Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, at times pertinent hereto, was a resident of Scott's Mobile Home Park (Park), located in Duval County, Florida. She lived in the Park with William Scott, the son of the Park owners, their child, and four other children who are Ms. Allen's natural children. The Petitioner, Mr. Scott, and the five children lived in a three-bedroom, double-wide mobile home, at the pertinent time in 1993. It had been provided by Mr. Scott's parents, the owners of the Park. The Department acquired certain property in Duval County, Florida, in 1993, as a result of an inverse condemnation action of which the property known as Scott's Mobile Home Park was a part. The Department, in due course, notified the Park residents that it would be closed and that efforts would be undertaken to relocate the residents. The Department staff obtained information from Ms. Allen and Mr. Scott, as well as from the other Park residents, in order to determine the amount of relocation assistance funds each displaced resident should receive, in accordance with the legal authority cited below. The Allen-Scott family were determined to be "90-day occupants" of the Park, as that term is used in applicable regulatory provisions. In calculating the relocation assistance amount to which the Petitioner may be entitled, the Department follows certain procedures set out in the Code of Federal Regulations, adopted by reference in its own rules and procedures. It must find replacement housing and then pay displaced residents a lump sum equal to 42 months of the difference between the new higher rent, if that be the case, and utility payments and what the displaced residents had been paying for rent and utilities prior to being displaced. The Department initially located replacement housing for the Allen- Scott family on Phillips Highway in Jacksonville, Florida. While the family had been living in a three-bedroom mobile home, the standards adopted by the Department for decent, safe, and sanitary housing for a family of seven required four bedrooms, which is the type residence the Department sought. The rent and utilities amount for the mobile home suitable to those standards, located on Phillips Highway, was $691.00 per month. The Allen-Scott family, however, desired a mobile home on the west side of Jacksonville, Florida. In order to calculate the amount due to the Petitioner, the Department had to subtract from the $691.00 per month figure for the property on Phillips Highway, the rent and utility total amount that the family had been paying at the Park. The evidence shows, however, that the living arrangements under which they occupied that dwelling in the Park were not the result of an arms-length transaction and that, in reality, the family was not paying any rent for the premises. Therefore, the Department had to impute a rental figure for them. Accordingly, Mr. William Kelbaugh, a Property Appraiser for the Department, made that imputed calculation, based upon the square footage of the Allen-Scott mobile home and the amount per square foot paid for other decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings in the same area, or comparable residences. After establishing that the average rent for mobile homes was approximately $.41 per square foot, Mr. Kelbaugh multiplied the square footage of the Allen-Scott family mobile home by that figure and, after making a deduction because of the condition of the Park, in terms of the actual rental value of the premises they had been living in, he arrived at a "market rental" of $375.00 per month. He then reduced the "market rental" figure by 15 percent based upon his observation of the premises, its condition, and his experience of 20 years or more in making such appraisals. The Department also had to include utility payments in its calculation. It received information from two utility companies about the family's utility bill over the prior 12-month period and computed an average monthly utility payment amount of $202.29. The Department also attempted to establish the family's income. It was required to do so because, in calculating the payment to be made for relocation assistance, the Department must subtract from the new rent and utility payment the smaller of the sums equal to the rent paid or, in the Petitioner's case, imputed, or 30 percent of gross monthly family income. In trying to determine their income amount, the Department asked the Petitioner and Mr. Scott to provide income information on its income certification form, which the Petitioner and Mr. Scott signed and dated March 10, 1993. The Petitioner represented that their income came from Aid to Families with Dependent Children and other welfare benefits, which are not considered income for purposes of the Department's calculation of relocation assistance. Mr. Scott represented that he earned $3,764.25 in income and $3,000.00 in "income from rental" for 1992, which is the year used in making the calculation. The Department asked repeatedly for verification of their income figures in the form of tax records, payroll stubs, or statements from employers. Mr. Scott, however, worked for his parents, the former owners of the Park. They were asked to provide pay stubs and other verification of his income but did not do so at any time during 1993. Relocating the family was a protracted affair because the family required a four-bedroom mobile home, and such dwellings for rental are scarce. On September 14, 1993, the Department delivered an updated income certification form, since the one that the Petitioner and Mr. Scott had signed in March 1993 had expired. The Petitioner signed that form on September 14, 1993, and Mr. Scott signed it on September 22, 1993. That form indicated that Mr. Scott's income was certified by him as gross wages and salaries equal to $3,764.25. No verification of this income had been provided, however, so the Department calculated the relocation assistance due the family by using the market rental figure of $375.00, plus $202.29 for utilities. The Petitioner and Mr. Scott refused to accept this figure and appealed the determination to the Department's "central office". While their appeal was pending in the Department's process, the Department, at the Petitioner's request, located another four-bedroom mobile home for rent on Beaver Road in Jacksonville, Florida. This was with the assistance of Robert Scott, Mr. William Scott's father. The Department re- calculated the Allen-Scott family relocation assistance eligibility supplement. The re-calculated amount was $6,161.82. That amount was presented to the Petitioner and Mr. Scott, but they refused to accept it. On December 7, 1993, Mr. Bud Eddleman, the Department's Administrator of Relocation Assistance, made his decision concerning the Petitioner's appeal and concluded that the $6,161.82 sum to be correct. On February 17, 1994, the Department received a handwritten note signed by Vivian Scott, William Scott's mother, stating that William Scott had been paid $842.25 in cash in 1992 and was furnished rent in lieu of salary equal to $3,000.00. (See Exhibit 8 in evidence). The Petitioner, thus, took the position that that was the totality of income of the family during the calculation period in question, as that relates to the calculation of the amount of relocation benefits they felt they should receive. The Department takes the position that this verification is not accurate and acceptable for a number of reasons. The Allen-Scott household had numerous possessions that suggested a lifestyle that could not be supported by a discretionary income of $842.25 annually. The family could apparently afford $202.79 per month as an average utility payment. Further, the family acquired a second car during the time period that Department employees were on the premises in the process of making its calculation and appraisal. The family had the funds to acquire and operate two cars, pay the utilities throughout 1993; and their personal property included certain items of antique furniture, at least four televisions, and three videocassette recorders. The Petitioner contended at hearing that Mr. Scott had no income because of the inverse condemnation proceedings because his work had been as a maintenance man for the operating Park. This is irrelevant in the context of relocation assistance, which concept is not designed to include considerations of whether the displacee is rendered unemployed by the taking of the property involved. It is also irrelevant factually because the year in question was 1992, and the relocation of people from the Park could not begin until 1993. Even then, Mr. Scott's maintenance duties would be needed for a certain period of time. Thirdly, there is also evidence that Mr. Scott worked on projects other than those located in the Park, for which he earned income. Mr. Scott did not provide tax returns, pay stubs, bank records, or a statement from his employer (his parents) despite numerous entreaties by the Department to do so. No more defining, verified evidence of the family income was offered at hearing. Accordingly, the income figures which the Petitioner provided are not credible. The family lifestyle and possessions evidence much more income than Mr. Scott would admit. The only evidence produced to verify Mr. Scott's income was sent from his mother some two months after the Department denied the "appeal". The statement is not credible, as Mrs. Scott alleged that in 1992, her son had been paid $842.25 for his work as a maintenance man. Mr. Scott's parents paid another resident of the Park $4,609.92 for performing the same type of work, at the same time. Further, the Petitioner testified inconsistently at hearing regarding income. She said on the one hand that Mr. Scott's parents "took the rent out of his paycheck", and on the other hand, said that he made approximately $127.00 per week as a maintenance man and Mrs. Scott "sometimes wrote him a check" and "would take out, you know, a little bit each week". This testimony demonstrates that, with the other evidence referenced above, the Allen-Scott family has not been forthcoming concerning its income. The totality of the evidence shows that Mr. Scott and his parents, as his employer, the source of the Petitioner's relevant income, had not been acting in good faith. Accordingly, it is reasonable to compute the relocation assistance payments by ignoring the 30 percent factor and instead merely subtracting the old rent and utilities from the new rent and utilities chargeable at the new premises occupied by the Allen- Scott family. The income figures presented by the Petitioner are simply unverified and are not credible. Another candidate for relocation assistance, Kirk Kostenko, a resident of the Park, refused to provide income verification. In his situation, as in that of the Allen-Scott family, represented by the Petitioner, the income figures presented by the Petitioner were not accepted by the Department. In the Kostenko situation, no relocation assistance was paid. While the Petitioner argued and made reference to other families allegedly receiving much larger sums for relocation assistance from the Park, the Petitioner produced no evidence that different standards or criteria were applied in those situations, as opposed to those applied to her family situation involved in the relocation assistance payment question. She adduced no evidence that would demonstrate that the Department had acted in a manner departing from the standards of its rules and procedures or in a manner aberrant from its normal policy in calculating the relocation assistance payments in the manner found above. The relocation assistance program is not a social welfare program based upon actual financial need of a family or based upon the number of dependents involved. Rather, it is a program to compensate persons forced to find replacement housing because the Department acquires their private property, either through eminent domain or inverse condemnation. The assistance is based upon what the family was paying for its rent and utilities and what it would have to pay for them after relocation. The final figure presented and supported by the Department in this proceeding was calculated by applying the regular, accepted criteria set out in the Department's rules, regulations and procedures.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding that the relocation assistance benefit, which the Department proposes to award the Petitioner in the amount of $6,161.82, is reasonable and should be awarded. The Petition should be dismissed in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of September, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of September, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-4899 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact The Petitioner presented no discreetly set forth proposed findings of fact. Rather, in essence, the Petitioner's post-hearing "pleading", in letter form, consists essentially of argument concerning the quantity and quality of evidence. Therefore, specific rulings on proposed findings of fact cannot be made. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact The Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbers 1-34 are accepted, to the extent consistent with those made by the Hearing Officer. Those proposed findings of fact which are not consistent with those made by the Hearing Officer are rejected as being either not supported by preponderant evidence of record, being irrelevant, immaterial or unnecessary to the resolution of the disputed issues. COPIES FURNISHED: Ms. Emma Allen 3523-1 Alcoy Road Jacksonville, FL 32221 Thomas H. Duffy, Esq. Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0450 Attn: Diedre Grubbs, M.S. 58 Thornton J. Williams, Esq. General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458
The Issue Whether the Appellant has been paid relocation assistance benefits in accordance with the law and applicable regulations.
Findings Of Fact The Appellant, Mr. Alfred J. Harris, lived in a one bedroom mobile home on property identified as Parcel No. 145 on Interstate 95. The area on which Mr. Harris and his wife and daughter lived was needed for the Interstate Highway and Mr. Harris became eligible for relocation assistance funds. Relocation assistance eligibility was found to be Eleven Thousand One Hundred Fifty Dollars ($11,150.00) which was based on the difference between a comparable home and location and the land of Mr. Harris. The eligibility mistakenly did not include the mobile home on Mr. Harris' land. A comparable mobile home and lot was found for Mr. Harris and his family in the general area where he lived which could have been purchased for Twenty-Six Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($26,500.00) in relocation benefits as well as receiving payment of Fifteen Thousand Three Hundred Fifty Dollars ($15,350.00) for his land. It was not learned until after the computation for relocation assistance was made and paid that Mr. Harris and his wife had living with them a daughter. The fact that the mobile home was a one bedroom home and three people were living there removed the home from the condition of decent, safe and sanitary housing for the occupants therein. Had the computation been made for relocation assistance with the knowledge that the mobile home in which the Appellant lived did not meet the conditions for decent, safe and sanitary housing, the relocation assistance benefits would have been Nine Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($9,250.00) which is less Sixteen Hundred Dollars ($1,600.00), the amount for which Mr. Harris sold his mobile home. Mr. Harris was paid Sixteen Hundred Dollars ($1,600.00) more than he would have been entitled to had the Appellee, the Florida Department of Transportation, not made an error with respect to the mobile home which Mr. Harris later sold by transfer upon the buyer assuming the payments of Sixteen Hundred Dollars ($1,600.00). Mr. Harris and his family decided to buy a conventional type home for the sum of Twenty-Six Thousand Two Hundred Dollars ($26,200.00) rather than the comparable mobile home and land found by the Appellee for the Appellant which was valued at Twenty-Six Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($26,500.00) . Mr. Harris then refunded Three Hundred Dollars ($300.00) to the Appellee from the Eleven Thousand One Hundred Fifty Dollars ($11,150.00) he had received in relocation assistance. The problem of the overpayment by the Appellee to the Appellant was reviewed by the federal government which refused to absorb the relocation benefits overpaid to Mr. Harris in the amount of Sixteen Hundred Dollars ($1,600.00) but he Appellee, Florida Department of Transportation, agreed that inasmuch as it had made the error and overpaid the Appellant Sixteen Hundred Dollars ($1,600.00), it would absorb the mistake and not collect the amount from the Appellant. The Appellant, Mr. Harris, had misunderstood the error of Appellee and the amount of overpayments and was under the mistaken belief that the Department of Transportation, Appellee, owed him additional relocation assistance monies. Thus, he filed a Complaint on February 18, 1976.
Recommendation Dismiss the appeal inasmuch as the Appellee owes no monies to the Appellant. DONE and ORDERED this 28th day of April, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Philip S. Bennett, Esquire George L. Waas, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Mr. Alfred J. Harris 509 Tumbling Kling Road Fort Pierce, Florida Mr. Joseph A. Alfes, Chief Bureau of Right of Way Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
Findings Of Fact In March, 1992, the Department of Labor and Employment Security ("Department") issued a Request for Proposal and Bid Submittal ("RFP") seeking to lease approximately 21,033 square feet of office space in Pinellas Park, Florida. The RFP specifies that "approximately" 130 off-street no charge parking spaces were required for the exclusive use of the employees and clients of the Respondent. The RFP states that "[p]arking space must be under the control of the bidder and be suitably paved, lined, and bumper pads installed." The Department received two bids in response to the RFP; one submitted by Hart-Land Ext., Inc., ("Petitioner") and the other submitted by Resolving, Inc. Both bids were signed by James Hartley, as Vice President of the respective corporations. The Department initially determined that, on the basis of the representations contained in the bids, both bids were responsive. An evaluation committee determined that the bid submitted by the Petitioner was the lowest and best bid. On the basis of the evaluation, the Department awarded the bid to the Petitioner by letter dated May 13, 1992. Subsequent to the bid award, the Petitioner submitted several differing site plans to the Department. The site plans indicated various amendments to the configuration of parking spaces available. None of the plans indicated that there would be less than 130 parking spaces available for use by Department personnel. The Department suggests that the revisions of site plans raised doubts as to whether the property was under the control of the Petitioner, that such information was requested of the Petitioner and that appropriate responses were not forthcoming. Nothing in the site plans would suggest that the property was not under the Petitioner's control. The evidence establishes that sufficient information was provided by the Petitioner in response to Department inquiries related to property ownership. By letter dated August 24, 1992, the Department rescinded its award to the Petitioner. The stated reason for recission was that the Petitioner did not have control over 130 paved and lined parking spaces as the time of the bid opening. At the time the Petitioner submitted the proposal, it had the right, pursuant to an executed Contract for Sale and Purchase, to purchase the property which was identified in the proposal as the site upon which the office space was located. The contract was valid at all times material to this case. The Department accepts the existence of a valid Contract for Sale and Purchase as sufficient evidence of a bidder having control over the property proposed for use. The evidence establishes that at all times material to this case, the Petitioner controlled the property proposed for use in his response to the RFP. As to the parking requirements, the Department offered testimony asserting that the language in the RFP requires that such spaces be paved, lined, and bumper-pads installed, at the time the bid is submitted. The RFP includes no requirement, either express of implied, that the parking area proposed must be paved, lined, and bumpered at the time of bid submission. The Petitioner's response to the RFP met the parking requirements set forth therein. The Department asserts that because the parking spaces were not lined, it was unable to determine the number of spaces available in each area proposed for parking. The Department had ample opportunity to inspect the property proposed in the Petitioner's bid, and in fact, such inspections did occur. The Department reviewed site plans, floor plans, physically inspected the structure and had full access to the property. The fact that the parking spaces were not lined or bumper-padded at the time of bid submittal would have been obvious. Further, the RFP seeks to have "approximately" 130 spaces available. Of the 130 spaces the Petitioner said would be available, 118 spaces were paved at all times material to this case. The remaining 22 parking spaces were located in an unpaved area which would have been paved prior to the date upon which the Respondent would have occupied the building, at which time all 130 spaces would have been lined and bumper-padded also. Therefore, even if the agency's position that the RFP required paved spaces at time of bid submission were supported by evidence, the Petitioner's proposal would meet the requirement. Subsequent to the award of the project, the Petitioner closed the contract for sale in escrow and placed $150,000 in trust to close the sale. The Petitioner employed a general contractor, obtained completed floor plans, mechanical plans, electrical and plumbing plans for the structure, performed roof repairs and purchased new air conditioning equipment. At the request of Department's representatives, the Petitioner also made arrangements for additional parking spaces beyond the 130 spaces previously proposed, with the additional spaces being located off-site and across the street from the office space. The total cost of these actions is approximately $179,600. The purchase of the property and incurrence of related costs was done in good faith and in reliance upon the award of the project.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Labor and Employment Security enter a Final Order awarding proposed lease 540:0921 to Hart-Land, Ext., Inc. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 24th day of March, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of March, 1993. APPENDIX TO CASE NO. 92-5748BID The following constitute rulings on proposed findings of facts submitted by the parties. Petitioner The Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order. Respondent The Respondent's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: Rejected, unnecessary. Rejected as to reference of difficulty in determining availability of parking spaces, not supported by greater weight of evidence. Measurement would have established whether space was adequate. There is no evidence that it was not. 6-9. Rejected as to inference that submission of amended site plans was inappropriate, not supported by greater weight of evidence. There is no evidence that the agency rejected the proposal based on the amendment of site plans, irrelevant. As to the amendment of site plans being indicative of a lack of 130 paved spaces, rejected immaterial. 11. Rejected as to determination that such spaces were not available on property controlled by the Petitioner, not supported by credible and persuasive evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Shirley Gooding, Acting Secretary Suite 303, Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle S.E. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Cecilia Renn Chief Legal Counsel Suite 307, Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle, S.E. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 William H. Walker, Esquire NCNB Bank Building, Suite 403 501 First Avenue North St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Edward Dion, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Suite 307, Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle S.E. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2189
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is engaged in the business of interior design and space planning of residential and commercial structures. In conjunction with these activities, Petitioner also manufactures furniture and cabinets. In 1986, prior to relocation to the present business site, Petitioner's facilities in Davie, Florida, included a kitchen, business offices, manufacturing room and bathroom. In the rear of the building, Petitioner maintained a spray room for the painting of furniture. In June or July of 1986, Petitioner was required to relocate to Pompano Beach, Florida, as the result of a public taking of the property where it was previously situated for the construction of interstate highway 595 in Broward County, Florida. The parties stipulated at hearing that Petitioner is an eligible displacee under the federal government's Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970. Respondent administers the Act using federal law interpretations. Respondent also administers a corresponding state relocation aid program established by state law. Rules governing the state program are almost a verbatim duplicate of the federal program. Chapter 4 of Respondent's right-of-way procedures manual, comprised of state rules governing nonfederal relocation assistance, has been adopted by reference by Respondent as a formal administrative rule. Both federal and state rules are used in administration of federal relocation aid projects. Common requirements of the two sets of rules are given the same interpretations by Respondent. Petitioner was previously reimbursed by Respondent for various expenses related to relocation. Respondent denied reimbursement for Petitioner's expenses related to telephone "yellow page" advertising, consultant and legal fees, installation of an exhaust fan system, and the time Petitioner's employees spent meeting with officials regarding relocation. Petitioner's primary source of advertising in the previous location was the telephone directory yellow pages. Petitioner had run the advertisement in the yellow pages for approximately 10 years. The advertisement was paid for monthly by Petitioner. While cancellation for the remaining period of time on the advertisement contract was possible at the time of Petitioner's relocation, Petitioner did not cancel the contract since a call forwarding service was provided by the telephone company. This service informed callers at Petitioner's previous telephone number of the number at the new location. Since Petitioner continued using this telephone directory advertisement for the completed 12 month term of the contract, Respondent denied Petitioner's request for reimbursement of approximately $1,324 or 10 monthly payments of $132.40. Respondent's denial was based on the benefit Petitioner obtained from the telephone call message service providing potential customers with Petitioner's new number and federal regulations prohibiting reimbursement for additional operating expenses incurred because of operating in a new location. Respondent's employee informed Petitioner that the cost of "hooking up" extensive duct work from the spray paint booth at the new location to an exhaust fan would be reimbursed by Respondent. The original exhaust fan employed in Petitioner's operation at the previous location had consisted of a portable fan on a movable dolly with a three to four-foot vent pipe which allowed toxic fumes to be blown out of the rear door of the facility. The new facility location did not offer such a convenience for ventilation. Further, local ordinances and regulations prevented use of Petitioner's former exhaust system. Instead, Petitioner was required to acquire a new exhaust apparatus. The new equipment consisted of a ventilation fan which had to be permanently attached to the outside of the roof of the facility. Ductwork measuring 6 to 7 feet in length was connected to the fan through an opening cut into the roof. The ductwork extended into the building's interior spray booth from the roof. Petitioner sought reimbursement of $385 for a flange fitting necessary to connect the ductwork to the booth. Petitioner also sought reimbursement in the amount of $460 for an offset fitting used to line up the ductwork with structural aspects of the roof, and $525 for labor costs associated with connection of the ductwork. Respondent denied reimbursement of the entire amount of $1,370 on the basis that such a larger, more modern and comprehensive exhaust system constituted a building improvement and was not permitted under applicable regulations governing either federal and state relocation programs. Petitioner's vice president is Sherry Parrish. Ms. Parrish was employed by Petitioner as a consultant to design a front or display area in the new facility. Among other consultant duties, she evaluated and selected an improved telephone system, wall coverings, carpet and linoleum for the new location. Petitioner had previously utilized the services of its president, Jerry Parrish, as a consultant regarding layout of manufacturing space located at the rear of the new facility. Petitioner's payment to Mr. Parrish of approximately $2,000 for this service was previously reimbursed by Respondent. Petitioner's claim for reimbursement of $1,035 paid to Ms. Parrish for this purpose was denied by Respondent on the basis that the building at the new location was unfinished. Federal and state regulations governing reimbursement for such expenses require that the building which is the subject of relocation be an "existing structure" that is already built, finished and completed. The building had been issued a certificate of occupancy in accordance with local governmental regulations prior to Petitioner's move to the premises. Petitioner hired an attorney to draft a lease in response to the lease proffered by Petitioner's future landlord at the new location facility. Petitioner was charged $1,180 by the attorney for this service. The attorney also provided petitioner with consultation services regarding certain relocation sites and the relative commercial advantages and disadvantages of each site. On a professional basis, the attorney has provided this consultative service to a number of other small businesses. The amount of the attorney's consultation fee for this service to Petitioner was $2,405. Respondent, considering the attorney's services to be of a legal nature, denied all expense reimbursement related to these charges on the basis that reimbursement for legal fees is not permitted by federal or state regulations. Petitioner sought reimbursement for the time spent by its officers in conferences with Respondent's representatives regarding Petitioner's relocation. Conferences were generally held at the Petitioner's facility or by telephone. Petitioner's request for reimbursement of a total of $1,200 for this alleged loss of employee time was denied by Respondent on the basis that regulations did not permit reimbursement for time spent determining claims or claim eligibility. Petitioner was previously paid $1,000 by Respondent to cover the cost of search expenses incurred in looking for relocation sites. The initial property which Petitioner decided upon as a site for relocation became unavailable as a result of the progress of condemnation action involving Petitioner's old location. Petitioner undertook a second and successful search to find a suitable relocation site. Petitioner's request for reimbursement of an additional $1,500 for expenses related to the second search was denied by Respondent. Respondent noted that rules governing federal and state relocation expense reimbursement limit search expenses to $1,000.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered awarding Petitioner reimbursement for consultative fees paid to Sherry Parrish in the amount of $1,035 as an eligible relocation expense and denying all other claims for reimbursement. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of October, 1988, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of October, 1988. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings 1-6. Addressed. 7-10. Unnecessary to result reached. 11. Addressed. 12-14. Unnecessary to result reached. 15-16. Not supported by weight of the evidence. Corroborative only of self-serving assertion; hearsay. Addressed. Unnecessary to result reached. Also, facts evidence that payment by was to be for the "unused portion" of which there was none. Not supported by weight of the evidence. 21-28. Addressed; some portions unnecessary to result on this issue. 29-35. Addressed; some portions unnecessary to result reached. 36-41. Addressed; some portions unnecessary to result reached. 42. -49. Addressed in part; remainder unnecessary to result reached. 50-51. Addressed in part; remainder unnecessary for result reached. 52-53. Addressed in part; remainder rejected as legal conclusion unsupported by the evidence. Respondent's Proposed Findings 1-9. Addressed in part; remainder unnecessary to result. 10-16. Addressed. Addressed. Rejected; Hearsay. 19-24. Addressed. 25-26. Addressed in part; remainder unnecessary to result. Weight of the evidence does not support that the building was unfinished. Addressed. 29-33. Addressed. 34-41. Addressed in part; remainder unnecessary to result. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles Gardner, Esquire Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Douglas Reynolds, Esquire 499 Northwest 70 Avenue Suite 220 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33317-2443 Thomas H. Bateman, III, Esquire General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Hon. Kaye N. Henderson Secretary Haydon Burns Building Attn: Eleanor F. Turner, M.S. 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
Findings Of Fact Linda Duvon, an outdoor advertising inspector, identified as Petitioner's Exhibit 1 a photograph of the signs which were the subject of the Notice of Violation. Ms. Duvon inspected these signs, and they appeared to be in the right-of-way owned by the State of Florida. She inquired of Mr. Jim Chaplin if he owned these signs, and he claimed ownership of the signs. Harvey Walker, a surveyor for the Department of Transportation, testified that he surveyed the subject signs, having identified them by reference to the photograph, Exhibit 1, and determined that the signs were 38 feet within the State-owned right-of-way and 61 feet from the center line of U.S. 1, a State-maintained highway.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law above, the Hearing Officer recommends that the agency head give the Respondent 90 days to remove said sign and at the end of which time, if said sign has not been removed, directs its removal pursuant to Section 479.17, Florida Statutes, by Department of Transportation personnel. DONE and ORDERED this 1st day of June, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Charles Gardner, Esquire Richard C. Hurst, Administrator Department of Transportation Outdoor Advertising Section Haydon Burns Building Department of Transportation Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. James F. Chaplin c/o Chaplin Real Estate 5190 Overseas Highway Marathon, Florida 33050
Findings Of Fact Petitioner R. G. Furniture is in the business of manufacturing and selling extruded aluminum patio furniture. Petitioner is owned by Robert L. Gass, Jr., who was also the owner of the real estate which Petitioner occupies as a tenant. For purposes of this administrative proceeding and for purposes of relocation assistance benefits, the parties have stipulated that R. G. Furniture, Medallion Furniture, Mar-Tec Furniture, R. G. Cushion Co., Robert L. Gass, Jr., and all other related entities, corporations, or persons shall be treated as one party so that there will be no duplicity of claims made or of benefits paid. The patio furniture, umbrellas, and related items are both sold and manufactured by Petitioner on-site. Straight tubes of aluminum are cut to size, bent into shape, welded, finished, and electrostatically painted. Strapping is then applied, and the furniture is then fitted with custom-made cushions. After this process is completed, the furniture is shipped to the customer or sold on the showroom floor. The furniture moves through the system on an overhead conveyor through each stage of the fabrication process. The paint system is extremely complex and critical to the operation of the plant. As the furniture goes through the paint machine, a dry, powdered paint is applied through an electrostatic process which bonds positive and negative charges, after which the dry paint is melted in an oven and cured. Gass was the fee owner of the real property on which Petitioner, a company owned by him, operates. On September 3, 1987, the Department notified Gass that his real property was needed for a new highway, I-595 in Broward County, Florida. The project requiring acquisition of the real property and the relocation of Petitioner is a federally-funded highway construction project. The September 3, 1987, letter also notified Gass of a prenegotiation meeting. Pursuant to a contract with the Department, employees of Kaiser Engineers were responsible for both the acquisition of real property and relocation of personal property of businesses and persons being displaced by the I-595 project. Their duties included advising displacees regarding their rights, negotiating settlements, and approving payment of claims. Some of Kaiser's employees are involved with acquisition (acquiring ownership of real property) and different employees are responsible for relocation assistance (relocating personal property). An appraisal of the land and improvements at the manufacturing site was performed on behalf of the Department. The Department's real estate appraiser called in a machinery and equipment appraiser to estimate the then-current replacement cost new, market value in-place, and salvage value of certain "immovable business fixtures and special purpose process systems". That appraisal was performed by Gary Maehl as of December 19, 1987. The appraisal prepared by Maehl for Kaiser Engineers contained 20 categories/items, consisting primarily of the painting machinery and the assembly line. Although the cover sheet to Maehl's full report is entitled "Immoveable Business Fixtures and Special Purpose Process Systems," there is no evidence that Gass ever saw more of the report than the 3-page listing of the 20 items which was entitled "Inventory." The components of the 20 categories/items are all movable. They are either freestanding or are attached to the building by nuts and bolts. Seventeen of the 20 items are easily movable. The component parts of the painting system and assembly line are bolted together. Those parts are bought and sold new and used on the open market. Even the freight elevator is movable. At all times material hereto, Gass has intended to continue in the furniture manufacturing business at a replacement site. It is not disputed that the painting machinery and assembly line are necessary to the operation of the furniture factory. Gass began receiving correspondence and informational packets from Kaiser Engineers regarding various relocation benefits to which he and his businesses would be entitled as eligible displacees. By March 9, 1988, Gass had been notified of his company's eligibility for relocation benefits, and negotiations for the acquisition of his real property had begun. Using its standard form Right-Of-Way Purchase Agreement, the Department made a written offer to Gass to acquire his property, one of the largest properties involved in the I-595 project. Gass, through his attorney, rejected that offer. One of Gass' concerns involved the "down time" he would incur in his business if he were required to disassemble, move, reassemble and install his assembly line and painting system process. The disassembly, moving, reassembly, and installation would take from 3 to 6 months, or more, essentially putting him out of business for an extended period of time. One of the relocation benefits for which a displaced business may be eligible involves the concept of substitute personal property. Under that concept, a business may purchase new equipment and machinery, such as an assembly line or specialized process, and have it fully installed and operational before relocating the business. At that time, the old machinery and equipment is shut down, and the business moves to the relocation site ready to continue production with its operational replacement equipment. In that manner, a business suffers only the disruption involved in the physical move of its other personal property and its employees. It was important to Gass that he have a replacement assembly line and painting system process operational before moving to the relocation site. On August 22, 1988, Gass entered into a Right-Of-Way Purchase Agreement with the Department to which was attached an Addendum required by him. The Addendum was specifically incorporated by reference. The Agreement also required a higher purchase price than the Department's first offer to Gass. Although the Department contends that the Agreement is used only to purchase real property, paragraph III. (c) of the Department's standard form agreement contains the following language: "All personal property included in the purchase price shall be delivered to PURCHASER in the same condition existing as of the date of this agreement." The Addendum also contained, in part, the following language: Seller shall retain title to all movable items and all items of personal property not identified as fixtures in the attached Exhibit "A". Seller retains his right to relocation benefits under the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, as amended, and PURCHASER agrees to pay said benefits upon receipts [sic] of appropriate application from Seller. Exhibit "A" was the listing of 20 items prepared by appraiser Gary Maehl. The total purchase price for the land, improvements thereon, and the 20 items on the Maehl inventory was $3,985,000. The parties to the Agreement added a footnote to specify that the total purchase price included all costs and attorneys fees in settlement in lieu of condemnation. Terry E. Morris, the land acquisition director of Kaiser Engineers, who personally handled the acquisition of the manufacturing site since the parcel was one of the largest properties involved in the project, designated $477,000 of the purchase price to be for the items listed on the Maehl inventory. This figure represents their depreciated value in-place. Gass netted $88,000 from the transaction. Although R. G. Furniture has not yet moved to its replacement site, Gass made application to the Department for relocation benefits to purchase replacement items for the items contained in the Maehl inventory, primarily those items needed to begin assembling and installing a new assembly line and painting system process. The Department's denial of that claim is the subject of this proceeding. Although relocation benefits are usually not payable prior to the relocation, except in cases of justified hardship, the concept of substitute personal property would embody payment prior to relocation, and the parties have stipulated that the issue of eligibility regarding the items listed in the Maehl inventory only is ripe for adjudication. The relocation benefit involving substitute personal property is computed using two different formulas. One of those formulas contemplates that the property being replaced will be sold, and the sales price will be deducted from the cost of purchasing and installing the replacement equipment. There is no prohibition against the Department being the purchaser of the property which is being replaced. Petitioner is an eligible displacee. It is an on-going business being displaced as a result of a federally-funded highway project. All of the items listed in Maehl's inventory are items of personal property. Petitioner is entitled to relocation benefits for substitute personal property for those items. At the time of the final hearing in this cause, the cost of substitute items including installation at the replacement site was $752,900. The estimated cost of moving and reinstalling the replaced items, with no allowance for storage, is $494,100.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Petitioner entitled to relocation benefits for substitute personal property and paying Petitioner the sum of $275,900 as partial payment of the relocation benefits to which Petitioner is entitled. DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of September, 1991, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of September, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Petitioner's second through fourth, eleventh, and twelfth unnumbered paragraphs have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's first, fifth through tenth, and thirteenth through eighteenth unnumbered paragraphs have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting conclusions of law, argument of counsel, or recitation of the testimony. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 1, 2, 4-8, and 10-13 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 3, 9, 14, 15, 19, 20, 23, and 24 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting conclusions of law, argument of counsel, or recitation of the testimony. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 17, 18, 21, and 22 have been rejected as not being supported by the weight of credible evidence in this cause. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 16 and 25 have been rejected as being unnecessary for determination of the issues herein. COPIES FURNISHED: Ben G. Watts, Secretary Florida Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, M.S. #58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Attn: Eleanor F. Turner Charles G. Gardner Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, M.S. #58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 J. Philip Landsman, Esquire Margaret Z. Villella, Esquire Platt, Haas & Landsman, P.A. Broward Financial Centre 500 East Broward Boulevard, Suite 1850 Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33394
The Issue Dr. Mark H. Feldman maintained a practice in podiatry at 1101 West Broward Boulevard, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. A widening and upgrading of Broward Boulevard resulted in a taking of a portion of the building in which Dr. Feldman maintained his practice. Because the widening of this highway was a part of a federal aid project, the doctor became eligible for certain payments to businesses as provided in the manual of Right-of-Way Bureau operating procedures and incorporated by reference into the Florida Administrative Code as Chapter 14-1. The provisions concerning payments to businesses include payment of actual reasonable expenses in moving the business and personal property, direct loss of tangible personal property in moving or discontinuing the business and actual reasonable expenses in searching for a replacement business. Further, in lieu of payment for actual moving and losses as indicated above, a fixed payment may be paid. Dr. Feldman applied for a fixed payment and was denied by the Department of Transportation. The Department of Transportation based its denial on two grounds: Dr. Feldman had already received payments for reasonable expenses, direct less of personal property and discontinuing his business, and for search of a replacement business site; and Dr. Feldman was ineligible for a fixed payment because the doctor maintained a commercial enterprise with more than one establishment, which was not being acquired by the State or the United States and was engaged in the same or similar business. Dr. Feldman asserted that he accepted payment because of the representation of employees of the Department and that he did not maintain two (2) business locations.
Findings Of Fact Dr. Mark H. Feldman maintained a practice in podiatry at 1101 West Broward Boulevard in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. A portion of the building in which Dr. Feldman maintained his practice was taken by the State under a construction project, which was partially federally funded, to widen Broward Boulevard. As a result of this taking, it was necessary for Dr. Feldman to move his practice. Dr. Feldman became eligible for certain payments to businesses required to move because of such construction. Dr. Feldman asserted that prior to receipt of the Department's notice, he engaged in discussions with representatives of the Department regarding his options. Dr. Feldman requested consideration for fixed payment in lieu of actual moving expenses, which resulted in a preliminary investigation by the Department of Transportation. This investigation revealed that in addition to maintenance of his practice at 1101 West Broward Boulevard. Dr. Feldman also was listed in the telephone directory and in the building directory as maintaining offices at 7301 North University Drive, Tamarack, Florida. This second location was not affected by any taking. Based upon this information, the Department made a determination that the doctor was not eligible for fixed payment in lieu of actual moving expenses because Dr. Feldman's business affected by the taking was part of a commercial enterprise having at least one other establishment which was not being acquired by the State or the United States and which was engaged in the same or similar business. See Right-of-Way Bureau Operating Procedures Manual, 4.3.7E(1)(b). Based upon this initial denial, and having received notice that he could only be guaranteed 90 days' occupancy, Dr. Feldman applied for actual expenses, which were paid. Thereafter, Dr. Feldman submitted his application for fixed payment in lieu of actual moving expenses, which was denied on the basis that he had received actual moving expenses. Approximately one year prior to the announcement by the Department of the incipient taking of the property of 1101 West Broward Boulevard, Dr. Feldman had been in practice with another podiatrist, Harry Westridge. Dr. Westridge originally maintained his practice at 1101 West Broward Boulevard. Dr. Westridge had joined Dr. Feldman's practice at 7301 North University Drive in Tamarack several years ago. In April of 1977, Dr. Westridge purchased Dr. Feldman's practice at North University Drive. As a part of their agreement, Dr. Feldman took over the lease and personal property located at 1101 West Broward Boulevard. Further, as a part of their agreement, Dr. Feldman agreed to permit Dr. Westridge to utilize his name in conjunction with the Tamarack practice. Both doctors explained that this was because Dr. Westridge was a newcomer to the area and was purchasing the "good will" in Dr. Feldman's practice, and it protected Dr. Feldman's investment if Dr. Westridge was unable to meet his obligations under the purchase agreement. However, both doctors testified that subsequent to Dr. Westridge's purchase of the practice Dr. Feldman did not maintain regular office hours at the Tamarack address, did not regularly see patients at the Tamarack address, and had seen approximately twelve (12) patients at the Tamarack address between April of 1977, and April of 1978. This included consultations and referrals to Dr. Feldman by Dr. Westridge. The nature of his surgical practice in podiatry prevented Dr. Feldman from waiting to move his practice until the Department of Transportation took his property where he was located. Further, Dr. Feldman could not afford to move his practice without assistance. Dr. Feldman only applied for payment of his actual expenses, which he received, when he was initially told he did not qualify for in-lieu of payment.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Department of Transportation pay Dr. Feldman a fixed payment in lieu of actual expenses and offset any amounts paid to Dr. Feldman against the fixed payment. DONE and ORDERED this 2nd day of November, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Dr. Mark H. Feldman 6468 Racket Club Drive Lauderhill, Florida 33319 =================================================================
The Issue The issue presented is whether Petitioner City of Opa Locka is responsible for reimbursing the Department of Transportation for the cost of relocating water and sewer lines owned and maintained by Petitioner within the State Road 916 right-of-way.
Findings Of Fact Opa Locka Boulevard and N. W. 135 Street in Dade County, Florida, are paired one-way streets between I-95 and N. W. 27 Avenue. They are located within the city limits of the City of Opa Locka and have been designated as State Road 916. Public records reveal that the portions of Opa Locka Boulevard and N. W. 135 Street which were involved in the Department’s road construction project and the right-of-way attendant to those streets were dedicated to perpetual public use by private landowners platting subdivisions between 1928 and 1956. In 1959 the City of Opa Locka transferred those roadways and rights-of-way to Dade County, Florida, so that the County would be responsible for maintaining them. In 1979 Dade County transferred its interests to the Department. The State Road 916 designation was subsequently made. The Department determined the need to improve those streets by widening them and making other improvements such as installing drainage and lighting. As the Department prepared to begin that project, it conducted a utility pre-design meeting on May 26, 1992. Such a meeting involves the Department’s employees who will be supervising portions of a road improvement project and representatives of the owners of utilities located within the area of anticipated construction. The owners of utilities are advised as to the details and extent of the anticipated construction, and they mark maps as to the location of their utilities. As the road design process proceeds, agreements are made and relocation schedules are prepared. If practical, the Department will design the road around utilities which conflict with the location of the roadway. If designing around the utility is not practical, the owner is required to relocate any utility which conflicts with the Department’s roadway or which interferes with the construction project. If the utility owner intends to relocate its own utilities, a Utility Relocation Schedule is agreed upon by the owner and the Department. If the owner requests that the Department do the relocation work and agrees to pay the costs in advance, a Joint Participation Agreement is entered into, and the Department’s contractor performs the work. The City’s consulting engineer attended the May 1992 utility pre-design meeting and attended many subsequent meetings. Subsequent meetings were also attended by the City’s public works director and the City’s project engineer. During the pre-design and design stages of the road project, the Department was able to design around all utilities or obtain voluntarily removal or relocation by all utility owners except the City. The City maintained that it could not afford to remove or relocate its water and sewer lines. Both the City and the Department were very concerned about the location of the City’s lines and about the lines themselves. The lines were made of cement asbestos and were old. Cement asbestos lines cannot withstand nearby construction and will break. Neither the Department nor the City wanted the lines to break during construction, and the Department did not want to build new roads and have the lines underneath breaking afterward, requiring re-construction. As feared, the City’s sewer line ruptured while another utility owner was relocating its utilities in the area of the City’s sewer line prior to the Department’s construction work. Further, as a result of that other utility owner’s relocation work, it was discovered that the City’s water and sewer lines within the project limits were not in fact located where the City’s maps of the lines reflected. Therefore, the City’s utilities posed a danger to the construction project, and the Department could not allow the lines to remain wherever they were. Due to the City’s position that it could not afford to remove or relocate its water and sewer lines and due to the Department’s need to proceed with the construction project, the Department and the City’s representatives agreed that the Department would issue to the City a 30-day notice to remove or relocate, but the City would not do so. The Department would then do the work for the City, and the City would reimburse the Department for its costs under a reimbursement plan yet to be negotiated. That meeting was attended by the City’s consulting engineer, the City’s former public works director, and the City’s current public works director. Everyone attending agreed that the lines needed to be replaced with newer, stronger lines. The Department agreed to issue the 30-day notice, do the work, and then seek reimbursement from the City since doing so was the only solution to the problem which would allow the road project to proceed without substantial damages and increased costs due to delay. Based upon that agreement and the City’s inability to pay the costs of relocating its water and sewer lines, no Utility Relocation Schedule or Joint Participation Agreement was entered into by the City and the Department. The City’s consulting engineer drew preliminary plans for the relocation of the City’s utilities, and the Department submitted those plans to its contractor to obtain bids for the City’s relocation work. The contractor priced the work and obtained three bids. The subcontract was awarded, the prime contractor added its overhead costs, and that became the anticipated cost. The Department kept the City advised as to additional costs as they were incurred. On July 7, 1993, the Department issued its 30-day notice to the City, expecting the City to respond in the agreed non-adversarial manner. Instead, the City requested this administrative proceeding. As the work was actually performed, the City expressed no disagreement with the materials used or the construction techniques. The City’s representatives were frequent visitors to the construction site since the actual work disclosed more problems. Not only were the City’s utilities not located where the City indicated they were but also the construction crews encountered lines which the City did not know existed. These problems caused additional delays in the project and thereby caused additional expenses to the Department. The reasonable and necessary costs incurred by the Department to remove and relocate the City’s utilities within the project limits total $791,751.07
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED THAT a Final Order be entered finding Petitioner City of Opa Locka responsible for reimbursing the Department of Transportation in the amount of $791,751.07 for the costs incurred in relocating and replacing the City's water and sewer utilities. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of April, 1997, at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of April, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Patricia C. Ellis, City Attorney City of Opa Locka 777 Sharazad Boulevard Opa Locka, Florida 33054 Francine M. Ffolkes Assistant General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation c/o Diedre Grubbs Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Pamela Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that all charges against Respondent be DISMISSED. DONE and ENTERED this 5th day of April, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of April, 1982.
