Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Constance M. Liccione, is a licensed clinical laboratory technician, having received said license in October, 1979 from respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS). In the summer of 1983, petitioner began making inquiry with HRS concerning the requirements to take the clinical laboratory supervisor examination. Because of either a communication's breakdown, or a failure of the agency to promptly reply to her request, she was not told of the specific requirements until 1984, and it was only in April, 1985 that she was able to get confirmation from HRS that she had nine years and one month of clinical experience, and when coupled with her 90 semester hours of academic study in the science field, she was eligible to sit on the supervisor examination. For some unexplained reason, she also was unable to obtain an application form from HRS and finally she had to obtain one from a local junior college. On April 5, 1985, Liccione filed her application to take the October, 1985 supervisor examination. At that time, the examination consisted of two parts: (a) administration and supervision, and (b) technical specialties for which the applicant wished to be licensed. In June, 1985, HRS adopted a sweeping change in its rules (Chapter lOD-41) governing eligibility for all supervisor examinations taken after October, 1985. Under the new rules, HRS requires an applicant for licensure as a supervisor to meet all new requirements for a clinical technologist. This will require Liccione to either have a bachelor's degree in science, or to have completed 90 semester hours or equivalent and to have completed a one-year internship in an approved school of Medical Technology. In addition, in view of the more stringent eligibility requirements, the examination no longer includes testing on the technical specialties, but only has testing in the administration and supervision area. Liccione meets neither of the two new requirements. Therefore, she is barred from taking any examination after the October 1985 examination until she either obtains a college degree in science or completes a one-year internship. Liccione is understandably upset because it took almost two years to learn from HRS if she was qualified under the old rules to take the supervisor examination, and therefore she missed 3 or 4 opportunities to take the examination under the old criteria. Because of the new rules, it is now an all or nothing proposition on the October, 1985 examination. When Liccione became aware of the impending rule change, she contacted HRS to determine if she could get a waiver of the old rule which required her to take an examination in various technical specialties. The old rules required supervisor candidates to pass an examination in each of the specialties or subspecialties for which the license is sought. Based upon her nine plus years of experience, Liccione desired a waiver in the five technical specialties of microbiology, serology, chemistry, hematology and immunohematology for which she is already licensed as a technologist. After considerable give and take between the two, HRS agreed to present her request for a waiver to the Clinical Laboratory Advisory Council (Council). The Council considered the same on October 3, 1985 and denied her request. That prompted the instant proceeding. As a result of HRS's decision, she was required to take both parts of the old examination. Her results are not of record. There have been no waivers of the technical specialty part of the examination granted since HRS began regulating clinical laboratories in 1967. However, under the provisions of Rule 10D-41.27, Florida Administrative Code, as they existed prior to June, 1985, examination in each of the specialties area was permissive, and not mandatory since the rule merely required that ". . . supervisors. . . may be required to pass an examination given by (HRS) in each of the specialties. . . for which the license is sought." (Emphasis added.) Liccione presently has an HRS issued temporary supervisor license which expires after she receives the results of the October, 1985 examination. She is acting as the supervisor of a clinical laboratory for a medical doctor in Port St. Lucie, Florida and as such is in charge of all technical aspects of the operation. She has written the procedures manual for the laboratory which was approved by HRS inspectors, and is active in all five specialties for which she seeks a waiver. As noted above, by this time she has almost ten years of practical experience, and has worked in hospitals and laboratories in both a technician and supervisor capacity. These qualifications were not disputed. At final hearing HRS did not question the above qualifications but relied instead upon statistics which reflected that candidates with qualifications comparable to Liccione had done poorly on the examination. It also pointed out that when Liccione took the specialties examination for a technician, her scores were "never. . . more than 4% higher than minimum established competency in any technical specialty." From this, HRS opined that Liccione's chance of success on the examination was not good, and that she was not entitled to the requested waiver. It also fears that a bad precedent will be set if Liccione's request for a waiver is approved. However, the undersigned finds the uncontradicted practical experience, education and training to be the more persuasive and credible evidence on the issue of whether such training, education and experience is adequate to warrant a waiver of the five technical specialties on the examination. In this regard, it is noted that there was no evidence to show that such experience, education, and training was not comparable to the new requirements in Rule 10D-41.69(2), Florida Administrative Code, or that such experience, education and training was not adequate to demonstrate competence in the five specialties in question.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that petitioner's request for a waiver of the technical specialty part of the October, 1985 examination be GRANTED, and if petitioner receives a passing grade on the administration and supervision portion of the examination, she be issued a clinical laboratory supervisor license. All other requests for relief should be DENIED. DONE and ORDERED this 20th day of January, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2Oth day of January, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: James A Liccione 168 S.W. Selva Court Port St. Lucie, Florida 33452 K. C. Collette, Esquire 111 Georgia Ave., Third Floor West Palm Beach, Florida 33401
Findings Of Fact By letter dated April 14, 1986, the Respondent denied the Petitioner's application to take the medical technologist examination in microbiology under the provisions of the Florida Clinical laboratory Law, Chapter 483, Florida Statutes because the Petitioner did not show "verification of 4 years pertinent microbiology experience required under Section 10D-41.69(5), Florida Administrative Code." By letter dated May 6, 1986, the Petitioner disputed the factual allegations contained in the Respondent's letter of denial and requested an administrative hearing. An informal administrative hearing was held in this cause on August 25, 1986. The hearing officer at the informal proceeding concluded that there were disputed issues of material fact and that the case should be reset for a formal hearing. On November 26, 1986, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services referred the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings for conduct of a formal administrative hearing. On February 17, 1987, a Notice of Hearing was mailed to both parties setting this cause for April 15, 1987, in Miami, Florida. The Petitioner's notice was addressed to 461 Lee Drive, Miami Springs, Florida 33166. All documents within the case file indicate that that is the Petitioner's correct address. The Notice was not returned to the Division of Administrative Hearings by the postal service. The Petitioner failed to attend the formal hearing, did not send a representative and did not communicate with the undersigned in any way regarding the formal hearing. After waiting approximately 45 minutes past the scheduled time for commencement of the formal hearing, the hearing was opened and the Respondent indicated that it did not desire to present any evidence. Therefore, no evidence was taken and the hearing was adjourned.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's application to take the medical technologist examination in microbiology be denied. DONE and ORDERED this 6th day of day May, 1987 in Tallahassee, Florida. W. MATTHEW STEVENSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of May, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Leonard Helfand, Esquire District XI Legal Counsel 401 Northwest 2nd Avenue Suite 1040 Miami, Florida 33128 Robert Acle 461 Lee Drive Miami Springs, Florida 33166 Gregory L. Coler Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John Miller, Esquire Acting General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Sam Power Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact Petitioner has 13 semester hours of science credits in college. She is also certified with the American Society of Clinical Pathologists. Petitioner's sole contention is that her certification is the equivalent of the seven remaining semester hours of academic instruction she needs to reach the 20 hours of science courses required for licensure by Rule 10D-49.68, Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact In October 1985, Dennis J. Donegan, Petitioner, qualified for and took the examination for medical technologist in hematology. He passed the examination and was subsequently so licensed. Effective January 1, 1986 new rules were adopted increasing the requirements for eligibility for applicants to take examinations in the various fields of medical technologist specialties. Although this rule was adopted by Respondent after complying with the procedural requirements for adopting rules, Petitioner was not personally notified of the change and was unaware of the increased requirements until his application to take the fall 1986 examinations in chemistry and microbiology specialties was denied. By letter dated August 27, 1986 Respondent denied the application because Petitioner did not meet the education requirements established by the rule which became effective January 1, 1986. Petitioner contends that had he known of the proposed rule change he would have applied and sat for all of the various laboratory technologist specialty examinations before the rule change became effective. Petitioner further contends that under Rule 10D-41.69(6) he is qualified to sit for the examination by reason of being an applicant who was qualified to sit for an examination prior to January 1, 1986.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner's application for a license by endorsement to practice medicine in the State of Florida should be granted or denied.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a medical doctor. Petitioner graduated medical school from the University of Miami in Miami, Florida, in May 1994. Petitioner signed an application for medical licensure by endorsement with the Board on January 9, 2003. On or about January 16, 2003, the Department of Health received Petitioner’s application for medical licensure by endorsement. Following receipt and review of the subject application, Petitioner was required to provide some additional information to the Board. Petitioner was eventually required to appear before the Credentials Committee of the Board to answer questions about his application. On October 17, 2003, the Board issued a Notice of Intent to Deny Licensure, in which the Board notified Petitioner of its intent to deny his application. That notice read as follows, in pertinent part: This matter came before the Credentials Committee of the Florida Board of Medicine at a duly-noticed public meeting on September 13, 2003 in Tampa, Florida[,] and the full Board on October 3-4, 2003, in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. The applicant appeared before the Credentials Committee on September 13, 2003, and presented testimony regarding the application file. The application file shows: The applicant lied before the Committee and lied on the licensure application as to the following: the applicant took a leave of absence during his training; the applicant was placed on probation at 3 schools; the applicant did not finish his training in the normal time frame; and, the applicant answered #15 b, c, d and #31 incorrectly on the application. The applicant is guilty of violating Section 458.331(1)(gg), Florida Statutes, for misrepresenting or concealing multiple material facts at any time during any phase of a licensing or disciplinary process or procedure. Based on the foregoing, the Board may refuse to certify an applicant for licensure, or restrict the practice of the licensee, or impose a penalty, pursuant to Sections 458.3331(2) and 456.072(2), Florida Statutes. It is therefore ORDERED that the application for licensure be DENIED. Petitioner attended the following four postgraduate training programs (residency programs): Medical College of Pennsylvania; Sinai Hospital1; Wayne State University/Detroit Medical Center; and University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey (“UMDNJ”). Petitioner’s dates of attendance in those four residency programs were as follows: Medical College of Pennsylvania from July 1, 1994 to June 30, 1995. Sinai Hospital from July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1999. Wayne State University/Detroit Medical from July 1, 1999 to June 30, 2001. UMDNJ from July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2003. Question number 15a on the application for medical licensure by endorsement asks, “Have you ever been dropped, suspended, placed on probation, expelled or requested to resign from a postgraduate training program?” Petitioner answered “yes” to question number 15a and submitted a written supplemental answer which stated, “I was placed on probation regarding the expectations of running a University service in a manner that kept attending physicians informed of patients’ clinical changes in July of 2000. Specific goals were given to me that I immediately fulfilled and was taken off probation in September of 2000 and remained in good academic standing until the time of my graduation.” On his application for licensure, Petitioner only admitted to being on probation at one residency program, Wayne State University/Detroit Medical Center. During the processing of the subject application, an employee of the Department of Health, Wendy Alls, advised Petitioner as follows by e-mail: “We are in receipt of your response to the inquiry from Wayne State University [Sinai Hospital], regarding your Residency from 7/95 to 6/99. It indicates that you were placed on probation and received negative reports. It also stated that limitations were placed upon you due to academic incompetence. Please respond.” On May 6, 2003, Petitioner submitted an e-mail response to Wendy Alls regarding his probation at Wayne State University [Sinai Hospital] which stated: “It is true that I did receive negative reports during my residency training from 7/95 to 6/99 for my work ethic. However, I was never formally placed on probation as per the guidelines of the Wayne State University. I, as well as the Graduate Medical Education Office, must receive formal written notification identifying the areas of deficiency and the duration of the probation period. Written notification must be submitted to both the GME office and myself after successful completion of the probation period. This was never done. In addition, no limitations or restriction were ever placed upon me due to academic incompetence or for any other reason for that matter.” Petitioner did not admit this on his initial application to the Florida Board of Medicine. Sinai Hospital submitted a Training Evaluation Form to the Board and stated on the form that Petitioner was on academic probation during his residency from 1996 to 1997. Sinai Hospital submitted a report to the Federation Credentials Verification Service (“FCVS”)2 and stated on the report that Petitioner was on academic probation during his residency from 1996 to 1997. Sinai Hospital reported that Petitioner was placed on probation during his residency in response to faculty concerns regarding both academics and behavior. While at Sinai Hospital, Petitioner was informed of the issues he needed to improve during his probationary period. These issues included, but are not limited to the following: Petitioner’s tardiness, sleeping during conferences, unavailability when on call, failing to follow hierarchy, and inability to carry his share of the workload. Petitioner admitted at the formal hearing he was told that he was on probation at Sinai Hospital. During his appearance before the Credentials Committee on September 13, 2003, Petitioner testified under oath, that he did not disclose the fact he was on probation at Sinai Hospital because he was never informed that he “was ever placed on probation.” A letter dated November 4, 1999, from Dr. Andrew Saxe (who was then the general surgery residency program director at Sinai Hospital) states that Petitioner was on “probationary status” at Sinai Hospital during his residency from 1996 to 1997. Dr. Andrew Saxe also noted Petitioner’s probationary status in a memo dated April 28, 1999, which Petitioner himself signed. Petitioner signed a memo dated December 18, 1996, stating that he was on “probationary status” at Sinai Hospital during his residency. Petitioner also signed a memo dated April 16, 1997, stating that he was “off probationary status” at Sinai Hospital during his residency. Wayne State University/Detroit Medical Center submitted a Training Evaluation Form to the Board and stated on the form that Petitioner was on academic probation during his residency from 1999 to 2000. Petitioner failed to fully disclose all of the reasons why he was placed on probation at Wayne State University/Detroit Medical Center. Wayne State University/Detroit Medical Center submitted a report to the FCVS and stated on the report that Petitioner was on academic probation during his residency for four months beginning in September 2000. The report stated that the probation was based on evaluations which cited “inadequate performances in clinical application of knowledge especially recognitions of own capabilities and limitations. There were also concerns over attention to details and work habits.” Petitioner’s supplemental answer to question 15a does not fully disclose his deficiencies in clinical knowledge and work habits at Wayne State University/Detroit Medical Center. At all times material to this case, Dr. Mark Granick has been the director of the plastic surgery program at UMDNJ. UMDNJ submitted a Training Evaluation Form to the Florida Board of Medicine and stated on the form that Petitioner was on academic probation during his residency “due to poor in-service exam scores.” After UMDNJ submitted the Training Evaluation Form, Petitioner contacted Dr. Mark Granick to discuss his probation at UMDNJ and the “program’s specifications in defining probation.” Dr. Mark Granick was prompted to send a second Training Evaluation Form to the Board, changing the substance of the first submitted Training Evaluation Form. The second Training Evaluation Form to the Board was submitted along with a letter from Dr. Mark Granick dated February 14, 2003, which stated he made an error in filling out the original form. When Dr. Mark Granick drafted Petitioner’s Fourth- Quarter Report on May 31, 2002, he was “documenting the reasons why I wanted him on a period of supervision, which I thought of as probation at that point in time.” Petitioner’s Fourth-Quarter Report dated May 31, 2002, was in fact signed by Petitioner. The Fourth-Quarter Report documented that Petitioner was “deficient on multiple occasions” with regard to Patient Care; Petitioner had a “poor acquisition of a central knowledge base in Plastic Surgery”; Petitioner’s tardiness needed to “stop”; Petitioner demonstrated “immaturity” in interpersonal skills; and, Petitioner had “been acting in an unprofessional manner.” Petitioner signed a memo dated January 8, 2003, stating that he was placed on “probation” at UMDNJ during his residency due to “poor performance on the in-service examination and overall perception of weakness in academic level.” Dr. Mark Granick testified that when he used the term “probation” in the January 8, 2003, memo, the word was consistent with his own thinking, and not consistent with university definitions. Dr. Mark Granick stated that Petitioner indicated to him during their meetings at UMDNJ that Petitioner understood he was on “probation” at UMDNJ. Dr. Mark Granick testified that in his mind he considered it “probation” when he put Petitioner under direct supervision, gave Petitioner academic support, and advised Petitioner of the areas in which he needed to improve. Although the period of academic supervision imposed on Petitioner did not qualify as probation at the university level, it did constitute “probation” in the mind of Dr. Mark Granick and was understood to be “probation” by the Petitioner himself. Petitioner misrepresented to the Board the circumstances which caused him to be placed on probation at Wayne State University/Detroit Medical Center. He also misrepresented his understanding of his probationary status at both Sinai Hospital and UMDNJ. Question number 15c on the subject application asks: “Did you take a leave of absence during a postgraduate training?” Petitioner answered “no” to question number 15c on the application. But Wayne State University/Detroit Medical Center documents show that Petitioner took a month-long leave of absence. Petitioner asserts that his month-long leave of absence from Wayne State University/Detroit Medical Center was not a “leave of absence” because he used a combination of sick time and vacation time. However, Petitioner signed a Family Medical Leave Act Certification asking for a leave of absence due to his being “unable to perform work of any kind” while training at Wayne State University/Detroit Medical Center. Petitioner requested a leave of absence for one month from his training program at Wayne State University/Detroit Medical Center in March of 2001. While on leave in March 2001, Petitioner was hospitalized for benzodiazepine poisoning, pace maker insertion, and possible seizure disorder secondary to cardiac rhythm disturbance. After Petitioner’s hospitalization, Petitioner needed to have a letter clearing him to resume unrestricted activity. During this period of time Petitioner was also told that he should avoid driving motor vehicles. Once questioned by the Credentials Committee, Petitioner admitted to taking a leave of absence in 2001 while training at Wayne State University/Detroit Medical Center. Prior to being questioned by the Credentials Committee, Petitioner concealed from the Florida Board of Medicine that he took a leave of absence while at Wayne State University/Detroit Medical Center. Question number 31 on the subject application asks “In the last five years, have you been treated for or had a recurrence of a diagnosed physical impairment?” Petitioner answered “no” to question number 31 on the application. However, after questioning by the Credentials Committee, Petitioner admitted he had a pacemaker. After his hospitalization, Petitioner had to be cleared by his doctors to return to his duties as a resident. Despite Petitioner’s own definition of “physical impairment,” he concealed his hospitalization, pacemaker, and possible seizure disorder from the Board. Question number 15b on the subject application asks “Was attendance in a postgraduate training program for a period other than the established time frame?” Petitioner answered “no” to question number 15b on the application. Petitioner attended the General Surgery postgraduate training program at Medical College of Pennsylvania for one year from July 1, 1994, to June 30, 1995. Petitioner attended the general surgery postgraduate training program at Sinai Hospital for four years from July 1, 1995, to June 30, 1999. Petitioner attended the general surgery postgraduate training program at Wayne State University/Detroit Medical Center for two years from July 1, 1999, to June 30, 2001. As indicated by the foregoing, Petitioner spent seven years attending general surgery postgraduate training programs. Physicians applying for licensure by endorsement in Florida are required to show that they have completed an “approved residency program” in a “slotted” position. The Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education (“ACGME”) accredits postgraduate training programs, sets the standards for training programs, and determines the number of “slotted” positions a program has. The Board considers an “approved residency program” to be one that has been accredited by the ACGME. The Board relies on the ACGME in making determinations for licensure. The Board relies on the information provided in the ACGME directory when processing applications. The ACGME established time frame for completing a general surgery postgraduate training program is five years. The ACGME-established time frame for completing the postgraduate training program in general surgery at Medical College of Pennsylvania, Sinai Hospital, and Wayne State University/Detroit Medical Center was five years when Petitioner attended these programs. Thus, a five-year general surgery residency was considered standard by ACGME, the Medical College of Pennsylvania, Sinai Hospital, Wayne State University/Detroit Medical Center, medical educators, and residents like Petitioner. Therefore, Petitioner would have had to complete all his postgraduate training in general surgery within five years in order to have finished his training within the “established time frame.” It took Petitioner seven years to complete all of his postgraduate training in general surgery. Petitioner’s attendance in his general surgery postgraduate training programs was for a period other than the normal time frame established by both ACGME and by the programs he attended. Question number 15d on the subject application asks, “Were you required to repeat any of your postgraduate training?” Petitioner answered “no” to question number 15d on the application. A memo dated December 3, 1997, written by Dr. Andrew Saxe (general surgery residency programs director at Sinai Hospital) and placed in Petitioner's training file, included the observation that "this is a consequence of his being asked to repeat the current clinical year." In a memo dated April 28, 1999, also written by Dr. Andrew Saxe and also placed in Petitioner’s training file, Dr. Saxe stated, “in light of prior probation and concerns regarding clinical competency an additional year of training would be of service to him.” At final hearing, Petitioner himself explained that each postgraduate year (“PGY”) runs from July 1st of one year to June 30th of the following year. On the Verification of Postgraduate Medical Education form submitted to FCVS, Sinai Hospital listed Petitioner as only completing PGY 2 through PGY 4 while attending their program. On the Verification of Postgraduate Medical Education form submitted to FCVS Wayne State University/Detroit Medical Center listed Petitioner as completing PGY 4 and PGY 5 in their program. While attending his postgraduate training programs, Petitioner was continuously evaluated, as evidenced in his training files. A review of Petitioner’s evaluation forms demonstrates that Petitioner was evaluated as a PGY 2 from July 1995 through June 1997. That means Petitioner was a PGY 2 for two years. A review of Petitioner’s evaluation forms demonstrates that Petitioner was evaluated as a PGY 4 from July 1998 through June 2000. That means Petitioner was a PGY 4 for two years. Therefore, Petitioner repeated both PGY 2 and PGY 4 levels of training. As demonstrated by Petitioner’s postgraduate training files, Petitioner’s education levels of training did not consistently progress through the calendar years. Petitioner concealed from the Board that he had to repeat PGY 2 and PGY 4. Over the course of the last year, the Board has licensed at least 55 applicants who were found to have made one or more material misrepresentations on their licensure applications, or in the course of the licensure process.3 Over the course of the last year, the Board has licensed a number of applicants alleged to have made material misrepresentations regarding one or more of the issues raised in this matter. In a few cases that are arguably similar to the facts presented in this case, the Board has granted the license application, but with conditions that required the applicant to file a new application, to pay a new application fee, and to pay an administrative fine in the amount of $5,000.00.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a final order denying Petitioner’s application for medical licensure by endorsement. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of April, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of April, 2004.
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether Respondent, Department of Health ("Department"), acted contrary to the agency's governing statutes, rules or policies, or the bid specifications in its proposed decision to award the contract for Invitation to Bid No. DOH 12-007 (the "ITB") to Intervenor Quest Diagnostics Clinical Laboratories, Inc. ("Quest").
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of the proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: On July 10, 2012, the Department issued the ITB. The ITB solicited bids for a three-year contract for the provision of clinical laboratory services to the Department and county health departments. The ITB estimated that the winning bidder will perform approximately 861,000 tests annually, which will produce sales of $9.3 million per year. Bids were received from four vendors: LabCorp, Quest, Florida Reference Laboratory, and Ecolab Group Co. The bids were opened on August 17, 2012. The Department found all four bids responsive. The ITB specified that the Department would make a single award based on the grand total of pricing for specified "core tests" for the initial three-year term and for a contingent three-year renewal term. Quest was the lowest bidder, and LabCorp was the second lowest bidder. The sum of Quest's core test pricing for the original three-year term and the contingent three-year renewal term for the relevant laboratory services was $29,555,864.96. The sum of LabCorp's core test pricing for the original three-year term and the contingent three-year renewal term was $36,059,437.52. Section 3.2 of the ITB provided definitions pertinent to the bid, including the following: Mandatory Requirements or Minimum Requirements -- means that the Department has established certain requirements with respect to proposals to be submitted by Respondent.1/ The use of shall, must, or will (except to indicate simple futurity) in this solicitation indicates compliance is mandatory. Failure to meet mandatory requirements will cause rejection of the bid or termination of the Contract/Purchase Order. Minor Irregularity -- used in the context of this solicitation and prospective Contract/Purchase Order, indicates a variation from the proposal terms and conditions which does not affect the price of the response, or give the respondent an advantage or benefit not enjoyed by other Bidders, or does not adversely impact the interests of the Department.2/ Section 4.15 of the ITB, titled "Responsive and Responsible," provided as follows: The Bidder shall complete and submit the following mandatory information or documentation as a part of the Bid Package. Any response which does not contain the information below shall be deemed non- responsive. Licensures-- Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments, Certificate of Compliance and State of Florida Agency for Health Care Administration Clinical Laboratory License Staffing Plan Attachment I Bid Price Pages-- Attachment III Initial Term & Renewal term (including balance of line minimum volume discount and phlebotomy services Required Certifications, Attachment VI The ITB provided no further clarification regarding the contents of the "Staffing Plan" beyond directing the bidders to "Attachment I" to the ITB. Attachment I was titled "Specifications of Clinical Laboratory Services" and contained six pages of additional specifications regarding services included in the bidders' prices, contractor liability, minimum tasks to be completed by the winning bidder, deliverables, and other requirements. Attachment I included the following specifications regarding staffing: Staffing Levels Each prospective offeror shall include its proposed staffing for technical, administrative, and clerical support including but not limited to a Contract Representative, Quality Control Manager, Staff Pathologist, Project Manager, Technical Support Manager, Technical Support Staff and statewide field representatives. The bidder shall provide hourly rate pricing, as an option to the contract, for an on-site Phlebotomist. The successful offeror shall maintain an adequate administrative organizational structure and support staff sufficient to discharge its contractual responsibilities. In the event the Department determines that the successful bidder's staffing levels do not conform to those promised in the proposal, it shall advise the successful offeror in writing and the successful offeror shall have 30 days to remedy the identified staffing deficiencies. Professional Qualification The successful bidder will be responsible for the staff affiliated with this proposal, insuring that they have the education, any professional licensure or certification which may be required by law, and experience necessary to carry out their duties. Staffing Changes The successful bidder shall staff the project with key personnel identified in the bidder's proposal, which are considered by the Department to be essential to this project. The bidder shall keep the Department notified of key staffing changes that directly impact services related to this solicitation. (Textual emphasis added.) The underscored language required the prospective offerer to include "proposed staffing" and required that the winning bidder staff the project with "key personnel identified in the bidder's proposal." The issue is whether the "Staffing Levels" and "Staffing Changes" provisions quoted above required the bidder to name the specific persons who would fill the "proposed staffing" and "key personnel" positions, or whether it would suffice for a bidder to indicate that it would fill those positions with qualified persons to be named after the bid is awarded. The term "key personnel" is undefined by the ITB. It is unclear from the specifications whether the "key personnel" referenced in "Staffing Changes" is synonymous with the "proposed staffing" referenced in "Staffing Levels." LabCorp interpreted "key personnel" to mean those persons named in the "Staffing Levels" provision: Contract Representative, Quality Control Manager, Staff Pathologist, Project Manager, Technical Support Manager, Technical Support Staff, and statewide field representatives. In its staffing plan, LabCorp provided the names of persons corresponding to each of the "Staffing Levels" positions named in the ITB, including a list of 69 field representatives and 19 sales support persons. The staffing plan submitted by Quest stated as follows: Quest Diagnostics has more than adequate staffing and capacity to meet the needs of the Florida Department of Health. Quest Diagnostics employs a Customer Solutions Manager (contract representative), Quality Assurance Manager (quality control manager), Medical Director and Senior Staff Pathologists, Project Manager, Specimen Processing Manager (technical support manager), Lab Manager (technical support staff), and Account Managers (statewide field representatives). Job descriptions for these positions are attached. Following this statement was a series of detailed job descriptions setting forth the qualifications, experience requirements and responsibilities for each of the named positions. Thus, Quest provided the Department with a set of job qualifications corresponding to the "Staffing Levels" provision of Attachment I to the ITB, but did not provide the name of a specific person to fill any of the positions. The Department concluded that Quest had sufficiently "identified" its key personnel. LabCorp did not provide the detailed job descriptions that Quest provided. For example, Sharon Kaplan is listed as "Project Manager" without further description of her qualifications, experience or duties. LabCorp contends that the ITB required the vendors to name specific persons who would fill those positions. The Department counters that the requirement to "identify" key personnel does not necessarily mean that the bidder must name the persons involved, and that Quest satisfied the ITB's requirement by "identifying" the positions it intended to fill and the qualifications for the positions named in the "Staffing Levels" section of Attachment I. Regina Taylor, the administrative service director of the Department's Bureau of Public Health Laboratories, performed the "responsive and responsible" review of the bids.3/ Ms. Taylor testified that the ITB "left the staffing plan a bit open-ended and left it up to the vendor as to how they would present it to us." The Department found both bids responsive though Quest and LabCorp each took a different approach to describing its staffing plan. Ms. Taylor stated that Quest would be able to name its personnel during the implementation process. She noted that LabCorp's bid provided the names of personnel but offered no detailed information regarding the qualifications or responsibilities of those persons beyond their job titles, whereas Quest provided detailed job descriptions without naming the persons who would fill the jobs. Ms. Taylor was not overly concerned about either company's ability to satisfy the requirements of the ITB. She stated, "Both Quest and LabCorp are national companies, so I'm sure that they have the adequate staff." The "Professional Qualification" section of Attachment I provides that the successful bidder is responsible for insuring that staff is properly qualified and certified. The "Staffing Levels" section allows the Department to review the successful bidder's staffing levels and require the bidder to remedy any deficiencies within 30 days of the Department's written notice. Ms. Taylor testified that the staffing provision section of the ITB was intended to ensure that the winning bidder had within its organization certain critical positions. The Department relied on its own experience in operating the state public health laboratory to identify the staffing requirements of the ITB. LabCorp points out that Quest was the only bidder that failed to submit a list of names of key personnel. Like LabCorp, Florida Reference Laboratory, and Ecolab Group Co. submitted the names of their key personnel. LabCorp also points out that Ms. Taylor's initial reaction to Quest's staffing plan submission was to call it "lame." Ms. Taylor's pronouncement on the quality of the Quest staffing plan was not a part of her review or of the Department's decision. Whether or not it she found it "lame," Ms. Taylor concluded that Quest's staffing plan was responsive to the bid criteria. The ITB requires the bidder to "identify" the "key personnel" with whom it proposes to staff the project. The ITB also states that the Department considers these key personnel to be "essential to this project." However, the ITB does not expressly define the term "key personnel." LabCorp named persons to fill the positions named in the Staffing Levels provision of Attachment I, which it reasonably took to be synonymous with "key personnel" referenced in the Staffing Changes provision of Attachment I. Via its staffing plan, Quest "identified" the key personnel without naming them. Given the lack of precision in these "open-ended" ITB specifications, both LabCorp and Quest made reasonable responses to the staffing requirements. Each chose a different way of "identifying" key personnel. Neither could be found to have clearly failed to comply with the bid specifications. The Department acted reasonably in finding both bids responsive. If LabCorp were correct that Quest's bid response did not comply with the staffing specifications, the question would arise as to whether Quest's deviation from the ITB specifications was a "minor irregularity" that could be waived by the Department. As noted above, the ITB defines "minor irregularity" as a variation from the bid specifications that does not affect the bidder's price or give the bidder an advantage or benefit not enjoyed by other bidders, or does not adversely impact the interests of the Department. LabCorp has not identified any adverse impact on the Department that Quest's failure to name its proposed staff or key personnel would have. Indeed, LabCorp is hard pressed to state what advantage the Department gains by having the vendor name 69 field representatives and 19 sales support persons in its bid. The names are likely meaningless to the Department. "Sharon Kaplan, Project Manager" provides no more useful information than does Quest's description of the education, knowledge, and experience it requires of a project manager. The Department's concern was vendor capability to adequately staff the project, and the Department reasonably concluded that both vendors' bids demonstrated that capability. The basis for award of this bid was the lowest price. There was no scored evaluation of the ITB responses, no ranking of the staffing plans, and no effort contemplated by the Department to investigate the qualifications of the named personnel. The staffing plans submitted by LabCorp and Quest were of equal value to the Department as an indication of the vendors' understanding of the bid criteria and ability to fill the necessary positions. The ITB anticipates that the Department will deal with any staffing problems after the contract is awarded and the successful bidder begins to implement its program. LabCorp fails to identify any price advantage that Quest would gain by not naming the persons who would fill the key personnel positions, and none is apparent. Whether or not the personnel are named in the bid, the key positions would have to be filled at a cost that would presumably be roughly the same for each vendor. Again, the ITB gives the Department the power to raise staffing questions with the successful bidder and to require that problems be remedied within 30 days of written notice. LabCorp contends that Quest's failure to name key personnel gave it an advantage not enjoyed by other bidders. LabCorp argues that it went to the time and expense of preparing a detailed staffing plan, whereas Quest cut corners by submitting a set of generic job descriptions. Quest's method of setting forth its staffing plan may or may not have made its bid preparation easier, but did nothing to improve its competitive position in the bidding process. Quest's commitment to fill the required staffing positions was equal to LabCorp's. LabCorp points out that its own staffing plan included persons who are already on its payroll. LabCorp did not offer an estimate as to the likelihood that all of the approximately 102 persons named in its staffing plan would still be on its payroll by the time the company commenced performing the contract. LabCorp has no way of guaranteeing that all of those persons will be present to perform on the contract. Under the "Staffing Changes" provision, LabCorp would be allowed to substitute other qualified LabCorp employees for the named persons should the need arise. The virtual certainty of employee turnover supports the Department's position that the ITB did not require that bidders undertake the task of naming the employees who would fill the positions set forth in the "Staffing Levels" section of Attachment I. LabCorp argues that Quest's staffing plan gives it the opportunity to delay or avoid altogether hiring the staff necessary to perform the contract to the Department's satisfaction. As noted above, the inclusion of employee names in the bid could not guarantee that the named employees would still be working for LabCorp after the bid award. Quest's commitment to staff the project was no less than LabCorp's. LabCorp's argument suggests that Quest's bid should be rejected because Quest may later choose to breach the contract, which specifically requires the vendor to provide adequate qualified staff. In any procurement, there is always a remote potential that the winning vendor will breach or default. The Department's contract provides remedies for such defaults. In summary, it is found that the bids of both LabCorp and Quest met the requirements of the ITB as to staffing plans. Even if LabCorp's narrow interpretation of the ITB's requirements were correct, Quest's non-conforming response would constitute a minor irregularity.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health enter a final order dismissing Laboratory Corporation of America, Inc.'s formal written protest and awarding the contract for Invitation to Bid No. DOH 12-007 to Quest Diagnostics Clinical Laboratories, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of December, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of December, 2012.
Findings Of Fact The Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Dentistry, filed an Administrative Complaint in DPR Case Number 00-52375 against the Petitioner's license to practice dentistry on May 13, 1986. The Petitioner did not dispute the facts alleged in the Administrative Complaint and the Board of Dentistry held an informal hearing, pursuant to Section 120.57(2), Florida Statutes, on September 13, 1986. On October 2, 1986, the Board of Dentistry issued a Final Order suspending the Petitioner from the remunerative practice of dentistry for a period of ten (10) years and advised the Petitioner of his right to appeal the Board's Final Order. The Petitioner did not appeal the October 2, 1986 Final Order of the Board of Dentistry. On or about May 1, 1987, and/or May 2, 1987, the Board of Dentistry met to consider correspondence from the Petitioner seeking a determination of compliance with the Board's October 2, 1986 Final Order for his proposal to do volunteer community service dental work at "St. Catherine Laboure Manor" in Jacksonville, Florida. The Board of Dentistry requested further clarification from the Petitioner and took no further action with respect to the Petitioner's request. On June 10, 1987, the Board of Dentistry met to consider the Petitioner's request to allow him to provide volunteer community service dental work under indirect supervision, and on June 26, 1987, the Board of Dentistry issued an Order Denying the Modification. The Petitioner did not appeal the June 26, 1987, Order of the Board of Dentistry. On or about March 9, 1988, the Petitioner submitted his second request to the Board of Dentistry for modification of its October 2, 1986 Final Order. The Petitioner identified the following reasons as why the Board of Dentistry should grant his request: My obligation to the people of the State of Florida was fully satisfied on September 28, 1987 (enc.). My civil rights were restored on February 25, 1988 (enc.). The fine imposed by the Board of Professional Regulation ($2000.00) has been paid in full. Since July 1987 I have been treating patients in St. Catherine Laboure' Manor under the direct supervision of Owen Boales D.D.S., as required by order of the Board (enc.). I am currently 64 years of age and need gainful employment. My wife and I are currently surviving primary on her earnings as an employee of the Florida Community College at Jacksonville. My mentally disabled son was admitted to The Northeast Florida State Hospital approximately one month after my arrest. His condition would be benefited by whatever personal attention and care my wife and I may be able to provide. The ten year suspension order now in effect is tantamount to lifetime punishment. This long suspension does not benefit the public but severely obstructs rehabilitative effort. It minimizes the opportunities for professional public service and prevents professional employment. It reduces the available options to demonstrate reliability and observable conformity to the profession's ethical standards. It will continue to impede all my effort to becoming a self sustaining productive and worthy member of society. On April 23, 1988, the Board of Dentistry met to consider the Petitioner's second request for modification of the Board's October 2, 1986 Final Order. After discussion and consideration of the evidence and arguments of the Petitioner, the Board of Dentistry on July 13, 1988, issued an Order Denying Modification of Final Order. The Petitioner did not appeal the Board's July 13, 1988 Order denying his second request. On or about June 5, 1990, the Petitioner through his attorney submitted his third request to the Board of Dentistry for a modification of the October 2, 1986 Final Order. The Petitioner's third Motion for Modification of Final Order submitted to the Board on or about June 5, 1990, did not contain information or circumstances that were substantially different from those known to the Board at the time the Final Order of October 2, 1986, was entered, at the time the first order was entered denying the modification request, or that were known to the Board when it had previously heard and denied Petitioner's second request in 1988. On July 28, 1990, the Board of Dentistry met to consider the Petitioner's third request for modification of the October 2, 1986 Final Order. After discussion of the parties and upon the advice of legal counsel, the Board of Dentistry on August 13, 1990, issued an Order Denying Modification of Final Order. The Petitioner timely sought an appeal of the Board's August 13, 1990 Order in the First District Court of Appeal, Case Number 90-2369. On September 4, 1991, the First District Court of Appeal issued its opinion where they found the August 13, 1990 Final Order to be ambiguous, vacated the August 13th Final Order, and remanded the case back to the Board of Dentistry for further proceedings. On October 8, 1991, the First District Court of Appeal issued its Mandate to the Board of Dentistry to hold further proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion. On or about October 15, 1991, the Petitioner submitted an Amended Motion for Modification alleging for the first time that "there had been material changes in circumstances since his suspension was entered and/or since the previous rulings as to his suspension." On November 8, 1991, the Board of Dentistry met to consider the Petitioner's third request for modification of the Board's October 2, 1986 Final Order, the Amended Motion for Modification of Final Order, and the Opinion and Mandate of the First District Court of Appeal. After discussion and consideration of the Petitioner's requests for modification, the Opinion and Mandate of the First District Court of Appeal, and the evidence presented, on December 12, 1991, the Board of Dentistry issued a Final Order on Remand granting the Petitioner's Amended Motion for Modification of the Board's October 2, 1986 Final Order. The Petitioner is a sole proprietor of a professional practice of dentistry. His principal office and domicile are located in Jacksonville, Florida. He has fewer than twenty-five (25) full-time employees, and his net worth, at the time of filing, was less than two million ($2,000,000) dollars. The Petitioner incurred appellate attorney's fees in the amount of $8,990.00 and costs in the amount of $323.92. The Respondent did not dispute the reasonableness of the fees and costs in this case.
Findings Of Fact Based on my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following findings of fact: By letter dated August 11, 1986, the Respondent advised the Petitioner that her application for supervisor license under the Florida Clinical Laboratory Law, Chapter 483, Florida Statutes, was denied. The letter provided that the application was denied because the Petitioner does "not have a B.S. degree required under Section 10D-41.68(3), Florida Administrative Code." By letter dated September 9, 1986, the Petitioner requested a formal administrative hearing. The Petitioner took and passed the proficiency examination for clinical laboratory technologists given by the U.S. Office of Health and Human Services (formerly Department of Health, Education and Welfare) in 1977. Based in part on the Petitioner's satisfactory grade on the federal examination, she was licensed in the State of Florida as a clinical laboratory technologist in microbiology, clinical chemistry, hematology and histology. The Petitioner has over six years of pertinent clinical laboratory experience. The Petitioner does not have a bachelor's degree.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Charlotte Holton's application for supervisor license under the Florida Clinical Laboratory Law, Chapter 483, Florida Statutes, be DENIED. DONE AND ORDERED this 11th day of May, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. W. MATTHEW STEVENSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of May, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-4067 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner Rejected as subordinate and/or unnecessary. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 1 and 2. Addressed in Conclusions of Law section. Rejected as subordinate and/or unnecessary. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 5. Rejected as argument. Addressed in Conclusions of Law section. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 4. Addressed in Conclusions of Law section. Addressed in Conclusions of Law section. Rejected as legal argument. Rejected as legal argument. COPIES FURNISHED: Ms. Charlotte Holton 4200 Northwest 76th Avenue Pompano Beach, Florida 33065 Leonard T. Helfand, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 401 Northwest Second Avenue, Suite 790 Miami, Florida 33128 Sam Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John Miller, Esquire Acting General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as alleged in the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner in September 1999.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Because of a "gut feeling that something was wrong" when he was not hired, Petitioner, Ausbon Brown, Jr. (Petitioner), an African-American male born on April 25, 1943, filed a complaint alleging that Respondent, Department of Children and Family Services (Department), unlawfully refused to hire him for any one of four positions he applied for on account of his race, gender, and age. The Department denies the allegation and contends that it hired the most qualified employee in each instance. After a preliminary investigation was conducted by the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission), which took over twenty months to complete, the Commission issued a Determination: No Cause on August 18, 1999. Although not specifically established at hearing, it can be reasonably inferred from the evidence that Respondent employed at least fifteen employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding year and thus is an employer within the meaning of the law. Petitioner received a Bachelor of Science degree in biology in 1965 from Florida A&M University, a Master of Science degree in wildlife and fisheries science in 1978 from Texas A&M University, and a doctorate in wildlife and fisheries science in 1991 from Texas A&M University. Petitioner's job applications reflect that from June 1965 until April 1994, he worked in various positions for the U. S. Department of Commerce, National Marine Fisheries Service, including as a "survey statistician," "operations research analyst," "chief turtle headstart," "fisheries biologist," "fisheries technician," and "equal opportunity employment counselor." Petitioner then apparently retired from federal service. Beginning on July 28, 1995, and continuing for several years, he was employed as a child support enforcement case analyst with the Florida Department of Revenue (DOR). His current employment is not of record in this case. Although Petitioner says he applied "continuously" for at least fourteen positions with the Department after leaving federal service, only four applications are in issue here. They involve positions 012123, 10081, 60287, and 60288. Position 012123 was a Management Review Specialist in the Department's Tallahassee district office ; position 10081 was an Operations and Management Consultant II at the Northeast Florida State Hospital in Macclenny; position 60287 was an Operations and Management Consultant II in the Department's Daytona Beach district office; and position 60288 was an Operations and Management Consultant II at the Department's central office in Tallahassee. Position 60287 was originally assigned to the Family Safety and Preservation Program in District 12 and required that the applicant have experience in child neglect and foster services. It was first advertised through a Job Opportunity Announcement (JOA) published on December 24, 1996. Because it was a "highly responsible" position that more closely fit within District Administration, the position was later "pulled" from the Family Safety and Preservation Program and transferred to District Administration. On January 8, 1997, Jane Miller (Miller), a black female and at that time a Program Administrator for the Family Safety and Preservation Program, submitted an interoffice memorandum requesting that she be given a 2-step demotion from pay grade 25 to 23, so that she could fill the position. It can be inferred from the evidence that her request for a demotion was due to a legislatively-mandated reorganization in 1997 that eliminated or transferred a number of positions. Because it was in the best interest of the Department, and Miller was fully qualified to assume the position, the Department decided to fill the slot through a demotion rather than from the applicant pool, and Miller's request was granted. After the position was transferred to District Administration, however, she demoted into another position involving day care licensure, rather than 60287. In response to the JOA, Petitioner timely filed his application. On January 14, 1997, he received a letter from the Department which advised that the position was being "filled by an employee who has taken a voluntary demotion with the department to assume this role." Although this ultimately turned out not to be true, when the letter was sent, the Department did in fact intend to fill the position through Miller's demotion, and thus it was an accurate representation at that time. The undersigned rejects the contention that the above letter, without a second letter to applicants explaining what actually occurred later, proves that there was discrimination. As noted above, after the January 14 letter was sent, the position was transferred to District Administration. A short time later, the reorganization of the Department was implemented, and Betsy Lewis (Lewis), a female whose age and race are unknown, filled the slot through a lateral reassignment that became effective on October 27, 1997. Prior to her reassignment, Lewis had held a similar position and was fully qualified. There was no evidence that the Department accepted Miller's demotion, then transferred the position to District Administration, and then laterally reassigned Lewis in order to deny Petitioner employment on account of his age, race, or gender. Position 60288, also an Operations and Management Consultant II, was located at the Department's central office in Tallahassee, Florida. Under current record retention requirements for that office, the Department purges "all records for employment received from individuals seeking employment but [who] were not hired" two years after the application deadline. Because more than two years have gone by since the application deadline, all of the records pertaining to the applicants who sought that position have been purged; therefore, a complete file relating to this position was not available at the final hearing. Position 60288 involved the compilation, analysis, and reporting of substance abuse data for the Department's substance abuse program. After he filed his application, Petitioner was given a telephone interview by Dr. L. E. Stivers, Program Administrator for Policy Integration & Information Systems. Although Petitioner says he had a "congenial interview" with Dr. Stivers, he was not considered because of a lack of proficiency in substance abuse language. Because Petitioner did not believe that knowledge of substance abuse was a prerequisite for a computer-related job in the substance abuse program, he asserted that Dr. Stivers was biased towards him, was "stretching for a reason to eliminate [him]," and used the lack of proficiency in drug abuse language as a pretext for not hiring him. These assertions have been rejected as not being credible. Of the candidates interviewed for the job, only three names were submitted to the Assistant Secretary for Substance Abuse for further consideration. Petitioner was not one of the three. Ultimately, a male (Robert Morrell) whose age and race are unknown, was hired for the job. That individual had direct experience in performing substance abuse data collection in the same department where the position was located, and he was the most qualified candidate. Position 10081, an Operations and Management Consultant II, was assigned to the Northeast Florida State Hospital in Macclenny, Florida. According to the vacancy announcement, the position's duties included "the support, consultation and guidance of the Unit Treatment and Rehabilitation Directors in the development and implementation of policies and procedures in the multi-discipline treatment and rehabilitation of mentally and physically ill residents in the area of Unit Operations." Thus, the position required that the individual have a working knowledge of the treatment of mental health patients and preferably a background in mental health. Petitioner met the minimum qualifications stated in the job announcement document and, along with seven other candidates, was given an interview. All candidates were asked the same questions. Petitioner contended that none of the questions asked were relevant, and most dealt with the "treatment of patients." This is hardly surprising, however, since the facility treats the mentally ill. A contention that the questions were unfair and were framed so as to exclude all "external" candidates has been rejected. The position was ultimately filled by Mary Jane Hartenstein (Hartenstein), a white female who was younger than Petitioner, and who received the highest score of all the applicants. At the time she was hired, Hartenstein served as a Unit Treatment Rehabilitation Director at the facility and was familiar with the treatment of mental health patients. She was the most qualified applicant because of her prior experience. The final position was 012123, a Management Review Specialist in the Tallahassee district office. The position called for familiarity with "planning, information resource planning, legislative budget requests, performance of needs assessment and knowledge of health and human services." John Girvin (Girvin), a white male whose age was the same as Petitioner, was ultimately selected for the job. Girvin had prior experience as a deputy secretary and assistant division director for the Department of Commerce and also served with the Historical Preservation Society. The evidence supports a finding that he was the most qualified person for the job. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Petitioner pointed out that when he had previously submitted his qualifications to his former employer (DOR) in 1996, he received a letter from DOR indicating that DOR "felt" that he qualified for a number of positions within the agency, including a Management Review Specialist. Therefore, Petitioner contended that this affirmation of qualifications by DOR also qualified him for the same type of position with another state agency, including the Department's position 012123. Assuming this to be true, it merely means that Petitioner met the minimum qualifications for such a position; it does not mean that he was the best qualified person for the job. As noted above, a more qualified individual was selected for the position. Petitioner further contended that nothing in the basic job announcement for position 10081 indicated that skills in "psychosocial" services were needed. That document, however, merely identified the minimum qualifications, and further details concerning the specific job requirements could have been obtained from the hospital's human resources office. Petitioner has also contended that existing employees of an agency have an advantage over "external" candidates since they can more easily obtain direct experience in the desired area as well as information about "vital criteria" for the job. Even if this is true, it does not equate to a discriminatory practice within the meaning of the law. Moreover, the evidence here shows that the most qualified person was hired in each instance. Finally, Petitioner asserts that the Department violated various Department of Management Services rules in the hiring process, such as failing to timely notify him after Wilson did not actually demote into position 60287, and ignoring the generic minimum qualifications which apply to similar positions in all agencies. The latter claim has been rejected, but even if a technical error occurred, such as the Department failing to send a second letter regarding position 60287, such action was harmless and was not taken with discriminatory animus. In summary, there was no credible evidence that the Department "chang[ed] classifications and var[ied] conditions of employment" in an effort to deny Petitioner employment, or that the Department's actions were a pretext for discrimination, as alleged in the Petition for Relief. Further, there is no evidence that the employment decisions were grounded on discriminatory animus in any respect, or that a discriminatory reason motivated the Department in its actions.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing, with prejudice, the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of April, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (850) 488-9675, SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of April, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Ausbon Brown, Jr. Post Office Box 289 Daytona Beach, Florida 32636 Kevin E. Hyde, Esquire Natasha A. Garrison, Esquire Foley & Lardner 200 Laura Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Daniel T. Medved, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 210 North Palmetto Avenue, Suite 412 Daytona Beach, Florida 32114-3269 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
