The Issue The issue presented is what is Peaches' basis in the Sterling stock?
Findings Of Fact There is no dispute as to the material facts in the instant case, Exhibit 1 presented at the hearing is a composite exhibit which is comprised of the Petitioner's U.S. Corporate Income Tax Return and Florida Corporate Income Tax Return for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1973. Exhibit 3 is the Respondent's document entitled "Income Tax Audit Changes" which reflects the adjustments made by the Respondent based upon a review of the Petitioner's return and the reasons for assessing the deficiency. Exhibit 2 is a composite exhibit comprised of the Petitioner's Amended Protest of the proposed deficiency and the Respondent's letter denying the same. Petitioner's federal return (Exhibit 1) Schedule D, Part II, reflects the 31,500 shares were acquired in 1958 at a cost basis of $10,191.00. These shares were subsequently sold by Peaches in 1972 for $1,160,131.00 or a gain of $1,149,940.00. This gain was reported on line 9(a) of the federal tax return as a portion of the "net capital gains." On its 1973 Florida Corporate Income Tax Return, Petitioner computed the income using the basis for the stock as of January 2, 1972, thereby reducing its reported income by $1,013,040.00 from the federal tax. The $1,013,040.00 reflects the amount of appreciation in the value of the stock between the transferrer's acquisition and January 1, 1972, the effective date of the Florida corporate income tax code. The shares of stock of Sterling Drugs were acquired by Peaches in 1971 from the controlling stockholder who made a contribution to capital to the corporation.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Petitioner's petition be denied and that the assessment against the Petitioner in the amount of $29,435.00 together with interest be assessed. DONE and ORDERED this 22nd day of January, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Edwin J. Stacker Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 James S. Moody, Jr., Esquire Trinkle and Redman, P.A. 306 West Reynolds Street Plant City, Florida 33566 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA PEACHES OF FLORIDA, INC. Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 78-1433 STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Respondent. / NOTICE TO: JAMES S. MOODY, JR., ESQUIRE ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER TRINKLE AND REDMAN, P. A. 306 WEST REYNOLDS STREET PLANT CITY, FLORIDA 33566 E. WILSON CRUMP, II, ESQUIRE ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL POST OFFICE BOX 5557 TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32304 You will please take notice that the Governor and Cabinet of the State of Florida, acting as head of the Department of Revenue, at its meeting on the 5th day of April, 1979, approved the Recommended Order of the Hearing Officer dated January 22, 1979, with paragraph 3 of the "Findings of Fact" therein amended to read as follows: "The shares of stock of Sterling Drugs were acquired by Peaches in 1972 from the controlling stockholder who made a contribution to capital to the corporation", in accordance with Stipulation of the Petitioner and Respondent filed in the case on March 1, 1979. This constitutes final agency action by the Department of Revenue. JOHN D. MORIARTY, ATTORNEY DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATION DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE STATE OF FLORIDA ROOM 104, CARLTON BUILDING TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32304 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice was furnished by mail to James S. Moody, Jr., Esquire, Trinkle and Redman, P. A., 306 West Reynolds Street, Plant City, Florida 33566, Attorney for Petitioner; by hand delivery to Wilson Crump, II, Esquire, Assistant Attorney General, Post Office fox 5557, Tallahassee, Florida 32304, Attorney for Respondent and Stephen F. Dean, Hearing Officer, Division of Administrative Hearings; Room 530, Carlton Building, Tallahassee, Florida this 5th day of April, 1979. JOHN D. MORIARTY, ATTORNEY
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Petitioner owes sales and use tax or specifically use tax, on certain purchases of tangible personal property in accordance with the relevant provisions of Chapter 212, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Florida Property Care, Inc. (Petitioner, taxpayer), was a Florida "Subchapter-S Corporation" having its home office in Dade City, Florida, at times pertinent hereto. The Petitioner's federal employer identification number was 59-3288869 and its Florida sales tax number was 06-1041158. The Petitioner was engaged in the business of cutting and removing trees, driveway construction, lawn maintenance, and landscaping. The Department of Revenue (Department) is an agency of the State of Florida charged with administering the tax laws of the state in accordance with Section 212 and 213, Florida Statutes. After issuing proper notification to the Petitioner on January 2, 2003, the Department conducted a sales and use tax audit of the Petitioner's business records. The audit covered the period of December 1, 1999 through December 16, 2001. The Petitioner corporation ceased doing business on December 16, 2001. The Department examined purchase invoices, general ledgers, and federal income tax returns of the Petitioner in the course of its audit. The Department elected to examine the records in detail rather than doing a statutorily permissible sample audit, since the assessment period was relatively short. The Petitioner was engaged in the business of making improvements to real property (construction driveways, landscaping, etc.) through the purchase and use of items of tangible personal property, as raw materials, it bought for use in its business. This included the purchase of limerock, plants, sod, mulch and the like for use in maintaining or landscaping real property. Because the Petitioner was engaged in the business of making improvements to real property, and not merely re-selling limerock, mulch, etc., it was generally only liable to pay sales tax on its purchases of items of tangible personal property used in its business, but not to charge and collect sales tax on its landscaping and real property improvement business activities or services for its ultimate customers. See Chapter 212, Fla. Stat. During the audit period, it was determined by the Department that sales tax had not been paid by the Petitioner on some of its purchases of items of tangible personal property used in the conduct of its business, such items as sod, limerock, asphalt, hay, and other products. The Department also found that the Petitioner had not paid sales tax on certain auto repairs that included both parts and labor charges. Accordingly, the Department noticed an assessment to the Petitioner for use tax on the purchases of items of tangible personal property, for which sales invoices produced in the audit, and by the Petitioner, did not indicate that sales tax had been paid when the items had been purchased from the suppliers. The Department calculated the additional tax due by multiplying the taxable amounts taken from the purchase invoices by the applicable tax rate. The Department also gave the Petitioner credit for sales taxes already paid. Specifically, on a purchase invoice for auto repairs, the Department gave the Petitioner credit for sales tax paid on the parts used in the repairs. The Petitioner's witnesses testified that the four purchase invoices identified as Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 2 in evidence, represented freight charges and were not tangible personal property purchase amounts for the limerock involved. Those purchase invoices, however, indicate on their face that they were for limerock. They indicate the total tonnage and the price per ton and do not indicate any portion of the charges representing freight or delivery charges. The price indicated per ton appears reasonable as a price for limerock and not just for freight charges. Moreover, the Petitioner's own witnesses concede that the purchase invoices in composite Exhibit 2 do not indicate any itemization or amount for freight charges. It is determined that these invoices are actually invoices for the purchase of limerock and not merely freight charges. The Petitioner contends that it assumed that the purchase invoices, identified as Petitioner's Exhibits 1, 4, and 7-9, in evidence, included sales tax in the unit price represented on those invoices, even though any sales tax increment of those invoices is not separately stated and itemized. The Petitioner's witness in this regard conceded, however, that he had no way of knowing whether the vendors from whom he purchased the goods actually charged sales tax on the subject invoices, since it was not itemized. He was only assuming that the tax was included in the unit price he paid, as a part of the total number. The Petitioner contends that it is not liable for the sales tax because sales tax was included in the unit price of the tangible personal property that the Petitioner purchased. The Petitioner argues, in the alternative, that it is not liable for sales tax because the vendors were responsible for charging and collecting the sales tax and that they should be held liable for the tax. In consideration of the evidence which shows that the Petitioner bought the limerock, sod, and other items for use in its business of providing landscaping, maintenance, and other improvements to real property, the Petitioner did not provide documentary or other evidence to corroborate its testimonial assumption or belief that the invoices were either not subject to tax or that the invoiced amounts included payment of the tax. Most of the invoices (the only documentary evidence of billing and the amount and category of payment), do not depict an itemization or category for tax on the face of the invoices. The evidence adduced by the Petitioner does show, as to Invoice Number 29, that tax indeed was paid on that purchase in the amount of $679.25. Additionally, with regard to APAC Invoice Number PORT 16175, $73.39 in tax was paid. Any assessment and collection of tax, penalty and interest by the Department upon conclusion of this proceeding should reflect credit to the Petitioner for these amounts. On June 3, 2003, a Notice of Proposed Assessment was issued by the Department to the Petitioner, setting forth deficient sales and use tax in the sum of $1,812.86, with interest through June 3, 2003, in the sum of $354.34, accruing at the rate of $.25 per day as well as a penalty in the sum of $906.44. The Notice of Proposed Assessment became a Final Assessment on August 2, 2003, for purposes of filing a request for formal proceeding before the Division of Administrative Hearings or for contesting the assessment in the circuit court. On September 30, 2003, the Petitioner elected to file a Petition with the Division of Administrative Hearings seeking a formal proceeding and hearing to contest the final assessment in this case.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and the arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Revenue assessing the tax as depicted in the notice of assessment, in evidence herein, including credit for the tax shown to have been collected on the two invoices referenced in the above Findings of Fact, and assessing interest and penalties in the amounts legally prescribed or as agreed to by the parties. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of June, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of June, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Carrol Y. Cherry, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Charles B. Morrow Jeanne Morrow Post Office Box 659 Astor, Florida 32102 James Zingale, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Bruce Hoffmann, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue Broadly stated, the issue in this proceeding the validity of the proposed deficiency in petitioner's corporate income in the amount of $25,712.80 for the 1972 fiscal year. More specifically, the issue is whether Florida may lawfully tax for the gain it realized on the sale of securities in the of $941,418.00. Included within this issue is the question of whether the apportionment formula set forth in Florida Statutes is applicable to petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the pleadings, the stipulations the parties and the record in this proceeding, the following relevant During the calendar year 1972, petitioner was a foreign " Corporation subject to the Florida Corporate Income Tax, imposed Chapter 220, Florida Statutes. Petitioner also operated a business in St. Louis, Missouri. January 1, 1972, petitioner held a 95 percent interest in Bal Harbour Joint Venture, which owned and operated the Ivanhoe Hotel and Restaurant in Bal Harbour, Florida. On December 15, 1972, petitioner was the sole owner of the Ivanhoe Hotel and Restaurant. November 16, 1972, the petitioner acquired by merger 100 percent interest in the Clearwater Beach Hilton, a motel and restaurant business located in Clearwater, Florida, and continued to own this interest on December 31, 1972. The Clearwater and Ivanhoe hotel and restaurant businesses in Florida and the petitioner's business in Missouri have separate, individual general managers. There is no central purchasing by the hotels and no centralized operating records are maintained by petitioner. There are no central reservation services available between the hotels and the hotels advertise separately and unilaterally in local publications in the cities in which they are located. No standardized product lines exist. On November 2, 1972, petitioner sold certain securities which resulted in a realized gain to petitioner for federal income tax purposes of $941,418.00. Said securities were purchased, located and sold in the State of Missouri, and had no relationship to petitioner's Florida transactions. Petitioner timely filed its 1972 Florida corporate income tax return on which it subtracted from its federal taxable income the gain realized from the sale of the securities. Its "Florida net income" and its "total tax due" were thus reported as "none." On or about May 8, 1974, respondent advised petitioner of a proposed deficiency in petitioner's 1972 tax in the amount of $29,392.00. In accordance with the provisions of Florida Statutes Sec. 214.11, petitioner timely filed with respondent its protest of the proposed deficiency assessment. After a hearing, respondent issued to petitioner its Notice of Decision in which the proposed, deficiency was reduced to $25,712.80, and the reasons therefor were set forth. Petitioner requested reconsideration by respondent. On March 11, 1975, the parties stipulated that further proceedings in this cause would be, processed under the Florida Administrative Procedures Act. The petition for hearing was forwarded by respondent to the Division of Administrative Hearings, the undersigned was duly assigned as the Hearing Officer.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is recommended that: the proposed deficiency assessment in the amount of $25,712.80 be vacated and set aside; and The respondent permit petitioner to file an amended 1972 return utilizing, within the discretion of the respondent, the employment of either separate accounting, a monthly averaging formula or another method which would effectuate an equitable apportionment of petitioner's income to the State of Florida. Respectfully submitted and entered this 8th day of August, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Donald A. Pleasants Shackleford, Farrior, Stallings and Evans Post Office Box 3324 Tampa, Florida 33601 Louis de la Parte, Jr. 725 East Kennedy Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33602 Patricia S. Turner Assistant General The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER =================================================================
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner is liable for sales tax, together with interest and penalties on the purported unpaid tax amount, as referenced in the assessment and the Respondent agency's notice of decision issued on October 18, 1994.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the sole proprietor of a marina and restaurant business located in Pensacola Beach, Florida. The Respondent is an agency of the State of Florida charged with enforcing pertinent statutes and rules providing for the collection of sales and use taxes, as well as penalties and interest for tax amounts determined to be due and payable but not timely paid to the Department and the State of Florida. Included within the Department's regulatory authority over the assessment and collection of sales and use taxes is the authority to conduct audits of taxpayers to determine amounts of tax due and owing to the State, as well as whether such taxes have been timely and properly remitted and otherwise accounted for. The relevant audit period involved in this proceeding extended from October 1, 1987 through December 31, 1992. The Petitioner's marina and restaurant business operated during the audit period was operated on property owned by the Santa Rosa Island Authority (Authority) and the State of Florida Department of Natural Resources (now Department of Environmental Protection, DEP). The property was leased to the Petitioner for the purpose of operation of this business. The property leased by the Petitioner from the Authority consisted of certain land above the mean high water mark and five boat slips. These five boat slips will be referred to sometimes hereafter as the "Santa Rosa boat slips". During the audit period, the Petitioner operated the restaurant business on the property leased from the Authority and rented the five boat slips to various boating customers. The Petitioner also rented 70 other boat slips to customers during the audit period. These slips were built by the Petitioner in 1977 on submerged land which had been leased from the State of Florida, Department of Natural Resources, Bureau of Land Management. This property adjoined the property leased from the Authority. On November 16, 1992, the Department sent to the Petitioner a notice of intent to audit its books and records. As part of the audit, the Department requested that the Petitioner produce various records, including but not limited to, the Petitioner's federal tax returns, Florida corporation income tax returns, Florida sales and use tax returns, depreciation schedules, general ledgers, property records, cash receipts journals, cash disbursement journals, purchase journals, general journals, sales journals, sales invoices, shipping documents, purchase invoices, intangible property records, sales tax exemption certificates and lease agreements for the real or tangible property involved in the Petitioner's business. The Petitioner basically was able to provide few records to support his restaurant sales and boat slip rental receipts, except for Florida sales tax returns and federal income tax returns. There were no sales control documentation records, such as general ledgers and general journals provided to the Department's auditor for review, except for a cash register tape for the night of December 1, 1992, representing that night's restaurant gross receipts activity. The Petitioner's method of record keeping essentially consisted of his writing down the gross sales each evening from the cash register tapes, totaling those figures at the end of the month, and reporting this total on his Florida sales tax returns as the gross receipts from the restaurant business. However, the Petitioner did not keep the cash register tapes or maintain other documents to support the information reported to the Respondent on the monthly sales tax returns. The Petitioner reported as, "exempt income," the rental from the boat slips for the five Santa Rosa boat slips on the monthly sales tax returns filed with the Respondent. He did not report his monthly rental income from the remaining 70 boat slips on his sales tax returns filed with the Respondent. He did report a great deal more gross receipts on his federal income tax returns than on his Florida sales tax returns. The Department compared the Petitioner's federal income tax returns during the audit period with his Florida sales tax returns and determined that the gross receipts reported to the federal government were substantially larger than the gross receipts reported to the Department. It determined that the primary difference in the gross receipts was attributable to rental revenues from the boat slips, which were not accounted for by the Petitioner in his Florida monthly sales tax returns. The auditor determined that four percent of the recorded restaurant gross receipts were attributable to alcohol sales and 96 percent to food sales. The Department calculated the sales tax due on the undisclosed income through the audit, which represented gross receipts from the restaurant business and the boat-slip rental business, which was not reported by the Petitioner on his Florida sales tax returns. It calculated the sales tax due during the audit period on the rentals of the five boat slips, which were improperly listed as exempt sales on the Petitioner's monthly sales tax returns filed with the Respondent. It was also revealed that during the audit period, the Petitioner had sub-leased a portion of the Santa Rosa property to his former wife for $5,000.00 per year. The Department calculated that the Petitioner owed $300.00 in taxes based upon the sub-lease to his former wife. The Department additionally calculated that the Petitioner owed an additional $314.00 for use taxes, based upon non-exempt purchases of tangible personal property. The Department assessed the Petitioner's sales taxes based upon the estimated boat-slip rental receipts, although it did not assess the lease payments made by the Petitioner to the Authority or to the State of Florida, Department of Natural Resources. On February 12, 1993, the Department assessed the Petitioner a total of $71,308.30 for the audit period, representing $45,694.90 of sales tax due, $14,093.37 of interest due thereon, $11,041.36 of penalties, and $314.98 of use tax, together with $91.02 of interest due on use taxes unpaid, and $72.67 of penalties due thereon. Daily interest of $15.13 commencing on February 13, 1993 was also assessed. Additionally, on February 12, 1993, the Department assessed the Petitioner $1,060.97 for the audit period, including penalties and interest, for local government infrastructure surtax due. Daily interest of $.29, commencing on February 13, 1993, was assessed on that amount. The Petitioner, in essence, does not dispute the Department's calculation of the assessed amount. The Petitioner, rather, contends that he believes that he reported all income and paid all sales taxes which were due and that his certified public accountant failed to account properly for his gross receipts and income to the federal internal revenue service, without the Petitioner's knowledge, during the audit period. He maintains, therefore, that the method of calculation of the Department's tax assessment, based upon the difference between the gross receipts depicted on the federal income tax returns and on the sales tax returns filed with the Department, is inaccurate, apparently because of the CPA's errors. Additionally, the Petitioner maintains that he was of the belief that the boat-slip rentals were not taxable and reportable for sales tax purposes to the Department because he believes, citing Rule 12A-1.061(5)(a) and (b), Florida Administrative Code. He bases this view on his assertion that the persons residing in the boat slips were "95 percent" live-aboard-type tenants, residing on their boats and that, essentially, they treated their boats as beach homes or condominiums, etc., for purposes of that rule, by residing for longer periods than six months. He thus contends that the rental revenues from such residents were tax exempt. The Department, however, established through its auditor's testimony and the Department's Composite Exhibit 2, that the Petitioner's CPA, through information he generated, did not establish that the difference between the gross receipts reported to the internal revenue service on the federal tax returns and the gross receipts reported on the Florida sales tax returns was not taxable. The Petitioner's proof does not show the factual elements necessary to establish that the 75 boat slips meet the rule's standard for exempt revenues from non-taxable residences.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Respondent assessing the taxes, penalties, and accumulated interest in the above-found amounts. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of June, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of June, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 94-7256 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted. Accepted, based upon the Petitioner's testimony in this regard, but immaterial. 3-4. Rejected, as not established by preponderant evidence. The Petitioner did not show that all or even most of the tenants are on annual rentals and, moreover, if they were, the rule cited by the Petitioner himself requires that such lease agreements or contracts be written. The Petitioner has simply failed to establish that the boat-slip rental arrangements were exempt transactions. Rejected, as incorrect as a matter of law and as immaterial and irrelevant. Rejected, as immaterial and irrelevant to the issues in this proceeding. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and as not probative by a preponderance of evidence that the assessment is incorrect. Rejected, as immaterial to the issues in this proceeding. The Department is not seeking to establish fraudulent intent. 9-27. These constitute argument and enunciation of the Petitioner's and the Respondent's perceived legal positions, and attempted equitable arguments concerning justification for the Petitioner's lack of relevant records, including a description of his financial difficulties related to destruction of his business by fire and by two hurricanes. While this is understandable and regrettable, these arguments and positions asserted by the Petitioner are immaterial and irrelevant to the issues in this case. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-26. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard E. Wells 715 Pensacola Beach Boulevard Post Office Box 505 Pensacola Beach, FL 32562-0505 Jarrell L. Murchison, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol - Tax Section Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that petitioners' request for a refund of corporate income taxes for the year ending January 31, 1975, be DENIED. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 14th day of January, 1981. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of January, 1981.
The Issue Whether Petitioners are liable for sales and use tax, penalty, and interest as assessed by the Department of Revenue (the Department)?
Findings Of Fact Salma is a Florida corporation with its principal place of business at 2231 Del Prado Boulevard, Cape Coral, Florida, 33990. Gausia is a Florida corporation with its principal place of business at 11571 Gladiolus Drive, Fort Myers, Florida, 33908. Petitioners are in the business of operating gas stations with convenience stores. The Department is an agency of the State of Florida and is authorized to administer the tax laws of the State of Florida. Petitioners were selected for audit because their reported gross sales were less than the total cost of items purchased (inventory) for the audit period. The Department issued Salma and Gausia each a Notice of Intent to Conduct a Limited Scope Audit or Self-Audit, dated April 26, 2013, for sales and use tax, for the period February 1, 2010, through January 31, 2013 (collectively referred to as the Notices). The Notices requested that Petitioners provide the Department: (a) a list of all their vendors for alcohol, tobacco, soda, chips, candy, etc.; (b) their total purchases of alcohol and tobacco, by vendor, for the period July 2010 to June 2011; (c) copies of their federal tax returns for the examination period; (d) purchase receipts for all purchases for the last complete calendar month; and (e) daily register (Z tapes) for the last complete calendar month. The Notices gave Petitioners 60 days to gather the requested documents before the audit was to commence. The Notices also requested that Petitioners complete an attached Questionnaire and Self Analysis Worksheet. In response to the Notices, Petitioners requested a 30- day extension of time until July 18, 2013, to provide the requested documents and to designate a Power of Attorney. Petitioners did not provide the Department any books and records for inspection, nor did they complete and return the questionnaire and self analysis worksheets. As a result, the Department's auditor determined the sales tax due based upon the best information available. To calculate an estimated assessment of sales tax, the Department used the purchase data of Petitioners' wholesalers and distributors of alcoholic beverages and tobacco, for July 1, 2010, through June 30, 2011; the 2010 National Association of Convenience Stores average markups and in-store sales percentages of alcoholic beverage and tobacco products; and historical audit data. After reviewing the purchase data for July 1, 2010, through June 30, 2011, and for July 1, 2011, through June 30, 2012, the Department's auditor determined that the data was missing a few vendors. As a result, the Department's auditor estimated the amount of Petitioners' cigarette purchases, based on historical audit data that shows that cigarette sales are generally 4.31 times more than beer sales. The Department's auditor and audit supervisor testified that the estimated gross sales seemed reasonable and consistent with the national averages and the purchase data for July 1, 2011, through June 30, 2012. The Department estimated gross sales (i.e., the retail sale value of the goods sold) by marking up the taxable sales and exempt sales reported on the sales and use tax returns submitted to the Department by Petitioners. For example, for July 1, 2010, through June 30, 2011, Salma purchased beer from its wholesalers and distributors for $148,826.15, and the Department marked up the purchase price by 27 percent for a retail value of $189,009.21. For July 1, 2010, through June 30, 2011, Gausia purchased beer from its wholesalers and distributors for $132,138.65, and the Department marked up the purchase price by 27 percent for a retail value of $167,816.09. The Department's markup on the alcoholic beverage and tobacco products is reasonable because the Department's auditor testified that he used a combination of 2010 National Association of Convenience Stores average markups and the competitive pricing and information from audits of other convenience stores. The Department determined that the exemption ratio reported on the sales and use tax returns submitted to the Department by Petitioners was extremely high for their industry. The Department used an exemption ratio of 15 percent, based on historical audit data for the industry, to calculate Petitioners' estimated taxable sales. A review of Petitioners' sales and use tax returns revealed that they did not apply the tax bracket system to their taxable sales transactions, as required under sections 212.12(9) and (10), Florida Statutes. Instead, Petitioners remitted sales tax on their taxable sales based on their gross receipts at a flat tax rate. The Department's auditor testified that this method of reporting tax is inappropriate and does not accurately reflect the sales activity of the business. The Department calculated the average effective tax rate of 6.0856 percent, based on historical audit data for the industry. To calculate the estimated tax due, the Department multiplied the effective tax rate by the estimated taxable sales and gave Petitioners credit for any tax remitted with their tax returns. The Department issued Salma a Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes, dated August 8, 2013, for audit number 200149872. The Department issued Gausia a Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes, dated August 8, 2013, for audit number 200149749. The Department assessed Petitioners sales tax on their sales of alcoholic beverages and tobacco. The Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes gave Petitioners 30 days to request a conference with the auditor or audit supervisor, to dispute the proposed changes. Petitioners did not make such a request. The Department issued a Notice of Proposed Assessment (NOPA) to Salma on March 6, 2014, for tax in the sum of $159,282.26; for penalty in the sum of $39,820.57; and interest as of March 6, 2013, in the sum of $27,772.36. The Department issued a NOPA to Gausia on March 6, 2014, for tax in the sum of $213,754.46; for penalty in the sum of $53,438.62; and interest as of March 6, 2013, in the sum of $36,921.79. Additional interest accrues at $30.55 per day until the tax is paid. The NOPAs became final assessments on May 5, 2014. After filing a request for an administrative hearing, Petitioners completed the Questionnaire and Self Analysis Worksheet and produced the following documents to the Department: (a) a list of all of their vendors for alcohol, tobacco, soda, chips, candy, etc.; (b) a list of vendors for alcohol and tobacco, for the examination period of July 2010 to June 2011; (c) a summary of their taxable sales, for the period February 2010 through December 2012; (d) copies of their federal tax returns, for the tax years 2010 through 2013; (e) copies of its purchase receipts for the months of July 2013; and (f) copies of their daily register (Z-tapes) for the month of July 2013. The Department's auditor testified that aside from being untimely, the records and information provided by Petitioners during these proceedings were not reliable because Petitioners did not provide any source documents that would allow the Department to reconcile the reported figures and confirm the supplied information. In addition, the purchase receipts and Z- tapes were not relevant because they were from outside of the audit period. The Z-tapes are also unreliable because the manager of the convenience store testified at the final hearing that employees purposely and routinely entered taxable sales into the cash registers as tax exempt sales. Petitioners argue that the Department did not use the best information available when estimating the taxes due. Petitioners claim that because their businesses are combination gas station/convenience stores, the national data for standalone convenience stores is inapplicable. However, notably absent from Petitioners' testimony or evidence was any alternative data upon which the Department could have relied for more accurate estimates.2/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order denying Petitioners' requests for relief and assessing, in full, the Department's assessments of sales tax, penalty, and interest against both Salma and Gausia. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of January, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MARY LI CREASY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of January, 2015.
Findings Of Fact Pursuant to a stipulation, the following facts are found. Petitioner is a West Virginia corporation, organized under the laws of that state on January 4, 1958. Prior to June 1, 1962, it operated an automobile dealership in Huntington, West Virginia. On June 1, 9162, Petitioner exchanged assets of its automobile dealership for fifty (50 percent) percent of the capital stock of Dutch Miller Chevrolet, Inc., a West Virginia corporation organized to succeed the automobile dealership formerly operated by the Petitioner. Prior thereto, in 1961, the Petitioner had acquired one hundred percent (100 percent) of the capital stock in Palm Beach Motors (the name of which was changed on August 10, 1961 to Roger Dean Chevrolet, Inc.). Roger Dean Chevrolet, Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Petitioner which operated on property owned by the Petitioner. The years involved herein are the fiscal years ending December 31, 1972 and 1973, during which years the Petitioner's principal income (except for the gain involved herein) consisted of rents received from Roger Dean Chevrolet, Inc. Petitioner and its subsidiary filed consolidated returns for the years involved. During the fiscal year ending December 31, 1972, Petitioner sold its stock in Dutch Miller Chevrolet, Inc. to an unrelated third party for a gain determined by the Respondent to be in the amount of $349,217.00, which, although the sale took place out of the State of Florida, the Respondent has determined to be taxable under the Florida Income Tax Code* (Chapter 220, Florida Statutes). In the fiscal years ending December 31, 1972 and 1973, Petitioner included in Florida taxable income, the amounts of $76.00 and $6,245.00, respectively, from the sale of property on April 23, 1971, such gain being reported for federal income tax purposes on the installment method under Section 453 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Roger H. Dean, individually or by attribution during the years involved herein, was the owner of one hundred (100 percent) percent of the stock of Roger Dean Enterprises, Inc. and seventy-five (75 percent) percent of the stock of Florida Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. The remaining twenty-five (25 percent) percent of Florida Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. was owned by Robert S. Cuillo, an unrelated person. The Respondent disallowed the $5,000.00 exemption to the Petitioner in computing its Florida corporate income tax for each of the years in question on the theory that the two corporations were members of a controlled group of corporations, as defined in Section 1563 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. By letter dated April 13, 1976, the Respondent advised Petitioner of its proposed deficiencies for the fiscal years ending December 31, 1972 and 1973, in the respective amounts of $19,086.25 and $1,086.79. Within sixty (60) days thereafter (on or about May 10, 1976), Petitioner filed its written protest in response thereto. By letter dated May 27, 1976, the Respondent rejected the Petitioner's position as to the stock sale gain and exemption issues. Thereafter on September 17, 1976, a subsequent oral argument was presented at a conference held between the parties' representatives in Tallahassee, and by letter dated September 23, 1976, Respondent again rejected Petitioner's position on all pending issues raised herein. The issues posed herein are as follows: Whether under the Florida Corporate income tax code, amounts derived as gain from a sale of intangible personal property situated out of the State of *Herein sometimes referred to as the Code. Florida are properly included in the tax base of a corporation subject to the Florida code. Whether amounts derived as installments during tax years ending after January 1, 1972, from a sale made prior to that date are properly included in the tax base for Florida corporate income tax purposes. Whether two corporations one of whose stock is owned 100 percent by the same person who owns 75 percent of the stock in the other, with the remaining 25 percent of the stock in the second corporation being owned by an unrelated person, constitute members of a control group of corporations as defined by Section 1563 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Many states, in determining corporate income tax liability, utilize a procedure generally referred to a "allocation" to determine which elements of income may be assigned and held to a particular jurisdiction, where a corporation does business in several jurisdictions. By this procedure, non- business income such as dividends, investment income, or capital gains from the sale of intangibles are assigned to the state of commercial domicile. This approach was specifically considered and rejected when Florida adopted its corporate income tax code. Thus, in its report of transmittal of the corporate income tax code to the legislature, at page 215, it was noted: "The staff draft does not attempt to allocate any items of income to the commercial domicile of a corporate taxpayer. It endeavors to apportion 100 percent of corporate net income, from whatever source derived, and to attribute to Florida its apportionable share of all the net income." Additional evidence of the legislature's intent in this area can be seen by noting that when the corporate income tax code was adopted, Florida repealed certain provisions of the Multi-state Tax Compact (an agreement for uniformity entered into among some twenty-five states). Thus, Article IV, Section (6)(c), a contained in Section 213.15, Florida Statutes, 1969, which previously read: "Capital gains and losses from sales of intangible personal property are allocable to this state if the taxpayer's commercial domicile is in this state", was repealed by Chapter 71-980, Laws of Florida, concurrently with the adoption of the Corporate Income Tax Code. This approach has survived judicial scrutiny by several courts. See for example, Johns-Mansville Products Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue Administration, 343 A.2d 221 (N.H. 1975) and Butler v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501 (1942). Respecting its constitutional argument that amounts derived as installments during tax years subsequent to January 1, 1972, from a sale made prior to the enactment of the Florida Corporate Income Tax Code, the Petitioner concedes that the Code contemplates the result reached by the proposed assessment. However, it argues that in view of the constitutional prohibition which existed prior to enactment of the Code, no tax should now be levied based on pre-Code transactions. The Florida Supreme Court in the recent case of the Department of Revenue v. Leadership Housing, So.2d (Fla. 1977), Case No. 47,440 slip opinion p. 7 n. 4, cited with apparent approval the decision in Tiedmann v. Johnson, 316 A.2d 359 (Me. 1974). The court in Tiedmann, reasoned that the legislature adopted a "yard-stick" or measuring device approach by utilizing federal taxable income as a base, and reasoned that there was no retroactivity in taxing installments which were included currently in the federal tax base for the corresponding state year even though the sale may have been made in a prior year. The Respondent denied the Petitioner a $5,000.00 exemption based on its determination that the two corporations herein involved were members of a controlled group of corporations as defined in Section 1563 of the Internal Revenue Code. Chapter 220.14(4), Florida Statutes, reads in pertinent part that: "notwithstanding any other provisions of this code, not more than one exemption under this section shall be allowed to the Florida members of a controlled group of corporations, as defined in Section 1563 of the Internal Revenue Code with respect to taxable years ending on or after December 31, 1972, filing separate returns under this code." Petitioner's reliance on the case of Fairfax Auto Parts of Northern Virginia, 65 T.C. 798 (1976), for the proposition that the 25 percent ownership of an unrelated third party in one of the corporations precluded that corporation and the Petitioner from being considered a "controlled group of corporations" within the meaning of Section 1563 of the Internal Revenue Code, is misplaced in view of the recent reversal on appeal by the Fourth Circuit. Fairfax Auto Parts of Northern Virginia v. C.I.R., 548 F.2d 501 (4th C.A. 1977). Based thereon, it appears that the Respondent correctly determined that the Petitioner and Florida Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., were members of the same controlled group of corporations as provided in Section 1563 of the Internal Revenue Code and therefore properly determined that Petitioner was not entitled to a separate exemption. Based on the legislature's specific rejection of the allocation concept and assuming arguendo, that Florida recognized allocation income for the sales of intangibles, it appears that based on the facts herein, Petitioner is commercially domiciled in Florida. Examination of the tax return submitted to the undersigned revealed that the Petitioner has no property or payroll outside the state of Florida. Accordingly, it is hereby recommended that the proposed deficiencies as established by the Respondent, Department of Revenue, be upheld in its entirety. RECOMMENDED this 7th day of July, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: E. Wilson Crump, II, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs Tax Division, Northwood Mall Tallahassee, Florida 32303 David S. Meisel, Esquire 400 Royal Palm Way Palm Beach, Florida 33480 Thomas M. Mettler, Esquire 340 Royal Poinciana Plaza Palm Beach, Florida 33480
The Issue Whether the Department of Revenue's ("Department") assessment for sales and use tax, penalty, and interest is valid, correct, and should be upheld.
Findings Of Fact The undersigned makes the following findings of relevant and material fact: The Department is the agency responsible for administering Florida's revenue laws, including the imposition and collection of state sales and use taxes. §§ 20.21 and 213.05, Fla. Stat. Cellular is a Florida S-corporation, having a principal address and mailing address of 11050 Pembroke Road, Miramar, Florida 33025. Resp. Ex. 4, Bates stamped p. 031. Cellular is a "dealer" as defined under section 212.06(2), Florida Statutes, and is required to collect and remit sales and use taxes to the State. § 212.06(2), (3)(a), Fla. Stat. The Department notified Cellular of its intent to conduct an audit by written notice and the request for specific records mailed on or about October 3, 2014. Resp. Ex. 2. The audit period is September 1, 2011, to August 31, 2014. Resp. Ex. 2, Bates stamped p. 279. Cellular has several locations in Florida where it sells cellular phones, accessories, phone repair services, and minutes for international calling cards to its customers. Cellular also provides services such as money transfers and accepts payments on behalf of Metro PCS. Store locations are in neighborhood business centers and in malls. During the audit period, Cellular had 11 store locations operating in Florida. Resp. Ex. 4, Bates stamped p. 031. Julia Morales is a tax auditor for the Department. She has been employed with the Department for 11 years. Initially, Morales worked as a tax collector. She has held the position of tax auditor since 2011. Morales has a bachelor's degree in finance and also engages in ongoing training with the Department in order to stay current with Florida Statutes and Department rules. Morales performed the audit and prepared the assessment in this case. Early in the audit, Cellular informed the Department that most of its sales were exempt from Florida's sales tax. Morales explained that insufficient sales records were supplied by Cellular to enable the Department to establish the exempt nature of sales transactions, and, therefore, exempt sales were disallowed by the Department. Resp. Ex. 4, Bates stamped p. 033. On September 3, 2015, the Department issued an initial Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes ("DR-1215") in the total sum due, as of that date, of $463,677.61 (i.e., $327,257.39 tax, $81,814.34 penalty, and $54,605.88 interest). After receiving the DR-1215, Cellular requested a conference with Morales to review the assessment. The conference was held on November 9, 2015. Resp. Ex. 1, Bates stamped pp. 007-008; Resp. Ex. 4, p. 030; Resp. Ex. 15, Bates stamped p. 131; Resp. Ex. 16, Bates stamped pp. 130-189. After the November 9, 2015, conference, Cellular provided Morales with sales invoices and detailed sales reports for the audit period. Morales explained that the supplemental records established that Cellular's reported tax exempt sales were properly exempt from sales tax, and, therefore, audit assessment Exhibits A01 to A11 were deactivated. Resp. Ex. 4, Bates stamped pp. 029-031; Resp. Ex. 18, Bates stamped pp. 058- 068. Audit assessment Exhibit A12 was also deactivated because Cellular provided records needed to reconcile the difference between gross sales reported on its 2012 federal tax return and gross sales reported on the sales and use tax returns for the same period. Resp. Ex. 18, Bates stamped p. 069. Among the supplemental records supplied by Cellular to establish the tax-exempt basis for some of its sales, its monthly Sales Transaction Detail reports showed that six of Cellular's 11 stores did not remit to the Department all the sales tax they collected during the audit period. Consequently, Morales added audit assessment Exhibits A13 through A18 to document the sales tax collected but not remitted, detailed by store. Resp. Ex. 4, Bates stamped pp. 029-030; Resp. Ex. 18, Bates stamped pp. 070- 110. Morales testified that one of Cellular's stores that under-remitted sales tax, namely the Northwest Store, was operating but not registered with the Department for the entire audit period. Morales discovered that the Northwest Store collected sales tax on its sales and did not start to remit collected tax to the Department until September 2014, which was after the audit period. Of the remaining five stores, Cellular remitted to the Department approximately 50 percent of the sales tax it collected from July 2012 to August 2014. Resp. Ex. 18, Bates stamped pp. 075, 082, 088, 095, 102, and 109. As to consumable purchases (audit assessment Exhibit B01) during the audit, Cellular failed to provide records to establish that it paid use tax on consumable purchases. The sums expensed in Cellular's federal tax returns, which could have a sales tax implication, were relied upon by the auditor to create Exhibit B01. Resp. Ex. 4, Bates stamped p. 034; Resp. Ex. 18, Bates stamped pp. 111-125. Based upon the supplemental records supplied after the November 2015 conference, on February 4, 2016, the Department issued a revised Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes ("DR-1215"), reducing the total sum due, as of that date, to $277,211.42 (i.e., $194,346.98 tax, $48,586.76 penalty, and $34,277.68 interest). Resp. Ex. 18, Bates stamped p. 053. Penalty considerations were reviewed by the Department. Resp. Ex. 19. Due to Cellular's failure to remit to the State collected sales tax, penalty was not waived by the Department. In addition, accrued statutory interest was also imposed as required by section 213.235, Florida Statutes. Resp. Ex. 18, Bates stamped pp. 054-056; Resp. Ex. 29, Bates stamped p. 2. On February 15, 2016, the Department issued a Notice of Proposed Assessment ("NOPA") in the total sum due, as of that date, of $277,620.29 (i.e., $194,346.98 tax, $48,586.76 penalty, and $34,686.55 interest). Resp. Ex. 23. On March 18, 2016, Cellular submitted a timely protest letter to the Department's Technical Assistance and Dispute Resolution ("TADR"). Resp. Ex. 25. Martha Gregory also testified for the Department. She has been employed with the Department for 20 years. Gregory currently holds the position of taxpayer services process manager in TADR. Gregory holds a bachelor's degree in accounting and has also taken master's level courses. TADR manages an assessment after a taxpayer submits a protest of a NOPA with the Department. Gregory is familiar with TADR's involvement in Cellular's case. Gregory testified that despite repeated efforts by TADR during the protest period, Cellular submitted no new information to the Department for review. Consequently, on April 17, 2017, TADR issued a Notice of Decision ("NOD"), sustaining the assessment in its totality. Because of accruing interest, the total sum due, as of that date, increased to $293,353.77. Resp. Ex. 24. On June 16, 2017, Cellular timely filed its petition for a chapter 120, Florida Statutes, hearing. In its petition, Cellular contests all taxes, penalty, and interest that have been assessed. (See petition filed with the Division on December 5, 2017.) After receiving the petition, the Department made repeated attempts to obtain information from Cellular to support the claims raised in their petition. Resp. Ex. 28. Because no additional information was submitted by Cellular, the petition was referred to the Division on December 5, 2017. Prior to this final hearing of June 28, 2018, Cellular provided additional records relevant to the sales tax assessed on consumable purchases (audit assessment Exhibit B01). Based upon the newly supplied supplemental records, the Department also deactivated Exhibit B01 from the assessment and issued a revised reduced assessment. As a result, on June 12, 2018, the Department issued a revised assessment, which reduced the additional sales and use tax owed to $158,290.02, plus $39,572.50 for a penalty and $55,040.52 in interest, for a total sum owed, as of that date, of $252,903.04. Resp. Ex. 29, Bates stamped p. 2. Erica Torres appeared at the hearing as Cellular's corporate representative and testified on Cellular's behalf. Torres is employed by Cellular as a manager in charge of sales personnel, commissions, schedules, and bookkeeping. She has been employed by Cellular since 2001. Torres admitted that the reports relied upon by the Department in determining that Cellular collected and failed to remit sales tax were correct. Cellular introduced no credible or persuasive evidence to support that the assessment was incorrect. The undersigned finds that more credible and reliable evidence is in favor of the Department. Cellular failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the assessment or proposed penalty and interest proven by the Department are incorrect.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order denying Cellular's requests for relief and sustaining the assessment in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of August, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT L. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of August, 2018. COPIES FURNISHED: Mark S. Hamilton, General Counsel Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 (eServed) Randi Ellen Dincher, Esquire Office of the Attorney General Revenue Litigation Bureau The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Carlos M. Samlut, CPA Samlut and Company 550 Biltmore Way, Suite 200 Coral Gables, Florida 33134 (eServed) Leon M. Biegalski, Executive Director Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 (eServed)
The Issue Is the Respondent's assessment for corporate income tax and interest for the tax years ending 12/31/78, 12/31/79, and 12/31/80 appropriate, and may it be properly imposed upon Petitioner?
Findings Of Fact The instant dispute between the parties arose out of how the substantial business interests of Petitioner Murray Kramer Corp. are to be defined and by what accounting method its corporate income tax assessments are to be made. Milton P. Weiss, C.P.A., is Petitioner's accountant and qualified representative for purposes of this proceeding. He is neither an internal bookkeeper for the corporation nor a corporate officer thereof. At all times material, Petitioner was conducting business, deriving income, or existing within the State of Florida, pursuant to Chapter 220, F.S. Petitioner invests primarily through partnerships. Among Petitioner's holdings and investments is ownership of an orange grove in the State of Florida from which it derived income by way of the sales of citrus fruit grown in Florida during the taxable years at issue: 1978, 1979, and 1980. The orange grove constitutes real and tangible property in Florida for purposes of Florida's corporate income tax. Petitioner has consistently filed Florida corporate income tax returns on a "separate accounting" basis since the inception of Florida's Corporate Income Tax Law on January 1, 1972. Petitioner used this method for the years at issue: 1978, 1979, and 1980. It did so without petitioning the Respondent Department of Revenue for permission at or before the filing of the returns to use the "separate accounting" method to determine the Florida tax base. Accordingly, Petitioner did not receive prior written permission from the Department to use the "separate accounting" method for those years, and the Department did not require that the Petitioner use the "separate accounting" method in those years. Nonetheless, Petitioner asserts that its pattern of using the "separate accounting" method for six years put the Department on sufficient notice that the corporate taxpayer would continue to use that method indefinitely and further asserts that it was therefore entitled to use such a "separate accounting" method on the basis of its prior consistent usage. Petitioner's Florida corporate returns declare investment income from dividends, interest, gains from securities, partnership income, and income from its orange grove located in Florida. In each of the disputed tax years, Petitioner entered its federal taxable income on Line 1 of the Florida Corporation Income Tax Return, FORM F-1120. This amount is not at issue and is accepted as a "given" by both parties. However, in each of the disputed tax years, Petitioner did not complete the apportionment schedule on Page 3 of the respective returns. Instead of using the apportionment method, Petitioner computed what it characterized as "Florida Profit" or "Florida Income" on a schedule it attached, based totally on the profits it derived from the Florida orange grove and then inserted that amount on Line 6, Florida Portion of Adjusted Federal Income, of the "Computation of Florida Tax Liability" on the Florida return. This entry did not relate computationally to the amount of federal taxable income reported federally on Line 1. All gross receipts from the sale of citrus fruit by Petitioner were derived from sales made to Zellwood Fruit Distributors. This dollar amount is also undisputed. Petitioner received payment from its Florida orange grove operation in the form of checks drawn by Zellwood. Approximately June 20, 1983, Respondent Department of Revenue made an initial audit of Petitioner's books and records for the taxable years in question. Respondent's auditor assigned at that time had full and free access to Petitioner's books and records. He and his supervisor memorialized their view that the "separate accounting" method employed by Petitioner was proper, but this judgment call (by the auditor on June 29, 1983 and by his supervisor on July 1, 1983) was in the nature of free-form agency action and was neither accepted nor formalized by their superiors within the agency who ultimately determined that the Petitioner should have employed the "apportionment" method and that the burden was upon the Petitioner even under the apportionment method to establish that one hundred percent of its income was not derived in Florida. The Respondent Department therefore determined the tax owed by Petitioner upon the basis of 100% of Petitioner's income as opposed to the yearly percentages that Petitioner had unilaterally assigned to its orange grove, and issued its Revised Notice of Intent to Make Corporate Income Tax Audit Changes on November 7, 1983. Florida's apportionment formula is a three-factor function which takes selected business activities of the taxpayer and computes the portion of that activity attributable to Florida, divided by that activity everywhere. A composite of the subtotal of those three measures (payroll, sales, and property) of business activity are used to compute Florida's share of the "everywhere" base that would be available under the adjusted federal taxable income base. See, Section 214.71(1), F.S. The Department calculated the tax using the three statutorily recognized apportionment factors of payroll, sales, and property. Concerning the first apportionment factor, payroll, Petitioner had federally reported no amount of payroll, and therefore this factor was determined by the Department to be zero, and pursuant to Section 220.15, F.S., the payroll factor was eliminated and the other two factors were used exclusively. Concerning the sales factor, all gross receipts of the orange grove were considered to be derived within the State of Florida, and all gross income attributable to intangible personal property was excluded from the sales factor, pursuant to Section 220.15(1), F.S. Concerning the property factor, the Department determined that all real and tangible personal property was within the State of Florida. The situs of the intangible property was not established by the taxpayer. Therefore, because Section 214.71, F.S. limits the construction of the property factor to include only "real and tangible personal property," it was thus determined to exclude intangible property. The Respondent Department of Revenue issued its Notice of Proposed Assessment on November 16, 1983, showing a balance of $10,596.00 ($7308.00 tax, $275.00 penalty, and $3,013.00 interest computed through October 31, 1983, plus notice of daily interest of $2.40 per day from November 1, 1983 until paid.) Petitioner timely availed itself of informal protest procedures, and the Department issued its Notice of Decision on March 15, 1985. By its June 21, 1988 Notice of Reconsideration, the Department concluded its informal proceedings and denied Petitioner's assertion of the right to use a "separate accounting" method and further denied Petitioner's challenge to the Department's assessment by the "apportionment" method, which in this instance had not made any apportionment for "outside Florida" activities. The situs of intangible personal property was not sufficiently demonstrated by the Petitioner at formal hearing. The Petitioner also did not establish that it owns real or tangible personal property outside Florida. Zellwood Fruit Distributors provided Petitioner Murray Kramer with letters attesting that, based upon information received from Winter Gardens Citrus Products Cooperative, Winter Gardens' sales percentages in the State of Florida were as follows: 1979 1980 18.60% 21.07% Zellwood provided no such figures to Petitioner for the year 1978. Petitioner contends, on the basis of the after the fact Zellwood letters, that Zellwood was a member of Winter Gardens, a cooperative, and Murray Kramer was an associate grower of Zellwood. At formal hearing, no one from Zellwood or Winter Gardens testified; no contract between Petitioner Murray Kramer and either Zellwood or Winter Gardens was introduced to prove agency; no bills of lading, sales slips, corporate documents, or other connective link among the three entities was offered in evidence; nor was any primary, direct, non-hearsay evidence of sales amounts or situs of Winter Gardens' sales offered by Petitioner. Milton Weiss, Petitioner's accountant, asserted that if a straight "apportionment" (not "separate accounting") calculation had been made for the income derived in Florida by Petitioner, percentages would be: 1978 1979 1980 24.03% 15.31% 15.01% These percentages rely in part on what are clearly the out-of-court statements of Zellwood's correspondent, relaying further out-of-court statements from Winter Gardens Citrus. (See the immediately preceding Finding of Fact). Neither of these out-of-court hearsay statements is such as may be used to supplement or explain direct evidence, since no direct, primary source evidence of these sales or income has been presented before the undersigned in this de novo proceeding. See, Section 120.58(1), F.S. Petitioner has not directly paid wages during the tax years at issue. Petitioner has not produced any federal partnership tax returns nor other persuasive proof to account for the return on its investments through partnership channels. During the tax years at issue, Petitioner was not a member of a Florida cooperative, as that term, "cooperative," is used in Section 214.71(3)(a)2, F.S. (See Finding of Fact 15). Petitioner was unable, by evidence of a type commonly relied upon by reasonably prudent persons in the conduct of their affairs, to establish that all amounts other than the percentages of gross income Petitioner had assigned by either of the alternative accounting methods was generated outside of the State of Florida. In so finding, the undersigned specifically rejects Petitioner's assertion that the initial audit report of June 1983 could, by itself alone, legally or factually establish that only the orange grove income was Florida income, that Petitioner's Florida income was solely from the orange grove, that the interest, dividends, and gains on securities sales were not derived in Florida, that the Petitioner taxpayer received rent income from partnerships, that the partnership real estate which gave rise to the rent income was 100% outside Florida, or that the Respondent's initial audit "verified" the figures needed to compute the sales factor, the figures for the property factor, and the figures for the payroll factor of the "apportionment" method for the following reasons: In addition to the first auditor's report being free-form agency action which was ultimately rejected by the agency, and in addition to the failure of either the first auditor or his supervisor to testify in the instant Section 120.57(1) de novo proceeding as to the accuracy of the underlying primary documentation which Petitioner Murray Kramer claimed the first auditor had apparently reviewed, Petitioner did not offer in evidence at formal hearing any such direct evidence documentation which it claimed had been reviewed by the auditors. Further, Respondent's successive auditor, Mr. Siska, testified that it is auditor practice to only examine those books and records individual auditors believe to be necessary to complete the audit. This discretionary element eliminates any guarantee of what the initial auditor relied upon. For the same reasons, Petitioner's assertion that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) audit of its books and records for the year 1979 "verifies" that the Petitioner's books and records accurately reflect the transactions that took place, is rejected. Petitioner Murray Kramer had admitted a letter (P-10) notifying the corporation that the IRS' "examination of ... tax returns for the above periods shows no change as required in the tax reported. The returns are accepted as filed." The tax period indicated on this exhibit is "7912", which is not helpful, and even if it means, as Mr. Weiss testified, that the 1979 federal tax return which is part of the Florida Corporate Tax Return is accurate under federal law, this IRS letter alone does not verify all the underlying documentation for all three years in question. Also, specifically with regard to investments made through other entities, Mr. Weiss' testimony suggests that the wages paid and partnership returns of these other entities never were in the possession of, nor accessible by, this Petitioner. Petitioner's reliance on its federal returns is apparently based, in part, at least, upon its assertion that it is a "financial institution" as defined in Sections 214.71(3)(b) and 220.15(2), F.S., but the presentation quality of evidence in this case does not permit of such a finding, either. Petitioner has paid no portion of the assessed taxes.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a Final Order which dismisses the Petition and affirms the assessment. DONE and ORDERED this 26th day of June, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of June, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-4100 The following constitute rulings, pursuant to Section 120.59(2), F.S. upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF). Petitioner's PFOF: 1, 6. Accepted. 2, 9, 10, 11, 17, 19. Rejected for the reasons set out in the Recommended Order. 3, 5, 7, 8, 12, 14, 16. Accepted but not dispositive of any material issue for the reasons set forth in the Recommended Order. With regard to item 8, specifically, this determination is non-binding in the de novo proceeding. 4. Rejected upon the citation given as not proved or applicable as stated. 13. Accepted in part and rejected in part as not proved or applicable as stated. See Conclusions of Law 11-12. 15, 18. Rejected as out of context and misleading upon the record as a whole, and as not dispositive of any material issue, and as subordinate and unnecessary to the facts as found. Respondent's PFOF: 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18. Accepted. 4, 5. Accepted in part; what is not adopted is subordinate or unnecessary to the facts as found. 17. Accepted, but by itself is not dispositive of any material issue at bar, for the reasons set out in the Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Milton P. Weiss, C.P.A. 686 Hampstead Avenue West Hampstead, New York 11552 Jeffrey M. Dikman, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Tax Section Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Sharon A. Zahner, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Revenue Room 204, Carlton Building Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 William D. Townsend, Esquire General Counsel 203 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Katie D. Tucker, Executive Director Department of Revenue 102 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Milton P. Weiss, C.P.A. 3091 North Course Drive Pompano Beach, Florida 33069 =================================================================
The Issue Whether the Petitioners are responsible for a use tax on the purchase of tangible personal property as assessed by the Respondent and, if so, in what amount.
Findings Of Fact The Department of Revenue is the state agency charged with the responsibility of collecting use tax in accordance with Florida law. At all times material to the allegations of this case, Petitioners were residents of Miami, Florida. In August, 1992, Hurricane Andrew struck the Miami area and destroyed most, if not all, of Petitioners' household furnishings. The Petitioners were devastated by their personal losses. Financially the Petitioners did not recover enough from the losses to replace all that had been damaged or destroyed by the storm. When it came time to refurnish their home, Petitioners traveled to North Carolina and selected new household furnishings which were paid for by them and imported into the State of Florida at their direction. These household furnishings are considered tangible personal property under the applicable Florida laws. The trucking companies which transported Petitioners' new furnishings were required to stop at Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services weigh stations, and copies of the bills of lading for Petitioners' personal property were produced and copied. The Department of Revenue utilized such bills of lading to calculate the use tax owed and due on the Petitioners' personal property. The Department of Revenue does not instruct the employees of the Department of Agriculture to stop particular kinds of trucks for inspection, but rather trains the Agriculutre employees to look for certain kinds of commodities, in order to identify all commodities that may be subject to sales and use tax. The Department of Agriculture employees are instructed by the Department of Revenue to forward to the Department of Revenue the bills of lading from those shipments containing consumer commodities that are for use or consumption and are subject to tax, and they are instructed not to forward bills of lading for items which are exempt from tax or which are intended for resale. The purpose of this program is to assist the Department of Revenue in its enforcement of the sales and use tax. A purchaser of goods from out-of-state is required to voluntarily comply with the statutes imposing the use tax. The Department of Revenue calculated the amounts due from Petitioners for the use tax associated with their personal property imported into Florida and reduced such amounts to a final assessment. This assessment was issued by the Department on or about July 25, 1996. Petitioners have not disputed the accuracy of the assessment nor the fact that they imported the personal property described in the bills of lading used to calculate the assessment. Petitioners maintain that they should not be required to remit the tax set forth in the assessment as they were the victims of Hurricane Andrew and, but for their losses from that storm, would not have incurred the expense of new furnishings. The final assessment identified the following sums owed by Petitioners: tax in the amount of $1,020.84; penalty in the amount of $510.42; and interest through July 25, 1996, in the amount of $137.87. Petitioners did not establish that they had paid sales tax in North Carolina for the personal property shipped to Florida. Petitioners did not establish that they paid the use tax in Florida for the personal property described in the bills of lading used to calculate the tax assessed. Petitioners did not purchase the personal property through a charitable organization such as the Red Cross which was afforded tax exemption after Hurricane Andrew to purchase furnishings for the storm's victims. Petitioners did not establish that they are financially unable to pay the assessment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order affirming the assessment in this cause. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of August, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of August, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Elizabeth T. Bradshaw Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Alphonso Thurman Betty Thurman 13603 Southwest 102 Court Miami, Florida 33176
