The Issue The issues are whether, under section 440.107, Florida Statutes, Petitioner may calculate a penalty assessment for a failure to secure the payment of workers' compensation for one day as though the failure persisted over two years and whether Petitioner may calculate a penalty assessment based on double the statewide average weekly wage (AWW) when the lone uncovered employee earned $10 per hour.
Findings Of Fact Respondent was incorporated in 2008 by Ineido Soler, Sr., and his son, Ineido Soler, Jr. Since the corporation began operations, the wife of Mr. Soler, Jr., Idalmis Pedrero, has served as the office manager of this family-owned company. At all material times, Respondent has contracted with a personnel leasing company to handle employee matters, such as securing the payment of workers' compensation. Ms. Pedrero's responsibilities include informing the employee leasing company of new hires, so the company can obtain workers' compensation coverage, which typically starts the day following notification. On the afternoon of November 22, 2015, Mr. Soler, Jr., telephoned his wife and told her that he and his father had hired, at the rate of $10 per hour, a new employee, Geony Borrego Lee, who would start work the following morning. Customarily, Ms. Pedrero would immediately inform the employee leasing company. However, Ms. Pedrero was working at home because, six days earlier, she had delivered a baby by caesarian section, and she was still recuperating and tending to her newborn. A fatigued Ms. Pedrero did not notify the employee leasing company that day of the new hire. Late the next morning, Ms. Pedrero was awakened by a call from her husband, who asked her if she had faxed the necessary information to the employee leasing company. Ms. Pedrero admitted that she had not done so, but would do so right away. She faxed the information immediately, so that the employee leasing company could add Mr. Lee to the workers' compensation policy, effective the next day, November 24. Uncovered for November 23, Mr. Lee joined three other employees of Respondent and performed roofing work at a worksite. Late in the afternoon of November 23, one of Petitioner's investigators conducted a random inspection of Respondent's worksite and determined that Respondent had secured the payment of workers' compensation for the three other employees, but not for Mr. Lee. The investigator issued an SWO on the day of the inspection, November 23. The SWO contains three parts. First, the SWO orders Respondent to cease work anywhere in the state of Florida. Second, the SWO includes an Order of Penalty Assessment, which does not contain a specific penalty, but instead sets forth the formula by which Petitioner determines the amount of the penalty to assess. Tracking the statute discussed below, the formula included in the SWO is two times the premium that the employer would have paid when applying approved manual rates to the employer's payroll "during periods for which it has failed to secure the payment of compensation within the preceding 2-year period." Third, the SWO includes a Notice of Rights, which advises Respondent that it may request a chapter 120 hearing. On November 24, Petitioner released the SWO after Respondent had secured the payment of workers' compensation for Mr. Lee. On November 25, the investigator hand delivered to Respondent a Request for Production of Business Records for Penalty Assessment Calculation (Request). The Request covers November 24, 2013, through November 23, 2015, and demands records in eight categories: identification of employer, occupational licenses, payroll documents, account documents, disbursements, contracts for work, identification of subcontractors, and documentation of subcontractors' workers' compensation coverage. The Request identifies "payroll documents" as: all documents that reflect the payroll of the employer . . . including . . . time sheets, time cards, attendance records, earning records, check stubs and payroll summaries for both individual employees and aggregate records; [and] federal income tax documents and other documents reflecting the . . . remuneration paid or payable to each employee . . . . The Request adds: The employer may present for consideration in lieu of the requested records, proof of compliance with F.S. 440 by a workers' compensation policy or coverage through employee leasing for all periods of this request where such coverage existed. If the proof of compliance is verified by the Department the requested records for that time period will not be required. The Request warns: If the employer fails to provide the required business records sufficient to enable the . . . Division of Workers' Compensation to determine the employer's payroll for the period requested for the calculation of the penalty provided in section 440.107(7)(d), F.S., the imputed weekly payroll for each employee shall be the statewide average weekly wage as defined in section 440.12(2), F.S., multiplied by 2. The Department shall impute the employer's payroll at any time after ten, but before the expiration of twenty eight business days after receipt by the employer of [the Request]. (FAC 69L-6.028) . . . . On December 11, 2015, Respondent provided the following documents to Petitioner: itemized invoices, including for workers' compensation premiums, from the employee leasing company to Respondent and checks confirming payment, but the invoices and checks are from December 2011; an employee leasing agreement signed by Respondent on August 1, 2014, and signed by the employee leasing company on August 5, 2014; an employee leasing application for Mr. Lee dated November 23, 2015, showing his date of birth as November 20, 1996, his hourly pay as $10, and his hire date as November 23, 2015; and an employee census dated December 1, 2015, showing, for each employee, a date of hire and, if applicable, date of termination. Partially compliant with the Request, this production omitted any documentation of workers' compensation coverage prior to August 1, 2014, and any documentation of payroll except for Mr. Lee's rate of pay. On December 14, 2015, Respondent filed with Petitioner its request for a chapter 120 hearing. On December 30, 2016, Petitioner issued an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment (Amended Assessment), which proposes to assess a penalty of $63,434.48. On the same date, Petitioner transmitted the file to DOAH. Petitioner issued a Second Amended Order of Penalty Assessment on February 16, 2016, which is mentioned in, but not attached to, the Prehearing Stipulation that was filed on April 26, 2016, but the second amended assessment reportedly leaves the assessed penalty unchanged from the Amended Assessment. In determining the penalty assessment, Petitioner assigned class code 5551 from the National Council on Compensation Insurance because Mr. Lee was performing roofing work; determined that the entire two-year period covered in the Request was applicable; identified the AWW as $841.57 based on information provided by the Florida Department of Economic Opportunity for all employers subject to the Florida Reemployment Assistance Program Law, sections 443.01 et seq., Florida Statutes, for the four calendar quarters ending June 30, 2014; applied the appropriate manual rates for class code 5551 to $841.57, doubled, and divided the result by 100--all of which yielded a result of $31,717.24, which, doubled, results in a total penalty assessment of $63,434.48. There is no dispute that the classification code for Mr. Lee is code 5551, the AWW is $841.57, and the manual rates are 18.03 as of July 1, 2013, 18.62 as of January 1, 2014, and 17.48 as of January 1, 2015. Because Petitioner determined that Respondent had failed to provide sufficient evidence of its payroll, Petitioner calculated the penalty assessment by using the AWW of $841.57, doubled, instead of Mr. Lee's actual rate of $10 per hour. Petitioner's calculations are mathematically correct. For the 5.27 weeks of 2013, the penalty assessment is $3198.58 based on multiplying the AWW, doubled, by the manual rate of 18.03 divided by 100 multiplied by 2 and multiplied by 5.27. For the 52 weeks of 2014, the penalty assessment is $32,593.67 based on multiplying the AWW, doubled, by the manual rate of 18.62 divided by 100 multiplied by 2 and multiplied by 52. For the 46.44 weeks of 2015, the penalty assessment is $27,326.48 based on multiplying the AWW, doubled, by the manual rate of 17.48 divided by 100 multiplied by 2 and multiplied by 46.44. Adding these sums yields a total penalty assessment of $63,118.73, which approximates Petitioner's penalty assessment calculation of $63,434.48. (Mistranscription of difficult-to- read manual rates or a different rule for handling partial weeks may account for the small difference.) Respondent challenges two factors in the imputation formula: the two-year period of noncompliance for Mr. Lee instead of one day's noncompliance and the AWW, doubled, instead of Mr. Lee's $10 per hour rate of pay. Underscoring the differences between the two-year period of noncompliance and double the AWW and the actual period of noncompliance and Mr. Lee's real pay rate, at the start of the two-year period, Mr. Lee was three days past his 16th birthday and residing in Cuba, and Mr. Lee continues to earn $10 per hour as of the date of the hearing. The impact of Petitioner's use of the two-year period of noncompliance and double the AWW is significant. If the calculation were based on a single day, rather than two years, the assessed penalty would be less than the statutory minimum of $1000, which is described below, even if double the AWW were used. One day is 0.14 weeks, so the penalty assessment would be $82.38 based on multiplying the AWW, doubled, by the manual rate of 17.48 divided by 100 multiplied by 2 and multiplied by 0.14. If the calculation were based on the entire two years, rather than a single day, the assessed penalty would be about one-quarter of the proposed assessed penalty, if Mr. Lee's actual weekly rate of pay were used instead of double the AWW. Substituting $400 for twice the AWW in the calculations set forth in paragraph 15 above, the penalty would be $760.14 for 2013, $7746.92 for 2014, and $6494.17 for 2015 for a total of $15,001.23. Explaining why Petitioner treated one day of noncompliance as two years of noncompliance, one of Petitioner's witnesses referred to Mr. Lee as a "placeholder" because the real focus of the imputation formula is the employer. The same witness characterized the imputation formula as a "legal fiction," implying that the formula obviously and, in this case, dramatically departs from the much-smaller penalty that would result from calculating exactly how much premium that Respondent avoided by not covering the modestly paid Mr. Lee on his first day of work. Regardless of how Petitioner characterizes the imputation formula, the statutory mandate, as discussed below, is to determine the "periods" during which Respondent failed to secure workers' compensation insurance within the two-year period covered by the Request. The focus is necessarily on the employee found by the investigator to be uncovered and any other uncovered employees. Petitioner must calculate a penalty based on how long the employee found by the investigator on his inspection has been uncovered, determining how many other employees, if any, in the preceding two years have been uncovered, and calculating a penalty based on how long they were uncovered. There is evidence of one or two gaps in coverage during the relevant two years, but Petitioner has failed to prove such gaps by clear and convincing evidence. One of Petitioner's witnesses testified to a gap of one month "probably" from late January to late February 2015. This witness relied on Petitioner Exhibit 2, but it is completely illegible. Ms. Pedrero testified that Respondent had workers' compensation coverage since 2011, except for a gap, which she thought had occurred prior to August 2014, which is the start date of the current policy. This conflicting evidence does not establish by clear and convincing evidence any gap, and, even if a gap had been proved, no evidence establishes the number of uncovered employees, if any, during such a gap, nor would such a gap justify enlarging the period of noncompliance for Mr. Lee. Ms. Pedrero testified that her mother-in-law, Teresa Marquez cleaned the office and warehouse on an occasional basis, last having worked sometime in 2015. Respondent never secured workers' compensation coverage for Ms. Marquez, but she did no roofing work and appears to have been a casual worker, so her periods of employment during the two-year period covered by the Request would not constitute additional periods for which Respondent failed to secure workers' compensation insurance. Based on the foregoing, Petitioner has proved by clear and convincing evidence only a single day of noncompliance, November 23, concerning one employee, Mr. Lee, within the relevant two-year period for the purpose of calculating the penalty assessment. Likewise, Petitioner has proved by clear and convincing evidence a rate of pay of only $10 per hour for the purpose of calculating the penalty assessment. At no time has Respondent provided payroll records of all its employees for November 23, 2015. Respondent Exhibit E covers payroll for Respondent's employees for a two-week period commencing shortly after November 23, 2015. But the evidence establishes that Mr. Lee's rate of pay was $80 for the day, which, as discussed below, rebuts the statutory presumption of double the AWW.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order determining that Respondent has failed to secure the payment of workers' compensation for one employee for one day within the two-year period covered by the Request and imposing an administrative penalty of $1000. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of July, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of July, 2016. COPIES FURNISHED: Jonathan Anthony Martin, Esquire Trevor S. Suter, Esquire Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4229 (eServed) Daniel R. Vega, Esquire Robert Paul Washington, Esquire Taylor Espino Vega & Touron, P.A. 2555 Ponce De Leon Boulevard, Suite 220 Coral Gables, Florida 33134 (eServed) Julie Jones, CP, FRP, Agency Clerk Division of Legal Services Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0390 (eServed)
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner based on her race in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American female. Respondent initially hired Petitioner through a temporary labor service. Petitioner worked for approximately 60 days as a temporary employee in the position of a medical transcriptionist preparing medical chronologies. At the end of the 60-day period, Respondent decided to eliminate Petitioner's position. Petitioner decided to enhance her career opportunities by applying for a position as a paralegal with Respondent. In a letter dated June 19, 1996, Petitioner expressed her interest in working for Respondent as a full-time employee. According to the letter, Petitioner had worked for over 20 years as a secretary/administrative assistant, including some experience in the areas of management and supervision. The letter, together with Petitioner's resumé, indicated that she had experience as a legal secretary. In a letter dated August 26, 1997, Respondent offered Petitioner a job as a paralegal. Petitioner accepted the offer. Randy Fischer, Esquire, explained the duties of a paralegal to Petitioner and gave her a copy of a paralegal's job description. The duties included, but were not limited to, the following: (a) drafting pleadings and correspondence; (b) drafting discovery requests; (c) organizing files and preparing file indexes; (d) investigating cases; (e) scheduling depositions; (f) attending document productions, exhibit exchanges, and pretrial conferences; and (g) assisting in legal research. Respondent gave Petitioner an employee handbook. The handbook included, among other things, information about attendance, discipline, and the firm's anti-discrimination policies and procedures. Petitioner also received a paralegal manual and billing guidelines. Respondent's anti-discrimination policy communicated to employees that sexual harassment, racial discrimination, or any other type of discrimination would not be tolerated. Respondent had an "open door" policy by which employees could report discrimination to the office manager or the office-managing partner. At all times material here, Mr. Fischer was the office-managing partner, and Janet Siefert was the office manager. Petitioner never took advantage of the opportunity to report any alleged racial discrimination to anyone on Respondent's staff. From the beginning of her employment as a paralegal, Mr. Fischer communicated to Petitioner that she would be expected to schedule, coordinate, and calendar activities for attorneys. He frequently was critical of Petitioner's performance because she failed to meet these expectations. There is no persuasive evidence that Mr. Fischer's criticisms were racially motivated. Respondent regularly provided written performance evaluations of employees. Petitioner's first review took place in December 1997. The evaluation indicated that Petitioner's attendance or dependability and teamwork were "highly acceptable." Her performance in oral expression, writing ability, decision-making ability, work product accurateness, and work product volume was "acceptable." Petitioner "needed to improve" in the following areas: (a) knowing subject matter; (b) analyzing problems; (c) obtaining information; (d) meeting deadlines; (e) performing assignments resourcefully and creatively; (f) recording billable time; (g) showing initiative; and (h) following through on assignments. Petitioner's overall rating on the evaluation was "acceptable." During the evaluation, Mr. Fischer counseled Petitioner about her job deficiencies. He particularly discussed Petitioner's need to follow appropriate guidelines for billing. This was important because Respondent routinely had to reduce Petitioner's excessive billing time in some areas. There is no persuasive evidence that Petitioner was singled out in terms of having billing time entries removed from the timesheets. In February 1998, Petitioner began having problems with her attendance and low work productivity. A written disciplinary action dated February 11, 1998, outlined the following deficiencies: (a) inattention to detail in handling files by failing to schedule the continuation of a deposition; poor performance in handling the Angela Davis file; leaving the building during work hours without proper authorization; (d) being late for work on numerous occasions; and (e) taking numerous personal absences. Regarding the Angela Davis file, Petitioner's failure to follow instructions adversely affected Mr. Fischer's handling of the file. Mr. Fischer became angry because it took Petitioner two hours to drive from Ocala, Florida, to Gainesville, Florida, with only a portion of the Angela Davis file that he had requested. However, there is no evidence that Mr. Fischer's anger was racially motivated. Petitioner admits that she occasionally left the building during her work breaks to go to the bank or for other personal reasons instead of spending that time in the employees' break room. She asserts that she did not know she had to have permission to do so and that she had to sign in and out. According to Petitioner, other employees were allowed these privileges without being reprimanded. Petitioner's testimony in this regard is not credible. Petitioner admitted during the hearing that her attendance record was problematic due to personal problems. On at least one occasion, Mr. Fischer agreed to let Petitioner make up some of the time she had lost. There is no persuasive evidence that Respondent's attendance policy was applied more rigidly to Petitioner than to any other employee. More importantly, Petitioner admitted that she was not qualified to perform all of the duties of a paralegal when she accepted the position. It is clear that she had difficulty learning "on-the-job." On February 20, 1998, Mr. Fischer wrote Petitioner and another paralegal a note regarding the importance of pulling a file together and following directions. Mr. Fischer had gone to mediation without the necessary file documents because Petitioner and her co-worker had not followed his directions. On March 12, 1998, Mr. Fischer reminded Petitioner and another paralegal about the importance of providing him with daily timesheets in a timely manner. Petitioner and her co-worker were at least a week behind in providing him with their timesheets. On March 26, 1998, Petitioner used the firm's copy machine and other supplies for personal reasons. On April 8, 1998, Petitioner was late to work due to a flat tire. In May 1998, Petitioner requested a more flexible work schedule so that she could attend class in Orlando, Florida, one afternoon each week. Mr. Fischer responded that her billing hours were already low and that she was routinely late to work. However, Mr. Fischer agreed to give her the time off for a 30-day period if she documented her time at the office, improved her productivity, and billed a minimum of 25 billed hours per week. In June 1998, Mr. Fischer had to remind Petitioner again about the importance of keeping calendars for the attorneys. Because Petitioner failed to follow instructions, no attorney from Respondent's office attended a scene viewing. In July 1998, Mr. Fischer sent Petitioner an e-mail message criticizing her for not properly issuing a subpoena and deposition notice. When he realized that Petitioner was not at fault, he promptly apologized in a subsequent message. On August 18 and 19, 1998, Petitioner received two personal facsimile transmissions at the office. On August 25, 1998, Mr. Fischer gave Petitioner a written disciplinary action and placed her on probationary status. The discipline was based on the following reasons: (a) Petitioner had been out of the office for various personal reasons 31 times in the last 90 days; (b) Petitioner had provided Respondent with inaccurate or incomplete reasons for those absences; (c) Petitioner's productivity was below office standards; (d) Petitioner had failed to properly schedule activities and calendar events for an attorney; (e) Petitioner had failed to follow repeated instructions in relation to file handling, scheduling depositions, and scheduling meetings; (f) Petitioner had used firm time to receive and review personal facsimile transmissions, to discuss personal information, and to participate in personal telephone calls; and (g) Petitioner had inappropriately used firm resources. On September 16, 1998, Mr. Fischer gave Petitioner another written disciplinary action. The memorandum outlined continued problems with Petitioner's performance. One example of Petitioner's poor performance involved her failure to properly arrange for a deposition. Other examples involved excessive billing for making summaries of records; the lack of time billed for other case activities, such as setting and noticing depositions and hearings; failure to resolve unpaid costs on a case; and modification of timesheets after they had been edited. The September 16, 1998, disciplinary action also reviewed continued problems with Petitioner's attendance and attitude. Respondent's paralegals are required to bill 100-105 hours per month. Some examples of Petitioner's billing hours are as follows: (a) March 1998, 97.3 hours; (b) April 1998, 58.9 hours; (c) May 1998, 74.3 hours; and (d) June 1998, 69.7 hours. Respondent fired Petitioner on September 25, 1998. Her termination was based on cumulative reasons, including low productivity, failure to be attentive to detail in the handling of files, and frequent absences and tardiness. During the time that Petitioner worked for Respondent, Mr. Fischer fired Robin Carr, a white female, for similar reasons that Petitioner was terminated: excessive absences, inappropriate use of personal time in the office, and excessive personal telephone calls. Mr. Fischer also fired Art Monig, a white male, for low work productivity. Ms. Carr and Mr. Monig both worked as paralegals. Petitioner testified that, on one occasion, Ms. Carr and other employees were in the employees' break room discussing the turnover of staff in the office. Petitioner testified that Ms. Carr made the statement that Petitioner did not have to worry about losing her job because she was a "token." In the Petition for Relief, Petitioner alleges that Ms. Seifert made this comment. Ms. Carr did not testify at the hearing but Ms. Seifert did testify and denies making such a statement or ever hearing it made. Similarly, Jennifer Whitehead, who was Mr. Fischer's secretary from February 1997 through May 2001, testified that she never heard anyone in the office make a statement that Petitioner was a "token" or a "quota." Nevertheless, Petitioner's testimony in this regard is persuasive. Petitioner admits that she never reported the statement allegedly made by Ms. Carr to anyone in Respondent's office. She admits that Mr. Fischer never made inappropriate racial comments in her presence. Mr. Fischer's dissatisfaction with Petitioner's performance may have caused Petitioner to be uncomfortable from time to time, but there is no evidence that his reactions to her poor performance were racially motivated.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That FCHR enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of May, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of May, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Dorine Alexander 1421 Southwest 27th Avenue Apartment No. 1807 Ocala, Florida 34474 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Randy Fischer, Esquire Boehm, Brown, Fischer & Harwood, P.A. Post Office Box 4140 Ocala, Florida 34478 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Acco Mechanical Contractors, Inc. was a subcontractor in the construction of the regional juvenile detention center located in Palm Beach County, Florida. The contracting authority for this facility was the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. The contract for the construction let by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services is in excess of $5,000.00 and pursuant to Section 215.19(1)(b), Florida Statutes, the Division of Labor established a prevailing wage to be paid different crafts and occupations in construction of said project. The prevailing wage established for plumbers on this project was $10.07 per hour. During the course of this project, Acco Mechanical Contractors, Inc. acknowledged by affidavit that all persons in its employ were being paid the prevailing wage as required by law. Between January 7, 1978 and May 20, 1978 Richard Fisher was employed by Acco Mechanical Contractors; Inc. on this project as a plumber. During this time Fisher was paid at the rate of $6.50 per hour for regular time and $9.75 per hour for overtime. The difference between the amount paid the Petitioner for regular time hours worked and the prevailing wage is $3.57 and the difference between the amount paid the Petitioner for overtime and the prevailing wage is $5.35 per hour. The Respondent also controverts the number of hours asserted to have been worked by Fisher. The Respondent asserts in its hearing brief that Fisher worked 459 regular hours and 50 overtime hours. The claim presented by Fisher indicated that he worked 512 regular hours and 50 overtime hours. Exhibit 8 reflects that Fisher worked 459 regular hours and 55 overtime hours. Exhibit 8 further reflects that Fisher received $6.50 per hour for regular time worked and $9.75 per hour for overtime worked. The prevailing wage rate established by the division was $10.07 per hour. The difference between the wage paid Fisher for regular time hours and the prevailing wage was $3.57. The difference paid Fisher between time and a half computed on the prevailing wage and time and a half paid Fisher is $5.35 per hour. The amount Fisher was underpaid is equal to the sum of the regular hours worked (459) times $3.57 end the overtime hours worked (55) times $5.35, or a total of $1,941.13. The Petitioner has complied with the provisions of Section 215.19(3)(a)1 and 2 by filing an affidavit with the contracting authority stating the number of hours worked and the amount of money paid for said hours. Said affidavit was filed within the time prescribed by statute. Pursuant to Section 215.19(3)(b), Florida Statutes, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Service is presently withholding $2,322.35 from Acco Mechanical Contractors, Inc. while awaiting the decision in this administrative proceeding.
Conclusions Petitioner has established that he was hired and worked for Acco, Inc. as a plumber and that he was paid $6.50 per hour rather than the prevailing wage of $10.07 for plumbers on the project in question. Petitioner is entitled to the difference between what he was paid and the prevailing wage for the total number of hours worked by Petitioner at less than the prevailing wage. The Hearing Officer, in his Recommended Order, addressed the difference in pay between the regular time worked and overtime worked. However, Section 215.19, Florida Statutes, is void of any statutory language concerning overtime. The statute only requires that the employee be paid "not less than the prevailing wage." Absent a legislative directive in Section 215.19, Florida Statutes, concerning overtime pay, the employee is only entitled to the difference between what he was paid and what he should have been paid at the prevailing wage for the total number of hours worked at a rate less than the prevailing wage. Therefore, Petitioner is entitled to $1,638.63. Respondent's argument that the Division of Labor failed to properly adopt prevailing wage rates has been considered by the First District Court of Appeals of Florida in Vernon Neff et al. vs. Biltmore Construction Company, Inc., 362 So.2d 442, (1st DCA Fla. 1978) and State of Florida Department of Commerce, Division of Labor vs. Matthews Corporation, 358 So.2d 256 (1st DCA Fla. 1978). The Court, in both cases, upheld the process by which the wage rates are adopted. Respondent argues that additional insurance benefits should be included in the wage rates, but such benefits are not "wages". The amount paid by the employer to provide insurance benefits should not be included in Petitioner's wage nor deducted from the amount owed to the Petitioner based upon this claim. It is, therefore, hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the contracting authority, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, pay the Petitioner, from the amount it is withholding in this claim, the amount of $1,638.63, and that the remaining amount held by the contracting authority, pursuant to this claim, be paid to Acco, Inc. DONE and ORDERED this 19th day of December, 1978 at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEVEN H. CAMPORA, Director Division of Labor Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security Suite 200 - Ashley Building 1321 Executive Center Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Telephone No.: (904) 488-7396 COPIES FURNISHED: DEWEY H. VARNER, JR., ESQUIRE Attorney for Petitioner 3003 South Congress Avenue Palm Springs, Florida 33461 L. BYRD BOOTH, JR., ESQUIRE Attorney for Respondent O'Neal and Booth, P.A. Post Office Drawer 11088 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33339 LUTHER J. MOORE, Administrator of Prevailing Wage Division of Labor 1321 Executive Center Drive, East Tallahassee, Florida 32301 THOMAS A. KOVAL, ESQUIRE Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security 401 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Department of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer would recommend that the Division of Labor enter its order directing the contracting authority to pay to the employee the sum of $1,941.13 and the remaining amount held by the contracting authority pursuant to this claim be paid to Acco Mechanical Contractors, Inc. DONE and ORDERED this 1st day of November 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Dewey H. Varner, Jr., Esquire Culp and Fisher 3003 South Congress Avenue Palm Springs, Florida 33461 Byrd Booth, Jr., Esquire Post Office Drawer 11089 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33339 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DIVISION OF LABOR RICHARD E. FISHER, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 78-1283 ACCO, INC., Respondent. / FINAL ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER Upon due notice to all parties in the above-styled cause, an administrative hearing was held on September 15, 1978 in West Palm Beach, Florida before Stephen F. Dean, the assigned hearing officer. STATEMENT OF CLAIM: Petitioner, Richard E. Fisher, filed a claim against Respondent, Acco, Inc., alleging that he had been hired by Acco, Inc. in the capacity of a plumber and that Acco, Inc. had failed to pay him the prevailing wage for plumbers as required by Section 215.19, Florida Statutes. The question presented in this case is how many hours the Petitioner, Richard E. Fisher, worked, the wage paid the Petitioner, and what, if any, difference exists between the wage paid the Petitioner and the prevailing wage. FINDINGS OF FACT: Acco, Inc. was a subcontractor in the construction of the Regional Juvenile Detention Center located in Palm Beach County, Florida. The contracting authority for this facility was the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. The contract for the construction let by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services is in excess of $5,000.00 and, pursuant to Section 215.19, Florida Statutes, the Division of Labor established a prevailing wage to be paid different crafts and occupations in construction of said project. The prevailing wage established for plumbers on this project was $10.07 per hour. During the course of this project, Acco, Inc. acknowledged by affidavit that all persons in its employ were being paid the prevailing wage as required by law. Between January 7, 1978 and May 20, 1978, Richard E. Fisher was employed by Acco, Inc. on this project as a plumber. During this time, Fisher was paid at the rate of $6.50 per hour. The difference between the amount paid Petitioner and the prevailing wage is $3.57. The Petitioner has complied with the prOvisions of se6ion 215.19(3)(a) 1 and 2 by filing an affidavit with the contracting authority stating the number of hours worked and the amount of money paid for said hours. This affidavit was timely filed. Exhibit No. 8, the Weekly Time Reports for Richard E. Fisher, establish that Fisher corked 459 hours at the rate of $6.50 and 55 hours at the rate of $9.75. The difference between what Petitioner was paid and what he should have been paid at the prevailing wage rate is equal to the sum of hours worked (459) times $3.57 or a total of $1,638.63. Pursuant to the statute, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services is withholding $2,322.35 from Acco, Inc. pending the outcome of this claim.
The Issue Whether or not Petitioner abandoned her position in accordance with the terms of Rule 22A-7.010(2) F.A.C.
Findings Of Fact At all times material, Petitioner was employed as an FSDB groundskeeper. Robert "Curly" Schopmann, the Grounds Supervisor and Petitioner's immediate supervisor, considered her to be "a very good employee" during her two years of employment prior to June 19, 1990. Petitioner's performance ratings confirmed Mr. Schopmann's assessment that Petitioner's quantity and quality of work was excellent during that period of time. Petitioner suffered an on-the-job accident on March 20, 1990 for which the employer and the Department of Insurance, Division of Risk Management accepted responsibility under Chapter 440 F.S., "The Florida Workers' Compensation Law." In June, 1990, Petitioner requested that the employer provide further medical treatment by an orthopedic physician, which further medical treatment was approved and provided. As a consequence thereof, Petitioner was off work from June 19 to mid-October 1990. Dr. Charles, Petitioner's authorized treating orthopedic physician, prepared a list of "job limitations" dated October 3, 1990 (Heilmann Exhibit 2). There is no evidence Petitioner was provided with a copy of this until after her termination. Sometime between October 1 and October 5, 1990, a rehabilitation consultant/specialist and registered nurse also prepared another, slightly more stringent list of limitations (DOE Exhibit B) which was not "verified" (approved) by Dr. Charles until October 29, 1990. Since Dr. Charles did not sign this second, more restrictive list until October 29, 1990, it must be assumed that neither Risk Management nor FSDB personnel saw it until after that date. Petitioner testified that she did not see it until after her termination. Effective October 13, 1990, Dr. Charles formally released Petitioner to do light work. The day before, Petitioner received notification concerning her release for light work from Risk Management (DOE Exhibit A). In that October 12, 1990 letter, Risk Management notified Petitioner that she was to either return to her old job and do light work while receiving temporary partial disability payments under the workers' compensation law or she was to make a good faith job search among other employers as also contemplated by that law. An abbreviated list of physical limitations based on Dr. Charles' October 3, 1990 list was also given by Risk Management to the Petitioner in its October 12, 1990 letter. By mutual agreement with the FSDB personnel office, Petitioner reported for light duty work at FSDB on Thursday, October 18, 1990. Mr. Schopmann first suggested that Petitioner work at her own speed outside but acceded to Petitioner's rejection of the use of a scooter to get around and do outdoors groundskeeping when she told him the scooter was "too bumpy" for her injured back. Either of Dr. Charles' job restrictions/physical limitations lists would have permitted Petitioner to work with hand-sized garden tools, a scooter, a riding mower, or a rolling seat for 80% of her day outside with only 20% of her day inside, provided she moved around and rested as needed with no lifting over 15 pounds and no squatting, crawling, bending, twisting, rotating, kneeling, or climbing inside or outside. When she said she could not ride the scooter, Mr. Schopmann told Petitioner to pot plants and trim the plants in the pots inside the greenhouse and that when she got tired, she should sit down and answer phones in the office before returning to pot more plants in the greenhouse. This instruction was in accord with the limitations for light work placed on Petitioner by her doctor in his October 3, 1990 list of limitations. It also was within the parameters of the abbreviated list relayed to Petitioner in Risk Management's letter of October 12 and those of the more stringent list the doctor later approved on October 29, 1990. At formal hearing, Petitioner admitted that she had understood that the supervisor's instructions included answering phones in the office and that she was otherwise assigned to the greenhouse. On Thursday, October 18 and Friday, October 19 and on October 22-24, she went to the greenhouse and office but did not restrict herself to just the jobs assigned by Mr. Schopmann. Instead, she tried to do all the usual work that is required of full-time, unimpaired greenhouse personnel. This additional work was considerably in excess of the limitations placed on her by her treating physician in either his October 3 or October 29 lists of limitations and was never directly assigned by her supervisor. The Petitioner asserted that she did this additional work because she was relying on the information provided in the October 12 Risk Management letter and in a telephone conversation she had had with Ms. Battle of FSDB's personnel office prior to October 18, and because she personally had never seen either of Dr. Charles' lists of limitations. On Wednesday, October 24, 1990, Petitioner left work at noon saying that she had a doctor's appointment, which she in fact did not have. Instead, she went home to rest. On Thursday, October 25, 1990, she called in sick and, as it turned out, she did not return to work after that date. The Petitioner testified that she did not return to work after October 24 because it was too painful for her to continue the work she had attempted. On October 26, 1990, a letter was sent from FSDB by Ms. Stephanie Battle notifying Petitioner that she was expected to come to work unless she had received a doctor's statement and that she was expected to return to work no later than Tuesday, October 30, 1990. Because October 26, 1990 was a Friday, it was Ms. Battle's intention that Petitioner would receive the letter on Saturday, October 27 or on Monday, October 29, and would then be able to obtain a doctor's certificate before the employer's October 30 deadline, if, in fact, Petitioner were eligible to receive a doctor's certificate at all. The October 26, 1990 letter sent by Ms. Battle provided in pertinent part: You are required to return to your job with the approved restrictions immediately. If you cannot return to work, you must provide this office with a letter from your attending physician saying why you are unable to perform your job, what the inclusive dates are that you cannot work and the approximate date of your return. At the present time you are in an unapproved leave without pay status. I expect to hear from you no later than Tuesday morning, October 30, 1990. On October 29, 1990, petitioner telephoned Stephanie Battle and informed her that she had received Ms. Battle's October 26, 1990 letter, that she could not work, but that Dr. Charles would not give her a "no work disability slip." At that time, Ms. Battle told Petitioner that she must return to work and asked if Petitioner had told her supervisor that she could not physically do the work assigned. Petitioner admitted to Ms. Battle that she had not yet discussed the problem with her supervisor. Later on October 29, Petitioner spoke on the telephone with Mr. Schopmann. Mr. Schopmann told Petitioner that she had to come back to work on October 30 or bring a doctor's certificate saying that she could not work at all. At that time, Petitioner indicated to Mr. Schopmann that she was aware that if she did not come back to work or provide some doctor's certificate she would lose her job. Whether Petitioner was consciously aware of the abandonment rule or merely thought she would be fired for not coming to work is not clear from the record. Petitioner asserted that she called Mr. Schopmann a second time on November 1, still seeking to retain her job; Mr. Schopmann denies that such a telephone call ever took place. It does not appear that Petitioner and Mr. Schopmann ever had a meeting of the minds that Petitioner was attempting to do more strenuous work than Mr. Schopmann thought he had assigned her to do, but at no time did Mr. Schopmann urge Petitioner to work harder. In her testimony, Petitioner blamed the employer far not making her fully aware of the limitations placed on her by her doctor. Petitioner also asserted that Ms. Battle had telephoned Dr. Charles on October 24, 1990 to see if the Petitioner's job assignments in the greenhouse and office exceeded his prescribed limitations for Petitioner and, further, that in so doing, Ms. Battle had misrepresented to the doctor the tasks that Petitioner was, in fact, doing and that Petitioner believed that it was due to Ms. Battle's misrepresentations that Dr. Charles would not give Petitioner a certificate of "no work." Ms. Battle confirmed that she had called Dr. Charles at some point and represented to him the type of light work that she understood from Mr. Schopmann that Petitioner was doing in the greenhouse and the office. However, at the time she telephoned Dr. Charles, Ms. Battle also did not know that Petitioner had physically attempted more than she had been assigned to do by Mr. Schopmann. At the time of her phone call, whenever it may have been, Dr. Charles told Ms. Battle [admissible hearsay pursuant to Section 120.58(1) F.S.] that Petitioner could do the light work described by her and assigned by Mr. Schopmann. Petitioner admitted that she did not consult her doctor in his office on October 24-25, that she never spoke personally with Dr. Charles during this period of time or tried to get a "no work certificate" from him personally prior to October 30, 1990, and that she dealt with him solely through his receptionist. However, the doctor's October 29, 1990 list of limitations and Petitioner's recitation of what the receptionist told her [admissible hearsay pursuant to Section 120.58(1) F.S.] supports a finding of fact that at all times material, Dr. Charles felt Petitioner could continue to do the light work actually assigned by Mr. Schopmann, a description of which had been related to him by Ms. Battle, and that the doctor also felt that the Petitioner could do all the light work which the doctor later listed on his October 29, 1990 list. Petitioner never presented a medical certificate to her employer. There was no evidence at formal hearing of whether or not the Petitioner had any accrued annual or sick leave that she could draw on, but it is clear that she never applied for authorized leave. The Petitioner never returned to work. On November 1, 1990, Mr. Schopmann notified the FSDB personnel office that Petitioner had not returned to work for three consecutive days, that he considered her to have abandoned her position, and that he recommended her dismissal on that basis. (DOE Exhibit D) In a letter dated November 2, 1990, Mr. Sam Visconti, FSDB Personnel Director, notified Petitioner that she was deemed to have abandoned her position due to her absence on October 29, 30, 31, and November 1 (sic, see Findings of Fact 12- 13), and that she was dismissed based on Rule 22A-7.010(2)(a), F.A.C. That letter reads in pertinent part: You failed to report or call in to work for four (4) consecutive work days on October 29, 30, 31, and November 1, 1990. In accordance with Chapter 22A-7.010(2), of the Florida Administrative Code, State Personnel Rules and Regulations, you have abandoned your position. Abandonment of position is considered and treated as a resignation from your job. Your resignation is effective 12:01 a.m., November 2, 1990. Petitioner had been on unauthorized leave without pay since October 24, 1990. However, due to the terms of Ms. Battle's October 26, 1990 letter, the only three days which could be legitimately counted against Petitioner under the abandonment rule were October 30 and 31, and November 1, 1990. Petitioner is angry about the on-the-job accident and how it occurred. She testified that as of the date of formal hearing she continues to see Dr. Charles professionally and that she would not do so if she were not in pain and really injured, but she produced no medical evidence that she was physically unable to report for work at all on October 30 and 31, and on November 1, 1990 or that she was unable on those dates to do the jobs contained in Dr. Charles' October 29, 1990 list of limitations.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Education enter a Final Order finding that Petitioner abandoned her position by unreasonable absence on October 30 and 31 and November 1, 1990. DONE and ENTERED this 30th day of April, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of April, 1991.
The Issue Whether Respondent has complied with the Final Order of the Florida Commission on Human Relations.
Findings Of Fact On July 9, 1990 after an evidentiary hearing on the Petitioner’s charge of racial discrimination, a Recommended Order was issued in favor of Petitioner. On June 18, 1992, after reviewing Respondent’s exceptions to the Recommended Order and after argument of Respondent’s counsel at a hearing before the Commission, the Florida Commission on Human Relations entered a Final Order in favor of the Petitioner, Ronnie Wideman. The Final Order stated in part: That the Respondent cease and desist from engaging in unlawful employment practices of this nature; That Respondent offer to promote Petitioner to the next available Quality Support Process Engineer or substantially similar position; That Respondent pay Petitioner back pay and benefits to which he would have been entitled had he received the Quality Support Process Engineer position; That Respondent pay Petitioner reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in litigating this claim, and That the Respondent notify the Commission in writing within 20 calendar days of the date of filing this Order of the steps that have been taken to comply with this Order. The Final Order was received by Respondent, filed and forgotten. The person who was responsible for filing and notifying the Pensacola plant of the Order’s requirements was the same person who failed to show for the original hearing in 1990. No appeal of the Final Order was filed by the Respondent. There was no attempt by Respondent to comply with the provisions of the Final Order, including the reporting, promotional and salary requirements of the Final Order. There are two relevant categories of jobs at Respondent’s facilities. There are hourly paid or non-exempt jobs and salaried administrative or exempt jobs. The exemption refers to whether the job is exempt from the union contract and collective bargaining. All of the salaried jobs at Respondent’s facilities are graded based on job responsibilities. The grades range from Grade 8 to Grade 25. The grade of a position relates to a salary structure for each grade. The salary structure provides for a range of salaries divided into thirds. A salary range for a grade often overlaps the salary range for the adjoining grade levels. The salary grade schedules for 1988-1996 are contained in Appendix 1 of this Recommended Order. Petitioner has been continuously employed with Respondent since 1976. He has been employed as a “paper tester/technician” since before the original charge of discrimination was filed in this case and held such a position at the time of the final hearing in 1990. The actual position title has varied over the years and has been assigned to different work sections over the years. However, Petitioner’s work in his job has remained essentially one of testing the quality of the paper Respondent makes and entering the data in the computer for analysis. Although he has never been promoted to the position of shift supervisor, Respondent has at various times filled some of the duties of the shift supervisor’s position, Grade 14. Petitioner has been and continues to be considered a competent and capable employee by Respondent. The position of “paper tester/technician” was throughout the time period involved in the original charge of discrimination to the present an hourly-paid position. Hourly paid employees can be required to work overtime and are paid for overtime work at the rate of the employee’s hourly rate plus one-half the hourly rate. Hourly employees receive pension benefits through a non-contributory plan. Hourly employees also can participate in 401-K retirement plans. The hourly employee’s contributions to a 401-K plan are matched at .50 cents on the dollar by the Respondent. However, the maximum amount an hourly employee can contribute to that employee’s 401-K plan is capped at $800.00. Since 1988, Petitioner’s hourly rate of pay has been, as follows: Ronnie Wideman SSN 250-94-9677 Position Effective Date Hourly Rate of Pay Paper Test 3B 08/01/88 $13.39* Paper Test 4B 03/23/89 13.90* Paper Test 4B (GWI) 07/01/89 14.25* Paper Test 4B (GWI) 07/01/90 14.54* Paper Test 4B (GWI) 07/01/91 14.90* Paper Test 4BC 05/09/92 15.46* Paper Test 4BC (GWI) 07/01/92 15.85* Paper Test 4BC (GWI) 07/01/93 16.25* Central Lab D 12/13/93 16.67 Paper Test 4BC 05/10/94 16.25* Paper Test 4BC (GWI) 07/01/94 16.66* Central Lab D 07/18/94 17.09 Central Lab 2D 08/26/94 17.29 Paper Test 4BC 04/05/95 16.66* Paper Test 4BC (GWI) 07/01/95 17.16* Central Lab 2D 01/23/96 17.81 Central Lab 3D 03/04/96 18.04 Central Lab 4D 05/10/96 18.24 Central Lab 4D (GWI) 07/01/96 18.79 Central Lab Family E 10/03/96 19.71 Petitioner also received at various times throughout the time period shown above an additional $.73 cents an hour for every hour worked as a Continuous Process Allowance for the difficulties of maintaining a four-shift job schedule necessitating working approximately 2300 hours per year. The pay periods during which Petitioner received the added Continuous Process Allowance are marked with an asterisk. The position of Quality Support Process Engineer was the position to which Respondent unlawfully failed to promote Petitioner and formed the basis of the original charge of discrimination. In 1988, when Petitioner should have been promoted, there were two openings for a quality support process engineer. The grade level was not advertised, but Respondent was told by a lab technician that the salary would range from $40,000.00 to $45,000.00 per year. The $40,000.00 range would have caused the position to fall within the grades 11, 12, 13 or 14. 11. The position of Quality Support Process Engineer was a salaried position with an annual salary based on the position’s grade level and the employee’s credentials and experience. As a salaried employee, the employee does not receive overtime pay, but still may be expected to work overtime in order to perform all the responsibilities of the position. Salaried employees receive pension benefits and can make up to a 6 percent contribution to that employee’s 401-K retirement plan which is matched at .50 cents on the dollar by Respondent. There is no cap on the amount of the contribution other than the 6 percent contribution. The position involves the supervision of the work of the “paper testers/technicians” and the laboratory in which the paper testing is performed. The position also involves attempting to resolve poor paper quality issues, as well as coordinating paper quality problems or issues with senior and field engineers and customers. Respondent prefers a person with a science degree to fill this position, but, as is obvious from the promotions described later, also recognizes a person’s knowledge gained through work in the paper field. In the past, Respondent has promoted employees to the position of Quality Support Process Engineer or similar position’s based on field experience absent a scientific degree. The position has had various titles and been housed in different areas due to Respondent’s reorganization of the various processes of papermaking. Those processes are cutsize, offset, market pulp and pulp. Essentially, Respondent has reorganized its work force at least twice. Beginning in 1991, The technical (paper testers) department and the quality departments were combined into a centralized technical department. The reorganized department still had people which performed quality process engineer functions, shift supervisors and paper testers. In fact, the functions of each person’s job didn’t substantially change. In 1995, the centralized department was eliminated and the technicians, quality support and supervisors were distributed between the various systems of cutsize, offset, market pulp and pulp. At about the same time, the shift supervisor positions were eliminated. The people who filled those positions remained, but transferred to more defined quality support positions under a new engineer grade system. In August of 1988, Charles C. “Red” Bradford (white male) was promoted to one of the two Quality Support Process Engineer positions. Mr. Bradford had been employed at Champion since 1956. Considerably longer than Petitioner. For a year prior to his promotion, Mr. Bradford had worked as the shift supervisor. Prior to shift supervisor, he had been a paper tester along with Petitioner. Upon promotion he received a salary of $45,500.00, even though he did not have a college degree. The position carried a grade level of 14. Mr. Bradford’s promotion was not discriminatory because of his greater experience in papermaking. At the same time, Kathy Dyess (white female), who was hired in 1983 performed the duties of an administrative clerical secretary but had a college degree in biology, was promoted to the second opening for Quality Support Process Engineer. She received a salary of $26,500.00 The position carried a level of Grade 10. Her promotion was discriminatory because of her lesser qualifications for the position when compared to Respondent’s. Because she had fewer qualifications for the position her starting position and subsequent work history since 1988 cannot be used to establish the salary Petitioner should have had if he had been promoted instead of Ms. Dyess. Clearly, Petitioner was entitled to make more than Ms. Dyess given his greater qualifications. Promotions which occurred in later years to substantially similar quality support positions given to David Currey and William Findley reflect a salary and grade level of Neither David Curry, nor Charles Findley had a college degree in the hard sciences, David Currey was hired as an hourly employee in 1971, four years before Petitioner, but is the most similar to Petitioner. Charles Findley was hired as an hourly employee in 1959 and is more similar to Red Bradford based on his greater number of years of experience. Both Mr. Currey and Mr. Findley were shift supervisors prior to their promotions to positions similar to Quality Support Process Engineer. Thus, except for Kathy Dyess’ promotion to Quality Support Process engineer, the evidence demonstrates that the position of Quality Support Process Engineer to which Petitioner should have been promoted carried a grade level of 14 and in 1988 a salary range of $35,800.00 to $57,400.00.1 Moreover, what is very clear from the evidence is that even though Mr. Curry had considrably less work experience at Champion, both men received salaries around the mid-range of the grade 14 salary range throughout the years they were grade level 14 employees. As senior and junior employees the difference between their salaries varied but fell around $2300.00. Therefore, in 1988 Petioner was entitled to receive compensation approximately $2300.00 less than the compensation received by Mr. Bradford. Petitoner’s increase in salary should have been to an hourly rate based on an annual salary of $43,200.00 for a 40 hour work week and 52 weeks in a year, i.e. an hourly rate of $20.77. In the years following 1988, Petitioner should have received increases in his salary based on a mid-range performance rating of 3, utilizing the upper percentage increase for that performance rating. Generally, both Mr.Curry and Mr. Findley received slightly more than the highest percentage rate for their performance rating. The current equivalent positions to the Quality Support Process Engineer are spread over a grade 10 Assistant Engineer, grade 11 Associate Engineer, grade 12 Engineer, grade 13 Process Engineer and grade 14 Senior Process Engineer. The evidence demonstrated that both Findley and Curry were brought into the new job classifications at level 14 around 1995. Given the fact that David Curry’s career tract is simmilar to what Petitioner’s would have experienced if he had received the promotion he was entitled to, he would have in 1995 received a similar position to grade 14 Senior Process Engineer and is entitled to receive a salary within that range for 1995. However, by 1995, Findley and Curry both had the opportunity to increase their skills and maintain their salary grade level under the 1995 engineer grade positions. Had Petitioner been promoted in 1988, he to would have had the requisite experience and skills to qualify for a grade level 14 as defined in 1995. For that reason Petitioner is entitled to receive an equivalent level of pay. The issue is different as to what level of position would be substantially equivalent to what he should have received in 1988. The best evidence, reflects that such a position would fall into the Grade 12 Engineer category. The evidence did not show that such a position with the Grade 14 level of salary was offered to Petitioner, but were only discussed. Petitioner, therefore, remains entitled to the first available Engineer position or its substantial equivalent, but at the salary he should have received if he had been able to pursue a normal course of employment. Finally, Petitioner has had to pay attorney fees and costs for the original 1990 proceeding and this motion proceeding in the amount of $4,482.30 for attorney fees and $1,023.73 in costs. The costs for mail fees and car rental have been disallowed. These fees and costs are reasonable and Petitioner is entitled to receive them from Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner was subjected to discrimination in the work environment by Respondent due to Petitioner's gender in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed as a payload operator by Respondent, a fertilizer manufacturer, at the time of her employment termination in August of 1996. Petitioner’s job duties included scooping fertilizer onto the pay loader, or front-end loader, and dropping the fertilizer into a “hopper” for subsequent loading into rail cars. Petitioner was expected, along with other payload operators, to perform other duties, including the cleaning of work areas when she ceased her loading function. During Petitioner's employment, a union contract existed between Respondent and the International Chemical Workers Union of which Petitioner was a member. The union contract governed overtime assignments, pay structure, shift structure, disciplinary/termination procedures and lay-offs, among other things. Respondent paid Petitioner and gave her breaks, contrary to her allegations, in the same manner as other employees. Governed by the union contract during the busy 1995-96 period, Respondent assigned work to employees on many different shifts. The plant operated 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Overtime requirements were based on business necessity. All employees worked the same number of hours regardless of the shift to which they were assigned. Petitioner never formally complained to anyone regarding displeasure with shift assignments. Neither salary nor number of work hours were affected by Petitioner’s assignments to different work shifts. Petitioner and other employees worked the same number of hours. Petitioner took breaks just like other employees. Changes from shift to shift experienced by Petitioner had nothing to do with her gender. The union contract governed how Respondent assigned overtime to its employees. The contract established a procedure that distributed overtime hours evenly and fairly among all of Respondent's employees. Those procedures were adhered to by Respondent and all employees were given overtime opportunities in an equal manner without regard to gender. On one occasion, Petitioner complained about her overtime assignment. She felt that she should have been called into work on a day when another operator (male) was called to come in and work. Respondent had attempted to contact Petitioner at contact numbers provided by Petitioner, without success. Safety equipment was distributed to all employees. Petitioner signed a check list indicating that she had received or knew how to request safety equipment. A pair of boots requested by Petitioner on one occasion had not yet arrived, but did arrive before the conclusion of the business day. The delay in delivery of Petitioner's requested boots to her was not related to her gender. Petitioner complained that adverse comments were made to her on the job by male workers. The alleged comments ranged from women should only do "clean up work" to "if you don't smoke or drink, we don't need you in this department." All of the alleged comments were roundly denied by Petitioner's co-workers at the final hearing. The credibility and candor of the testifying co-workers establishes that the adverse comments were not made. One incident in which Petitioner complained about her work assignment resulted in the general foreman's immediately contacting Respondent's human resource department. A meeting was then held with Petitioner to address the situation. The foreman felt confident that Petitioner would voice any additional concerns if the situation did not change. Petitioner never voiced further concerns to the foreman. Petitioner alleged that she was denied the right of free speech at a meeting attended by her, Respondent representatives, and union representatives. As established at the final hearing, she was told by the union representative to remain quiet and let him do the talking if Respondent representatives made Petitioner angry. However, the union representative did not instruct Petitioner to otherwise remain silent. Under the union contract, Respondent could terminate employees who received three reprimands within a 12-month period. Petitioner was aware of this procedure. Petitioner had numerous instances of work-related misconduct and received more than three reprimands in a 12-month period. Counseled on June 4, 1995, for damaging a payloader, Petitioner received a reprimand on July 18, 1995, for again damaging a payloader. Petitioner was counseled again on August 14, 1995, for failure to communicate with the shipping operator. On October 16, 1995, Petitioner received a second reprimand for poor work performance for mixing discarded product with good product, a violation of Respondent policy. Petitioner received her third reprimand on February 28, 1996, for loading hot fertilizer, a violation of Respondent's policy. The difficulty of loading fertilizer before it cooled was the later removal of the hot product which would harden upon cooling into a concrete-like substance. Petitioner was given a second chance and not fired upon receiving her third reprimand in a 12-month period. Management hoped that Petitioner would seek to improve her work performance. Petitioner refused to help clean the plant on July 10, 1996, and was counseled by her supervisor. On July 25, 1996, she received a verbal warning for failure to report an accident. In August of 1996, Petitioner received her final reprimand for failure to attend a company meeting at the proper time and for again loading hot product. Petitioner's employment was terminated. The various reprimands imposed on Petitioner were from different supervisors at different times. None of the reprimands were based on Petitioner's gender. After a complete review of Petitioner's case, the union representative determined that Respondent had properly terminated her employment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of October, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of October, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Azizi M. Dixon, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Artie Johnson 2672 Northwest 6th Drive Jennings, Florida 32053 Mary L. Wakeman, Esquire McConnaughhay, Duffy, Coonrod, Pope, and Weaver, P.A. Post Office Drawer 229 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0229 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Lester Bishop, was employed as a Correctional Officer at Union Correctional Institution from March 20, 1981, to April 1, 1986. Union Correctional Institution (UCI) is a facility which houses inmates ranging in custody levels from minimum to close. In December of 1981, the Respondent was given a copy of the rules of the Department of Corrections. At this time he acknowledged that he was responsible for compliance with these rules. In late March and early April, 1986, the Respondent was scheduled to work the first shift at UCI beginning at 12:00 midnight and ending at 8:00 a.m.. The supervisor for this shift was either Lieutenant R. L. Weiland or Lieutenant S. E. Stafford, depending upon the day of the week. On March 23, 1986, the Respondent called Lieutenant Weiland at Union Correctional Institution at 12:30 a.m., requesting and receiving sick leave for the remainder of this shift. On March 24, 1986, the Respondent did not report to work, and he did not contact the shift supervisor to request leave. As a result, he was placed on unauthorized leave without pay status for this day. On March 25, 1986, the Respondent called his supervisor, requesting and receiving eight hours sick leave for this day. On March 26 and 27, 1986, the Respondent neither called his supervisor nor reported for work. He was given unauthorized leave without pay status for these days. March 28 and 29, 1986, were the Respondent's regularly scheduled days off. From March 30 until April 2, 1986, the Respondent neither called his supervisor nor reported for work. He was given unauthorized leave without pay status for these days. On April 2, 1986, the Superintendent of Union Correctional Institution, T. L. Barton, sent the Respondent a letter informing him that he had abandoned his position at Union Correctional Institution, and that he was dismissed.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Administration enter a Final Order terminating the employment of the Respondent, Lester Bishop, from his position as Correctional Officer at Union Correctional Institution, for abandonment, pursuant to Rule 22A 7.010(2), Florida Administrative Code, effective March 25, 1986. THIS Recommended Order entered on this 9th day of December, 1986, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Gilda H. Lambert Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Augustus D. Aikens, Esquire General Counsel Department of Administration 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Louie L. Wainwright, Secretary Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Louis A. Vargas General Counsel Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of December, 1986. Ernest A. Reddick, Esquire 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Lester Bishop, in pro per Box 1341 Starke, Florida 32091
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner has just cause to terminate Respondent's employment on grounds alleged in the Civil Service Notice of Disciplinary Action of May 10, 2000.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this proceeding, Petitioner employed Respondent in Petitioner's maintenance department as a Carpenter I. Respondent was a non-probationary educational support employee as defined in Section 1012.40, Florida Statutes (2003), which is substantially similar to Section 231.3605, Florida Statutes (2001), and its predecessors. In October 1995, Respondent's fishing boat collided with a commercial barge. As a result of the accident, Respondent's father and uncle were killed and Respondent's son suffered serious bodily injury. Respondent had a history of poor attendance at work. Sometime prior to October 1998, Respondent's supervisor counseled him and recommended discipline due to unexcused and excessive absences from work. Respondent was arrested in October 1998 as the result of the boating accident. Respondent initially was charged with one count each of vessel homicide, culpable negligence, and boating under the influence (BUI) severe bodily injury, and two counts of manslaughter. On April 28, 2000, a jury found Respondent guilty as charged. It is undisputed that Respondent was absent from work without authorization or approved leave from April 17, 2000 through May 17, 2000. Petitioner terminated his employment effective May 17, 2000. Respondent was sentenced on August 22, 2000, for the following offenses: causing serious bodily injury to another, culpable negligence in the death of another, vessel homicide, and two counts of BUI manslaughter. On appeal, some of Respondent's felony convictions were discharged. However, the Court affirmed Respondent's BUI manslaughter convictions. See Ronald R. Cardenas, Jr. v. State of Florida, 816 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). The court in Ronald R. Cardenas, Jr. v. State of Florida, 816 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002), certified a question of great public importance involving a jury instruction to the Florida Supreme Court. See Ronald R. Cardenas, Jr. v. State of Florida, Case No. SC02-1264, Rev.gr. 832 So. 2d 103 (Table) (Fla. November 19, 2002). At the time of the hearing, the Florida Supreme Court continued to have jurisdiction over Respondent's criminal case. Therefore, Respondent's convictions for BUI manslaughter remain in effect. Petitioner's Rule 2.24 provides that personnel absent from work without approved leave shall forfeit compensation and be subject to discipline, including termination. Unavailability for work due to incarceration does not constitute a basis for approved leave and is an unauthorized absence.
Recommendation Based on the forgoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter a final order terminating Respondent's employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of March, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of March, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Ron Cardenas Department of Corrections No. 202263 Reception and Medical Center Post Office Box 628 Lake Butler, Florida 32054 Joseph L. Hammons, Esquire Hammons, Longoria & Whittaker, P.A. 17 West Cervantes Street Pensacola, Florida 32501-3125 Jim Paul, Superintendent Escambia County School Board 215 West Garden Street Pensacola, Florida 32502 Honorable Jim Horne Commissioner of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1514 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 323299-0400 Daniel J. Woodring, General Counsel Department of Education 325 West Gaines Street, Room 1244 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Alfred Greenberg, has held the position of a veterinary aide since approximately November, 1967. During October 1974, he was converted from OPS status to a regular career service employee subject to the normal six month probationary period. By letter dated June 24, 1976, from J. Patrick McCann, Division Director, Petitioner was advised that based on "action by the 1976 legislature, we most regretfully inform you that it will be necessary to abolish your position effective the close of business, June 30, 1976. In lieu of two weeks notice, you will receive two weeks termination pay." (See Respondent's Composite Exhibit Number 1). Within a few days, the Petitioner was converted back to an OPS position receiving the same hourly pay and was advised that he would be offered any vacancy which occurred within the department to which he qualified within the following 12 month period. Petitioner, through his attorney, timely appealed the Respondent's actions essentially contesting his conversion from the career service status to the OPS status and thereby losing social security benefits, retirement benefits and the accrual of vacation and sick leave. He further complained about the manner in which he was served his layoff notice. Specifically, he complained that his letter was hand delivered whereas personnel rules and regulations require that layoff notices etc. be sent by certified mail. In this regard, evidence reveals that by letter dated August 3, 1976, by certified mail, return receipt requested, Petitioner was advised that he was then being provided notice in accordance with the requirement in the department's personnel rules and regulations. Pursuant to emergency rules governing the layoff of career service employees, 22AER76-1, the Petitioner was advised that his position was abolished pursuant to action taken by the 1976 legislature. Evidence adduced during the course of the hearing reveals that the Petitioner's layoff was effected via the procedures as outlined in the above referred emergency rule and he was immediately converted to an OPS position, a position he now holds, at the same rate of pay. Evidence clearly reveals that Petitioner's layoff was effected pursuant to and authorized by the foregoing emergency rule. In view thereof, and in the absence of any evidence which would provide basis for a contrary finding, the action of the Department in effecting the Petitioner's layoff was proper and I shall accordingly recommend that such action be sustained. It is therefore recommended that the action of the Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, in effecting the layoff of the Petitioner, Alfred Greenberg, pursuant to emergency rule 22AER76-1, as published in the Florida Administrative Weekly on June 11, 1976, and adopted by the Administration Commission that same date, be sustained. RECOMMENDED this 28th day of June, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: William Hatch, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32304 James W. Pritchard, Esquire 1038 Alfred I. DuPont Building 169 East Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33131 Mrs. Dorothy B. Roberts Room 443, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
Findings Of Fact Acco Mechanical Contractors, Inc. is a subcontractor in the construction of a regional juvenile detection center located in Palm Beach County, Florida. The contracting authority for this facility was the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. The contract for the construction let by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services was in excess of $5,000.00 and pursuant to the provisions of Section 215.19(1)(b), Florida Statutes, the Division of Labor established a prevailing wage to be paid different crafts and occupations in construction of this project. The prevailing wage established for plumbers on this project was $10.07 per hour. During the course of this project, Acco Mechanical Contractors, Inc. acknowledged by affidavit that all persons in its employ were being paid the prevailing wage as required by law. Between April 10, 1977 and October 16, 1977, Charles G. Mathis was employed by Acco Mechanical Contractors, Inc. as a plumber on this project and paid at the rate of $7.50 per regular time hour and $11.25 per overtime hour. Between October 16, 1977 and June 25, 1978, Mathis was employed on this project as a plumber and paid at the rate of $8.25 per regular time hour and $12.37 per overtime hour. The difference between the amount paid Petitioner for regular time hours worked and the prevailing wage is $2.50 per regular time hour during the period he was paid $7.50 an hour and $3.85 per hour for the period he was paid $11.25 for each overtime hour. The difference between the amount paid Petitioner for regular time hours and the prevailing wage was $1.75 for the period of time he was paid $8.25 for regular time hour and $2.73 for the period he was paid $12.37 for each overtime hour. The evidence conflicts concerning the number of hours the claimant worked. The Hearing Officer finds that the records of the Respondent Company, Exhibit 6, accurately reflects the number of regular and overtime hours the claimant worked on this project. Exhibit 6 reflects that the claimant worked 891.5 hours at a rate $7.50 an hour and 23 hours at the rate of $11.25 an hour, overtime. Exhibit 6 further reflects that the claimant worked 1,172 hours at a rate of $8.25 an hour and 76.5 hours at the rate of $12.37 per hour, overtime. The Petitioner was underpaid the amount of $2028.75 for regular time hours worked at the rate of $7.50 per hour; $2,051.00 for the hours worked at the rate of $8.25 an hour; $208.85 at the rate of $12.37 an hour; and underpaid $88.50 at the rate of $11.25 an hour, for a total of $4,577.10. Petitioner complied with the provisions of Section 215.19(3)(a)1 and 2 by filing an affidavit with the contracting authority stating the number of hours worked and the amount paid for said hours. Said affidavit was filed within the time prescribed by statutes. Pursuant to Section 215.19(3)(b), Florida Statutes, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services is presently withholding $5,844.56 from Acco Mechanical Contractors, Inc. while awaiting the decision in this administrative proceeding.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact anus Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer would recommend that the Division of Labor enter its order directing the contracting authority to pay to the employee the sum of $4,577.10 and the remaining amount held by the contracting authority pursuant to this claim be paid to Acco Mechanical Contractors, Inc. DONE and ORDERED this 1st day of November 1978, Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: L. Byrd Booth, Jr., Esquire Post Office Drawer 11089 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33339 Charles G. Mathis 942 Montego Drive West Palm Beach, Florida 33406
