The Issue The issue is whether Respondents' real estate licenses should be disciplined on the ground that Respondents violated a rule and various provisions within Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint filed by Petitioner on May 20, 1998.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: When the events herein occurred, Respondents, Mercedes M. Powers and Patricia A. Fleck, were both licensed as real estate brokers, having been issued license numbers 0151412 and 0027277, respectively, by Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (Division). Fleck served as qualifying broker for Patricia A. Fleck Real Estate, 5466 Spring Hill Drive, Spring Hill, Florida, while Powers was employed as a broker-salesperson at the same firm. Douglas K. Rogers, a Spring Hill resident, was interested in purchasing a lot in a Spring Hill subdivision and observed a "for sale" sign on Lot 7 at 12287 Elmore Drive. The lot was owned by Wayne and Faith Ryden, who resided in North Hero, Vermont. Rogers contacted the Rydens by telephone in mid or late March 1997 to ascertain the price of the lot. Rogers had also seen a nearby lot for sale carrying a sign from Respondents' firm. On March 23, 1997, he telephoned Powers and inquired about another lot in the same subdivision. Powers contacted the owners but learned that they did not want to sell. After relaying this advice to Rogers, she told him that she had a listing on Lot 6; however, Rogers was not interested in Lot 6 and merely indicated he would "get back" to her later. On April 3, 1997, Rogers again telephoned Powers and told her he was interested in purchasing Lot 7, which was owned by the Rydens. Powers invited Rogers to come to her office where she would call the sellers. Powers then "ran the public record" and learned that the Rydens owned the lot. On Friday, April 4, 1997, in the presence of Rogers, Powers telephoned Mrs. Ryden and spoke with her for three or four minutes. In response to an inquiry from Mrs. Ryden, Powers indicated that if the Rydens listed the property with her, she would represent the sellers; otherwise, she would represent the buyer in the transaction. Based on Mrs. Ryden's response, Powers was led to believe that the Rydens wanted Powers to represent them in the transaction. Accordingly, she explained the arrangement to Rogers, and he voluntarily signed an Agency Disclosure form which acknowledged that he understood, and agreed with, that arrangement. With Powers' assistance, that same day Rogers executed a contract for the sale and purchase of Lot 7 for a price of $8,500.00. The contract called for the sellers to accept the offer no later than April 7, 1997, or three days later, and that the contract would close by May 15, 1997, unless extended by the parties. The contract further called for Rogers to provide a $200.00 cash deposit, which was "to be placed in escrow by 4-7-97." The contract, listing agreement, and expense report were all sent by overnight mail to the Rydens the same day. Because Rogers did not have sufficient cash for a deposit with him, he advised Powers that he would return with a check the following Monday, or April 7. Notwithstanding the language in the contract, he gave Powers specific instructions that when he delivered a check, she was to hold it until the Rydens signed the contract, and then deposit the money. This is confirmed by a contemporaneous note made by Powers which read: "Mr. Rogers will bring check Monday. Then to hold until Rydens sign contract, then deposit it." Rogers testified that he delivered check no. 3497 in the amount of $200.00 to a receptionist in Respondents' office approximately two hours after he executed the contract. He also says he got the receptionist to make a copy of the face of the check, which has been received in evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 5. If in fact a check was actually delivered to a receptionist that day, that person lost the check and never advised Powers or Fleck (or anyone else) that one had been delivered. Indeed, until June 6, 1997, Respondents were not aware that one was purportedly delivered, and they never saw a copy of the face of the check until they received the Administrative Complaint, with attached exhibits, in May 1998. The original check has never surfaced, and it was never presented for payment to the bank. Under these circumstances, it was impossible for Respondents to deposit the check in the firm's escrow account, as required by rule and statute. According to a Division investigator, there have been other instances where a realtor denies receiving a deposit from the buyer. It can be fairly inferred from his testimony that when this occurs, if the realtor's denial is accepted as being true, the realtor will not be held accountable. At no time did Respondents ever intend to violate any rule or statute governing the deposit of escrow funds; had they known that a check had been delivered to the firm, it would have been handled in an appropriate manner. The contract technically expired on April 7, 1997, when the Rydens had not yet accepted the offer. However, on April 8, 1997, Powers again contacted Mrs. Ryden by telephone since Powers had not received a reply. Based on that conversation, which led Powers to believe that the Rydens may not have received the first set of documents, Powers re-sent by overnight mail copies of the contract, agency disclosure, and expense sheet to the Rydens with a request that they either accept or refuse the contract, but in either event, to return the contract and let her know their decision. The Rydens, however, never extended her the courtesy of a reply. It is fair to infer from the evidence that by now, Rogers had again contacted the Rydens by telephone about purchasing the lot in a separate transaction so that the parties would not have to pay a realtor's commission. Rogers telephoned Powers once or twice in April or May 1997 to ask if the contract had ever been returned by the Rydens. He made no mention of his check. Those inquiries are somewhat puzzling since Rogers was well aware of the fact that the parties intended to negotiate a separate agreement. In any event, on the reasonable belief that the contract had never been accepted, and no deposit had ever been made by Rogers, Powers did nothing more about the transaction until June 6, 1997, when Rogers telephoned her at home that evening asking for "his check." By then, he had a separate binding contract with the Rydens for the sale of the lot; he had already stopped payment on the check a week earlier; and he knew that it had never been deposited. Powers advised Rogers that if in fact his check was at the office, he could drop by the next day at 10:30 a.m. and get it from the broker. Rogers came to the office the next morning, but he arrived at around 8:45 a.m., or well before Powers expected him. In Powers' absence, the on-duty receptionist was unsuccessful in locating his file (which was in Powers' office) and the check. On June 14, 1997, Rogers sent a complaint to the Division. That complaint triggered this proceeding. It is fair to infer that Rogers filed the complaint to gain leverage in the event Respondents ever brought an action against him to recover their lost real estate commission. Unknown to Respondents, on June 10, 1997, the sale was completed, and the Rydens executed and delivered a warranty deed to Rogers and his wife conveying the property in question. For all their efforts in attempting to accommodate Rogers, Respondents were deprived of a real estate commission through the covert acts of the buyer and seller, and they were saddled with the legal costs of defending this action. In terms of mitigating and aggravating factors, it is noted that Fleck was never involved with this transaction until the demand for the check was made in June 1997. There is no evidence that Powers has ever been disciplined by the Real Estate Commission on any prior occasion. On an undisclosed date, however, Fleck received a fine and was required to complete a 30-hour broker management course for failing to adequately supervise a "former rental manager" and failing to "timely notify FREC of deposit dispute." Neither Rogers or the Rydens suffered any harm by virtue of the deposit check being lost, and the parties completed the transaction on their own without paying a commission. During the course of the investigation, Respondents fully cooperated with the Division's investigator.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint, with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of May, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of May, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Herbert S. Fecker, Director Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Ghunise Coaxum, Esquire Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Suite N-308 Orlando, Florida 32801-1772 Charlie Luckie, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box 907 Brooksville, Florida 34605-0907 William M. Woodyard, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Whether or not the Respondent, Maxey Roger Watson, is guilty of violations of Sections 626.561, 626.611(3), 626.621(2), 626.611(9), 626.611(10), 626.621(6) and 626.611(7), Florida Statutes, through his business transactions with James B. Galloway. Whether or not the Respondent, Maxey Roger Watson, is guilty of violations of Sections 626.561, 626.611(3), 626.621(2), 626.611(9), 626.61L(10), 626.621(6) and 626.611(7), Florida Statutes, through his business transactions with Nancy E. Galloway.
Findings Of Fact THIS CAUSE comes on for consideration based upon the Administrative Complaint filed by the State of Florida, Office of Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner, against Maxey Roger Watson. The case number before the State of Florida, Office of Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner is Case No. 78-L-42K. The Petitioner, State of Florida, Office of Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner, is an agency of the State of Florida having among other functions the regulation of the insurance industry operating in the State of Florida. The authority for such regulation is found in Chapter 626, Florida Statutes. The Respondent, Maxey Roger Watson, is licensed by the Petitioner in the various categories of licenses set forth in the Petitioner's Composite Exhibit No. 2 admitted into evidence. The facts in this case reveal that between January of 1974 and April of 1977, inclusive, one James B. Galloway of Lake Butler, Florida, had been issued policy number VA 33672 through the Hartford Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company. During that same period, Nancy E. Galloway of Lake Butler, Florida, had been issued policy number VA 33671 with the Hartford Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company. Those two policies were part of an annuity program which the Respondent's company, First Jacksonville Corporation, had negotiated for the benefit of the Galloways and other employees of the Union County, Florida, School Board. During the time periods pertinent to this administrative complaint, the Respondent, Maxey R. Watson, was the majority stockholder of First Jacksonville Corporation, and did business as First Jacksonville Corporation. In addition, he was knowledgeable of the negotiations concerning the aforementioned Galloway policies. The specific terms and conditions of the arrangement which First Jacksonville Corporation had with the Union County School Board were to the effect that the payment of the premiums on the annuity plan would be handled by a payroll deduction from the warrants of the employees in the category of the Galloways. In turn, this money for the premium payments would be transmitted to First Jacksonville Corporation. First Jacksonville Corporation would then be responsible for the transmittal of the premium payments to the Hartford Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company and commissions would be forwarded to the First Jacksonville Corporation upon receipt of the premium payments. Another aspect of the arrangement, in theory, was to have the Hartford Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company submit billings for the premium payments directly to the First Jacksonville Corporation to aid the First Jacksonville Corporation in determining the amounts to be submitted to the insurer. However, even without those billing statements the premiums belonged to the insurer and were to be transmitted to it by First Jacksonville Corporation. Between January of 1974 and April of 1977, inclusive, the Union County School Board paid the premium payments on the policies of the Galloways to Maxey Roger Watson d/b/a First Jacksonville Corporation. The amount of the premium payments in this time sequence was a total of $2,164.00 for James B. Galloway and $2,164.00 for Nancy E. Galloway. These amounts, set forth as premium payments due and owing to the Hartford Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company on the accounts of the Galloways, were never remitted by First Jacksonville Corporation to the Hartford Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company, notwithstanding the obligation of the Respondent through his company to do so. The money received as premium payments on the Galloway accounts was placed in a bank account of the First Jacksonville Corporation and it was kept there together with other monies than the Galloway premiums. The Respondent had access to this bank account and used the proceeds of the premiums for personal and business reasons. The Respondent's explanation of why he used the premium payments for purposes of his own is tied in with his contention that the Hartford Insurance Group was acting unreasonably when it forwarded the billing statements on the accounts such as the Galloways directly to the Union County School Board, as opposed to the First Jacksonville Corporation, which had been agreed to. Respondent found out about this problem in 1973. He then began to take steps to have the arrangement changed to send premium notices directly to the various school boards he dealt with and have them remit the premiums directly to the insurance company and remove his organization from the responsibility. Nonetheless, the problem with the non-payment of premiums from First Jacksonville Corporation to the Hartford Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company continued to exist from 1973 through April of 1977 related to the accounts of the Galloways. During the pendency of that time period the Respondent used the Galloways' premiums for personal and business purposes, knowing that he was obligated to remit the premiums to the Hartford Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company. The Respondent was responsible for the bookkeeping of the First Jacksonville Corporation during the period of January of 1974 through and including April of 1977 and had the further expertise of being a licensed C.P.A. in the State of Florida. The Respondent had what he characterized as being an open-ended invoicing system for dealing with the premium payments. Under this system, according to the Respondent, it was difficult to ascertain what premium payments were due and owing to the various insurance companies, unless First Jacksonville Corporation received current billing statements on the amounts due and owing to the insurer. However, under the circumstances, the action of the Respondent in not remitting the Galloway premium payments to the Hartford Insurance Group constituted a willful violation of the provisions of the Insurance Code under Chapter 626, Florida Statutes. In view of these facts, the Petitioner has charged the Respondent with various violations of Chapter 626, Florida Statutes, in his transactions with James B. Galloway and Nancy E. Galloway. The first allegation pertains to Section 626.561, Florida Statutes. The Respondent has violated the conditions of that section in that he took the trust funds constituted of the premium payments in behalf of the Galloways and failed to account for and pay those premium payments to the insurer in the regular course of business and, not being lawfully entitled to those premiums, diverted and appropriated the funds to his own use. The complaint next alleges that the Respondent violated Section 626.611(13), Florida Statutes. That provision has been violated because the Respondent has willfully failed to comply with the requirements of Section 626.561, Florida Statutes, for the reasons stated above. The Administrative Complaint makes an allegation that the Respondent has violated the provisions of Section 626.611(9), Florida Statutes. This allegation has been established because the evidential facts show the Respondent is guilty of fraud and dishonest practices in the conduct of the business transactions involving the Galloways. A further allegation of the Administrative Complaint concerns an alleged violation of Section 626.611(10), Florida Statutes. The Respondent is guilty of a violation of that provision in that he misappropriated, converted and unlawfully withheld monies belonging to the Hartford Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company in the matter of the premium payments of the Galloways. There is an allegation that the Respondent has violated the provision of Section 626.621(6), Florida Statutes. Likewise, the Respondent has been shown to be guilty of that provision in that he has shown himself to be a source of injury or loss to the public or a detriment to the public's interest in his willful conversion and misappropriation of the Galloway premium payments to his own use, when those payments were properly to be remitted to the Hartford Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company. Finally, the Respondent has been charged with the violation of Section 626.611(7), Florida Statutes. That substantive allegation is one that the Respondent has demonstrated a lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance. Taking into account all of the facts of this case, this contention of the Administrative Complaint has been shown.
Recommendation It is recommended that the various licenses held by the Respondent, Maxey Roger Watson a/k/a Maxey Roger Watson, stated in the Petitioner's Composite Exhibit No. 2, be revoked. This recommendation takes into account the facts reported herein and the additional consideration of the Respondent's failure to comply with an agreement to repay the Hartford Insurance Group the premiums due on the Galloway accounts after entering into such agreement to make whole the Hartford Insurance Group. DONE and ENTERED this 30th day of January, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Edward L. Kutter, Esquire Office of the Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner 428-A Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Frederick B. Tygart, Esquire Suite 400, Fletcher Building 100 Riverside Avenue Jacksonville, Florida 32204
Findings Of Fact The Respondent Thomas P. Hoolihan is a licensed real estate broker. His last known address is 3440 N.W. Marinatown Lane, North Fort Myers, Florida 33903. Hoolihan is also president of Seago Group, Inc., a publicly held land development and rental corporation, of which Marinatown Realty, Inc., is a wholly owned subsidiary. In late 1977, Hoolihan met L. E. Hutchinson, the complainant in this case, through another broker for whom Hutchinson at the time was employed. In December 1977, Hoolihan and Hutchinson discussed the marketing of two condominium projects being developed by Hoolihan and reached an oral agreement whereby Hutchinson would be paid $18,000 in salary with a 1.5 percent commission on all sales. when the condominium units were completed and mostly sold, the parties' employment agreement was revised in late December 1979. Under the new agreement, Hutchinson was to receive $30,000 a year salary, commission on the remaining condominium units that had not yet closed and any commissions on outside property listings neither owned nor controlled by Seago. In return for the $30,000 guarantee, Hutchinson was to forego commissions on future properties owned or controlled by Seago Group, Inc. During the period from 1977-1978 when Hutchinson was receiving $18,000 plus a 1.5 percent commission, sales were handled through Lee Hutchinson Realty, Inc., which held license number 0182945. In early 1979, Marinatown Realty was incorporated to market Seago's real estate inventory, to identify and list outside properties and to act as a management agent for purposes of renting condominium units previously sold in recent projects. When Marinatown Realty was formed, the complainant became its active broker. While employed as the broker for Marinatown and receiving $30,000 a year as a salaried employee, Hutchinson held two other broker's licenses, one as L. E. Hutchinson Realty, Inc., and another as L. E. Hutchinson. In January 1980, Hoolihan agreed to pay a $15,000 bonus to Hutchinson in lieu of a salary increase. Since at that time sales were minimal, Hoolihan decided to pay the bonus in installments as sales occurred. Because Hutchinson left in May 1980, he received only $10,000 of the bonus which represented monies previously paid. On April 23, 1980, Hutchinson and Chuck Bundschu, a licensed real estate broker, negotiated and obtained a sales contract between Hancock Harbor Properties, Ltd., a wholly owned subsidiary of Seago Group, Inc., seller, and Frank Hoffer, buyer and licensed real estate broker, in which Hoffer offered to purchase approximately 3.16 acres of unimproved acreage for $500,000. Thomas P. Hoolihan, general partner of Hancock Harbor, executed the contract on behalf of the partnership. Prior to presenting the contract to Hoolihan, Bundschu, Hoffer and Hutchins on decided on a 30 percent, 40 percent, 30 percent, respective co- brokerage split on the $50,000 commission due on the sale of the Hancock Harbor Property. The co-brokerage fee split was typed on the bottom of the contract submitted to Hoolihan and was signed by the three brokers. The commission due to Hutchinson was made payable to L. E. Hutchinson Realty, Inc. On April 25, 1980, the contract with the original co-brokerage split was presented to Hoolihan who refused to agree to its co-brokerage split provision. In the presence of Hutchinson, Hoolihan informed Bundschu and Hoffer that he would not pay a commission to Hutchinson because he was a salaried employee of the Seago Group and not entitled to a commission on the sale of this property. Accordingly, the co-brokerage fee provision of the executed contract was never signed by the seller, Thomas P. Hoolihan. Instead, on April 25, 1980, Bundschu, Hoffer and Hoolihan agreed to a split of $20,000 to Hoffer and $15,000 to Bundschu in lieu of the split specified in the original contract. At the closing on July 18, 1980, which was held at Coastland Title Company, a closing statement was prepared which shows that real estate commissions were disbursed to Chuck Bundschu Realty, Inc. ($15,000), Marinatown Realty, Inc., ($15,000) and Hoffer's firm, Landco, Inc., ($20,000). The checks were written and disbursed following a conversation between an official of Coastland Title Company and Hoolihan in which Hoolihan informed the official that Hutchinson was a Seago employee and he would not agree to pay a $15,000 commission to him under such circumstances. On July 18, 1980, a check for $15,000 was issued by Coastland Title Company to Marinatown Realty, Inc. The $15,000 represented Hutchinson's share of the co-brokerage agreement. when received on July 18, 1980, by Billie Robinette, the broker for Marinatown Realty, the check was signed over by her to Seago Group, Inc., since in her opinion it did not represent commissions earned by Marinatown Realty. The oral agreement between Hutchinson and Hoolihan was to terminate at the end of April 1980, or approximately five days after the Hoffer contract was presented. Hoolihan offered to renew the contract without a provision for a guaranteed salary because Marinatown Realty had been consistently losing money since its incorporation. On May 6, 1980, Hoolihan received a letter of resignation from Hutchinson and concluded that his offer had been rejected In early May 1980, Hoolihan received a call from Ms. Robinette, who had been employed as Hutchinson's secretary, regarding filling the open brokerage position at Marinatown Realty, Inc. Hoolihan discovered from Ms. Robinette that Hutchinson had paid himself 50 percent of the commissions due Marinatown Realty, Inc., for the management of condominium rentals. After examining the check stubs from Marinatown's bank account, Hoolihan took personal possession of all the books and records of the company and had the office locks changed. When he examined the books and records of the realty company, Hoolihan realized that his assumption that Hutchinson Realty, Inc., became inactive when Marinatown Realty, Inc. was formed in January 1979, was erroneous and that Hutchinson had operated his own realty company, L. E. Hutchinson Realty, Inc., while employed by Marinatown Realty, Inc. The Administrative Complaint in this case was filed on July 22, 1981. The preliminary investigative report compiled by Robert Corno, DPR Investigator, was filed on September 24, 1981 and the final investigative report was filed on September 30, 1981. The following is a synopsis of the investigator's findings and recommendation: That the COMPLAINANT [Hutchinson] worked for the SUBJECT [Hoolihan] and their contractual agreement was verbal. COMPLAINANT was paid on a salary/commission basis by companies of which SUBJECT is Chief Officer. That the COMPLAINANT filed civil action suit against SUBJECT in this case and it was dismissed with prejudice. That prior investigation by the DPR recommended that no action be taken against the SUBJECT in this case. That two weeks after this investiga- tion was undertaken, an Administrative Complaint was being filed by the DPR against the SUBJECT. That the existing BROKER for MARINATOWN REALTY, INC, was not involved in this case, and that since the time of the above referenced transaction, the SUB- JECT has acquired his BROKER'S license number 020462 which had no effect in this case. That conflicting statements by inter- viewers, namely former and present employees and other agents involved in this case revealed that there is a reasonable doubt for probable cause against the SUBJECT. (Respondent's Exhibit 1) As noted by Investigator Corno, this was the second time Marinatown Realty had been investigated in relation to this case. In both instances, a recommendation that no action be taken was apparently made. At the final hearing on December 1, 1981, counsel for the Department saw the complete investigative report, including the investigator's recommendation of a lack of probable cause, for the first time.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Administrative Complaint filed against Thomas P. Hoolihan be dismissed. DONE and ORDERED this 30th day of December, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. SHARYN L. SMITH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of December, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Xavier J. Fernandez, Esquire NUCKOLLS JOHNSON & FERNANDEZ Suite 10, 2710 Cleveland Avenue Fort Myers, Florida 33901 James A. Neel, Esquire 1315 Chalon Lane, S.W. Fort Myers, Florida 33903 William M. Furlow, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation - Legal Section 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 C. B. Stafford, Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Samuel R. Shorstein, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Wilbur Lewis Hallock, at all times relevant thereto, was a licensed real estate broker-salesman having been issued license number 0035549 by Petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, in 1971. He also has the designation of a Graduate of the Realtors Institute (GRI), having successfully completed its requirements. At the time the events herein occurred, Hallock was a salesman for Don Asher and Associates in Orlando, Florida. On or about August 8, 1980, Respondent, through reading the Orlando Sentinel Star, became aware of a mortgage foreclosure proceeding by Winter Park Federal Savings and Loan Association 1/ pending against James A. and Jeanie Lockwood, husband and wife, who owned a home located at 4813 and 4815 Basswood Lane, Orlando, Florida. 2/ Hallock had been told to vacate his apartment, and was in the process of finding a new home. He was "looking for a bargain" and believed he found one when he read of the Lockwoods' plight. The Lockwoods were separated at that time and only James Lockwood lived in the house on Basswood Lane. Hallock telephoned James Lockwood on Friday evening, August 8, 1980, and told him he was aware of the foreclosure proceeding and wished to meet with him to discuss a possible sale or way to avoid foreclosure proceedings. Lockwood, who was in the process of moving to Winter Haven and wished to immediately sell the property, was receptive and invited Respondent to meet with him that evening. Respondent and a lady friend (Mrs. Florence Harrison) then visited James that night. Hallock introduced himself, and showed two cards to prove his identity. Hallock made clear he did not represent his employer, Don Asher and Associates, but was simply representing himself. Although conflicting stories as to what happened during and after this first meeting were given by the various witnesses, the undersigned finds the following to be the more credible version of the sequence of events. Upon meeting Lockwood, Hallock proceeded to discuss the various alternatives available to Lockwood. These included selling the home to Hallock's brother, who lived in Miami, allowing Hallock himself to purchase the house, or simply letting the lending institution foreclose. Because the mortgage payments were in arrears and a foreclosure proceeding in progress, Lockwood offered to give the house to Hallock if he would bring the payments current. Hallock, who knew consideration for a real estate transaction was required, declined the offer and instead offered James "a minimum of $50 equity." No total purchase price was discussed since the balances on the first mortgage, and a second mortgage held by Freedom Federal Savings and Loan of Tampa, were unknown. Neither was the agreement reduced to writing. James also wished to avoid paying a commission on the sale of the house that might be due since another realtor, Area One West, Inc., held a listing. However, Hallock advised James that because Jeanie Lockwood had not signed the agreement, the listing realtor would have "no claim whatsoever." Hallock also told James that his wife needed to concur in their agreement. That same evening, Hallock telephoned Jeanie Lockwood, who resided in an apartment in Orlando. He told her he had just talked with her husband concerning a possible sale of their house, and wished to discuss the matter with her that evening. She agreed, and subsequently met Hallock and Mrs. Harrison later that evening. Also present was Jeanie's neighbor, Carol Gordon, who had been asked by Jeanie to sit in on the discussions. Hallock identified himself to the ladies, told them that he had become aware of the foreclosure proceeding by reading a newspaper, and had discussed a possible sale with the husband. He briefly described the same alternatives available to her as he had with James. When asked by Hallock whether she wished to keep the house or move into it, Jeanie stated she did not. No purchase price or equity payment was discussed that evening. However, Hallock requested Jeanie to call the two lending institutions on the following Monday morning to authorize him to ascertain the balances owed on the mortgages. He also advised her that the listing then held on the property by the other realtor was not valid because Jeanie had failed to sign the listing agreement. Hallock called James early the next morning (Saturday) and asked to meet with him. James was moving his possessions out of the home that day and told Hallock to come over right away. Upon arriving at the home, Hallock told James he had a deed prepared that conveyed the property to him and wished to have James sign it that day before he moved to Winter Haven. However, he indicated he would not record it or pay any consideration until the mortgage balances were ascertained, the chain of title checked, and final confirmation received from the Lockwoods. James agreed to meet Hallock at 10:00 a.m. that morning to sign the deed. Hallock then telephoned Jeanie and asked to meet her that morning. When they met, Hallock explained he wished her to sign the deed that day so he would not have to interrupt her work schedule during the following week. Hallock told her to meet James and himself at Wescott Realty at 10:00 a.m. to sign the papers. He also told her that "the least you will get is $100 for the house." At approximately 10:00 a.m. that morning, the Lockwoods and Hallock met at Wescott Realty in Orlando. There they executed a warranty deed conveying the property in question from the Lockwoods to Hallock (Petitioner's Exhibit 3). It was notarized by Barbara Boehmer, an employee of Wescott. Also present was Mary Black, another employee of Wescott. Prior to their signing the document, the Lockwoods were asked by Hallock if they were of legal age, were husband and wife, were under duress or threat to sign, or were subject to the influence of drugs or alcohol. Although the signing was done in a rather hasty fashion, there was no effort by Respondent to cover or conceal any portion of the document. The word "deed" was not mentioned at any time during the transaction, nor were the Lockwoods verbally advised at that time as to the nature of the document being signed. Neither was any money or other consideration exchanged. On Monday, August 11, 1980, Jeanie Lockwood called Margaret M. Norman at Winter Park Federal Savings and Loan to request the balance on the mortgage held by that institution. Mrs. Norman advised Jeanie to make the request in writing; Jeanie then prepared a letter requesting that the institution give Hallock "any information he requires regarding the foreclosure on our house at 4815 Basswood Lane." (Respondent's Exhibit 2). Hallock telephoned Jeanie on Monday evening and told her he would give her $65 equity instead of $50.00. She concurred with this amount. He also told her he was in the process of having the title checked and would not record the deed unless the title was clear. On Tuesday morning, Hallock telephoned Mrs. Norman to ascertain the balance on the mortgage held by Winter Park Federal Savings and Loan. Upon receiving preliminary information concerning the mortgage, Hallock called James in Winter Haven and advised him the wife had accepted the $65 equity offer on Monday night. The husband complained he wanted an amount closer to $100; Respondent said he would "split the difference" and upped the equity payoff to $75. The husband then gave his concurrence. At 11:43 a.m. on August 12, 1980, Hallock recorded the warranty deed signed by the Lockwoods in the Orange County Courthouse and paid $232 for documentary stamps affixed to the deed (Petitioner's Exhibit 3). He later requested and obtained from the Department of Revenue a partial refund of the stamp tax after he determined the stamp tax paid exceeded the amount actually required. After recording the deed he obtained a cashier's check in the amount of $75 and mailed it to James in Winter Haven. However, James never cashed the check and returned it to Hallock. On that same Tuesday, Jeanie called Area One West, Inc., the listing realtor, to let them know she had received foreclosure papers on the second mortgage. A salesperson told Jeanie that she had a prospective buyer for the house, and suggested they view the property that afternoon. Thereafter, two representatives of Area One West, the prospective buyer and Jeanie all met at 4815 Basswood Lane. Upon reaching the premises, they found the realtor's sign and multilock in the carport, the front door unlocked, and Hallock's car in the driveway. Inside was Hallock showing the house to a prospective buyer. Jeanie told Hallock she now had a buyer and would not sell the house for $65. Hallock told her he had bought the home, already recorded the deed she had previously signed on Saturday, and had mailed James a check for $75. Jeanie then accused Hallock of being "in cahoots" with James. On August 14, 1980, Respondent telephoned James Lockwood in Winter Haven to inquire about a lawnmower, edger and books that James had left in his house. James told Hallock to keep his books but stated he wished to keep the lawnmower and edger. During the next day or two, James came and took the lawnmower, drapes and oven racks from the house. Thereafter, Hallock called James and asked if he would swap the edger for the missing oven racks; James agreed. Hallock ultimately changed the locks on the house on Saturday, August 16, 1980. James Lockwood is a 29-year-old stockholder employed by Merrill Lynch in Winter Haven, Florida. Prior to his present employment, he worked for an Orlando automobile dealership. His wife is a secretary with the State of Florida. Although their formal education was not disclosed, James did attend college for an undisclosed period of time. Jeanie described her husband as being as honest and truthful "as the next person" but acknowledged he sometimes lied. The listing agreement with Area One West, Inc., was signed by James Lockwood and Carol Lockwood on July 3, 1980 (Petitioner's Exhibit 4). 3/ Carol is his second wife. Jeanie did not sign the agreement. The house was originally listed for $56,900 on the agreement but that figure was marked through and replaced with a figure of $49,900. Hallock purchased the house for approximately $39,600.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the complaint against Respondent Wilbur Lewis Hallock be DISMISSED. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of June, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of June, 1981.
The Issue Whether the Department of Transportation's intended action to reject all quotes and re-advertise Lease No. 550:0318 was illegal, arbitrary, fraudulent, or dishonest.
Findings Of Fact In October of 1999, the Department advertised for office space for use as the Toll Data Center - Audit Section, Office of Toll Operations (Toll Office) located in Broward County. The lease was clearly advertised as a negotiated lease. It was not advertised as a competitive bid lease. Under the negotiated lease process before letting any lease, the Department must submit to the Department of Management Services (DMS) a Request for Space Need (RSN) and Letter of Agency Staffing (LAS). From DMS the Department receives the authority to directly negotiate a lease for space under 5,000 square feet with prospective lessors. 1/ Consistent with procedure, the Department received approval of the RSN on October 18, 1999. Pursuant to statute, DMS has strongly suggested that prior to selection of the apparent successful lessor, the Department should obtain a minimum of three documented quotes for a lease that has not been competitively bid. The Department has consistently followed that suggestion in negotiated leases. Under special circumstances, where it is clear it is improbable that three quotes cannot be obtained, the Department may waive its requirement that three documented quotes be received. However, the agency must certify to DMS that attempts to receive the required number of documented quotes were unsuccessful and/or special circumstances exist to negotiate the lease with less than three quotes. In this case, no special circumstances exist. In an effort to obtain more than the minimum three documented quotes, the Department opted to advertise for lease space on the Internet. The Internet is utilized by the DMS, among other state agencies, to disseminate information provided in the RSN to the private sector. Additionally, the Internet site may also be used by the private sector to provide notice of space they have available for review by the agency seeking space. A total of three submittal packages were distributed for Lease No. 550:0318. Despite the Department's advertisement over the Internet, only two requests for quote submittal packages were received. Of the three quote submittal packages distributed, the Department received only one documented quote in response to the advertisement for the Toll Office. Atlantic Investment submitted a Quote Submittal Form to the Department in late October for office space in North Fort Lauderdale. Atlantic Investment became aware of the Department's advertisement for lease space from Sheldon M. Schermer, employed by Atlantic Investment as its real estate agent. Mr. Schermer learned of the Department's need for lease space from an advertisement placed on the Internet. On November 8, 1999, the Department informed Atlantic Investment via Sheldon M. Schermer, Real Estate Agent for Atlantic Investment, of the Department's intent to reject all quotes and re-advertise for Lease No. 550:0318. This decision was not arbitrary, capricious, fraudulent, or dishonest and well within the Department's discretion and procedures for negotiated leases. The basis for the decision was the Department's modification of the lease specifications pursuant to a recommendation by DMS to modify the lease space terms to hopefully generate more interest and more quotes. In a competitive negotiation, DMS was aware of agencies who modified leases and advertised as many as five times before three documented quotes were received. Moreover, the evidence showed that the Broward County commercial real estate market could easily generate three quotes for the space required by the Toll Office.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered dismissing the Petitioner's protest. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of April, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of April, 2000.
Findings Of Fact Carmine Amato is a real estate broker holding license number 0110690, and is the broker for Wise Realty in Broward County, Florida, which he wholly owns. Amerigo DiPietro is a real estate salesman holding license number 0326813. At all times in question, DiPietro was employed by Wise Realty, and Amato was his supervising broker. In August, 1980, DiPietro took a sales contract from Charles and Jennie Conroy for the sale of their home in Broward County, Florida, described as Lot 3, Block 5 of Margate Estates, Section 3. DiPietro suggested to the Conroys that they could afford a larger home by selling their present house and using the equity to put a down payment on a new house. The Conroys subsequently contracted to buy a larger and more expensive house in Broward County from the Hocenics, said house described as Lot 13, Block 8 of Kimberly Forrest. DiPietro found buyers, the Meads, for the Conroys' house; however, the Meads were unable to qualify, and the contract did not close. The Conroys were anxious to close on the Hocenics' house and, as a result, sought a loan from Security Pacific Finance Company, said loan being referred to as a "swing" loan. The Conroys used this swing loan to close on the Hocenics' house, and this loan was secured by a security interest in their old home and the Hocenics' home. The Conroys were not induced in any manner by the Respondents to seek this swing loan. Having obtained the loan, the Conroys closed on the Hocenics' house, moved out of their old house and into the Hocenics' house, and assumed financial responsibility for both homes. Because the Conroys were short $2400, DiPietro took a note from the Conroys payable from the proceeds of the sale of their house. This represented money due DiPietro, which the Conroys could not pay at closing. DiPietro continued to attempt to sell the Conroys' old home and found another buyer, the La Serras. The La Serras qualified, but the Conroys could not raise $3400 needed to pay off their obligation at the closing of the sale of their old home. Because of this, the La Serra transaction did not close. In an effort to save the deal and close the La Serra contract, DiPietro made every effort, even agreeing to take a note for the commissions due to Wise's sales people, who represented both buyer and seller. The Conroys refused to close. With the swing loan almost due, Mrs. Conroy asked DiPietro if he and Amato would buy their old house outright. Eventually, DiPietro and Amato agreed to buy the house and accept financial responsibility for the first mortgage if the Conroys would agree to certain conditions. DiPietro indicated from the outset that neither he nor Amato had sufficient cash to purchase the house outright, and that financing would have to be arranged. DiPietro also advised the Conroys that, if this financing could not be arranged, the swing loan would have to be extended, and that it would be necessary for the Conroys to work with Amato and him to arrange for the extension of this loan. The specific conditions which the Conroys would have to meet were as follow: (a) the Conroys would give Amato and DiPietro a quit claim deed to their old house; (b) the Conroys would do those things necessary to extend the swing loan another six months; and (c) DiPietro and Amato would assume immediate financial responsibility for the house and, during the six months' period, sell it or arrange for long-term financing. The Conroys concurred in this agreement and executed a quit claim deed to their old house to the Respondents. DiPietro tried three different companies, seeking substitute financing for the house. When he failed in this, DiPietro contacted Mr. Conroy about renewing the swing loan. Mr. Conroy accompanied DiPietro to Security Pacific to renew the swing loan. DiPietro attempted to get Security Pacific to substitute any of a number of pieces of property owned by Amato and him for the Conroys' new house and to release its security interest in said house. Because of Security Pacific's excellent equity position in this new house, Security Pacific was unwilling to release its encumbrance on the Conroys' house. Security Pacific said it would release its interest in the Conroys' house only if the amount of the loan was paid down to an amount that the old house could secure. Neither Amato, DiPietro nor Conroy could afford to do this. Security Pacific said it would renew the loan only upon the Conroys' reapplication. Lastly, Security Pacific made clear that it still looked to the Conroys and to their new house as primary security on the swing loan. During all this time, the Conroys' old home was vacant. It had been vandalized and had suffered significant damage which decreased its value. In addition, no yard maintenance had been performed during the period since the Conroys had moved out. To be salable, substantial repairs and maintenance had to be performed by DiPietro and Amato. The revelation that Security Pacific looked to him and his wife for payment of the loan secured by their new house frightened Mr. Conroy. The Conroys were already financially strapped, having been responsible for the payments on both houses during this time. With the swing loan nearly due, and envisioning the loss of both houses and being left with an unsatisfied $28,000 debt, Conroy went to an attorney. The attorney advised Conroy not to join with DiPietro and Amato in extending the swing loan. When the swing loan was not extended, Security Pacific commenced foreclosure proceedings. Amato and DiPietro kept up the payments on the first mortgage, although Mrs. Conroy had to complain at first when these payments were late. The first three payments (July, August and September) were delayed following transfer from the Conroys to Amato and DiPietro. DiPietro and Amato did not promise to assume sole responsibility for the swing loan. DiPietro's representation was that they would try to refinance the property, and that if they could not refinance it they would assume primary responsibility for payment of the swing loan if the Conroys would join with them in extending the swing loan. Respondent Amato never saw or spoke to the Conroys and never made any promises which he did not fulfill. When the foreclosure action commenced, DiPietro stepped up his effort to sell the Conroys' old house and, approximately six to eight weeks later, sold it after substantial repairs were completed. The sales price was $57,000. At the time of the sale, approximately $32,000 was owed on the house to Security Pacific, and approximately $21,000 was owed to Heritage Mortgage Company on the first mortgage. Respondent Amato had put approximately $2,000 into repairs on the house, and Wise Realty was owed a note of approximately $2400 representing commission on the Hocenic/Conroy sale.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the following is recommended: That the charges against the Respondent, Carmine Amato, be dismissed, it having been found that he had no contact with the Conroys, could not have made any representations to them, and is not guilty of Violating Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes; and That the charges against the Respondent, Amerigo DiPietro, be dismissed, it having been found that he made no misrepresentations to the Conroys and therefore did not violate Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 14th day of April, 1983, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of April, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Fred Langford, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Lawrence F. Kranert, Jr., Esquire 1000 South Federal Highway, Suite 103 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316 David F. Hannan, Esquire 3300 Inverrary Boulevard, Suite 200 Lauderhill, Florida 33319 Harold Huff, Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Frederick Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 William M. Furlow, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802
The Issue By an information filed by the Florida Real Estate Commission, respondent Thomas F. Thayer was charged with fraud, dishonest dealing and breach of trust in a business transaction in violation of Florida Statutes s.475.25(1)(a). In essence, the information charges that respondent, as the real estate broker for the Jacobs and in order to obtain a ninety percent loan commitment for the Jacobs, falsely represented to a mortgage corporation that the Jacobs Intended to move into the duplex they planned to purchase and sell their present home.
Findings Of Fact At all relevant times to this proceeding, respondent was a registered real estate broker. Respondent had been an acquaintance of Mr. and Mrs. Richard Jacobs for a period of four to five years. Some two years before the transaction in question, Jacobs had expressed to respondent his desire to purchase property containing a duplex for purposes of a tax shelter. Mr. Jacobs testified that he intended the purchase to be an Investment somewhere in the neighborhood of $5,000.00. There was also evidence that Mr. Jacobs understood that there were tax shelter benefits from living in half the duplex and depreciating the other half. In April of 1974, respondent showed the Jacobs a duplex. At the time, the Jacobs were living in a two bedroom, two bath waterfront home with a swimming pool, valued somewhere in the neighborhood of $60,000.00. The location of the duplex was in a lower rent neighborhood near some railroad tracks. However, the front portion contained three bedrooms, two baths, a thick shag carpet and a built-in bar. There were also two large screened-in patios. The Jacobs were impressed with the duplex, and on April 19, 1974, they signed a deposit receipt contract prepared by respondent to purchase the duplex for $41,000.00. This contract was subject to the Jacobs being able to obtain ninety percent financing at 9.25 percent annual Interest within fifteen days from the date of acceptance by the sellers. The contract also contained certain conditions regarding inspection of the rear apartment; electrical, plumbing, roofing and appliance defects; termite damage and the inclusion of a metal storage shed. Such conditions were included in the contract at the request of Mr. Jacobs. In order to obtain ninety percent financing, it was necessary that the lender be assured that the borrower actually intends to reside on the mortgaged property. This assurance comes about through either an affidavit executed by the borrower at the time of closing and/or the filing with the lender of a sales listing on the present home of the borrower. From this point forward, disputes in the testimony arise. Respondent testified that Mr. Jacobs was aware of the financing requirement that he would have to indicate an intent to sell his present home. Jacobs acknowledged that he was so aware, but testified that he never had any intent to move from his waterfront home to the duplex, and so informed respondent. However, when he went in to make the loan application with the mortgage company, he told its representative that he would be living in the duplex. Respondent then informed the mortgage company that he would be sending them a multiple listing form on the Jacobs' present residence. Jacobs stated at the hearing that he and his wife never intended to reside in the duplex and that he followed respondent's advice regarding the filing of a multiple listing only because he had faith and trust in respondent, who told him such things were done all the time. Respondent testified that the Jacobs never informed him that they did not intend to live in the duplex or that they did not intend to sell their present home. In fact, there was testimony from Mr. Jacobs that between the time of the deposit receipt contract and the first letter approving the mortgage loan commitment, he and his wife were looking at other homes on the water in which to live. The multiple listing form was signed by the Jacobs and delivered to the mortgage company by respondent, but it was never turned in to the multiple listing service. Sometime subsequent to receiving the mortgage loan commitment on May 29, 1974, Jacobs inspected the rear apartment of the duplex and became very upset and disgusted with its condition. Repairs were estimated at $1,000.00 and the sellers only offered to contribute approximately $75.00 toward such repairs. Jacobs then went to an attorney who advised him that it would be illegal to continue with the purchase because of the misrepresentation as to the Jacobs' intent to reside in the duplex. Jacobs then called the mortgage company and told them he did not intend to live in the duplex. Thereafter the mortgage company informed Jacobs that they were unable to obtain a mortgage commitment. Respondent testified that he first became aware that the Jacobs did not intend to live in the duplex the night after Jacobs inspected the rear apartment and spoke with his attorney. In summary, the testimony in this case is conflicting with respect to respondent's knowledge of the Jacobs' intent as to where they would actually reside. In order for respondent to be found guilty of fraud, dishonest dealing and breach of trust in a business transaction, as prohibited by Florida Statutes s 475.25(1)(a), the Real Estate Commission must prove by clear and convincing evidence that respondent actually knew that the Jacobs never intended to reside at the duplex property. That proof is lacking in this case. Here, the substance of the matters in dispute are as readily susceptible of proving respondent's innocence as they are susceptible of proving guilt. Jacobs testified that he originally wanted the duplex as an investment which would provide a tax shelter and that he did not intend to live in it. Yet, he verbally represented to the mortgage company that he did intend to live in the duplex, signed a multiple listing agreement and actually did look at other homes to live in during the period of time between signing the deposit receipt contract and obtaining knowledge of the original loan commitment. There was no evidence that respondent had any knowledge of or was involved in the Jacobs' search for another home in which to live. Jacobs was willing to go through with the purchase of the duplex until he became aware of the extent of damages to the rear apartment. It was at this time that he Informed the mortgage company that he did not have any intention of living in the duplex or selling their house. And, it was at about this same time, according to respondent, that respondent first learned that the Jacobs did not intend to reside in the duplex. There is no clear and convincing evidence in this record that proved that respondent knew that the Jacobs did not plan to live in the duplex at the time respondent forwarded the multiple listing to the mortgage company on April 30, 1974. The most credible evidence tending to show such knowledge on respondent's behalf is the fact that after the multiple listing agreement was signed and delivered to the mortgage company, the house was never actually put up for sale, was not shown to anyone, and the agreement was not filed with the multiple listing service. Yet, this is consistent with the evidence that the Jacobs did not receive word of the loan commitment until after May 29, 1974 (later to be rescinded on July 5, 1974) and the fact that the Jacobs were in the process of looking for yet another home to purchase. It is logical to assume that they were not yet ready to sell their present home with the uncertainties that existed, and this Instructed respondent to delay the selling process. In summary, it is concluded that the Real Estate Commission failed in its burden to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the misconduct charged; to wit: fraud, dishonest dealing and breach of trust in a business transaction. It is therefore RECOMMENDED that the information charging respondent with a violation of Florida Statute 475.25(1)(a) be dismissed. Respectfully submitted and entered this 30th day of December, 1975, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Louis B. Guttman, III, Esquire Staff Counsel Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 James F. Spindler, Jr., Esquire and James R. Eddy, Esquire EDDY AND SPINDLER, P. A. 700 East Atlantic Boulevard Pompano Beach, Florida 33060
