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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. CHARLES LAWRENCE ROSS, 75-001898 (1975)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 75-001898 Latest Update: Sep. 27, 1976

Findings Of Fact While in Puerto Rico, in 1971, the Respondent was charged with violation of Article 29, Drug and Narcotics Law, which charges were brought in the Superior Court of Puerto Rico, Court of Aguadilla. These case numbers were information numbers, G-71-54 and G-71-55. These charges were made on March 9, 1971 for alleged offenses which were committed on February 16, 1971. The information which shows these case numbers can be found in Petitioner's Exhibit "D", admitted into evidence. On March 10, 1971, the Respondent was found guilty of the offenses charged in cases G-71-54 and G-71-55. The record shows that in case no. G-71-54, the Respondent was convicted by a judgement entered on March 10, 1971. On April 14, 1971, in case number G-71-54 and case number G-71-55 the Superior Court, of Puerto Rico, Court of Aguadilla, sentenced the Respondent to a term of five to eight years in prison by confinement at hard labor, which sentences were suspended. By such suspension, the Respondent was committed to the legal custody of the court until the expiration of the maximum term of the sentence under certain general conditions for the Respondent's conduct, and was given a special condition that he contact the Florida Parole and Probation Commission, District Office, at Room 180, Courthouse, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. The judgement in case number G-71-54 and the conditions of sentence may be found in Petitioner's Exhibit "F", admitted into evidence. The judgement in case number G-71-55 may be found in Petitioner's Exhibit "E" admitted into evidence. On September 16, 1973, the Respondent completed an application for registration as a real estate salesman with the Florida Real Estate Commission, which application was completed under oath. Within that application for registration is found a question number "9". This question reads as follows: "9. Have you ever been arrested for or charged with the commission of an offense against the laws of any municipality, state or nation including traffic offenses, without regard to whether sentence has been passed or served, or whether the verdict or judgement has been reversed or set aside or not, or pardon or parole granted?" to which the Respondent replied, "yes". Question nine further stated, "if yes state details in full", to which the Respondent replied, "(see attached statement)". The attachment spoken of is found in the Petitioner's Exhibit "C", and this attachment sets forth the Respondent's explanation of his answer to the initial part of question nine. Subsequent to the completion of the form the Respondent was registered with the Florida Real Estate Commission as a real estate salesman, from February 21, 1974 through March 31, 1975. From May 8, 1975, up to, and including March 31, 1975, the Respondent has been accepted as a registrant, non-active real estate salesman.

Recommendation It is recommended that the Respondent be released from accountability under the charge found in the subject administrative complaint. DONE and ENTERED this 20th day of July, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Louis B. Guttmann, III, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 Mr. Charles Lawrence Ross 3789 Southwest 41st Street Hollywood, Florida 33023

Florida Laws (2) 475.17475.25
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FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION vs. CAROLYNE L. RAY, T/A CAROLYNE L. RAY REALTY, 87-002646 (1987)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 87-002646 Latest Update: Dec. 15, 1987

Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent was a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida having been issued license number 0072124. On or about September 6, 1986, the Respondent as seller/owner and Kenneth and Alicia Pelczar as purchasers entered into an agreement for the sale and purchase of Lot 10, Bowden Acres Subdivision, located in Duval County, Florida for the total purchase price of $79,000. Upon execution of the agreement, the purchasers deposited the sum of $1,500.00 with the Respondent which was to be part of the down payment, provided the sale of the property was finalized. The check from the Pelczars was cashed by the Respondent on October 24, 1986. The agreement provided remedies to both the seller and the purchasers if either party defaulted. Under the agreement no commission was to be paid on the sale of the property. The Pelczars were aware that the Respondent owned the property and that they were dealing with her as the owner, not as a real estate broker. The deposit was not paid to Respondent as a real estate broker to be held in trust but was paid to Respondent as part of a down payment to be applied to the total purchase price, if the transaction closed, and subject to being retained as liquidated damages if the purchasers defaulted under the agreement. The Respondent suffered financial difficulties, and on November 19, 1986, the bank foreclosed on several parcels of property owned by the Respondent, including the property Respondent had under contract with the Pelczars. However, the bank gave Respondent written authority to go forward with the sale to the Pelczars. The reason for the Pelczars' refusal to close the transaction on November 14, 1986, is not clear but they refused and demanded the return of the deposit. Respondent retained the deposit under the default clause of the agreement, and has refused to return any portion.

Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law the evidence in the record and the demeanor and candor of the witnesses, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a Final Order DISMISSING the Amended Administrative Complaint filed herein. Respectfully submitted and entered this 15th day of December, 1987, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of Decemeber, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-2646 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the Petitioner in this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3 but clarified. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6 but clarified. The fact that the closing was to be on November 14, 1986, is adopted in Finding of Fact 6. The balance of paragraph 5 is rejected as not being supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. The fact that the bank authorized the sale of the house after foreclosure is adopted in Finding of Fact 6. The balance of paragraph 7 is rejected as not supported by substantial competent evidence in the record with the exception of the fact that Respondent has not returned the deposit. Rejected since it is a statement of Respondent's testimony rather than a finding of fact. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3 but clarified. 5.-7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. 8.-9. Rejected since it is a statement of Respondent's and Kenneth Pelczar's testimony rather than a finding of fact. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Rejected since it is a statement of Respondent's testimony rather than a finding of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven W. Johnson, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Larry L. Bryan, Esquire 1420 North Third Street Jacksonville, Florida 32250 Darlene F. Keller, Acting Director Division of Real Estate Department of Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802

Florida Laws (3) 120.57475.011475.25
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. GEORGE A. HEYEN, 75-002052 (1975)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 75-002052 Latest Update: Mar. 22, 1977

Findings Of Fact George A. Heyen is a duly registered real estate salesman with the Florida Real Estate Commission, and was so registered and has been so registered continuously since October 1, 1972, as evidenced by Petitioner's Exhibit number 1. While serving in the capacity as a real estate salesman, the Respondent entered into a listing agreement with one Thomas S. Bowers and Brenda L. Bowers, his wife. This agreement was drawn on December 11, 1973 and is Petitioner's Exhibit number 4. On February 6, 1974, a purchase and sell agreement was drawn up by the Respondent and entered into between Maria A. Hindes and the Bowers. This purchase and sell agreement is Petitioner's Exhibit number 3. This contract of February 6, 1974 was submitted to Molton, Allen and Williams, Mortgage Brokers, 5111 66th Street, St. Petersburg, Florida. The contract, as drawn, was rejected as being unacceptable for mortgage financing, because it failed, to contain the mandatory FHA clause. When the Respondent discovered that the February 6, 1974 contract had been rejected, a second contract of February 8, 1974 was prepared. A copy of this contract is Petitioner's Exhibit number 5. The form of the contract, drawn on February 8, 1974, was one provided by Molton, Allen and Williams. When, the Respondent received that form he prepared it and forged the signature of Mr. and Mrs. Bowers. The explanation for forging the signatures as stated in the course of the hearing, was to the effect that it was a matter of expediency. The expediency referred to the fact that the parties were anxious to have a closing and to have the transaction completed, particularly the sellers, Mr. and Mrs. Bowers. Therefore, in the name of expediency the signatures were forged. Testimony was also given that pointed out the Bowers were very hard to contact in and around the month of February, 1974, and some testimony was given to the effect that the Bowers made frequent trips to Ohio, but it was not clear whether these trips would have been made in the first part of February, 1974. The Bowers discovered that their name had been forged when they went to a closing on April 11, 1974. They refused to close the loan at that time. On April 24, 1974, a new sales contract was followed by a closing which was held on April 26, 1974 and a copy of the closing statement is Petitioner's Exhibit number 6. The Respondent has received no fees or commissions for his services in the transaction and there have been no further complaints about the transaction. Prior to this incident, the Respondent, George A. Heyen, was not shown to have had any disciplinary involvement with the Florida Real Estate Commission and has demonstrated that he has been a trustworthy individual in his business dealings as a real estate salesman.

Recommendation It is recommended that the registration of the registrant, George A. Heyen, be suspended for a period not to exceed 30 days. DONE and ENTERED this 8th day of April, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Richard J. R. Parkinson, Esquire Associate Counsel Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 George A. Heyen c/o Gregoire-Gibbons, Inc. 6439 Central Avenue St. Petersburg, Florida 33710

Florida Laws (1) 475.25
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. SAM KAYE AND SAM KAYE, INC., 77-000047 (1977)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 77-000047 Latest Update: Nov. 02, 1977

The Issue The issue in Count I is whether Section 475.42(1)(j) absolutely prohibits a broker or salesman from filing a lien or other encumberance against real property to collect a commission. The issue in Count II is whether the Respondents violated a lawful order of the Commission by failing to remove the motion of lis pendens contrary to Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes.

Conclusions Section 475.42(1)(j), Florida Statutes, provides as follows: "No real estate broker or salesman shall place, or cause to be placed, upon the public records of any county, any contract, assignment, deed, will, mortgage, lien, affidavit, or other writing which purports to affect the title of, or encumber, any real property, if the same is known to him to be false, void, or not authorized to be placed of record, or not executed in the form entitling it to be recorded, or the execution of recording thereof has not been duly authorized by the owner of the property, maliciously or for the purpose of collecting a commission, or to coerce the payment of money to the broker or salesman or other person, or for any unlawful purpose." Clearly the Respondents placed or caused to be placed the notice of lis pendens in question. A notice of lis pendens is clearly an "other writing which purports to effect the title of, or encumber, any real property." The Florida Real Estate Commission argues that this provision is an absolute bar to the filing of any lien for the purpose of collecting a commission. The Respondents argue that this provision is not an absolute bar and there are circumstances when a broker may file a notice of lis pendens. They also assert that the notice of lis pendens falls within the exception because the Circuit Court refused to remove the notice of lis pendens upon motion of the property owner. Lastly, it is argued that the notice was filed by counsel for the Respondents in good faith on an action at law and that this mitigates their action even if there was a violation. The language of Section 475.42(1)(j) cannot be read to absolutely prohibit a broker from obtaining a lis pendens. When given this construction, it effectively denies brokers and salesmen access to the courts for redress of injury as provided in Article I, Section 21 of the Florida Constitution. Section 475.42(1)(j) is a complex provision which is subject to two interpretations. One interpretation would prohibit a broker or salesman from filing an encumberance if the same were known to him to be false, void or not authorized by law; if not authorized to be upon the public records; if not executed in the form entitling it to be recorded; if the execution of recording thereof has not been duly authorized by the owner of the property; if maliciously (filed); if for the purpose of collecting a commission, if to coerce payment of money to the broker or salesman or other person; or if for any other unlawful purpose. This first interpretation would consider each clause a separate limitation on filing an encumberance. The facts analyzed under this interpretation do not show any knowledge by Respondents that the lis pendens was false, void or not authorized to be filed or not on a form entitling it to be recorded. The facts do not show that Respondents filed the lis pendens maliciously, for the purpose of collecting a commission, or for the purpose of coercing payment of money to the broker or salesman, or for any unlawful purpose. The nature of lis pendens would not require the owner's authorization of execution for recording. The facts show that the lis pendens was filed by Respondent's attorney in conjunction with a suit brought by the Respondents against Perrin. The record also shows that the circuit court determined that the lis pendens was recordable when it denied the motion to remove it. The notice of lis pendens was neither malicious, coercive or for the purpose of collecting the commission. The notice was for the purpose of perfecting the claim against the property for execution of the judgment if the Respondents prevailed in the suit. Executing on a judgment is different from collecting the commission or coercing payment. Under this interpretation the Respondents have not been shown to violate Section 475.42(1)(j). A second interpretation would read the clause, ". . . if the same is known to to him to be false, void, or not authorized to be placed of record, or not executed in the form entitling it to be recorded, or the execution of recording thereof has not been authorized by the owner of the property. . ." as the first of two criteria to be met to establish a violation. The second criteria would consist of proof that the encumberance was recorded maliciously or for the purpose of collecting a commission, or to coerce payment of money to the broker or salesman, or for any unlawful purpose. Again the facts do not show there was knowledge by the Respondents of the falsity, or impropriety of the notice of lis pendens, as stated above. Again the facts show that the lis pendens was filed in conjunction with a law suit pending between the Respondent and the property owner, and that the court before which the action was pending refused to remove it. The file of the notice by Respondent's counsel was a legitimate method of perfecting the Respondent's claim should they prevail and obtain judgment. The facts do not indicate that the filing of the notice was malicious, coercive or for the purpose of collecting a commission. Under either interpretation, Respondents did not violate the statute. COUNT II The Respondents are charged in Count II with violation of Section 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes, which provides that the registration of a registrant may be suspended for up to two years for violation of a lawful order of the Commission. Clearly, the facts reveal that the Respondents had a substantial interest involved in the litigation with Perrin. The order, of the Florida Real Estate Commission to remove the notice of lis pendens substantially affected their rights in this litigation. Therefore, any final order directing Kay to remove the notice of lis pendens should have issued after an opportunity for hearing pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes. The evidence reveals that the Florida Real Estate Commission did not notice a hearing under Section 120.57, and therefore its order cannot be "lawful." The provisions of Section 475.25(1)(d) require that registrants not violate lawful orders. The Respondents have not violated Section 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes, by not removing the notice of lis pendens as directed by the order of the Florida Real Estate Commission.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Hearing Officer recommends that no action be taken against the Respondent, Sam Kaye and Sam Kaye, Inc. DONE and ORDERED this 23rd day of September 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce I. Kamelhair, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 William E. Boyes, Esquire Cone, Owen, Wagner, Nugent, Johnson & McKeown, P.A. Post Office Box 3466 West Palm Beach, Florida 33402

Florida Laws (3) 120.57475.25475.42
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. JAMES R. SIEBERT, 81-003270 (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-003270 Latest Update: Jul. 19, 1982

The Issue Whether Respondent's license as a real estate broker should be suspended or revoked, or the licensee otherwise disciplined, for alleged violation of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, as set forth in Administrative Complaint, dated December 4, 1981. This proceeding involves allegations by the Florida Board of Real Estate (now Florida Real Estate Commission) that Respondent, James R. Siebert, violated Subsection 475.25(1)(h) Florida Statutes, by sharing a commission with a person not properly licensed under the real estate law, and that he employed a person as a salesman who is not the holder of a valid license, in violation of Subsection 475.42(1)(c) , Florida Statutes, and therefore in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(a), Florida Statutes. The incident which prompted the Administrative Complaint involved an auction sale of a restaurant in Brooksville, Florida which was conducted by an auctioneer who did not have a license to practice real estate in Florida. Respondent requested an administrative hearing and filed an answer to the Administrative Complaint admitting the occurrence of the auction, but denying that it involved the sale of real estate.

Findings Of Fact Respondent, James L. Siebert, is a licensed real estate broker at Orange Lake, Florida, and was so licensed at all times relevant in this proceeding. (Stipulation) On several occasions prior to February 21, 1981, Respondent had gratuitously assisted Albert W. (Billy) Mitchell, an auctioneer, in conducting auctions by serving as a "ring man" and clerk. A "ring man" normally is one of several such individuals at an auction who assists the auctioneer by encouraging bidding and identifying bidders. Mitchell is not licensed under real estate laws of Florida, but operates under a local occupation license. None of the prior auctions in which Respondent assisted Mitchell involved the sale of real estate. (Testimony of Respondent, Mitchell) On January 28, 1981, Mitchell entered into an "auction sale contract" with Welberta Pruitt whereby Mitchell agreed to sell at auction to the highest and best bidder: . . . the following described business and personal property owned by the Party of the First Part: Pruitts Golden Wagon Steak House Restaurant and Contents on attached inventory list and located 1702 Howell Avenue, Brooksville, in Hernando County, State of Florida. The terms of this sale shall be 10 percent of the amount of the purchase price to be paid on day of sale and the balance to be paid as follows: On delivery of title - There is a mortgage on the business of $67,838.20 with interest at 8 3/4 percent on the unpaid balance. The attachment to the contract listed various items of food supplies and restaurant furniture and equipment, plus decorative items of personal property. Pruitt and her husband had purchased the real property on which the restaurant building was located under an agreement for deed in 1979 which provided that the Pruitts would make the payments on a mortgage of about $67,000 from the sellers to the First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Citrus County and, when such mortgage was paid in full, the sellers would convey title to the property by warranty deed. The contract reflected that the total purchase price of the property was $75,000, and that a down payment had been made in the sum of $7,000. Mrs. Pruitt owned furniture, fixtures and equipment which she transported from Tennessee to operate a restaurant on the premises. (Testimony of W. Pruit Kelly, Mitchell, Johnston, Respondent's Exhibits 1,2) It was the understanding of the parties to the auction agreement that only the personal property in and around the restaurant building would be sold to the highest bidder, and it was anticipated that the successful bidder would take up the mortgage payments on the real property. The equity which the Pruitts had acquired by prior mortgage payments was to be "given" to whoever purchased the "business" at the auction. Accordingly, on February 20, 1981, the day preceding the auction, Mrs. Pruitt issued a "notice" that she would sell her "entire Restaurant, business, furnishings, equipment, and Inventory at Public Auction". The notice further stated that she would give her equity in the real estate to the purchaser on which there was an existing mortgage of $67,821.36 "that you may assume". The noticewas placed on the door of the restaurant. In addition, Mitchell issued a brochure advertising the auction wherein it was stated that the "entire business, furnishings, equipment, and stock" would he sold at absolute auction and that the purchaser would have the "privilege of assuming the payments on the existing mortgage." Mitchell had Respondent's name placed at the bottom of the brochure without Respondent's knowledge because he thought it would be a good advertisement for him. (Testimony of Mitchell, W. Pruitt, Petitioner's Exhibit 3, Respondent's Exhibit 3) Mitchell asked Respondent to assist at the Pruitt auction and told him that since Mrs. Pruitt and her attorney were having a disagreement, it might be necessary for Respondent to write the contract resulting from the auction. No fee for Respondent's services was discussed prior to the auction. (Testimony of Mitchell, Respondent) On February 21, 1981, the auction was conducted at the restaurant in Brooksville, and Respondent was present to act as a "ring man". There were only about 3 individuals who entered bids at the auction. Prior to receiving bids, Mitchell announced that he was auctioning the contents of the business and that whoever bought the property would take over the payments on the mortgage. The successful bidder was Robert Shrader, who bid $9,600. He made a 20 percent down payment at the time in the amount of $1,920 which Mitchell retained as a commission on the sale. Mitchell had not described the real estate at the auction, but merely stated that he was auctioning the business and that Mrs. Pruitt would give the successful bidder her equity in the property. After accepting Schrader's bid, Mitchell gave the figures on the sale to Respondent who prepared a standard contract for sale and purchase of the real estate in the total amount of $77,421.36. The contract reflected a deposit of $1,920 to be held in escrow by Billy Mitchell and Associates, that the contract was subject to assumption of a mortgage of $67,821.36, and that there would be a balance of $7,680. Shrader and Mrs. Pruitt signed the agreement on February 21, 1981, which was witnessed by Mitchell and Respondent. Although no brokerage fee was listed, Respondent signed as broker on the contract. He testified at the hearing that he had done this out of habit. A real estate contract was prepared rather than merely a bill of sale of the personal property in order that the parties would have the figures they needed to close which they could take to the closing attorneys. After the auction, Mitchell gave Respondent $200 as a gift for his gasoline and other expenses on the Pruitt and prior auctions. Respondent testified, and Mitchell confirmed, that the latter insisted that he accept that amount as reimbursement for expenses. (Testimony of Mitchell, Respondent, Petitioner's Exhibit 1) On April 6, 1981, Joseph P. Johnston, an attorney in Brooksville, closed the transaction by means of a bill of sale for the furnishings and equipment in Pruitts restaurant, and assignment of the Pruitt interest in the mortgaged real property. The closing statement reflected that a "broker's commission" in the amount of $1,920 was held by the "broker" to apply on commission, In actuality, the sum retained by Mitchell as a commission was based solely upon a percentage of the personal property sold at auction. (Testimony of Johnston, Mitchell, Petitioner's Exhibit 2)

Recommendation That the Florida Real Estate Commission dismiss the charges against Respondent, James R. Siebert. DONE and ENTERED this 3d day of June, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3d day of June, 1982 COPIES FURNISHED: Salvatore Carpino, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Harvey R. Klein, Esquire Klein & Klein 333 North West 3rd Avenue Ocala, Florida 32670 Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. C. B. Stafford Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801

Florida Laws (4) 421.36475.01475.25475.42
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. GARY R. BERKSON, 83-003623 (1983)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 83-003623 Latest Update: Jul. 27, 1984

Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Gary R. Berkson, is a licensed real estate salesman, holding license No. 034697. From September 27, 1980, until May of 1983, the Respondent as a salesman working as an independent contractor for Act Now Real Estate, Inc., a corporate broker whose active qualifying brokers and officers were Robert F. Picheny and Thelma R. Sarkas. Robert F. Picheny was subpoenaed and requested to bring with him the records of Act Now Real Estate, Inc., showing the disbursement of commissions to the Respondent. These records did not contain any entries relating to rental transactions involving the persons named in the complaint as having paid commissions to the Respondent. The only lease offered and received in evidence was between Samuel Schnur, as lessor, and lessees named Davis and Johnston. Samuel Schnur, presented as one of the Petitioner's witnesses, did not pay a rental commission to the Respondent in connection with this lease. Another lease transaction where the Respondent was alleged to have received rental commissions was between Sami Elmasri, as landlord, and Donald Bauerle, as tenant. Sami Elmasri, presented as another of the Petitioner's witnesses, testified that he paid a $300 commission, but that this was not paid to the Respondent. This commission was paid to another salesman, Wendy Corman. The final witness for the Petitioner, except for the Respondent, was Wendy Corman. She showed Mr. Elmasri's property to persons wishing to rent through a lead given by the Respondent. She was paid a $300 commission by Mr. Elmasri. The Respondent did not receive any of this commission. The Petitioner's final witness was the Respondent, who testified that he never received a commission for rental property. The only money he received in connection with rental properties was a management fee he received on some properties owned by Richard Jacobson. This fee was in payment for management services consisting of arranging for repairs to the properties such as painting it, repairs to the plumbing and the garage door, and being available to tenants with problems in the absence of the owner. These management fees continued even after the Respondent left Act Now Real Estate, Inc., until Mr. Jacobson assumed the management duties himself.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint filed against the Respondent, Gary R. Berkson, be DISMISSED. This Recommended Order entered this 13th day of June, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of June, 1984.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57475.25475.42
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FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION vs. ANNMARIE CARPENTER, 87-000454 (1987)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 87-000454 Latest Update: May 07, 1987

Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, Respondent was licensed as a real estate broker with the Florida Real Estate Commission and was employed by Hernando County Realty as a broker-salesman. The active broker for Hernando County Realty was Doris M. Wysong. Prior to the contract hereafter discussed, Respondent had only sold three or four properties since she was first licensed as a real estate salesman in 1984. Respondent obtained a listing for several houses being built by a developer and placed a Hernando County Realty sign on one of these properties. The developer, Carl L. Lawson, advertised this house for sale in the newspaper with his telephone number listed to contact. In response to that advertisement, Frank and Josephine Mello called Lawson to see the house. Lawson made an appointment and called Respondent who showed up while Lawson was showing the house to the Mellos. The Mellos liked the house. After leaving the premises, the Mellos decided to buy the property and called Lawson to tell him. Lawson arranged for them to return to sign a contract, and so advised Respondent. At this meeting the following day, on April 7, 1986, Respondent arrived with a contract which she completed. The buyers and seller negotiated a few additional items the buyers wanted and, although Respondent offered to put these items in the contract, both buyers and seller demurred. Buyers and seller agreed that seller could use the down payment to cover the cost of the additional work. Mello made the earnest money deposit payable to Lawson even though the check was clearly marked for deposit, and after making a copy of the check for the office records, Respondent returned the check to Lawson who cashed it. When the contract was signed on April 7, 1966, Mello asked Lawson to lock up the building to keep people from coming in and messing it up. Lawson agreed but Mello visited the property frequently between April 7 and the closing date of May 15, 1986, but never found the house locked. He complained to Lawson about this and about a settling crack that appeared in the garage wall. On Sunday, May 13, 1986, Mello again visited the house to show it to his son and daughter-in-law. They went in and Mel1o saw the crack in the garage wall appeared to be getting bigger. He again telephoned Lawson about this. Monday, May 14, was scheduled for a final inspection. Early that morning, before the time for the inspection, the Mellos went to the property and found Lawson removing some of the debris from the grounds and doing some cleaning. Respondent was also there. When Mr. and Mrs. Mello went into the house to inspect, Mello saw the crack in the garage had not been corrected and he and Lawson got into a violent argument, nearly culminating in fisticuffs. Mrs. Mello returned to her car crying, while Lawson and Mello shouted. At this time, Lawson told Respondent to get the Mellos out of his house and to forget about the contract. To settle the controversy before fisticuffs erupted, Respondent wrote void across the contract and Mello left. Respondent then returned to the real estate office and told her broker, Doris Wysong, what had transpired. Wysong reminded Respondent that she should have had the deposit made out to the realty office and placed it in escrow, but if the transaction didn't close, that she should get Lawson to refund the deposit. The parties didn't cool off sufficiently to complete the transaction, the sale didn't close, and Lawson refused to return the deposit which he had apparently used for the additions requested by Mello. Mello went to the real estate office and talked to Respondent and to Wysong. The latter called her attorney, who advised her not to refund money she never had received. Mello then went to the consumer affairs office in New Port Richey where he was advised to report the incident to the Florida Real Estate Commission. That was subsequently done and this administrative complaint and hearing resulted. Shortly after this incident, Respondent placed her license in an inactive status.

Florida Laws (2) 475.25475.42
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