Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: At all times relevant to these proceedings, Respondent, doing business as The Knight Out, was the holder of alcoholic beverage license number 72-79, series 1-COP. Prior to the hearing . . . in this cause, Respondent had turned in his license to the Petitioner. To the rear of the licensed premises, Respondent operated a bottle club known as The Knight Club. The Knight Club is attached to and shares restroom facilities with The Knight Out. On March 27, 1975, Respondent was served with a "Notice to show cause why beverage license should not have civil penalty assessed against it or be suspended or revoked" on the grounds that on Sunday, January 26, 1975: his employee, Vicki Lynn Williamson, at approximately 2:00 am., did sell at the licensed premises, an alcoholic beverage, a can of Budweiser beer, to beverage officer L. E. Williams during the time that the sale and consumption of alcoholic beverages is prohibited, in violation of City of Perry Ordinance 394 enacted pursuant to F.S. s. 562.14; at approximately 4:00 a.m., he sold at the licensed premises an alcoholic beverage, one can of Budweiser beer, to beverage officer Williams in violation of City of Perry Ordinance 394; at approximately 5:00 a.m., he sold at the licensed premises an alcoholic beverage, one can of Budweiser beer, to beverage officer Williams in violation of City of Perry Ordinance 394; at approximately 6:05 a.m., he refused to admit to the licensed premises beverage officer Jack Garrett, while in the performance of his official duties, contrary to F.S. s. 562.41; and at approximately 6:05 a.m., he had in his possession, custody and control, at the licensed premises a partially full 4/5 quart of Smirnoff Vodka, an alcoholic beverage not authorized to be sold by him, in violation of F.S. s. 562.02. Beverage officer L. E. Williams went to The Knight Out the weekend of January 24, 1975, in order to conduct an undercover investigation of the licensed premises. He observed the Respondent, between 11:30 p.m. and 12:00 a.m. on January 24th, remove four cases of beer from The Knight Out and place them into a small room in The Knight Club portion of the premises. At about 1:00 a.m. on January 25th, Williams paid a $2.00 cover charge, entered The Knight Club and remained there until 6:00 a.m. On Saturday night, January 25th, beverage officer Williams again went to The Knight Out and, at about 11:30 p.m., again observed Respondent moving five cases of beer from The Knight Out to the rear portion, The Knight Club. Williams entered The Knight Club during the early hours of January 26, 1975, carrying a can of beer with him. He left at approximately 2:30 a.m., met with other beverage agents, and returned to The Knight Club at about 3:45 a.m., paying the cover charge of $2.00. At 4:00 a.m. and again at 5:00 a.m. on January 26, 1975, Williams purchased from Respondent Poppell cans of Budweiser beer at seventy-five cents per can. Williams retained control of the two beer cans and at about 6:30 a.m. he tagged them as evidence. They were admitted into evidence at the hearing as Exhibits 4 and 5. At approximately 6:05 a.m. on January 26, 1975, beverage officer Jack Garrett, along with several other law enforcement agents, knocked on the front door of The Knight Club seeking entrance thereto. Respondent told Garrett to get in front of the peephole on the door so that he could see who was there. Garrett, who had known Respondent for some fifteen years, testified that he showed his identification card to Respondent through the peephole, whereupon Respondent replied that he would not let him in. Beverage officer T. A. Hicks, present with Garrett at the time, confirmed these events. Respondent and two other witnesses present at the scene testified that Respondent asked the persons at the front door to identify themselves, but that no response was received. Shortly thereafter, Officer Garrett, along with other law enforcement officers, went around to the other side of The Knight Club and entered, without knocking, the ladies rest room which led to the inside of The Knight Club. Once inside, they met Respondent leaving a small room with a handful of liquor bottles. One such bottle was seized - - a partially filled bottle of Smirnoff Vodka - - and was received into evidence at the hearing as Exhibit 6. Shirrell Woodalf testified that she had come to The Knight Out on the morning in question with another couple. When the other couple left, they gave her their bottle of Smirnoff Vodka. She then gave the bottle to Respondent to keep for her in his office. Woodalf identified Exhibit 6 as being the same bottle as that left with her and given to Respondent. Four witnesses who often frequented The Knight Club testified that patrons of the Club always brought their own beer or other alcoholic beverages into the Club. Respondent would cool their beer for them and keep their bottles in his office if they so desired. Respondent sometimes charged a small fee for cooling the beer and he sold setups for mixed drinks. These four witnesses never saw Respondent sell either beer or other alcoholic beverages in The Knight Club.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is recommended that: Paragraphs 1 and 5 of the notice to show cause be dismissed; Respondent be found guilty of violating F.S. ss. 562.14 and 562.41, as set forth in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the notice to show cause; and Respondent's alcoholic beverage license be revoked. Respectfully submitted and entered 26th day of May, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Charles Nuzum Director Division of Beverage 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida Charles Tunnicliff, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street, Room 210 Johns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Conrad C. Bishop, Jr., Esquire Weed & Bishop P.O. Box 1090 Perry, Florida 32347
The Issue Whether the Respondent operated as a salesperson without being the holder of a valid and current license as a real estate salesperson, in violation of Section 475.42(1)(a), Florida Statutes, and therefore in violation of Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a state licensing and regulatory agency charged with the duty to prosecute Administrative Complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular, Section 20.30, Florida Statutes, Chapters 120, 455, and 475, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. The Respondent is and was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate salesperson in the State of Florida having been issued license number 0475436 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license was issued to Respondent as a salesperson c/o Dolphin Realty Referral Inc., 2525 Pasadena Avenue, Suite L., South Pasadena, Florida 33707. On December 18, 1996, Respondent presented a written offer to listing agent Sharon Simms for property located at 3900 48th Avenue, South, St. Petersburg, Florida. In connection therewith, Respondent, who was the building contractor for buyer Joseph S. Sparra, accepted a $2,000 deposit which was placed in the escrow account of Dolphin Realty Referral Inc., of which Thomas J. Hassel was qualifying broker. Hassel drafted the contract and qualified Joseph S. Sparra with Sigmund Financial for a first mortgage. The Respondent was employed by Hassel as an independent contractor. Thomas Hassel, the Respondent's employing broker, advised him that he was not sure Respondent's license was active, but the Respondent made no attempt to contact the Petitioner to ascertain his licensure status. On January 24, 1997, the Respondent accompanied Joseph S. Sparra to the closing at Anclote Title Services, where the Respondent provided the escrow money and accepted a $5,780 commission check on behalf of Dolphin Realty Referral, Inc. During the entire transaction, Respondent was not properly licensed with Dolphin Realty Referral, Inc., nor with any other real estate brokerage. Respondent's license was involuntarily placed on inactive status from January 1, 1996, through July 20, 1997, due to no employing broker. Hassel later advised Respondent that his license was not transferred to the new corporation when the broker changed its name from Dolphin Realty of Pinellas County to Dolphin Realty Referrals, Inc. The Respondent did not accept a share of the commission on the house in St. Petersburg, Florida. Respondent did not participate as a real estate salesperson in any other transaction while his license was on inactive status.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED as follows: The Florida Real Estate Commission issue a Final Order finding the Respondent guilty of violating Subsections 475.25(1)(a) and (e), Florida Statutes, as charged in the Administrative Complaint; and, Impose an administrative fine of $500 and require Respondent to complete a 45-hour salesperson's post-licensure course, as prescribed by the Florida Real Estate Commission. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of December, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of December, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven W. Johnson, Senior Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 John A. Kitzmiller, pro se 2613 59th Street, South St. Petersburg, Florida 33707 James Kimbler, Acting Division Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner's application for a real estate license should be denied for the reasons stated in Respondent's Notice of Intent to Deny, dated November 2, 2018.
Findings Of Fact The Commission is the state agency charged with licensing real estate brokers and sales associates in Florida. See § 475.161, Fla. Stat. On August 17, 2018, Petitioner filed with the Commission an application for a Real Estate Broker License – Out of State Experience. According to his PRO, however, he is applying for a "real estate associate license." In conjunction with the application, a lengthy and somewhat confusing record of Petitioner's administrative and criminal history in New York and Minnesota between 1995 and 2018 has been compiled and is found in Commission Exhibit 11, consisting of approximately 300 pages. Besides holding an active Colorado real estate license, he also has a mortgage originator's license issued by the State of Minnesota in 2018. The application required Petitioner to provide answers to four background questions. In response to question 1, which asks the applicant if he has ever been convicted or found guilty of, or entered a plea of nolo contendere or guilty to, regardless of adjudication, a crime in any jurisdiction, or is currently under criminal investigation, Petitioner answered yes. In his explanation to the question, Petitioner listed four arrests, discussed below, all occurring in the State of Minnesota. Although the Notice of Intent to Deny alleges that he was convicted of a felony, the Commission now concedes that all convictions are for misdemeanors. First, on July 1, 1997, Petitioner, then 22 years old, was arrested for one felony count of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree and two felony counts of criminal sexual conduct in the third degree. In May 1998, he pled guilty to fifth degree sexual conduct, a gross misdemeanor, and was fined $900.00, sentenced to nine days in jail, placed on two years' probation, ordered to undergo sex offender treatment, and required to register as a sex offender for ten years in New York (where he had relocated temporarily) and Minnesota. Petitioner completed all conditions required by the court. In his application, Petitioner explained that the arrest and conviction were the result of "interactions with an underaged woman [a 15-year-old babysitter for his fiancee's child] that lied about her age." At hearing, he testified that he pled guilty to the misdemeanor charge because he did not have sufficient funds to continue to fight the original felony charges, and he "did not want to take the chances with the jury," even though the prosecutor admitted to the court the defendant's attorney "can kill our guys on cross-examination." He decided to "take the misdemeanor and get on with [his] life." Petitioner acknowledges that he pled guilty to a sexual offense, but it is fair to find that he wants the Commission to accept his version of events - that the girl fabricated the entire incident. Second, on July 10, 1997, Petitioner was arrested for disorderly conduct, a misdemeanor, after an "[a]rgument with girlfriend and her brother." He was found guilty of the charge and paid a $150.00 fine. Third, in October 2008, while in a divorce proceeding with his then wife, Petitioner was charged with violation of an Order for Protection for "exchanging messages with my wife on childcare/exchange matters which were allowed according to the original order. She called in and filed a complaint." The application states that the charge was later dismissed. The Commission does not dispute this representation. Finally, in November 2008, Petitioner was arrested for gross misdemeanor domestic assault against his then wife. Petitioner explained that this incident occurred after an "argument with wife (she was heavily intoxicated) that escalated." He later pled guilty to disorderly conduct, paid a $300.00 fine, and was given one year of unsupervised probation. He successfully completed all conditions imposed by the court. Question 1 requires that an applicant also report traffic offenses other than parking, speeding, inspection, or traffic signals. The Commission's PRO points out that Petitioner failed to disclose that in 1995, while a resident of the State of New York, he pled guilty to operating a motor vehicle (motorcycle) while impaired by drugs (marijuana). At hearing, Petitioner testified that he forgot about the traffic violation, as it occurred 24 years ago when he was only 20 years old. Even though the Notice of Intent to Deny does not allege that Petitioner failed to disclose his complete criminal record, the issue was tried by consent at hearing. However, Petitioner's omission of this minor item should have no bearing on whether to approve or deny the application. Question 4 asks the applicant to disclose whether he ever has had a license to practice any regulated profession revoked, annulled, suspended, relinquished, or otherwise disciplined in any jurisdiction. Petitioner answered yes. In explaining his answer to question 4, Petitioner stated that his Minnesota real estate broker license was revoked by the Department of Commerce in May 2018 for (a) failure to self-report a 2008 bankruptcy; (b) the denial in 2009 of his application for a residential general contractor's license; and a 2012 felony charge (domestic assault by strangulation of his ex-wife), which was dismissed later. The application added that due to the revocation of the Minnesota license, his Colorado realtor license "is currently in review." At hearing, however, Petitioner testified that Colorado is not taking any action on that license. The revocation order provided in part that Petitioner obtained his license by fraud and misrepresentation, he had a complete disregard for the law, and he could not be trusted to make material disclosures and otherwise comply with licensing requirements. See Comm. Ex. 11, p. 208. Obtaining a license by fraud and/or misrepresentation, and not being trusted to make material disclosures and comply with licensing requirements, are grounds for revoking or suspending a license in the state of Florida had Petitioner then been registered. At hearing, Petitioner testified that he actually had disclosed the bankruptcy and administrative action to the state when he submitted an application to transfer a brokerage license in 2009. Evidently, this contention was not accepted by the Department of Commerce. Petitioner says he "attempted" to appeal the revocation order, but the appeal was denied. In its PRO, the Commission alleges that Petitioner failed to disclose an enforcement action instituted by the Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry (MDLI) in 2009, which resulted in him voluntarily consenting to the revocation of a residential building contractor license held by Vanquish Custom Homes, LLC, a company he controlled. Although this omission is not cited in the Notice of Intent to Deny, the issue was raised at hearing without objection by Petitioner. Petitioner's response to background question 3 acknowledges that his application for a "residential general contractor's license" was denied in 2009. Also, in a letter attached to the application, Petitioner made reference to that action, although in a somewhat confusing and incomplete manner. See Comm. Ex. 11, p. 187. The letter fails to disclose that the proceeding arose in the context of an enforcement action by MDLI, which alleged, among other things, that Petitioner was untrustworthy, incompetent, and unqualified to act as a licensee's qualifying owner. The letter and application also fail to disclose that MDLI issued a consent order revoking the license, imposing a $5,000.00 suspended civil fine, and ordering him to cease and desist from acting as a residential building contractor. Had Petitioner been registered in the state of Florida, these actions would have been grounds to suspend or revoke the license. At hearing, Petitioner explained that the license lapsed around 2007, he reapplied for licensure in 2008, but he withdrew the application after MDLI issued an intent to deny. He says he took this action because he "didn't need the contractor license, and it just wasn't worth spending the money to fight it." By consent of the parties, Petitioner acknowledged that he failed to disclose a consent order issued by MDLI in 2013, which determined that Vanquish Services Group, LLC, another company controlled by Mr. Shields, had violated the 2009 consent order. Petitioner was ordered to cease and desist from any further residential building contractor violations and to pay a $5,000.00 civil penalty, of which $4,500.00 was stayed. At hearing, Petitioner testified that in an effort to procure clients, his company incorrectly advertised four trades on Angie's List, when the company was allowed no more than three trades to be advertised. He admits this was a "mistake." Two character witnesses, Mr. Hartos and Ms. Anderson, both currently licensed as realtors in Minnesota, testified on behalf of Petitioner. Both testified that they are aware of his prior administrative and criminal history. Mr. Hartos is a long- time licensed broker, who has served on the Minnesota Association of Realtors Board of Professional Standards for more than 25 years, and was Petitioner's broker and "boss" for the last five years. The other is a former employee. Based on their work experience with Petitioner, they found him to be ethical, truthful, honest, and trustworthy, and not a danger to the public. Forty-three letters of recommendation, including those submitted by the two character witnesses, all hearsay in nature, corroborate this conclusion.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for a license as a real estate broker or sales associate. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of July, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of July, 2019.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondents negotiated the sale of real property and collected a commission on said sale without the requisite real estate license issued by the State of Florida.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility and duty of prosecuting Administrative Complaints filed against real estate practitioners pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida. Respondent Rene Larralde, Jr., is a citizen of the State of Florida. At no time relevant to this proceeding did Larralde hold a Florida-issued license as a real estate sales associate or real estate broker. Respondent Maxous, Inc., is a Florida for-profit corporation formed on August 10, 2004. Larralde is president and registered agent of Maxous. Respondent Glinda G. Hatfield has held licenses as a Florida real estate broker and a Florida real estate associate. As of the date of the incident relevant to this proceeding, Hatfield's real estate broker's license was in an inactive status. Hatfield had failed to meet one of the continuing education requirements for renewal of her license that year. She was not aware of that fact until notification by the state relevant to the issues in this proceeding. Upon receiving notice, Hatfield took the necessary measures to have her license re-instated to active status. Hatfield assisted Larralde in forming Maxous. It was Hatfield's responsibility, as the licensed real estate broker in the new entity, to make sure Maxous was duly registered with the state as a real estate broker. Hatfield went to the Melbourne Association of Realtors to register the business once it had been incorporated. Hatfield did not understand that the business also had to be registered through the Florida Real Estate Commission in Tallahassee. Not being aware of that requirement, Hatfield never registered Maxous with the state. Rather, she paid the fees associated with registration of the company with the local real estate association and made the erroneous presumption that the company could then operate as a licensed real estate broker in the state. On or about February 27, 2008, certain parties entered into a Contract for Sale and Purchase (the "Contract") of property located at 1033 June Drive, Melbourne, Florida (the "Property"). Maxous was designated as the listing broker in the Contract. On April 21, 2008, the sale of the Property closed, as evidenced by a HUD Settlement Statement. The Settlement Statement indicates a real estate commission in the amount of $5,964.18 for the sale. The Settlement Statement indicates $2,982.09 (one half of the commission) is to be paid to Maxous and the other half of the commission to be paid to Exit One Realty. Exit One Realty was the listing agent for the Property, but had not been made aware of the impending sale. As the sole listing agent, Exit One Realty would normally expect to receive the entire broker's commission at the time of closing. However, Exit One Realty was not even aware of the sale of the Property until it received its commission. It appears that Maxous, through the person of Larralde, held itself out as the listing broker and assumed ownership of the commission on the sale of the Property. Larralde did, however, designate Exit One Realty as another broker in the sale who was entitled to half of the commission. At the time of the transaction involving the Property, Maxous was not registered with the State of Florida as a real estate broker. Larralde was not licensed as a real estate sales associate. In order to consummate this sale (and others like it), Larralde had established Maxous. It was apparently Larralde's intent, although he did not appear at the final hearing, to use Hatfield's status as a licensed broker to legitimize Maxous' status as a brokerage firm. Hatfield was amenable to that arrangement. Hatfield was designated as the vice-president of Maxous when the company was formed. As previously noted, Hatfield went to the Melbourne Association of Realtors for the purpose of registering Maxous as a brokerage entity. Hatfield paid the necessary fees to the association for the registration of Maxous with the local real estate association, and, upon inquiry from that office, felt that she had done everything necessary to allow Maxous to operate as a broker. Thus, at the time of the aforementioned transaction, Maxous was not a legitimate broker in the State of Florida. Hatfield assumed she was the registered broker for Maxous; assumed Maxous was duly registered with the state; and assumed that her broker's license was current. In matter of fact, none of those assumptions proved true. Clearly Hatfield did not attempt to circumvent or avoid the requirements for real estate brokers. Rather, she was mistaken about what had to be done regarding registration with the Florida Real Estate Commission. She did not know that her license had been deemed inactive for failure to complete a continuing education class. Neither Larralde, nor anyone else testified at final hearing as to what their knowledge was concerning these matters. It cannot be determined whether Larralde knew Maxous was not a registered brokerage firm and that the transaction relating to the Property was improper. However, Larralde did share the commission with Exit One Realty. It is clear from Hatfield's testimony at final hearing that she did not intend to defraud anyone or to do anything illegal or improper. However, her actions were improper nonetheless. It is not clear from the testimony whether Hatfield received any of the commission provided to Larralde. However, to her credit, Hatfield, upon learning of the violations set forth above, unilaterally ceased doing business as a real estate agent or broker. She acknowledged her mistake and took immediate action to make sure she would not make any further mistakes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate: (1) imposing a fine in the amount of $5,000 against Respondent, Rene Larralde; (2) imposing a fine of $5,000 against Respondent, Maxous, Inc; (3) imposing a fine of $250 against Respondent, Glinda G. Hatfield; (4) requiring Hatfield to pay the costs of the investigation in this matter; and (5) suspending Hatfield's real estate license for a period of one year. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of November, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of November, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Amy Toman, Hearing Officer Office of the General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Reginald Dixon, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Patrick J. Cunningham, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Hurston Building-Suite 801 North Orlando, Florida 32801 Joseph G. Colombo, Esquire 2351 West Eau Gallie Boulevard, Suite 1 Melbourne, Florida 32935
The Issue The issue posed for decision herein is whether or not the Respondent, based on conduct set forth hereinafter in detail, unlawfully withdrew and transferred monies from an escrow account and is therefore guilty of fraud, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, or breach of trust and conversion within the purview of Subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1979) At the final hearing, Petitioner called Donald Lloyd, Respondent, Donald Reda and Kenneth Viviano as its witnesses. Petitioner offered Exhibits 1 through 7 which were received into evidence. Respondent called no witnesses and offered Respondent's Exhibits 1 through 4 which were received into evidenced.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received, posthearing memoranda and the entire record complied herein, I hereby make the following relevant findings of fact. By its administrative complaint filed herein on July 29, 1981, Petitioner seeks to take disciplinary action against the Respondent as licensee and against his license as a real estate salesman. During times material herein, Respondent was a licensed real estate salesman and has been issued license No. 0188032. During times material herein, Century 21, Lloyds of Lauderdale, Inc., was a Florida licensed real estate corporate broker with its offices located at 3300 NE 33rd Street, Fort Lauderdale, Florida corporate entity was licensed under that name on October 12, 1979. The predecessor entity was known as Lloyds' of Lauderdale, Inc., and had its escrow account at Gulfstream Bank H.A., formerly known as Gulfstream American Bank and Trust Company H.A., formerly known as American National Bank and Trust Company of Fort Lauderdale, which account number was 005-1-00160-3. Upon obtaining the change of name, i.e. Century 21, Lloyds of Lauderdale, Inc., the successor entity maintained the same escrow account number at the same bank and continued using the checks on that account bearing its former name, Lloyds of Lauderdale, Inc. During times material herein, Respondent was a salesman associated with Century 21 and was an authorized signatory on the above-referred escrow account. Respondent was also a stockholder, officer and director of Century 21, Lloyds of Lauderdale, Inc. Respondent was also the owner of an unrelated business known as Brewer's Care Center, which in turn operated a motel located in Georgia. During times material, Respondent owned a one-third (1/3) interest in Century 21, Lloyds of Lauderdale, Inc. On February 3, 1981, Respondent issued a check, No. 79-228, drawn on the Century 21, Lloyds of Lauderdale, Inc., escrow account, payable to Brewer's Care Center in the amount of $11,903.12. Approximately fifteen days later, on February 18, 1981, Respondent issued another check, No. 79-223, drawn on the above-referenced escrow account payable to Brewer's Care Center in the amount of $2,500. On March 3, 1981 Respondent verbally authorized the Gulfstream Bank to withdraw $399.66 from the referenced escrow account to pay interest on loan No. 59-004-00-058-3866-4. Also, on March 18, 1981 Respondent verbally authorized the withdrawal of $799.32 to be applied against the same loan. Neither of the above-referenced checks or verbal loan authorizations were, in any wise, connected with any real estate transactions from which monies were held in escrow by the Respondent. The verbal withdrawals and checks, either authorized or drawn by the Respondent, reduced the escrow account by a sum of approximately $15,602.10 and depleted the account to such an extent that Century 21, Lloyds of Lauderdale, Inc. was unable to meet demands for the return of the escrow funds held in trust (See Petitioner's Composite Exhibit No. 1). Respondent took the position that the monies represented by the payments of the two checks made payable to Brewer's Care Center were repayments of loans and that he was unaware that the accounts which the checks were drawn against were, in fact, escrow accounts. In this regard, evidence reveals that the Respondent suffered a heart attack during November of 1980 and his health regressed to the degree that he was placed in the intensive care unit at a hospital in Cleveland, Ohio for an extended period of time. At the conclusion of the Petitioner's case in chief, Respondent's counsel filed an ore tenus motion to continue the subject hearing until the following day. The undersigned afforded Respondent's counsel an opportunity to submit, for the record, his basis for the continuance. However, that motion was denied based on the numerous continuances which had been previously granted by the undersigned to Respondent's counsel (See Order dated November 16, 1982 - Copy attached).
Findings Of Fact On June 23, 1972, respondent obtained from petitioner a four COP Special license, No. 27603-S, after Thomas E. Pelt, respondent's president, executed a form affidavit reciting that the "Sand Shaker Lounge is a hotel, motel or motor court containing 100 or more transit [sic] guest units;" and after R. E. Daniels, one of petitioner's agents, certified that he had investigated and found Mr. Pelt's statement to be true. At all pertinent times, there were and have been 104 units in the "Mai Kai," the establishment housing the premises respondent operates at: Pensacola Beach, Florida. Some 28 of these units are apartments with one or two bedrooms and full kitchens. The units surrounding the swimming pool area are "efficiency type" motel rooms. Each of the remaining units consists of one large room. All 104 units were available, if unoccupied, to house overnight or transient guests, at all pertinent times; and units of all kinds were so used at least as recently as last year. At all pertinent times, however, the Mai Kai has leased mere than four of these units for periods as long as one year under renewable written agreements requiring monthly rental payments. On March 11, 1976, some 19 one year leases were in force between the Mai Kai and its customers. These agreements require the Mai Kai to furnish water but provide that "[a]ll other utilities services are to be arranged for and paid for by Lessee." Petitioner's exhibit No. 1. At approximately one o'clock on the afternoon of March 11, 1976, petitioner's employee Larry Stevens inquired of employees of Gulf Power Company as to whose names were on their accounts for 32 of the Mai Kai's units. Mr. Stevens was told that all but six of the accounts about which he inquired were listed in names other than that of the management of the Mai Kai. On or about March 11, 1976, respondent's invoices for malt beverages and wines dated on or after March 1, 1976, were on the licensed premises. Invoices with earlier dates were in respondent's accountant's office, however. Ever since respondent's employees ware advised that they should do so, respondent has maintained all of its invoices for malt beverages and wines on the licensed premises, not just those for the current month, as had been its prior practice.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That petitioner suspend respondent's license for thirty (30) days and thereafter until and unless respondent contracts to pay for all utilities furnished to its guest rooms. DONE and ENTERED this 23rd day of October, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Francis Bayley, Esquire Legal Section 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Leo A. Thomas, Esquire Sevill Tower 226 South Palafox Street Pensacola, Florida 32501
Findings Of Fact Based upon the pleadings and responses thereto, an Order imposing sanctions for Respondent's failure to submit discovery as required by the undersigned dated October 15, 1986 and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following relevant factual findings. Respondent is the developer of a condominium known as La Residence. As Presently developed, La Residence consists of sixty units. La Residence is located in Boca Raton, Florida. Respondent failed to meet the completion date for the subsequent phases of La Residence as is described in the declaration of condominium of La Residence. According to the Declaration of Condominiums for La Residence, the scheduled dates listed for construction of the subsequent phases of La Residence were June, 1982 for phase II; February, 1983 for phase III, and November, 1983 for phase IV. Amendments to the Declaration of Condominium of La Residence were recorded on June 30, 1981, March 22, 1982 and August 2, 1984. Respondent did not furnish the Division with copies of the above-referred amendments. Additionally, Respondent failed to provide purchasers of units within La Residence, copies of the above-referred amendments. Respondent failed to hold annual members meeting for the years 1981, 1982, 1983 and 1984. Respondent failed to call a members meeting to allow non-developer unit owners to elect a director after fifteen percent of the available units had been conveyed. Respondent failed to mail to unit owners, copies of the proposed annual budget for the years 1982, 1983, and 1984. Respondent failed to include the statutory reserves and the proposed annual budget as required for the years 1982, 1983 and 1984. Respondent failed to fund reserve accounts for the years 1982, 1983 and 1984. Respondent failed to provide unit owners with financial reports for fiscal years 1982, 1983 and 1984. Respondent failed to pay the developer's share of assessments due to be paid by the developer after June 30, 1982. The Declaration of Condominium for La Residence was recorded in the public records of Palm Beach County in 1981. Control of the Condominium Association was turned over to non-developer unit owners on February 16, 1985. No "turnover report" was prepared by a certified public accountant nor was such a report ever furnished to the Condominium Association by Respondent. Respondent has not provided the Condominium Association copies of all canceled checks and bank statements for the time period dating from the recordation in 1981 to January 31 1984. Respondent, or a representative on its behalf, did not appear at the hearing to refute or otherwise contest the alleged violations set forth in the Notice to Show Cause filed herein.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions, of a Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED Respondent pay to the Division, within thirty (30) days of issuance of the Division's Final Order, a civil penalty in the amount of ten thousand dollars ($10,000). Respondent secure the services of an independent certified public accountant who shall review the condominium records and submit a turnover review in accordance with the provisions of Section 718.301(4)(c), Florida Statutes (1985) and rule 7B-23.03(4)(5) and (6), Florida Administrative Code. Within thirty days of the Division's Final Order, it is recommended that the Division issue guidelines to Respondent to ensure that the condominium records are reviewed in accordance with the above-referenced statutory and rule provisions. Provided that monies are found to be due and owing the association based on the review, Respondent shall be directed to remit such amounts to La Residence of Boca Del Mar Condominium Association. Recommended this 23rd day of March, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of March, 1987.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner in connection with Petitioner’s employment by Respondent on the basis of his national origin.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Leneve Plaisime (“Plaisime”), whose country of origin is Haiti, was employed as a busboy and room service attendant at the Marriott Key Largo Bay Resort (“Marriott”)1 from 1995 to 1997. On September 13, 1997, upon returning to work after a vacation of several weeks, Plaisime was fired by a manager named Eric Sykas who said to him: “There is no job for you because the owner says he’s not interested in Haitians.”2 This statement was overheard by a co-worker of Plaisime’s named Fito Jean, who testified at the final hearing, corroborating Plaisime’s account.3 In around the middle of October 1997 (approximately one month after his discharge), Plaisime found a new job at Tak Security Corporation (“Tak”). Evidence introduced by Plaisime shows that he earned $7,862.52 at Marriott in 1997, which reflects an average monthly wage of about $925. Had he worked the entire year at Marriott, Plaisime would have earned a total of approximately $11,100. In contrast, working for Tak in 1998 Plaisime earned $11,396 (or approximately $950 per month)——a 2.7% increase in his annual income. There is no evidence showing what Plaisime’s likely income would have been in 1998 had he remained in the employ of Marriott. Ultimate Factual Determinations Marriott discharged Plaisime because of his national origin. Thus, Marriott committed an unlawful employment practice in violation of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes. The actual economic loss that Plaisime suffered as a result of Marriott’s unlawful discrimination against him was one month’s pay, or $925.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR enter a final order declaring that Marriott discharged Plaisime on the basis of his national origin, in violation of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes; prohibiting Marriott from committing further such violations; and awarding Plaisime $925 to relieve the effects of the unlawful discrimination that Marriott perpetrated against him. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of February, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of February, 2003.
The Issue Whether or not the, Respondent, Buenaventura Lakes Country Club, Inc., may be issued Division of Beverage, license number 7-COP-59-2, for use at 301 Buenaventura Boulevard, Kissimmee, Florida.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner and Respondent stipulated and agreed to the underlying facts which they deemed to have necessary application in considering the question of the propriety of the Respondent issuing the Division of Beverage, license number 7-COP-59-2 to the Petitioner for use at 301 Buenaventura Boulevard, Kissimmee, Florida. Notwithstanding the lack of dispute in facts surrounding this issue, the Respondent and Petitioner have requested the undersigned to examine those facts and to offer conclusions of law on the dispute. In the course of the presentation, it was agreed that Mr. Norman J. Smith, attorney for the Petitioner, would be allowed to set forth the factual stipulation for the record. Mr. Smith indicated that the official description of the license was, Division of Beverage, license number 7-COP-59-2. It was stated that the Petitioner is now a qualified motel and restaurant as set forth in Florida Statute, 561.20, which describes those establishments which would qualify for a "special" beverage license. It was further indicated that when the license in question was issued originally it was not issued to such a qualified hotel, motel or restaurant as set forth in Florida Statute, 561.20, which established the requirements for issuance of a "special" beverage license, and that when the subject license was transferred to the present location, that the motel and restaurant, at the present location, was not such a qualified hotel, motel or restaurant in accordance with Florida Statute, 561.20, which established those requirements for issuance of a "special" beverage license. However, as of October 21, 1975, and as of the application date for license transfer, filed by the Petitioner, by improvements and physical changes to the edifice, (location where the license currently is housed), would meet the definitional requirements of Florida Statute, 561.20, which sets forth the qualifications for "special" beverage licenses to be issued to a hotel, motel or restaurant. This qualification referred to as of October 21, 1975, and as of the date of application, applies to the section on hotels/motels and restaurants. That is to say the establishment would qualify under the standards for a hotel/motel or under the standards for a restaurant. It was further established that the application which was filed by the Petitioner was duly filed with the Division of Beverage upon form, DBR-704L, which is the application for the transfer of an alcoholic beverage license in this type request. Mr. Smith stated that the Petitioner understood that the letter of August 21, 1975, from the Director of the Division of Beverage, addressed to the Petitioner, stated the only basis for denying the application which had been filed by the Petitioner, and Mr. Hatch, attorney for the Respondent, agreed that there were no other grounds for disapproving the license application other than the one established in the letter from Mr. C. A. Nuzum, Director of the Division of Beverage. It was more specifically developed that the language which was relied upon to deny the application was that language set forth in Florida Statute, 561.20(2)(a)(3), "... However, any license heretofore issued to any such hotel, motel, motor court, or restaurant or hereafter issued to any such hotel, motel, or motor court [including a condominium accommodation] under the general law shall not be moved to a new location, such license being valid only on the premises of such hotel, motel, motor court, or restaurant." Mr. Hatch, in behalf of the Respondent, agreed to the accuracy of the depiction of the stipulation as stated for the record by Mr. Smith. The parties through their respective attorneys then offered oral argument on the law as it relates to the Petitioner's request for issuance of a license at the aforementioned location. Additionally, Mr. Bishop, a licensing supervisor with the Division of Beverage, was called to testify concerning his interpretation of the operation of Florida Statute, 561 as it pertains to license applications, moves, and transfers. One further item was offered in the way of a stipulation, and that is an agreement on the part of Mr. Smith, for the Petitioner, to allow examination of two memoranda offered by the Respondent as part of its argument. Mr. Smith indicated that he had a copy of the memoranda and that he had no objection to the use of that memoranda in the way of argument in behalf of the Respondent. Upon that representation the undersigned was provided with a copy of the Respondent's memoranda and has considered the same in addressing the legal issue.
Recommendation It is recommended that the application for transfer as filed by the Respondent, Buenaventura Lakes Country Club, Inc., to transfer Division of Beverage, license number 7-COP-59-2 from its present location to 301 Buenaventura Boulevard, Kissimmee, Florida, be granted. DONE and ENTERED this 20th day of November, 1975, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Norman J. Smith, Esquire Brinson and Smith, P. A. Post Office Drawer 1549 Kissimmee, Florida 32741 William A. Hatch, Esquire Department of Business Regulation Division of Beverage 725 Bronough Street Johns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
