Conclusions Having reviewed the administrative complaint dated June 12, 2009, and Notice of Intent dated July 9, 2009, attached hereto and incorporated herein (Ex. 1 and 2), and all other matters of record, the Agency for Health Care Administration (“Agency”) has entered into a Settlement Agreement (Ex. 3) with the other party to these proceedings, and being otherwise well- advised in the premises, finds and concludes as follows: 1 Filed November 20, 2009 10:37 AM Division of Administrative Hearings. ORDERED: 1. The attached Settlement Agreement is approved and adopted as part of this Final Order, and the parties are directed to comply with the terms of the Settlement Agreement. 2. The administrative fine against the Respondent in AHCA Case No. 2009001632 is withdrawn. 3. The Respondent's abortion clinic license is cancelled. 4. The initial application seeking laboratory licensure in Case No. 2009007700 is withdrawn. 5. The Respondent's request for formal hearing is dismissed. 6. Each party shall bear its own costs and attorney’s fees. 7. The above-styled cases are hereby closed. DONE and ORDERED this _// day of hover Ake , 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. El . Arnold, Secretary Y t Health Care Administration Thomas Agenc A PARTY WHO IS ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS FINAL ORDER IS ENTITLED TO JUDICIAL REVIEW WHICH SHALL BE INSTITUTED BY FILING ONE COPY OF A NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THE AGENCY CLERK OF AHCA, AND A SECOND COPY, ALONG WITH FILING FEE AS PRESCRIBED BY LAW, WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL IN THE APPELLATE DISTRICT WHERE THE AGENCY MAINTAINS ITS HEADQUARTERS OR WHERE A PARTY RESIDES. REVIEW OF PROCEEDINGS SHALL BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FLORIDA APPELLATE RULES. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF RENDITION OF THE ORDER TO BE REVIEWED. Copies furnished to: Jan Mills Facilities Intake Unit Agency for Health Care Admin. (Interoffice Mail) Thomas M. Hoeler, Esquire | Office of the General Counsel Agency for Health Care Admin. (Interoffice Mail) Laura MacLafferty, Unit Manager Hospital and Outpatient Services Unit Agency for Health Care Admin. (Interoffice Mail) Andrew T. Lavin, Esquire Navon & Lavin, P.A. Emerald Park Office Center 2699 Stirling Road, Suite B-100 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33312 (U.S. Mail) Karen Rivera, Unit Manager ‘| Laboratory Unit Agency for Health Care Admin. (Interoffice Mail) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of this Final Order was served on the above-named person(s) and entities by U.S. Mail, or the method designated, on this the /8 day of AGI A , 2009. Richard Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Building #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 (850) 922-5873 Certified Mail Receipt (7003 1010 0000 9715 3702) STATE OF FLORIDA AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION STATE OF FLORIDA, AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, Petitioner, AHCA No.: 2009001632 vs. COMMUNITY HEALTHCARE CENTER OF PENSACOLA, INC., Respondent. ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT COMES NOW the Agency for Health Care Administration (hereinafter “AHCA”), by and through the undersigned counsel, and files this Administrative Complaint. against Community Healthcare Center of Pensacola, Inc. (hereinafter “Community Healthcare Center of Pensacola, Inc.”), pursuant to Section 120.569, and 120.57, Fla. Stat. (2008), alleges: NATURE OF THE ACTION 1. This is an action to impose one (1) administrative fine against Community Healthcare Center of Pensacola, Inc. in the amount of Four Hundred and Thirteen Thousand Dollars ($413.000), based upon one (1) deficiency, pursuant to Section 483.091, Fla. Stat. (2008). EXHIBIT 1. i \ JURISDICTION AND VENUE 2. This Agency has jurisdiction pursuant to 483, Part I and Section 120.569 and 120.57, Fla. Stat. (2008). 3. Venue lies in Escambia County, Pensacola, Florida, pursuant to Section 120.57 Fla. Stat. (2008); Rule 58A-5, Fla. Admin. Code (2008) and Section 28.106.207, Fla. Stat. (2008). PARTIES 4. AHCA, is the regulatory authority responsible for licensure and enforcement of all applicable statutes and rules governing clinical laboratory facilities pursuant to Chapter 483, -Part 1, Fla. Stat. (2008) and Rule 58A-5, Fla. Admin. Code (2008). 5. Community Healthcare Center of Pensacola, Inc. is a for-profit corporation, ABO Group + RH clinical laboratory facility is located at 6770 North Ninth Avenue, Pensacola, Florida 32504. Community Healthcare Center of Pensacola, Inc. is licensed as clinical laboratory facilities license # 800003116; certificate number #60474, effective November 21, 2005 through November 20, 2007. Community Healthcare Center of Pensacola, Inc. was at all times material hereto, licensed facility under the licensing authority of AHCA, and required to comply with all applicable rules, and statutes. COUNTI COMMUNITY HEALTHCARE CENTER OF PENSACOLA, INC. BASED ON RECORD REVIEW, OBSERVATIONS AND INTERVIEW WITH THE FACILITY ADMINISTRATOR ON JANUARY 7, 2009, AT APPROXIMATELY 9:30 A.M., IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE LABORATORY LICENSE AND HAD CONTINUED TO PERFORM LABORATORY TESTING. STATE TAG L001-CLINICAL LABORATORY LICENSE Section 483.091, Fla. Stat. (2007) CLINICAL LABORATORY LICENSE 6. AHCA re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs (1) through (5) as if fully set forth herein. 7. On or about January 7, 2009, AHCA conducted a biennial survey at the Respondent’s facility. AHCA cited the Respondent based on the findings below, to wit: 8. On or about January 7, 2009, based on record review, observation, and interview with the facility administrator on January 7, 2009, at approximately 9:30 a.m., it was determined that the laboratory had not renewed the State of Florida clinical laboratory license and had continued to perform laboratory testing. 9. Review of state licensure records prior to the survey showed that the facility's laboratory license, number 800003116, had expired on November 20, 2007 and there was no pending application. 10. Review of Rh testing, hematocrit testing records, and pregnancy testing records showed documentation of test results for patient testing that had been performed between November 20, 2007 and January 6, 2009. ll. Observation of the Florida Clinical Laboratory license on display in a frame in the laboratory showed that the license had expired on November 20, 2007. 12. The administrator stated that the laboratory did not have a new state clinical laboratory license and did not realize they had not renewed the Florida license. The administrator stated that the facility had not received the renewal letter prior to the expiration of the license and had not received the "failed to renew" letter from the Agency for Health Care Administration following expiration of the license. Plan of Correction must be completed by February 21, 2009. 13. The regulatory provision of the Florida Statutes and Agency Rules (2008), that are pertinent to this alleged violation read as follows: 483.091 Clinical laboratory license A clinical laboratory may not send a specimen drawn within this state to any clinical laboratory outside the staté for examination unless the out-of-state laboratory has obtained a license from the agency. A new license may be secured for thé new location before the actual change, if the contemplated change complies with this part, part II of chapter 408, and the applicable rules. ek 483.221 Administrative fines.— In determining the penalty to be imposed, the Agency must consider, inter alia, the severity of the violation, actions taken by the licensee to correct the violation, any previous violations by licensee, and the financial benefit to the licensee of committing or continuing the violation. * ko ® 408.804 License required; display.— (1) It is unlawful to provide services that require licensure, or operate or maintain a provider that offers or provides services that require licensure, without first obtaining from the agency a license authorizing the provision of such services or the operation or maintenance of such provider. (2) A license must be displayed in a conspicuous place readily visible to clients who enter at the address that appears on the license and is valid only in the hands of the licensee to whom it is issued and may not be sold, assigned, or otherwise transferred, voluntarily or involuntarily. The license is valid only for the licensee, provider, and location for which the license is issued. 408.812 Unlicensed activity.— (3) It is unlawful for any person or entity to own, operate, or maintain an unlicensed provider. If after receiving notification from the agency, such person or entity fails to cease operation and apply for a license under. this part and authorizing statutes, the person or entity shall be subject to penalties as prescribed by authorizing statutes and applicable rules. Each day of continued operation is a separate offense. (5) When a controlling interest or licensee has an interest in more than one provider and fails to license a provider rendering services that require licensure, the agency may revoke all licenses and impose actions under s. 408.814 and a fine of $1,000 per day, unless otherwise specified by authorizing statutes, against each licensee until such time as the appropriate license is obtained for the unlicensed operation. 15. Despite being unlicensed, Respondent continued to conduct laboratory testing and continued to reap the financial benefit of conducting said testing. 16. The violation alleged herein constitutes a deficiency, and warrants a fine of $413,000. 17. The Respondent's history of failing to timely renew its license, coupled with Respondent’s performance of unlicensed clinical laboratory testing resulting in financial gain in the face of Agency notification advising of the expiration of the license and the consequences of unlicensed activity, serve as a basis for the instant action and are, inter alia, a consideration of the Petitioner in determining the penalty sought herein. 18. Unlicensed laboratory testing is testing without Agency oversight and may result in substandard laboratory protocols and results which place the health and welfare of Respondent’s patients in danger. 19. The violation alleged herein constitutes a deficiency, and warrants a fine of $413,000. WHEREFORE, AHCA demands the following relief: 1. Enter factual and legal findings as set forth in the allegations of this administrative complaint. 2. Impose a fine in the amount of $413,000. CLAIM FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, the Petitioner, State of Florida Agency for Health Care Administration requests the following relief: 1. Make factual and legal findings in favor of the Agency on Count I. 2. Impose upon Community Healthcare Center of Pensacola, Inc. an administrative fine in the amount of $413,000 for the violation cited above. 3. Grant such other relief as the court deems is just and proper. Respondent is notified that it has a right to request an administrative hearing pursuant to Section 120.569, Florida Statutes (2008). Specific options for administrative action are set out in the attached Election of Rights (one page) and explained in the attached Explanation of Rights (one page). All requests for hearing shall be made to the Agency for Health Care Administration, and delivered to the Agency for Health Care Administration, Building 3, MSC #3, 2727 Mahan Drive, Tallahassee, Florida 32308; Michael O. Mathis, Senior Attorney. RESPONDENT IS FURTHER NOTIFED THAT THE FAILURE TO REQUEST A HEARING WITHIN 21 DAYS OF RECEIPT OF THIS COMPLAINT WILL REASULT IN AN ADMISSION OF THE FACTS ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT AND THE ENTRY OF A FINAL ORDER BY THE AGENCY. Florida. Michael O. Mathis Fla. Bar. No. 0325570 Counsel of Petitioner, Agency for Health Care Administration . Bldg. 3, MSC #3 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (850) 922-5873 (office) (850) 921-0158 (fax) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE L HEREBY CERTIFY, that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been served by certified mail on pat day of ark , 2009 to Warren Do Taylor, Administrator, Community Healthcare Center of Pensacola, Inc., 6770 North Ninth Avenue, Pensacola, Florida 32504. Michael O. Mathis, Esq. STATE OF FLORIDA : AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINIS: RATION RE: Case Name: COMMUNITY HEALTHCARE CENTER OF PENSACOLA, INC. CASE NO: 2009001632 ELECTION OF RIGHTS This Election of Rights form is attached to a proposed administrative action by the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA). The title may be Notice of Intent to Deny, Notice of Intent to Impose a Late Fee, Notice of Intent to Impose a Late Fine, Administrative Complaint, or some other notice of intended action by AHCA. An Election of Rights must be returned by mail or by fax within 21 days of the day you receive the attached Notice of Intent to Deny, Notice of Intent to Impose a Late Fee, Notice of Intent to Impose a Late Fine, Administrative Complaint or any other proposed action by AHCA. If an election of rights with your selected option is not received by AHCA within twenty-one (21) days from the date you received a notice of proposed action by AHCA, you will have given up your right to contest the Agency’s proposed action and a final order will be issued. PLEASE RETURN YOUR ELECTION OF RIGHTS TO: Agency for Health Care Administration Attention: Agency Clerk 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308. Phone: 850-922-5873 Fax: 850-921-0158. PLEASE SELECT ONLY 1 OF THESE 3 OPTIONS OPTION ONE (1) I admit to the allegations of facts and law contained in the Notice of Intent to Deny, the Notice of Intent to Levy a Late Fee, the Notice of Intent to Levy a Late Fine, the Administrative Complaint, or other notice of intended action by AHCA and I waive my right to object or to have a hearing. | understand that by giving up my right to a hearing, a final order will be issued that adopts the proposed agency action and imposes the penalty, fine or action. OPTION TWO (2) I admit to the allegations of facts contained in the Notice of Intent to Deny, the Notice of Intent to Levy a Late Fee, the Notice of Intent to Levy a Late . Fine, the Administrative Complaint, or other proposed action by AHCA, but I wish to be heard at an informal proceeding (pursuant to Section 120.57(2), Florida Statutes) where I may submit testimony and written evidence to the Agency to show that the proposed administrative action is too severe or that the fine should be reduced. OPTION THREE (3)___ I do dispute the allegations of fact contained in the Notice of Intent to Deny, the Notice of Intent to Levy a Late Fee, the Notice of Intent to Levy a Late Fine, the Administrative Complaint, or other proposed action by AHCA, and I request a formal hearing (pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes (2006) before an Administrative Law Judge appointed by the Division of Administrative Hearings. PLEASE NOTE: Choo ; OPTION THREE (3), by itself, i ‘OT sufficient to obtain a formal hearing. You musi file a written petition in order to obt. «a formal hearing before the ‘Division of Administrative Hearings under Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. It must be received by the Agency Clerk at the address above within 21 days of receipt of this proposed administrative action. The request for formal hearing must conform to the requirements of Rule 28-106.201, Florida Administrative Code, which requires that it contain: 1. The name and address of each agency affected and each agency’s file or identification number, if known; 2. Your name, address, and telephone number, and the name, address, and telephone number of your representative or lawyer, if any; 3. An explanation of how your substantial interests will be affected by the Agency’s proposed action; 4. A statement of when and how you received notice of the Agency’s proposed action; ; 5. A statement of all disputed issues of material fact. If there are none, you must state that there are none; . 6. A concise statement of the ultimate facts alleged, including the specific facts you contend warrant reversal or modification of the Agency’s proposed action; 7. A statement of the specific rules or statutes you claim require reversal or modification of the Agency’s proposed action; and 8. A statement of the relief you are seeking, stating exactly what action you wish the Agency to take with respect to its proposed action. Mediation under Section 120.573, Florida Statutes, may be available in this matter if the Agency agrees. Facility type: (ALF? nursing home? medical equipment? Other type?) Facility Name: License number: Contact person(or attorney or representative): Name Title Address: ; Street and number City Zip Code Telephone No. ; Fax No. Email Signed: Date: NOTE: If your facility is owned or operated by a business entity (corporation, LLC, etc.) please include a written statement from one of the officers or managers that you are the authorized representative. If you are one of the managers or officers, please state which office you hold. ‘Entity name: Name of office you hold: You, your attorney or representative may reply according Subsection 120.54 Florida Statutes (2006) and Rule 28, Florida Administrative Code or you may use this recommended form. Lee teoF 70d FLORIDA AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION RN on T Better Health Care for all Floridians Oana N July 9, 2009 CERTIFIED MAIL / RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED WARREN TAYLOR MD COMMUNITY HEALTHCARE CTR OF PENSACOLA INC LICENSE NUMBER: 800003116 6770 NORTH NINTH AVENUE PENSACOLA, FL 32504-7346 CASE #: 2009007700 NOTICE OF INTENT TO DEEM APPLICATION INCOMPLETE AND WITHDRAWN FROM FURTHER REVIEW Your application for license RENEWAL is deemed incomplete and withdrawn from further consideration pursuant to Section 408.806(3)(b), Florida Statutes, which states that “Requested information omitted from an application for licensure, license renewal, or change of ownership, other than an inspection, must be filed with the agency within 21 days after the agency’s request for omitted information or the application shall be deemed incomplete and shall be withdrawn from further consideration and the fees shall be forfeited’’. You were notified by correspondence dated June 05, 2009 to provide further information addressing identified apparent errors or omissions within twenty-one days from the receipt of the Agency’s correspondence. Our records indicate you received this correspondence by certified mail on June 09, 2009. As this requested information was not timely received by the Agency, your application is deemed incomplete and withdrawn from further consideration. The outstanding issues remaining for licensure are: Failure to submit upon written request: e Health Care Licensing Application Addendum with ownership information in Section 2A. EXPLANATION OF RIGHTS Pursuant to Section 120.569, F.S., you have the right to request an administrative hearing. In order to obtain a formal proceeding before the Division of Administrative Hearings under Section 120.57(1), F.S., your request for an administrative hearing must conform to the requirements in Section 28-106.201, Florida Administrative Code (F.A.C), and must state the material facts you dispute. ECTION AND EXPLANATION OF RIGHTS FORMS. Karen Rivera, Manager — . Laboratory Licensure Unit Certified Article Number 7460 3901 9848 4334 8301 SENDERS. RECORD cc: Agency Clerk, Mail Stop 3 Legal Intake Unit, Mail Stop 3 2727 Mahan Drive,MS#32 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 h EXHIBIT STATE OF FLORIDA AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION STATE OF FLORIDA, AGENCY FOR DOAH No. 09-3585 HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, Petitioner, vs. AHCA No. 2009001632 COMMUNITY HEALTHCARE CENTER OF PENSACOLA, INC., Respondent. COMMUNITY HEALTHCARE CENTER OF PENSACOLA, INC., Petitioner, vs. AHCA No. 2009007700 STATE OF FLORIDA, AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, Respondent. / SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT The State of Florida, Agency for Health Care Administration (“the Agency”), and the licensee/applicant, Community Healthcare Center of Pensacola, Inc. (“the Provider”), pursuant to Section 120.57(4), Florida Statutes, enter into this Settlement Agreement (“Agreement”) and agree as follows: WHEREAS, the Provider is a licensed abortion clinic pursuant to Chapter 408, Part II, Chapter 390, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 59A-9, Florida Administrative Code, and is also an applicant for clinical laboratory licensure pursuant to Chapter 408, Part II, Chapter 483, Part I, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 59A-7, Florida Administrative Code; and WHEREAS, the Agency has jurisdiction by virtue of being the licensiy EXHIBIT Page 1 of 5 authority over the Provider pursuant to the above referenced provisions of law; and WHEREAS, the Agency served an Administrative Complaint dated June 12, 2009, on the Provider; and WHEREAS, the Agency served a Notice of Intent to Deem Application Incomplete and Withdrawn from Further Review (“NOIW”) dated July 9, 2009, on the Provider; and WHEREAS, the parties have agreed that a fair, efficient, and cost effective resolution of this dispute would avoid the expenditure of substantial sums to litigate the dispute; and WHEREAS, the parties have negotiated in good faith and agreed that the best interest of all the parties will be served by a settlement of this proceeding; NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises and recitals herein, the parties intending to be legally bound, agree as follows: 1. All recitals are true and correct, are incorporated into the Agreement and are binding findings of the parties. 2. Upon full execution of this Agreement, the Provider agrees to waive any and all appeals and proceedings to which it may be entitled including, but not limited to, an informal proceeding under Subsection 120.57(2), Florida Statutes, a formal proceeding under Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, appeals under Section 120.68, Florida Statutes; and declaratory and all writs of relief in any court or quasi-court (DOAH) of competent jurisdiction; and agrees to waive compliance with the form of the Final Order (findings of fact and conclusions of law) to which it may be entitled, provided, however, that no agreement herein shall be deemed a waiver by either party of its right to judicial enforcement of this Agreement. 3. Upon full execution of this Agreement, the Agency agrees to voluntarily dismiss the Administrative Complaint against the Provider with prejudice foregoing the administrative fine sought to be imposed against the Provider in its entirety, and the Provider agrees to: (1) the Page 2 of 5 voluntarily relinquishment of its abortion clinic license (License No. 821) and closure of the abortion clinic effective on or before October 31, 2009, (2) the surrender of the license certificate to the Agency at “Hospital and Outpatient Unit, Agency for Health Care Administration, 2727 Mahan Drive, MS #31, Tallahassee, Florida 32308” immediately upon the discontinuance of the operation of its clinic, (3) the withdrawal of its petition for formal hearing with regard to the pending Administrative Complaint, and (4) the withdrawal of its initial application for clinical laboratory licensure which is the subject of the NOIW. As part of the closure of its clinic, the Provider recognizes that it must comply with all statutes and rules regarding its closure, including but not limited to, Section 408.810 and Section 456.057, Florida Statutes. Until the license is voluntarily relinquished, the Provider recognizes that it must comply with all statutes and rules required by its licensure, including but not limited to, the reporting requirements under Section 390.0112, Florida Statutes, and Rule 59A-9.034, Florida Administrative Code. The Provider agrees to submit a final report for the final month or partial final month of operation, and if unable to do so through the Agency’s on-line system, may do so by United States mail at the above-referenced address. 4. Venue for any action brought to interpret, enforce or challenge the terms of this Agreement and its corresponding Final Order shall lie solely in the Circuit Court of Florida, in and for Leon County, Florida. 5. By executing this Agreement, the Provider does not admit the allegations raised in the Administrative Complaint and NOIW, but recognizes that the Agency continues in good faith to assert these allegations. 6. Upon full execution of this Agreement, the Agency shall enter a Final Order adopting and incorporating the terms of this Agreement and closing the above-styled cases. 7. Each party shall bear its own costs and attorney’s fees. Page 3 of 5 8. This Agreement shall become effective on the date upon which it is fully executed by all parties. 9. The Provider, for itself and any controlling interests, parent corporations, subsidiary corporations, successors, transferees, and any related entities, discharges the State of Florida, Agency for Health Care Administration, and its agents, representatives, and attorneys of and from all claims, demands, actions, causes of action, suits, damages, losses, and expenses, of any and every nature whatsoever, arising out of or in any way related to this matter and the Agency’s actions, including, but not limited to, any claims that were or may be asserted in any federal court, state court or administrative forum, including any claims arising out of this Agreement, by or on behalf of the Provider. 10. This Agreement is binding upon all parties and those identified in the above paragraph of this Agreement. 11. In the event that the Provider was a Medicaid provider at the time of the occurrences alleged in the administrative complaint, this Agreement does not prevent the Agency from seeking Medicaid overpayments related to the subject issues or from imposing any further sanctions pursuant to Rule 59G-9.070, Florida Administrative Code. 12, The undersigned have read and understand this Agreement and have the authority to bind their respective principals to it. The Provider’s representative has the legal capacity to execute the Agreement and has consulted with independent counsel. The Provider understands that counsel for the Agency represents solely the Agency and that counsel for the Agency has not provided any legal advice to, or influenced, the Provider in its decision to enter into the Agreement. 13. This Agreement contains and incorporates the entire understandings of the parties. This Agreement supersedes any prior oral or written agreements between the parties. This Page 4 of 5 Agreement may not be amended or supplemented except in writing. Any attempted assignment of this Agreement shall be void. 14. All parties agree that a facsimile signature suffices for an original signature. The following representatives acknowledge that they are duly authorized to enter into this Agreement. Elizabeth Deputy Se Agency for Health Care Administration Community Healthcare Center of Pensacola 2727 Mahan Drive, Bldg. #1 6770 North Ninth Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Pensacola, Florida 32504 DATED: Mf 7 2007 DATED: w\ | 04 COoUNAL 0 Grmun Reronice ht or nn : . Andrew T. Lavin, Esquj Office of the General Counsel Navon & Lavin, P.A. Agency for Health Care Administration Emerald Park Office Center 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop #3 2699 Stirling Road, Suite B-100 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33312 DATED: u/ 19]04 DATED: “4 Thomas M. Hoeler, Senior Attorney Office of the General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop #3 Tallahassee, Florig& 32708 DATED: Page 5 of 5
The Issue Whether the Respondent is guilty of unprofessional conduct. Whether her license as a registered nurse, certificate no. 8829 should be suspended or revoked or whether Respondent should be put on probation.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Christine Richter, who holds license no. 88294-2 was employed as a registered nurse at Tallahassee Memorial Hospital, Tallahassee, Florida, during the month of February, 1977. She worked as a certified nurse and anesthetist under Ann Marie Connors, the chief nurse anesthetist. The chief nurse anesthetist reported to the Associate Executive Director April 11, 1977, that there were gross discrepancies in the narcotics record kept by the Respondent and at that time she presented him with some of the records. On April 12, 1977, Respondent was requested by the Associate Executive Director to report to his office for a conference. Nurse Connors, the chief nurse anesthetist, was also called to be present at that conference. At the conference the Associate Executive Director asked Respondent for an explanation as to the discrepancies between the narcotic and barbiturate administration record and the patient records. In reply the Respondent stated that she needed a hysterectomy and could not afford it. Upon the insistance of the Associate Executive Director that she give an explanation for the discrepancy in the hospital records, she indicated that she needed to improve her charting. She gave no explanation for discrepancies in the narcotics chart which she signed, and indicated that she would resign. The Director stated that he would accept her resignation and she left the conference. The Respondent mailed her written resignation to the Tallahassee Memorial Hospital the following day. The Accreditation Manual for Hospitals, 1976 edition, published by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals "Anesthesia Services" pages 59 through 64 is used as the standard for anesthetic procedure. A department standard book approved by the American Hospital Association and the joint commission on the accreditation of hospitals is required to be read by each employee of the Tallahassee Memorial Hospital as it pertains to the department in which the work is to be performed. The instructions in the department standards book are the same as in the Accreditation Manual for Hospitals as far as anesthesia services is concerned. Medical records of eight patients were introduced into evidence together with Narcotic and Barbiturate Record no. 081291. This shows the date, time, patient's name, room number, doseage, attending physician and administering nurse. The doseage of drugs secured by and signed for by the Respondent, Christine Richter, was more than the records show was administered to the various patients. No accounting was made for the difference between the amounts of drugs secured and the amounts, if any, administered to the patients, although it is the duty of the nurse checking out drugs to account for its use in writing on a form provided for that purpose. The Respondent offered no verbal explanation for the missing drugs when given the opportunity to explain her actions by the Associate Executive Director at Tallahassee Memorial Hospital and her immediate supervisor, Ann Marie Connors, chief nurse anesthetist.
Recommendation Revoke the license of Christine Richter. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of December, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Julius Finegold, Esquire 1005 Blackstone Building 233 East Bay Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Rivers Buford, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box 647 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue This case concerns the issue of whether the Respondent's license as a registered nurse should be suspended, revoked or otherwise disciplined for submitting employment applications which contained false information and for unprofessional conduct in the performance of her duties as a nurse. At the formal hearing the Petitioner called as witnesses Janet Brown, Wilma Green, E. Jean King, Susan Coffin Brennan, Mary Ann Cottrell, and Mary Sheffield. The Respondent testified on her own behalf and was the only witness called by the Respondent. The Petitioner offered and had admitted into evidence, ten exhibits and the Respondent offered and had admitted into evidence, seven exhibits. Counsel for the Petitioner and counsel for the Respondent submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law for consideration by the Hearing Officer. To the extent that those proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law are consistent with the findings made in this order, the proposed findings were adopted by the Hearing Officer. To the extent that the proposed findings and conclusions of law are not consistent with this order, they were considered by the Hearing Officer and rejected as being unsupported by the evidence or unnecessary to the resolution of this cause.
Findings Of Fact The facts set-forth in paragraphs 1 through 4 below were stipulated to by the parties and are found as facts: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was a licensed registered nurse in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 67142-2. Respondent filled out and filed the applications for licensure as a registered nurse, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. Respondent did fill out and file the applications for employment as a nurse, Petitioner's Exhibit Nos. 2 through 9. Respondent did falsify her date of birth, age, and date of graduation from nursing school on her applications for employment as a nurse, Petitioner's Exhibit Nos. 2 through 9. This was done by Respondent on the recommendation of an employment agency initially, and was done in order to obtain employment. On or about April 8, 1982, Respondent filled out and submitted an employment application for work as a nurse to Lakeview Nursing Center. (Petitioner s Exhibit No. 2). The application reflected that Respondent obtained her R.N. degree from Bellevue Hospital in 1948. That information is false. The Respondent received her R.N. degree in 1939. On or about March 11, 1983, Respondent filled out and submitted an employment application for work as a nurse to Leesburg General Hospital, Leesburg, Florida (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3). That application reflects a date of birth of December 24, 1932 and the date June, 1948 as the year Respondent received her nursing degree. This information is false in that Respondent's date of birth is September 29, 1918, and the year she received her nursing degree was June, 1939. On or about January 25, 1982, Respondent filled out and submitted an application for employment as a registered nurse to Sanford Nursing and Convalescent Center, Inc., Sanford, Florida (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4). That application reflected a date of birth of December 24, 1932 and the year 1948 as the year in which Respondent obtained her R.N. degree. The date of birth and year of graduation are false. On or about May 28, 1980, Respondent filled out and submitted an application for employment as Director of Nursing at Orlando Memorial Convalescent Center, Orlando, Florida (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 5). That application reflected that Respondent graduated from Bellevue Hospital School of Nursing in 1948. That information is false in that she graduated in 1939. On or about February 13, 1980, the Respondent filled out and submitted an application for employment as a nurse to Quality Care, a nursing service (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 6). That application contained a false date of birth of December 24, 1932 and a false year of graduation from Bellevue Hospital School of Nursing of 1948. On or about January 23, 1980, Respondent filled out and submitted to the Physician's Registry an application for employment as a nurse (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7). That application reflected an age of 47 and date of birth of January 24, 1932. This information is false. On or about January 8, 1980, the Respondent filled out and submitted an application for employment as a nurse to Medox, Inc. That information reflected a birth date of December 24, 1932 and a year of graduation from Bellevue Hospital as 1948 (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 8). This birthdate and year of graduation are false. On or about January 19, 1978, Respondent filled out and submitted an application for employment as a nurse to Dr. P. Phillips Memorial Nursing Home, Orlando, Florida (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 9). That application reflected an incorrect birthdate of December 24, 1932 and reflected that Respondent attended Bellevue Hospital School of Nursing from 1945 to 1948. Respondent actually attended Bellevue Hospital from 1936 to 1939. During March, 1982, Respondent was employed as a registered nurse at Leesburg Regional Medical Center. Janet Gillespie Brown, also a registered nurse, was assigned to act as Respondent's preceptor during Respondent's orientation at Leesburg Regional Medical Center. As her preceptor Ms. Brown trained as well as supervised Respondent's work during her orientation period. During the time she was employed at Leesburg Regional Medical Center, the Respondent used improper procedures in attempting to insert a foley catheter into a female patient. in cleansing the meatus to remove bacteria the Respondent used a scrubbing technique rather than a wiping technique. This was improper antiseptic technique. The Respondent then attempted to insert the catheter by probing. This also was improper. Upon observing these improper techniques Janet Brown instructed Respondent to make no further attempts to insert the catheter and told her to wait whale she obtained a sterile foley kit which she would insert herself. Respondent did not do as she had been instructed and inserted the catheter after Nurse Brown left the patient's room to obtain the sterile foley kit. After Nurse Brown returned and discovered the catheter had been inserted against her instructions, she went outside the patient's room with Respondent and explained to her that the catheter she inserted was contaminated as a result of the probing. Respondent agreed and explained that she had not performed this procedure for awhile. The ability to properly insert such catheters is a basic nursing skill. No infection resulted from the improper insertion of the catheter by Respondent. Also while employed at Leesburg Regional Medical Center the Respondent failed to properly chart food intake of patients in that she charted each item of food consumed rather than charting percentages of food consumed as she had been instructed. Respondent also failed to properly chart the progress of a stroke patient by failing to chart that the patient had been making attempts to verbally communicate. The Respondent failed to properly organize her time, appeared unable to properly assess patient progress by asking appropriate questions and recording the patient's response, and failed to complete daily assignments such as bed baths and picking up food trays. Respondent did not feel capable of starting an IV (intravenous). Although starting an IV was not considered to be a skill required of Respondent by Leesburg Regional Medical Center, Respondent was unable to change the tubing on an IV and this was a skill expected of her. Respondent was also unable to give accurate counts of the remaining amount of solution in patients' IVs. On one occasion Respondent failed to properly chart the time of the doctor's visit and apparently "switched" the time. Respondent increased the IV flow for a patient as requested by the doctor, but charted the doctor's visit as having occurred later than the time at which she increased the IV. While working at Leesburg Regional Medical Center the Respondent failed to meet the minimal standards of acceptable and prevailing nursing practice. During the first part of February, 1982, Respondent was employed as a relief charge nurse at Sanford Nursing and Convalescent Center, Sanford, Florida. Ms. E. Jean King, R.N. was a charge nurse at Sanford Nursing and Convalescent Center and was assigned to assist in Respondent's orientation. While at Sanford Nursing and Convalescent Center, Respondent was observed by Ms. King to be very confused and very disorganized in her work. She could not remember patients' names and in passing out medications failed to medicate some patients. Then asked whether or not a particular patient had been given medication, Respondent became confused and indicated she could not remember whether or not the medication had been given. In taking a phone order from a doctor the Respondent wrote the wrong order on a sheet of paper and could not then remember what medication had in fact been ordered. This necessitated calling the doctor back and having the order repeated. Respondent also administered medications without first taking the pulse and blood pressure of the patient as required. Respondent required much more supervision than the other nurses under Ms. King's supervision. Respondent's performance and nursing practice at Sanford Nursing and Convalescent Center failed to meet the minimal standards of acceptable and prevailing nursing practice in Florida. On January 12 and January 27, 1980, Respondent as an employee of Medox, Inc., was assigned to Florida Hospital in Orlando, Florida. At the time she reported for work Respondent was informed by Ms. Ann Cottrell, R.N. (Head Nurse in Special Care at Florida Hospital) about what her responsibilities would be during her shift as team leader in the progressive care unit. The duties outlined to Respondent included responsibility for the administration of IV medications, antiequivalent drugs, insulin and any other specific procedures not within the job description of the licensed practical nurses. Respondent was also instructed that she was responsible for ordering IV medications that were to be administered for the next twenty-four (24) hours, that she was to make rounds with the physicians and observe and report the patients' conditions, and that at the end of the shift she was responsible for making certain that all charts were signed off, the doctor's orders were signed off, and any pertinent information included in the nurse's notes. During the course of the day Ms. Cottrell checked back with Respondent several times and asked if she understood her responsibilities and whether she was having any problems. Each time Respondent indicated that she knew what she was doing and had done it many times. During the course of the day the Respondent failed to make a complete report on the patients and as a result, the three to eleven shift was unable to determine what had happened during the day with regard to the patients for which Respondent was responsible. Medications had not been charted properly and many of the notes entered by Respondent were irrelevant to the patient's progress. Respondent also failed to insure that EKG strips for which she was responsible had been read. Ms. Cottrell, a registered nurse, was qualified to express an opinion as to the prevailing standards of nursing practice in Florida. She testified that in her opinion the Respondent was not qualified to work in an acute care area as a nurse and that her performance of her duties at Florida Hospital failed to meet the minimal standards of acceptable nursing practice in the State of Florida. This opinion is accepted by the Hearing Officer.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Respondent's license as a registered nurse be suspended for a period of three (3) months. It is further RECOMMENDED that upon completion of the three-month suspension period, Respondent be placed on probation for a period of one (1) year working only under the supervision of another licensed nurse and upon such other conditions as the Board may specify. DONE and ENTERED this 29 day of August, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARVIN E. CHAVIS Hearing Officer Department of Administration Division of Administrative Hearings Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29 day of August, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Julia P. Forrester, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Arthur Baron, Esquire Attorney at Law 14 East Washington, Ste. 623 Orlando, Florida 32801 Helen P. Keefe, Executive Director Florida Board of Nursing Room 504, 111 East Coast Line Drive Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Frederick Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA or Agency) was entitled to change the rating of Gulf Coast Convalescent Center (Gulf Coast) from Standard to Conditional.
Findings Of Fact Gulf Coast is a nursing home located in Panama City, Florida, which is duly licensed under Chapter 400, Part II, Florida Statutes. AHCA is the state agency which licenses and regulates nursing homes in the state. As such, it is required to evaluate nursing homes in Florida, pursuant to Section 400.23(8), Florida Statutes. AHCA evaluates all Florida nursing homes at least every 15 months and assigns a rating of Standard or Conditional to each licensee. In addition to its regulatory duties under Florida law, the Agency is the state "survey agency" which, on behalf of the federal government, monitors nursing homes which receive Medicaid or Medicare funds. Ms. Bonnie Cile Baxter is employed by AHCA in the Division of Managed Care and Health Quality Assurance, Area Two. She is a registered nurse specialist and a graduate of the Florida State University School of Nursing. She has been a registered nurse for 27 years. She currently conducts surveys of nursing homes as required by state and federal law in AHCA's Area Two. Ms. Baxter visited Gulf Coast while conducting a licensure survey report. The survey began on March 13, 2000, and ended on March 15, 2000. As a result of the survey, a Statement of Deficiencies was issued on March 15, 2000. This report is referred to as a TAG 314. The report alleged Class II deficiencies. A Class II deficiency occurs when the outcome of the resident care directly affects the health, safety, or security of the resident. The TAG 314, set forth on a "2567" form, entered into evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 1, is, in effect, the charging document. The residents to be checked were determined off-site by AHCA, prior to the survey. The information used to make these decisions was provided by the facility. The focus of the survey was pressure sores and nutrition and the four residents who were observed are referred to as Residents 16, 26, 22, and 15. Resident 16 Resident 16 was approximately 75 years of age. Ms. Baxter observed Resident 16 on March 13, 2000 at 9:00 a.m. Ms. Baxter observed that Resident 16 had a stage IV pressure sore. Pressure sores are evaluated in stages, beginning with stage I; a stage IV is the worst stage. A stage IV pressure sore may be open or closed, and it involves more than just the outer skin. A stage IV pressure sore involves severe damage to tissue. When evaluating the treatment of a resident with pressure sores, the evaluator observes the assessment and care plan and determines whether nutritional considerations have been addressed. The plan is evaluated to determine if it is sufficiently aggressive. What is implemented depends on the resident's need and the resident's desire. If the resident is incompetent to determine what care the resident wishes to accept, then a guardian may make the determination. Resident 16 was unable to make cognitive choices. Kimberly Roland, the Special Services Director at Gulf Coast at the time of the survey tried to contact Developmental Services of the Department of Children and Family Services with regard to a care plan for Resident 16 but the Agency asserted that it did not get involved with medical decisions. Ms. Baxter also tried, unsuccessfully, to determine who was authorized to make medical decisions on behalf of Resident 16. Resident 16 had been admitted to Gulf Coast on September 16, 1999. Facility staff noted that Resident 16 was first observed with a stage I pressure ulcer on February 1, 2000. The care plan developed by the facility in the case of Resident 16 did not facially address the pressure sore problem because it lacked specificity. Excellent nutrition serves to prevent pressure sores and to promote their healing. During the period subsequent to February 1, 2000, Resident 16 was without dentures, and this negatively affected her ability to ingest the type of foods which would address Patient 16's nutritional needs. There were discrepancies in Exhibit's 5, 7, and 8. Exhibit 5, which memorialized a one-time visit with a physician from Bay Psychiatric Services on February 12, 2000, indicated that Resident 16 did not exhibit symptoms of tardive dyskinesia, yet Exhibit 7 indicates that Resident 16 could not wear dentures because of involuntary movements related to tarsive dyskenesia on February 23, 2000. Exhibit 8, nurses' notes, indicate the presence of tardive dyskenesia involving movements of the tongue and body on January 27, 2000. Petitioner's Exhibit F demonstrated that Resident 16 had tardive dyskenesia symptoms, which resulted from long-time Mellaril use. The symptoms reported included involuntary movements of the tongue, which precluded the use of dentures. These involuntary movements were present on September 19, 1999. Mr. Gilliland, a licensed practical nurse with many years' experience working in nursing homes, stated he noticed that Resident 16 manifested involuntary movements of the tongue and body in December, 1999. If a person has tardive dyskenesia, it may preclude the utilization of dentures. The disappearance of Resident 16's dentures indicated a deficiency in security procedures but even if Resident 16 had dentures available, Resident 16 could not masticate hard food. Resident 16 had been on a mechanical soft diet prior to January 20, 2000. Subsequently, when Resident 16 no longer had the ability to masticate food, Resident 16 was put on a pureed diet. Resident 16's condition was the subject of an "at risk" meeting by the facility staff on February 15, 2000. Subsequently, Resident 16's nutritional needs were addressed with an enhanced diet. Resident 16 was provided with multi- vitamins and milkshakes twice a day in addition to other food. From February to March 2000, Resident 16 lost weight. The facility staff's efforts to provide Resident 16 with proper nutrition were appropriate under the circumstances. The first pressure sore on Resident 16 was found on February 1, 2000, and it was already a stage II without drainage. On February 18, 2000, the sore had advanced to a stage III and an additional pressure ulcer had formed on Resident 16's hip. This latter ulcer was also a stage II. By February 25, 2000, the ulcer on the hip changed to stage III and there was some draining. Subsequent to the inception of the ulcers, Resident 16 had been placed on a pressure reduction mattress. On March 3, 2000, more frequent turning was ordered by her attending physician. Mr. Gilliland observed that Resident 16 was mentally incapable of decision-making. Mr. Gilliland spent a lot of time with Resident 16. He was emotionally attached to Resident 16 who, to him, ". . . was like a little child." He spent a lot of time with Resident 16, kept Resident 16 clean and dry, and turned her frequently. At the time of the survey, the representatives of the state insisted that Resident 16 be fed through a tube. Dr. Haslam, Resident 16's physician, would not have ordered tube feeding had not the surveyors insisted that it be done. Resident 16 objected when Mr. Gilliland put the feeding tube in her nose. Resident 16 removed the tube. Mr. Gilliland put the tube in three or four times. Each time, Resident 16 removed it. When Dr. Haslam was informed of this, he told Mr. Gilliland that he could discontinue using the feeding tube. Resident 16 ate until two days before she died. When Resident 16 was admitted to Gulf Coast on September 3, 1999, Resident 16 could ambulate with assistance and was incontinent of bladder and bowel. By the time of the survey, Resident 16 could not walk at all and was bladder and bowel incontinent. At the time of the survey, and for several months before the survey, Resident 16 was bowel and bladder incontinent, had impaired mobility, and was an insulin-dependent diabetic. Resident 16 had occlusion of the arteries and veins of her lower extremities, which resulted in poor circulation. These are high-risk conditions for pressure wounds. Resident 26 Resident 26 was admitted to Gulf Coast on June 7, 1998. Resident 26 required extensive care with daily living activities and was approximately 83 years old at the time of the survey. On August 14, 1999, a stage I pressure sore was observed on the coccyx of Resident 26. By August 20, 1999, the pressure sore had become a stage II. By October 1999, the pressure sore on the coccyx had become a stage IV, and pressure sores had developed on the Resident 26's knee and on the left heel. Both of these sores were diagnosed as stage II. By November 11, 1999, the pressure sore on the coccyx was causing pain to Resident 26. It was determined on November 16, 1999, that the wound on the coccyx was infected with methicellin- resistant staphylococcus aureus (MRSA). MRSA is a type of infection that is resistant to antibiotics. It is communicable, and it is imperative that it be controlled. Vancomycin is the antibiotic of choice when treating MRSA. Resident 26 was administered Vancomycin and procedures were instituted to determine its effectiveness. The facility's staff determined that it would be best if a PICC line was installed in Resident 26. A PICC line is a method for administering antibiotics intravenously. In the case of Resident 26, records which tracked the status of the MRSA, were inadequate. Resident 26 refused to allow the PICC line to be placed. There is no indication whether Resident 26 refused Vancomycin administered in some other manner. On November 19, 1999, Dr. Ernest Haslam was notified of Resident 26’s refusal to allow installation of the PICC line. This information was not available at the time of the survey. At the time of the survey there were no documents indicating that the infection was being properly tracked or that there was an adequate treatment plan. The care plan for the treatment of Resident 26's pressure sores addressed providing proper nutrition, which included dietary supplements and pressure-relieving devices. Resident 26 was offered a feeding tube but Resident 26 declined. The implementation of the feeding tube was discussed by Resident 26's doctor with Resident 26's family and together they decided not to use it. The nutrition provided for Resident 26 was acceptable under the circumstances. Resident 26 was, at the time of the survey, and for several months before the survey, incontinent of both bowel and bladder. Resident 26's rheumatoid arthritis was so severe that Resident 26 was required to ingest anti-neoplastic drugs, which can kill cells. Resident 26 was admitted with a diagnosis of failure to thrive. Resident 26 was required to take Prednisone, which can contribute to the formation of pressure sores. Resident 26's albumin level was high, and a high albumin level promotes the formation of pressure sores. Resident 26 had a living will and had provided instructions not to resuscitate and resisted necessary treatment. These factors put Resident 26 at a high risk for pressure sores. Resident 22 Resident 22 was 67 years of age upon admission to Gulf Coast on May 12, 1999. Resident 22 had an open surgical wound on the hip upon admission, along with a fractured hip and gastrointestinal bleeding. Resident 22 also was anemic and had cardiovascular disease. On July 7, 1999, Resident 22 had a stage II pressure sore on the right heel, which had been present on admission. On September 2, 1999, it was noted that the left hip was infected and antibiotics were administered. On October 13, 1999, it was noted that Resident 22 had a stage III pressure sore on the right heel and a stage II open area on the right lateral foot. Poor nutrition was not a contributing factor with regard to Resident 22's pressure sores. On May 29, 1999, bilateral profo boots were prescribed for Resident 22, to be used for positioning of the feet while in bed. Dr. Osama Elshazly ordered the use of the profo boots. The use of profo boots was not included in the plan of care. Dr. Elshazly discontinued the use of the boots on January 1, 2000. There was speculation among the facility staff that the profo boots may have contributed to the pressure sores. Resident 22, at the time of the survey, and for several months before the survey, had pressure sore risk factors of diabetes mellitus, end-stage renal disease, coronary artery disease and arteriosclerosis obliterans. This latter condition means that the circulation in Resident 22's lower extremities was poor. Resident 15 Resident 15 is 87 years of age. Resident 15 was admitted to Gulf Coast on September 13, 1994. Upon admission, Resident 15 had ingrown toenails, a deformed left hammer toe, and other medical conditions involving the feet. Resident 15 required extensive assistance from staff in the activities of daily living and received nutritional support in the form of tube feeding. On December 17, 1999, Resident 15 was admitted to the Bay Medical Center due to a cerebrovascular accident, which is commonly referred to as a "stroke." Resident 15 was returned to Gulf Coast on December 23, 1999. After the cerebrovascular accident, Resident 15 was even less mobile and suffered a decline both mentally and medically. On March 1, 2000, Resident 15 was noted as having a pressure sore on her left bunion. Staff informed Ms. Baxter that they believed it occurred because Resident 15 had limited mobility. Resident 15, at the time of the survey and for several months before the survey, had pressure sore risk factors of bowel and bladder incontinence, congestive heart failure, and peripheral vascular disease. Resident 15 was a noninsulin- dependent diabetic.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order finding Petitioner not guilty of the alleged deficiencies and reinstating Petitioner's license rating to Standard as of March 15, 2000. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of December, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of December, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Christine T. Messana, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Building 3, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Donna H. Stinson, Esquire Broad and Cassel 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 400 Post Office Box 11300 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Building 3, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Julie Gallagher, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Building 3, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Ruben J. King-Shaw, Jr., Director Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Building 3, Suite 3116 Tallahassee, Florida 32308
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against him.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at the final hearing and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent is now, and has been since October 17, 1996, a Florida-licensed registered nurse. He holds license number 3109442. From September 11, 2000, to March 28, 2001, Respondent was employed as a registered nurse by the North Broward Hospital District and assigned to the emergency room at Imperial Point Medical Center (IPMC) in Broward County, Florida. IPMC is a division of the North Broward Hospital District. It serves as a designated Baker Act receiving facility where persons are "brought involuntary[ily] for psychiatric evaluation" and referral. Some of these persons are "dangerous and violent" and have "cause[ed] injuries to the staff of the emergency room." In early 2001, Respondent was involved in two separate incidents in which he mistreated a patient in the emergency room at IPMC. The first incident occurred on or about February 23, 2001. On that day, K. N., a 21-year-old female, was admitted to the emergency room suffering from "acute intoxication." Pursuant to emergency room policy, upon her admittance to the emergency room, K. N. was "completely undressed . . . to make sure that [she was] not hiding any drugs, contraband, weapons, [or other] things of that nature." K. N. was lying, "passed out" and completely naked, on a stretcher in an examining room with Respondent by her side, when one of the hospital's emergency room technicians, Robert Russo, walked into the room to assist Respondent. Respondent greeted Mr. Russo by making the following comments about K. N.: "Look at those tits. Wouldn't you like to get a piece of that?" Mr. Russo left the room to get a hospital gown for Respondent to put on K. N., as Respondent was required to do, in accordance with hospital policy, so as "to preserve [K. N.'s] dignity." Mr. Russo returned with a gown and gave it to Respondent, but Respondent did not put it on K. N. or otherwise use it to try to cover K. N. Respondent, though, did continue making comments about K. N.'s body. Referring to K. N.'s genitals, he remarked to Mr. Russo, "That's sweet," or words to that effect. Feeling "uncomfortable," Mr. Russo left the room. By allowing K. N. to remain completely naked and by making the remarks he did to Mr. Russo about K. N.'s body, Respondent failed to conform to the minimal acceptable standards of prevailing nursing practice. The following month, Respondent was involved in another incident in which he acted inappropriately toward an IPMC emergency room patient. This second incident occurred on March 18, 2001. The patient Respondent mistreated on this day was F. L., a 17-year-old male with a history of drug abuse. F. L. was brought to the IPMC emergency room by the City of Pompano Beach Fire/Rescue at the request of F. L.'s mother, J. L., who accompanied him to the emergency room and remained there for the duration of F. L.'s stay. J. L. had "called 911" after F. L. had come home from a night of drinking and, in her presence, had had a seizure. By the time fire/rescue arrived at their home, F. L. was conscious, and he remained conscious during the ambulance ride to IPMC. J. L. wanted F. L. to be involuntarily committed under the Baker Act. She did not think she would be able to handle his coming back home because he "was on drugs at the time" and she thought that he would "go crazy" if he did not receive treatment. F. L. was aware of his mother's desire. In the past, he had attempted to "fight" (verbally, but not physically) efforts to have him "Baker Acted." F. L. was admitted to the IPMC emergency room at 3:49 a.m. on March 18, 2001. At the time of his admittance, F. L. was conscious, "somewhat calm," and able to stand up and walk "with a wobble" and to speak coherently (although his speech was slurred). He was asked to give a urine sample for a "urine screen," and with the help of his mother, who accompanied him to bathroom "[s]o he wouldn't fall or miss the cup," he complied. F. L. soon became upset and "verbally abusive to the staff" on duty, including Respondent. Respondent decided that F. L. needed to be restrained. With the help of others, including Mr. Russo, Respondent restrained F. L. "with Velcro restraints on the wrists and the ankles." Respondent then requested that F. L. give another urine sample. F. L., in turn, "asked for a urine bottle." Respondent refused F. L.'s request. Instead, he took out a Foley catheter. A Foley catheter is a thin, flexible rubber tube that is threaded through the urethra and into the bladder. It is used to drain urine from the bladder. It should be sterile and lubricated when inserted. F. L. went "totally beserk" when he saw the catheter, letting it be known in no uncertain terms that he did not want to be catherized and again requesting that he be given a "urine bottle." Respondent responded, inappropriately, by "hit[ting] [F. L.] in the face with the catheter numerous times," while telling F. L. two or three times, "I'm going to shove this hose down your dick." This caused F. L., understandably, to become even more loud and boisterous. Respondent enlisted the assistance of three or four others, including Mr. Russo and George Austin, a Wackenhut security officer on patrol at the hospital, to place F. L. in four-point leather restraints (one for each ankle and wrist) on a stretcher in Room 6. 1/ F. L. resisted, but was eventually subdued and restrained on the stretcher. Given F. L.'s out-of-control behavior, placing him in four-point restraints was warranted. After F. L. was restrained on the stretcher, Respondent, against F. L.'s will, inserted the Foley catheter (that he had used to hit F. L. and that was therefore not sterile) in F. L. 2/ Respondent did so in a rough and negligent manner, without using lubricating jelly or any other type of lubrication. Subsequently, while F. L. was still in four-point restraints on the stretcher, he became "more upset, more verbally abusive," and "tried to sit up." Respondent responded, inappropriately, by "grabb[ing] [F. L.] by the neck," "slapp[ing] him back down onto the stretcher," and "choking [F. L.] until [F. L.] was almost blue." Respondent "let go" of F. L. only after an observer intervened. After Respondent stopped choking him, F. L. "asked for his mother." 3/ Respondent responded, again inappropriately, by telling F. L. three times, "I got your mother right here," as he "grabbed his own testicles." 4/ As could be expected, this "further upset" F. L., and he again tried to sit up. Respondent's response was, again, an inappropriate one. He "climbed up on the stretcher," "put his right knee on [F. L.'s] chest," "cover[ed] F. L.'s face" with his left hand, and with his right hand "grabbed" F. L.'s penis and scrotum and "squeeze[d] and twist[ed]." Respondent, without any justification, "squeeze[d] and twist[ed]" F. L.'s penis and scrotum "two or three times" while F. L. was in four-point restraints on the stretcher. On one of these occasions, he told F. L. (as he was "squeeze[ing] and twist[ing]") "something like," "What are you going to do now?" During his encounter with F. L. on March 18, 2001, Respondent used more force against F. L. than was reasonably necessary to properly discharge his nursing duties and to protect himself and those around him. 5/ By physically, and also verbally, abusing F. L., Respondent failed to conform to the minimal acceptable standards of prevailing nursing practice. 6/ When J. L. was finally reunited with her son, she noticed that he had red marks on his face and "bruise[s]" on his extremities. The IPMC emergency room physician who evaluated F. L. determined that there was reason to believe that F. L. was "mentally ill as defined in Section 394.455(18), Florida Statutes" (based upon an "initial diagnosis" of "acute agitation"), and that F. L. otherwise met the "criteria for involuntary examination" under the Baker Act. At approximately 2:45 p.m. on March 18, 2001, F. L. was discharged from IPMC and transferred to Florida Medical Center. Sometime after the March 18, 2001, incident involving F. L., a security officer and nurse working at IPMC expressed to Beverly Gilberti, the nurse/manger of IPMC's emergency room, their "concerns" regarding Respondent's "practice." On March 26, 2001, Ms. Gilberti contacted Gayle Adams, IPMC's human resources specialist, and told her about the security officer's and nurse's "concerns." Ms. Adams began an investigation into the matter. Ms. Gilberti telephoned Respondent and advised him that he was being suspended pending the outcome of an investigation into alleged wrongdoing on his part. Respondent was given "very little information as to what type of complaint[s]" were being investigated. On March 28, 2001, before the investigation had been completed, Respondent telephoned Ms. Adams and "verbally resigned over the phone."
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Board issue a final order in which it dismisses Count Three of the Amended Administrative Complaint, finds Respondent guilty of the violations alleged in Counts One and Two of the Amended Administrative Complaint, and, as punishment for having committed these violations, permanently revokes Respondent's license and requires him to pay a fine in the amount of $1,000.00, as well as the "costs related to the investigation and prosecution of the case." 16/ DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of November, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of November, 2002.
The Issue The issue is whether either respondent bore a relationship to Petitioner, as described in Section 760.10, Florida Statutes, that confers jurisdiction upon the Florida Commission on Human Relations to investigate Petitioner's claims of racial discrimination under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, Sections 760.01-760.11 and 509.092, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner has been a registered nurse licensed in Florida for 14 years. Her specialty is intensive care. Seeking advancement within the profession of nursing, Petitioner decided to pursue certification as a Certified Registered Nurse Anesthetist (CRNA). A CRNA has advanced training and education in anesthesia and passes a national certification examination, which is administered by neither Respondent. Upon passing the examination and meeting other requirements, an applicant is entitled to certification from the Council on Certification of Nurse Anesthetists. After obtaining this certificate and completing other requirements, such as financial responsibility, the applicant is eligible for certification by the Florida Board of Nursing as an advanced registered nurse practitioner in anesthesiology, pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B9-4.002. In Florida, a CRNA is authorized to administer anesthesia in in- and out-patient settings and bears significant responsibilities for the safety of anesthetized patients. Petitioner enrolled at Barry University to fulfill the educational requirements for certification. Barry University is a private institution headquartered in Miami Shores and is one of several institutions in Florida that offer a program to satisfy the educational requirements for CRNA certification. The 28-month program at Barry University leads to a master of science degree in anesthesiology. A major component of the educational program is clinical practice. The clinical practice requires a student to perform clinical responsibilities, under supervision, with an anesthesiology group. At the time in question, Barry University maintained relationships with different anesthesiology groups in most major urban areas in Florida. Petitioner began the Barry University program in January 2005 and withdrew from the program in May 2006. She chose to take her clinical training in Orlando, where Wolverine Anesthesia Consultants accepted Barry University students for clinical practice. Wolverine Anesthesia Consultants served various hospitals forming part of the Orlando Regional Healthcare System. Petitioner began the clinical portion of the program in May 2005. No cash is exchanged between Barry University and Wolverine Anesthesia Consultants as part of the arrangement described above. The obvious benefit for Barry University, whose program is not inexpensive, is that Wolverine's supervision of its students in the clinical practice allows Barry to offer a comprehensive anesthesiology program that qualifies its students to sit for the CRNA examination. The obvious benefits to Wolverine Anesthesia Consultants are access to newly certified CRNAs, who are in high demand, and the ability to recruit the students likeliest to excel within the profession. It is less clear, from the present record, if Wolverine is able to bill for the services of more advanced students. From time to time, Wolverine provides Barry with financial support, such as a stipend so that a financially needy student may attend an out-of-town conference, as the tuition charged by Barry does not cover the cost of the program or incidental student costs. The economic relationship between the respondents is only of relevance, however, in providing the background from which to assess the economic relationship between the respondents, on the one hand, and Petitioner--and, more specifically, the value that flows to Petitioner from one or both respondents. Clearly, the educational and clinical programs provide educational value, and potential economic value, if and when certification is obtained, but, as explained in the Conclusions of Law, the key question is what, if any, economic value flows to Petitioner from either respondent during her relationship with each respondent. Neither respondent paid Petitioner any income, compensation, or other benefit, directly or indirectly. Neither respondent ever provided Petitioner with an IRS W-2 statement or Form 1099, as evidence of payments to an employee or independent contractor. She never received compensation of any type from either respondent, nor did she receive an IRS Form 1099, reflective of the payment of compensation to an independent contract. Petitioner never received any other employment- related benefits from either respondent, such as health insurance or retirement benefits. Neither respondent provided Petitioner with housing or a housing allowance. Wolverine did not insure Petitioner on its medical malpractice insurance policy. Neither respondent covered Petitioner under workers' compensation. Wolverine Anesthesia Consultants required Petitioner to sign her name on any anesthesia record pertaining to a case in which she was involved. When Petitioner was required, due to the needs of a particular patient, to work in excess of her scheduled time, she was entitled, from Barry University, to "comp time," which means only that she could receive credit for the additional time worked when setting a subsequent schedule. However, apart from a grant from Barry University as part of her financial-aid package, Petitioner never received any financial benefit from either respondent. In addition to the occasional stipend, which Petitioner does not appear to have received, Wolverine Anesthesia Consultants provided minor items, such as lunches for meetings of the interns, which Petitioner may not have attended, and $50 Christmas gift certificates to all interns, including Petitioner. In no way does the record support an interpretation of these minor acknowledgements or courtesies as compensation because Wolverine is under no obligation to provide them, no relationship exists between the recipient of the item and the amount of time worked, and no relationship exists between the value of the item or stipend and the amount of time worked by the student receiving the item or stipend. Although Barry University administers a comprehensive test to all candidates for a master's degree in anesthesiology, passage of which is required for a degree, Petitioner withdrew from the program prior to the administration of this test. She withdrew essentially due to reports from Wolverine to Barry University that she had failed to make adequate progress in the clinical program.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the petitions of Petitioner in these two cases. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of June, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of June, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Andrea Bateman, Esquire 1999 West Colonial Drive Orlando, Florida 32804 Cecil Howard, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Susan T. Spradley, Esq. Deborah L. La Fleur, Esq. GrayRobinson, P.A. 301 East Pine Street, Suite 1400 Orlando, Florida 32801 John A. Walker, General Counsel Barry University Division of Legal Affairs and Human Resources LaVoie Hall, Office 209 11300 Northeast Second Avenue Miami Shores, Florida 33161
The Issue The issues are whether Petitioner overpaid Medicaid reimbursements to Respondent for inpatient hospital services due to the lack of medical necessity for such services and, if so, the amount of the overpayment.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a 226-bed community hospital in Sanford. It is an acute-care hospital with an emergency department. At all material times, Respondent has been an authorized Medicaid provider. For inpatient services, Respondent receives, under Medicaid, an all-inclusive per diem rate for all goods and services provided during a 24-hour period, less any third-party payments. Petitioner is the state agency responsible for the regulation of the Medicaid program in Florida. Petitioner is required to perform Medicaid audits of providers and to recover any overpayments. Pursuant to this authority, Petitioner conducted an audit of Respondent for the period from January 1, 2001, through March 31, 2002. Pursuant to its procedures, Petitioner duly informed Respondent of the audit, obtained from Respondent relevant medical and hospital records, issued a Provisional Agency Audit Report on January 24, 2006, obtained additional information from Respondent pertinent to the provisional findings, and issued a Final Agency Audit Report on October 19, 2006, which claimed a total overpayment of $286,357.54 based on Medicaid payments made to Respondent on behalf of 35 different recipients. (The report indicates two separate denials for each of four recipients, so 39 total transactions are listed.) The dispute in this case concerns the medical necessity of the inpatient hospitalization of each recipient. The Florida Medicaid Hospital Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook (Handbook) states that the purpose of the Medicaid program is "to provide medically necessary inpatient and outpatient services to recipients in the hospital." Handbook, page 1-1. This case involves paid claims for inpatient, not outpatient, services. The Handbook defines inpatient services as those services "rendered to recipients who are admitted to a hospital and are expected to stay at least 24 hours and occupy a bed, even though a bed is not actually utilized because the recipient is discharged or transferred to another hospital." Handbook, page 1-1. The Handbook provides that the day of admission is covered, but the day of discharge is not covered, unless it is also the day of admission. Handbook, page 2-22. The Handbook defines "grace days" as non-medically necessary days following the day of formal discharge when the recipient continues to occupy a hospital bed until an outside facility or residence can be found. These days are not reimbursable by Medicaid except for children under 21 years of age on "Department of Children and Families hold . . .." Medicaid will pay up to 48 hours of inpatient stay beyond the formal discharge day for these children while an alternative placement is located. The Handbook incorporates the limitation of medical necessity as follows: Medicaid reimburses for services that are determined medically necessary, do not duplicate another provider's service, and are: individualized, specific, consistent with symptoms or confirmed diagnosis of the illness or injury under treatment, and not in excess of the patient's needs; not experimental or investigational; reflective of the level of services that can be safely furnished, and for which no equally effective and more conservative or less costly treatment is available statewide; furnished in a manner not primarily intended for the convenience of the recipient, the recipient's caretaker, or the provider. The fact that a provider has prescribed, recommended, or approved medical or allied care, goods, or services does not, in itself, make such care, goods or service medically necessary or a covered service. Note: See Appendix D, Glossary, in the Florida Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, UB-92, for the definition of medically necessary. Handbook, pages 2-1 to 2-2. The Florida Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, UB-92, Appendix D, defines "medically necessary" as follows: Means that the medical or allied care, goods, or services furnished or ordered must: Meet the following conditions: Be necessary to protect life, to prevent significant illness or significant disability, or to alleviate severe pain; Be individualized, specific, and consistent with symptoms or confirmed diagnosis of the illness or injury under treatment, and not in excess of the patient's needs; Be consistent with generally accepted professional medical standards as determined by the Medicaid program, and not experimental or investigational; Be reflective of the level of service that can be safely furnished, and for which no equally effective and more conservative or less costly treatment is available; statewide; and Be furnished in a manner that is not primarily intended for the convenience of the recipient, the recipient's caretaker, or the provider. "Medically necessary" or "medical necessity" for inpatient hospital services requires that those services furnished in a hospital on an inpatient basis could not, consistent with the provisions of appropriate medical care, be effectively furnished more economically on an outpatient basis or in an inpatient facility of a different type. The fact that a provider has prescribed, recommended, or approved medical or allied care, goods, or services does not, in itself, make such care, goods or services medically necessary or a medical necessity or a covered service. The Florida Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, UB-92, Appendix D, page D-10. E. A. was admitted on January 6, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat E. A.'s acute exacerbation of chronic bronchitis from January 6-8. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining ten days of E. A.'s hospitalization. (All calculations of duration of hospitalizations omit the day of discharge, pursuant to the above-cited provision from the Handbook. In this case, for instance, E. A. was discharged on January 19.) E. A., a 60-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with shortness of breath and a history of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), emphysema, and hypertension. He had been unable to eat for the preceding four days due to respiratory distress. At the time of his admission, E. A. had been living for a short while with his sister, who was suffering from cancer. His relevant history included a shotgun wound to the left lung 30 years earlier. Respondent states in its proposed recommended order that E. A.'s chest X-rays showed acute infiltrate demonstrating pneumonia, although the discharge summary reveals that chest X-rays fail to reveal this condition, but acknowledged that sputum grain stains revealed a polymicrobial infection. More to the point, the X-ray reports dated January 6 and 8 note: "no focal infiltrate." However, the discharge summary described E. A.'s prognosis as poor because he was in "end-stage lung disease." In the emergency department, after treatment with bronchodilators, E. A.'s oxygen saturation rate was only 87 percent--not 94-100 percent, as mistakenly stated by Petitioner's expert, Dr. Ellen Silkes, an otolaryngologist whose practice is largely limited to outpatients. This low rate of oxygen saturation evidences hypoxia. E. A.'s arterial blood gases bore a pH of 7.28, evidencing, on the facts of this case respiratory acidosis, which results from excessive retained carbon dioxide due to poor lung function. E. A. was started on Albuterol and Atrovent by nebulizer at four-hour intervals, as well as a corticosteroid intravenously every six hours to relieve the swelling in the lungs. He received oxygen by nasal cannula. On January 10, the physician's notes state that E. A. still suffered from "severe COPD" secondary to smoking with bronchospasms. According to the notes, the first day that E. A. showed any improvement was January 12. On January 14 and 16, E. A. was still retaining excessive carbon dioxide and remained hypoxic, but showed some improvement by January 16 in terms of arterial blood gases. The physician's note for January 17 states that E. A. could be discharged as soon as arrangements for home health care were completed. E. A.'s hospitalization was medically necessary from January 6-17. His hospitalization after January 17 was not medically necessary. Petitioner improperly denied January 9-16, given that the day of discharge is excluded. Thus, for E. A., Petitioner should have denied two days, not all ten days. A. A. was admitted on June 19, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat A. A.'s gastrointestinal bleeding from June 19-20. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 12 days of A. A.'s hospitalization. (Some of Petitioner's calculations are incorrect. For instance, in this case, Petitioner does not deny July 2-5, even though, undoubtedly, its position as to the lack of medical necessity as to the earlier dates would mandate the same position as to the later dates. This recommended order does not disturb Petitioner's implicit acceptance of the medical necessity of any dates, even when it appears to be in error.) A. A., a 51-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with abdominal pain, diarrhea, and black tarry stools. His recent history included bloody vomit and a diagnosis, a few months earlier, of a pulmonary embolism. A. A. had discontinued taking Coumadin, a blood thinner, due to nosebleeds. A. A. had been diagnosed with AIDS in 1998 and had lost 30 pounds in one month. At admission, A. A.'s hemoglobin and hematocrit levels were critically low at 5.1 and 15.5, respectively, and remained critically low the following day when, after A. A. received transfusions of two units of packed red blood cells, his hemoglobin and hematocrit levels were only 6.8 and 20.0, respectively. Dr. Silkes denied the hospitalization after June 20 because an upper gastrointestinal endoscopy revealed, on June 19, no acute bleeding, and a bleeding scan the following day was negative. However, according to the physician's notes, A. A. was continuing to experience diarrhea on June 20, even though he was starting to feel better. The course of treatment of A. A. was complicated by his recent history of pulmonary embolism and his inability to report an accurate history. By June 21, A. A.'s severe anemia had been corrected, but he was diagnosed with candida, an opportunistic fungal infection common in AIDS patients. This diagnosis would explain the vomiting of blood. Generally, the treatment dilemma posed by A. A. was that efforts to increase his clotting time to stop the bleeding raised the risk of pulmonary embolism. The physicians debated whether to install a Greenfield filter to stop the passage of a blood clot. The filter is introduced under X-ray control through the femoral vein into the inferior vena cava, where it is anchored, so that it allows the passage of blood, but not the passage of a blood clot. But the Greenfield filter is contraindicated in the presence of A. A.'s fever of 101 degrees and elevated white blood counts. Physicians introduced Coumadin to minimize the risk of clots, but A. A.'s low platelet count required the discontinuation of Coumadin on June 30. A. A.'s International Normalization Ratio (INR) was 4.2, which is well above the range of 2.0-3.0 and thus indicative of the fact that A. A.'s blood was taking too long to clot. The standard of care in 2001 precluded safe outpatient management of a complicated patient such as A. A., given his twin risks of pulmonary embolism and bleeding, either of which could result in his death. A. A.'s Coumadin could not safely have been adjusted on an outpatient basis. The physicians restarted the Coumadin on June 24 and doubled its dosage the following day. As they were working on adjusting the blood thinner, though, A. A. continued to suffer nightly fevers of 103 degrees, and the physicians needed to monitor him closely for the next week for this reason too. On June 28, A. A. reported that he was feeling better, but the physicians needed to monitor him for a recent reduction in his Coumadin dosage. A. A. was reported as "alert and comfortable" on July 2. A. A.'s hospitalization was medically necessary from June 19 through at least July 2. Petitioner improperly denied all ten days of this hospitalization. T. B. was admitted on May 15, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat T. B.'s esophageal cancer and tuberculosis from May 15-17 and The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the ten days that Dr. Silkes denied of the remaining 14 days of T. B.'s hospitalization. (It is unclear why Petitioner denied only ten days when Dr. Silkes denied May 18-20 and May 22-June 1--a total of 14 days, or 13 days exclusive of the day of discharge. But, as noted above, in cases such as this, the recommended order will consider only whether up to ten days within this period are allowable as medically necessary.) T. B., a 47-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with difficulty swallowing. He had visited a physician in February 2001 with the same complaint, and the physician had recommended an upper gastrointestinal series. Due to financial constraints, T. B. did not undergo this procedure until late April, when he was found to have a high-grade obstruction consistent with a tumor. T. B.'s recent history included the loss of 25 pounds. An endoscopy with biopsy performed on May 16 revealed a high-grade carcinoma of the esophagus. The physician planned to commence preoperative chemotherapy and radiation therapy to shrink the lesion, but, based on sputum collected on May 18, it was discovered that T. B. had mycobacterium tuberculosis. Physicians had suspected the tuberculosis from the time of admission when they placed T. B. in a negative airflow isolation room. Treatment of the tuberculosis necessarily preceded the preoperative chemotherapy recommended for T. B.'s carcinoma. The sputum sample revealed rare acid-fast bacilli, for which the standard of care in 2001 typically required two to three weeks of treatment before isolation precautions could be discontinued. T. B. remained in isolation at least through May 31. In addition, T. B. suffered significant pain from the carcinoma. By May 23, he was on patient-controlled analgesia in the form of a morphine pump, which is not available outside of an acute-care hospital. T. B.'s hospitalization was medically necessary from May 15 through at least June 1. Petitioner improperly denied all ten days of this hospitalization that it denied. R. B. was admitted on December 3, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat R. B.'s respiratory failure from December 3, 2001, to January 2, 2002, and January 8, 2002. Based on Petitioner's prehearing stipulation, the dispute concerns only seven days' hospitalization. R. B., a 59-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with acute respiratory distress and respiratory failure. She was immediately intubated. Her family insisted upon aggressive treatment of, among other things, her bilateral pneumonia caused by a virulent staph infection. R. B. required a tracheotomy on December 20 due to the difficulty in weaning her from the ventilator. She required the placement of a percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy (PEG) tube on January 1. The discharge summary describes R. B. as "very frail and fragile" and her hospitalization as "very prolonged and complicated." On December 23, when R. B. was finally weaned from the ventilator, her family agreed to a do-not-resuscitate (DNR) code for her. The dispute arises from an incident on January 3 when R. B. fell when trying to get out of bed. Her mental status deteriorated, probably due to malignant disease. Physicians ruled out sepsis in the bloodstream, but X-rays revealed multiple nodules in the lung and liver. On January 8, a CT- guided lung biopsy of one of the nodules confirmed malignant disease. Two days later, the physician stated that a consultation with hospice was indicated. Upon the agreement of the family, R. B. was discharged to her home under hospice care on January 12. Dr. Silkes is substantially correct in her opinion. The diagnostic work after January 2 only supported the poor prognosis that had become obvious to R. B.'s family ten days earlier and certainly was not palliative in nature. R. B.'s hospitalization after January 2, 2002, was not medically necessary--except for January 8, which Dr. Silkes initially conceded, and an additional two days, which Petitioner conceded in its prehearing stipulation. Petitioner properly denied seven days of this hospitalization. J. B. was admitted on January 5, 2002. Petitioner does not contest a 23-hour observation on January 5, but this would generate a reimbursement considerably smaller than that sought by Respondent for inpatient services for that day, so Petitioner has essentially denied the entire hospitalization, which consists of 16 days. J. B., a 59-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with shortness of breath and atrial fibrillation with fast ventricular rate. He had been diabetic for 25 years. He had been laid off from construction work in August 2001, and had arthritic knees which prevented his return to work. Since losing his job, J. B. had been feeling poorly and had lost 20 pounds. J. B.'s pulse at the time of his arrival was 165, and it dropped to 105 within his first six hours at the hospital. J. B.'s relevant history included congestive heart failure, edema of the extremities, and nocturnal dyspnea. A chest X-ray on the day of admission revealed a dense mass in the left lobe. Physicians started a calcium channel blocker to regulate J. B.'s rapid heart beat and a diuretic to eliminate his excess fluids and swelling. J. B. was feeling much better by January 7, as the physicians had controlled his rapid heart beat. On that day, J. B. underwent a stress test, which was negative. However, a CT scan performed on January 8 and reported the following day revealed a left hilum mass that proved to be advanced carcinoma. The physicians decided that J. B. needed a bronchoscopy to biopsy the lung mass and a thoracentesis, in which a needle is inserted between the ribs to extract fluid for the purpose of determining the fluid's source. However, J. B.'s atrial fibrillation complicated their plans. On January 8, J. B. remained in atrial fibrillation, and the physicians were considering starting him on Coumadin because patients with atrial fibrillation are at high risk of clotting due to the poor expulsion of blood into the ventricle. Introduction of this blood-thinning agent before other invasive procedures requires first that the physicians stabilize the patient. This dilemma delayed the introduction of the blood- thinning agent and prevented treating J. B. as an outpatient. Once stabilized on Coumadin, J. B. underwent the two diagnostic procedures on January 11. They revealed that he was suffering from stage IV squamous cell carcinoma, according to a physician's report dictated on January 14 and transcribed the following day. The physician ordered additional CT scans to determine the extent of the metastatic disease before deciding on a course of treatment. A whole body bone scan was performed on January 15 and was essentially negative. However, the carcinoma had metastasized to the left hilum and, by report dated January 15, a physician noted that J. B. would not benefit from surgery, chemotherapy, or radiation, although palliative radiation could offer him some relief. An IV port for chemotherapy (not radiation) was placed on January 16--not January 6, as noted by Dr. Silkes in her report. Coumadin had been discontinued in advance of the procedure and resumed on the day of the procedure, but required adjustment for the next several days, as J. B.'s INR was too low, indicative of excessive clotting. Although the administration of the chemotherapy through the IV port could have been done on an outpatient basis, J. B. was comfortable at all times after January 15, and with no effective treatment possible, his hospitalization remained medically necessary until the physicians were able to adjust his Coumadin so that his INR reached the normal range. J. B.'s hospitalization was medically necessary from January 5 through January 22, on which date he was discharged. Petitioner improperly denied the 16 days of inpatient services. N. C. was admitted on February 8, 2002. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat N. C.'s intracranial hemorrhage from February 8-10. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 21 days of N. C.'s hospitalization. N. C., a 40-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with a complaint of passing out and no significant medical history. N. C. was a single mother of a developmentally disabled child. Her father resided in a nursing home and suffered from dementia, so her siblings were her decisionmakers concerning care. At admission, N. C. was already in a vegetative state, suffering from a massive intracranial hemorrhage. Her blood pressure was 213/107. She was immediately intubated and given Mannitol to reduce intracranial pressure and Dilantin to prevent seizures. On February 8, a neurologist evaluated N. C. and found her a poor candidate for surgery to evacuate the intracranial hematoma due to the likelihood of extensive consequent neurological deficits. The neurologist discussed the possibilities and the "extremely poor" prognosis with the siblings, who decided not to pursue surgery and instead allow N. C. to be "managed medically." The physicians asked the siblings to consider a DNR code for N. C. N. C. made no meaningful progress in the following days. Respondent was unable to contact her siblings until February 19, and they asked for two days within which to make the decision whether to place N. C. on a DNR code. On February 22, they decided to place N. C. on a DNR code and withdraw the ventilator. Three days later, the physician discussed with the siblings the possibility of placement in a nursing home. Three days after this discussion, the siblings agreed on inpatient hospice care for N. C. On March 4, IV fluids and medications and the nasogastric feeding tube were withdrawn, and N. C. was transferred to a nursing home under hospice care. N. C.'s hospitalization was medically necessary through February 22 because a nursing home cannot accept a patient on a ventilator, N. C.'s course following the stroke could reasonably be observed for a couple of weeks to determine if improvement--however unlikely--might take place, and the siblings reasonably required this long to make this difficult decision. From February 23 through discharge, the inpatient services provided N. C. were no longer medically necessary, so Petitioner properly denied nine days of the 21 days that it denied for this recipient. N. Ch. was admitted on May 23, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat N. Ch.'s cellulitus and osteomyelitis from May 23 to June 24. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 46 days of N. Ch.'s hospitalization. N. Ch., a 38-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with wounds to both legs and loss of feeling in both feet and a history of fractures to both tibias 20 years ago followed by osteomyelitis four years ago. Despite considerable hospital treatment to both legs, consisting of antibiotics, hyperbaric oxygen, debridement, and skin grafts, drainage of the wounds persisted. Four grainy wounds on both legs penetrated to the bone, and N. Ch. had suffered some bony damage from the persistence of these infected wounds. A physician performed a surgical debridement of the wounds on May 26, and a vacuum- assisted closure device was applied to the wound on the following day. This device produces negative air pressure to stimulate a chemical change in the tissues to enhance the migration of new blood vessels and granulation tissue over the area of the wound. The pump was changed often. On June 22, N. Ch. underwent a second debridement and a pump was reapplied to the wounds on June 24. The issue in this case involves the use of hyperbaric oxygen treatment on an inpatient basis. On June 7, a physician reasonably recommended 20, 90-minute hyperbaric oxygen treatments. The treatments, which accelerate wound healing, began the next day. Dr. Silkes correctly finds no medical necessity after N. Ch. became stable after the second debridement. Although he later suffered some fever, apparently from his reaction to an antibiotic, and gastroesophagael reflux, as well as some adverse reactions to IV and peripherally inserted central catheter lines, N. Ch. could have been managed as an outpatient after June 24. Nothing suggests that the vacuum-`assisted closure device requires hospitalization, and hyperbaric oxygen treatment clearly does not require hospitalization. Respondent contends that inpatient services remained medically necessary after June 24 because Medicaid would not pay for hyperbaric oxygen treatment on an outpatient basis. Medical necessity is driven by medical, not legal, considerations. If the sole reason for hospitalization is to obtain a medically necessary good or service that Respondent has restricted to the inpatient setting, then the provider community improperly circumvents Petitioner's restriction. If there is no other reason to continue to hospitalize a recipient, such as N. Ch., the decision to do so in order to obtain for him a concededly medically necessary service--that does not otherwise require hospitalization--is unwarranted. Petitioner properly denied the 46 days of inpatient services for N. Ch. after June 24. J. C. was admitted on February 24, 2002. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat J. C.'s coronary artery disease and lymphoma on February 24 and March 3-8. In its proposed recommended order, Respondent does not contest Petitioner's denial of the "last two days," which apparently are March 9-10. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining six days of hospitalization from February 25 through March 2. J. C., a 61-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with worsening chest pain over the past two weeks and a history of coronary artery disease. She also had an undiagnosed mass on her neck. She had previously failed outpatient treatment and was admitted to the hospital. Two weeks earlier, J. C. was to have had an outpatient biopsy of the neck mass, but the anesthesiologist declined to administer anesthesia until her unstable angina was addressed. J. C. went to her primary care physician, who referred her to a cardiologist, but, prior to seeing him, J. C. went to the emergency department. On February 25, the physician's notes indicate that J. C. was stable and without chest pain. The cardiologist performed a cardiac catheterization on February 26 and found 100 percent blockage of the left anterior descending artery, 80 percent blockage of the proximal circumflex, and other narrowings that were not amenable to angioplasty and stenting, so he recommended coronary artery bypass grafting. Heart surgery could not proceed until physicians learned the nature of the neck mass. A biopsy was performed on February 28, which revealed B-cell malignant lymphoma. The oncologist preferred to commence chemotherapy after the bypass operation, so this was performed on March 3. J. C. was extubated on March 4, but developed acute respiratory distress on March 5 and required a transfusion the following day. However, Dr. Silkes is correct in finding the hospitalization from February 25 through March 2 medically unnecessary. The procedures performed during this period could have been done on an outpatient basis. The record does not support Respondent's argument that her unstable angina required inpatient management. Petitioner properly denied these six days of inpatient services. R. LaB. was admitted on April 2, 2001. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the last day of inpatient service on April 12. This is the first case considered in this recommended order handled by Dr. Alan Yesner, an internist whose practice is more evenly divided between inpatients and outpatients than is Dr. Silkes' practice. R. LaB., a 47-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with abdominal pain of two days' duration and a history of COPD, hypertension, and diabetes. She was rushed to abdominal surgery to reduce an incarcerated hernia. The surgery was long. R. LaB. suffered respiratory failure and required intubation. Dr. Yesner is correct in opining that R. LaB.'s hospitalization after April 11 was not medical necessary. She was stable and on appropriate medication, so Petitioner properly denied one day of inpatient service for R. LaB. J. L. was admitted on June 12, 2001. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the seven days of inpatient services. J. L., a 47-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with complaints of a gradual increase of abdominal girth and was found to have blood in his stool. Lab work indicated an elevated INR, elevated bilirubin, and bacteria in his urine. The physician concluded that J. L. suffered from primary biliary cirrhosis, for which he had been treated since at least 1998. J. L. admitted that he had become noncompliant with his medication after a divorce. A CT scan revealed a probable stone obstructing the right ureter, causing urine to back up and flood the right kidney. A successful laser lithotripsy was performed on June 17 with the complete fragmentation of the stone and the installation of a stent, which would facilitate drainage, to be removed a few days later. J. L. tolerated the procedure well, and on the next day he reported feeling better without any pain in his flank. Dr. Yesner notes the "late schedule" of the lithotripsy, but Respondent did not have a lithotripter in 2001 and had to schedule it for use at the hospital. The hospitalization was medically necessary through June 17 due to the pain, advanced kidney disease, and potential kidney problems presented by the blockage, prior to its surgical fragmentation. Petitioner should have denied two days, not seven days. C. M. was admitted on April 2, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of admission for 23-hour observation only on April 2 for end-stage sarcoidosis, pneumonia, and gastrointestinal bleeding. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 31 days of C. M.'s hospitalization, which concluded with her death. C. M., a 55-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with shortness of breath and weakness. She is a Jehovah's Witness, so she declines blood transfusions on religious grounds. By April 4, C. M.'s blood gases, although not within normal ranges, were out of critical ranges. C. M. suffered respiratory failure and required intubation on April 16. Her hemoglobin gradually dropped after this, but treatment was limited to iron and vitamins due to the refusal of the patient to accept a blood transfusion. This treatment was unsuccessful. The family supported C. M.'s decision not to accept a blood transfusion, but insisted on full, aggressive treatment, including CPR. C. M. went into cardiac arrest on May 3 and CPR failed to revive her. Dr. Silkes states that Respondent should have arranged for hospice care during the first day of hospitalization. C. M. was not then on a ventilator, so a hospice would not have objected to taking C. M. on that ground, but her respiration was critically impaired for the first three days of her hospitalization and her prognosis was not such as to render hospital care medically unnecessary. It was medically necessary to stabilize C. M.'s respiration during these first three days, but her hemoglobin issues could have been addressed by home health care for the next 11 days. The medical necessity of inpatient services resumes, though, after C. M.'s respiratory failure of April 16 and continues to the end of her hospitalization. The first three days of inpatient services were medically necessary, the next 11 days of inpatient services were not medically necessary, and the last 17 days of inpatient services were medically necessary, so Petitioner should have denied 11 days, not 31 days. M. M. was admitted on March 3, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat acute asthmatic bronchitis with a history of coronary artery bypass graft, asthma, sarcoidosis of the lung, and diabetes from March 3-12, which Petitioner later extended to March 13. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining three days of M. M.'s hospitalization, which Respondent's expert frankly conceded was difficult to justify. As Dr. Yesner noted, M. M. was stabilized on oral medication by March 11, and he allowed a couple of additional days to monitor her. M. M. experienced hypoglycemia on March 16, but this is a condition that, according to Dr. Yesner, is not unusual with the Prednisone that M. M. was taking, and hypoglycemia is typically managed on an outpatient basis. Petitioner properly denied the last three days of M. M.'s hospitalization. J. P. S. was admitted on January 4, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat J. P. S.'s obstruction of the common bile duct. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the last three days of his hospitalization. J. P. S., a 54-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with severe jaundice and a history of diabetes, congestive heart failure, and triple coronary artery bypass graft performed in 1997, although he displayed no significant cardiac abnormalities during this hospitalization. During the initial examination, J. P. S. went into respiratory arrest and required intubation. The gastroenterologist found J. P. S. ready for discharge, from a gastroenterological perspective, on January 13. but J. P. S. immediately developed COPD symptoms, including shortness of breath and edema. According to the physician notes, J. P. S. was sufficiently stable for discharge on January 15, but a note for the next day says to hold the discharge pending cardiac evaluation. Respondent discharged J. P. S. three days later, after physicians could monitor the level of Digoxin to ensure that J. P. S. was safe for discharge. P. S.'s entire hospitalization was medically necessary. Petitioner improperly denied the last three days of inpatient services. J. P. was admitted on December 8, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of services to treat J. P.'s fever from December 8-12. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 14 days of J. P.'s hospitalization. J. P., a 27-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with high-grade fevers and severe headaches and a history of AIDS. Dr. Silkes approved the treatment of the fever until it ended on December 12. The fever was likely caused by J. P.'s toxoplasmosis of the central nervous system. This is an opportunistic condition not unusual in immunocompromised patients. Candida fungal infection likely caused J. P.'s complaints of pain on swallowing, as this too is an opportunistic condition. Additionally, a blood culture revealed a staph infection. Through December 18, J. P. was continuing to experience fevers of up to 101 degrees. At the same time, it was necessary to address the toxoplasmosis before it extended to other organs. This required the sequential administration of IV antibiotics and careful, continual monitoring of the patient for his clinical response to treatment. On December 20, J. P. underwent a bone marrow biopsy to rule out the extension of toxoplasmosis in the bone marrow or the presence of tuberculosis. This test was negative, which was a precondition for discharge. The pathology report was "received" on December 21, but not "printed" until December 27. However, J. P. did not complete his IV administration of Doxycycline until December 23, when the medical necessity for his inpatient services ended. Petitioner should have denied three days, not 14 days. W. P. was admitted on June 18, 2001. Dr. Silkes would allow only a 23-hour observation on the day of admission for the treatment of lung cancer and tuberculosis. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of 13 days of his hospitalization from June 18 through July 1 (even though he was not discharged until July 13). W. P., a 59-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with severe coughing up of blood and a recent loss of 40 pounds. A chest X-ray at admission revealed a large mass in the upper left lobe of the lungs. Lab work suggestive of anemia correlated with a malignancy as its source. Sputum to test for acid fast bacillus was taken, and a consult was immediately arranged with a pulmonary specialist to consider a bronchoscopy and to take a biopsy. A CT scan of the chest on June 18 revealed abnormal soft tissue density filling the right upper lobe, two tumors, and numerous nodes. The bronchoscopy on June 19 revealed 80 percent obstruction of the right main bronchus secondary to an endobronchial lesion and 100 percent obstruction of the right upper lobe. A biopsy of the right mainstem bronchus revealed a squamous cell carcinoma. A physician noted in his consultation report that W. P. was to complete his metastatic survey on the day of the report--June 22--after which they would discuss palliative treatment. The report states that the patient understands that he will unlikely live more than six months. Subsequently, acid fast bacillus, which had originally not been detected, was found, so W. P. was placed in isolation on June 26. He had been experiencing elevated white blood counts and fevers. He was placed on antituberculosis treatment, which, as noted above, typically takes two or three weeks until the patient can be removed from isolation. July 10 was W. P.'s first day without fever. On this date, Respondent sent his records to the Health Department to facilitate a transfer to a tuberculosis hospital. He was discharged on July 13. W. P.'s entire hospitalization was medically necessary. Petitioner should not have denied any of the 13 days that it denied. M. Pr. was admitted on December 18, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat M. Pr.'s coronary artery disease from December 18-27. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining seven days of M. Pr.'s hospitalization. M. Pr., a 58-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with a recent cardiovascular accident while out of state. A cardiac catheterization revealed severe triple vessel coronary artery disease. On December 19, M. Pr. underwent a four-vessel bypass. Post-operatively, however, M. Pr. fell while on the commode. The dispute in this case arises due to the unavailability of rehabilitation facilities that would take M. Pr. after his fall. He was suitable for discharge on December 28, but no facility could be found to receive him. These are "grace days," as noted in the Handbook and are available, on a limited basis, for persons under 21 years of age, but, by negative implication, are unavailable for adults. Thus, medical necessity dictated that Respondent discharge M. Pr. on December 27, so the inpatient services are not reimbursable after December 28, given that the day of discharge is not allowable. Dr. Silkes' determination was correct in this case. Petitioner properly denied seven days' inpatient services for M. Pr. A. R. was admitted on December 30, 2001. Petitioner has denied the entire 14 days of A. R.'s hospitalization, although Dr. Silkes approved one day's inpatient services, on the day of admission, for the treatment of ovarian cancer. A. R., a 63-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with vomiting on the day of admission, progressive abdominal distension, anorexia, weight loss over the past month, and a 15-year history of bronchial asthma. A CT scan of A. R.'s thorax at the time of admission revealed a large collection of fluid in the abdominal cavity. At this time, a physician removed 4.5 liters of fluid from the cavity, and A. R., not surprisingly, began to feel much better. A report on January 3--delayed probably due to the holidays-- indicated the presence of scattered malignant cells in the withdrawn fluid compatible with carcinoma. Metastatic ovarian cancer was subsequently confirmed. A. R.'s case was complicated by the withdrawal of this large volume of fluids, which required continual monitoring of her electrolytes, and the sudden exacerbation of her dementia on January 2, which would impede outpatient services, as well as the initiation of chemotherapy. The dementia, which had been progressive for the past six months, was likely a reaction to the carcinoma. By January 11, a physician recommended hospice placement given A. R.'s incurable tumor. A. R.'s daughter agreed on this day to hospice placement. This is the day that medical necessity for inpatient services ended. Petitioners should have denied three days, not 14 days. The remaining days were medically necessary. E. S. was admitted on May 4, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat E. S.'s pancreatitis and multisystem failure from May 4-23. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 24 days of her hospitalization, which ended with her death. E. S., a 64-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with nausea and abdominal pain and a history of hypertension and abuse of alcohol and tobacco. She was found to have elevated pancreatic enzymes. On May 8, E. S. underwent a laparoscopic removal of her gallbladder, which she tolerated well, but soon afterwards suffered respiratory failure. E. S. was then placed on a ventilator. Problems with malnourishment and then kidney failure precluded a successful weaning her off the ventilator. On May 23, the family agreed to a DNR code. May 23 marks the last day that Dr. Silkes found that E. S.'s hospitalization was medically necessary. Care after this date was entirely supportive and not medically necessary; however, no hospice or skilled nursing facility would take E. S. because she could not be weaned off the ventilator. The unavailability of an alternative, less costly setting does not automatically render the inpatient care of a recipient medically necessary. The circumstances dictate whether inpatient services to such a patient are medically necessary. Here, it is impossible to find that services after May 23 were medically necessary. Dr. Silkes was correct in her opinion. Petitioner properly denied all 24 days of inpatient services for E. S. D. S. was admitted on March 24, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat D. S.'s osteomyelitis of the right foot from March 24-25 and March 30-April 10. (Originally, Dr. Silkes allowed only March 24-25 and March 30-April 6, but, on February 7, 2007, she revised her opinion to allow the additional four days to April 10.) In its prehearing statement, Petitioner conceded that only three of the original ten denied days remained at issue, as it was agreeing that an additional seven days were medically necessary. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining three days, although it is not clear what three days Petitioner is contesting. D. S., a 57-year-old female, presented at the emergency department with a "hole in the right foot" and a history of diabetes. She dropped a can of juice on her foot on January 1, and the foot had become progressively infected since that time. On the day of admission, she underwent surgery for the removal of fourth and fifth metatarsal bones and toes of the right foot. She did not heal properly and required followup surgery on April 7 to trim some of the necrotic flap, as the physicians considered the possibility of a below-knee amputation. On April 13, the surgeon probed the wound, found no hidden pockets, and discharged D. S. Regardless what three days that Petitioner continues to find were not medically necessary, the entire hospitalization was medically necessary. J. W. was admitted on August 20, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat J. W.'s multiple organ failure from August 20 to September 14. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining two days of J. W.'s hospitalization, at which time he died. J. W., a 48-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with a two or three-day history of progressive congestive heart failure with pulmonary edema, atypical chest pain, and increasing abdominal girth. His history included nonischemic cardiomyopathy with minimal coronary artery disease, chronic alcohol abuse, pulmonary hypertension, chronic atrial fibrillation requiring anticoagulation therapy, hepatitis B and C, chronic renal insufficiency, and chronic congestive heart failure with multiple hospitalizations. On admission, his INR was 6.6, indicative of very slow clotting. Despite the care of numerous consultants, J. W. suffered increased respiratory failure on September 5, at which time he was intubated. He received a Greenfield filter on September 7 to prevent further pulmonary clots. Starting September 10, and continuing everyday thereafter, J. W. required dialysis due to renal failure. J. W. was on total parenteral feeding as of September 14. The family, whose availability had been a problem, agreed to a DNR code on September 17. Respondent claims in its proposed recommended order that a DNR code is a precondition to hospice care, but no competent evidence establishes this fact. Dr. Silkes and Petitioner properly denied the last two days because they were not medically necessary. M. W. was admitted on June 10, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat M. W.'s ventricular fibrillation and complications from June 10- The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining seven days of M. W.'s hospitalization. M. W., a 31-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with cardiopulmonary arrest after his wife found him slumped on the sofa, seizing. On arrival, he was found to be in ventricular fibrillation, and he was intubated. Physicians restored a normal rhythm, but M. W. suffered a seizure in the emergency department, so he was given large doses of Dilantin. M. W. had suffered brain damage from cerebral anoxia. M. W. was extubated on June 13, and his breathing remained stable. He remained in normal sinus rhythm. M. W. began to receive Librium on June 13 to sedate him. The cardiologist proposed a cardiac catheterization, but M. W. refused. An EKG on June 15 found a conduction defect in M. W.'s heart that was suggestive of Wolff Parkinson White syndrome. The cardiologist then determined, on June 16, that M. W. required an electrophysiology study to rule out Wolff Parkinson White syndrome. In 2001, Respondent lacked the equipment to perform this study, for which M. W. remained too confused to participate on June 18 anyhow. Physicians continued to monitor M. W.'s cardiac rhythm, and, when a bed opened at Florida Hospital, Orlando, which had the necessary equipment, Respondent promptly transferred M. W. on June 22. During the transfer, the cardiac monitor continued to check M. W.'s rhythm due to the risk of another cardiac incident until the underlying cardiac abnormality was assessed and treated. Petitioner improperly denied the final seven days of M. W.'s hospitalization. M. W. had suffered a serious cardiac event. Physicians had not yet ruled out all possible reasons for the event and needed to address a promising possibility of Wolff Parkinson White syndrome, so M. W. remained at risk for another event. He was confused from the brain damage. All of these factors militate in favor of finding that the remaining seven days of inpatient services were medically necessary. E. A. $1666.62 R. B. $5703.18 N. C. $7332.66 N. Ch. $38,332.26 J. C. $4888.44 R. LaB. $833.31 J. L. $1666.62 C. M. $9166.41 M. M. $2499.93 The total overpayment is $104,309.97, which breaks down as follows: J. P. $2444.22 M. Pr. $5703.18 A. R. $2444.22 E. S. $19,999.44 J. S. $1629.48
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order finding overpayments totaling $104,309.97 during the audit period and requiring that Respondent repay this amount, imposing an administrative fine of $1000, requiring Respondent to prepare a corrective action plan, and reserving jurisdiction to remand the case to the Division of Administrative Hearing for a determination of Petitioner's entitlement to statutory costs, if any. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of June, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of June, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard J. Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Craig H. Smith, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Dr. Andrew C. Agwunobi, Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3116 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Richard M. Ellis, Esquire Rutledge, Ecenia, Purnell & Hoffman, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 420 Post Office Box 551 Tallahassee, Florida 32304-0551 William Blocker, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III, Mail Stop 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Building 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Daniel Lake, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Fort Knox Building III, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Tracy Cooper, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III, Mail Stop 3 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308
The Issue Whether the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) has jurisdiction to conduct a formal hearing under the provisions of Sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, if the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) does not make a "cause" or "no cause" determination, as provided in Section 760.11(3), Florida Statutes, but rather issues a Notice of Dismissal, pursuant to Section 760.11(8), Florida Statutes. Whether DOAH has jurisdiction to conduct a formal hearing under the provisions of Sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, if the Petition for Relief was not timely filed pursuant to Section 760.11(6), Florida Statutes. Whether DOAH has jurisdiction to conduct a formal hearing under the provisions of Sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, if Petitioner fails to name Respondent in the Petition for Relief filed with the FCHR, as required by Section 760.11(1), Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing facts and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered dismissing with prejudice the Petition of Manuel Pedraza in DOAH Case No. 02-0237, and FCHR Case No. 99-0849, for failure to timely file his Petition for Relief and for failure to properly name Respondent in the Petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of June, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of June, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Susan K. W. Erlenbach, Esquire Erlenbach Law Offices, P.A. 2532 Garden Street Titusville, Florida 32796 W. Russell Hamilton, III, Esquire Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP 5300 First Union Financial Center 200 South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33131-2339 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
