The Issue The issue in this case is whether the real estate license issued to the Respondent, Kathi L. Kitts, should be revoked or otherwise penalized based upon the acts alleged in the Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I make the following findings of fact: Brickell Grove Realty Corporation ("Brickell Grove") is a licensed real estate brokerage corporation in Florida having been issued license number 0245921. From at least May 1988 through September 1, 1988, the sole qualifying broker for Brickell Grove was Frederick Morrison, Jr. (Morrison). At some point in mid to late 1988, (the exact date was not established by competent substantial evidence) Morrison was hospitalized with a terminal illness and his subsequent involvement in the real estate brokerage business was limited. Morrison died on September 1, 1988. Respondent, Kathi L. Kitts (formerly known as Kathi L. Abassi), was licensed by Petitioner as a salesman with Brickell Grove beginning on or about August 13, 1986. Respondent completed the required course for a real estate broker's license in April of 1988. On September 19, 1988, she passed the state exam required to obtain a broker's license. The evidence did not establish when Respondent first filed an application for a broker's license. After passing the exam in September of 1988, Respondent submitted an application which she thought would enable her to become the sole qualifying broker for Brickell Grove. The evidence did not establish the date that application was submitted. That application was not signed by the qualifying broker of Brickell Grove and/or the owner so it could not serve to qualify Respondent as the sole qualifying broker for Brickell Grove. On October 1, 1988, Petitioner issued Respondent a broker/salesman license as an employee of Brickell Grove. That broker/salesman license was revoked in November of 1988 when it was discovered that the corporate registration of Brickell Grove was cancelled effective September 30, 1988 as a result of the death of Morrison and the non-renewal of the corporate license. The exact date of the revocation was not established by competent substantial evidence but it was apparently on or after November 1, 1988. Prior to receiving the revocation notice, Respondent was advised by an investigator employed by Petitioner that her application to become the qualifying broker was deficient because it was not signed by the owner or broker. On October 20, 1988, Respondent filed another application to become licensed as the qualifying broker for Brickell Grove and to change the name on her license from Kathi Abassi to Kathi Kitts. This second application contained the signature of the owner of Brickell Grove. On November 4, 1988, Respondent sent a letter to the Division of Real Estate indicating that Mr. Morrison was seriously ill and that it was urgent that her application to be the active broker for Brickell Grove be approved as quickly as possible. Respondent did not, however, discover that Mr. Morrison had died on September 1, 1988, until sometime in the middle of November when she was advised by Petitioner's investigator. Petitioner approved Respondent's second application to become the qualifying broker for Brickell Grove on November 22, 1988. The approved broker's license was backdated to establish an effective date of October 20, 1988. Effective October 20, 1988, the corporate registration of Brickell Grove Realty Corporation was reinstated upon the Respondent becoming its sole qualifying broker. Respondent admitted that at least during the time period from September 1, 1988 through October 20, 1988, she operated as a salesman in the office of Brickell Grove Realty without any supervision from another broker in the office. However, no competent substantial evidence was offered to establish the nature or extent of business conducted by that office or by Respondent during this time period. Respondent did not open bank accounts or advertise as a broker until after October 20, 1988. While Respondent contends that she thought Mr. Morrison was continuing to carry on as the active broker for Brickell Grove during the time period he was hospitalized and continuing through November (after his death), she admitted that she only saw him on occasion and could not recall when he was last in the office. The limited contact between Respondent and the licensed broker for Brickell Grove is reflected by her lack of knowledge of his death until almost two months after it occurred. While there is hearsay testimony that Mr. Morrison was in the hospital for several months prior to his death and that his involvement with Brickell Grove Realty during the several months preceding his death was limited, or nonexistent, no competent substantial evidence was offered to establish the nature or extent of the business conducted by Respondent without the benefit of supervision by a licensed broker during the time period prior to September 1, 1988. Petitioner had previously initiated an investigation into unlicensed practice by one of the owners of Brickell Grove, Mahmoud Abassi (Respondent's former husband) in July of 1986. That investigation resulted in an August 29, 1986 affidavit executed by Mahmoud Abassi to cease and desist unlicensed real estate brokerage activity. However, no competent substantial evidence was offered to prove any involvement by Respondent in the activities which led to the execution of that affidavit nor was any evidence offered to show that Mahmoud Abassi was actually running Brickell Grove at any point subsequent to the execution of the affidavit. Moreover, no competent substantial evidence was offered as to Respondent's activities and/or supervision during the period from the execution of the affidavit until September 1, 1988.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Professional Regulation, Florida Real Estate Commission, enter a Final Order finding Respondent, Kathi Kitts, guilty of operating as a broker without a license during the period from September 14, 1988, to October 1, 1988, reprimanding her and placing her on probation for one year. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 15th day of December 1989. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of December, 1989.
Findings Of Fact Dan Lee Isaacs is a real estate broker/salesman with the Petitioner, Key Realty, Inc. He seeks in this proceeding to have approved his dual licensure as a broker for Key Realty Management, Inc., as well as to retain his broker/salesman licensure with the Petitioner, Key Realty Inc. In his capacity as a broker/salesman for Key Realty Inc., he works under the supervision of Mr. Les Epperson, who is the licensed broker for that entity. Mr. Isaacs owns no stock in the corporation, Key Realty Inc. He does own stock and would be sole manager of the separate corporation known as Key Realty Management, Inc. Key Realty Management, Inc., is not affiliated in a subsidiary or other relationship with Key Realty, Inc., although there is some commonalty of ownership in that Les Epperson is a minority shareholder. The President and majority stockholder of Key Realty, Inc., Les Epperson, would have no part in the management of the operations of Key Realty Management, Inc. Mr. Isaacs desires, for personal and financial reasons, to remain active in the real estate sales field as a broker/salesman under the supervision of broker Epperson. He would, as sole manager and broker with Key Realty Management, Inc., engage in no sales activities, but rather solely in the management and supervision of various rental properties for clients of that firm. The two corporations maintain and would maintain separate accounting books and records; and, as pertinent, separate escrow and trust funds and accounts. It is to the advantage of both firms, both financially and in terms of legal liability, to maintain these escrow funds and accounts separately because of the financial and operational differences characteristic of a real estate management firm, as compared to a purely real estate sales operation as conducted by Key Realty, Inc. The Petitioner has complied with all requirements for qualification as a real estate broker pursuant to Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated thereunder. In October, 1980, the Petitioner applied for the above described dual licensure. The Respondent denied the application on the basis that an individual cannot be a broker and a broker/ salesman simultaneously. The principals of both corporations, Mr. Epperson and Mr. Isaacs, have submitted the affidavits and agreements pursuant to Rule 2IV-6.06, Florida Administrative Code, attesting to the absence of any conflict of interest stemming from Mr. Isaacs' licensure as a broker of the separate corporation and that both of them agree and consent to the dual registration. There is no dispute between the parties that in essence a "salesman" and a "broker/salesman" perform some of the same real estate transaction functions under the supervision of a licensed broker, for instance, the depositing with the broker of any escrow or other funds involved in a given real estate transaction for appropriate disposition and disbursement by the broker and acting in all other pertinent operative capacities under the supervision of a broker, rather than independently. The parties also did not dispute that the real basis for the "broker/salesman" designation in the licensing scheme in Florida is to allow a licensee to demonstrate to the public that a broker/salesman is clothed with additional internship, educational and experience credentials and is thus possessed of a greater degree of expertise in real estate transactions and operations than one licensed as a salesman. The Respondent however, in its argument during and subsequent to the hearing, apparently takes the position that a "broker/salesman" and a salesman perform identical functions; and, therefore, are legally to be considered as the same type of license and licensee, for purposes of establishing its legal position that since a salesman's license may not be issued to a person registered as an active broker unless the active broker's license is surrendered that neither may a person be dually licensed as both a "broker/salesman" and a broker.
Recommendation In consideration of the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence in the record and the pleadings and arguments of counsel, it is; therefore, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered granting Dan Lee Isaacs a license as an active real estate broker for, and on behalf of, Key Realty Management, Inc., and allowing his retention of licensure as a broker/salesman with Key Realty, Inc. RECOMMENDED this 15th day of September, 1981, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of September, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: W. Kirk Brown, Esquire Post Office Box 4075 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Randy Schwartz, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondents' licenses as real estate brokers should be suspended or revoked, or the licensees otherwise disciplined, for alleged violations of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, as set forth in the Administrative Complaint, dated September 28, 1981. This proceeding is based on an administrative complaint filed by Petitioner, Board of Real Estate, alleging that Respondents, while engaged in a rental service business which advertised and sold rental property information or lists, for an advance fee to prospective lessees, utilized a contract or receipt agreement which included language defining when a "rental has been obtained" that was contrary to the intent of Rule 21V-10.30, Florida Administrative Code, and that therefore Respondents had violated Subsection 475.453 and 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes. It further alleged that Respondents failed to refund 75 percent of an advance fee to specific prospective tenants as required by Subsection 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes and therefore constituted a violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes. At the commencement of the hearing, the parties submitted a Proposed Stipulation of facts which was accepted by the Hearing Officer and constitutes the Findings of Fact hereinafter. No witnesses testified at the proceeding nor were any exhibits entered in evidence other than the four exhibits attached to the Stipulation. (Exhibit 1)
Findings Of Fact Respondent Jack Braunstein is a licensed real estate broker having been issued license number 0146924. The last known address of this Respondent is 916 North Federal Highway, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33304. Respondent Rent Aid, Inc., is a licensed corporate real estate broker having been issued license number 0133234. The last known main office address of Rent Aid, Inc., is 916 North Federal Highway, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33304. At all times material herein Respondent Braunstein was the sole active broker of and for Respondent Rent Aid, Inc., doing business at the corporate main office located in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. As said active broker, Braunstein was responsible and liable for the acts and/or omissions of the associates of Rent Aid, Inc. performed in the scope of their employment; and was responsible and liable for the acts and/or omissions of Rent Aid, Inc. At all times material herein, Respondent Rent Aid, Inc., was engaged in a full service real estate brokerage business which included representing potential buyers and sellers of real property and potential landlords and tenants with regard to rental properties. As part of the business Rent Aid, Inc. entered into contracts with prospective tenants for an advanced fee, as shown by Exhibit "A" to the Complaint and incorporated herein by reference. That the contract or receipt agreement forms provided by the Respondents, have inserted therein additional language as to specifically stating that "a rental has been obtained when company provides a guaranteed available rental unit upon the terms specified and requested by member. On or about September 16, 1980 Jan Spear and Deborah Nigro entered into the contract, an accurate copy of which is appended to the Complaint as Exhibit "A", with Rent Aid, Inc. That under the terms of the contract, Respondent had the discretion to refuse any and all refunds if they had shown to the prospective tenant an available rental unit which met the terms specified and requested by the prospective tenant, even if the prospective tenant declined to rent said unit and demanded a refund of the paid fee within the required time frame. That Respondent's practice was to refuse demands for refund made where, in Respondent's opinion, a bona fide effort had been made to obtain a rental, which efforts had been unsuccessful through no fault of Respondent's. Jan Spear and Deborah Negro made written demand upon Respondent's for a partial refund of the fifty ($50) fee which they had paid Respondent's pursuant to the contract. This demand was made within thirty days of the contract date as shown by therefund refusal dated October 12, 1980, attached to the Complaint as Exhibit "B" and incorporated herein by reference as true and accurate. The contract utilized by Respondent's does not strictly conform to the refund required by Rule 21V-10,30 in that the conditions under which a refund would be payable are restricted beyond the scope of said Rule, and SS 475.453(1), Florida Statutes. Respondent utilized the Contract form in question in reliance upon advice received from his prior counsel, Gregory Jones, as shown by a letter dated April 1, 1980. A true and accurate copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "C". Sal Carpino, attorney for the Department of Professional Regulation, had been provided with a copy of the form utilized by Respondent and had approved the format of said form without approving a discrepancy of the language in question in this proceeding, to wit: "a rental has been obtained with company (Rent Aid, Inc.) provides a guaranteed available rental unit upon the terms specified and requested by members." In response to this proceeding, Respondent has made full and complete refund to Jan Spears and Deborah Nigro and has agreed to voluntarily stop all use of the Contract form in question, and use only such a form as strictly complies with 475.453(1) and Rule 210-10.30 and to furnish a copy of said form to the Department conformance with said Rule."
Recommendation That the Board of Real Estate issue a private reprimand and impose a $100 fine against Respondents Jack Braunstein and Rent Aid, Inc. for violation of Subsections 475.25(1)(d) and (e), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this day of March, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of March, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael J. Cohen, Esquire Suite 101 2715 East Oakland Park Boulevard Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33306 John P. Gaudiosi, Esquire 3801 North Federal Highway Pompano Beach, Florida 33064 Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 C.B. Stafford, Executive Director Board of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondents negotiated the sale of real property and collected a commission on said sale without the requisite real estate license issued by the State of Florida.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility and duty of prosecuting Administrative Complaints filed against real estate practitioners pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida. Respondent Rene Larralde, Jr., is a citizen of the State of Florida. At no time relevant to this proceeding did Larralde hold a Florida-issued license as a real estate sales associate or real estate broker. Respondent Maxous, Inc., is a Florida for-profit corporation formed on August 10, 2004. Larralde is president and registered agent of Maxous. Respondent Glinda G. Hatfield has held licenses as a Florida real estate broker and a Florida real estate associate. As of the date of the incident relevant to this proceeding, Hatfield's real estate broker's license was in an inactive status. Hatfield had failed to meet one of the continuing education requirements for renewal of her license that year. She was not aware of that fact until notification by the state relevant to the issues in this proceeding. Upon receiving notice, Hatfield took the necessary measures to have her license re-instated to active status. Hatfield assisted Larralde in forming Maxous. It was Hatfield's responsibility, as the licensed real estate broker in the new entity, to make sure Maxous was duly registered with the state as a real estate broker. Hatfield went to the Melbourne Association of Realtors to register the business once it had been incorporated. Hatfield did not understand that the business also had to be registered through the Florida Real Estate Commission in Tallahassee. Not being aware of that requirement, Hatfield never registered Maxous with the state. Rather, she paid the fees associated with registration of the company with the local real estate association and made the erroneous presumption that the company could then operate as a licensed real estate broker in the state. On or about February 27, 2008, certain parties entered into a Contract for Sale and Purchase (the "Contract") of property located at 1033 June Drive, Melbourne, Florida (the "Property"). Maxous was designated as the listing broker in the Contract. On April 21, 2008, the sale of the Property closed, as evidenced by a HUD Settlement Statement. The Settlement Statement indicates a real estate commission in the amount of $5,964.18 for the sale. The Settlement Statement indicates $2,982.09 (one half of the commission) is to be paid to Maxous and the other half of the commission to be paid to Exit One Realty. Exit One Realty was the listing agent for the Property, but had not been made aware of the impending sale. As the sole listing agent, Exit One Realty would normally expect to receive the entire broker's commission at the time of closing. However, Exit One Realty was not even aware of the sale of the Property until it received its commission. It appears that Maxous, through the person of Larralde, held itself out as the listing broker and assumed ownership of the commission on the sale of the Property. Larralde did, however, designate Exit One Realty as another broker in the sale who was entitled to half of the commission. At the time of the transaction involving the Property, Maxous was not registered with the State of Florida as a real estate broker. Larralde was not licensed as a real estate sales associate. In order to consummate this sale (and others like it), Larralde had established Maxous. It was apparently Larralde's intent, although he did not appear at the final hearing, to use Hatfield's status as a licensed broker to legitimize Maxous' status as a brokerage firm. Hatfield was amenable to that arrangement. Hatfield was designated as the vice-president of Maxous when the company was formed. As previously noted, Hatfield went to the Melbourne Association of Realtors for the purpose of registering Maxous as a brokerage entity. Hatfield paid the necessary fees to the association for the registration of Maxous with the local real estate association, and, upon inquiry from that office, felt that she had done everything necessary to allow Maxous to operate as a broker. Thus, at the time of the aforementioned transaction, Maxous was not a legitimate broker in the State of Florida. Hatfield assumed she was the registered broker for Maxous; assumed Maxous was duly registered with the state; and assumed that her broker's license was current. In matter of fact, none of those assumptions proved true. Clearly Hatfield did not attempt to circumvent or avoid the requirements for real estate brokers. Rather, she was mistaken about what had to be done regarding registration with the Florida Real Estate Commission. She did not know that her license had been deemed inactive for failure to complete a continuing education class. Neither Larralde, nor anyone else testified at final hearing as to what their knowledge was concerning these matters. It cannot be determined whether Larralde knew Maxous was not a registered brokerage firm and that the transaction relating to the Property was improper. However, Larralde did share the commission with Exit One Realty. It is clear from Hatfield's testimony at final hearing that she did not intend to defraud anyone or to do anything illegal or improper. However, her actions were improper nonetheless. It is not clear from the testimony whether Hatfield received any of the commission provided to Larralde. However, to her credit, Hatfield, upon learning of the violations set forth above, unilaterally ceased doing business as a real estate agent or broker. She acknowledged her mistake and took immediate action to make sure she would not make any further mistakes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate: (1) imposing a fine in the amount of $5,000 against Respondent, Rene Larralde; (2) imposing a fine of $5,000 against Respondent, Maxous, Inc; (3) imposing a fine of $250 against Respondent, Glinda G. Hatfield; (4) requiring Hatfield to pay the costs of the investigation in this matter; and (5) suspending Hatfield's real estate license for a period of one year. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of November, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of November, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Amy Toman, Hearing Officer Office of the General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Reginald Dixon, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Patrick J. Cunningham, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Hurston Building-Suite 801 North Orlando, Florida 32801 Joseph G. Colombo, Esquire 2351 West Eau Gallie Boulevard, Suite 1 Melbourne, Florida 32935
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Leonard M. Wojnar, is a licensed real estate salesman, having been issued license number 0372634. The Respondent was a licensed real estate broker in the State of Michigan from approximately 1975 until his license was revoked on or about July 2, 1982. In the fall of 1980, a Complaint was filed in Michigan against the Respondent. The Respondent appeared at a hearing in Michigan, after which this case was dismissed. On or about February 3, 1981, the Department of Licensing and Regulation in Michigan contacted the Respondent by letter, notifying him of the Department's involvement with the complaint against him. This letter was received by the Respondent. By letter dated February 9, 1981, to the Michigan Department of Licensing and Regulation, the Respondent replied to the February 3, 1981 letter. On or about May 12, 1981, the Michigan Department of Licensing and Regulation issued a formal Complaint against the Respondent, and served it on him on approximately May 13, 1981. There is no evidence to demonstrate that the Respondent received service of this Complaint, but based upon the earlier correspondence between the Michigan Department of Licensing and Regulation and the Respondent, the Respondent was on notice of a proceeding pending against him. On May 22, 1981, the Respondent completed his application for licensure in Florida. Thereafter, with the assistance of counsel in Michigan, the Respondent attended hearings and proceedings in the Michigan action against his real estate license. The Respondent's Michigan license was revoked on or about July 2, 1982. When the Respondent applied for his Florida license, he failed to disclose that a proceeding was pending against his license in Michigan, and he answered Question 15a on the Florida application in the negative. This question asks if any proceeding is pending in any state affecting any license to practice a regulated profession. The Respondent contends that the revocation of his license by the Michigan authorities is invalid, and that legal proceedings are pending in Michigan to obtain restoration of his license there. He also contends that he was not aware of any proceeding pending against him when he answered Question 15a on the Florida application.
Recommendation From the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that license number 0372642 held by Leonard M. Wojnar be REVOKED. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered this the 21st day of July, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of July, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael J. Cohen, Esquire Suite 101 Kristin Building 2715 East Oakland Park Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33306 Steven Warm, Esquire 101 North Federal Highway Boca Raton, Florida 33432 William M. Furlow, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Harold Huff, Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation Old Courthouse Square Bldg. 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility for regulating the real estate profession in the State of Florida. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, the Respondent was a licensed real estate salesperson in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0189734 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. On July 16, 1991, Petitioner filed an administrative complaint against Respondent which contained certain factual allegations and which charged Respondent with violating certain statutory provisions and rules regulating licensed real estate professionals in the State of Florida. The matter was assigned Case No. 9181335 by Petitioner. Thereafter, the matter was referred to the Florida Division of Administrative Hearing (DOAH) for formal proceedings pursuant to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. Upon being referred to DOAH, the matter was assigned DOAH Case No. 91-4852. On October 31, 1991, a formal hearing was conducted by a DOAH Hearing Officer. The Respondent was represented by counsel at that formal hearing. Following the formal hearing, a Recommended Order was duly entered by the Hearing Officer which contained findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a recommended disposition of the proceeding. The Hearing Officer found that Petitioner had proved the violations alleged against Respondent by clear and convincing evidence and recommended that Petitioner impose an administrative fine against Respondent in the amount of $1,000. On April 3, 1992, Petitioner entered a Final Order that adopted the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommended disposition submitted by the Hearing Officer in DOAH Case 91-4852. The Final Order imposed an administrative fine against Respondent in the amount of $1,000. Respondent thereafter appealed the Final Order to the Third District Court of Appeal of Florida where it was assigned Case No. 92-01033. On June 3, 1992, Petitioner entered an "Order Granting Stay" which stayed the Final Order pending the appeal. On September 21, 1992, Respondent's appeal was dismissed by order of the Third District Court of Appeal. The Final Order entered by Petitioner on April 3, 1992, was lawfully imposed, is final, and is binding on Respondent. At the time of the formal hearing conducted in this proceeding, Respondent had not paid the $1,000 administrative fine that was imposed upon her by the Final Order entered in Case No. 9181335 (DOAH Case No. 91-4852) on April 3, 1992.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order which finds that Respondent violated the provisions of Section 475.25(1)(e) and of Section 475.42(1)(e), Florida Statutes, and which suspends Respondent's license as a real estate salesperson for ten years. It is further recommended that the final order provide that the suspension of Respondent's license be terminated upon her paying the $1,000.00 administrative fine that was imposed upon her by the Final Order entered in Case No. 9181335 (DOAH Case No. 91-4852). DONE AND ORDERED this 13th day of October, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of October, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Theodore R. Gary, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 401 Northwest Second Avenue, Suite N-607 Miami, Florida 33128 Cecelia M. Smile 810 Rutland Drive, Apartment 726 Lincoln, Nebraska 68512 Darlene F. Keller, Director Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Jack McRay, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Whether the Respondent is guilty of the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint filed by the Petitioner and, if so, whether Respondent's real estate license should be suspended, revoked, or otherwise disciplined.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is a state government licensing and regulatory agency with the responsibility and duty to prosecute Administrative Complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular Section 20.165, Florida Statutes; Chapters 120, 455, and 475, Florida Statutes; and the rules adopted pursuant thereto. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent Jared A. White T/A Jerry White Realty was a licensed real estate broker, having been issued license number 0187087 pursuant to Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license issued to Respondent was as a broker with an address of 231 Skiff Pt. 7, Clearwater, Florida 34630. TITLE TO THE PROPERTY The matters at issue began with Respondent's retention as a real estate broker to bid at a foreclosure auction for a beachfront house and lot at 235 Howard Drive in Belleair Beach, Pinellas County, Florida. Respondent was hired to submit the bid on behalf of Dr. Moshe Kedan and/or his wife, Ella Kedan. Prior to the auction on August 17, 1995, Respondent had no contact with the Kedans. Kathy MacKinnon of Viewpoint International Realty in Clearwater was Respondent’s point of contact with the Kedans. It was Ms. MacKinnon who obtained Respondent's services to bid on behalf of the Kedans, and Ms. MacKinnon who negotiated with Dr. Kedan as to the financial arrangements for both the bid and any ensuing commissions for Respondent. Neither Ms. MacKinnon nor Dr. Kedan was called as a witness in this case. Respondent attended the foreclosure auction and tendered the winning bid on the property. Respondent bid in his own name. Respondent testified that he had bid at several similar sales in the past, and his practice was to bid in the name of the person who would hold title to the property. Respondent did not follow his usual practice here because Ms. MacKinnon failed to instruct him as to whether the property would be titled in the name of Dr. Kedan, Mrs. Kedan, or one of their corporations. Ms. MacKinnon told Respondent she would know on August 18 how the property was to be titled. Respondent's testimony regarding the initial titling of the property is supported by a handwritten note faxed by Ms. MacKinnon to Dr. Kedan on August 17, shortly after the auction. Ms. MacKinnon's note provides instructions regarding payment of the purchase price, indicating that the money must be submitted to the Clerk of the Court no later than 10:30 a.m. on the morning of August 18. The note specifically asks, "Also, whose name do you want the house in?" Respondent testified that on August 18, he went to Atlanta on business, with the understanding that Ms. MacKinnon would handle the payments to the Clerk of the Court and the titling of the property on that date. This testimony is consistent with the handwritten note in which Ms. MacKinnon indicates that she will take the Kedans' checks to the court. The record evidence shows that the payments were made to the Clerk of the Court and that title insurance on the property was timely issued. However, the title and the title insurance policy listed Respondent as owner of the property. Respondent was unaware the property had been titled in his name until he received the certificate of title in the mail, approximately two weeks after the auction. Upon receiving the incorrect certificate of title, he went to the title company and signed a quitclaim deed, effective August 17, 1995, in favor of Ella Kedan. Respondent testified that he had learned from Ms. MacKinnon that the property would be titled in Ella Kedan’s name at sometime during the two-week period after the auction. The quitclaim deed was not notarized until October 9, 1995, and was not recorded until October 10, 1995. However, the face of the deed states that it was made on August 17, 1995. It is plain that the signature line of the notary statement on the quitclaim deed has been altered from August 17, 1995 to October 9, 1995. Respondent had no knowledge of how the quitclaim deed came to be altered. Respondent also had no clear recollection as to why he dated the quitclaim deed August 17, 1995, in light of his testimony that he signed it approximately two weeks after that date. A reasonable inference is that Respondent so dated the quitclaim deed to clarify that Mrs. Kedan's ownership of the property commenced on August 17, the date on which Respondent submitted the winning bid. Respondent also had no knowledge of why the title company failed to record the quitclaim deed at the time he signed it. He testified that on or about October 9, 1995, he checked the Pinellas County computer tax records and discovered that he was still the owner of record. At that time, he returned to the title company to make sure the quitclaim deed was recorded the next day. Petitioner offered no testimonial evidence regarding the events surrounding the titling of the property. Respondent's uncontradicted testimony is credible, consistent with the documentary evidence, and thus credited as an accurate and truthful statement of the events in question. THE CONTRACT FOR REPAIRS Shortly after the auction, Respondent began discussing with Dr. Kedan the possibility of Respondent’s performing repairs on the just-purchased property. Because Dr. Kedan did not testify in this proceeding, findings as to the substance of the negotiations between Respondent and Dr. Kedan must be based on the testimony of Respondent, to the extent that testimony is credible and consistent with the documentary evidence. Respondent testified that Ms. MacKinnon approached him after the auction and asked him if he would be interested in fixing up the house for the Kedans. Respondent testified that he was agreeable to contracting for the work because his carpenter was between jobs and could use the money. Respondent thus met with Dr. Kedan at the doctor’s office to discuss the repairs. Dr. Kedan explained to Respondent that his ultimate plan was to demolish the existing house on the property and to build a more elaborate residence. Dr. Kedan wanted to rent out the house for five years before tearing it down, and wanted Respondent to affect such repairs as would make the house rentable for that five-year period. Respondent testified that Dr. Kedan expressly told him he did not want to spend a lot of money on the repairs. Respondent quoted Dr. Kedan a price of $20,000.00, which was the price it would take to pay for the repairs, with no profit built in for Respondent. Respondent testified that he sought no profit on this job. He had made a substantial commission on the purchase of the property, and anticipated doing business with Dr. Kedan in the future, and thus agreed to perform this particular job more or less as a “favor” to Dr. Kedan. After this meeting with Dr. Kedan, Respondent walked through the house with Irene Eastwood, the Kedans’ property manager. Ms. Eastwood testified that she and Respondent went from room to room, and she made notes on what should be done, with Respondent either concurring or disagreeing. Ms. Eastwood typed the notes into the form of a contract and presented it to Respondent the next day. On September 21, 1995, Respondent signed the contract as drafted by Ms. Eastwood. There was conflicting testimony as to whether Respondent represented himself as a licensed contractor in the negotiations preceding the contract. Respondent testified that he never told Dr. Kedan that he was a contractor, and that he affirmatively told Ms. Eastwood that he was not a contractor. Ms. Eastwood testified that she assumed Respondent was a licensed contractor because Dr. Kedan would not have hired a nonlicensed person to perform the contracted work. She denied that Respondent ever told her that he was not a licensed contractor. The weight of the evidence supports Respondent to the extent it is accepted that Respondent never expressly represented himself as a licensed contractor to either Dr. Kedan or Ms. Eastwood. However, the weight of the evidence does not support Respondent’s claim that he expressly told either Dr. Kedan or Ms. Eastwood that he was not a licensed contractor. Respondent’s subcontractors commenced work immediately upon the signing of the contract. Ms. Eastwood was in charge of working with Respondent to remodel the house, and she visited the site every day, often two or three times. She only saw Respondent on the site once during the last week of September, and not at all during the month of October. She did observe painters and a maintenance man regularly at work on the property during this period. Respondent concurred that he was seldom on the property, but testified that this was pursuant to his agreement with Dr. Kedan that he would generally oversee the work on the property. Respondent testified that he was on the property as often as he felt necessary to perform his oversight duties. Ms. Eastwood testified as to her general dissatisfaction with the quality of the work that was being performed on the property and the qualifications of those performing the work. She conveyed those concerns to the Kedans. Respondent testified that he did not initially obtain any permits to perform the work on the house, believing that permits would not be necessary for the job. On or about October 11, 1995, officials from the City of Belleair Beach shut down Respondent’s job on the Kedans’ property for lack of a construction permit. Respondent made inquiries with the City as to how to obtain the needed permit. City officials told Respondent that a permit could be granted to either a licensed contractor, or to the owner of the property if such property is not for sale or lease. Respondent checked the City’s records and discovered that, despite the fact that he had signed a quitclaim deed on August 17, he was still shown as the owner of the property. Respondent then proceeded to sign a permit application as the homeowner, and obtained a construction permit on October 11, 1995. Respondent testified that because the City’s records showed him as the record owner of the property, he committed no fraud in obtaining a construction permit as the homeowner. This testimony cannot be credited. Whatever the City’s records showed on October 11, 1995, Respondent well knew he was not the true owner of this property. Respondent cannot be credited both with having taken good faith steps to correct the mistaken titling of the property and with later obtaining in good faith a construction permit as the record owner of the property. Respondent testified that in obtaining the construction permit under false pretenses, his main concern was to keep the job going and to finish it in a timely fashion. He testified that there was no financial advantage to him in having the property in his name: he was making no profit on the job, and actually lost money because he had to pay for another title policy in the name of the Kedans. While there may have been no immediate financial advantage to Respondent, he was clearly motivated by the prospect of future profits in projects with Dr. Kedan. The City’s closing down this project jeopardized Respondent’s anticipated continuing relationship with Dr. Kedan, and Respondent took the improper step of obtaining a construction permit as the property owner to maintain that relationship. The Kedans ultimately dismissed Respondent from the job. A claim of lien was filed against the property by the painter hired by Respondent, and the cabinet maker sent the Kedans a lawyer’s letter threatening to file a claim of lien. Mrs. Kedan testified that she paid off both the painter and the cabinetmaker in full. Ms. Eastwood estimated that the Kedans ultimately had to pay an additional $20,000 to $50,000 to complete the repairs to the house, some of which included correctional actions for the improper repairs performed by Respondent’s workers. ALLEGED PRIOR DISCIPLINE Respondent has been the subject of a prior disciplinary proceeding by the Florida Real Estate Commission. In that prior proceeding, the Division of Real Estate's Administrative Complaint alleged that Respondent was guilty of violating Sections 475.25(1)(b) and (1)(k), Florida Statutes. On September 25, 1995, Respondent and the Division of Real Estate entered into a Stipulation disposing of the Administrative Complaint. Under the terms of the Stipulation, Respondent agreed to pay a fine of $1,000, and be subject to one year of probation, during which he would complete 30 hours of post-license education for brokers. The Stipulation expressly stated that Respondent neither admitted nor denied the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint. The Florida Real Estate Commission entered a Final Order approving the Stipulation on November 14, 1995. Respondent's broker license was suspended by the Florida Real Estate Commission on January 24, 1996. The cause for this suspension was Respondent's failure timely to pay the $1,000 fine imposed by the Stipulation. Respondent paid the fine on February 19, 1996, and late renewed his license on April 24, 1997. In the instant proceeding, Respondent testified that by entering into the Stipulation, he had no intention of pleading guilty to any of the allegations, and that he would never have entered into the Stipulation had he known it would be construed in any way as a guilty plea.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order dismissing Counts One and Three of the administrative complaint, and finding Respondent guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Count Two of the administrative complaint, and suspending Respondent’s real estate license for a period of three years and fining Respondent a sum of $1,000. RECOMMENDED this 11th day of March, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of March, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Geoffrey T. Kirk, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street, N-308 Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 John Bozmoski, Jr., Esquire 600 Bypass Drive, Suite 215 Clearwater, Florida 34624-5075 Jared White White Realty 231 Skiff Point, Suite Seven Clearwater, Florida 34630 Henry M. Solares Division Director 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900
Findings Of Fact In 1985 James M. Rickly (Rickly) filed suit in the County Court, Martin County, Florida, against Respondent, Carl J. Bruner (Bruner) and Two Rivers Realty Corporation (Two Rivers), to recover $2,500.00 he alleged he was owed on earned real estate commissions. On December 31, 1985, Rickly and Two Rivers entered into a written stipulation whereby Two Rivers agreed it was indebted to Rickly in the sum of $2,500.00 on account of his claim, together with court costs in the sum of $54.80. Two Rivers agreed to pay Rickly $100.00 on January 3, 1986, the sum of $100.00 on the first of each month thereafter until January 1, 1987, when the remaining balance would be paid in full. Two Rivers made no payment to Rickly under the stipulation. On February 25, 1986, the court in the foregoing proceeding entered a final judgment for Rickly and against Two Rivers in the sum of $2,500.00 and costs in the sum of $54.80. Contemporaneously, the court entered an order dismissing Bruner from the case since he was "not a proper party".
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the administrative complaint against Bruner be dismissed. DONE AND ORDERED this 10th day of February, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of February, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Carl J. Bruner c/o Two Rivers Realty Corp. Post Office Box 1672 Stuart, Florida 33495 Harold Buff, Executive Director Division of Real Estate Department of Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Van Poole, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Wings Benton, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact The Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (Petitioner), is the state licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints filed pursuant to Chapters 455 and 475, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. At all times material hereto, Robert A. Schwartz (Respondent) was a Florida licensed real estate broker, having been issued license number 0481297, with an address of American Real Estate Properties, Inc., 13833 Wellington Trace, West Palm Beach, Florida. Respondent was initially licensed on or about May 23, 1988. At all times material hereto, Respondent was the qualifying broker and officer of American Real Estate Properties, Inc. (American Real Estate). On or about May 18, 1992, Respondent met with Ms. Renate Schuetze in West Palm Beach. 4/ Ms. Schuetze was from the State of New York and was interested in buying lots, building homes on the lots and renting the homes. Respondent had been referred to Ms. Schuetze by her friend, Ms. Mary Ann Runer. A few years ago, on behalf of Ms. Runer and using monies provided by her, Respondent had purchased a lot in West Palm Beach, overseen the contracting and construction of her home on the lot and rented out the home. All for which he charged Ms. Runer a fee. Ms. Schuetze wanted Respondent to do the same for her. On that same day, after meeting with Respondent, visiting prospective lots and model homes with him and discussing his process and procedure, Ms. Schuetze gave Respondent a check for $15,120 made payable to American Real Estate and returned to New York. Although Ms. Schuetze noted on the check that the money was for a deposit on one of the model homes, the monies were actually for a deposit of $2,000 on two certain lots ($1,000 each) and Respondent's fee of $13,000 ($6,500 per house) 5/ for performing the same service for her that he had performed for Ms. Runer. Ms. Schuetze wanted to pay Respondent his fee in advance instead of waiting until the homes had been built and rented. This was the first time that Respondent had received his fee in advance. The following day, on May 19, 1992, Respondent deposited the $15,120 into the operating account of American Real Estate which did not have an escrow account. Furthermore, Respondent had no intentions of opening an escrow account. However, the day before, on May 18, 1992, Respondent wrote two checks for $1,000 each to Miki S. Murray Realty (Murray Realty) for a deposit on two certain lots on behalf of Ms. Schuetze, leaving a balance of $13,120 from the monies given by her to Respondent. The deposits held the lots for Ms. Schuetze. On May 19, 1992, Murray Realty completed a document entitled "Reservation Deposit" for each of the lots. The document represented an acknowledgment of a deposit and the terms associated therewith. Murray Realty sold the lots and the homes to be constructed as a package deal. Each Reservation Deposit indicated, among other things, a lot deposit of $1,000 on a certain lot, the location of the lot, the purchase price of the house to be constructed on the lot, the representative for the builder/seller (Murray Realty), and the buyer who was indicated as Respondent. Also, each Reservation Deposit indicated that the deposit was an "earnest money deposit," that the contract was to be entered into on June 10, 1992, and that the deposit could be returned for any reason on or before June 10, 1992. Murray Realty required no further monies until after the signing of a contract for purchase from which construction draws would come from an account specifically setup for that purpose. This was not the first time that Respondent had entered into such a transaction with Murray Realty. Respondent used the same transaction for Ms. Runer. From on or about May 12, 1992, through on or about June 1, 1992, Respondent wrote checks from American Real Estate's operating account, totalling $10,403.01, from the remaining $13,120 given to Respondent by Ms. Schuetze. The expenditures were for Respondent's own use and benefit; none were associated with the services requested by Ms. Schuetze. On or about June 1, 1992, Respondent sent a completed contract for sale and purchase of the lots and homes and a blank buyer-broker contract, by express mail, to Ms. Schuetze for her signature. The contract for sale and purchase reflected that a "deposit" of $15,120 had been paid to American Real Estate, as seller, toward the purchase price and that the deposit was being held in "escrow." The blank buyer-broker agreement contained spaces for Respondent to insert an agreed upon fee but these were also left blank. Prior to sending these documents, Respondent had discussed the contracts with her and informed her that he was sending them to her. At the same time, on or about June 1, 1992, Ms. Schuetze wrote to Respondent requesting the return of her "deposit" of $15,120 within three days, indicating that she had decided not to sign a contract for the purchase of the homes. After she received the contracts, Ms. Schuetze returned them to Respondent unsigned. At no time prior to June 1, 1992, had Respondent presented to Ms. Schuetze for her signature a buyer-broker contract or a contract for sale and purchase. At no time pertinent hereto has Ms. Schuetze executed a buyer-broker contract or a contract for sale and purchase. Not having received a response to her letter of June 1, 1992, on or about June 8, 1992, Ms. Schuetze again made a demand by way of a letter for return of the $15,120 within three days. On or about June 11, 1992, at the request of Ms. Schuetze, Murray Realty returned her deposit of $2,000 on the two lots. At that time, Respondent had not contacted Murray Realty regarding her request, and he was unaware that Murray Realty had returned the deposit. Shortly thereafter, but also in the month of June 1992, Respondent agreed to return the $13,120, less the value of services he had already rendered, to Ms. Schuetze but requested additional time in which to so do since he had spent the money. She agreed to give Respondent additional time. On or about December 4, 1992, Respondent gave a statement to Petitioner in which he agreed to return, within 12 months, the $13,120 less 10 percent for the services that he believed that he had already rendered, leaving a balance of $11,808 to be returned. At the time of hearing on October 13, 1993, Respondent had failed to refund any of the money to Ms. Schuetze. Respondent has no history of disciplinary action.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order DISMISSING Count II of the amended administrative complaint; and SUSPENDING the broker's license of Robert A. Schwartz for five years. Provided, however, that the duration of his suspension may be lessened upon the return to Ms. Schuetze of the $13,120. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 26th day of May 1994. ERROL H. POWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of May 1994.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is now and was at all times material to this action a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, holding license number 0064475. Respondent operated his own real estate brokerage firm under his license. The firm was located in Niceville, Florida. In addition to his real estate brokerage business Respondent maintained and managed his personal real estate investments. Several of these personal investments included rental property which Respondent would later sell. One such piece of property was located at 104 Perdido Circle, Niceville, Florida, and is the property involved in this action. Prior to July 6, 1985, the Respondent, as seller and not as a broker, advertised for sale the Perdido property. Sometime around July 6, 1985, Robert L. Mitchell and June F. Mitchell looked at the Perdido property. Frank Ray, a salesman for John Brooks Realty, an unrelated real estate firm showed the property to the Mitchells. They liked the property and wanted to buy it. Frank Ray made arrangements for himself and the Mitchells to meet with Respondent in order to discuss the terms of the potential purchase contract. They met on July 6, 1985. The meeting lasted approximately an hour to an hour and a half. During the lengthy meeting Respondent went over the purchase terms contained in the contract of sale. The Mitchells main concern was to have immediate occupancy of the house. Special terms were developed for renting the property. At some point during the meeting the down payment came under discussion. Originally, the Mitchells had planned on a $1500 down payment which was acceptable to Respondent. However, as the meeting progressed the Mitchells decided they would like to reduce the amount of the down payment. Respondent informed the Mitchells that the only way he could decrease the $1500 down payment was to make the money a non-refundable option payment. Respondent then marked out the $1500 down payment figure contained in the purchase contract and inserted a $1200 figure. Respondent concurrently added the language "option payment" next to the $1200 figure. The remainder of the contract was discussed and the Mitchells signed the amended document. The Mitchells then wrote a check to Respondent, personally, in the amount of $1200. The note section of the check the Mitchells wrote contained the language "house down payment." The exact discussion on the down payment/option is not clear. What is clear from the evidence is that neither party had a meeting of the minds over what the $1200 check was. The Mitchells being very inexperienced in real estate thought it was a down payment. Although it is doubtful the Mitchells understood the legal meaning of the term "down payment." Respondent thought it was a non- refundable option payment. Absolutely no evidence of fraud or misrepresentation on the part of Respondent was demonstrated. Likewise, there was no evidence that Respondent in any way used his knowledge or expertise in the real estate market improperly. The final result of the negotiations was that the Mitchells had entered into what on its face purports to be a rental contract with an option to buy. However, since there was no meeting of the minds over the option, the option was eventually unenforceable. Since there was no meeting of the minds regarding the $1200 the money was not properly escrowable property. In essence the $1200 was neither a down payment nor an option payment. This lack of escrowability is borne out by the sales contract which calls for another escrow agent. 1/ The Mitchells took possession of the property for approximately three months. The Mitchells failed to obtain financing. The contract was conditioned upon the Mitchells obtaining financing, and the transaction failed to close. A dispute arose between the parties concerning the down payment/option money. When the dispute could not be resolved by the parties, the Mitchells filed a lawsuit against Nevin H. Nordal demanding a refund of the $1200 "house down payment." As a result of the Mitchell's lawsuit the County Court, in Okaloosa County, Florida, Summary Claims Division, by Amended Final Judgment dated January 20, 1987, awarded the sum of $1,028,87. The judgment figure is the balance of the $1200 after deduction of a counterclaim of $171.13 for cleaning the house after the Mitchells evacuated the property. Additionally, the Respondent was required to pay costs in the sum of $57 for a total of $1,087.87 due the Mitchells. The judgment amount is bearing interest at a rate of 12 percent per annum. The County Court judgment contains no findings of fact as to the Judge's reasoning on the judgment award. The Mitchells have repeatedly demanded of the Respondent that he pay the judgment. He has repeatedly refused to pay the judgment. Respondent did account to the Mitchells for the money when he told them he had deposited the check and had spent the funds.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is therefore RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint failed against Respondent, Nevin H. Nordal, be dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 4th day of March, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of March, 1989.
