Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated to those factual findings set forth in paragraphs 1- 12, below. Stipulated Facts Petitioner's completed application was received by Respondent on February 15, 1990. The application was timely for admission to Respondent's licensure examination offered on April 19, 1990. The application was complete, free of errors or omissions and fully responded to all previous requests by Respondent for additional information or correction of errors or omissions. Respondent's board did not vote to admit Petitioner to the April 19, 1990 examination at its meeting on March 3-4, 1990. No communication was made to Petitioner by Respondent following that meeting to inform her that no action had been taken on the application, except to the extent it could be said to have been incorporated into the notice recited in paragraphs 4 and 7 below. Respondent's board did not meet again until April 27-28, 1990. On April 28, 1990, Respondent's board made a formal decision to deny Petitioner's application. On May 21, 1990, the board's decision to deny the application was orally communicated to Petitioner's attorney. On May 30, 1990, Respondent's Order Of Intent To Deny Petitioner's application was issued and signed. Subsequently, Respondent's Order Of Intent To Deny was filed with the agency clerk on June 6, 1990. A copy of Respondent's order was thereafter received by Petitioner on June 7, 1990. The oral communication of Respondent's denial of the application to Petitioner's attorney; issuance and signing of Respondent's order; the formal filing of the order with the agency clerk; and the receipt of Respondent's order by Petitioner all occurred more than 90 days after receipt of Petitioner's complete application on February 15, 1990. There were no special circumstances or conditions which hindered or prevented Respondent from processing the Order Of Intent To Deny or the delivery of notice of that order to Petitioner. The petition challenging Respondent's administrative action was timely filed. Petitioner's substantial interests have been affected by the challenged agency action. The parties stipulate that the issues in the Division Of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) Case No. 90-4259 be bifurcated and that Petitioner's contention that her application must be deemed approved upon satisfactory completion of the licensure examination under Chapter 120.60(2), Florida Statutes (1989) be considered first, inasmuch as determination of that issue may moot further proceedings. The parties stipulate that remaining issues in the case be stayed for later determination, if necessary. Other Facts Petitioner, Donna Ann Jennings, is a 34 year old resident of Tallahassee, Florida. She received a Bachelor of Science Degree in Health Education from the University of North Carolina and a Master of Arts Degree in Agency Counseling from North Carolina Central University. She is presently a candidate for a Ph.D. from Florida State University. Petitioner has practiced in the field of marriage and family therapy since 1980. She has served as an assistant and adjunct faculty member at Florida State University from 1985 through 1989, teaching in the areas of child development, marriage and family, and family systems. Presently, she serves as an adjunct faculty member at Tallahassee Community College. By correspondence to Petitioner dated January 26, 1990, following receipt of an application from Petitioner, Respondent deemed that application incomplete and requested additional information. Respondent's correspondence of January 26, 1990, stressed that the additional information had to be provided "and approved" no later than February 19, 1990, in order for Petitioner "to be scheduled" for the licensure examination to be given on April 19, 1990. As established by the parties' stipulation in paragraph 1., above, Petitioner's application which was subsequently filed on February 15, 1990, was complete, free of errors or omissions and fully responded to all previous requests by Respondent for additional information or correction of errors or omissions. No additional requests for information pertinent to the application were forwarded by Respondent to Petitioner between February 15, 1990, and the meeting of Respondent's board on March 3-4, 1990. The parties' stipulation regarding Petitioner's February 15, 1990 application, coupled with Respondent's January 26, 1990 correspondence to Petitioner, establishes that the failure of Respondent's board to consider the application at its March 3-4, 1990 meeting effectively deprived Petitioner of admission to the April 19, 1990 licensure examination and thereby affected her substantial interests. Respondent did not act with reasonable dispatch in regard to Petitioner's rights and privileges. Such failure on the behalf of Respondent is established by Respondent's action informing Petitioner of an application deadline (February 19, 1990) for admission to a particular licensure examination (April 19, 1990), and Respondent's stipulation that Petitioner met that deadline.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Board of Clinical Social Work, Marriage & Family Therapy, and Mental Health Counseling, granting Petitioner's application for licensure as a marriage and family therapist, subject to satisfactory completion of requisite examination requirements. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of November, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of November, 1990. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings. 1.-16. Adopted in substance, though not verbatim. Respondent's Proposed Findings. 1.-12. Adopted in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Frank J. Santry, Esq. P.O. Box 14129 Tallahassee, FL 32317 Linda B. Miles, Esq. Edwin Bayo, Esq. Assistant Attorney General Office Of Attorney General 1602 The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050 Executive Director Board of Clinical Social Work, Marriage & Family Therapy, and Mental Health Counseling Department of Professional Regulation The Northwood Centre 1940 N. Monroe St. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0750 Kenneth Easley, Esq. General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation The Northwood Centre, Suite 60 1940 N. Monroe St. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0750
The Issue Whether Petitioner, by pleading no contest to four counts of petit theft, in violation of Section 812.014(2)(e), Florida Statutes, despite steadfastly maintaining her innocence, must forfeit her rights and benefits under the Florida Retirement System, pursuant to Section 112.3173, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Division of Retirement is charged with the responsibility of managing, governing, and administering the Florida Retirement System (FRS) on behalf of the Department of Management Services. (Joint Stipulation of Fact 1.) FRS is a public retirement system as defined by Florida law. As such, Respondent had deemed its action regarding the forfeiture of Petitioner's rights and benefits under FRS subject to administrative review. (Joint Stipulation of Fact 2.) Petitioner is a senior management service class member of FRS. (Joint Stipulation of Fact 3.) At all times material to the allegations of this case, Petitioner was employed by the Town of Callahan as a planning and zoning administrator. (Joint Stipulation of Fact 4.) On or about August 23, 2005, the State Attorney for the Fourth Judicial Circuit, through an assistant, filed a Third Amended Information charging Petitioner with (a) one (1) count of grand theft, contrary to the provisions of Section 812.014(2)(c), Florida Statutes; (b) two (2) counts of grand theft, contrary to the provisions of Section 812.014(2)(b)1., Florida Statutes; (c) nineteen (19) counts of official misconduct, contrary to the provisions of Section 839.25(1), Florida Statutes; and (d) one (1) count of petit theft, contrary to the provisions of Section 812.014(2)(e), Florida Statutes. (Joint Stipulation of Fact 5.) The events that formed the basis for the Third Amended Information occurred during Petitioner's tenure as an employee of the Town of Callahan. (Joint Stipulation of Fact 6.) The Third Amended Information outlines the violations to which Petitioner pled no contest and provides, in pertinent part, as follows: COUNT 1: BARBARA F. BOONE on or between May 10, 2001 and January 31, 2002, in the County of Nassau and the State of Florida, did knowingly obtain or use or endeavor to obtain or use U.S. currency or gasoline, the value of $300.00 or more but less than $20,000.00, the property of the TOWN OF CALLAHAN, with intent to either temporarily or permanently deprive THE TOWN OF CALLAHAN of a right to the property or benefits therefrom, or with the intent to appropriate the property to her own use or to the use of any person not entitled thereto . . . COUNT 2: BARBARA F. BOONE on or between October 1, 1999 and September 30, 2002, in the County of Nassau and the State of Florida, did knowingly obtain or use or endeavor to obtain or use U.S. currency, the value of $20,000.00 or more but less than $100,000.00, the property of THE TOWN OF CALLAHAN received in accordance with El Nino Community Development Block Grant 00DB-6M- 04-55-02-G16, with intent to either temporarily or permanently deprive THE TOWN OF CALLAHAN of a right to the property or benefit therefrom, or with the intent to appropriate the property to her own use or the use of any person not entitled thereto . . . COUNT 3: BARBARA F. BOONE on or between October 1, 1999 and September 30, 2002, in the County of Nassau and the State of Florida, did knowingly obtain or use or endeavor to obtain or use U.S. currency, the value of $20,000.00 or more but less than $100,000.00, the property of THE TOWN OF CALLAHAN received in accordance with Housing Rehabilitation Community Development Block Grant 00DB-6B-04-055-02-H09, with intent to either temporarily or permanently deprive THE TOWN OF CALLAHAN of a right to the property or benefit therefrom, or with the intent to appropriate the property to her own use or to the use of any person not entitled thereto . . . * * * COUNT 23: BARBARA F. BOONE on or between October 1, 2000 and January 31, 2002, in the County of Nassau and the State of Florida, did knowingly obtain or use, or endeavor to obtain or use U.S. currency or cellular phone service, valued at One-Hundred Dollars ($100.00) or more but less than Three- Hundred Dollars ($300.00), the property of THE TOWN OF CALLAHAN, with intent to, either temporarily or permanently deprive THE TOWN OF CALLAHAN of a right to the property or benefit therefrom, or with the intent to appropriate the property to her own use or to the use of any person not entitled thereto . . . (Joint Stipulation of Fact 9.) Count 1 related to alleged misuse of a City gasoline credit card. Count 2 related to alleged dual billing of hours for the El Nino Block Grant. Count 3 related to alleged dual billing of hours for the HUD Block Grant. Count 23 related to alleged misuse of a City cell phone. (Exhibit 4: Circuit Court Hearing Transcript, pages 10-12.) Petitioner had filed a civil action against the City concerning all these issues before she was charged with them as crimes. (Exhibit 9: Informal Hearing Transcript, page 13.) On or about March 7, 2006, Petitioner entered a plea agreement with the State of Florida, wherein she acknowledged she would plead no contest (nolo contendere), while maintaining her innocence, to the "lesser included" offense of petit theft contained in Counts 1, 2, 3 and 23 of the Third Amended Information. The agreement provided, however, that Counts 1, 2, and 3 would be reduced to the lesser-included misdemeanor counts of petit theft, in violation of the provisions of Section 812.014(2)(e), Florida Statutes, and Counts 4 through 22 would be dismissed. (Joint Stipulation of Fact 7.) The first sentence of the plea agreement reads as follows: I hereby enter my plea of no contest for the reason it is in my best interest although I maintain my innocence. (Joint Stipulation of Fact 8.) On or about March 7, 2006, Petitioner pled no contest in accordance with the terms of the plea agreement. (Joint Stipulation of Fact 10.) During the plea dialogue, which included inquiry by the circuit judge taking the plea to ascertain if the accused understood the charges and was entering the plea voluntarily, Petitioner articulated that she was innocent of all charges. (Exhibit 4: Circuit Court Hearing Transcript, pages 5-13.) In accepting a nolo contendere plea and its concomitant plea agreement, a circuit judge is required to inquire and determine if there is a "factual basis" for the charges. To those types of questions at Petitioner’s plea dialogue Petitioner's counsel replied: . . . just for our purposes we do not agree that any of those facts are true, but we do agree, if they were true they would constitute a sufficient factual basis. (Exhibit 4: Circuit Court Hearing Transcript, pages 12-13.) The circuit judge then stated on the record: The Court finds that there is sufficient factual basis to support the pleas, and that the pleas have been entered into freely, willingly, and voluntarily. (Exhibit 4: Circuit Court Transcript, page 13.) Judge Robert Foster, Circuit Court Judge in the Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, in and for Nassau County, Florida, ordered that adjudication of guilt be withheld for good cause shown. Petitioner was ordered to pay $8,260 in restitution to the Town of Callahan and $386.00 in court costs. (Joint Stipulation of Fact 11.) The state attorney then entered a Code 30 nolle prosequi in accordance with the plea agreement. (Exhibit 4: Circuit Court Hearing Transcript, page 13.) On or about August 17, 2006, Respondent received from its legal counsel a report recommending that Petitioner's FRS rights and benefits be forfeited pursuant to Section 112.3173, Florida Statutes. (Joint Stipulation of Fact 12.) On August 21, 2006, Respondent approved the forfeiture of Petitioner's FRS rights and benefits pursuant to Section 112.3173, Florida Statutes. (Joint Stipulation of Fact 13.) On August 28, 2006, Respondent notified Petitioner, by agency action letter, of the forfeiture of her FRS rights and benefits and afforded Petitioner a point of entry to challenge its decision and to request an administrative review of the issues. (Joint Stipulation of Fact 14.) The Agency conducted an informal proceeding on or about February 19, 2007. At that hearing, Petitioner maintained, under oath, her innocence with regard to all criminal charges that had been alleged against her, including those to which she had pled "no contest." She further testified that she was not guilty on all counts and had pled "no contest" to some of the criminal charges because the stress of the criminal process had been taking a toll on her and her family. The stress on Petitioner was exacerbated by a mastectomy and her subsequent treatment for breast cancer conducted during the pendency of the criminal proceeding, the plea bargaining, and the plea itself. (Exhibit 9: Informal Hearing Transcript, pages 10-14.) After the informal proceeding, the cause was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for proceedings consistent with Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. Herein, Respondent presented no evidence refuting Petitioner's testimony and no evidence of her guilt in relation to the charges to which she had pled nolo contendere.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency enter a final order determining that Petitioner’s rights and benefits under the Florida Retirement System have not been forfeited and reinstituting those benefits. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of July, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of July, 2007.
The Issue Whether Respondent, John R. Blum (Mr. Blum), violated the re-employment provisions set forth in section 121.091(13)(c)5.d., Florida Statutes (2013), and, therefore, must repay his Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) distribution and subsequent monthly retirement benefits.
Findings Of Fact The Division is the state agency charged with the responsibility of administering the Florida Retirement System (FRS). Mr. Blum was employed as a highway patrol officer with the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DHSMV). He made the decision to enter DROP, and, for the last five years of his employment with DHSMV, he participated in DROP. Prior to ending his DROP participation, Mr. Blum completed a Deferred Retirement Option Program Termination Notification, confirming he would terminate employment on May 31, 2013. The notification was also signed by the retirement coordinator for DHSMV confirming Mr. Blum’s employment termination date, and reads in pertinent part: In order to satisfy your employment termination requirement, you must terminate all employment relationships with all participating FRS employers for the first 6 calendar months after your DROP termination date. Termination requirement means you cannot remain employed or become employed with any FRS covered employer in a position covered or non-covered by retirement for the first 6 calendar months following your DROP termination date. This includes but is not limited to: part-time work, temporary work, other personal services (OPS), substitute teaching, adjunct professor or non-Division approved contractual services. * * * If you fail to meet the termination requirement, you will void (cancel) your retirement and DROP participation and you must repay all retirement benefits received (including accumulated DROP benefits). The form has been incorporated by reference into Florida Administrative Code Rule 60S-11.004(9). Mr. Blum terminated his employment with DHSMV on the agreed termination date of May 31, 2013. In July 2013, Mr. Blum began to work once again with DHSMV. He had applied and was hired to return as a reserve officer to work security at Florida turnpike stations. The Florida Highway Patrol provided Mr. Blum with access to the online system for payroll, and he was paid for his work through direct deposit from DHSMV, an FRS employer. Mr. Blum was under the mistaken impression that, when he worked the security for the turnpike stations, he was working for a private vendor. He had no intention of violating the termination of employment provisions. In September 2013, after working for almost three months, Mr. Blum was notified that he had violated the termination of employment provisions of DROP, and he ceased working as a reserve officer. On May 8, 2014, the Division sent a letter to Mr. Blum, notifying him that his DROP participation and retirement had been voided and that he must repay all retirement benefits, including his DROP accumulation. The total amount paid is $227,755.51, which the Division seeks to recover. He was also informed that his retirement account would be credited to reflect membership from March 2009 through May 2013. Mr. Blum has returned to work as a highway patrol officer, and his DROP application has been approved effective May 1, 2014.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division enter a final order finding that Mr. Blum violated the re-employment provisions of section 121.091(13)(c)5.d., Florida Statutes, and, therefore, must repay retirement payments in the amount of $227,755.51 to the Division. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of August, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JESSICA E. VARN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of August, 2014. COPIES FURNISHED: John R. Blum 5050 Southwest Eleventh Place Margate, Florida 33068-4060 Larry D. Scott, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Dan Drake, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 Bruce Conroy, Interim General Counsel Office of the General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue Whether Petitioner may purchase retirement service credit for two (2) school terms in Leon County, Florida, beginning January 24, 1955 and January 16, 1956. Whether the Leon County School Board had authority to retroactively grant leave requests on July 2, 1957.
Findings Of Fact On or about January 19, 1955, Petitioner submitted a letter of resignation to Amos Godby, Superintendent of Public Instruction, resigning from her position as teacher in the Leon County schools effective January 21, 1955 (Petitioner's Exhibit 1). Maurice Peterson, principal of her school, wrote Petitioner and stated he did not want her to resign but instead would request a leave of absence for her (Petitioner's Exhibit 2). On or about January 20, 1955, Petitioner submitted an "Application of Member for Withdrawal of Accumulated Contributions" (Respondent's Exhibit 1) . In filing this form, Petitioner attested that she was withdrawing from service as a teacher as of January 21, 1955, and that she wished to have-her retirement contributions and accrued interest refunded to her. Amos Godby, superintendent of Public Instruction, also signed the form, certifying that Petitioner Berkowitz was no longer employed by the public school system, that her service as a teacher terminated on January 21, 1955, and that the last retirement deduction was made January 15, 1955. Petitioner received a refund of her retirement contributions in the amount of $200.41. Petitioner Berkowitz returned to teaching in Leon County, Florida, at the beginning of the school term in the 1955-56 school year. Thereafter, in December of 1955, she underwent surgery and, as a result, was unable to return to teaching for the remainder of the 1955-56 school term. By letter dated January 16, 1956, Maurice Peterson, her principal, asked Amos Godby, Superintendent of Public Instruction, to place Petitioner on temporary leave of absence because of her health problems Petitioner's Exhibit 3). At the beginning of the 1956-57 school term, Petitioner Berkowitz returned to teaching in Leon County, Florida. A letter dated June 11, 1957, from Maurice Peterson, principal of Petitioner's school, stated: Enclosed are two letters concerning Mrs. Irene Berkowitz which verify the fact that she was out of school in January, 1955 and January, 1956 on a leave of absence. (Petitioner's Exhibit 4) The Leon County School Board was the employer of all Leon County teachers and had exclusive authority to approve or grant leaves of absence. Petitioner had not been granted a leave of absence for January 24 - school term, 1955 by her employer, the Leon County School Board, and she filed no application to continue her membership in the retirement system and paid no retirement contributions. Petitioner also stopped teaching in January, 1956 without having been granted a leave of absence by the Leon County School Board for January 16 - school term, 1956, aid there was no evidence to show she filed application to continue her membership in the retirement system or paid retirement contributions. On July 2, 1957, the Leon County School Board retroactively approved leaves of absence for Petitioner for the periods of January 24 - school term, 1955 and January 16 - school term, 1956 (Petitioner's Exhibit 6). The former school superintendent, a witness for Petitioner, could not remember why the leaves of absence were not granted Petitioner Berkowitz by the school board at the time the leaves were taken, although he suggested it might have been an administrative oversight.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the Hearing Officer recommends that Petitioner's request to purchase retirement service credit for the two (2) school terms beginning January, 1955 and January 1956 be denied. DONE and ORDERED this 7th day of May, 1980, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Diane K. Kiesling, Esquire Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street Suite 207C - Box 81 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Mark S. Levine, Esquire 1801 North Meridian Road, Suite C Tallahassee, Florida 32303 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER =================================================================
Findings Of Fact John L. Durden, Petitioner, was initially employed by the State Road Department (SRD), the predecessor agency to Respondent, on September 29, 1952. He left the SRD on June 30, 1955, and was employed by the Florida Turnpike Authority (FTA) on July 1, 1955. Petitioner was employed by the FTA until October 9, 1958, and was reinstated at the SRD on October 10, 1958, and has been continually employed by this agency and Respondent. At the time Petitioner terminated his employment with the SRD, the Merit System in Florida had not commenced although the law became effective on June 20, 1955, when signed by the Governor. The Merit System became applicable to a state agency when that agency was so designated by the Governor. During the period Durden was employed by the FTA that agency was not placed under the Florida Merit System, but the SRD was placed under the Merit System. Accordingly, when Durden returned to the SRD in 1958, he became covered under the Florida Merit System. Leave policies in effect during the period between 1952 and 1958 provided that an employee earned annual leave at the rate of one working day per month during the first ten years of creditable service and one and one-quarter working days per month from the commencement of the eleventh year of creditable service. After state agencies came under the Merit System, State Personnel Rules promulgated thereafter were applicable only to agencies under the Merit System. When Petitioner returned to the SRD in 1958, there was no provision in the statutes or rules whereby Petitioner could use his prior service with the SRD or his service with the FTA to accrue ten years' creditable service for the purpose of computing earned leave. Accordingly, the entry on his personnel records that he would complete ten years' creditable service in 1968 was correct. In 1968 the personnel rules were changed to allow an employee, working for an agency under the Merit System, to earn ten hours of annual leave per month after five years of continuous and creditable service and twelve hours of annual leave after ten years of continuous and creditable service. These rules specifically provided they would have no retroactive application (Exhibit 11). In 1968 Petitioner completed ten years of continuous and creditable service with the SRD and earned leave in accordance with these rules. At the time Petitioner tendered his resignation to the SRD to accept employment with the FTA sick leave could not be transferred to a different agency. When Petitioner left FTA to return to SRD, any sick leave Petitioner had accrued at the FTA could not be transferred to the SRD because the FTA was not under the Merit System. The FTA was made a state agency by the Legislature when the FTA was created in 1953 Section 340.05, Florida Statutes (1955), but, as noted above, its employees were never covered by the Merit System. The pay records maintained by the Comptroller show that Petitioner was paid by state warrant issued from the Comptroller's office from 1952 until 1955 and from 1958 to the present. This indicates that FTA employees were not paid from appropriated funds but from revenues (or bonds) from the Turnpike.
The Issue Whether Respondent is entitled to contest the forfeiture of his retirement benefits.
Findings Of Fact On December 28, 2006, Respondent sent a Notice of Forfeiture to Petitioner at 2848 Carriage Court, Kissimmee, Florida 34772, via certified mail. Petitioner’s actual residence was not in Kissimmee, but rather located at 2848 Carriage Court, Saint Cloud, Florida 34772. The certified mail receipt for the Notice of Forfeiture was returned unsigned. A printout of the United States Postal Service’s website scanned in as part of Petitioner's file with the Division indicates that the Notice of Forfeiture was delivered on January 6, 2007, in Saint Cloud, Florida 34772. A handwritten notation on the copy of the printout indicates that: “must file petition on or before Jan 29, 2007.” On January 22, 2007, Robert Augustus Harper, who represented himself as counsel for Petitioner, sent a letter to Respondent requesting “all records and documents on Mr. Day.” This letter was stamped as received on January 25, 2007, in Respondent’s records. Respondent’s records do not indicate whether a response was ever sent to Mr. Harper or Petitioner. On April 8, 2009, Petitioner sent a letter to Respondent regarding the appeal of his criminal case, which was stamped as received on April 10, 2009, by Respondent. The letter advised that it was “to update your office of my retirement account with the State.” The letter further stated: At this time I have gone through one appeal process of criminal offences [sic] filed against me, out of the original 15 charges filed 13 has [sic] been reversed or found not guilty by either the Circuit Court or Appeals Court [sic] We are in the process of further appealing the remaining two counts. Enclosed is a letter from my attorney which was sent to you prior to our first appeal. After over 30 years of retirement payments made and a few years paid by myself in the 1970’s I hope this results in a favorable ending to myself. No response was sent to this letter by Respondent. On July 26, 2017, Petitioner met with employees of Respondent and received a copy of the Notice of Forfeiture. At that meeting, an employee of the Division, identified as Mr. Dame, submitted the following electronic inquiry: “Member never received reply to his letter dated April 8, 2009. He would like a reply ASAP. He also would like to know the disposition of his contributions.” On August 9, 2017, Kathy Gould, bureau chief of Benefit Calculations for Respondent, sent Petitioner a letter in response to his inquiry of July 26, 2017. The August 9, 2017, letter from Ms. Gould to Petitioner stated in pertinent part: The Division has reviewed the legal circumstances surrounding the forfeiture of your Florida Retirement System Benefits. On December 28, 2006, a Notice of Forfeiture of Retirement Benefits was sent by certified mail to you. This notice also included a statement of your rights to appeal the forfeiture decision by administrative hearing within 21 days, if you believed your rights under Chapter 121, F.S. were improperly or wrongfully determined. We have no evidence that you filed an appeal with the Division within 21 days. You have $315.89 in employee contributions on deposit. I am enclosing a Request For Refund of Employee Contributions (form FRS- M81) for your completion. Please contact our office if you have any questions or need additional information. On September 18, 2017, Petitioner sent Respondent a letter addressed to Ms. Gould stating in pertinent part: Thank you for your letter dated August 9, 2017. Although your letter indicates that a Notice of Retirement Benefits was sent by certified mail on December 28, 2006, I did not receive the notice. In fact, when I visited with staff of the Division of Retirement on July 26, 2017, I was advised of the existence of the forfeiture notice and provided a copy of the Certified Mail Receipt from my file. Importantly, the receipt is unsigned and the mailing address was incorrect. The file also includes a request from my attorney for a copy of all records and documents related to myself. The letter is dated January 22, 2007. No documents, records, or other response, however, was provided. The timing of the forfeiture letter is very curious to me. At the time the letter was mailed, my convictions were under appeal. A decision was not issued until February 22, 2008. Day v. State, 977 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008). That decision reversed all of the convictions for the misdemeanor offenses. The two felony convictions were upheld but, as of the date of the forfeiture letter, they were on appeal and not yet final. My file also includes a letter dated April 8, 2009, from myself to the Division of Retirement advising that the process of further appealing the remaining two felony counts was continuing. The letter attached the previous letter from my attorney requesting a copy of my file. Again, no response from the Division was received. I believe that I have a meritorious argument regarding whether the retirement benefits for my 30-years of service were lawfully forfeited. Under the circumstances, it would be greatly appreciated if you would review my file and advise whether the Division will re-issue the forfeiture letter so as to allow me appropriate notice and an opportunity to contest the determination. The letter was stamped as received by Respondent on September 21, 2017. On October 12, 2017, Respondent, through its Assistant General Counsel Mitchell Herring sent a letter to Petitioner denying his request to reissue the forfeiture letter. The pertinent part of the letter states: I am responding to your letter dated September 18, 2017 addressed to Kathy Gould. Based on a review of the original legal file related to the forfeiture of your retirement benefits, a Notice of Forfeiture of Retirement Benefits was mailed to 2848 Carriage Court, Kissimmee, FL on December 28, 2006 and delivered to that address on January 6, 2007. This was the address that you provided to the Florida Retirement System as your home address, and therefore constituted your address of record. Accordingly, this Notice was effective pursuant to section 120.569, Florida Statutes (2006), and your opportunity to file a petition expired on January 27, 2007. There is no record indicating that a petition was filed. More importantly, our records indicate that the Department was not provided with any notice that an appeal of your criminal conviction was occurring until more than two years after the Notice had originally been sent. Regardless of this, had the appeal overturned all convictions which could have served as the basis for the forfeiture of your retirement benefits, the forfeiture would have been reversed. However, this did not occur, as either of the two convictions for grand theft which still stand are independently sufficient bases for the forfeiture of retirement benefits pursuant to section 112.3173, Florida Statutes (2001-2017), and were included as justification for the forfeiture in the Notice of Forfeiture of Retirement Benefits. Because it has been more than ten years since the Department notified you of its forfeiture of your rights and benefits under the Florida Retirement System, a sufficient basis for the forfeiture still exists, and the Department provided effective notice of its intended action pursuant to law, the Notice of Forfeiture of Retirement Benefits will not be re-issued. At the hearing, Petitioner persuasively testified and offered evidence that he neither received the Notice of Forfeiture in January 2007, nor was aware that such a notice had been issued until his meeting with an employee of the Division near the end of July 2017. When Petitioner obtained a copy of the Notice of Forfeiture during his July 2017 meeting, he noticed that it had an incorrect address, i.e., it was mailed to Kissimmee instead of St. Cloud. Kissimmee and St. Cloud are distinct cities and the only two incorporated cities in Osceola County. Petitioner further explained that his home in St. Cloud was located about a quarter-mile down a private dirt road from a county-maintained road. His home was situated on five acres, with a fence surrounding the property and a locked gate at the driveway. He purchased the property in 2001 and resided there until 2011. Petitioner testified that all of the mailboxes for homes on the private dirt road were clustered together and located at the end of the road where it intersected with the county-maintained road. Anyone from the post office would have been unable to access Petitioner's home because of the fence and locked gate. Petitioner also had a “cur dog” that would not let anybody on the property. The other individuals residing in Petitioner's home in January 2007 were his wife and daughter. Petitioner's wife worked during the week and his daughter went to school and worked part-time. Petitioner testified that there would have been no one around during the week to receive any certified mail delivered at his home from the post office. There were occasions where the post office would leave certified mail slips in Petitioner’s mailbox at the end of the road. On such occasions, Petitioner would go into town to the post office to pick them up. Petitioner did not recall, however, the delivery of, or anyone showing up at his home with, a certified mail letter from the Division. The fact that Petitioner was aware that his criminal convictions could impact his ability to obtain retirement benefits does not demonstrate that he received the Notice of Forfeiture in January 2007. Petitioner acknowledged that he never asked for his deferred retirement option program (DROP) proceeds to be distributed. However, when asked why he sent his letter in April 2009, advising the Division of the status of his appeals and post-conviction efforts, if he was unaware of the forfeiture letter, Petitioner explained that he was still able to work, he was not 62 at the time, and that he wanted to let the Division know that he was still out there. Petitioner further explained that he informed the Division about the status of his appeals because he thought that he could receive his retirement benefits if he won in the appeal process. Petitioner's testimony that he did not receive the Notice of Forfeiture until his meeting with a Division employee in July 2017 was credible. The location and physical description of Petitioner’s home was uncontested and it appears unlikely that the postal service would have been able to deliver the certified mail to Petitioner. Other than the printout of the United States Postal Service website indicating that the Notice of Forfeiture was delivered on January 6, 2007, in St. Cloud, Florida, the Division produced no evidence that Petitioner, in fact, received it. The absence of a signed receipt, when considered with the postal service’s Track and Confirm printout indicating delivery, could, at best, suggest that Petitioner deliberately failed to pick up the certified mail letter. If delivered to St. Cloud, it is plausible that the certified mail slip was placed in the wrong mailbox. The evidence is insufficient, however, to show that Petitioner refused to accept the certified mail letter. The Division’s records do not include any notation that the certified mail was undeliverable or refused. Considering the evidence in light of all of the surrounding facts and circumstances, it is found, as a matter of fact, that the evidence is insufficient to show that Petitioner received the Notice of Forfeiture in January 2007. The Department presented no testimony regarding the practices and policies of the Division when the Notice of Forfeiture was issued. Division employees who were historically involved with Petitioner’s retirement forfeiture issues have either retired or obtained employment elsewhere. The deposition testimony of Mary Katherine Gould, the present bureau chief of the Division’s Benefit Calculations, discussed the Division’s current practice regarding unsigned certified mail receipts for notices of forfeiture. Ms. Gould testified that, currently, additional efforts are undertaken to locate the member and additional certified mailings are attempted to obtain the member’s signature on the return receipt. She also indicated that current practice would include further review of a member’s file to discover any other addresses. Petitioner’s retirement file with the Division shows that the general counsel for the Department at the time was aware that the certified mail return receipt was neither signed nor dated. And, there is nothing in the file indicating that Petitioner was avoiding delivery of the certified mail. Based on her review of Petitioner’s file, Ms. Gould could not determine whether any additional efforts had been made to search for a different address to attempt another certified mail delivery. Had the Division reviewed its own files, it could have easily discovered Petitioner’s correct mailing address. There are letters, applications, and other retirement form submittals within Petitioner’s file reflecting that his correct mailing address at the time was 2848 Carriage Court, St. Cloud, Florida 34772. For example, there are several documents from Petitioner related to his DROP application and submittals that contain his correct mailing address. His file also contains several letters and documents mailed from the Division to Petitioner at his correct address. The Division’s file for Petitioner further reveals that it received the public records request by Petitioner’s attorney, Robert Harper, on January 25, 2007. At the hearing, Petitioner explained that he had retained Mr. Harper to represent him in the appeals of his convictions, which were ongoing at the time of the public records request. Petitioner also asked Mr. Harper to help him “keep track of . . . the retirement part.” There is no evidence that the Department ever responded to Mr. Harper’s request. According to practice, the Division calendars the 21-day time period for the challenge of a forfeiture as commencing on the date the notice is received by the member. Although there is no certified mail return receipt, the purported delivery date of the Notice of Forfeiture indicated by the postal service was January 6, 2007. Therefore, had Petitioner actually received the Notice of Forfeiture, there was still time for Petitioner to contest the forfeiture, when the Division received the public records request by Mr. Harper on January 25, 2007. On January 30, 2007, five days after Mr. Harper’s public records request, the Division sent a memorandum to the General Counsel’s office. The subject of the memorandum is “Request for OGC Assistance with Public Records Request." The memo specifically advised that the public records request was for a copy of Petitioner’s retirement file and that there was a “legal block of Mr. Day’s retirement account because of possible forfeiture. There should be a file in the Legal Office.” An interoffice memorandum regarding the matter from Sarabeth Snuggs, director of the Division, to Geoffrey Christian, Office of General Counsel, dated February 1, 2007, states, in part: The return receipt was neither signed nor dated. However, according to the postal service’s track and confirm website, the letter was delivered on January 6, 2007. The member has failed to protest the forfeiture action within the 21-day time limit. The benefits are now forfeited and the legal file is closed. In other words, even though the certified mail receipt was returned unsigned, and despite the fact that the Division and its general counsel were aware of the pending unanswered public record’s request from Petitioner’s counsel, the Division closed Petitioner’s file on the grounds that Petitioner failed to timely challenge the forfeiture. Regarding Petitioner’s meeting with Division employee, Mr. Dame, on July 26, 2017, Petitioner provided undisputed and persuasive testimony that Mr. Dame provided him with a copy of the Notice of Forfeiture, the certified mail return receipt, and the Postal Service Track and Confirm printout. During the meeting, Mr. Dame pointed out the fact that the return receipt was unsigned. At the time, Mr. Dame also advised Petitioner that he was going to send an inquiry regarding the issue and that Petitioner should “sit tight, we’ll see what happens.” Mr. Dame never advised Petitioner that his 21-day time period to challenge the forfeiture letter would re-commence based upon the fact that Petitioner received a copy of the Notice of Forfeiture during that July 2017 meeting. Petitioner filed the Petition in this case in response to the letter from the Department’s Assistant General Counsel Mitchell Herring, dated October 12, 2017, because it had a case number on it. The letter referenced Petitioner’s September 18, 2017, letter and “OGC Case No. 17-36457.” Prior to that time, Petitioner's understanding was that the Division was investigating the circumstances surrounding his forfeiture letter. Based upon these facts, it is found that the Department never provided Petitioner with a clear point of entry within which to contest the forfeiture of his retirement benefits.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Department of Management Services, either reissue the Notice of Forfeiture of Retirement Benefits to Petitioner or otherwise allow him a point of entry with a 21-day time period within which to contest the forfeiture of retirement benefits. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of May, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of May, 2015.
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to Section 57.105(5), Florida Statutes, and, if so, what amount?
Findings Of Fact The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this proceeding. § 57.105(5), Fla. Stat.; and Order and Mandate in Case No. 1D04-4167, First District Court of Appeal. Section 57.105(5), Florida Statutes, reads as follows: (5) In administrative proceedings under chapter 120, an administrative law judge shall award a reasonable attorney's fee and damages to be paid to the prevailing party in equal amounts by the losing party and a losing party's attorney or qualified representative in the same manner and upon the same basis as provided in subsections (1)-(4). Such award shall be a final order subject to judicial review pursuant to s. 120.68. If the losing party is an agency as defined in s. 120.52(1), the award to the prevailing party shall be against and paid by the agency. A voluntary dismissal by a nonprevailing party does not divest the administrative law judge of jurisdiction to make the award described in this subsection. Subsection (5) of Section 57.105, Florida Statutes, directs the undersigned to the preceding subsections which set forth standards to be applied in the analysis of entitlement to attorney’s fees. Subsection (1) provides that reasonable attorney’s fees shall be awarded to the prevailing party to be paid by the losing party where the losing party or the losing party’s attorney knew or should have known that a claim or defense, when initially presented to the administrative tribunal or at any time before the administrative hearing, “[w]as not supported by the material facts necessary to establish the claim or defense or [w]ould not be supported by the application of then-existing law to those material facts.” The standards set forth in Subsection (1) and incorporated by reference in Subsection (5) were the result of an amendment to Section 57.105, Florida Statutes, in 1999. s. 4, Ch. 99-225, Laws of Florida. Prior to that amendment, the statute provided for the award of attorney’s fees when “there was a complete absence of justiciable issue of either law or fact raised by the complaint or defense of the losing party.” These new standards became applicable to administrative hearings in 2003 by s. 9, Ch. 2003-94, Laws of Florida, with an effective date of June 4, 2003. Petitioner filed his Petition for Administrative Hearing in September 2003. Accordingly, the newer standards of Section 57.105, Florida Statutes, apply to this case. In the case of Wendy’s v. Vandergriff, 865 So. 2d 520, (Fla. 1st DCA 2003), the court discussed the legislative changes to Section 57.105: [T]his statute was amended in 1999 as part of the 1999 Tort Reform Act in an effort to reduce frivolous litigation and thereby to decrease the cost imposed on the civil justice system by broadening the remedies that were previously available. See Ch. 99- 225, s. 4, Laws of Florida. Unlike its predecessor, the 1999 version of the statute no longer requires a party to show a complete absence of a justiciable issue of fact or law, but instead allows recovery of fees for any claims or defenses that are unsupported. (Citations omitted) However, this Court cautioned that section 57.105 must be applied carefully to ensure that it serves the purpose for which it was intended, which was to deter frivolous pleadings. (Citations omitted) In determining whether a party is entitled to statutory attorney's fees under section 57.105, Florida Statutes, frivolousness is determined when the claim or defense was initially filed; if the claim or defense is not initially frivolous, the court must then determine whether the claim or defense became frivolous after the suit was filed. (Citation omitted) In so doing, the court determines if the party or its counsel knew or should have known that the claim or defense asserted was not supported by the facts or an application of existing law.(Citation omitted) An award of fees is not always appropriate under section 57.105, even when the party seeking fees was successful in obtaining the dismissal of the action or summary judgment in an action. (Citation omitted) Wendy's v. Vandergriff, 865 So. 2d 520, 523. The court in Wendy’s recognized that the new standard is difficult to define and must be applied on a case-by-case basis: While the revised statute incorporates the ‘not supported by the material facts or would not be supported by application of then-existing law to those material facts’ standard instead of the ‘frivolous’ standard of the earlier statute, an all encompassing definition of the new standard defies us. It is clear that the bar for imposition of sanctions has been lowered, but just how far it has been lowered is an open question requiring a case by case analysis. Wendy’s v. Vandergriff, 865 So. 2d 520, 524 citing Mullins v. Kennelly, 847 So. 2d at 1155, n.4. (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). More recently, the First District Court of Appeal further described the legislative change: The 1999 version lowered the bar a party must overcome before becoming entitled to attorney’s fees pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes . . . Significantly, the 1999 version of 57.105 ‘applies to any claim or defense, and does not require that the entire action be frivolous.’ Albritton v. Ferrera, 913 So. 2d 5, 6 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005), quoting Mullins v. Kennelly, supra. The Florida Supreme Court has noted that the 1999 amendments to Section 57.105, Florida Statutes, “greatly expand the statute’s potential use.” Boca Burger, Inc. v. Richard Forum, 912 So. 2d 561, 570, (Fla. 2005). The phrase “supported by the material facts” found in Section 57.105(1)(a), Florida Statutes, was defined by the court in Albritton to mean that the “party possesses admissible evidence sufficient to establish the fact if accepted by the finder of fact.” Albritton, 913 So. 2d 5, at 7, n.1. Therefore, the first question is whether FAMU or its attorneys knew or should have known that its defense of Dr. Jain’s claim was not supported by the material facts necessary to establish the defense when the case was initially filed or at any time before trial. That is, did FAMU possess admissible evidence sufficient to establish its defense. The parties filed a Pretrial Stipulation the day before the hearing. The Pretrial Stipulation characterized FAMU’s position as follows: It is the position of the University that Dr. Babu Jain retired at the close of business on May 30, 2003, pursuant to the provision of the DROP retirement program. Dr. Jain did not have the right, nor the authority, to unilaterally rescind his resignation and retirement date. In a letter dated May 5, 2003, the Division of Retirement informed Dr. Jain that it was providing him with the “DROP VOID” form that had to be signed by himself and the University, for his participation in DROP to be rescinded. No University official signed that form nor agreed to rescind his retirement. On May 30, 2003, Dr. Babu Jain knew that his retirement through DROP had not been voided and that he had in-fact retired. The University included the position that Dr. Jain occupied in its vacancy announcement in the ‘Chronicle of Higher Education.’ The University, through Dr. Larry Robinson notified Dr. Jain that his retirement rescission was not accepted. Dr. Jain did not work past May 30, 2003. Finally, there was never a ‘meeting of the minds’, nor any other agreement between the University and Dr. Jain to void his retirement commitment. It [is] the University’s position that Dr. Babu Jain retired from Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University effective at the close of business on May 30, 2003. Pretrial Stipulation at 14-15. (emphasis in original) The material facts known by FAMU necessary to establish its defense against Petitioner's claim at the time the case was filed included: Petitioner’s initial Notice of Election to Participate in DROP and Resignation of Employment in which Dr. Jain resigned effective the date he terminated from DROP (designated as May 30, 2003); Dr. Robinson’s letter dated May 27, 2003, which asserted that the University was not in agreement with Dr. Jain's decision and that the decision to terminate from DROP is a mutual one; Dr. Robinson's letter of May 30, 2003, which informed Dr. Jain that the two summer semester employment contracts were issued to him in error and informing Dr. Jain that he would be paid through May 30, 2003, his designated DROP date; the refusal of anyone from FAMU to sign the DROP-VOID form provided to Dr. Jain by the Division of Retirement; the reassignment of another instructor to take over Dr. Jain’s classes the first Monday following the designated DROP termination date; and the Refund of Overpayment of Salary Form and resulting salary deduction from Dr. Jain’s sick leave payout. It is difficult to determine what, if any, additional facts FAMU learned through discovery. That is, whether deposition testimony of FAMU officials enlightened FAMU or its attorneys as to material facts not known at the time the case was filed by Dr. Jain, is not readily apparent. However, a review of the pre-trial depositions reveals material facts which supported FAMU’s defense that the summer contracts were issued in error and that there was no meeting of the minds between the parties regarding voiding Dr. Jain’s DROP participation. In particular, Dr. Robinson, Provost and Vice- President for Academic Affairs, testified in deposition that when he signed Dr. Jain’s summer employment contracts on May 20, 2003, he had no knowledge of Dr. Jain’s participation in the DROP program; that he first became aware that Dr. Jain was in DROP with a DROP termination date of May 30, 2003, upon receiving a May 21, 2003, memorandum from Nellie Woodruff, Director of the FAMU Personnel Office; and that Dean Larry Rivers did not have the authority to issue work assignments for any of his faculty beyond their DROP dates. Additionally, Dr. Henry Williams, Assistant Dean for Science and Technology, testified in deposition that when he signed the Recommendation for Summer Employment on May 5, 2003, which recommended Dr. Jain for teaching summer courses beginning May 12, 2003, he was unaware that there was a 30-day window during which a DROP participant could not be employed. Obviously, when the undersigned weighed all of the evidence, including evidence presented at hearing which is not part of this analysis, it was determined that the preponderance of the evidence was in favor of Dr. Jain’s position. However, that is not the standard to be applied here. The undersigned concludes that at the time the case was filed and prior to the commencement of the hearing, FAMU possessed admissible evidence sufficient to establish the fact that it did not give written agreement to his decision to abandon DROP and resume employment if accepted by the finder of fact. While the finder of fact ultimately did not agree with FAMU, FAMU possessed the material facts necessary to establish the defense, i.e., admissible evidence sufficient to establish the fact if accepted by the trier of fact, when the case was filed and prior to the final hearing. The second question is whether FAMU’s defense would not be supported by the application of then existing law to those material facts, when the case was initially filed or at any time before the final hearing. In the Pretrial Stipulation, the parties referenced Sections 121.091(13) and 121.021(39), Florida Statutes, as provisions of law relevant to the determination of the issues in the case.2/ These statutory provisions were also referenced by the undersigned in the Recommended Order as “two competing statutory provisions.” Recommended Order at 15. Subsection 121.091(13), Florida Statutes, establishing the DROP program, was created by s. 8, Ch. 97-180, Laws of Florida, with an effective date of January 1, 1999.3/ Section 121.091(13), Florida Statutes (2003), read as follows: DEFERRED RETIREMENT OPTION PROGRAM.--In general, and subject to the provisions of this section, the Deferred Retirement Option Program, hereinafter referred to as the DROP, is a program under which an eligible member of the Florida Retirement System may elect to participate, deferring receipt of retirement benefits while continuing employment with his or her Florida Retirement System employer. The deferred monthly benefits shall accrue in the System Trust Fund on behalf of the participant, plus interest compounded monthly, for the specified period of the DROP participation, as provided in paragraph (c). Upon termination of employment, the participant shall receive the total DROP benefits and begin to receive the previously determined normal retirement benefits. Participation in the DROP does not guarantee employment for the specified period of DROP. Participation in the DROP by an eligible member beyond the initial 60-month period as authorized in this subsection shall be on an annual contractual basis for all participants. Section 121.021(39)(b), Florida Statutes (2003), read as follows: 'Termination' for a member electing to participate under the Deferred Retirement Option Program occurs when the Deferred Retirement Option Program participant ceases all employment relationships with employers under this system in accordance with s. 121.091(13), but in the event the Deferred Retirement Option Program participant should be employed by any such employer within the next calendar month, termination will be deemed not to have occurred, except as provided in s. 121.091(13)(b)4.c. A leave of absence shall constitute a continuation of the employment relationship. Unlike the situation in Albritton, supra, the DROP program was relatively new and the statutes creating the same were not well established provisions of law. Dr. Jain was in the first “class” of DROP for FAMU. FAMU and its lawyers did not have the benefit of established case law that discussed DROP and its provisions when this case was filed or at any time before the hearing. While general contract law also came into play, it had to be considered in the context of the DROP program, which had no precedent of case law. FAMU argues in its Response to the Motion for Attorney's Fees that it interpreted the provision in Section 121.091(13), Florida Statutes, that requires written approval of the employer to be either the DROP VOID form provided by the Division of Retirement or a written document, executed by the designated University official, specifically approving Petitioner's decision. "The University did not believe the employment contracts that were issued to Petitioner in error, would constitute written approval." FAMU's Response at 5. This argument is consistent with the position FAMU took in the Pretrial Statement quoted above, that there was never a meeting of the minds "or any other agreement" that Dr. Jain's retirement rescission was accepted. A critical conclusion in the Recommended Order is found in paragraph 38: "Moreover, while the FAMU administration did not sign the DROP-VOID form, the contracts issued to Dr. Jain constitute written approval of Dr. Jain's employer regarding modification of his termination date." FAMU also took the position in the Pretrial Stipulation that Dr. Jain did not work past May 30, 2003, based upon the material facts recited above. Under that reading of the facts, Dr. Jain did not work during the next calendar month after DROP, and, therefore terminated employment consistent with the definition of "termination" in Section 121.021(39)(b), Florida Statutes. Again, while the undersigned did not agree with FAMU's application of the material facts to the then-existing law, FAMU's interpretation was not completely without merit. See Mullins v. Kennerly, 847 So. 2d 1151, 1155. (Case completely without merit in law and cannot be supported by reasonable argument for extension, modification or reversal of existing law is a guideline for determining if an action is frivolous.) Accordingly, the undersigned concludes that at the time the case was filed and prior to the commencement of the hearing, FAMU did not know and could not be expected to know that its defense would not be supported by the application of then-existing law to the material facts necessary to establish the defense. Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is ORDERED: Petitioner’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees is denied. DONE AND ORDERED this 1st day of March, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of March, 2006.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Ida L. Salz, began her employment as a classroom teacher in 1942 with the Central Institute for the Deaf in St. Louis, Missouri. The Central Institute for the Deaf is a private, non-profit agency and has been such ever since its beginning in 1914. Mrs. Salz worked for the institute as a classroom teacher for eight (8) years. She moved to Florida in 1954 and began employment with the public schools in January, 1955, at which time she also became a member of the Teachers' Retirement System. When she started her employment with the Dade County School System, she completed an enrollment application form which is required of all teachers in the public school systems of Florida. The purpose of the enrollment form was to identify the member, to provide beneficiary designation, to establish the beginning date of employment and the beginning date of membership in the Teachers' Retirement System. In 1966, she inquired of the (then) Teachers' Retirement System regarding her right to purchase credit for the eight (8) years of out-of-state teaching service from Missouri. She was informed shortly thereafter by the Teachers' Retirement System (Mr. B. M. Kelley) that she would be allowed to purchase eight (8) years of credit for hem Missouri teaching time. The Petitioner received a letter from Mr. B. M. Kelley employed by the Respondent, in September 2, 1966, stating that she could make periodic personal remittances to the Teachers' Retirement System in any amount she desired. She made periodic payments to the Teachers' Retirement System and on November 28, 1977, made the final payment of the amount due to the Teachers' Retirement System representing the eight (8) years prior service credit which she was purchasing. The Petitioner retired on June 15, 1981. She thereupon made application to the Respondent for retirement benefits. The Petitioner is sixty- four (64) years of age and has been a classroom teacher since 1942. The Petitioner's husband had previously retired on April 1, 1979,and is now sixty- seven (67) years old. The Petitioner's and her husband's retirement plans were based upon their belief that her retirement benefits would be computed based upon credit for the eight (8) years out-of-state Missouri service. The Petitioner would not have retired in July of 1981 had she not been in the belief, since 1966, that she would receive credit for her eight (8) years of out-of-state service. She relied on the Division of Retirement's representation in 1966 that she would have credit for those eight (8) years out-of-state service and had computed her expected retirement benefits and personal budget based on this information. Had the Petitioner known that after her retirement benefits resulting from the eight (8) years out-of-state service would be denied, she would not have retired, since the income so generated is insufficient to adequately support her and her husband. Upon receipt of the Petitioner's retirement application by the Division, the Bureau of Retirement Calculation reviewed the Petitioner's file for compliance with the statute and appropriate rules and regulations. It determined that the eight (8) years out-of-state service was not creditable because it was in a private school. The Respondent took the position that the so-called approval given the Petitioner in 1966 to purchase the service time related to her private school teaching was a "clerical error or a oversight" by the division. In a letter of August 3, 1981, Mr. A. J. McMullian, III, Director of the division, advised the Petitioner that the out-of-state service had been erroneously allowed to her, that the contribution she had paid for it would be returned, and that she would not get retirement credit for those eight (8) years. The personnel of the Teachers' Retirement System (later the Division of Retirement) are unilaterally responsible for the investigation in 1966, which led to their determination at that time that the Petitioner was entitled to the eight (8) years out- of-state service. The Petitioner had no influence in making this determination, but has relied on it in making her retirement plans during the years from 1966 through 1981. Sometime after the Petitioner started employment in the Dade County School System, the Division of Retirements' sent a form. to the Central Institute for the Deaf in St. Louis and, either personnel of that institute or of `a state agency of Missouri, completed the form and returned it to the Division of Retirement. The form certifies that the Petitioner was employed in the school, Central Institute for the Deaf in St. Louis, Missouri, from September 1, 1940 to June, 1948. The word in the form, "public", which appears before "schools" on the form was crossed out by either the Central Institute personnel or an employee of the Missouri State Government who completed the form. Thus, the Respondent's official who read the form and made the decision that the Petitioner was entitled to eight (8) years of out-of-state service was on notice that the out-of-state service was performed at a private institution rather than a public school. The parties stipulated that the Central Institute for the Deaf in St. Louis, Missouri, is a private, non-profit school and not a public school and that their interpretation of the statute quoted below is that out-of-state service in private schools is not creditable. The Petitioner contends, however, that inasmuch as the Petitioner relied, from 1966 through 1981, upon the representation made to her in 1966 that she would be allowed credit for the eight (8) years out-of-state service and planned her retirement and budgeted her retirement income accordingly, that the State Division of Retirement is now estopped to deny her benefits based upon those eight (8) years out-of-state service.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the pleadings and arguments of the parties, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the evidence in the record, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Respondent, the Division of Retirement, issue a Final Order finding that the Petitioner be allowed credit for her out-of-state teaching service, and recompute her retirement benefits from the date of her retirement, allowing her such credit. DONE and ENTERED this 11th day of June, 1982 at Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of June, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: William DuFresne, Esquire Suite 1782, One Biscayne Tower Two South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33131 Stanley M. Danek, Esquire Division Attorney Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street Suite 207C-Box 81 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Andrew J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Building C Cedars Executive Center Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Nevin G. Smith, Secretary Department of Administration The Carl ton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION DIVISION OF RETIREMENT IDA L. SALZ, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 81-2487 DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, Respondent. /
The Issue Whether Petitioner should be allowed to withdraw from the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) of the Florida Retirement System.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a member of FRS. Petitioner is part of the "Regular" class for FRS retirement purposes. In April 2001, and until late August 2001, Petitioner understood the law to require that if he wanted to participate in DROP he must elect to do so within 12 months of his 30-year anniversary of employment or within 12 months of attaining 62 years of age, whichever date came first. This was, in fact, the law until July 1, 2001. (See Findings of Fact 11 and 25-27). In July of 2001, Petitioner would become eligible to participate in DROP by virtue of reaching thirty years of service teaching at the University of Florida (UF).1 Petitioner would become 62 years old on July 2, 2001. In preparation for entry into DROP, Petitioner requested, and in April 2001 received, from the Division, an Estimate of Benefits. In bold capital print the acknowledgement stated: AFTER YOUR FIRST MONTH OF DROP PARTICIPATION YOU CANNOT ADD ADDITIONAL SERVICE, CHANGE OPTIONS, CHANGE YOUR DROP BEGIN DATE OR CHANGE YOUR TYPE OF RETIREMENT. (P-2) Petitioner filed his application for DROP participation on April 12, 2001. His application selected payout Option 2 to provide benefits to his wife and specified a "begin date" of July 1, 2001, his normal retirement date. Respondent Division, by date of April 16, 2001, acknowledged receipt of Petitioner's DROP application, but required that he provide additional materials, stating: The following items must be received: Properly completed DROP application, DP-11. The notary public's stamp and/or commission expiration date was not shown. A notary public may not amend a notarial certification after the notarization is complete. Enclosed is another Form DP-11, Application for Service Retirement and the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) for you to complete and have properly notarized. Return the completed application to this office immediately. The Hospital Record you submitted as birthdate verification is acceptable as partial proof of age. Please read the enclosed Request for Proof of Age, BVR-1, for a list of documents we will accept to complete your proof of age. AFTER YOUR FIRST MONTH OF DROP PARTICIPATION YOU CANNOT ADD ADDITIONAL SERVICE, CHANGE OPTIONS, CHANGE YOUR DROP BEGIN DATE OR CHANGE YOUR TYPE OF RETIREMENT. A Final Salary Certification, FC-1 with current year salary and terminal leave payments (excluding sick leave payments) must be received from your employer. Your employer is aware of this requirement. (R-1) Petitioner provided the additional information, and on April 30, 2001, the Division notified Petitioner that the apparent birth certificate he had supplied did not constitute acceptable proof of age and that additional proof was required. That item stated: The following items must be received: The Medical Center record you submitted as birth date verification is acceptable as partial proof of age. Please read the enclosed Request for Proof of Age, BVR-1, for a list of documents we will accept to complete your proof of age. If you have a copy of your birth certificate that is registered with the State of New York, please send it to us. The document you submitted was not registered with the vital statistics office for New York. AFTER YOUR FIRST MONTH OF DROP PARTICIPATION YOU CANNOT ADD ADDITIONAL SERVICE, CHANGE OPTIONS, CHANGE YOUR DROP BEGIN DATE OR CHANGE YOUR TYPE OF RETIREMENT. (R-2) The Division's April 30, 2001, request for a valid birth certificate was the parties' last correspondence before August 22, 2001. (See Finding of Fact 25). Shortly after April 30, 2001, Petitioner caused the Federal Social Security Administration to send verification of his birthdate to the Division. The Division received this item but did not acknowledge to Petitioner that it had been received. During the 2001 session, the Florida Legislature amended Section 121.091(13)(a)5., Florida Statutes, to allow "instructional personnel" to participate in DROP at any time after they reach their normal retirement date. In other words, the option for instructional personnel to elect DROP was no longer limited to a 12-month period after their 30 years' creditable service retirement date or attainment of age 62. The parties stipulated that the foregoing amendment "became law" on May 16, 2001. However, Chapter 2001-47, Laws of Florida, Section 2., clearly specifies that the amendment "shall take effect July 1, 2001." Respondent Division never individually sought out and notified Petitioner, any other DROP applicant, or any FRS retiree of the legislative change. According to Mr. Hunnicutt, on behalf of the Division, the Division has no way to single out all the people (such as DROP applicants) who might be affected by a specific legislative amendment. However, the Division does try, on a yearly basis, each autumn, to notify all retirees and all employees in FRS and other state retirement programs of the current year's legislative changes. The Division also answers specific questions about such legislative amendments if retirees or employees take the initiative to ask the Division about them. Since Petitioner did not know about the amendment until after August 22, 2001, he did not ask about it or otherwise contact the Division until August 30, 2001. (See Finding of Fact 27.) On June 21, 2001, the Division sent Information Release 2001-73, to all FRS employers, including the UF Retirement Office. This Information Release noted the changes to DROP eligibility for instructional personnel. (R-6) The Division's June 21, 2001, Information Release addressed many types of retirement information that could be obtained at the Division's web site, but did not specifically link the web site and the new legislation. Petitioner's testimony that the Division's web site never announced the amendment effective July 1, 2001, is unrefuted. At no time did UF affirmatively and individually seek out Petitioner and notify him concerning the new legislation. UF also did not do a blanket notification of the new legislation to all FRS members working for UF until November 19, 2001. (P-2) Effective July 2001, Petitioner was honored by a special merit salary increase of $10,000.00 per year that would significantly raise his retirement benefits if he were not considered to have entered DROP, effective July 1, 2001. This award was not reasonably foreseeable at the time he applied for DROP on April 12, 2001. The only document Respondent Division sent Petitioner after April 30, 2001, was a "Final Notification of DROP Benefit," dated July 19, 2001, but post-marked August 20, 2001. It included the following: You should call the Retired Payroll Section at (850) 487-4856, immediately if you: Extend your DROP participation date (approval of employer required). Your participation in the DROP cannot exceed the 5 years (3 years for Special Risk members) which is the maximum allowed by law; (P-1) According to Mr. Hunnicutt, the Division cannot do the final benefit calculations for a DROP or regular retirement applicant until the Division receives all of the information from the employee (Petitioner) and direct employer (UF) because final retirement calculations use the final salary information. The July 19, 2001, date of the foregoing "Final Notification" would have been the date the Division's Benefits Specialist prepared the final calculations and falls within the 30 days the Division usually needs to make and mail the final benefit calculations. Mr. Hunnicutt's only explanation for the month's delay in mailing the foregoing "Final Notification" was that it takes approximately a month for the verification process to be completed and the calculations mailed out. He testified that, regardless of its content, the Final Notification would not have been sent to Petitioner unless the Division had considered Petitioner's DROP application to be complete. Mr. Hunnicutt testified that it is not Agency practice to send an "acceptance into DROP letter." In his opinion, an FRS member is supposed to know he is in DROP unless he is advised that he is not in DROP. The Division viewed Petitioner as automatically having entered DROP on his request date of July 1, 2001. The Division considered Petitioner's begin date of DROP participation to be July 1, 2001, as Petitioner had requested on April 12, 2001. Accordingly, the Division also considered Petitioner's first month of DROP participation to have ended on July 31, 2001. By "DROP participation date" the Agency means "begin DROP participation date." The Division allows members to change or amend their DROP applications during the first month of retirement or DROP participation because it takes approximately a month to make final benefit calculations, and the Division's aspirational goal is to provide the final calculations before the 30 days are up. Therefore, in the Division's view and practice, Petitioner's right to alter any of his retirement selections would have been July 31, 2001. On August 22, 2001, Petitioner received the "Final Notification," dated July 19, 2001, but mailed August 20, 2001. (P-1). It showed a final retirement calculation of benefits for Petitioner which was $6.15 less per month than the original estimate he had received in April 2001. Immediately thereafter, Petitioner went to the UF Retirement Office and discovered the opportunity afforded by the 2001 legislation. By an August 30, 2001, letter, Petitioner wrote Mr. Hunnicutt, requesting to make a change in his DROP participation begin date to either January 2002 or July 2002, dependent upon receiving and reviewing new estimated calculations of benefits based on each of those dates (P-2.) On September 13, 2001, the Division denied Petitioner's request, citing Subsections 121.091(13)(b)3. and (13)(c)1. and 3., Florida Statutes, and advised that: After your DROP begin date, you cannot cancel your DROP participation, change your DROP begin date, change your option selection, or claim additional creditable service period. The letter did not mention the 30 days' grace period for changes which previous correspondence had and which is the Division's acknowledged practice. It stated that it constituted final agency action. Petitioner continued to argue his case by correspondence, seeking an administrative hearing if necessary. Apparently, it was not clear to many members of the academic community that university instructional personnel, as well as K-9 teachers, were eligible under the 2001 extended DROP sign-up amendment. However, as of October 2001, the Division had accepted DROP applications for instructional personnel who previously had not joined DROP during their initial DROP window period and who, as a result, and but for the new statutory amendment, would never have been eligible for DROP. As of October 2001, the Division also had advised other instructional personnel, that due to the new amendment, they were newly exempt from the 12-month window and could apply for DROP at any time. 2 On October 5, 2001, the Division again denied Petitioner's request to withdraw from DROP. In this letter, the Division also provided greater detail as to the reasons for its denial, stated it was final agency action, and included more details advising Petitioner of his right to request a disputed- fact hearing. The 2001 legislative session enacted, in addition to the amendment affecting Petitioner, a number of other amendments which affected retirement benefits, The Division made no blanket mailing to all members of FRS concerning any 2001 retirement law amendments until its annual bulletin, discussing all of the amendments, was mailed for the Division to all FRS members on December 28, 2001, by a private company in New York.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Retirement enter a final order deeming Petitioner timely withdrawn from DROP in the month of July 2001, returning him to an FRS status of regular employment, earning regular retirement serviceable credit, and providing for a recalculation of his retirement credits as appropriate to his altered status. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of May, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of May, 2002.
