The Issue The issues are whether Petitioner overpaid Medicaid reimbursements to Respondent for inpatient hospital services due to the lack of medical necessity for such services and, if so, the amount of the overpayment.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a 226-bed community hospital in Sanford. It is an acute-care hospital with an emergency department. At all material times, Respondent has been an authorized Medicaid provider. For inpatient services, Respondent receives, under Medicaid, an all-inclusive per diem rate for all goods and services provided during a 24-hour period, less any third-party payments. Petitioner is the state agency responsible for the regulation of the Medicaid program in Florida. Petitioner is required to perform Medicaid audits of providers and to recover any overpayments. Pursuant to this authority, Petitioner conducted an audit of Respondent for the period from January 1, 2001, through March 31, 2002. Pursuant to its procedures, Petitioner duly informed Respondent of the audit, obtained from Respondent relevant medical and hospital records, issued a Provisional Agency Audit Report on January 24, 2006, obtained additional information from Respondent pertinent to the provisional findings, and issued a Final Agency Audit Report on October 19, 2006, which claimed a total overpayment of $286,357.54 based on Medicaid payments made to Respondent on behalf of 35 different recipients. (The report indicates two separate denials for each of four recipients, so 39 total transactions are listed.) The dispute in this case concerns the medical necessity of the inpatient hospitalization of each recipient. The Florida Medicaid Hospital Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook (Handbook) states that the purpose of the Medicaid program is "to provide medically necessary inpatient and outpatient services to recipients in the hospital." Handbook, page 1-1. This case involves paid claims for inpatient, not outpatient, services. The Handbook defines inpatient services as those services "rendered to recipients who are admitted to a hospital and are expected to stay at least 24 hours and occupy a bed, even though a bed is not actually utilized because the recipient is discharged or transferred to another hospital." Handbook, page 1-1. The Handbook provides that the day of admission is covered, but the day of discharge is not covered, unless it is also the day of admission. Handbook, page 2-22. The Handbook defines "grace days" as non-medically necessary days following the day of formal discharge when the recipient continues to occupy a hospital bed until an outside facility or residence can be found. These days are not reimbursable by Medicaid except for children under 21 years of age on "Department of Children and Families hold . . .." Medicaid will pay up to 48 hours of inpatient stay beyond the formal discharge day for these children while an alternative placement is located. The Handbook incorporates the limitation of medical necessity as follows: Medicaid reimburses for services that are determined medically necessary, do not duplicate another provider's service, and are: individualized, specific, consistent with symptoms or confirmed diagnosis of the illness or injury under treatment, and not in excess of the patient's needs; not experimental or investigational; reflective of the level of services that can be safely furnished, and for which no equally effective and more conservative or less costly treatment is available statewide; furnished in a manner not primarily intended for the convenience of the recipient, the recipient's caretaker, or the provider. The fact that a provider has prescribed, recommended, or approved medical or allied care, goods, or services does not, in itself, make such care, goods or service medically necessary or a covered service. Note: See Appendix D, Glossary, in the Florida Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, UB-92, for the definition of medically necessary. Handbook, pages 2-1 to 2-2. The Florida Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, UB-92, Appendix D, defines "medically necessary" as follows: Means that the medical or allied care, goods, or services furnished or ordered must: Meet the following conditions: Be necessary to protect life, to prevent significant illness or significant disability, or to alleviate severe pain; Be individualized, specific, and consistent with symptoms or confirmed diagnosis of the illness or injury under treatment, and not in excess of the patient's needs; Be consistent with generally accepted professional medical standards as determined by the Medicaid program, and not experimental or investigational; Be reflective of the level of service that can be safely furnished, and for which no equally effective and more conservative or less costly treatment is available; statewide; and Be furnished in a manner that is not primarily intended for the convenience of the recipient, the recipient's caretaker, or the provider. "Medically necessary" or "medical necessity" for inpatient hospital services requires that those services furnished in a hospital on an inpatient basis could not, consistent with the provisions of appropriate medical care, be effectively furnished more economically on an outpatient basis or in an inpatient facility of a different type. The fact that a provider has prescribed, recommended, or approved medical or allied care, goods, or services does not, in itself, make such care, goods or services medically necessary or a medical necessity or a covered service. The Florida Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, UB-92, Appendix D, page D-10. E. A. was admitted on January 6, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat E. A.'s acute exacerbation of chronic bronchitis from January 6-8. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining ten days of E. A.'s hospitalization. (All calculations of duration of hospitalizations omit the day of discharge, pursuant to the above-cited provision from the Handbook. In this case, for instance, E. A. was discharged on January 19.) E. A., a 60-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with shortness of breath and a history of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), emphysema, and hypertension. He had been unable to eat for the preceding four days due to respiratory distress. At the time of his admission, E. A. had been living for a short while with his sister, who was suffering from cancer. His relevant history included a shotgun wound to the left lung 30 years earlier. Respondent states in its proposed recommended order that E. A.'s chest X-rays showed acute infiltrate demonstrating pneumonia, although the discharge summary reveals that chest X-rays fail to reveal this condition, but acknowledged that sputum grain stains revealed a polymicrobial infection. More to the point, the X-ray reports dated January 6 and 8 note: "no focal infiltrate." However, the discharge summary described E. A.'s prognosis as poor because he was in "end-stage lung disease." In the emergency department, after treatment with bronchodilators, E. A.'s oxygen saturation rate was only 87 percent--not 94-100 percent, as mistakenly stated by Petitioner's expert, Dr. Ellen Silkes, an otolaryngologist whose practice is largely limited to outpatients. This low rate of oxygen saturation evidences hypoxia. E. A.'s arterial blood gases bore a pH of 7.28, evidencing, on the facts of this case respiratory acidosis, which results from excessive retained carbon dioxide due to poor lung function. E. A. was started on Albuterol and Atrovent by nebulizer at four-hour intervals, as well as a corticosteroid intravenously every six hours to relieve the swelling in the lungs. He received oxygen by nasal cannula. On January 10, the physician's notes state that E. A. still suffered from "severe COPD" secondary to smoking with bronchospasms. According to the notes, the first day that E. A. showed any improvement was January 12. On January 14 and 16, E. A. was still retaining excessive carbon dioxide and remained hypoxic, but showed some improvement by January 16 in terms of arterial blood gases. The physician's note for January 17 states that E. A. could be discharged as soon as arrangements for home health care were completed. E. A.'s hospitalization was medically necessary from January 6-17. His hospitalization after January 17 was not medically necessary. Petitioner improperly denied January 9-16, given that the day of discharge is excluded. Thus, for E. A., Petitioner should have denied two days, not all ten days. A. A. was admitted on June 19, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat A. A.'s gastrointestinal bleeding from June 19-20. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 12 days of A. A.'s hospitalization. (Some of Petitioner's calculations are incorrect. For instance, in this case, Petitioner does not deny July 2-5, even though, undoubtedly, its position as to the lack of medical necessity as to the earlier dates would mandate the same position as to the later dates. This recommended order does not disturb Petitioner's implicit acceptance of the medical necessity of any dates, even when it appears to be in error.) A. A., a 51-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with abdominal pain, diarrhea, and black tarry stools. His recent history included bloody vomit and a diagnosis, a few months earlier, of a pulmonary embolism. A. A. had discontinued taking Coumadin, a blood thinner, due to nosebleeds. A. A. had been diagnosed with AIDS in 1998 and had lost 30 pounds in one month. At admission, A. A.'s hemoglobin and hematocrit levels were critically low at 5.1 and 15.5, respectively, and remained critically low the following day when, after A. A. received transfusions of two units of packed red blood cells, his hemoglobin and hematocrit levels were only 6.8 and 20.0, respectively. Dr. Silkes denied the hospitalization after June 20 because an upper gastrointestinal endoscopy revealed, on June 19, no acute bleeding, and a bleeding scan the following day was negative. However, according to the physician's notes, A. A. was continuing to experience diarrhea on June 20, even though he was starting to feel better. The course of treatment of A. A. was complicated by his recent history of pulmonary embolism and his inability to report an accurate history. By June 21, A. A.'s severe anemia had been corrected, but he was diagnosed with candida, an opportunistic fungal infection common in AIDS patients. This diagnosis would explain the vomiting of blood. Generally, the treatment dilemma posed by A. A. was that efforts to increase his clotting time to stop the bleeding raised the risk of pulmonary embolism. The physicians debated whether to install a Greenfield filter to stop the passage of a blood clot. The filter is introduced under X-ray control through the femoral vein into the inferior vena cava, where it is anchored, so that it allows the passage of blood, but not the passage of a blood clot. But the Greenfield filter is contraindicated in the presence of A. A.'s fever of 101 degrees and elevated white blood counts. Physicians introduced Coumadin to minimize the risk of clots, but A. A.'s low platelet count required the discontinuation of Coumadin on June 30. A. A.'s International Normalization Ratio (INR) was 4.2, which is well above the range of 2.0-3.0 and thus indicative of the fact that A. A.'s blood was taking too long to clot. The standard of care in 2001 precluded safe outpatient management of a complicated patient such as A. A., given his twin risks of pulmonary embolism and bleeding, either of which could result in his death. A. A.'s Coumadin could not safely have been adjusted on an outpatient basis. The physicians restarted the Coumadin on June 24 and doubled its dosage the following day. As they were working on adjusting the blood thinner, though, A. A. continued to suffer nightly fevers of 103 degrees, and the physicians needed to monitor him closely for the next week for this reason too. On June 28, A. A. reported that he was feeling better, but the physicians needed to monitor him for a recent reduction in his Coumadin dosage. A. A. was reported as "alert and comfortable" on July 2. A. A.'s hospitalization was medically necessary from June 19 through at least July 2. Petitioner improperly denied all ten days of this hospitalization. T. B. was admitted on May 15, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat T. B.'s esophageal cancer and tuberculosis from May 15-17 and The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the ten days that Dr. Silkes denied of the remaining 14 days of T. B.'s hospitalization. (It is unclear why Petitioner denied only ten days when Dr. Silkes denied May 18-20 and May 22-June 1--a total of 14 days, or 13 days exclusive of the day of discharge. But, as noted above, in cases such as this, the recommended order will consider only whether up to ten days within this period are allowable as medically necessary.) T. B., a 47-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with difficulty swallowing. He had visited a physician in February 2001 with the same complaint, and the physician had recommended an upper gastrointestinal series. Due to financial constraints, T. B. did not undergo this procedure until late April, when he was found to have a high-grade obstruction consistent with a tumor. T. B.'s recent history included the loss of 25 pounds. An endoscopy with biopsy performed on May 16 revealed a high-grade carcinoma of the esophagus. The physician planned to commence preoperative chemotherapy and radiation therapy to shrink the lesion, but, based on sputum collected on May 18, it was discovered that T. B. had mycobacterium tuberculosis. Physicians had suspected the tuberculosis from the time of admission when they placed T. B. in a negative airflow isolation room. Treatment of the tuberculosis necessarily preceded the preoperative chemotherapy recommended for T. B.'s carcinoma. The sputum sample revealed rare acid-fast bacilli, for which the standard of care in 2001 typically required two to three weeks of treatment before isolation precautions could be discontinued. T. B. remained in isolation at least through May 31. In addition, T. B. suffered significant pain from the carcinoma. By May 23, he was on patient-controlled analgesia in the form of a morphine pump, which is not available outside of an acute-care hospital. T. B.'s hospitalization was medically necessary from May 15 through at least June 1. Petitioner improperly denied all ten days of this hospitalization that it denied. R. B. was admitted on December 3, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat R. B.'s respiratory failure from December 3, 2001, to January 2, 2002, and January 8, 2002. Based on Petitioner's prehearing stipulation, the dispute concerns only seven days' hospitalization. R. B., a 59-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with acute respiratory distress and respiratory failure. She was immediately intubated. Her family insisted upon aggressive treatment of, among other things, her bilateral pneumonia caused by a virulent staph infection. R. B. required a tracheotomy on December 20 due to the difficulty in weaning her from the ventilator. She required the placement of a percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy (PEG) tube on January 1. The discharge summary describes R. B. as "very frail and fragile" and her hospitalization as "very prolonged and complicated." On December 23, when R. B. was finally weaned from the ventilator, her family agreed to a do-not-resuscitate (DNR) code for her. The dispute arises from an incident on January 3 when R. B. fell when trying to get out of bed. Her mental status deteriorated, probably due to malignant disease. Physicians ruled out sepsis in the bloodstream, but X-rays revealed multiple nodules in the lung and liver. On January 8, a CT- guided lung biopsy of one of the nodules confirmed malignant disease. Two days later, the physician stated that a consultation with hospice was indicated. Upon the agreement of the family, R. B. was discharged to her home under hospice care on January 12. Dr. Silkes is substantially correct in her opinion. The diagnostic work after January 2 only supported the poor prognosis that had become obvious to R. B.'s family ten days earlier and certainly was not palliative in nature. R. B.'s hospitalization after January 2, 2002, was not medically necessary--except for January 8, which Dr. Silkes initially conceded, and an additional two days, which Petitioner conceded in its prehearing stipulation. Petitioner properly denied seven days of this hospitalization. J. B. was admitted on January 5, 2002. Petitioner does not contest a 23-hour observation on January 5, but this would generate a reimbursement considerably smaller than that sought by Respondent for inpatient services for that day, so Petitioner has essentially denied the entire hospitalization, which consists of 16 days. J. B., a 59-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with shortness of breath and atrial fibrillation with fast ventricular rate. He had been diabetic for 25 years. He had been laid off from construction work in August 2001, and had arthritic knees which prevented his return to work. Since losing his job, J. B. had been feeling poorly and had lost 20 pounds. J. B.'s pulse at the time of his arrival was 165, and it dropped to 105 within his first six hours at the hospital. J. B.'s relevant history included congestive heart failure, edema of the extremities, and nocturnal dyspnea. A chest X-ray on the day of admission revealed a dense mass in the left lobe. Physicians started a calcium channel blocker to regulate J. B.'s rapid heart beat and a diuretic to eliminate his excess fluids and swelling. J. B. was feeling much better by January 7, as the physicians had controlled his rapid heart beat. On that day, J. B. underwent a stress test, which was negative. However, a CT scan performed on January 8 and reported the following day revealed a left hilum mass that proved to be advanced carcinoma. The physicians decided that J. B. needed a bronchoscopy to biopsy the lung mass and a thoracentesis, in which a needle is inserted between the ribs to extract fluid for the purpose of determining the fluid's source. However, J. B.'s atrial fibrillation complicated their plans. On January 8, J. B. remained in atrial fibrillation, and the physicians were considering starting him on Coumadin because patients with atrial fibrillation are at high risk of clotting due to the poor expulsion of blood into the ventricle. Introduction of this blood-thinning agent before other invasive procedures requires first that the physicians stabilize the patient. This dilemma delayed the introduction of the blood- thinning agent and prevented treating J. B. as an outpatient. Once stabilized on Coumadin, J. B. underwent the two diagnostic procedures on January 11. They revealed that he was suffering from stage IV squamous cell carcinoma, according to a physician's report dictated on January 14 and transcribed the following day. The physician ordered additional CT scans to determine the extent of the metastatic disease before deciding on a course of treatment. A whole body bone scan was performed on January 15 and was essentially negative. However, the carcinoma had metastasized to the left hilum and, by report dated January 15, a physician noted that J. B. would not benefit from surgery, chemotherapy, or radiation, although palliative radiation could offer him some relief. An IV port for chemotherapy (not radiation) was placed on January 16--not January 6, as noted by Dr. Silkes in her report. Coumadin had been discontinued in advance of the procedure and resumed on the day of the procedure, but required adjustment for the next several days, as J. B.'s INR was too low, indicative of excessive clotting. Although the administration of the chemotherapy through the IV port could have been done on an outpatient basis, J. B. was comfortable at all times after January 15, and with no effective treatment possible, his hospitalization remained medically necessary until the physicians were able to adjust his Coumadin so that his INR reached the normal range. J. B.'s hospitalization was medically necessary from January 5 through January 22, on which date he was discharged. Petitioner improperly denied the 16 days of inpatient services. N. C. was admitted on February 8, 2002. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat N. C.'s intracranial hemorrhage from February 8-10. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 21 days of N. C.'s hospitalization. N. C., a 40-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with a complaint of passing out and no significant medical history. N. C. was a single mother of a developmentally disabled child. Her father resided in a nursing home and suffered from dementia, so her siblings were her decisionmakers concerning care. At admission, N. C. was already in a vegetative state, suffering from a massive intracranial hemorrhage. Her blood pressure was 213/107. She was immediately intubated and given Mannitol to reduce intracranial pressure and Dilantin to prevent seizures. On February 8, a neurologist evaluated N. C. and found her a poor candidate for surgery to evacuate the intracranial hematoma due to the likelihood of extensive consequent neurological deficits. The neurologist discussed the possibilities and the "extremely poor" prognosis with the siblings, who decided not to pursue surgery and instead allow N. C. to be "managed medically." The physicians asked the siblings to consider a DNR code for N. C. N. C. made no meaningful progress in the following days. Respondent was unable to contact her siblings until February 19, and they asked for two days within which to make the decision whether to place N. C. on a DNR code. On February 22, they decided to place N. C. on a DNR code and withdraw the ventilator. Three days later, the physician discussed with the siblings the possibility of placement in a nursing home. Three days after this discussion, the siblings agreed on inpatient hospice care for N. C. On March 4, IV fluids and medications and the nasogastric feeding tube were withdrawn, and N. C. was transferred to a nursing home under hospice care. N. C.'s hospitalization was medically necessary through February 22 because a nursing home cannot accept a patient on a ventilator, N. C.'s course following the stroke could reasonably be observed for a couple of weeks to determine if improvement--however unlikely--might take place, and the siblings reasonably required this long to make this difficult decision. From February 23 through discharge, the inpatient services provided N. C. were no longer medically necessary, so Petitioner properly denied nine days of the 21 days that it denied for this recipient. N. Ch. was admitted on May 23, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat N. Ch.'s cellulitus and osteomyelitis from May 23 to June 24. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 46 days of N. Ch.'s hospitalization. N. Ch., a 38-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with wounds to both legs and loss of feeling in both feet and a history of fractures to both tibias 20 years ago followed by osteomyelitis four years ago. Despite considerable hospital treatment to both legs, consisting of antibiotics, hyperbaric oxygen, debridement, and skin grafts, drainage of the wounds persisted. Four grainy wounds on both legs penetrated to the bone, and N. Ch. had suffered some bony damage from the persistence of these infected wounds. A physician performed a surgical debridement of the wounds on May 26, and a vacuum- assisted closure device was applied to the wound on the following day. This device produces negative air pressure to stimulate a chemical change in the tissues to enhance the migration of new blood vessels and granulation tissue over the area of the wound. The pump was changed often. On June 22, N. Ch. underwent a second debridement and a pump was reapplied to the wounds on June 24. The issue in this case involves the use of hyperbaric oxygen treatment on an inpatient basis. On June 7, a physician reasonably recommended 20, 90-minute hyperbaric oxygen treatments. The treatments, which accelerate wound healing, began the next day. Dr. Silkes correctly finds no medical necessity after N. Ch. became stable after the second debridement. Although he later suffered some fever, apparently from his reaction to an antibiotic, and gastroesophagael reflux, as well as some adverse reactions to IV and peripherally inserted central catheter lines, N. Ch. could have been managed as an outpatient after June 24. Nothing suggests that the vacuum-`assisted closure device requires hospitalization, and hyperbaric oxygen treatment clearly does not require hospitalization. Respondent contends that inpatient services remained medically necessary after June 24 because Medicaid would not pay for hyperbaric oxygen treatment on an outpatient basis. Medical necessity is driven by medical, not legal, considerations. If the sole reason for hospitalization is to obtain a medically necessary good or service that Respondent has restricted to the inpatient setting, then the provider community improperly circumvents Petitioner's restriction. If there is no other reason to continue to hospitalize a recipient, such as N. Ch., the decision to do so in order to obtain for him a concededly medically necessary service--that does not otherwise require hospitalization--is unwarranted. Petitioner properly denied the 46 days of inpatient services for N. Ch. after June 24. J. C. was admitted on February 24, 2002. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat J. C.'s coronary artery disease and lymphoma on February 24 and March 3-8. In its proposed recommended order, Respondent does not contest Petitioner's denial of the "last two days," which apparently are March 9-10. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining six days of hospitalization from February 25 through March 2. J. C., a 61-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with worsening chest pain over the past two weeks and a history of coronary artery disease. She also had an undiagnosed mass on her neck. She had previously failed outpatient treatment and was admitted to the hospital. Two weeks earlier, J. C. was to have had an outpatient biopsy of the neck mass, but the anesthesiologist declined to administer anesthesia until her unstable angina was addressed. J. C. went to her primary care physician, who referred her to a cardiologist, but, prior to seeing him, J. C. went to the emergency department. On February 25, the physician's notes indicate that J. C. was stable and without chest pain. The cardiologist performed a cardiac catheterization on February 26 and found 100 percent blockage of the left anterior descending artery, 80 percent blockage of the proximal circumflex, and other narrowings that were not amenable to angioplasty and stenting, so he recommended coronary artery bypass grafting. Heart surgery could not proceed until physicians learned the nature of the neck mass. A biopsy was performed on February 28, which revealed B-cell malignant lymphoma. The oncologist preferred to commence chemotherapy after the bypass operation, so this was performed on March 3. J. C. was extubated on March 4, but developed acute respiratory distress on March 5 and required a transfusion the following day. However, Dr. Silkes is correct in finding the hospitalization from February 25 through March 2 medically unnecessary. The procedures performed during this period could have been done on an outpatient basis. The record does not support Respondent's argument that her unstable angina required inpatient management. Petitioner properly denied these six days of inpatient services. R. LaB. was admitted on April 2, 2001. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the last day of inpatient service on April 12. This is the first case considered in this recommended order handled by Dr. Alan Yesner, an internist whose practice is more evenly divided between inpatients and outpatients than is Dr. Silkes' practice. R. LaB., a 47-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with abdominal pain of two days' duration and a history of COPD, hypertension, and diabetes. She was rushed to abdominal surgery to reduce an incarcerated hernia. The surgery was long. R. LaB. suffered respiratory failure and required intubation. Dr. Yesner is correct in opining that R. LaB.'s hospitalization after April 11 was not medical necessary. She was stable and on appropriate medication, so Petitioner properly denied one day of inpatient service for R. LaB. J. L. was admitted on June 12, 2001. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the seven days of inpatient services. J. L., a 47-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with complaints of a gradual increase of abdominal girth and was found to have blood in his stool. Lab work indicated an elevated INR, elevated bilirubin, and bacteria in his urine. The physician concluded that J. L. suffered from primary biliary cirrhosis, for which he had been treated since at least 1998. J. L. admitted that he had become noncompliant with his medication after a divorce. A CT scan revealed a probable stone obstructing the right ureter, causing urine to back up and flood the right kidney. A successful laser lithotripsy was performed on June 17 with the complete fragmentation of the stone and the installation of a stent, which would facilitate drainage, to be removed a few days later. J. L. tolerated the procedure well, and on the next day he reported feeling better without any pain in his flank. Dr. Yesner notes the "late schedule" of the lithotripsy, but Respondent did not have a lithotripter in 2001 and had to schedule it for use at the hospital. The hospitalization was medically necessary through June 17 due to the pain, advanced kidney disease, and potential kidney problems presented by the blockage, prior to its surgical fragmentation. Petitioner should have denied two days, not seven days. C. M. was admitted on April 2, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of admission for 23-hour observation only on April 2 for end-stage sarcoidosis, pneumonia, and gastrointestinal bleeding. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 31 days of C. M.'s hospitalization, which concluded with her death. C. M., a 55-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with shortness of breath and weakness. She is a Jehovah's Witness, so she declines blood transfusions on religious grounds. By April 4, C. M.'s blood gases, although not within normal ranges, were out of critical ranges. C. M. suffered respiratory failure and required intubation on April 16. Her hemoglobin gradually dropped after this, but treatment was limited to iron and vitamins due to the refusal of the patient to accept a blood transfusion. This treatment was unsuccessful. The family supported C. M.'s decision not to accept a blood transfusion, but insisted on full, aggressive treatment, including CPR. C. M. went into cardiac arrest on May 3 and CPR failed to revive her. Dr. Silkes states that Respondent should have arranged for hospice care during the first day of hospitalization. C. M. was not then on a ventilator, so a hospice would not have objected to taking C. M. on that ground, but her respiration was critically impaired for the first three days of her hospitalization and her prognosis was not such as to render hospital care medically unnecessary. It was medically necessary to stabilize C. M.'s respiration during these first three days, but her hemoglobin issues could have been addressed by home health care for the next 11 days. The medical necessity of inpatient services resumes, though, after C. M.'s respiratory failure of April 16 and continues to the end of her hospitalization. The first three days of inpatient services were medically necessary, the next 11 days of inpatient services were not medically necessary, and the last 17 days of inpatient services were medically necessary, so Petitioner should have denied 11 days, not 31 days. M. M. was admitted on March 3, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat acute asthmatic bronchitis with a history of coronary artery bypass graft, asthma, sarcoidosis of the lung, and diabetes from March 3-12, which Petitioner later extended to March 13. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining three days of M. M.'s hospitalization, which Respondent's expert frankly conceded was difficult to justify. As Dr. Yesner noted, M. M. was stabilized on oral medication by March 11, and he allowed a couple of additional days to monitor her. M. M. experienced hypoglycemia on March 16, but this is a condition that, according to Dr. Yesner, is not unusual with the Prednisone that M. M. was taking, and hypoglycemia is typically managed on an outpatient basis. Petitioner properly denied the last three days of M. M.'s hospitalization. J. P. S. was admitted on January 4, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat J. P. S.'s obstruction of the common bile duct. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the last three days of his hospitalization. J. P. S., a 54-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with severe jaundice and a history of diabetes, congestive heart failure, and triple coronary artery bypass graft performed in 1997, although he displayed no significant cardiac abnormalities during this hospitalization. During the initial examination, J. P. S. went into respiratory arrest and required intubation. The gastroenterologist found J. P. S. ready for discharge, from a gastroenterological perspective, on January 13. but J. P. S. immediately developed COPD symptoms, including shortness of breath and edema. According to the physician notes, J. P. S. was sufficiently stable for discharge on January 15, but a note for the next day says to hold the discharge pending cardiac evaluation. Respondent discharged J. P. S. three days later, after physicians could monitor the level of Digoxin to ensure that J. P. S. was safe for discharge. P. S.'s entire hospitalization was medically necessary. Petitioner improperly denied the last three days of inpatient services. J. P. was admitted on December 8, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of services to treat J. P.'s fever from December 8-12. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 14 days of J. P.'s hospitalization. J. P., a 27-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with high-grade fevers and severe headaches and a history of AIDS. Dr. Silkes approved the treatment of the fever until it ended on December 12. The fever was likely caused by J. P.'s toxoplasmosis of the central nervous system. This is an opportunistic condition not unusual in immunocompromised patients. Candida fungal infection likely caused J. P.'s complaints of pain on swallowing, as this too is an opportunistic condition. Additionally, a blood culture revealed a staph infection. Through December 18, J. P. was continuing to experience fevers of up to 101 degrees. At the same time, it was necessary to address the toxoplasmosis before it extended to other organs. This required the sequential administration of IV antibiotics and careful, continual monitoring of the patient for his clinical response to treatment. On December 20, J. P. underwent a bone marrow biopsy to rule out the extension of toxoplasmosis in the bone marrow or the presence of tuberculosis. This test was negative, which was a precondition for discharge. The pathology report was "received" on December 21, but not "printed" until December 27. However, J. P. did not complete his IV administration of Doxycycline until December 23, when the medical necessity for his inpatient services ended. Petitioner should have denied three days, not 14 days. W. P. was admitted on June 18, 2001. Dr. Silkes would allow only a 23-hour observation on the day of admission for the treatment of lung cancer and tuberculosis. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of 13 days of his hospitalization from June 18 through July 1 (even though he was not discharged until July 13). W. P., a 59-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with severe coughing up of blood and a recent loss of 40 pounds. A chest X-ray at admission revealed a large mass in the upper left lobe of the lungs. Lab work suggestive of anemia correlated with a malignancy as its source. Sputum to test for acid fast bacillus was taken, and a consult was immediately arranged with a pulmonary specialist to consider a bronchoscopy and to take a biopsy. A CT scan of the chest on June 18 revealed abnormal soft tissue density filling the right upper lobe, two tumors, and numerous nodes. The bronchoscopy on June 19 revealed 80 percent obstruction of the right main bronchus secondary to an endobronchial lesion and 100 percent obstruction of the right upper lobe. A biopsy of the right mainstem bronchus revealed a squamous cell carcinoma. A physician noted in his consultation report that W. P. was to complete his metastatic survey on the day of the report--June 22--after which they would discuss palliative treatment. The report states that the patient understands that he will unlikely live more than six months. Subsequently, acid fast bacillus, which had originally not been detected, was found, so W. P. was placed in isolation on June 26. He had been experiencing elevated white blood counts and fevers. He was placed on antituberculosis treatment, which, as noted above, typically takes two or three weeks until the patient can be removed from isolation. July 10 was W. P.'s first day without fever. On this date, Respondent sent his records to the Health Department to facilitate a transfer to a tuberculosis hospital. He was discharged on July 13. W. P.'s entire hospitalization was medically necessary. Petitioner should not have denied any of the 13 days that it denied. M. Pr. was admitted on December 18, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat M. Pr.'s coronary artery disease from December 18-27. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining seven days of M. Pr.'s hospitalization. M. Pr., a 58-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with a recent cardiovascular accident while out of state. A cardiac catheterization revealed severe triple vessel coronary artery disease. On December 19, M. Pr. underwent a four-vessel bypass. Post-operatively, however, M. Pr. fell while on the commode. The dispute in this case arises due to the unavailability of rehabilitation facilities that would take M. Pr. after his fall. He was suitable for discharge on December 28, but no facility could be found to receive him. These are "grace days," as noted in the Handbook and are available, on a limited basis, for persons under 21 years of age, but, by negative implication, are unavailable for adults. Thus, medical necessity dictated that Respondent discharge M. Pr. on December 27, so the inpatient services are not reimbursable after December 28, given that the day of discharge is not allowable. Dr. Silkes' determination was correct in this case. Petitioner properly denied seven days' inpatient services for M. Pr. A. R. was admitted on December 30, 2001. Petitioner has denied the entire 14 days of A. R.'s hospitalization, although Dr. Silkes approved one day's inpatient services, on the day of admission, for the treatment of ovarian cancer. A. R., a 63-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with vomiting on the day of admission, progressive abdominal distension, anorexia, weight loss over the past month, and a 15-year history of bronchial asthma. A CT scan of A. R.'s thorax at the time of admission revealed a large collection of fluid in the abdominal cavity. At this time, a physician removed 4.5 liters of fluid from the cavity, and A. R., not surprisingly, began to feel much better. A report on January 3--delayed probably due to the holidays-- indicated the presence of scattered malignant cells in the withdrawn fluid compatible with carcinoma. Metastatic ovarian cancer was subsequently confirmed. A. R.'s case was complicated by the withdrawal of this large volume of fluids, which required continual monitoring of her electrolytes, and the sudden exacerbation of her dementia on January 2, which would impede outpatient services, as well as the initiation of chemotherapy. The dementia, which had been progressive for the past six months, was likely a reaction to the carcinoma. By January 11, a physician recommended hospice placement given A. R.'s incurable tumor. A. R.'s daughter agreed on this day to hospice placement. This is the day that medical necessity for inpatient services ended. Petitioners should have denied three days, not 14 days. The remaining days were medically necessary. E. S. was admitted on May 4, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat E. S.'s pancreatitis and multisystem failure from May 4-23. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 24 days of her hospitalization, which ended with her death. E. S., a 64-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with nausea and abdominal pain and a history of hypertension and abuse of alcohol and tobacco. She was found to have elevated pancreatic enzymes. On May 8, E. S. underwent a laparoscopic removal of her gallbladder, which she tolerated well, but soon afterwards suffered respiratory failure. E. S. was then placed on a ventilator. Problems with malnourishment and then kidney failure precluded a successful weaning her off the ventilator. On May 23, the family agreed to a DNR code. May 23 marks the last day that Dr. Silkes found that E. S.'s hospitalization was medically necessary. Care after this date was entirely supportive and not medically necessary; however, no hospice or skilled nursing facility would take E. S. because she could not be weaned off the ventilator. The unavailability of an alternative, less costly setting does not automatically render the inpatient care of a recipient medically necessary. The circumstances dictate whether inpatient services to such a patient are medically necessary. Here, it is impossible to find that services after May 23 were medically necessary. Dr. Silkes was correct in her opinion. Petitioner properly denied all 24 days of inpatient services for E. S. D. S. was admitted on March 24, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat D. S.'s osteomyelitis of the right foot from March 24-25 and March 30-April 10. (Originally, Dr. Silkes allowed only March 24-25 and March 30-April 6, but, on February 7, 2007, she revised her opinion to allow the additional four days to April 10.) In its prehearing statement, Petitioner conceded that only three of the original ten denied days remained at issue, as it was agreeing that an additional seven days were medically necessary. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining three days, although it is not clear what three days Petitioner is contesting. D. S., a 57-year-old female, presented at the emergency department with a "hole in the right foot" and a history of diabetes. She dropped a can of juice on her foot on January 1, and the foot had become progressively infected since that time. On the day of admission, she underwent surgery for the removal of fourth and fifth metatarsal bones and toes of the right foot. She did not heal properly and required followup surgery on April 7 to trim some of the necrotic flap, as the physicians considered the possibility of a below-knee amputation. On April 13, the surgeon probed the wound, found no hidden pockets, and discharged D. S. Regardless what three days that Petitioner continues to find were not medically necessary, the entire hospitalization was medically necessary. J. W. was admitted on August 20, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat J. W.'s multiple organ failure from August 20 to September 14. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining two days of J. W.'s hospitalization, at which time he died. J. W., a 48-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with a two or three-day history of progressive congestive heart failure with pulmonary edema, atypical chest pain, and increasing abdominal girth. His history included nonischemic cardiomyopathy with minimal coronary artery disease, chronic alcohol abuse, pulmonary hypertension, chronic atrial fibrillation requiring anticoagulation therapy, hepatitis B and C, chronic renal insufficiency, and chronic congestive heart failure with multiple hospitalizations. On admission, his INR was 6.6, indicative of very slow clotting. Despite the care of numerous consultants, J. W. suffered increased respiratory failure on September 5, at which time he was intubated. He received a Greenfield filter on September 7 to prevent further pulmonary clots. Starting September 10, and continuing everyday thereafter, J. W. required dialysis due to renal failure. J. W. was on total parenteral feeding as of September 14. The family, whose availability had been a problem, agreed to a DNR code on September 17. Respondent claims in its proposed recommended order that a DNR code is a precondition to hospice care, but no competent evidence establishes this fact. Dr. Silkes and Petitioner properly denied the last two days because they were not medically necessary. M. W. was admitted on June 10, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat M. W.'s ventricular fibrillation and complications from June 10- The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining seven days of M. W.'s hospitalization. M. W., a 31-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with cardiopulmonary arrest after his wife found him slumped on the sofa, seizing. On arrival, he was found to be in ventricular fibrillation, and he was intubated. Physicians restored a normal rhythm, but M. W. suffered a seizure in the emergency department, so he was given large doses of Dilantin. M. W. had suffered brain damage from cerebral anoxia. M. W. was extubated on June 13, and his breathing remained stable. He remained in normal sinus rhythm. M. W. began to receive Librium on June 13 to sedate him. The cardiologist proposed a cardiac catheterization, but M. W. refused. An EKG on June 15 found a conduction defect in M. W.'s heart that was suggestive of Wolff Parkinson White syndrome. The cardiologist then determined, on June 16, that M. W. required an electrophysiology study to rule out Wolff Parkinson White syndrome. In 2001, Respondent lacked the equipment to perform this study, for which M. W. remained too confused to participate on June 18 anyhow. Physicians continued to monitor M. W.'s cardiac rhythm, and, when a bed opened at Florida Hospital, Orlando, which had the necessary equipment, Respondent promptly transferred M. W. on June 22. During the transfer, the cardiac monitor continued to check M. W.'s rhythm due to the risk of another cardiac incident until the underlying cardiac abnormality was assessed and treated. Petitioner improperly denied the final seven days of M. W.'s hospitalization. M. W. had suffered a serious cardiac event. Physicians had not yet ruled out all possible reasons for the event and needed to address a promising possibility of Wolff Parkinson White syndrome, so M. W. remained at risk for another event. He was confused from the brain damage. All of these factors militate in favor of finding that the remaining seven days of inpatient services were medically necessary. E. A. $1666.62 R. B. $5703.18 N. C. $7332.66 N. Ch. $38,332.26 J. C. $4888.44 R. LaB. $833.31 J. L. $1666.62 C. M. $9166.41 M. M. $2499.93 The total overpayment is $104,309.97, which breaks down as follows: J. P. $2444.22 M. Pr. $5703.18 A. R. $2444.22 E. S. $19,999.44 J. S. $1629.48
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order finding overpayments totaling $104,309.97 during the audit period and requiring that Respondent repay this amount, imposing an administrative fine of $1000, requiring Respondent to prepare a corrective action plan, and reserving jurisdiction to remand the case to the Division of Administrative Hearing for a determination of Petitioner's entitlement to statutory costs, if any. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of June, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of June, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard J. Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Craig H. Smith, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Dr. Andrew C. Agwunobi, Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3116 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Richard M. Ellis, Esquire Rutledge, Ecenia, Purnell & Hoffman, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 420 Post Office Box 551 Tallahassee, Florida 32304-0551 William Blocker, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III, Mail Stop 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Building 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Daniel Lake, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Fort Knox Building III, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Tracy Cooper, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III, Mail Stop 3 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308
The Issue Whether the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) has jurisdiction to conduct a formal hearing under the provisions of Sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, if the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) does not make a "cause" or "no cause" determination, as provided in Section 760.11(3), Florida Statutes, but rather issues a Notice of Dismissal, pursuant to Section 760.11(8), Florida Statutes. Whether DOAH has jurisdiction to conduct a formal hearing under the provisions of Sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, if the Petition for Relief was not timely filed pursuant to Section 760.11(6), Florida Statutes. Whether DOAH has jurisdiction to conduct a formal hearing under the provisions of Sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, if Petitioner fails to name Respondent in the Petition for Relief filed with the FCHR, as required by Section 760.11(1), Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing facts and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered dismissing with prejudice the Petition of Manuel Pedraza in DOAH Case No. 02-0237, and FCHR Case No. 99-0849, for failure to timely file his Petition for Relief and for failure to properly name Respondent in the Petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of June, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of June, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Susan K. W. Erlenbach, Esquire Erlenbach Law Offices, P.A. 2532 Garden Street Titusville, Florida 32796 W. Russell Hamilton, III, Esquire Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP 5300 First Union Financial Center 200 South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33131-2339 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner in violation of Section 760.10 et. seq., Florida Statutes, as set forth in Petitioner's Petition for Relief filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) and, if so, the penalties that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a female African-American who has completed medical school. On March 19, 1997, Petitioner completed an "Application for Residency," seeking to participate in Respondent's clinical anesthesiology residency program. That program is operated in conjunction with the Public Health Trust. Applicants selected to participate in the residency program become employees of Respondent. The terms and conditions of employment are subject to the policies of both Respondent and the Public Health Trust. Petitioner's application to participate in the residency program related that she had completed an internship at University of Maryland/Harbor Hospital (Harbor) and two years of anesthesiology residency at King/Drew University, Los Angles (King). Petitioner signed the application on March 19, 1997. On April 30, 1997, Petitioner submitted an "Application for Graduate Medical Education at the Jackson Memorial Medical Center" that required her to "list chronologically your activities from time of graduation from Medical School to present. Specify type of post graduate training if any." Petitioner listed the internship at Harbor and the residency at King. She signed the application under the declaration: "I hereby declare that I have examined this application; and to the best of my knowledge and belief, it is true, correct, and complete." Petitioner was accepted into Respondent's clinical anesthesiology residency program based, in part, on the information reflected in the foregoing applications. That acceptance created an employee/employer relationship between Petitioner and Respondent. On July 17, 1997, Petitioner submitted a completed "Personnel Form" to Respondent. The Personnel Form required her to disclose all her activities since her completion of medical school. On that form Petitioner listed her previous internship at Harbor and her previous residency training at King. She verified it was correct to the best of her knowledge and signed the form. At the times pertinent to this proceeding, Dr. Brian Craythorne was a Professor of Medicine at the University of Miami and the Chairman of Respondent's Department of Anesthesiology. Dr. Craythorne had supervisory responsibility for Petitioner and was instrumental in selecting her to participate in the residency program. In April 1998, Dr. Craythorne received routine information from the American Board of Anesthesiology (ABA) setting forth the number of hours of training from other anesthesiology residency programs for which each resident participating in Respondent's residency program had received credit. The information from the ABA also set forth the number of hours of training for which each resident had received no credit. From that information, Dr. Craythorne learned that Petitioner had a total of 39 hours of residency training in anesthesiology from other programs for which she had received no credit. Three of the 39 hours of training for which she had no training were at King, which was reflected on her application and related paperwork. The training at King is not an issue in this proceeding. The additional 36 hours of residency training for which she received no credit was from Howard Hospital. 1/ The program at Howard, which was equivalent to a three-year program, was not reflected on any application or related document Petitioner submitted to Respondent before April 1998. Petitioner's failure to disclose her participation in the residency program at Howard was intentional. Petitioner's failure to disclose her participation in the residency program at Howard violated the clear policies of both Respondent and the Public Health Trust that require applications and related documents to be truthful, correct, and complete. Dr. Craythorne confronted Petitioner about the foregoing omissions in her applications and associated paperwork. In response, Petitioner submitted a letter dated May 27, 1998, in which she tried to explain why she did not obtain credit at Howard and why she had not divulged that information to Respondent. Petitioner asserted that she had sued Howard and had subsequently settled the litigation with instructions from her attorney that she could not discuss the litigation. 2/ Petitioner's letter of May 27, 1998, was not satisfactory to Dr. Craythorne. On June 3, 1998, Dr. Craythorne issued to Petitioner a "Disciplinary Action Report" (DAR) advising he was recommending that Petitioner be dismissed from the residency program (thereby terminating her employment with Respondent). The grounds for the action were her violation of Respondent's policies by making a false statement or statements on her application for employment and related documents and her violation of Public Health Trust Policy #305 pertaining to falsifying records or any other record of the Trust. Referencing Respondent's Department of Anesthesiology, the DAR also contained the following: Our department's recruiting and hiring practices . . . includes a policy/practice not to accept residents [sic] who have had more than one prior anesthesia residency experience for the clinical anesthesia years 1 through 3. [3/]] On June 29, 1998, Dr. Craythorne wrote a letter to Petitioner terminating her employment on the grounds set forth in the DAR. The termination letter advised Petitioner that she could request the Senior Vice President for Medical Affairs (Dr. Gerard A. Kaiser) to review the decision to terminate her participation. The letter also advised Petitioner that "[u]nless the Senior Vice President rescinds the proposed action, it will become effective following his review and decision." On July 21, 1998, Dr. Kaiser advised Petitioner that he had reviewed the facts surrounding her termination and agreed with the termination decision. Consistent with her rights pursuant to the applicable collective bargaining agreement, Petitioner requested and received a hearing before the Peer Review Committee, which was composed of other participants in the anesthesiology residency program. On December 1, 1998, the Peer Review Committee issued its report upholding Petitioner's termination for the reasons cited by Dr. Craythorne. On December 23, 1998, Ira C. Clark, president of the Public Health Trust, advised Petitioner that he had upheld her dismissal based on his review of the Peer Review Committee's findings and recommendation. Petitioner thereafter filed a grievance pursuant to her collective bargaining rights. On October 21, 1999, an evidentiary hearing was conducted before an arbitrator. On November 1, 1999, the arbitrator entered his Opinion and Award upholding Petitioner's termination of employment. Petitioner thereafter filed a complaint of discrimination with the FCHR on or about March 27, 2000. The gravamen of the complaint was that Respondent fired her in retaliation for her complaint to Dr. Craythorne that another resident had made a derogatory racial comment towards her. On December 10, 2001, the FCHR entered a determination of "no cause," determining that there was no cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice had occurred. On January 14, 2002, Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief from an unlawful employment practice with the FCHR. The Petition alleged the following facts in support of her claim of discrimination: On April 1, 1998, a racial remark was made to me by Dr. Kirsten O'Neal, which was, "we know how lazy you Blacks are." I reported it (the statement) to Dr. Craythorne and Dr. Brindle, as well as in writing (copies are in my file). Dr. Craythorne asked me if I had any witnesses, I said yes. The following month they decided to investigate my application, and terminated me on July 1998 (sic). The Petition described the disputed issues of fact as follows: I was terminated because I did not put on my application that I had worked for Howard Hospital in Washington, D. C. They stated the reason I was terminated is because the ABA (American Board of Anesthesiology) requires that you only attend two programs if you have received credit. I did not receive any credit. Please see the enclosed pamphlet from the ABA at page 9. The Petition set forth the following ultimate facts entitling Petitioner to relief: When JMH terminated me, it was because I made a claim of racial discrimination, which I reported prior to investigation of my application. Had I not complained of racial remarks that was made to me by the above Dr. Kirsten O'Neal, it would not have come up about my application. The evidence established that Petitioner complained to Dr. Craythorne that Dr. O'Neal had made the derogatory, racial remark set forth in the Petition. 4/ There was no evidence to establish a link between the complaint made by Petitioner to Dr. Craythorne pertaining to Dr. O'Neal and the decision to terminate her participation in the residency program. Respondent established that Petitioner was terminated because she failed to adhere to Respondent's and the Public Health Trust's clear policies requiring applications and other employment documents to be truthful, correct, and complete.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of August, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of August, 2002.
The Issue By an Administrative Complaint executed May 27, 1986 and filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings on July 11, 1986, Respondent is charged, pursuant to Sections 464.018(1)(f) and/or (h) Florida Statutes (1985) with "unprofessional conduct which departs from minimal standards of acceptable and prevailing nursing practice; and/or being unable to practice nursing with reasonable skill and safety to patients by reason of use of alcohol or drugs." All charges are limited to events allegedly occurring May 6, 1985.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is a licensed practical nurse. On May 5-6, 1986, Respondent was employed at the Orlando Health Care Center as a licensed practical nurse on the 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. shift. At that time, Jeanette Crandall, a 68 year-old female patient roomed with Lorene Johnson, another elderly female patient who has a history of "wandering." Mrs. Crandall testified that early on the morning of May 6, 1986 she observed Respondent alone attempt to place Lorene Johnson in bed and that when Respondent could not get Lorene Johnson into bed due to Johnson's resistance, Respondent struck Johnson with Johnson's shoe two or three times in her head resulting in a one and a half inch laceration causing Johnson to bleed. Although Ms. Crandall's testimony is somewhat disjointed as to precise time sequence, it is credible. In making the foregoing finding, the testimony of Linda Oram, nurse's aid, has not been overlooked. Ms. Oram testified upon behalf of the Respondent that when she first saw Lorene Johnson, witness Oram was with Respondent near the nurse's station and that patient Johnson came out of her room and was already bleeding. Ms. Oram stated she did not see how Ms. Johnson received her injuries nor did she see Respondent batter Ms. Johnson. Ms. Oram helped Respondent put Johnson back to bed but did not relate that Johnson had her shoes in her hand or that she resisted Oram and Respondent. Ms. Gram carefully explained that she was not present with Respondent all the time prior to putting Johnson back to bed and all the time afterwards. This evidence of Ms. Gram is not contradictory of Ms. Crandall's testimony. Moreover, there is the testimony of patient Lucille Diel that she subsequently heard Respondent telling Ms. Johnson "I didn't mean it," and the testimony of Pam Warner that Respondent told Warner that Lorene Johnson "just kept hitting me and hitting me. She was trying to kill me." Both Oram and Respondent confirm that Respondent applied a band-aid to Johnson's head injury when the two entered the room together despite profuse bleeding. Respondent's witness Oram is a recovering alcoholic and friend of Respondent who is also a recovering alcoholic. Her initial impression of Respondent's behavior was that Respondent was intoxicated and she stated this impression to a number of other witnesses on May 6, 1986. Her testimony at formal hearing did not contradict this initial impression but was expanded to include her belief that Respondent might also have been distressed on May 6 due a fight with Respondent's boyfriend. Oram felt Respondent was not in a condition to work. Jeanette Crandall was familiar with intoxicated people and testified that Respondent was drunk when she hit Johnson. Linda Ciekot, the licensed practical nurse who came on to relieve Respondent at 6:50 a.m. for the beginning of the 7:00 a.m. May 6, 1986 shift found Respondent with her head down on the desk, sweating profusely and responding to questions with slurred speech. She observed Respondent at that time to have glassy eyes, a staggering gait and to smell of alcohol. Ciekot formed the impression Respondent was very intoxicated. At this time several witnesses observed that the medicine cart and medicine Room in Respondent's charge were both unlocked and the cart was messy with doors turned out, all contrary to standard requirements. Respondent acknowledged that she frequently leaves the medicine cart unlocked and is reprimanded by her superiors for it. Pam Warner, a licensed practical nurse was summoned by Ciekot to attend patient Johnson. By that time, Johnson was in the atrium near the nurse's station and still bleeding from her wound. Pam Warner observed that Respondent had slurred speech and was loud and disheveled; she observed no alcohol odor on Respondent in the atrium. Arlene McClellan, a registered nurse coming on the new shift as charge nurse on Respondent's wing, described Respondent at this time as having glassy eyes, a wandering gaze, slurred speech and talking loudly. McClellan smelled alcohol on Respondent's person when she spoke with her privately in the small closed medicine room. These observations by persons familiar with the appearance and behavior of intoxicated persons are consistent with Respondent's being under the influence of alcohol while on duty and it is found that she was under the influence of alcohol while on duty. In making the immediately foregoing finding, Respondent's testimony has not been overlooked. She testified that her distraught condition was due to a violent fight she had had with her boyfriend just before coming to work at 11:00 p.m. May 5 and because of his telephoned threats against herself and her dog during the shift. Respondent maintained she was staggering due to skinned knees incurred May 5 when the boyfriend had dragged her across a parking lot. Her evidence of skinned knees and a series of phone calls and emotional upsets through the shift are corroborated by the observations of Leslie Martinez, another licensed practical nurse who saw Respondent approximately every two hours through the shift up until 4:00 a.m. However, Martinez stated that Respondent seemed herself until 4:00 a.m. when Martinez observed Respondent with a Betadine-stained uniform, messy nurse's station, unlocked medicine cart and medicine room, and slurred speech. Martinez' description is similar to that of other witnesses at approximately 6:30 a.m. It strains credulity to accept Respondent's version that so many medical personalities who are experienced with intoxicated persons could have confused the odors of imbibed apple juice and spilled Betadine (an iodine-based solution) with the odor of imbibed alcohol or confused the symptoms of acute emotional distress with the symptoms of being under the influence of alcohol. Her explanation is rejected. Despite elaborate speculation by Arlene McClellan based on uncorroborated hearsay, Petitioner did not establish by any competent direct evidence that any drugs were missing from the medicine cart or room or that any were ingested by Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent be suspended for a period of three years with leave to reapply after one year upon a showing to the Board of Nursing that her alcoholism is under control, that she is rehabilitated, and that she is fit to practice nursing. DONE and Ordered this 26th day of January, 1987 in Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of January, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2) F.S. upon Petitioner's proposed findings of fact (FOF): Accepted FOF 1. Accepted FOF 2. Accepted but not adopted as subordinate and unnecessary. Accepted but not adopted as subordinate and unnecessary. Accepted FOF 3. Accepted FOF 3. Accepted but not adopted as subordinate and unnecessary. Accepted FOF 5. Those portions supported by the record as a whole are accepted in FOF What is rejected is rejected as speculative, without predicate, and as not supported by the record as a whole. Accepted as FOF 5. Accepted that Respondent testified to this but rejected as a finding of fact as not supported by the record as a whole. Rejected as irrelevant what anyone observed concerning Respondent 10 hours after the incident at a time when she was off duty. Accepted but irrelevant for the reasons stated above. Accepted but irrelevant for the reasons stated above. Accepted FOF 5. Accepted FOF 5. Accepted FOF 5. Accepted FOF 3. Rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2) F.S. upon Respondent's proposed findings of fact (FOF): 1. Respondent has presented no additional argument as to why Petitioner should not have been permitted to reopen its case to present evidence of licensure. The reopening of the Petitioner's case was permitted upon authority of Dees v. State 357 So.2d 491 and Jones v. State 392 So 2d 18. Since Respondent has not availed herself of further argument on that issue in her post hearing proposals, that ruling on the record is reiterated here and the record therefore contains evidence to support licensure of Respondent by Petitioner. Rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2) F.S. upon Respondent's alternative proposed findings of fact (FOF): Accepted FOF 1. Accepted but not adopted as not determinative of any issue at bar (See FOF 5). Accepted but not adopted as not determinative of any issue at bar (See FOF 5). Accepted but not adopted as not determinative of any issue at bar (See FOF 5). Rejected as not supported by the record. Rejected as not supported by the record. Mrs. Crandall is unclear about whether Mrs. Oram was present or came in later from behind her. Mrs. Oram was not with Respondent at all times prior to going into the room with her. It would appear Ms. Johnson wandered on several occasions that night and Mrs. Crandall is clear Mrs. Oram was not assisting Respondent when the blow was struck. Accepted FOF 3. Accepted FOF 3. Accepted FOF 3. Rejected as not supported by the record as a whole and upon the lack of credibility of the Respondent. Rejected as not supported by the record as a whole and upon the lack of credibility of the Respondent. Rejected. Observation of Petitioner's Exhibits 1 and 2 suggests this type of injury is consistent with the sandal used. Rejected as not supported by the record as a whole. Accepted but not adopted as not determinative of any issue at bar. (See FOF 5) Accepted FOF 6. COPIES FURNISHED: John Namey, Esquire 22 East Pine Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Francisco Colon, Jr., Esquire 1 North Orange Avenue Suite 500 Orlando, Florida 32801
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaints? If so, what disciplinary action should be taken against him?
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: The Parties The Agency is a state government licensing and regulatory agency. Respondent is now, and has been since August 27, 1971, a physician licensed to practice medicine in the State of Florida. He holds license number ME 0018306. Respondent previously faced charges of professional misconduct in DPR Case No. 89-0925. In that case, Respondent was charged with practicing medicine with an inactive license from on or about January 1, 1984, until on or about November 22, 1989. The matter was resolved by the parties entering into a settlement stipulation, which was approved by the Board of Medicine in a final order entered August 13, 1990. Under the terms of the agreement, Respondent, without admitting his guilt, agreed to pay a $500.00 administrative fine and not to "in the future violate Chapters 455, 458 and 893, Florida Statutes, or the rules promulgated pursuant thereto." Facts Relating to Case No. 93-2640/Administrative Complaint #1 From on or about February 8, 1991, to March 24, 1991, patient R.D., a 43 year old male who had tested positive for the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), was hospitalized at North Florida Reception Medical Center Hospital (hereinafter referred to as "MCH"). During his hospitalization, R.D. received treatment for advanced Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) and related complications. Elizabeth Mutch, M.D., was R.D.'s attending physician at MCH. R.D. was experiencing difficulty in swallowing oral medications due to multiple ulcerations in his mouth secondary to an uncontrolled Herpes Virus. On or about March 16, 1991, Dr. Mutch determined that R.D. would benefit from intravenous medications through a central venous line. She therefore wrote an order for "central venous line placement Monday 3/18." In another written order, she directed that "IV fluids [be held] until central venous line in place." Both orders were dated March 16, 1991. In her progress notes for March 16, 1991, Dr. Mutch indicated "Central line ASAP." In the middle of March of 1991, Respondent was the acting medical director of MCH. In addition to his duties as acting medical director, he was on the staff of the hospital's internal medicine department. Respondent was the only internist on staff at the hospital with any significant experience in central line placements of the type ordered by Dr. Mutch, although there was a surgeon affiliated with the hospital, a Dr. Capliwski, who had such experience and in fact performed most of the placements needed by patients at the hospital. Sometime after she wrote the order for central venous line placement for R.D., Dr. Mutch verbally requested Respondent to attempt such placement at his earliest possible convenience. On March 18, 1991, Respondent made approximately five unsuccessful attempts to place a subclavian venous line in R.D., the first of which yielded air, indicating that R.D.'s lung had been punctured. Following these unsuccessful placement attempts, Respondent ordered a chest x-ray for R.D. The x-ray taken revealed no evidence of pulmonary distress. Respondent's progress notes for March 18, 1991, do not reflect that he ordered a surgical consultation that day after his placement attempts failed. The next two or three days Respondent was out of town on hospital business in his capacity as the hospital's acting medical director. Respondent reasonably assumed that, in his absence from the hospital, Dr. Mutch would ask Dr. Capliwski to try to perform the central venous line placement that she had initially requested Respondent to attempt. Upon his return to the hospital, Respondent learned that no such attempt had been made. Respondent therefore again made several attempts at central venous line placement. Placement was attempted via R.D.'s jugular vein. While the approach was different, the results were the same. Respondent was unable to accomplish his objective. Following this second series of unsuccessful placement attempts, Respondent ordered another chest x-ray for R.D. On March 24, 1991, at approximately 1:00 a.m., R.D. began to have difficulty breathing. He also had a rapid heart rate, a pulse rate of 140, a respiratory rate of 30, and a temperature of 103.3. degrees. Respondent was the "on call" physician. He was at home, approximately 35 miles away from the hospital. The duty nurse telephoned Respondent and spoke with him about R.D. 3/ Respondent instructed the nurse to give R.D. Tylenol and to make sure that he was receiving oxygen. He did not suggest that R.D. be seen by Dr. Chandler, the physician manning MCH's emergency room. By 9:15 p.m. that same day, R.D.'s condition had further deteriorated. His respiratory rate had increased to 40. The duty nurse again telephoned Respondent at home and informed him of R.D.'s deteriorating condition. This time Respondent directed that R.D. be immediately evaluated by Dr. Chandler. In accordance with Respondent's directive, Dr. Chandler was contacted. He ordered a chest x-ray for R.D. The x-ray revealed a 50 percent pneumothorax with right mediastinal shift. Dr. Chandler therefore performed an emergency thoracotomy. Arrangements were then made to transfer R.D. to Lake Shore Hospital. At approximately 10:10 p.m. on March 24, 1991, shortly after he was placed in the ambulance that was to transport him to Lake Shore Hospital, R.D. experienced respiratory arrest and expired. An autopsy was performed by Carolyn Hopkins, M.D., of the local Medical Examiner's Office. The autopsy report prepared by Dr. Hopkins lists "complications of acquire[d] immunodeficiency syndrome" as the cause of death. More specifically, Respondent died as a result of a tension pneumothorax. Facts Relating to Case No. 93-2683/Administrative Complaint #2 Counts 1 and 2 Respondent's license to practice medicine in the State of Florida was inactive due to non-renewal from on or about December 31, 1983, until approximately November of 1989. Respondent engaged in the practice of medicine at Cypress Medical and Professional Centre (hereinafter referred to as the "Centre") in Winter Haven, Florida, during a portion of the period that his medical license was inactive. On or about September 12, 1989, Respondent entered a plea of nolo contendere to the criminal offense of referring a patient to a business entity without disclosure of financial interest, in violation of Section 458.327(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1989). It was stipulated by Respondent and the prosecutor at the time of the entry of the plea that the crime to which Respondent pled was a lesser included offense of the crime of practicing medicine without a license. On or about October 25, 1989, adjudication of guilt was withheld and Respondent was ordered to pay a $500.00 fine. Counts 3, 4 and 5 On January 20, 1989, patient M.L. went to the Centre complaining, among other things, of chronic headaches. M.L. was first seen by a chiropractor at the Centre, who referred her "to M.D. for complete detailed neurologic-orthopedic exam." On January 24, 1989, M.L. was examined by Respondent at the Centre. The records maintained at the Centre reflect that, during this initial examination, Respondent explored the history and possible etiology of M.L.'s chronic headaches. The entries made on the Progress Notes and Patient Control Sheet maintained at the Centre (11 of which apparently were made by, or at the direction of, Respondent) reflect that M.L. visited the Centre on 21 different occasions. Bills from the Centre for 20 of these 21 visits were signed by Respondent. 4/ The Progress Notes and Patient Control Sheet do not reflect that Respondent saw M.L. on all 20 visits covered by these bills. Facts Relating to Case No. 94-0234/Administrative Complaint #3 On November 22, 1989, patient A.M.D., a 40-year old female, presented to the emergency room at Polk General Hospital (hereinafter referred to as "PGH") in Bartow, Florida, with complaints of a high fever, abdominal pain, vomiting and coughing. An examination revealed that she had rapid pulse and respiration rates. It was further observed that she had a flushed face and epigastric tenderness. A.M.D. was treated in the PGH emergency room with, among other things, an antibiotic, vibramyacin, for which she was also given a prescription. She was then discharged. A.M.D. returned to the PGH emergency room on November 23, 1989, with symptoms similar to those with which she had presented the previous day. She was again treated and discharged. Records of these two emergency room visits were made and kept by the hospital. A.M.D. paid a third visit to the PGH emergency room on November 24, 1989, with symptoms similar to those she had exhibited during her first two visits. On this occasion, she was admitted to PGH in the care of Respondent. She remained in Respondent's care throughout her entire stay at the hospital. As her attending physician, it was incumbent upon Respondent to review the records of A.M.D.'s prior two emergency room visits. Upon A.M.D.'s admission to the hospital, Respondent failed to order multiple blood cultures, notwithstanding that, as Respondent should have known, Respondent was already on an antibiotic. A single blood culture is insufficient to properly diagnose the condition of such a patient. Respondent's initial diagnosis of A.M.D., made without the benefit of results of multiple blood cultures, was undetermined gastrointestinal problems. A.M.D. was treated with, among other things, antibiotics. Although A.M.D. still had a high fever following the first several days of her hospitalization and the diagnosis of her condition remained obscure, Respondent did not attempt to obtain a consultation with an infectious disease specialist, 5/ nor did he order that A.M.D.'s treatment plan be modified to include intravenous administration of high dosages of at least two different broad spectrum, latest generation antibiotics. A.M.D. continued to run a fever until December 4, 1989, after which her condition slightly improved. Even though a blood culture had indicated that A.M.D. had a staphylococcal infection, Respondent nonetheless ordered that the intravenous administration of antibiotics be discontinued because A.M.B. had been afebrile for a few days. Thereafter, A.M.D.'s condition quickly deteriorated. She suffered congestive hear failure, but Respondent did not seek to obtain a consultation with a cardiologist. On December 11, 1989, 17 days after she had been admitted to the hospital, A.M.D. expired. At the time of her death she was not on antibiotics. This was a factor which contributed to her demise. Respondent's final primary diagnosis of A.M.D. was toxemic shock, protracted. His secondary diagnoses included: staphylococcal septicemia, acute; cholelithiasis, chronic; and pneumonitis, subacute, staphylococcal. In not doing the following while A.M.D. was hospitalized at PGH and under his care, Respondent failed to practice medicine with that level of care, skill and treatment that, in light of the surrounding circumstances, a reasonably prudent internist would have recognized as being acceptable and appropriate at the time: ordering multiple blood cultures upon A.M.D.'s admission to the hospital in order to properly assess her condition; attempting to seek a consultation with an infectious disease specialist and ordering that A.M.D.'s treatment plan be modified to include intravenous administration of high dosages of at least two different broad spectrum, latest generation antibiotics when A.M.D. still had a high fever following the first several days of her hospitalization and the diagnosis of her condition remained obscure; seeking to obtain a consultation with a cardiologist when A.M.D. suffered congestive heart failure; and appropriately treating A.M.D. with antibiotics throughout the time she was under his care, including the period following the brief improvement in her condition and reduction of her temperature to normal. Facts Relating to Case No. 94-0235/Administrative Complaint #4 On or about August 17, 1992, patient A.A., a 69 year old male, presented to Respondent at Preferred Quality Medical Care in Plantation, Florida with complaints of shortness of breath and nocturia (two to three times a night). A.A. provided Respondent with a written medical history, which revealed, among other things, that he was a heavy smoker. During his physical examination of A.A., Respondent observed and noted in his written record of the examination, among other things, inspiratory wheezes, prolonged expiration, shortness of breath and that A.A. gave the appearance of being chronically ill. Respondent diagnosed A.A.'s condition as C.O.P.D. (chronic obstructive pulmonary disease) and what Respondent termed "tobaccism," which is a nonstandard diagnosis. Respondent ordered an EKG, spirometry, urinalysis and blood tests. He failed to order a chest x-ray, notwithstanding that A.A. had indicated he was a heavy smoker and that Respondent's examination had revealed that A.A. had shortness of breath and that he had the appearance of someone who was chronically ill. Under such circumstances, it was quite possible that A.A. was suffering from C.O.P.D., as Respondent had opined. There were other possibilities, however, such as cancer, 6/ tuberculosis, pneumonia and congestive heart failure. In order to fully investigate these other possibilities, it was necessary for Respondent to order a chest x-ray. On or about September 11, 1992, A.A. returned to Respondent complaining of intermittent coughing spells. Respondent examined A.A. and observed prolonged wheezing. Respondent diagnosed A.A.'s condition as C.O.P.D. and hypertensive disease and treated him with bronchodilators. Although a diagnosis of hypertensive disease requires a baseline chest x-ray as part of the initial evaluation, Respondent made his diagnosis without the benefit of such an x-ray. A.A. next visited Respondent on October 19, 1992, complaining of extreme nervousness and inability to sleep. Respondent found that A.A. was expectorating large amounts of mucus. Respondent treated A.A. with Sinequan, which is an antidepressant that helps with sleep. Once again Respondent failed to order a chest x-ray. A.A. returned to Respondent on November 23, 1992, complaining of shortness of breath and nocturia. Respondent examined A.A. and discovered a soft mass in the supraclavicular area. He also noted that A.A. had a heart murmur. Respondent finally ordered a chest x-ray. The x-ray revealed pleural effusion. Subsequent testing detected inoperable cancer, which led to A.A.'s death on May 9, 1993. In waiting until A.A.'s fourth visit before ordering a chest x-ray and, as a result, not making an earlier diagnosis of A.A.'s cancer, Respondent failed to practice medicine with that level of care, skill and treatment that, in light of the surrounding circumstances, a reasonably prudent internist would have recognized as being acceptable and appropriate at the time.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby recommended that the Board enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of the violations of subsection (1) of Section 458.331, Florida Statutes, noted above, dismissing the remaining allegations against him and disciplining him for the violations he committed by suspending his license for a period of eighteen months, placing him on probation for the following five years, and imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $4,000.00. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 15th day of November, 1994. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of November, 1994.
Findings Of Fact The facts, as stipulated to by the parties and as set forth above, are hereby adopted.
Findings Of Fact By application dated September 28, 1988 respondent/applicant, Southwest Florida Regional Medical Center, Inc. (SFRMC), filed an application with respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), seeking the issuance of a certificate of need (CON) authorizing the expenditure of approximately $19.98 million to construct a new three story clinical and ancillary services building at its facility located in Fort Myers, Florida. After the application was filed, and certain additional information was provided by SFRMC, HRS issued proposed agency action in the form of a letter on January 13, 1989 advising that it intended to issue SFRMC a CON. On February 3, 1989, HRS published in the Florida Administrative Weekly a notice of its intent to grant the CON. After learning of this action, petitioner, Lee Memorial Hospital (Lee), filed a petition for formal administrative hearing seeking to contest the proposed agency action. That prompted this proceeding. The state agency action report, which is a part of this record, reflects that the applicant proposes to: ... add 4 additional operating rooms to the existing 11; 16 new cardiac surgery recovery beds to the existing 16; and 8 new CCU beds to the existing 8 (by conversion of med/surg beds) in a new three story building that will be a replacement/expansion to the existing facility. The requested project will not constitute an increase in the licensed beds of the applicant's facility. The proposal does not request approval of any new services or change in the total number of beds that are licensed for the applicant's facility, but it does include redesignation of 8 existing medical/surgical beds to add to the 8 additional CCU beds requested. New space for Central Supply Services, as well (as) new and additional administrative, staff support areas, land public areas have been planned. (Emphasis added) These changes were sought by SFRMC to meet "(t)he need and demand for Cardiac services (that have) increased dramatically over the last seven years due to the community's growth, technological advancements and changing clinical practices." According to the allegations in the petition, Lee operates a health care facility in Fort Myers, Florida, which is in the same health planning district as SFRMC. The petition goes on to aver that Lee provides a wide range of medical services and programs, including cardiac surgery and recovery, cardiac catheterization laboratories, CCU, and non-invasive diagnostic cardiology services as proposed in SFRMC's application. The petition alleges further that, due to the sheer size of the project and the "substantial change" in services that will occur, Lee is entitled to a hearing. Based upon these considerations, Lee alleges that its open heart surgery program will be substantially affected if the CON is issued. HRS has authorized Lee to operate an open heart surgery program. However, by stipulation dated March 28, 1988 in DOAH Case No. 87-4755, it has agreed not to begin this program until at least April 1, 1990. If approved, SFRMC's building addition would not be completed until May 1, 1990, or one month after Lee's program begins. The application reflects that SFRMC will increase its total square footage by 25%, operating room capacity by 57%, and SICU capacity by 64%. In all, the project will add approximately 68,000 square feet to the facility complex. In addition, operating expenses associated with the project will total in excess of $28 million per year. Finally, utilization of existing facilities will be enhanced by the new addition.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Southwest Florida Regional Medical Center's motion to dismiss the petition of Lee Memorial Hospital be GRANTED and that Lee's petition for formal administrative hearing be dismissed with prejudice. DONE AND ORDERED this 27th day of April, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of April, 1989.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Barbara Barlow, is a licensed practical nurse holding License No. 41347-1 issued by the Florida State Board of Nursing. During the month of November, 1978, Respondent was employed as a licensed practical nurse at West Florida Hospital, Pensacola, Florida. Prior to November, 1978, Respondent underwent a formal orientation program given by the hospital, which program included medication procedures for West Florida Hospital. Subsequent to that formal orientation program, Respondent received additional orientation with respect to medication procedures from Carrie Miller, an experienced licensed practical nurse working at West Florida Hospital on the same shift as the Respondent. Respondent was additionally counseled by Beverly Everitt, Respondent's head nurse, regarding medication procedures. Respondent's explanation for the errors alleged in Paragraphs 1(c) and 1(d) of the Administrative Complaint was vague and uncorroborated by either live testimony or the patients' medical records, which were received into evidence. Further, Respondent's explanation failed to withstand cross-examination. Respondent was terminated from her position at West Florida Hospital for having committed an excessive number of medication errors.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Board enter its final order finding Respondent, Barbara Barlow, guilty of unprofessional conduct based upon each and every allegation contained in the Administrative Complaint and placing the license of Respondent to practice nursing in the State of Florida on probation for a period of one year with the specific term and condition of said probation being that Respondent, during the period of probation, enroll in and successfully complete a course in the administration of and charting of medications by a nurse. RECOMMENDED this 20th day of May, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Julius Finegold, Esquire 1107 Blackstone Building 223 West Bay Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Joseph L. Hammons, Esquire 412 West Gregory Street Pensacola, Florida 32501 Ms. Barbara Barlow Route 2, Box 129 Milton, Florida 32570 Ms. Geraldine B. Johnson, R.N. Supervisor I, Office of Investigations Region II Florida State Board of Nursing 111 East Coastline Drive Jacksonville, Florida 32292 Ms. Nancy Kelley Wittenberg, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301
