The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to Section 57.105(5), Florida Statutes, and, if so, what amount?
Findings Of Fact The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this proceeding. § 57.105(5), Fla. Stat.; and Order and Mandate in Case No. 1D04-4167, First District Court of Appeal. Section 57.105(5), Florida Statutes, reads as follows: (5) In administrative proceedings under chapter 120, an administrative law judge shall award a reasonable attorney's fee and damages to be paid to the prevailing party in equal amounts by the losing party and a losing party's attorney or qualified representative in the same manner and upon the same basis as provided in subsections (1)-(4). Such award shall be a final order subject to judicial review pursuant to s. 120.68. If the losing party is an agency as defined in s. 120.52(1), the award to the prevailing party shall be against and paid by the agency. A voluntary dismissal by a nonprevailing party does not divest the administrative law judge of jurisdiction to make the award described in this subsection. Subsection (5) of Section 57.105, Florida Statutes, directs the undersigned to the preceding subsections which set forth standards to be applied in the analysis of entitlement to attorney’s fees. Subsection (1) provides that reasonable attorney’s fees shall be awarded to the prevailing party to be paid by the losing party where the losing party or the losing party’s attorney knew or should have known that a claim or defense, when initially presented to the administrative tribunal or at any time before the administrative hearing, “[w]as not supported by the material facts necessary to establish the claim or defense or [w]ould not be supported by the application of then-existing law to those material facts.” The standards set forth in Subsection (1) and incorporated by reference in Subsection (5) were the result of an amendment to Section 57.105, Florida Statutes, in 1999. s. 4, Ch. 99-225, Laws of Florida. Prior to that amendment, the statute provided for the award of attorney’s fees when “there was a complete absence of justiciable issue of either law or fact raised by the complaint or defense of the losing party.” These new standards became applicable to administrative hearings in 2003 by s. 9, Ch. 2003-94, Laws of Florida, with an effective date of June 4, 2003. Petitioner filed his Petition for Administrative Hearing in September 2003. Accordingly, the newer standards of Section 57.105, Florida Statutes, apply to this case. In the case of Wendy’s v. Vandergriff, 865 So. 2d 520, (Fla. 1st DCA 2003), the court discussed the legislative changes to Section 57.105: [T]his statute was amended in 1999 as part of the 1999 Tort Reform Act in an effort to reduce frivolous litigation and thereby to decrease the cost imposed on the civil justice system by broadening the remedies that were previously available. See Ch. 99- 225, s. 4, Laws of Florida. Unlike its predecessor, the 1999 version of the statute no longer requires a party to show a complete absence of a justiciable issue of fact or law, but instead allows recovery of fees for any claims or defenses that are unsupported. (Citations omitted) However, this Court cautioned that section 57.105 must be applied carefully to ensure that it serves the purpose for which it was intended, which was to deter frivolous pleadings. (Citations omitted) In determining whether a party is entitled to statutory attorney's fees under section 57.105, Florida Statutes, frivolousness is determined when the claim or defense was initially filed; if the claim or defense is not initially frivolous, the court must then determine whether the claim or defense became frivolous after the suit was filed. (Citation omitted) In so doing, the court determines if the party or its counsel knew or should have known that the claim or defense asserted was not supported by the facts or an application of existing law.(Citation omitted) An award of fees is not always appropriate under section 57.105, even when the party seeking fees was successful in obtaining the dismissal of the action or summary judgment in an action. (Citation omitted) Wendy's v. Vandergriff, 865 So. 2d 520, 523. The court in Wendy’s recognized that the new standard is difficult to define and must be applied on a case-by-case basis: While the revised statute incorporates the ‘not supported by the material facts or would not be supported by application of then-existing law to those material facts’ standard instead of the ‘frivolous’ standard of the earlier statute, an all encompassing definition of the new standard defies us. It is clear that the bar for imposition of sanctions has been lowered, but just how far it has been lowered is an open question requiring a case by case analysis. Wendy’s v. Vandergriff, 865 So. 2d 520, 524 citing Mullins v. Kennelly, 847 So. 2d at 1155, n.4. (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). More recently, the First District Court of Appeal further described the legislative change: The 1999 version lowered the bar a party must overcome before becoming entitled to attorney’s fees pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes . . . Significantly, the 1999 version of 57.105 ‘applies to any claim or defense, and does not require that the entire action be frivolous.’ Albritton v. Ferrera, 913 So. 2d 5, 6 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005), quoting Mullins v. Kennelly, supra. The Florida Supreme Court has noted that the 1999 amendments to Section 57.105, Florida Statutes, “greatly expand the statute’s potential use.” Boca Burger, Inc. v. Richard Forum, 912 So. 2d 561, 570, (Fla. 2005). The phrase “supported by the material facts” found in Section 57.105(1)(a), Florida Statutes, was defined by the court in Albritton to mean that the “party possesses admissible evidence sufficient to establish the fact if accepted by the finder of fact.” Albritton, 913 So. 2d 5, at 7, n.1. Therefore, the first question is whether FAMU or its attorneys knew or should have known that its defense of Dr. Jain’s claim was not supported by the material facts necessary to establish the defense when the case was initially filed or at any time before trial. That is, did FAMU possess admissible evidence sufficient to establish its defense. The parties filed a Pretrial Stipulation the day before the hearing. The Pretrial Stipulation characterized FAMU’s position as follows: It is the position of the University that Dr. Babu Jain retired at the close of business on May 30, 2003, pursuant to the provision of the DROP retirement program. Dr. Jain did not have the right, nor the authority, to unilaterally rescind his resignation and retirement date. In a letter dated May 5, 2003, the Division of Retirement informed Dr. Jain that it was providing him with the “DROP VOID” form that had to be signed by himself and the University, for his participation in DROP to be rescinded. No University official signed that form nor agreed to rescind his retirement. On May 30, 2003, Dr. Babu Jain knew that his retirement through DROP had not been voided and that he had in-fact retired. The University included the position that Dr. Jain occupied in its vacancy announcement in the ‘Chronicle of Higher Education.’ The University, through Dr. Larry Robinson notified Dr. Jain that his retirement rescission was not accepted. Dr. Jain did not work past May 30, 2003. Finally, there was never a ‘meeting of the minds’, nor any other agreement between the University and Dr. Jain to void his retirement commitment. It [is] the University’s position that Dr. Babu Jain retired from Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University effective at the close of business on May 30, 2003. Pretrial Stipulation at 14-15. (emphasis in original) The material facts known by FAMU necessary to establish its defense against Petitioner's claim at the time the case was filed included: Petitioner’s initial Notice of Election to Participate in DROP and Resignation of Employment in which Dr. Jain resigned effective the date he terminated from DROP (designated as May 30, 2003); Dr. Robinson’s letter dated May 27, 2003, which asserted that the University was not in agreement with Dr. Jain's decision and that the decision to terminate from DROP is a mutual one; Dr. Robinson's letter of May 30, 2003, which informed Dr. Jain that the two summer semester employment contracts were issued to him in error and informing Dr. Jain that he would be paid through May 30, 2003, his designated DROP date; the refusal of anyone from FAMU to sign the DROP-VOID form provided to Dr. Jain by the Division of Retirement; the reassignment of another instructor to take over Dr. Jain’s classes the first Monday following the designated DROP termination date; and the Refund of Overpayment of Salary Form and resulting salary deduction from Dr. Jain’s sick leave payout. It is difficult to determine what, if any, additional facts FAMU learned through discovery. That is, whether deposition testimony of FAMU officials enlightened FAMU or its attorneys as to material facts not known at the time the case was filed by Dr. Jain, is not readily apparent. However, a review of the pre-trial depositions reveals material facts which supported FAMU’s defense that the summer contracts were issued in error and that there was no meeting of the minds between the parties regarding voiding Dr. Jain’s DROP participation. In particular, Dr. Robinson, Provost and Vice- President for Academic Affairs, testified in deposition that when he signed Dr. Jain’s summer employment contracts on May 20, 2003, he had no knowledge of Dr. Jain’s participation in the DROP program; that he first became aware that Dr. Jain was in DROP with a DROP termination date of May 30, 2003, upon receiving a May 21, 2003, memorandum from Nellie Woodruff, Director of the FAMU Personnel Office; and that Dean Larry Rivers did not have the authority to issue work assignments for any of his faculty beyond their DROP dates. Additionally, Dr. Henry Williams, Assistant Dean for Science and Technology, testified in deposition that when he signed the Recommendation for Summer Employment on May 5, 2003, which recommended Dr. Jain for teaching summer courses beginning May 12, 2003, he was unaware that there was a 30-day window during which a DROP participant could not be employed. Obviously, when the undersigned weighed all of the evidence, including evidence presented at hearing which is not part of this analysis, it was determined that the preponderance of the evidence was in favor of Dr. Jain’s position. However, that is not the standard to be applied here. The undersigned concludes that at the time the case was filed and prior to the commencement of the hearing, FAMU possessed admissible evidence sufficient to establish the fact that it did not give written agreement to his decision to abandon DROP and resume employment if accepted by the finder of fact. While the finder of fact ultimately did not agree with FAMU, FAMU possessed the material facts necessary to establish the defense, i.e., admissible evidence sufficient to establish the fact if accepted by the trier of fact, when the case was filed and prior to the final hearing. The second question is whether FAMU’s defense would not be supported by the application of then existing law to those material facts, when the case was initially filed or at any time before the final hearing. In the Pretrial Stipulation, the parties referenced Sections 121.091(13) and 121.021(39), Florida Statutes, as provisions of law relevant to the determination of the issues in the case.2/ These statutory provisions were also referenced by the undersigned in the Recommended Order as “two competing statutory provisions.” Recommended Order at 15. Subsection 121.091(13), Florida Statutes, establishing the DROP program, was created by s. 8, Ch. 97-180, Laws of Florida, with an effective date of January 1, 1999.3/ Section 121.091(13), Florida Statutes (2003), read as follows: DEFERRED RETIREMENT OPTION PROGRAM.--In general, and subject to the provisions of this section, the Deferred Retirement Option Program, hereinafter referred to as the DROP, is a program under which an eligible member of the Florida Retirement System may elect to participate, deferring receipt of retirement benefits while continuing employment with his or her Florida Retirement System employer. The deferred monthly benefits shall accrue in the System Trust Fund on behalf of the participant, plus interest compounded monthly, for the specified period of the DROP participation, as provided in paragraph (c). Upon termination of employment, the participant shall receive the total DROP benefits and begin to receive the previously determined normal retirement benefits. Participation in the DROP does not guarantee employment for the specified period of DROP. Participation in the DROP by an eligible member beyond the initial 60-month period as authorized in this subsection shall be on an annual contractual basis for all participants. Section 121.021(39)(b), Florida Statutes (2003), read as follows: 'Termination' for a member electing to participate under the Deferred Retirement Option Program occurs when the Deferred Retirement Option Program participant ceases all employment relationships with employers under this system in accordance with s. 121.091(13), but in the event the Deferred Retirement Option Program participant should be employed by any such employer within the next calendar month, termination will be deemed not to have occurred, except as provided in s. 121.091(13)(b)4.c. A leave of absence shall constitute a continuation of the employment relationship. Unlike the situation in Albritton, supra, the DROP program was relatively new and the statutes creating the same were not well established provisions of law. Dr. Jain was in the first “class” of DROP for FAMU. FAMU and its lawyers did not have the benefit of established case law that discussed DROP and its provisions when this case was filed or at any time before the hearing. While general contract law also came into play, it had to be considered in the context of the DROP program, which had no precedent of case law. FAMU argues in its Response to the Motion for Attorney's Fees that it interpreted the provision in Section 121.091(13), Florida Statutes, that requires written approval of the employer to be either the DROP VOID form provided by the Division of Retirement or a written document, executed by the designated University official, specifically approving Petitioner's decision. "The University did not believe the employment contracts that were issued to Petitioner in error, would constitute written approval." FAMU's Response at 5. This argument is consistent with the position FAMU took in the Pretrial Statement quoted above, that there was never a meeting of the minds "or any other agreement" that Dr. Jain's retirement rescission was accepted. A critical conclusion in the Recommended Order is found in paragraph 38: "Moreover, while the FAMU administration did not sign the DROP-VOID form, the contracts issued to Dr. Jain constitute written approval of Dr. Jain's employer regarding modification of his termination date." FAMU also took the position in the Pretrial Stipulation that Dr. Jain did not work past May 30, 2003, based upon the material facts recited above. Under that reading of the facts, Dr. Jain did not work during the next calendar month after DROP, and, therefore terminated employment consistent with the definition of "termination" in Section 121.021(39)(b), Florida Statutes. Again, while the undersigned did not agree with FAMU's application of the material facts to the then-existing law, FAMU's interpretation was not completely without merit. See Mullins v. Kennerly, 847 So. 2d 1151, 1155. (Case completely without merit in law and cannot be supported by reasonable argument for extension, modification or reversal of existing law is a guideline for determining if an action is frivolous.) Accordingly, the undersigned concludes that at the time the case was filed and prior to the commencement of the hearing, FAMU did not know and could not be expected to know that its defense would not be supported by the application of then-existing law to the material facts necessary to establish the defense. Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is ORDERED: Petitioner’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees is denied. DONE AND ORDERED this 1st day of March, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of March, 2006.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Ida L. Salz, began her employment as a classroom teacher in 1942 with the Central Institute for the Deaf in St. Louis, Missouri. The Central Institute for the Deaf is a private, non-profit agency and has been such ever since its beginning in 1914. Mrs. Salz worked for the institute as a classroom teacher for eight (8) years. She moved to Florida in 1954 and began employment with the public schools in January, 1955, at which time she also became a member of the Teachers' Retirement System. When she started her employment with the Dade County School System, she completed an enrollment application form which is required of all teachers in the public school systems of Florida. The purpose of the enrollment form was to identify the member, to provide beneficiary designation, to establish the beginning date of employment and the beginning date of membership in the Teachers' Retirement System. In 1966, she inquired of the (then) Teachers' Retirement System regarding her right to purchase credit for the eight (8) years of out-of-state teaching service from Missouri. She was informed shortly thereafter by the Teachers' Retirement System (Mr. B. M. Kelley) that she would be allowed to purchase eight (8) years of credit for hem Missouri teaching time. The Petitioner received a letter from Mr. B. M. Kelley employed by the Respondent, in September 2, 1966, stating that she could make periodic personal remittances to the Teachers' Retirement System in any amount she desired. She made periodic payments to the Teachers' Retirement System and on November 28, 1977, made the final payment of the amount due to the Teachers' Retirement System representing the eight (8) years prior service credit which she was purchasing. The Petitioner retired on June 15, 1981. She thereupon made application to the Respondent for retirement benefits. The Petitioner is sixty- four (64) years of age and has been a classroom teacher since 1942. The Petitioner's husband had previously retired on April 1, 1979,and is now sixty- seven (67) years old. The Petitioner's and her husband's retirement plans were based upon their belief that her retirement benefits would be computed based upon credit for the eight (8) years out-of-state Missouri service. The Petitioner would not have retired in July of 1981 had she not been in the belief, since 1966, that she would receive credit for her eight (8) years of out-of-state service. She relied on the Division of Retirement's representation in 1966 that she would have credit for those eight (8) years out-of-state service and had computed her expected retirement benefits and personal budget based on this information. Had the Petitioner known that after her retirement benefits resulting from the eight (8) years out-of-state service would be denied, she would not have retired, since the income so generated is insufficient to adequately support her and her husband. Upon receipt of the Petitioner's retirement application by the Division, the Bureau of Retirement Calculation reviewed the Petitioner's file for compliance with the statute and appropriate rules and regulations. It determined that the eight (8) years out-of-state service was not creditable because it was in a private school. The Respondent took the position that the so-called approval given the Petitioner in 1966 to purchase the service time related to her private school teaching was a "clerical error or a oversight" by the division. In a letter of August 3, 1981, Mr. A. J. McMullian, III, Director of the division, advised the Petitioner that the out-of-state service had been erroneously allowed to her, that the contribution she had paid for it would be returned, and that she would not get retirement credit for those eight (8) years. The personnel of the Teachers' Retirement System (later the Division of Retirement) are unilaterally responsible for the investigation in 1966, which led to their determination at that time that the Petitioner was entitled to the eight (8) years out- of-state service. The Petitioner had no influence in making this determination, but has relied on it in making her retirement plans during the years from 1966 through 1981. Sometime after the Petitioner started employment in the Dade County School System, the Division of Retirements' sent a form. to the Central Institute for the Deaf in St. Louis and, either personnel of that institute or of `a state agency of Missouri, completed the form and returned it to the Division of Retirement. The form certifies that the Petitioner was employed in the school, Central Institute for the Deaf in St. Louis, Missouri, from September 1, 1940 to June, 1948. The word in the form, "public", which appears before "schools" on the form was crossed out by either the Central Institute personnel or an employee of the Missouri State Government who completed the form. Thus, the Respondent's official who read the form and made the decision that the Petitioner was entitled to eight (8) years of out-of-state service was on notice that the out-of-state service was performed at a private institution rather than a public school. The parties stipulated that the Central Institute for the Deaf in St. Louis, Missouri, is a private, non-profit school and not a public school and that their interpretation of the statute quoted below is that out-of-state service in private schools is not creditable. The Petitioner contends, however, that inasmuch as the Petitioner relied, from 1966 through 1981, upon the representation made to her in 1966 that she would be allowed credit for the eight (8) years out-of-state service and planned her retirement and budgeted her retirement income accordingly, that the State Division of Retirement is now estopped to deny her benefits based upon those eight (8) years out-of-state service.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the pleadings and arguments of the parties, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the evidence in the record, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Respondent, the Division of Retirement, issue a Final Order finding that the Petitioner be allowed credit for her out-of-state teaching service, and recompute her retirement benefits from the date of her retirement, allowing her such credit. DONE and ENTERED this 11th day of June, 1982 at Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of June, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: William DuFresne, Esquire Suite 1782, One Biscayne Tower Two South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33131 Stanley M. Danek, Esquire Division Attorney Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street Suite 207C-Box 81 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Andrew J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Building C Cedars Executive Center Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Nevin G. Smith, Secretary Department of Administration The Carl ton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION DIVISION OF RETIREMENT IDA L. SALZ, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 81-2487 DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, Respondent. /
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner, Erin R. McGuire, is entitled to purchase retirement service credit for the 1980-1981 school year based upon the determination of whether she was on a properly authorized leave of absence for that school year or, conversely, had actually resigned for that year before returning as a full- time employee of the Bay County School System the following year.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a regular class member of the FRS, with some 28 years of service credit. Her entire FRS career has been with the Bay County School District. On October 8, 1980, the Petitioner resigned her employment with the Bay County School System to re-locate her residence to Alabama. She wanted to be closer to her family in Alabama and at the time did not intend to return to Bay County. She changed her mind, however, and on September 9, 1981, was re-hired by the Bay County School System. She has continued her employment with Bay County schools from that time until the present. The Petitioner maintains that she spoke to her school principal after tendering her resignation in 1980, and he persuaded her to rescind her resignation and instead take a leave of absence. No school board record of such a decision or denomination of her absence from employment as a leave of absence, was produced at hearing. The Petitioner did admit that when she left her employment with Bay County in 1980, she had no intention of ever returning at that point. She did, however, return for the following school year and has been employed by Bay County Schools ever since. When a member, such as the Petitioner, seeks to purchase a leave of absence from the FRS, they, and their employer, must verify the leave of absence on the FRS form FR That form is provided by the Division and must be executed by both the employer and the employee. The leave of absence must have been approved by the employer, the school board, either prior to or during the time period of the leave of absence, according to the rule cited herein. When Ms. McGuire submitted her form FR 28 to the school board, the board completed the form indicating that she had resigned on October 8, 1980 (not a leave of absence), and was re-hired as a "new hire" on September 9, 1981. It is also the case that the school board approved amending her record to show the time period in question as a leave of absence. That amendment of her record was approved by the school board on January 14, 2004, however, long after the time period of the purported leave of absence itself.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, denying the Petitioner's request to purchase leave of absence credit for the period October 1980 through September 1981. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of September, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of September, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Sarabeth Snuggs, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Alberto Dominguez, General Counsel Department of Management Services Division of Retirement 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Thomas E. Wright, Esquire Department of Management Services Division of Retirement 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Erin McGuire 1507 Rhode Island Avenue Lynn Haven, Florida 32444
The Issue Whether the Petitioner, Glen L. Hessler (Petitioner) is entitled to participate in the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP).
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is employed by the Indian River County Property Appraiser and is entitled by virtue of such employment to membership in the Florida Retirement System (FRS). For all purposes material to this case, it is undisputed the Petitioner began such employment (and thereby participated in the FRS) on November 9, 1992. The Petitioner was born on August 9, 1938. For purposes of this case, the Department has not disputed the accuracy of such date. In July 2000 an amendment to Section 121.021 took effect whereby employees within the FRS were "vested" after six years of service. This change in the law reduced the time to vest for retirement purposes from the 10 years previously set forth in the statute. As a result of the change, the Petitioner, who immediately became vested with the change, was eligible to apply for DROP on August 1, 2001. It is undisputed the Petitioner did not apply for DROP within 12 months of such date. The Petitioner maintains he was not given notice of the need to apply for DROP. The Petitioner maintains he was not timely notified of the change in the law affecting the time of his vesting. Finally, the Petitioner maintains he applied for DROP after 10 years of service. The Petitioner maintains that such application was timely filed as it was filed when he would have been eligible to apply but for the change in the statute. The Department disputes all assertions raised by the Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a Final Order denying the Petitioner's request for participation in DROP. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of September, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ___________________________________ J. D. Parrish Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of September, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Erin Sjostrom, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Cedars Executive Center Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Monesia Taylor Brown, Acting General Counsel Division of Retirement Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Eric Barkett, Esquire 2165 15th Avenue Vero Beach, Florida 32960 Larry D. Scott, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue Petitioner challenges the validity of Rule 3SF-2.13, Florida Administrative Code. 1/
Findings Of Fact Based on the entire record compiled herein, including the parties' factual stipulation, the following relevant facts are found. MISSION Insurance Co. (MISSION) is a corporation duly authorized to issue insurance policies, including workers' compensation insurance policies in the State of Florida. MISSION conducts its adjusting operations at North Regency One, Suite 400, 985 Regency Square Boulevard, Jacksonville, Florida. In the regular course of its business, MISSION adjusted the worker's compensation claim of Katrine Graham, who was injured on April 30, 1984 in an accident arising out of and in the course of her employment with Smiley's Mobey Dick Restaurant. MISSION received notice of the accident on May 21, 1984. On September 1, 1984, MISSION filed with the DIVISION its initial Injury Progress report (LES From BCL-13), in connection with the claim. On February 11, 1985, MISSION received from the DIVISION's Bureau of Workers' Compensation Carrier practices a letter dated February 4, 1985, notifying MISSION that the Bureau had assessed against MISSION the penalty of $100.00 for filing the form 11 days after the time prescribed by Rule 38F-3.16, F.A.C. A copy of the letter is attached hereto as Joint Exhibit "A." Since at least 1979, the DEPARTMENT has had a policy of imposing a fine of $100.00 on any insurance carrier who files its initial Injury Progress Report (LES From BCL-13) more than 105 days after it receives notice of the accident. The DEPARTMENT applies this policy, through its Bureau of Workers' Compensation Carrier Practices, to all insurance carriers and self-insured employers who come within the jurisdiction of the DEPARTMENT. The DEPARTMENT imposes penalties for the untimely filing of forms other than the BCL-13 form. The penalties to be imposed for the untimely filing of the BCL-13 form, as well as other forms, are stated in a "Penalty Assessment Chart," a copy of which is attached hereto as Joint Exhibit "B." At the time the subject penalty was imposed on MISSION, this chart was used by the DEPARTMENT's workers' compensation examiners in determining whether a penalty should be imposed and, if so, the amount of the penalty. The DEPARTMENT did not implement or use Chapter 120 rulemaking procedures to adopt the Penalty Assessment Chart, or the policy it represents, as a rule. PETITIONER'S POSITION Petitioner contends that the Penalty Assessment Chart amounts to an unpublished rule which has the effect of exacting a penalty for "late" filing in excess of Respondent's legislative authority inasmuch as Respondent is only authorized to impose a penalty based on a carriers failure or refusal to file forms, reports, or notices pursuant to Section 445.185(9), Florida Statutes. Petitioner avers that in the absence of specific statutory authorization for Respondent to impose a penalty or assessment for an untimely filing, there is no basis upon which Respondent can impose the penalty involved herein, that the rule should be declared invalid and the $100.00 penalty imposed based thereon, should be rescinded. RESPONDENT'S POSITION Respondent avers that timely filings are inextricably tied to the Division's reporting requirements and that to conclude that a carrier could file reports, notices, etc. at will, without any directive, would lead to an absurd result in contravention of Respondent's long-standing reporting policy which has been effective since approximately 1979. Finally, Respondent urges that the legislature has authorized it to exact penalties for late filings based on the authority granted in Sections 440.185(5) and (9), Florida Statutes.
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether petitioner's rights and benefits under the Florida Retirement System are subject to forfeiture.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Robert T. Lacey (Lacey), was employed as the Director of the Criminal Justice Institute, Broward Community College, Broward County, Florida, from at least January 1, 1985, until his resignation in March 1986. At all times pertinent to this case, Broward Community College (BCC) was an employer which participated in the Florida Retirement System, and petitioner, while employed by BCC, was a member of the Florida Retirement System. On February 4, 1987, a Grand Jury impaneled in Broward County, Florida, returned a fourteen (14) count true bill of indictment against Lacey. The matter was ultimately assigned Case No. 87-2056CFA, Circuit Court, Broward County, Florida. Pertinent to this case are Counts I-XII of the indictment, one count for each of the calendar months of 1985 (January through December 1985). Each count charges that Lacey did, while employed by BCC that year, commit the following acts each month: . . . unlawfully and knowingly obtain or endeavor to obtain the property of Broward Community College, to wit: United States Currency, services and/or material, of a value of one hundred dollars ($100.00) or more, with the intent to permanently or temporarily deprive Broward Community College of a right to the property or a benefit thereof, or to appropriate the property to his own use or the use of any person not entitled thereto, contrary to F.S. 812.014(1)(a)., and (1)(b)., and F.S. 812.014(2)(b). The gravamen of such charges was the assertion that while employed as director of the Criminal Justice Institute, an entity within Broward Community College, Lacy used materials, time and personnel to benefit him personally in his consulting business. On February 25, 1988, following a jury trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of grand theft, as alleged in Counts I-XII of the indictment, and not guilty as to Counts XIII and XIV of the indictment. Although found guilty by a verdict of the jury, the court withheld adjudication as to each count, placed Lacey on probation for a period of three years, ordered Lacey to pay $3,000 in restitution to BCC, and ordered Lacey to perform 200 hours of community service. Lacey's post trial motions for arrest of judgment, new trial, and renewed motion for judgment of acquittal were denied by the court. Following the true bill of indictment that issued February 4, 1987, Lacey was also charged by direct information filed April 21, 1987, in the Circuit Court, Broward County, Florida, Case No.87-6744CFA, with two counts of official misconduct (Counts I and III), one count of petit theft (Count II), and one count of grand theft (Count IV). Pertinent to this case, Count I of the information charged that on or about September 5, 1985, Lacey did, while a public servant, to wit: . . . an employee of Broward Community College . . . did then and there unlawfully and knowingly falsify, or cause another to falsify, an official record or official document, to-wit: a Broward Community College form entitled "STAFF AND PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT COURSE APPROVAL FORM," with the corrupt intent to obtain a benefit for himself . . . or another, to-wit: for the benefit of JACINDA LYNN FANNIN, contrary to F.S. 839.25(1)(b). Counts III and IV of the information charged Lacey with official misconduct and grand theft, respectively; however, that portion of the information which would have set forth the factual basis for Counts III and IV is not of record, and no conclusion can be drawn as to whether or not the basis for those charges related to Lacey's employment with BCC. In response to the information in Case No. 87-6744 CFA, and following the resolution of Case No. 87-2056CFA, Lacey entered a plea of nolo contendere to all counts. The Court, by order of November 28, 1988, withheld adjudication of guilt, and placed Lacey on probation for three years with regard to Counts I, III and IV and six months as to Court II. All probationary terms were to run concurrent and coterminous with those imposed in Case No.87-2056CFA. 2/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be rendered forfeituring the rights and benefits of petitioner, Robert T. Lacey, under the Florida Retirement System, except for the return of his accumulated contributions. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 25th day of March 1994. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of March 1994.
The Issue Whether Petitioner’s employment with Respondent terminated on May 31, 2003, or whether Petitioner continued to be employed by Respondent during the next calendar month.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Babu Jain was hired by Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University (FAMU) as a physics professor in September, 1967. He became an associate professor with tenure in 1979 and a full professor in 1996. The exact date of his last day of employment is a central issue in this case. In 1998, Dr. Jain learned of the DROP program. After reviewing written materials regarding DROP for nearly a year, Dr. Jain decided to join DROP in 1999. He executed Forms DP-11 and DP-ELE, indicating his election to participate in DROP. Form DP-ELE is entitled, "Notice of Election to Participate in the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) and Resignation of Employment." Form DP-ELE includes the following: "RESIGNATION FROM EMPLOYMENT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE DROP - I elect to participate in the DROP in accordance with Subsection 121.091(13), Florida Statutes . . . and resign my employment on the date I terminate from the DROP." The form contains Dr. Jain’s notarized signature below the following: "I understand that I must terminate all employment with FRS employers to receive a monthly retirement benefit and my DROP benefit under Chapter 121, F.S." Dr. Jain signed the form on October 12, 1999. The bottom portion of Form DP-ELE is to be completed by the agency head or designated representative. Within that portion of the form, the signature of Nellie Woodruff, Director of Personnel Relations at FAMU, appears following an acknowledgement: "I acknowledge that DROP participation for Babu L. Jain will begin on 06/01/1999, and I accept his resignation effective 05/30/2003 (the date the employee’s DROP participation will terminate)." This portion of the form indicates that it was signed by Ms. Woodruff on November 10, 1999. Sometime in the early part of 2003, Dr. Jain, for personal and financial reasons, decided that he wanted to relinquish his participation in DROP. He was aware that if he did so, he would forfeit all accumulated DROP moneys. Dr. Jain first relayed his desire to FAMU by verbally informing Dr. Henry Williams, the Assistant Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences, who was in charge of science departments. This conversation took place in approximately mid-February, 2003. On March 18, 2003, Dr. Jain sent a letter to Dr. Larry Rivers, Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences, which read in pertinent part as follows: This letter is in connection with my 1999 DROP application. I would like to inform you that I am finding my circumstances very unfavorable to accept the DROP at this time and, hence, I will not be taking the retirement in May 2003. Dr. Jain sent a copy to, among others, Dr. Gladys Lang, who was the Acting Provost and Vice President of Academic Affairs at that time. She did not take any action regarding Dr. Jain’s letter because it was her understanding and belief that no action was necessary. It was her understanding and belief that that Dr. Jain notified the University of his decision to withdraw from DROP and that no action was necessary on her part, "because I believed that the participants in DROP could make that decision that they wanted to continue to work and did not want to continue in the DROP program. I did nothing." She considered her decision not to take any action on Dr. Jain’s letter to be an acceptance of his decision. However, Dr. Lang acknowledged that had the letter been addressed to her, rather than her receiving a copy of it, she would have responded. Dr. Jain did not receive any response to his March 18, 2003, letter to Dr. Rivers. Because of this, Dr. Jain wrote again to Dr. Rivers on April 18, 2003, in which he reiterated that he did not want to retire in May 2003. Dr. Jain received a Termination Notification Form, Form DP-TERM, from the Division of Retirement in February 2003. Form DP-TERM specifies that it must be completed by both the DROP participant and the employer. It reads in pertinent part as follows: According to our records, your DROP termination date is 05/31/03. This form must be completed by both you and your employer and returned to the Division of Retirement in order to receive your DROP benefits and your monthly retirement benefits. In order to collect DROP, you must agree to the following statements. I understand that I cannot accept work for any Florida Retirement System (FRS) covered employer during the calendar month following my DROP termination date or my DROP participation will be null and void. If I fail to meet this requirement, I will forfeit my accumulated DROP benefit including interest. I also understand that I may not be reemployed by any FRS employer in any capacity . . . during the calendar month immediately following my DROP termination date. If I fail to meet this requirement, I will forfeit my accumulated DROP benefit, including interest retroactive to my enrollment date in DROP. I understand that if I forfeit my DROP benefit, my employer will be responsible for making retroactive retirement contributions and I will instead be awarded service credit for the time period during which I was in DROP. I will be eligible for a service retirement benefit based on my new termination date. I will be responsible for submitting an Application for Service Retirement. My retirement benefit will be based on my creditable service and salary, including such service and salary earned while in DROP. Dr. Jain did not sign Form DP-TERM. It is not clear from the record whether FAMU was even aware that Dr. Jain received this form. In any event, the portion of the form which is to be completed by the employer certifying that the employee has or will terminate employment is not signed by anyone from FAMU. Dr. Bill Tucker is a faculty member of the physics department and is president of the FAMU chapter of the United Faculty of Florida. On or about April 19, 2003, Dr. Tucker met with Dr. Rivers regarding Dr. Jain’s intention not to retire. Dr. Tucker left that meeting with the impression that Dr. Rivers had accepted Dr. Jain’s decision to remain a faculty member at FAMU and not retire in May 2003. Following that meeting, Dr. Jain wrote a letter dated April 21, 2003, to Dr. Rivers thanking him for his support and understanding the he, Dr. Jain, had decided not to retire. The letter also reminded Dr. Rivers that Dr. Mochena had not yet given him his 2003-2004 assignment of responsibilities, and requested that Dr. Rivers ask Dr. Mochena to do so at his earliest opportunity. Dr. Rivers did then call Dr. Mochena regarding preparing a schedule for fall semester for Dr. Jain. Dr. Mochena described the call as a "very quick call." As a result of that call, Dr. Mochena issued an Assignment of Responsibility Form on April 23, 2003, for Dr. Jain for the fall 2003 semester. While Dr. Rivers insisted at hearing that his intention was that Dr. Jain be assigned teaching duties on an adjunct basis, he acknowledged, and Dr. Mochena confirmed, that the assignment of responsibilities for Dr. Jain for fall of 2003 was not of a type that would have been given to an adjunct professor. Sometime after April 23, 2003, Dr. Jain asked Dr. Mochena to assign him teaching responsibilities for the summer of 2003. Dr. Mochena had already made his summer teaching assignments. He assumed, however, that since Dr. Jain was being assigned fall classes, that it was it would be appropriate to assign summer classes to Dr. Jain as well. On May 2, 2003, Dr. Mochena issued an Assignment of Responsibility Form for Summer Term "C" 2003, which was for 12 weeks. This was signed by Dr. Jain and Dr. Mochena on May 2, 2003. While Dr. Mochena's assignment of summer teaching responsibilities to Dr. Jain was as a result of Dr. Jain’s request and not at the request of the Dean’s office, Dr. Henry Williams, Assistant Dean for the College of Arts and Sciences, and Dr. Larry Rivers signed the Assignment of Responsibility Form for Summer Term "C" for Dr. Jain on May 5 and 6, 2003, respectively. Dr. Williams and Dr. Rivers also signed two forms on May 5 and 6, 2003, respectively, regarding Dr. Jain entitled "Recommendation for Faculty Employment." One was for the period of employment designated May 12, 2003 to June 30, 2003. The second was for the period July 1, 2003 to August 1, 2003. These recommendations went to the new Provost, Dr. Robinson. Dr. Larry Robinson became Provost and Vice President of Academic Affairs of the University on May 5, 2003. On May 20, 2003, Dr. Robinson signed two employment contracts regarding Dr. Jain for Summer Term "C." The first contract period was May 12, 2003 to June 30, 2003. The period of the second contract was July 1, 2003 until August 1, 2003. There were two contracts covering the summer term because the "C" summer term during which the physics courses were taught, extended into the next fiscal year. There is a section on the two summer contracts entitled "Tenure Status." There is an "X" beside the designation "Tenured." On May 21, 2003, Nellie Woodruff sent a memo addressed to Dr. Robinson which stated as follows: SUBJECT: DROP Termination Date for Babu L. Jain We are requesting your intervention in bringing closure to the subject employee’s request to withdraw from the DROP and continue his employment with the University subsequent to May 31, 2003. Enclosed are copies of the documents which were received in this Office from both Dr. Jain and the Division of Retirement. Please advise this office by May 30, 2003, regarding the appropriate action to take relative to Dr. Jain’s request for withdrawal from the DROP and remaining an employee of the University. According to Dr. Robinson, Ms. Woodruff’s May 21, 2003, memorandum to him was the first time he "officially" became aware of the issue regarding Dr. Jain. That is, he was generally aware of the fact that several employees were approaching their retirement date and entering DROP. Dr. Jain’s designated retirement date was a month earlier than the other FAMU DROP participants who had a June 30, 2003, DROP termination date. Whether Dr. Robinson had unofficial knowledge of Dr. Jain's retirement date or of his desire to withdraw from DROP at the time he signed the two summer contracts is unclear based upon his testimony. As a result of learning of Dr. Jain’s situation, Dr. Robinson sent a certified letter to Dr. Jain dated May 27, 2003, which read as follows: This comes in response to your request to void your participation in the Deferred Retirement Option (DROP) program. It appears from your correspondence of April 18, 2003, addressed to Dr. Larry Rivers, Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences, that you believe the decision to void your participation is a unilateral one. On the contrary, the decision to void your participation in DROP is a mutual one, requiring the University’s assent. The University is not in agreement with your decision to void your participation in DROP. I call your attention to two documents, Form DP-ELE and Form DP-11, which are on file with your signature. Specifically, Form DP- ELE reads in relevant part as follows: "I elect to participate in the DROP in accordance with Subsection 121.091(13), Florida Statutes (F.S.), as indicated above and resign my employment on the date I terminate from the DROP." Additionally, Form DP-11 reads in relevant part as follows: "I have resigned my employment on the date stated above and elect to participate in the DROP in accordance with Subsection 121.091(13), Florida Statutes (F.S.).” Regrettably, the University must inform you that it will follow the guidelines for DROP as outlined in the aforementioned Florida Statutes and cannot support your request to void your application in DROP. I also call your attention to Florida A&M University Rule 6C-10.211(2)(c), Florida Administrative Code which is enclosed with the aforementioned forms. Thank you for your many years of service to the University. The Division of Retirement issued a letter, dated May 5, 2003, to Dr. Jain with Form DP-VOID enclosed. Dr. Jain insists he did not receive it in the mail and, therefore, went to the Division of Retirement on May 29, 2003, to pick it up. In any event, he signed the DROP-VOID form on May 29, 2003, and took it to FAMU in an attempt to get it executed by Dr. Rivers or Dr. Robinson. The DROP-VOID form contains a section entitled "Employer Certification" which reads as follows: This is to certify that the (agency name) has rescinded the resignation of the above named member, and the member will continue working in a regularly established position with FRS ceverage. We understand the member’s DROP participation will be null and void, the membership in the FRS Pension Plan will be reestablished to the date the member joined the DROP and we will begin immediately reporting the correct retirement plan and contributions to the Division of Retirement. FRS will adjust previous payrolls reported under DROP based upon the member not having joined the DROP. In addition, we understand that contributions, plus interest, may be required. Future payrolls should reflect the retirement plan of active membership. Despite Dr. Jain’s efforts on May 29 and 30, 2003, to get this form signed, the DROP-VOID form was not signed by anyone at FAMU. On either May 29 or 30, 2003, Dr. Mochena received a call from Dr. Henry Williams, Assistant Dean for the College of Arts and Sciences, who instructed Dr. Mochena to end Dr. Jain’s summer employment and to reassign Dr. Jain’s classes to another instructor. Dr. Mochena assigned Mr. Jay Jackson to teach Dr. Jain’s classes beginning Monday, June 2, 2003. Dr. Robinson wrote a second letter to Dr. Jain on May 30, 2003, which read in pertinent part as follows: Dear Dr. Jain: This letter is to inform you that the two Summer Semester Employment Contracts, May 12, 2003 to June 30, 2003, and July 1, 2003 to August 1, 2003, were issued in error to you due to the fact that your DROP retirement date is May 31, 2003. As a result, you will be paid through May 30, 2003 for your services to the University and the University will consider you to have retired as of May 31, 2003. On Monday, June 2, 2003, Dr. Jain arrived at his classroom where Mr. Jackson was teaching. Dr. Jain left the classroom and went to see Dr. Mochena. Dr. Jain learned from Dr. Mochena that he had been instructed by the Dean prior to Saturday, May 31, 2003, to replace Dr. Jain with another instructor. Dr. Jain continued to go to his office for several days after June 2, 2003, "doing things I usually do. Do some research, study, read." He did not teach any classes in June 2003. Each department submits a payroll certification indicating the number of hours that an employee worked during a pay period. The payroll certification signed by Dr. Mochena on June 4, 2003, for the pay-period May 23 through June 5, 2003, initially indicated that Dr. Jain worked 79.3 hours. However, the 79.3 was crossed out and replaced with 47.58. The 47.58 was in handwriting, not typed as the rest of the numbers on the certification sheet which included the entry of 79.3 hours. The record is not clear as to who made the correction or when it was made. According to Ms. Woodruff, however, it is not the practice of the payroll section to change any certifications after the fact. Additionally, once an employee in a salaried position is added to the payroll, he/she is automatically issued a paycheck based upon the contract, unless some action occurs. In any event, the payroll section did not make an adjustment in Dr. Jain’s pay for the pay-period May 23 through June 5, 2003. Dr. Jain’s received an Earnings Statement reflecting a "pay date" of June 13, 2003, and a pay-period of 05/23/2003- 06/05/2003 reflecting regular wages of $3,266.11. Subsequently, the payroll office at FAMU completed a Refund for Overpayment of Salary form and submitted it to the Office of the Comptroller, Bureau of State Payrolls. In the section entitled, Reason for Adjustment, the payroll office wrote, "DROP end date 5/30/03." A salary refund in the amount of $898.33 was deducted from Dr. Jain’s sick leave payout on June 20, 2003.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a final order rescinding its letters of May 27 and 30, 2003, and reinstating Petitioner to employment effective June 1, 2003, including all salary and benefits for that period of time.1/ DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of May, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of May, 2004.
Conclusions WHEREFORE, it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that the protests are dismissed with prejudice. DONE AND ORDERED this |2__ day of May _, 2010, in Tallahassee, Florida. Fr J> . BR 7 . yamjssioner of Education | COPIES FURNISHED TO: | Christopher McRae Robert Hosay | 2612 Centennial Place 100 E. College Ave., Suite 900 | Tallahassee, FL 32308 Tallahassee, FL 32301 | Clerk William F. Quattlebaum | Division of Administrative Hearings Administrative Law Judge | The DeSoto Building Division of Administrative Hearings | 1230 Apalachee Parkway The DeSoto Building | Tallahassee, FL 32399 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-3060
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to a refund of retirement contributions for the period from February 1, 1960, through January 1975.
Findings Of Fact Until January 1975, the Florida Retirement System and its predecessor, the State and County Officers and Employees Retirement System (SCOERS), were contributory retirement plans, in which state employees contributed a portion of their wages toward their retirement benefits. In January 1975, FRS became a non-contributory retirement plan, in which the employer paid all contributions to the plan. On February 1, 1960, Petitioner, who was then known as Rebecca Jamis or James Lee, began her state employment at Florida State Hospital (FSH), located in Chattahoochee, Florida. During her employment, Petitioner was enrolled in the state’s retirement plan and contributed $2,188.01 to that plan. In 1980, Petitioner was convicted of a felony offense and was sentenced to prison. She began serving her sentence in state prison in June 1980. Due to her imprisonment, Petitioner’s employment at FSH terminated on July 29, 1980. At some unknown date, Respondent received form FRS-M81 requesting a refund of Petitioner's contributions to the state’s retirement plan. Pursuant to the state's document retention policy, the original form was destroyed many years ago with a microfilmed copy of the front of the form retained by DMS. The microfilmed copy of this form does not reflect the date the form was signed. Additionally, except for the agency number and various signatures, information contained in the refund request form was typed in. The date of termination of Petitioner’s employment was also typed on the form, indicating the form was completed after Petitioner was imprisoned. More importantly, the form was purportedly signed by Petitioner with the name she used at the time. However, the address on the request was not Petitioner’s residence but was the 1980 address of Florida State Hospital Credit Union. At the time, Petitioner had a loan at the credit union, although she denies having an account there. Petitioner also did not hear any more from the Credit Union about her loan and does not know what happened to it. The regularly kept records of the Division indicate that on November 4, 1980, pursuant to this request for refund, Respondent issued Warrant No. 264829 in the amount due Petitioner for a refund of her retirement contributions. The warrant was issued to Petitioner and mailed as instructed to the address of the credit union. Again due to the passage of time, a copy of this warrant is no longer available. Moreover, the credit union records are not available. However, Charlene Fansler performed a search of un- cashed state warrants for Warrant No. 264829. The warrant was not on the list of warrants that remained outstanding. Further, the warrant had not escheated to the State as abandoned property. As such, the evidence demonstrated that the warrant was paid by the State. In 1990, at the age of 60 and several years after her release from prison, Petitioner requested a refund of her retirement contributions. On May 24, 1990, Respondent denied Petitioner’s request based on the 1980 refund of those contributions. At the time, Respondent did not advise Petitioner of her chapter 120 hearing rights; and therefore, did not provide Petitioner with a clear point of entry for an administrative hearing. However, Petitioner was clearly aware that DMS claimed that she had been issued a refund of her contributions and was, therefore, not entitled to a further refund. Petitioner took no action in 1990 even though she did not personally receive the 1980 refund because and claimed to not have signed the refund request form. In 2012, 32 years after the 1980 warrant was issued and 22 years after the 1990 denial of her request for refund, Petitioner, at the age of 82, again requested a refund of her retirement contributions based on her claim that she did not sign the 1980 refund request form and the fact that she did not personally receive the refund warrant. Respondent submitted the microfilmed copy of the signed refund request form and known handwriting exemplars of Petitioner's signature to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) laboratory for analysis. Kesha White, a handwriting analyst with FDLE, analyzed the documents and concluded that they were more likely than not signed by the same person. Her finding was not conclusive due to the limits of analyzing signed documents preserved on microfilm. Indeed, the signatures on the refund form and the known handwriting samples of Petitioner's signature are very similar and appear to be by the same person. In this case, the better evidence demonstrates that Petitioner signed the 1980 refund request form and, due to the passage of time, has simply forgotten that she did so. By signing that form, Petitioner instructed Respondent to issue and mail the warrant to the address for the credit union listed on the form. Respondent complied with that request. Given these facts, Petitioner is not entitled to another refund of her retirement contributions.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division enter a Final Order finding that Petitioner was issued a refund of retirement contributions for the period from February 1960, through January 1975, and dismissing Petitioner's request for hearing. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of May, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of May, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Rebecca Thomas 1929 Hamilton Street Quincy, Florida 32351 Thomas E. Wright, Esquire Department of Management Services Division of Retirement Suite 160 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Dan Drake, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Division of Retirement Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 Jason Dimitris, General Counsel Department of Management Services Division of Retirement Suite 160 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399
