted any kind of surveillance, located a missing person, or investigated a homicide or arson case. He has never testified at a trial or conducted an electronic "debugging" or "bugging" exercise. The Petitioner completed a short prescribed program at the Miami-Dade Community College in August of 1979, and was awarded a "planned certificate" as a legal assistant. To obtain this certificate, he completed various courses at the college during the period stretching from January, 1976, until July, 1979. Among those courses completed by the Petitioner were three hour courses in legal research, business law, legal writing, domestic relations and criminal law, and legal writing. Alan Rollins, assistant director for Respondent's licensing division, testified that Respondent's policy has been to define the statutorily required licensing prerequisite of "[p]rivate investigative work or related fields of work" as a requirement that an applicant for a Class "C" license possess field investigatory experience beyond the mere review of public records. Rollins noted that even law enforcement officers could not be licensed under this policy, unless equipped with investigatory experience. He further stated that the policy is the result of Respondent's desire to be consistent with the perceived legislative intent of the statute to protect the public welfare. Harvey Morse, owner of several private investigator agencies, holder of a law degree and a practicing private investigator, testified as an expert witness for the Respondent. The testimony of Morse establishes that surveillance experience is essential to the conduct of investigations by private investigators. Since the purpose of licensing private investigators is to protect the interest of the public in obtaining competent services from persons holding themselves out as private investigators, the legal research experience and education of the Respondent is not, standing alone, an adequate substitute for the statutory requirement of experience in the areas of "[p]rivate investigative work or related fields of work". Morse, who also serves as chairman of the advisory council which advises the Respondent on licensing of this profession, opined that the Petitioner was qualified only to obtain information from public records. Experience in a related field of work should involve surveillance. Such experience could be obtained by the Petitioner through first obtaining a Class "CC" license and working as an intern to a licensed investigator.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying the Petitioner's application for licensure. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 21st day of June, 1988, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of June, 1988. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS: Included in finding 1. Included in finding 2. Unnecessary to result reached. Included in finding 1. 5.-14. Unnecessary to result reached. 15. Included in finding 5. 16.-19. Included in finding 6. Included in finding 3. Unnecessary to result reached. Included in finding 2. COPIES FURNISHED: R. Timothy Jansen, Esquire Department of State The Capitol, Mail Station #4 Tallahassee, FL, 32399-0250 Mr. Martin Broyles 985 N.E. 149th Street Miami, Florida 33161 Ken Rouse, Esquire General Counsel Department of State 1801 The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Hon. Jim Smith Secretary of State Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
The Issue Whether the subject site is within Petitioner's permitting jurisdiction and whether an earthen dam constructed at the subject site required a permit? Whether Respondent should be required to remove the earthen dam and/or be required to pay Petitioner's investigative costs?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the agency of the State of Florida that regulates dredge and fill activities conducted in wetlands within its statutory jurisdiction as set forth in Chapters 373 and 403, Florida Statutes. Respondent owns the subject property, which is located in the 200 block of Jan Drive in Section 18, Township 4 South, Range 13 West, Bay County, Florida. On July 22, 1999, Mr. Keisker met informally with Respondent at Respondent’s request and made a field visit to the subject property. Mr. Keisker told Respondent that he thought the subject property was within Petitioner’s permitting jurisdiction. Although Mr. Keisker took soil samples, surveyed the plant life of the area, and observed the hydrology of the area, his visit was not intended to be an official determination that the subject property was within Petitioner's permitting jurisdiction. There is no dispute that an earthen dam was constructed across the unnamed creek, described in findings of fact paragraph 5, in late 1999 or early January 2000. The central issue in dispute is whether the site of the earthen dam is within Petitioner’s permitting jurisdiction. Respondent asserts that the area at issue is a drainage ditch that did not naturally occur and is not within the permitting jurisdiction of Petitioner. Petitioner asserts that the area is an unnamed creek in a historical, natural wetland that is within its permitting jurisdiction. The greater weight of the credible, competent evidence established that Respondent’s property contains an unnamed creek that is located in an area of historically natural wetlands that was likely excavated in the 1970's by the local Mosquito Control District. This area of natural wetlands drains and connects into Rogers Pond and Calloway Bayou, which are Class III waters of the State of Florida. The site is within the permitting jurisdiction of Petitioner. 2/ Respondent did not receive a permit prior to the construction of the earthen dam. Construction of the earthen dam constitutes unpermitted fill activity in a wetland within Petitioner's regulatory jurisdiction. Shortly after Petitioner received a complaint in January 2000 that it had been constructed, the dam was partially breached as the result of a heavy rain event. To prevent further pollution of the unnamed creek, the remaining portion of the earthen dam should be removed by non- mechanical means. Mr. Keisker testified that he calculated Petitioner’s investigative costs based on the amount of time he expended in investigating this matter multiplied by his hourly rate of pay. In calculating his hourly rate of pay, he took his annual salary and added to that 52 percent of his annual salary for fringe benefits. He then divided that sum by 2000, which represents 50 work weeks of 40 hours per week. He used 50 weeks to calculate the hourly rate to adjust for two weeks of paid vacation. Based on his calculations, Mr. Keisker testified that Petitioner incurred costs and expenses in excess of $750.00 during its investigation of this matter.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order adopting the findings and conclusions contained herein and requiring Respondent to remove the remaining portions of the earthen dam by non-mechanical means. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of March, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of March, 2001.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent has been licensed as a Class "C" private investigator and Class "MA" agency manager, having been issued licenses numbered C-0002856 and NA-8600240, respectively. On or about November 10, 1988, Respondent was engaged in an investigation and surveillance involving Joseph King to determine if King was disabled for purposes of a worker's compensation claim which was being disputed by the insurance carrier. As a result of Respondent's investigation, King was eventually denied certain benefits which he would otherwise have received. Respondent was performing this work through the Hillsborough County branch office of TRACE, Inc., a licensed private investigative agency which he managed. He was accompanied in this investigation and surveillance of King by two other licensed private investigators. During the course of this investigation,and surveillance, King became aware of Respondent and the other two investigators who were following him. He confronted one of the investigators named Tony Hobbs, and after it became apparent that King was preventing Hobbs from leaving, Respondent came to his aid and attempted to calm down the situation. King continued to refuse to allow the investigators to leave, and eventually Deputy Sheriffs arrived and secured Hobbs' release. At hearing, Mr. and Mrs. King both testified that Respondent and the other investigator, Hobbs, falsely identified themselves as federal agents who were allegedly involved in an undercover drug investigation. Respondent denies that he ever made such a representation to the Kings. Hobbs was not present to testify, but in a statement given to the Petitioner's investigator, John Matlack, in the regular course of his investigation of this incident Hobbs stated that he had been told by one of the Deputy Sheriffs that Respondent had made this statement. However, Hobbs was fired from TRACE, Inc., a couple of weeks after this incident, and therefore, has a motive for placing Respondent's license in jeopardy. Based upon the demeanor and testimony of Respondent and the Kings at hearing, as well as the motive which existed for the Kings to try to get back at Respondent for their loss of certain benefits resulting from his investigation, it is found that Respondent did not falsely identify himself as a federal agent at any time during the course of this investigation. Respondent was calm, orderly, logical, coherent and professional in his recollection of events, while Mr. King was aggressive and hostile towards Respondent. It was King who provoked the confrontation with Hobbs by restraining and preventing him from leaving. It was King who was angry with the investigators, including Respondent, and who allowed them to leave only after Deputy Sheriffs arrived. At hearing, it was King who was unclear in his recollection of specific details about the events of November 10, 1988, and he was clearly still angry with Respondent. The Petitioner also alleges that Respondent falsely identified himself as a federal agent to a neighbor of King, but that neighbor was not present to testify and his absence was not explained. Therefore, there is no competent substantial evidence in the record to support this allegation concerning a statement allegedly made by Respondent to King's neighbor. It is against the policy of Respondent's company, TRACE, Inc., for any agent to represent himself to be a federal agent, and such misrepresentation is a basis for termination. Respondent is well aware of this policy, and credibly testified that he did not violate it in his investigation of King.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that the Petitioner enter a Final Order dismissing the charge that Respondent violated Section 493.319(1)(i) Florida Statutes, as set forth in the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of March, 1990 in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of March, 1990. APPENDIX Rulings on the Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted and Rejected in part in Findings of Fact 2-5. Rejected in Finding of Fact 6. Rulings cannot be made on the narrative statement filed by the Respondent on March 1, 1990, since it does not contain separately numbered proposed findings of fact and does not evidence that Respondent has provided a copy to counsel for the Petitioner. COPIES FURNISHED: Henri C. Cawthon, Esquire Department of State The Capitol, Mail Station 4 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250 Michael R. Heiland P. O. Box 152143 Tampa, FL 33614 Ken Rouse, Esguire General Counsel The Capitol, LL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250 The Honorable Jim Smith Secretary of State The Captol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250
The Issue Whether the State of Florida, Department of Transportation (“Department”), properly denied Wilton Manors Street Systems, Inc.’s (“Wilton Manors”), applications for outdoor advertising sign permits.
Findings Of Fact Wilton Manors is a for-profit corporation authorized to engage in the business of outdoor advertising in the state of Florida. The Department is the agency vested with the responsibility to administer and enforce the provisions of chapter 479, Florida Statutes, including the approval and denial of applications for permits for outdoor advertising signs that are located within 660 feet of the State Highway system, interstate, or federal-aid primary system. In July 2012, Wilton Manors entered into a lease agreement with the City of Boynton Beach (“City”) for the construction of a two-sided billboard on a portion of real estate owned by the City on the east side of Interstate 95, located at 510 Northwest 14th Court, Boynton Beach, Florida. The site is located in an area commonly known as the City of Boynton Beach Public Works Site. The Public Works Site consists of two parcels bordered by Interstate 95 to its west. The north and south portions of the property totals approximately nine acres. The two parcels are contiguous and have the same zoning and future land use classification. Each parcel consists of approximately four and one-half acres. The subject sign is proposed to be placed on the far northwest section of the southern parcel near the border of the northern and southern parcels. On August 9, 2012, Wilton Manors submitted two applications (application numbers 58994 and 58995) to the Department for a double-faced outdoor advertising sign to be located on the east side of Interstate 95, 0.75 miles north of Boynton Beach Boulevard. The applications were assigned file numbers 58994 and 58995. The applications were complete and the appropriate fee was provided. The proposed sign structures met the size, height, and spacing requirements of section 479.07, Florida Statutes. The proposed sign would be visible and within 660 feet of an interstate. On September 6, 2012, the Department issued Wilton Manors a Notice of Denied Outdoor Advertising Permit Application, advising that Wilton Manors’ applications for double-faced outdoor advertising sign permits were not approved because of the following reasons: Location is not permittable under land use designations of site. [s.479.111(2), FS] Location does not qualify as unzoned commercial/industrial area. [s.479.01(26), FS] On December 14, 2012, Wilton Manors filed a Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing to challenge the Department’s denial of its applications. By agreement of the parties, referral of the petition to the DOAH was deferred. In 2014, while the petition remained pending before the Department, statutory changes were made to chapter 479, to include a new section 479.024, effective July 1, 2014. After the new law became effective, Wilton Manors supplemented its permit applications and submitted additional information to the Department. The supplemental information provided by Wilton Manors to the Department in response to the statutory changes included a certification from Michael Rumpf, the City’s Planning and Zoning Director since 1999. Mr. Rumpf completed the portion of the Department’s application regarding land use, certifying the designation of the Future Land Use Map for the parcel as Public, Private Governmental and Institutional (“P, PG & I”), and the current zoning of the parcel as Public Usage (“PU”). Mr. Rumpf confirmed that the parcel is in an industrial zone or commercial zone in accordance with the new statute. Mr. Rumpf certified and checked the box “yes” under the question: “Does the referenced property qualify as a commercial or industrial parcel as defined in section 479.024, F.S. and section 14-10.0052, F.A.C.” Prior to executing the verification form, Mr. Rumpf reviewed the new statute and definitions of industrial use and commercial use in the statute. The Department requested that its expert in the area of land use and comprehensive zoning, David Depew, review the supplemental application and information submitted by Wilton Manors to the Department and determine whether the proposed parcel is in an industrial zone or commercial zone as defined in the new section 479.024. Mr. Depew concluded that it is not, and therefore, the Department did not alter its initial decision to deny Wilton Manors’ permit application based on the changes to chapter 479. The central factual issue to be determined in this case by the undersigned is whether the subject parcel is located within a commercial or industrial zone as defined in section 479.024. The City determined that the parcel is located within a commercial or industrial zone, in compliance with chapter 163, Florida Statutes. The parcel is appropriate for commerce, industry, or trade. The parcel is comprehensively zoned PU, and the City’s land development regulations include commercial or industrial uses as allowable uses. The parcels were previously used by the City for its wastewater treatment plant. The parcels continue to be actively used by the City for industrial uses and as an industrial site for the staging of waste collection, vegetative debris, recycling activities, and the storage of equipment, materials, and supplies in connection with the City’s solid waste management system and public works. Many large industrial waste-type dumpsters and recycling bins are located on the parcels. The storage of the recycling bins is part of the City’s recycling service which generates revenue for the City. Large trucks access the property on a regular basis. An existing cell tower on the northern parcel services both public and private users. The parcel can reasonably accommodate a commercial or industrial use under the future land use map of the City’s comprehensive plan and land development regulations. Sufficient utilities are available to support commercial or industrial development. The public access to the parcel is sufficient to accommodate a commercial or industrial use. Currently, the City utilizes large commercial trucks in its conduct of the aforementioned industrial operations. The parcel is not being used exclusively for noncommercial or nonindustrial uses. In sum, the persuasive evidence establishes that the parcel is located within a commercial or industrial zone.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order granting Wilton Manors’ applications for outdoor advertising sign permits (application numbers 58994 and 58995) and issue the requested outdoor advertising permits. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of January, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DARREN A. SCHWARTZ Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of January, 2016. COPIES FURNISHED: J. Stephen Menton, Esquire Rutledge Ecenia, P.A. Suite 202 119 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Susan Schwartz, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Mail Stop 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 (eServed) Andrea Shulthiess, Clerk of Agency Proceedings Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Mail Stop 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 (eServed) Tom Thomas, General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Mail Stop 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 (eServed) James C. Boxold, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Mail Stop 57 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 (eServed)
The Issue Whether the Petitioner has the three years of experience as an employment clerk of its equivalent as required by 449.023(1), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Sarah B. Bedingfield applied for licensure as a private employment agency and private employment agent pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 449, Florida Statutes. The evidence reveals that Sarah B. Bedingfield has extensive experience as an office manager but lacks specifically three years experience as an employment clerk or its equivalent. The Petitioner meets all other requirements of licensure as an employment agency and employment agent.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer would recommend that the application of Sarah B. Bedingfield as an employment agency and employment agent be denied. DONE and ORDERED this 27th day of November, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 101 Collins Building MAILING ADDRESS: 530 Carlton Bldg. Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of November, 1978. COPIES FURNISHED: Ms. Sarah B. Bedingfield 18700 South West 99th Road Miami, Florida Marvin Sirotowitz Division of Licensing The Capitol Gerald Curington, Esquire Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondents, David H. Fort and Claudia A. Fort, violated certain statutes and rules of Petitioners, Department of Environmental Protection ("Department") and Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund ("Trustees"), related to the construction of a dock and boathouse and the use of sovereignty submerged lands, as alleged in the Amended Notice of Violation and Orders for Corrective Action ("Amended NOV") and, if so, whether the administrative fines, investigative costs, and corrective actions sought by Petitioners should be imposed against Respondents.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with the power and duty to administer and enforce the provisions of Chapter 403, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated in Florida Administrative Code Title 62. The Trustees are responsible for state-owned sovereignty submerged lands and ensuring that such lands are managed for the benefit of the citizens of Florida pursuant to Chapter 253, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated in Florida Administrative Code Title 18. The Department performs all staff duties and functions for the Trustees related to the administration of state lands. See § 253.002, Fla. Stat. David and Claudia Fort own property located at 7875 A1A South, St. Augustine, St. Johns County, Florida. The property is located adjacent to the Matanzas River, a part of the Intracoastal Waterway. The Trustees own the lands lying below the mean high water line of the Matanzas River. The Permit and Lease Harbor Engineering (“Harbor”), a marine engineering firm, acted as Respondents' agent in preparing plans and applying for the permit and lease to construct a dock and boathouse at the property. Harbor prepared and submitted to the Department five sketches or drawings showing various layouts, cross sections, and elevations of the proposed dock and boathouse. These drawings were made a part of the permit and became conditions of the permit. The permit drawings show one large covered slip, two smaller covered slips for mooring of jet skis, and a two-level boathouse. Although some of the elevations do not show walls, it is apparent that this was for the purpose of showing interior areas, such as the slips. Although difficult to see, one drawing indicates a doorway on the lower level. The elevations show window openings or "cutouts" in the walls of the boathouse, but do not indicate framed window panes. The drawings do not create a necessary conclusion that the cutouts are intended to be finished with framed window panes. On January 13, 2004, the Department issued Environmental Resource Permit and Sovereign Submerged Lands Authorization No. 55-216127-002-ES ("permit"), which authorized Respondents to construct a dock and boathouse in the Mantanzas River adjacent to Respondents' property. General Condition (a) of the permit states: All activities shall be implemented as set forth in the plans, specifications and performance criteria as approved by this permit. Any deviation from the permitted activity and the conditions for undertaking that activity shall constitute a violation of the permit. On February 24, 2004, the Trustees issued Sovereignty Submerged Lands Lease No. 550034552 ("lease") to Respondents, authorizing the use of sovereignty submerged lands for a 3-slip docking facility and boathouse "as shown and conditioned" in the Department permit, which was incorporated into and made a part of the lease.2/ Paragraph 1 of the lease states that the dock and boathouse are "exclusively to be used for mooring of recreational vessels in conjunction with an upland single-family residence." Paragraph 7 of the lease states in pertinent part: This lease is given to the Lessee to use or occupy the leased premises only for those activities specified herein and as conditioned by the Department of Environmental Protection, Environmental Resource Permit. The Lessee shall not change or add to the approved use of the leased premises as defined herein . . ., shall not change activities in any manner that may have an environmental impact that was not considered in the original authorization . . . without first obtaining . . . the Lessor's written authorization in the form of a modified lease. Paragraph 26 of the lease states that the lessee shall ensure that no "structures whose use is not water-dependant shall be erected or conducted over sovereignty submerged lands without prior written consent from the Lessor." The term "water dependent activity" is defined in Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-21.003(71): "Water dependent activity" means an activity which can only be conducted on, in, over, or adjacent to water area because the activity requires direct access to the water body or sovereign submerged lands for transportation, recreation, energy production or transmission, or source of water, and where the use of the water or sovereign submerged lands is an integral part of the activity. The lease was issued for a term of five years. It expired on January 12, 2009. Enforcement History Respondents began construction of the dock and boathouse in February 2004. A Department employee, Michael Savage, inspected the dock and boathouse on June 8, 2004, while construction was in progress. Savage said he was responding to an anonymous complaint about Respondents' dock and boathouse, but Savage did not explain the nature of the complaint. Savage had the permit drawings with him during the inspection. The dock pilings were in place as well as the "shell" of the boathouse. The structure had some cutouts for windows, but no windows with panes were installed. Savage measured the structure. Savage did not see anything during his June 8, 2004, inspection that caused him to believe the structure was not being constructed in compliance with the permit, except that a copy of the permit had not been posted at the site as required by the permit. Savage said he called Respondents, left a voice message, and talked to the builder. The Department's on-line enforcement record for the June 8, 2004, inspection indicates that a call was made and a message was left: "Need to have permit posted/erosion control in place." Savage and another Department employee inspected the dock and boathouse again on July 9, 2004. Savage had the permit drawings with him during this second inspection. Three outside walls were in place and the second level of the boathouse was under construction. No window framing or glass had been installed. An overhang, extending over the northwest corner of the structure, was in place. Savage had some concern about whether the locations of the window cutouts were in compliance with the permit. In all other respects, he thought that the construction was in compliance. The structure shown in the photographs taken on July 9, 2004, looks like a small house. It does not look like a structure intended only to provide shelter to a boat slip. The Department did not communicate with Respondents about the July 9, 2004, inspection. The Department's on-line enforcement record for the July 9, 2004, inspection includes the entry "In compliance." General Condition (j) of the permit requires that within 30 days after completion of construction of the permitted system, the permittee must submit a written statement of completion using an As Built Certification Form ("as-built"). On the as-built, the permittee is required to note and explain any “substantial deviations." Instead of submitting a single as-built following the completion of the dock and boathouse, Respondents submitted three as-builts. David Fort said his purpose was to keep the Department informed about the progress of the project. On September 8, 2004, the Department received the first of Respondent's as-builts. On the as-built form, David Fort indicated that the work was substantially completed. Although Fort did not intend to mislead the Department, the construction was not substantially completed at that time. A substantial amount of work remained to be done. Savage and another Department employee inspected the dock and boathouse on September 14, 2004. Savage had the permit drawings with him for this inspection. The boathouse was not changed much from its appearance in July 2004. It had no windows or doors. Savage believed that the project was in compliance with the permit and later made a note to that effect on a sheet containing three photographs that were taken during the inspection. The Department's on-line enforcement record for the September 14, 2004, inspection indicates that Savage met with the builder and includes the entries "In Compliance" and "Built as Permitted." Matthew Kershner, Compliance Enforcement Manager for the Department, accompanied Savage on one of the inspections of the dock and boathouse. Kershner placed a telephone call to David Fort and said his purpose in calling was to respond to a complaint from a neighbor "about a large dock being constructed." Kershner told Fort that Fort could not "climatize" the boathouse. Kershner did not explain at the final hearing what he meant by the term "climatize," nor did he give any other details about his conversation with Fort. It is reasonable to infer from the evidence, however, that Kershner meant that Fort was not permitted to provide artificial heating and air- conditioning in the boathouse. Fort called Kershner later and asked if he could install fans and Kershner told Fort that fans would be acceptable. It is reasonable to infer from the photographic evidence, alone, that Kershner knew in September 2004 that the apparent plan of construction was to at least partially enclose the boathouse. However, Kershner told Fort that turning the dock into a residence or "enclosing it" was not permitted. The only reasonable meaning to ascribe to a statement that a structure cannot be enclosed is that there must be some permanent, unobstructed way to pass in and out of the structure. A room surrounded by walls, with a door, is an enclosed structure. In November 2004, the first windows were installed in the boathouse. The windows were specially made to withstand severe weather. Respondents paid $120,000.00 for the windows. On January 7, 2005, the Department received the second as-built from Respondents. Hand-written on the form is “windows installed 1-6-05.” Another Department employee, Tracy Schilling, inspected the dock and boathouse in January 2005. Schilling said the inspection was in response to a complaint from a neighbor that the dock was "extremely large" and that it was blocking the neighbor's view. Schilling reviewed the permit drawings before her inspection. The construction was still incomplete. There was framing work underway on the first floor interior of the boathouse. Schilling said it was apparent from the framing that the boathouse would have "separate rooms." Schilling believed that the dock and boathouse were in compliance with the permit. On April 13, 2005, the Department received the third as-built from Respondents. On June 28, 2005, Schilling and another Department employee inspected the dock and boathouse again. Photographs taken during the inspection show windows were installed. Framing was completed in the upstairs portion of the structure, creating two rooms, and interior walls on the first floor were finished. The rooms were at least partially furnished with chairs, tables, and a lamp. During the June 2005 inspection, Schilling observed a fiberglass shower stall, still in its box, on the dock. Schilling believed that the installation of a shower stall would violate the prohibitions in the permit and lease against structures that were not water-dependent. The Department's notes for the June 2005 inspection indicate “Minor Out-of- compliance.” Schilling said she did not consider the windows to be out of compliance because window openings were shown on the permit drawings. On the first sheet of photographs taken during the June 2005 inspection (Respondents' Exhibit 3B), someone has written, "This is sliding over into non-water dependent category - Let's talk." However, the record does not include any explanation of this handwritten comment. Schilling sent a letter to Respondents on August 29, 2005, informing Respondents that an “item” was found to be non- compliant with Condition 26 of Respondents’ permit that prohibits structures whose use is not water-dependent and that such structures must be removed within 30 days. The letter did not identify the structure that was not water-dependent. On September 7, 2005, David Fort called Schilling about the August 28 letter. Schilling told Fort that the “item” referred to in the letter was the shower stall. She told Fort that plumbing and running water were not allowed. Fort told Schilling that he was not going to install the shower. In February or March, 2006, Schilling called David Fort to request permission for Schilling and some Department employees from the Division of State Lands in Tallahassee to inspect the dock and boathouse. Schilling said State Lands employees occasionally make site visits to inspect unusual docks and marinas "that may have issues." She suggested the inspection of Respondents' boathouse because it was the "Taj Mahal of docks." The inspection was conducted by Schilling and three other Department employees. Schilling had a copy of the lease with her. The exterior construction of the boathouse was complete and the interior work was substantially complete. Schilling believed the structure was built in compliance with the permit. Respondents did not submit an as-built to reflect the final construction of the dock and boathouse. The Department's enforcement action arose as a result of Savage's September 3, 2009, inspection of the dock and boathouse. It was during this inspection when Savage first became aware of the enclosed rooms of the boathouse. He observed a children's playroom with carpeting, lighting, an air conditioning unit, cable for television, and shelves. These structures and uses are not water-dependent. Savage observed another room in the boathouse that contained an air conditioner or dehumidifier, refrigerator, kitchen-style cabinetry, glass-paned windows, kitchen-style sink connected to a water supply, television, and a microwave oven. These structures and uses are not water-dependent. Savage observed another room with a water heater and a shower stall. The room also was being used to store cleaning materials and personal property. These structures and uses are not water-dependent. Savaged observed electrical wiring throughout the boathouse. The Department allows electrical wiring only for water-dependent uses, such as an electric boatlift or for emergency lighting. On the dock adjacent to the large mooring slip, Savage observed a sink connected to a water supply, a glass-paned window, and a door that enclosed a lower level room. Savage did not think the sink was "representative of a fish cleaning station." His objection to the sink was that it had more than one basin and did not have a sign identifying it as a fish cleaning station. Also on the dock in the area of the slips, Savage observed music speakers installed on the wall, doors enclosing rooms, and a closet which was being used to store fishing reels and gear. There is a pump stored next to the boat lift in the boat storage area that pumps water out of the Matanzas River into a tank for keeping live bait. Respondents admitted that they had installed structures at the dock and boathouse that were not authorized by the permit. These unauthorized structures are a stairway and ramp to the beach, a floating platform on pilings with a metal gangway, and an "overhang" (that portion of the upper level deck on the north side of the boathouse that extends 1.5 feet beyond the outer wall of the lower level). The Department incurred $1,874.00 in investigative costs for investigation and enforcement activities associated with Respondents' dock and boathouse. Respondents did not dispute these costs. They are reasonable costs. Detrimental Reliance Respondents claim that they relied on the Department's representations following the Department's inspections of the construction and would not have installed the doors, windows, or other features in the structure if the Department had told Respondents that these structures were not authorized by the permit. The permit drawings indicate a boathouse with areas that would be semi-enclosed. However, the permit and lease limit this boathouse to a structure for the mooring and protection for boats. The boathouse is not supposed to serve as a residence or a clubhouse. It was unreasonable for Respondents to believe that the permit authorized enclosed rooms and amenities typical of an upland residence with many features that are not water-dependent. Respondents presented no evidence to show that similar boathouses have been authorized by Department permit. David Fort's actions showed that he had a complete disregard for the warnings and instructions that he received from the Department. He was told that he could not "climatize" the boathouse. He was told that he could not enclose the boathouse. He was told that he could not install the shower stall. He was told that he could not install plumbing or running water. He was told that he could not use the dock and boathouse for activities that were not water-dependent. Yet he did all of these things anyway. He built certain structures, such as the floating dock and gangway, which he knew were not authorized by the permit. It is in this context of Fort's apparent intent to do whatever he wanted with the boathouse, no matter what the Department said, that Fort's claims of detrimental reliance must be considered. The more persuasive evidence does not show that Respondents relied to their detriment on any representation by a Department employee, except for the installation of fans. David Fort asked a direct question about whether he could install fans, before the fans were installed, and was told by the Department that he could install fans. All of the other structures that are the subject of this case were installed without a prior discussion with the Department or are contrary to instructions given by the Department. Respondents point out several times that certain structures were in place before a Department inspection, facts which Respondents believe support their arguments about the structures being in compliance with the permit, because the Department saw the structures but did not object to them. Although these facts are relevant to the determination of whether the structures were, in fact and in law, in compliance with the permit, they undermine Respondents' claim of reliance. Respondents' claim of reliance is not based on any affirmative acts of the Department, but on the Department's silence. The Department's silence caused Respondents to believe that the Department would not take enforcement action, but the evidence does not show that Respondents relied on the Department's silence to construct or install any of the disputed structures.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioners issue Final Orders that impose the administrative fines and order the corrective actions set forth in the Amended Notice of Violation and Orders for Corrective Action, dated June 1, 2010, with the modifications stated above. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of September, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BRAM D. E. CANTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of September, 2010.
Findings Of Fact DOT has been engaged for some years in a program to improve U.S. Highway 1, which runs through the Florida Keys. The program has involved highway paving, and reconstruction of most of the bridges. The roadway and bridge construction projects require large amounts of fill material. DOT has experienced an increase in the cost of obtaining fill material in the Florida Keys. To lessen the cost of the fill material DOT is seeking to open a borrow pit on Dudjoe Key. The pit, and an adjoining roadway would cover approximately fourteen acres. DOT initially filed a permit application with DER, seeking approval to construct the pit. DER ultimately issued a notice of intent to deny the application on the grounds that reasonable assurances had not been given that the short-term and long-term effects of the proposed project would not violate water quality standards set out in DER's rules and regulations. DOT thereafter filed a request for variance from the water quality standards so that the pit could be permitted. This proceeding ensued. Petitioner is a Florida corporation which does business in Monroe County, Florida. Petitioner has engaged in numerous public road and bridge construction projects in the Florida Keys and in the selling of fill material for road and bridge construction projects. Petitioner currently owns and operates a "borrow pit" on Cudjoe Key. Petitioner's pit is located within one- half mile of DOT's proposed pit. The purpose of the DOT pit would be to provide fill material which the Petitioner currently provides from its Cudjoe Key pit. DOT originally asserted that operation of a state borrow pit would result in savings of nine million dollars. This assertion has been scaled down to three million dollars, and more recently to 1.5 million dollars. Basically, DOT asserts that fill from a state-owned pit would be cheaper because the operation costs would be approximately the same, but no royalty would need to be paid for the material. DOT sought to establish the amount of potential savings at the hearing through two kinds of analysis: First, DOT offered the testimony of its former cost estimator as to the costs per cubic yard of fill from a state-owned pit as opposed to fill from a private contractor pit; and second, DOT offered bid submissions that have been made by contractors in recently bid projects in the Keys, and which had alternative bids for state-owned and private contractor supplied fill material. DOT's estimator calculated that the State would save approximately 1.5 million dollars through operation of a state-owned borrow pit. The testimony, however, is not of probative value, and cannot serve as the basis for a finding to that effect. In the first place, many of the estimator's figures were determined through private conversations that he had with various unnamed contractors. This hearsay evidence is not cumulative nor corroborative of other evidence, and cannot therefore serve as the basis for a finding of fact (See discussion at Paragraph 2 of the Conclusions of Law, infra.). Furthermore, the estimator underestimated the heavy equipment that would be required to operate the borrow pit; underestimated the cost of the equipment; did not include insurance, social security, and overtime in labor costs; overestimated by twice the number of swings that a dragline would be able to make; and underestimated the cost of moving equipment to the site. Methodology used by the State's estimator would appear to be the best that is available to the State in making initial estimates as to the cost of proposed road-building projects. The State does not have the detailed cost information available to it that private contractors have. While useful for the purpose of making preliminary estimates of the cost of proposed projects, the methodology is not adequate to support a finding of fact based as it is upon hearsay, and containing numerous miscalculations. The second line of analysis offered by DOT to establish the amount of possible savings was a comparison of recent bids submitted by contractors. Special provisions drafted by DOT for the Park and Bow bridge projects using two alternatives for embankment or fill material. Alternate "A" in the bid called for state-furnished material. The low bidder on the project was Atlantic Foundation Company, Inc. Under Alternate "A", Atlantic bid a price of $9.35 per cubic yard for embankment material, and $12.00 under Alternate "B". This would have resulted in a total of $222,574.00 lest using the Alternate "A" bid on the Park and Bow projects. The second low bidder, MCC of Florida, Inc., bid $11.13 for material under Alternate "A", and $14.02 under Alternate "B". Alternate "A" would have been $247,752.00 cheaper under the MCC bid. Petitioner was the next low bidder, and it bid $10.05 per cubic yard under Alternate "A", and $10.25 under Alternate "B". Hardaway Constructors, Inc., was the only other bidder, and it offered $10.00 under Alternate "A", and $10.25 under Alternate "B". The potential savings in favor of Alternate "A" under all of these bids is reduced somewhat by clearing and grubbing costs which were bid separately by the contractors. Clearing and grubbing costs would actually have made Alternate "B" cheaper under the bids submitted by Petitioner and Hardaway. Clearing and grubbing costs would not, however, continue as a cost item in subsequent projects, because once clearing and grubbing is accomplished, it would not need to be done again. DOT seeks to apply bid differentials submitted for the Park and Bow Channel jobs to determine the potential saving the State could realize by using a state-owned landfill for the remaining road and bridge projects in the Keys. Approximately 402,039 cubic yards of embankment material will be needed to complete the remaining projects. Using the high differential between Alternates "A" and "B" submitted for the Park and Bow Channels (that submitted by MCC), which was $2.89 per cubic yard, the potential saving would be $1,161,892.00. Using the low differential (twenty cents per cubic yard as submitted by Petitioner), savings would be $80,407.00. Subsequent to the hearing, DOT awarded the Park and Bow Channel construction to the low bidder, Atlantic Foundation, Inc. The Alternate "B" proposal was accepted. DOT did not accept that proposal because of a preference to do that, but rather so that the otherwise advantageous bid could be accepted despite the pendance of this proceeding. During the hearing, bids were opened for two new road and bridge projects in the Keys: the Kemp and Torch-Ramrod Channel Projects. The apparent low bidder on these projects was the Petitioner. Petitioner bided a price of $11.00 for embankment material if provided by a private contractor, and $10.80 if provided from a state-owned pit for the Kemp project, and $10.40 and $10.20 respectively for the Torch-Ramrod Project. The differences between the two reflect differences in hauling distance. The price differentials for contractor versus state provided embankment material in projects that have already been let cannot be used to determine with any precision the amount of saving that would inure to the State through opening its own borrow pits. Potential savings depend upon many factors. The primary of these factors is which contractor happens to make the lowest bid for the project, and this in turn depends upon the contractor's cost figures for many items other than embankment material will receive the bid only if the total bid is lower than that submitted by other contractors. It is clear that opening a state-owned borrow pit would result in some savings. It appears that $10.00 per cubic yard is the lowest possible price that could be expected for contractor- provided fill material. It appears that state-furnished material could reach a price as low as $7.00 per cubic yard, although none of the bids submitted up to the time of the hearing reflected such a price. It appears that the highest potential saving would be less than the approximately one million dollars that would have been saved if the price differential reflected in the Atlantic Foundation bid on the Park and Bow Channel projects became the differential in all subsequent projects. It also appears that the saving would be somewhat more than the eighty thousand dollar saving that would inure if the price differential reflected in the Petitioner's bid on the Park and Bow projects remained consistent. Beyond these parameters, the evidence would not support a finding as to the amount of savings. The fourteen-acre site of the proposed borrow pit is presently comprised entirely of tidally inundated wetland areas. Approximately two-thirds of the area has average water depths up to six inches. The southeastern portion of the site is dominated by buttonwood, and red, black and white mangrove. All of these species are wetland indicator species under DER's rules and regulations. A large number of mollusks inhabit the area, and it is a feeding area for birds, and for deer. The area of the proposed borrow pit is within the Key Deer Refuge, which is managed by the Refuse Division of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service. There is now a stable herd from 350 to 400 Key deer, an endangered species, and they feed primarily on mangrove. There are 15 to 20 deer in the Cudjoe Key area. The deer do presently feed in the area of the proposed borrow pit. The proposed pit, including the access roads, would comprise approximately fourteen acres. It would be located landward of a berm so that there would not be a constant exchange of waters between the pit and surrounding areas. There would be an initial two-foot drop form the edge of the pit, and then a slope of five-to-one extending into the pit. A ten-to-one slope would be preferable because ultimately vegetation would be ore easily established in such a slope area. The term "Borrow pit" is actually a euphemism for a mining operation. Material would be extracted from the pit to be used as embankment material on the Keys road and bridge projects. The pit would ultimately reach a depth of more than thirty feet. Construction of the borrow pit would result in obliteration of approximately fourteen acres of a natural wetland environment in the Keys. All the flora and fauna presently on the site would be destroyed. During the time that the pit is being constructed and actively operated, violations of DER's standards for turbidity, lead, oils and greases, and transparency would be likely. Once the mining operation terminates, these short-term impacts would lessen; however, violations of the Department's dissolved oxygen standards would be likely as long as the pit exists. A viable biologic community could be established along the fringes of the pit, but in the deeper areas, low dissolved oxygen levels would be a limiting factor. Other mining operations in the Keys and elsewhere in Florida confirm the likelihood of dissolved oxygen violations. Loss of the fourteen acres of feeding ground for the Florida Key deer would be a significant loss in terms of preservation of that species. The proposed borrow pit is located adjacent to U.S. Highway 1. On the other side of the highway, there is a housing development. Operation of the borrow pit, especially blasting activities would inevitably prove a nuisance to residents of that area. One witness testified that blasting would likely cause damage to the residences, but this was not confirmed by competent, scientific evidence.
Findings Of Fact Respondent holds a Class "A" Private Investigative Agency license Number A88-00071, in the name of Orlando Detective Bureau, effective March 21, 1988. Respondent holds a Class "A" Private Investigative Agency license Number A86-00182, in the name of Tampa Bay Detective Bureau, effective August 1, 1988. Respondent holds a Class "AA" Private Investigative Branch Agency license Number AA88-00026, in the name of Highlander Detective Agency, effective August 18, 1988. Respondent holds a Class "C" Private Investigator license Number COO- 01501, effective October 20, 1987. Respondent holds a Class "E" Repossessor license Number EOQ-00103, effective August 1, 1988. Respondent holds a Class "MA" Private Investigative Agency Manager license Number MA86-00215, effective August 1, 1988. In May 1989, during an investigation of Respondent for suspected violations of Chapter 493, Florida Statutes, Respondent failed to submit information concerning his business practices or methods regarding the repossession of a 1986 Amberjack Sea Ray boat, after proper demand by the Petitioner. In May 1989, during an investigation of Respondent for suspected violations of Chapter 493, Florida Statutes, Respondent failed to submit information concerning his business practices or methods regarding the repossession and sale of a 1982 Chrysler New Yorker automobile, after proper demand by the Petitioner. On February 15, 1988, Respondent, his agents or employees, repossessed a 1982 Chrysler Newyorker automobile in Indian Rocks Beach, Florida, on behalf of Chrysler Credit Corporation. Subsequently, Chrysler Credit Corporation authorized Respondent to sell the automobile and turn the proceeds over to them. Respondent failed to account to Chrysler Credit Corporation as to the disposition of the vehicle or the proceeds of the sale thereof.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent be found guilty on Counts I and II of the Administrative Complaint, and that all licenses of the Respondent be suspended for a period of one year and that he pay an administrative fine of $250 for each count; that Respondent be found guilty of misconduct on Count III, and that all licenses of the Respondent be suspended for a period of five years and that he pay an administrative fine of $1,000. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of December, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of December, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Henri C. Cawthon, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of State The Capital, Mail Station #4 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250 Harold W. Charlton, c/o Tampa Bay Detective Agency 8430 40th Street North Tampa, FL 33604 Honorable Jim Smith Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250 Ken Rouse General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, LL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the owner of real property known as Lot 6, Block 10, Angler's Park, in Key Largo, Florida. He purchased that property in November of 1986. Petitioner's property is contiguous to sovereign submerged lands in Largo Sound, a sound of the Atlantic Ocean. The Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund of the State of Florida holds title to submerged lands waterward of the mean high water line contiguous to Petitioner's property. The submerged lands contiguous to Petitioner's property lie within the boundaries of John Pennekamp Coral Reef State Park. The Board of Trustees dedicated the submerged lands contiguous to what is now Petitioner's property to the Florida Board of Parks and Historical Memorials, now the Division of Recreation and Parks of the Department of Natural Resources, on September 21, 1967. A dock existed on the submerged lands contiguous to Petitioner's property prior to 1967. The entire dock existed at least by 1938. The historic dock was probably one of the oldest docks in Largo Sound. Due to the passage of time and hurricanes, only the pilings and a concrete pad near shore still existed as of 1967. The dock was not rebuilt until 1988. Throughout the years, boats were moored at the dock. After the planking on the dock no longer existed, people still moored their boats to individual pilings. The dock was considered an excellent location for fishing, and people travelled by boat to the location, tying their boats to the pilings to fish. When Petitioner purchased his property, the only structures left on the contiguous submerged lands were thirteen concrete pilings and the concrete pad near shore. Only four of the pilings were sticking up out of the water. The remaining pilings were submerged. The original configuration of the historic dock was easily ascertained by the pilings and concrete pad. After Petitioner purchased his property, he began constructing a residence. He would travel from elsewhere in the Key Largo area by boat, would tie his boat to one of the pilings, and would wade ashore. Petitioner applied to Monroe County for a permit to rebuild portions of the dock. Although Monroe County accepted and retained his permit application fee, he was not issued a permit. Instead, he was told that he should contact the people at Pennekamp State Park. Petitioner then contacted Respondent's employees at Pennekamp State Park about reconstructing portions of the dock. In response to that inquiry Petitioner received a letter dated June 10, 1987, advising him that Respondent was not a permitting agency. That letter further recited two of Respondent's rules prohibiting the removal or destruction of natural features and marine life and construction activities in that state park. Having been frustrated by his attempts to obtain a permit to rebuild the dock from both Monroe County and from Respondent's employees at Pennekamp State Park, Petitioner made no further effort to obtain a permit or authorization from any other state, local, or federal government agency to reconstruct his dock. One day he backed a pickup truck to the edge of the water, hooked up, and raised the closest piling up in the air. Utilizing the existing pilings and adding additional ones, Petitioner rebuilt the dock "going a step at a time." In the course of his rebuilding the dock, Petitioner replaced the wooden decking and fasteners, replaced the wooden stringers and fasteners, added seven new concrete pilings, raised and repositioned several existing concrete pilings, and poured concrete footings for the new pilings. He completed rebuilding the dock in 1989. During the almost one year that he was rebuilding the dock, he worked in plain view of employees of local and state agencies. He was easily observed by the Coast Guard, the Marine Patrol, and the Park Service boats travelling to and through the Marvin D. Adams Waterway located approximately seventy-five feet from his property. No one told Petitioner to stop his construction activities. When it was completed, his dock was 12 feet wide and 84 feet long, 28 feet shorter than the historic dock. Petitioner's entire dock consists of 1018 square feet. Petitioner's dock is in the same location as the historic dock. Petitioner's dock is a private dock, used only by him when he moors his boat there occasionally. In re-building his dock, Petitioner extended it to a distance so that the water depth at the end of Petitioner's dock is four feet mean low water. Additionally, Petitioner left an open space of one to two inches between each plank on the deck so that sunlight could penetrate between the deck planking the entire distance of the dock. Pilings are an integral part of a dock. In 1988 Respondent began conducting a survey of private docks, commercial marinas, and fills, both authorized and unauthorized, within the boundaries of Pennekamp State Park as those boundaries were extended in 1967 to Key Largo. The survey was to be utilized in developing a policy regarding structures within the extended park boundaries. Petitioner's dock was included in that survey. The information which Respondent transmitted to the Governor and Cabinet regarding Petitioner's dock was that it was not authorized, that it was built in 1990, and that the water depth at the mooring area, considered by Respondent to be the terminal end of the dock, was two feet. Respondent did not advise the Governor and Cabinet that a dock had been in existence at Petitioner's property prior to 1967 and as far back as at least 1938, that the concrete pad and thirteen pilings from the historic dock still existed, or that Petitioner had rebuilt the dock in the same location, but shorter, than the historic dock. Further, Respondent did not advise the Governor and Cabinet that its water depth measurement of two feet was not taken at the waterward end of the dock, the way such a measurement is normally done. Respondent did advise the Governor and Cabinet that the access channel to the dock was four feet deep. On April 12, 1990, the Governor and Cabinet, sitting as the head of Respondent, approved a policy regarding development encroachments in Pennekamp State Park. The portion of that policy which relates to private docks provides as follows: Private docks must (1) be in existence prior to 1967 within state park waters to receive authorized structure status; (2) all docks within state park waters legally authorized by the Department of Natural Resources or the Board of Trustees during or after 1967 receive status as authorized structures; (3) that all other private docks in existence since 1967 within state park waters that are not legally authorized by Department of Natural Resources or the Board of Trustees have been evaluated on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration any authorization issued by state and federal environmental agencies and, using the Florida Keys Marina and Dock Siting Policies and Criteria - 18-21.0041 Florida Administrative Code, as a guideline for reviewing environmental impact on marine communities, designate the structure as either authorized or require removal or modification; and (4) that no future authorizations will be issued for the construction of new private docks in state park waters. Respondent subsequently notified Petitioner that his dock fell into category (3), that it had been evaluated on an individual basis using the Florida Keys Marina and Dock Siting Policies and Criteria, that his dock had an impact on marine communities because it exceeded the size and dimension requirements and did not meet the water depth requirements, and that Petitioner's dock needed to be "modified." Respondent further advised Petitioner that the modifications required included reconstructing his dock to a T-shaped structure rather than Petitioner's rectangular-shaped structure. The new structure would be required to have a four-foot wide walkway with a terminal platform of no more than 160 square feet. Further, Respondent's proposed dock would also extend an additional 28 feet further into Largo Sound than Petitioner's dock. Respondent also required that Petitioner install permanent handrails along the dock in order to convert it to only a swimming/fishing pier, and the mooring of any water craft to the structure would be prohibited. Petitioner has not so modified his dock. There are algae, sea grasses, sponges, coral, and other vegetation and marine life beneath and adjacent to Petitioner's dock, constituting a marine community. Shading has an adverse impact on the growth of sea grasses and marine vegetation. Where shading exists under Petitioner's dock, the submerged land under the dock is nearly barren. However, Petitioner rebuilt the dock in a manner so as to reduce the effect of shading. The dock is 41 inches above water at high tide. The spacing between planks on the deck also allows sunlight to penetrate the water below Petitioner's dock. An underwater videotape of the area beneath and around Petitioner's dock reveals an extensive marine life habitat and nursery. The pilings which have been under water for such a long time have an extensive buildup of sponges and coral which, in turn, provide a habitat for an enormous number of fish. Spiny Florida lobsters live under Petitioner's dock, as do mangrove snapper, barracuda, porkfish, damselfish, reef fish, sea cucumbers, and urchins. In effect, Petitioner has created an artificial reef. Some of the barren areas beneath Petitioner's dock are a result of the halo effect, i.e., the crustaceans and fish living under the dock and in the sponges and soft corals on the pilings only graze so far from their homes in order to avoid predators. This halo effect can also be seen around the free-standing pilings outside of Petitioner's dock area. Even if the planking on Petitioner's dock were removed, the sea grasses would not grow back around the pilings since the grazing organisms would still be present. Although there may be less shading beneath Respondent's proposed dock than exists underneath Petitioner's dock, substantial damage to the marine community beneath Petitioner's dock would be caused by the removal of Petitioner's dock and the building of a new one. It is not clear that the long- term effect of Respondent's proposed dock would have less adverse impact than Petitioner's dock. It is likely, however, that the removal of the present dock, with or without the subsequent construction of Respondent's proposed dock, would have a substantial adverse effect on the healthy marine community now existing beneath and around Petitioner's dock.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered giving Petitioner's dock authorized structure status. DONE and ENTERED this 10th day of February, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of February, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-3 and 5-7 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 4 and 9 have been rejected as unnecessary for determination of the issues involved herein. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 8 and 10-19 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting conclusions of law, argument of counsel, or recitation of the testimony. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 2-7, 9-13, 16-18, 20, 21, 26-31, 33, 36, and 37 have adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 1, 8, 14, 15, 25, 35, 40, and 41 have been rejected as being unnecessary for determination of the issues herein. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 22-24 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting conclusions of law, argument of counsel, or recitation of the testimony. Respondent's proposed finding of fact numbered 19 has been rejected as being irrelevant to the issues herein. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 32, 34, 38, 39, and 42-44 have been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the evidence in this case. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Burgess, Jr., Esquire Syprett, Meshad, Resnick & Lieb, P.A. Post Office Box 1238 Sarasota, Florida 34230-1238 Suzanne B. Brantley, Esquire Department of Natural Resources Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-3000 Don E. Duden Acting Executive Director Department of Natural Resources Mail Station 10 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-3000 Ken Plante, General Counsel Department of Natural Resources Mail Station 10 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-3000
