The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to "in line of duty" death benefits from the Florida Retirement System (FRS).
Findings Of Fact In assessing whether or not a death was "in line of duty," the Division of Retirement, in 1979, regularly relied upon the certificate of death; the Workers' Compensation First Report of Injury; the autopsy report, if there was one; any investigative reports or statements made by witnesses; and the final determination of the Workers' Compensation agency. Other items were also required, but if the Division of Retirement would have relied on this type of information then, which it would have, and if FRS requested and considered this type of information in denying Petitioner’s claim in 2003, which it did, it is appropriate that all of these sources also be considered in this proceeding, even without predicate, as to their internal hearsay statements. Where available, those items have been considered in this proceeding. This methodology is also approved and codified in Section 121.021(14), Florida Statutes. See the Conclusions of Law. That said, no single document is determinative of the issue of entitlement. On June 9, 1979, Donald Shackelford was a Volusia County Sheriff's Deputy and a member of FRS, with approximately one year of creditable service. On June 9, 1979, Deputy Shackelford was 36 years old. He passed away in his sleep at approximately 3:30 a.m., several hours after leaving work. The Workers' Compensation First Report of Injury on Deputy Shackelford was prepared by the decedent's supervising sergeant. It relates that Deputy Shackelford had stated at 1:19 a.m., on June 9, 1979, that he was not feeling well; was having cold chills; and was experiencing passing numbness in his hands. The Report states that those "injuries" were reported by Deputy Shackelford at 1:12 a.m., and that at 12:05 a.m., the deceased had been on duty and involved in a fight while arresting a suspect. There is no dispute that Deputy Shackelford was relieved of duty and went home before the end of his regularly scheduled shift on June 9, 1979. At the time of his death, Petitioner was married to Deputy Shackelford. Petitioner testified that when Deputy Shackelford arrived home early on June 9, 1979, he told her he had received a blow to the chest during a fight/arrest while on duty earlier in the evening. She believed that this blow caused his death. Deputy Shackelford had driven himself home in a patrol car, which he was required to keep at his residence even when he was off-duty. He also was required to be “on-call” 24 hours a day. However, he was not "on duty" at the time of his death. Later on June 9, 1979, an autopsy was performed by Dr. Schildeker, M.D., with the final diagnosis being: [T]hrombosis, right coronary artery, recent; myocardial infarct [infarction], early posterior left ventricle and septum; artherosclerosis, calcification coronary artery, severe; dilation right heart, moderate; pulmonary edema, acute. (R-15). The autopsy report also notes that there were bite marks (presumably from the resisting arrestee the night before) on Deputy Shackelford's arm, and lividity to the left side and lower portion of his face, neck, and upper shoulders. It does not note any bruising to his chest. (R-15). The autopsy report also reveals that ". . . in the coronary artery, approximately 4 centimeters from the point of origin there is an acute antemortem [before death] thrombosis which is completely occluding the lumen of the vessel." A current medical dictionary defines "thrombosis" as the formation of a blood clot in a vein or artery. Without expert medical testimony, the undersigned cannot determine if the "lividity" described in the autopsy report is bruising that occurred while Deputy Shackelford was alive or if it was postmortem lividity, which is the after-death settling of blood caused by the position of a body. However, the autopsy report also states: Careful examination of the body reveals no wounds or injuries that are contributory to the death. (R-15). The certificate of death form was also signed by Dr. Schildeker, M.D., on June 18, 1979. The form allows its signator to choose between "(Probably) accident, suicide or homicide, or undetermined." Deputy Shackelford’s certificate of death specifies "natural," on this blank. It also states under "Describe How Injury Occurred," the words, "Had coronary while making arrest." The "causes of death” listed on the certificate were, in order of descending immediacy: immediate cause: myocardial infarct [infarction], posterior; due to or as a consequence of: thrombosis, right coronary artery; and due to or as a consequence of: ASHD [artherosclerotic heart disease (R-7)]. Petitioner was represented by a lawyer for her workers' compensation claim. On June 29, 1979, she began to receive workers' compensation death benefits from Volusia County. The County was self-insured for workers' compensation purposes under Chapter 440, Florida Statutes. (P-3 and P-4). On July 27, 1979, the National Sheriffs' Association denied that Deputy Shackelford’s death was covered by its accidental death and dismemberment policy, because the death had been ruled "natural." (R-23). Within a month of Deputy Shackelford's death, Petitioner and their children relocated to Virginia Beach, Virginia. At the time of this relocation, Petitioner definitely provided forwarding information to her lawyer and possibly to Volusia County. On September 10, 1979, after being notified of Deputy Shackelford's death, the Division of Retirement sent a letter to the Volusia County Personnel Office, outlining the requirements for survivors, in this case Petitioner, to claim FRS benefits as a result of Deputy Shackelford’s death. (R-3). In 1979, the Volusia County Personnel Office's procedure would have been to forward the Division of Retirement information concerning the FRS claim requirements and the application to the surviving spouse at the spouse’s last known address. However, it cannot be verified whether or not the Division of Retirement's information was forwarded to Petitioner. Petitioner testified credibly that she never received the Division of Retirement's information from Volusia County. Petitioner subsequently remarried in 1980. On October 26, 2000, the United States Justice Department denied Petitioner benefits pursuant to the Public Safety Officers' Benefits Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3796 (PSOB), because the decedent's certificate of death suggested death was from a heart attack, and the cause of death was listed as "natural." The definition of "personal injury sustained in the line of duty" under that Act requires that the claimant demonstrate "that a traumatic injury was a substantial factor in the public safety officer's death." (P-7).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order denying Petitioner's request for “in line of duty” death benefits. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of August, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of August, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas E. Wright, Esquire Department of Management Services Division of Retirement 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Linda Shackelford Russell Post Office Box 1325 Daytona Beach, Florida 32115 Alberto Dominguez, Esquire Department of Management Services Division of Retirement 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Sarabeth Snuggs, Interim Director Department of Management Services Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560
The Issue Whether the Division properly denied Petitioner's request to change Petitioner's retirement in the Florida Retirement System from an early retirement service benefit to disability retirement.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is charged with managing, governing, and administering the Florida Retirement System ("FRS"). Petitioner worked for Miami Dade Transit from August 1990 to March 2004, and was a member of FRS while employed there. Afterwards, Petitioner went to work as an auditor with a private employer, Robert Half, in New York. In 2007, Petitioner sustained an injury while working for Robert Half. In 2008, the Division generated an Estimate of Retirement Benefits for Petitioner detailing what her benefit amounts would be if she decided to retire. In February or March 2009, Petitioner informed the Division by telephone that she could no longer work and wanted to retire. Subsequently, the Division mailed Petitioner a retirement application. On April 13, 2009, the Division received Petitioner's filled-out application for service retirement. Directly above Petitioner's signature, the application stated: I understand I must terminate all employment with FRS employers to receive a retirement benefit under Chapter 121, Florida Statutes. I also understand that I cannot add additional service, change options, or change my type of retirement (Regular, Disability, and Early) once my retirement becomes final. My retirement becomes final when any benefit payment is cashed or deposited. Petitioner's application was incomplete and could not be processed upon receipt. On or about April 17, 2009, the Division sent Petitioner an Acknowledgment of Service Retirement Application requesting that Petitioner send "birth date verification of your joint annuitant" if she chose Option 3 or 4 and "The Option Selection for FRS Members, Form FRS-11o" to finalize the application. The acknowledgment stated at the bottom: ONCE YOU RETIRE, YOU CANNOT ADD SERVICE CHANGE OPTIONS, CHANGE YOUR RETIREMENT DATE, CHANGE YOUR TYPE OF RETIREMENT OR ELECT THE INVESTMENT PLAN. RETIRMENT BECOMES FINAL WHEN ANY BENEFIT PAYMENT IS CASHED OR DEPOSITED. In April 2009, the Division generated a second Estimate of Benefits for Petitioner, which she received. On or about May 8, 2009, Petitioner completed her retirement application by providing the Division the option selection form, which notified the Division that she selected Option 2. Directly above Petitioner's signature, the selection form FRS-11o stated: I understand I must terminate all employment with FRS employers to receive a retirement benefit under Chapter 121, Florida Statutes. I also understand that I cannot add additional service, change options, or change my type of retirement (Regular, Disability, and Early) once my retirement becomes final. My retirement becomes final when any benefit payment is cashed or deposited. When Petitioner received the estimate and saw the early retirement benefit amount, she called the Division to question what she considered a small amount. It was explained to Petitioner that she lost a certain percentage because she was retiring early and that her retirement was either "being processed, or it was processed." Petitioner's application for retirement was approved by the Division and Petitioner was awarded the Option 2 retirement benefit she requested with the effective date of May 1, 2009. Petitioner's first retirement check was dated April 23, 2010, and was cashed by Petitioner on July 28, 2010. Petitioner's retirement status was final when she cashed her benefit payment. On June 6, 2011, Petitioner contacted the Secretary of Division of Management Services by email and requested that she receive disability retirement for the first time.1 On, June 23, 2011, the Division informed Petitioner by letter that her retirement status was final when she cashed or deposited a benefit payment and that the request to change her retirement from regular service retirement to disability retirement could not be honored. On or about July 19, 2011, Petitioner requested a hearing regarding the issue.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's request to change her early service retirement benefit to disability retirement. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of February, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JUNE C. MCKINNEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of February, 2012.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner and Respondent agreed to the following facts: On November 23, 1975, Herschel and Audi Motes, a deputy sheriff with the Putnam County Sheriff's Department, died of a heart attack while arresting an individual who struggled with the arresting Louise Motes, Petitioner in this cause, was married to Herschel Audi Motes at the time of his death, thereby becoming his widow. Mrs. Motes remains unmarried to date and is qualified as to her status for all of the rights and benefits granted January 21, 1976, Sheriff E.W. Pellicer wrote a letter to the Department of Administration, Division of Personnel and Retirement, furnishing the Department with the record of Mr. Motes' salary, contributions to the retirement fund, together with the dates of his employment. The letter concluded by stating, "I would appreciate hearing from you at an early date and if anything further is needed, please advise." The letter was signed by E.W. Pellicer, Sheriff, Putnam County, Florida. On March 10, 1976, Mrs. Motes received a letter from Marjorie B. Smith, Retirement Benefits Specialist, with the letter showing a copy to Mr. E.W. Pellicer. The letter stated as follows: "As the designated beneficiary and surviving spouse of Herschel A. Motes, who died November 23, 1975, you are entitled to the refund of the accumulated retirement contributions which amount to $4,325.69 or the Option 3 monthly retirement benefit. If you desire the refund of the contributions, you should execute a request for refund, form . . . which must be completed in the personnel office of the Putnam County Sheriff's Department If you prefer the Option 3 monthly retirement benefit, which has been computed to be $125.29 based on 18.30 years of service, you should execute the enclosed form FST-11b on which a single beneficiary must be designated and send your personal remittance in the amount of $1,089.23 made payable to the Florida Retirement System. This payment is necessary to allow credit for four years of military service, service rendered from April through August 1963, and complete payment of the necessary contributions for the 1963-64 and 1964-65 years. This monthly benefit, if elected instead of the refund, is a lifetime income which will continue even though you should remarry. In the event of your death prior to receiving in monthly benefits an amount equal to the total accumulated retirement contributions, any contribution on deposit in excess of the total monthly benefits paid will be refunded to your beneficiary. Please let us know if we may be of further assistance." (emphasis added). Enclosed with this letter was form FST-11b which is an "Application of Beneficiary for Monthly Benefits." The form. Joint Exhibit I, contained no reference whatsoever to any rights or benefits under Section 121.091(7)(c)(1), Florida Statutes (the death in the line of duty benefits). Either the Division of Retirement or a Mrs. Key, with the Sheriff's Office of Putnam County, had filled in the blank portions of the first sentence of the form by writing "121" and "3" in the blanks where the form states "Chapter 121, Option 3." The remainder of the form is typed in except for the signature of Louise A. Motes. After filing the "application" through the Putnam County Sheriff's Office, and receiving her first benefit check, Mrs. Motes had a conversation with a Mr. Ronald Clark of Palatka, Florida, about workmens' compensation comprehension benefits. As a result of that conversation, she went to an attorney, who filed a workmens' compensation claim for her. Sometime thereafter, Mrs. Motes was going through some of her husband's papers, which were contained in a filing cabinet at the Sheriff's Office, which her sons brought home. In those papers, she found a newspaper article that Mr. Motes had cut out and saved which told about the death in the line of duty benefits, a copy of the newspaper articles is attached to and made part of Joint Exhibit K. In response thereto, Mrs. Motes went back to the attorney who had filed her workmens' compensation claim and inquired about the "death in the line of duty retirement benefits" of Section 121.091(7)(c), Florida Statutes. At no time prior to or during her filing out the "application" from the State of Florida, Bureau of Retirement, was she informed by anyone that she might possibly entitled to higher benefits because of the manner in which her husband died. At no time prior to filling out the retirement "application" did she have any actual knowledge that the State paid benefits other than those benefits which had been presented to her which were listed on said application. At no time did the Sheriff's Office inform her that she had any possibility of benefits other than the benefits listed on the above stated State of Florida, Bureau of Retirement, application form. By letter of November 7, 1977, Steven S. Mathues, Assistant Division Attorney for the Division of Retirement, Department of Administration, informed Ms. Jill Brown (the attorney for Mrs. Motes who began the original inquiry as to obtaining the "death in the line of duty benefits"), that " . . . it is this Division's position that all retirement benefits and options become fixed when the first warrant is cashed. However, it would appear that under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, your client would have a right to challenge this position . . . . As I see it, the issue would be whether Mrs. Motes' notarized application . . . and continued acceptance of benefits would estop her from now attempting to change the benefit " Thereafter, Mrs. Motes' case was referred to Mr. Maynard, who after several conferences with Mr. Mathues, the attorney for the Division of Retirement, filed a Petition for Administrative Hearing on Mrs. Motes' behalf, alleging, among other things, that Herschel Audi Motes was killed in the line of duty within the meaning of Section 121.091(7)(c)(1), Florida Statutes. The petition also alleged that the Division's "policy" that as of the moment Mrs. Motes had cashed one of her benefit checks her retirement benefits had vested and could not be changed by her subsequent to that event was within the definition of a rule as defined by Section 120.54(14), Florida Statutes, and that the Division of Retirement had never promulgated such a rule in accord with the procedures required by Chapter 120. Depositions were taken in Daytona, Palatka, and Tallahassee on the issue of whether or not Mr. Motes had been "killed in the line of duty." Subsequent to those depositions, Mr. Mathues informed Petitioner that the Division of Retirement no longer wanted to contest the in line of duty issue. Thereafter, Mr. Mathues and Mr. Maynard, attorney for Petitioner, executed a "Joint Motion for Continuance" which states as follows: "1. The parties have settled all of the questions which relate to the issue of whether Herschel Audi Motes, his widow, to the in line of duty death benefits provided in Chapter121, Florida Statues. The only remaining issue in dispute is whether or not Louise Motes has waived her rights to the in line of duty death benefits provided in Chapter 121, Florida Statutes, because she has been cashing her benefit checks since 1975. The remaining issue is solely a legal issue and does not require any testimony by witnesses, with the possible exception of testimony by Mrs. Motes and/or affidavits from Mrs. Motes and the Putnam County Sheriff's Office if the parties cannot agree to a stipulation of facts. Therefore, this issue can be argued by the undersigned attorneys for the parties in Tallahassee, Florida, at the time and place stated above." The Joint Motion was signed by both Mr. Maynard and Mr. Mathues. In response to that Motion, the hearing officer promulgated an Order entitled "Order of Continuance" which stated: "The parties in the above styled cause have filed a Joint Motion for Continuance of the hearing from February 15, 1979, at 1:00 p.m. in Palatka, Florida, to February 26, 1979, at 10:00 a.m., in Room 103, Collins Building, in Tallahassee, Florida. The Motion is granted. Done and Ordered this 12th day of February, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida." With the Division of Retirement, Department of Administration, no longer contesting the in line of duty issue, a final hearing was held on February 26, 1979, on the only remaining issue in dispute which is whether or not Louise Motes has waived her rights to the in line of duty death benefits provided by Chapter 121, Florida Statutes, because she has been cashing retirement benefit checks since 1975. The issue as to whether Petitioner's husband died in such a manner as to entitle her to in-line-of-duty death benefits has been settled by agreement of the parties in Petitioner's favor. This Administrative Hearing was held to resolve the issue of whether Petitioner waived her right to the in-line-of-duty death benefits provided in Section 121.091(7)(c)(1), Florida Statutes, inasmuch as she has been cashing benefit checks awarded her pursuant to Section 121.091(6)(a)(3). Inquiry to the Respondent as to subject retirement claim was made by Petitioner, Louise Motes, when she became aware of the possibility of her entitlement to in-line-of-duty death benefits. No rules have been promulgated in relation to Section 121.091(7) Death benefits, although Rule 22B-4.10(5) was promulgated in 1972 (amended 1974) under authority of Section 212.091(6), Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Deny the request of Petitioner to change the retirement benefits she now receives to in-line-of-duty death benefits provided in Chapter 121, Florida Statutes. DONE and ORDERED this 1st day of June, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Stephen S. Mathues, Esquire Division of Retirement Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Zollie M. Maynard, Esquire 502 East Jefferson Street Post Office Box 1716 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION DIVISION OF RETIREMENT LOUISE MOTES, Petitioner, vs. DOAH Case NO. 78-2105 DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, Respondent. /
The Issue Whether Petitioner, John Hasko ("Petitioner"), is entitled, pursuant to the City of Dania Beach Code of Ordinances ("Code") section 18-49(4), to be paid retirement pension benefits under the City of Dania Beach Police and Firefighters Retirement System's ("Respondent" or "System") "100 Percent Joint and Last Survivor Annuity" ("Last Survivor Annuity") or the "Modified Cash Refund Annuity" ("Life Annuity").
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner is a retired police officer who was employed by the City of Dania Beach Police Department ("Police Department") and who has qualified for, and is receiving, retirement pension benefits under the System. Pursuant to chapter 18, article IV of the Code, Respondent is the retirement pension system provided for the benefit of firefighters and police officers, including Petitioner, who are or previously were employed by the City of Dania Beach. Evidence Adduced at Final Hearing Background Petitioner was hired by the Police Department on December 18, 1980, and, upon being employed, began accruing credit toward a pension under the System. Petitioner was employed by the Police Department for 20 years. On October 1, 1988, the City of Dania Beach Police Department merged with the Broward County Sheriff's Office ("BCSO"). At that time, Petitioner was given the option whether to remain in the System or to retrieve his contributions and become enrolled in the Florida Retirement System ("FRS"), which was and is the retirement program in which BSCO employees are eligible to enroll. At that time, Petitioner elected to remain enrolled in the System rather than enrolling in the FRS. On August 28, 2000, Petitioner executed a retirement benefits election form to select the type of pension under which he would receive pension benefits from the System starting on January 1, 2001. Petitioner retired from the Police Department effective December 31, 2000. In April 2001, Petitioner began receiving monthly pension payments under the System, and also received back payments for January through March 2001. Immediately upon retiring from the Police Department, Petitioner began working with the BCSO. At that time, he enrolled in the FRS and began accruing credit under a life annuity plan provided through the FRS. Petitioner was employed by the BCSO for slightly over 14 years. As the result of a series of work-related injuries, attendant surgeries, and permanent restrictions on his activities, Petitioner retired from the BCSO on April 14, 2014. In the 2006-to-2007 timeframe, Petitioner was diagnosed with a cardiac condition that ultimately necessitated placement of a stent in 2012. Petitioner remains under the regular care of a cardiologist and is on medication to treat his cardiac condition. He credibly testified that since 2012, his condition has remained stable. In June 2014, Petitioner applied for pension benefits under the FRS. Petitioner testified, credibly, that he had four options from which to choose,1/ and that he selected the Ten Year Certain option. Under this plan, Petitioner receives monthly payments for the rest of his life. If Petitioner were to predecease his beneficiary——in this case, his wife——before the 120-month period ends, she would continue to receive payments through the end of the 120-month period; however, if Petitioner were to predecease his wife after the end of the 120-month period, she would not receive any further payments. Petitioner testified that, based on his belief that he had enrolled in the Last Survivor Annuity under the System, he selected the FRS Ten- Year Certain Option so that if he predeceased his wife, she would receive benefits payments from two sources for the remainder of her life——the Last Survivor Annuity and Social Security. Petitioner receives benefit payments through the FRS to date. Petitioner has received monthly retirement benefit payments through the System since April 2001, including back payments for January through March 2001. He continues to receive monthly retirement benefit payments from the System to date. Evidence Regarding Petitioner's Election of Benefits Under the System The City of Dania Beach Police and Firefighters Retirement System Summary Plan Description ("SPD") summarizes the System's available pension plan options. The section titled "Forms of Benefits Payment," on page 16 of the SPD, states under the "Normal Form of Benefit Payment" subsection: "[u]nless you elect otherwise before your retirement, your pension is payable as a Single Life Annuity with a guaranteed refund of your contributions. This is a series of monthly payments for your life." This provision effectively makes the "Normal Form" the "default" form of benefits payments if the employee does not elect another form of benefit payments before retiring. The "Election of Optional Forms of Benefit Payments" subsection of the SPD states: "You have the right at any time before your retirement date to elect not to have your retirement benefit paid in the Normal Form." This subsection identifies other forms of benefit payments available that the employee may choose as an alternative to the Normal Form. These forms are the Joint and Last Survivor Annuity, the Ten Year Certain and Life Thereafter Annuity, and another optional form actuarially equivalent to the Normal Form. Petitioner decided to retire from City of Dania Beach Police Department at the end of 2000. On August 28, 2000, he met with Sonia Brown, then the plan administrator for the System, to fill out an application for retirement benefits. He completed a form titled "City of Dania Beach Police and Firefighters' Retirement System Application for Benefits" ("Application Form"). Section 1 of the Application Form, titled "For Retirement or DROP Benefits," contained a section to identify the beneficiary for the Joint and Survivor and Ten Year Certain options. Petitioner completed this portion of the form, naming his wife as his beneficiary and providing pertinent information about her. He also completed section 4 of the form, designating his wife as his beneficiary for all purposes under the System. He signed and dated the Application Form. Petitioner testified that he met with Brown again in early December 2000, to finalize his election of his benefits that he would be paid under the System. According to Petitioner, at that time, he told Brown that he chose the Last Survivor Annuity option. He testified that Brown gave him paperwork to fill out, that he completed the paperwork, and that she told him that he would receive benefit payments of between $2,400 and $2,500 per month based on his chosen option. Petitioner testified that Brown did not give him the "City of Dania Beach Police and Firefighters Retirement System Notification of Benefits Payable as a Result of Retirement" form ("Notification of Benefits Form") to complete at the December 2000 meeting. Petitioner testified that he did not specifically remember what documents he completed that day, and that he did not receive a copy of those documents. Respondent's file regarding Petitioner's benefits election does not contain either the original or a copy of the documents that Petitioner claims he signed in December 2000. In short, there is no physical evidence substantiating the existence of these documents. Petitioner testified that based on the December 2000 meeting with Brown, he believed he had selected the Last Survivor Annuity and that the payments under that option would start in January 2001. After Petitioner retired from the Police Department, he did not receive his benefit payments under the System for January, February, and March 2001. He testified that he assumed that this delay was due to the time involved in processing the paperwork he claims to have completed in December 2000. On January 23, 2001, Brown sent correspondence to the System's actuarial services firm requesting that Petitioner's early retirement benefit be calculated according to the various benefits options available to police plan participants who are eligible for early retirement with 20 years of service. Petitioner is shown as having been copied on this letter, and he acknowledges having received the letter. By letter dated February 19, 2001, Respondent sent Petitioner "several forms to be completed by you and returned to this office for further processing of your early retirement benefit." The letter identified these forms as the Notification of Benefits Form, a W-4P form for specifying the amount to be withheld from the benefit payments for federal income tax, and a form to authorize direct deposit of the benefit payments into Petitioner's bank account. Petitioner claims that he did not receive this letter. Petitioner testified that in March 2001, Brown contacted him to complete a "verification of beneficiary form." On March 8, 2001, Petitioner went to Brown's office, where she presented him with what he characterized as a "verification of beneficiary form." According to Petitioner, Brown "asked him to make sure my beneficiary information was correct" and to sign and date the form where she had placed check marks. The "verification of beneficiary form" Petitioner signed actually consists of the second page of the Notification of Benefits Form. The second page of the Notification of Benefits Form that Petitioner executed contains a table that identifies Petitioner's wife (whose name is redacted) as his beneficiary. Portions of the table consist of spaces in which to state information regarding the amount of the nontaxable portion of monthly benefits for the various annuity options, which are identified by number and listed on the first page of the form. There are no amounts listed in those spaces on the form that Petitioner signed; those spaces have been left blank. A paragraph below the table states: "[t]he Survivor Annuity benefit amounts shown above are based on the beneficiary named above and are payable only to this beneficiary. Should you wish to change your beneficiary before your payments begin, new amounts have to be calculated."2/ Near the bottom of the form is the sentence "I accept the terms above, including my choice of annuity form, and confirm the information shown above to be correct."3/ Immediately below the above-referenced sentence is a "Participant's Signature" line. Petitioner signed the form on this line and dated it "3/08/01." Petitioner testified that at the time he signed this form, the spaces for the signature by the Board of Trustees representative and the date of signature were blank. The form subsequently was executed by the Board of Trustees, through Eugene H. Jewell, on March 13, 2001. Petitioner testified that in November 2015, he became aware, through checking his various beneficiary designations as the result of a bank error,4/ that the System was paying his retirement benefits pursuant to the Life Annuity rather than the Last Survivor Annuity. Petitioner testified that on November 6, 2015, he went to the System office to verify that his wife was correctly designated as his retirement pension beneficiary. He met with Cathy David,5/ the current system plan administrator, to review the documents in his retirement pension file. Petitioner testified that, he saw, for the first time, the first page of the Notification of Benefits Form contained in his file. This page had a check mark next to the "Modified Cash Refund"——i.e., the Life Annuity——option. He testified that he did not make the check mark next to the "Modified Cash Refund" option on the form. Petitioner obtained documents contained in the Salem Trust ("Salem")6/ file regarding his retirement pension. Among these documents was a letter dated March 13, 2001, from Brown to Livia Nixon, with Petitioner shown as copied, transmitting the completed forms to enable Salem to process Petitioner's retirement pension, and requesting that Salem expeditiously issue retroactive checks to Petitioner for January through March 2001. Petitioner testified that he had not previously received a copy of the March 13, 2001, letter or the attached forms, and that he did not see them until he obtained the documents in the Salem file. Petitioner also testified that he did not receive a December 6, 2001, letter from Respondent notifying him that the System's auditors, S. Davis & Associates, P.A. ("SDA"), were conducting an annual audit of Respondent's financial statements.7/ This letter contained information regarding Petitioner's pension ——including information expressly identifying the type of benefit Petitioner was receiving as the "Life Annuity." The letter requested that Petitioner review the information contained in the letter and correct any errors by providing the correct information to SDA. Petitioner testified that he first saw this letter during his November 6, 2015, review of the documents in the System's file, so he did not respond to SDA in 2001. In sum, Petitioner claims that at a December 2000 meeting with Brown, he selected the Last Survivor Annuity as the form in which he would be paid retirement pension benefits under the System. He claims that he did not select the Life Annuity, and that he did not make the check mark by the "Modified Cash Refund" option on the first page of the Notification of Benefits form that was contained in the System file. In sum, Petitioner also claims that he did not receive or otherwise was not provided the following documents: (1) the unidentified "paperwork" that he claims he completed at a meeting with Brown in December 2000, at which he selected the Last Survivor Annuity; (2) the letter dated February 19, 2001, from Brown to Petitioner, transmitting forms——including the entire Notification of Benefits Form——that Petitioner needed to complete to enable processing of his early retirement benefit; (3) the first page of the Notification of Benefits Form on March 8, 2001, when he completed the second page of that form confirming his wife as his beneficiary; (4) the March 13, 2001, letter from Brown to Livia Nixon of Salem, transmitting Petitioner's retirement pension forms completed on March 8, 2001, to Salem for processing; and (5) the December 6, 2001, letter to Petitioner from Respondent's outside auditor, SDA, requesting him to verify the accuracy of the information regarding his pension and to correct any errors in that information. Petitioner acknowledges that he did receive a letter from Cathy David dated July 1, 2012, regarding a change in Florida law that could affect retirees. That letter expressly stated "[y]ou chose the life annuity when you retired on January 1, 2001." Petitioner claims that he did not read this letter in its entirety, so he did not see the statement in the letter regarding having chosen the life annuity. Findings of Ultimate Fact Upon careful consideration of the evidence in the record, it is determined that Petitioner did not show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he selected the Last Survivor Annuity, rather than the Life Annuity, so that, pursuant to section 18-49(4) of the Code, he should be reclassified as being enrolled in the Last Survivor Annuity. First, the undersigned finds implausible Petitioner's testimony that he signed unspecified "paperwork" selecting the Last Survivor Annuity——clearly, a very important decision on his part——but that he does not "remember specifically" what that paperwork was and that he did not receive a copy of that paperwork. Compounding that implausibility is that neither the original nor any copies of that "paperwork" were found in Respondent's file or in Salem's file. Simply stated, there is no physical evidence establishing the existence of this "paperwork" ——which Petitioner claims is the instrument through which he elected the Last Survivor Annuity.8/ Second, the first page of the Notification of Benefits Form that was contained in Respondent's file on Petitioner's retirement pension shows the "Modified Cash Annuity" option—— i.e., the Life Option——as having been selected by the placement of a check mark next to that option. It is undisputed that Petitioner executed the second page of the form. This complete Notification of Benefits Form contained in Respondent's file constitutes the complete, most credible evidence in the record that Petitioner selected the Life Annuity when he executed the form on March 8, 2001. To this point, Petitioner offered no credible evidence to support his assertion that someone——unknown to him and having unknown motives——must have placed the first page of the Notification of Benefits Form, having the check mark next to the "Modified Cash Refund" option, in Respondent's file without his knowledge. The undersigned does not find credible or persuasive Petitioner's testimony that he was not given the first page of the Notification of Benefits Form on March 8, 2001,9/ and that based on the language in the paragraph below the table, quoted in paragraph 29 above, he reasonably believed that the second page of that form constituted a "verification of beneficiary" that simply confirmed his beneficiary for his previous selection of the "survivor annuity." However, in order for the clause "the Survivor Annuity benefit amounts shown above" in that paragraph to make sense, it must be read in conjunction with the table above the paragraph. As discussed above, in the table on page 2 of the Notification of Benefits Form that was executed by Petitioner, no amounts of nontaxable portion of monthly benefit for any of the survivor annuity options have been filled in, even though the paragraph below the table expressly refers to the "Survivor Annuity benefit amounts shown above." The absence in the table of any "Survivor Annuity benefit amounts shown above" is inconsistent with Petitioner having chosen a survivor annuity option. Thus, the paragraph below the table can only be reasonably read to mean that to the extent the employee has selected one of the different survivor annuity options on the first page of the form, the survivor annuity benefits amounts shown in the table apply to the particular beneficiary identified in the table. Accordingly, if no survivor annuity benefit amounts are "shown above"——i.e., set forth in the table ——that would indicate, and only be consistent with, the selection of a retirement option other than a survivor annuity. The undersigned also does not find plausible Petitioner's testimony that he did not receive or otherwise was not given copies of five crucial retirement-related documents—— four of which clearly informed him that he was enrolled in the life annuity——so that he was not timely informed of the need to correct a mistake in his retirement pension enrollment. That these documents were transmitted by different senders—— Respondent, Salem, and SDA——compounds that implausibility.10/ For these reasons, it is determined that Petitioner has not sustained his burden in this proceeding to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he has been erroneously classified as being enrolled in the Life Annuity, and that, pursuant to section 18-49(4) of the Code, he should be reclassified as being enrolled in the Last Survivor Annuity.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order denying Petitioner's request for reclassification of pension enrollment from Life Annuity to Last Survivor Annuity. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of September, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of September, 2018.
The Issue The central issue is whether the Petitioner is entitled to modify her deceased husband's retirement benefit option.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I make the following findings of fact. Petitioner is the surviving spouse of Lamar W. Whaley, Jr., deceased. From 1972 to 1990, Mr. Whaley was employed by the Hillsborough County Board of County Commissioners (Board) and as such was a member of the Florida Retirement System. Mr. Whaley retired from his position as a minibus driver with the Board on June 29, 1990. In anticipation of his retirement, Mr. Whaley filed an FR-9 Form with the Division of Retirement (Division). The FR-9 Form, entitled "Request for Audit," was signed by Mr. Whaley and dated November 6, 1989. The FR-9 Form is used by members of the Florida Retirement System who want estimates of the monthly payments which they will receive after they retire. The FR-9 Form provided a space where Mr. Whaley could list the name and birthdate of a joint annuitant. On the FR-9 Form, Mr. Whaley named the Petitioner and the Petitioner's birthdate in these spaces. On the line immediately after the spaces provided for name and birthdate of the joint annuitant, the FR-9 expressly states that "This is not an official beneficiary designation." By listing a joint annuitant and that individual's birthday on the FR-9 Form, the Division is able to calculate the monthly benefits that would be payable to a member under each of the four retirement options available. In response to Mr. Whaley's audit request, the Division calculated the amount of the monthly payments he and/or his survivor would receive under the four retirement options available. On or about November 22, 1989, the Division sent Mr. Whaley information which reflected an estimate of the monthly benefits he and/or his survivor would receive under each of the four retirement options from which he was eligible to select. Included with the estimate of retirement benefits sent to Mr. Whaley, was a document entitled, "What Retirement Option Should I Choose?". This information sheet listed sent to Mr. Whaley listed and described the four different options. In 1990, members of the Retirement System contemplating retirement were provided a Division Form FR-11, Florida Retirement System Application for Service Retirement (Application). The application listed the four different options and provided a brief description of each. Next to Option 1 was the following: "Benefit for the Member Only." A further notation on the application read, "SEE THE REVERSE SIDE FOR AN EXPLANATION OF THESE OPTIONS." The Application adequately described the consequences of the election of each option. The explanation read as follows: Option 1: A monthly benefit payable to you for your lifetime. This option does not provide continuing benefit to a beneficiary. Upon your death, the monthly benefit will stop and you beneficiary will receive only a refund of any contributions you paid which are in excess of the amount you received in benefits. If you wish to provide a beneficiary with a continued monthly benefit after your death, you should consider selecting one of the other three options. The option 1 benefit is the maximum form of lifetime payment and all other optional payments are derived by applying actuarial factors to the option 1 benefit. Option 2: A reduced monthly benefit payable to you for your lifetime. If you die before receiving 120 monthly benefit payments, your designated beneficiary will receive a monthly benefit payment in the same amount as you were receiving until the total monthly benefit payments to both you and your beneficiary equal 120 monthly payments. No further benefits are then payable. Option 3: A reduced monthly benefit payable to you for your lifetime. Upon your death, your joint annuitant (spouse or financial dependent), if living, will receive a lifetime monthly benefit payment in the same amount as you were receiving. No further benefits are payable after both you and your joint annuitant are deceased. Option 4: An adjusted monthly benefit payable to you while both you and your joint annuitant (spouse or financial dependent) are living. Upon the death of either you or your joint annuitant, the monthly benefit payable to the survivor is reduced to two- thirds of the monthly benefit you were receiving when both were living. No further benefits are payable after both you and your joint annuitant are deceased. (Emphasis in original text.) On January 12, 1990, Mr. Whaley executed an Application. The Application listed the Petitioner as beneficiary and indicated that the retirement option selected was Option 1. In selecting Option 1, Mr. Whaley rejected all other options. The fact that Petitioner was listed on the application as a beneficiary is of no consequence given that Mr. Whaley chose Option 1. An explanation on the back of the retirement application expressly states, "This option does not provide continuing benefit to a beneficiary." Because Mr. Whaley chose Option 1, Petitioner, as his beneficiary, would have been entitled only to a refund of Mr. Whaley's contributions in the event that Mr. Whaley's contribution exceeded the amount of monthly benefits paid to him before prior to his death. Petitioner did not assert, nor did the evidence establish that the refund provision in Option 1 applies in the instant case. Petitioner stated that Mr. Whaley could read and was not mentally impaired at the time he completed the retirement application, yet Petitioner testified that the agency did not explain to Mr. Whaley the benefits of the plan which he selected. According to the testimony of Stanley Colvin, administrator and supervisor of the Division's Survivor Benefits Section, staff members are available to provide counseling to members who come in or call with questions relative to their retirement. There is no record that Mr. Whaley ever contacted the Division with questions regarding the various options. The pastor of the church which Petitioner is a member testified that Mr. Whaley may have needed help to understand the ramifications of legal documents. Mr. Whaley's daughter also testified that her father may not have understood the retirement option he chose. Both the pastor and Mr. Whaley's daughter testified further that in conversations with Mr. Whaley, he had indicated to them that he had taken care of the legal work necessary to ensure that his was family was taken care of in the event of his death. Notwithstanding the testimony of Petitioner and others, there is no evidence that at the time Mr. Whaley selected Option 1 he did not fully understand the nature and effect of his selection. Neither does the evidence support the claim that the selection of Option 1 by Mr. Whaley was inconsistent with his desire or intention at the time the choice was made. At the time of Mr. Whaley's retirement, he was in good health. Given this fact it is not unusual that he selected the option that would provide him with the maximum monthly benefit. Statements by Mr. Whaley that he had taken care of matters and that "things were in order" do not provide substantial evidence that the selection of Option 1 by Mr. Whaley was made only because he did not fully understand the consequences of his choice. The testimony revealed that upon Mr. Whaley's death, the Petitioner was the beneficiary of his life insurance policy and also the recipient of benefits under his social security. Under these circumstances, Mr. Whaley's selection of Option 1 was not necessarily inconsistent with his statement that things "were in order" or his listing Petitioner as beneficiary on the Application. On several documents provided to and/or completed by Mr. Whaley, it was clearly stated that once a member begins to receive his benefit, the option selection cannot be changed. The information sheet, "What Retirement Option Should You Choose?," mailed to Mr. Whaley on or about November 22, 1989, contained the following provision: Option Choice Cannot Be Changed Once you begin to receive your benefit your option selection cannot be changed. Therefore, it is important to carefully study your personal circumstances before making your decision . . . . The Application submitted to the Division by Mr. Whaley on or about January 25, 1990, contained a statement that "[o]nce you retire, you cannot add additional service nor change options." Finally, the Acknowledgment of Retirement Application sent to Mr. Whaley by the Division on or about February 8, 1990, provided in relevant part the following: ONCE YOU RETIRE, YOU CANNOT ADD ADDITIONAL SERVICE OR CHANGE OPTIONS. RETIREMENT BECOMES FINAL WHEN ANY BENEFIT CHECK IS CASHED OR DEPOSITED! Mr. Whaley received his first retirement check on or about the last working day in July 1990. Petitioner testified that Mr. Whaley cashed this check in July or August of that same year. By cashing that check, Mr. Whaley was precluded from thereafter changing his retirement option. By selecting Option 1, Mr. Whaley received the maximum benefits payable to him during his lifetime. However, under the provisions of retirement Option 1, upon Mr. Whaley's death, his beneficiary, the Petitioner is not entitled to receive any benefits.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Division of Retirement enter a final order denying the request of Petitioner to modify the retirement benefits elected by Mr. Whaley, the deceased husband of Petitioner. RECOMMENDED this 1st day of August, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of August, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-0059 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat. (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1a-1c. Rejected as not being supported by competent and substantial evidence. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1-6. Accepted and incorporated herein. 7-8. Accepted. 9-11. Accepted and incorporated herein. COPIES FURNISHED: Gladys Whaley 3807 East Norfolk Street Tampa, Florida 33604 Robert B.Button, Esquire Division of Retirement Legal Office Cedars Executive Center-Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee Florida 32399-1560 A. J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Paul A. Rowell, Esquire General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 265 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
Findings Of Fact This case is an action for in-line-of-duty death benefits brought pursuant to Sections 120.57, 121.021(14), and 121.091(7), Florida Statutes. Carolyn W. Walker was the legal wife and is now the widow of Ronnie D. Walker, deceased. Carolyn W. Walker is the natural mother and legal guardian of Melanie L. Walker, age 9; Ronnie D. Walker, Jr., age 5; and Jason W. Walker, age 6 months; the minor children of Ronnie D. Walker, deceased. At the time of his death on December 4, 1976, and for the previous six years, Ronnie D. Walker was employed as a sergeant and deputy sheriff for the Leon County Sheriff's Department. Sgt. Walker was killed in an automobile/tank truck collision at the intersection of Woodville Highway and Oakridge Drive, Leon County, Florida. The location of the accident in which Sgt. Walker was killed was less than one mile from his residence on Oakridge Drive. Based upon the time his shift terminated and the location of the accident, Sgt. Walker had chosen the most direct route from the Leon County Jail to his residence. At the time of his death, Sgt. Walker was in full uniform and was armed. Sgt. Walker was a member of the Florida Retirement System at the time of his death and was entitled to the benefits provided for in Chapter 121, Florida Statutes. Carolyn W. Walker was the designated beneficiary of Ronnie D. Walker for death benefits payable under the provisions of Chapter 121, Florida Statutes. Subsequent to the death of her husband, Carolyn Walker made application to the Division of Retirement for in-line-of-duty death benefits, pursuant to Section 121.091(7)(c), Florida Statutes. All information, data and documentation required by the Division of Retirement was furnished by either Mrs. Walker or her attorneys. Deputies of the Leon County Sheriff's Department work a tour of duty known as a shift. The work day for the Leon County Sheriff's Department was at the time in question in this case divided into three shifts; 7:00 a.m. - 3:00 p.m., 3:00 p.m. - 11:00 p.m., 11:00 p.m. - 7:00 a.m. The deputies worked different shifts on a rotating basis, the times changing on a 28-day cycle. Sgt. Ronnie Walker worked the 11:00 p.m. - 7:00 a.m. shift on the evening of December 3, 1976 and morning of December 4, 1976. Sgt. Walker was the acting shift commander during this particular shift due to the absence of Lt. Ron Koenig, the regular shift commander. Therefore, in addition to his duties as a field deputy, Sgt. Walker assumed a supervisory role with responsibility for efficient operation of the evening shift on the tour of duty preceding his death. As part of his normal and routine duties, a shift commander or his replacement is responsible for initiating investigations of more serious incidents during his shift. It is not unusual for a shift commander's involvement in such investigations to extend well beyond the termination of the normal tour of duty, to include providing additional information needed as the investigation by the Sheriff's Department is continued. However, the responsibility for making routine investigations passes from the shift commander on duty when he is relieved by the oncoming shift commander. A shift ends when the shift commander checks in the field deputies from their patrol assignments and clears them from the Leon County. Once the field deputies have been cleared and relieved the shift commander is relieved. Deputies below the rank of shift commander, to include Sgt. Walker, were not assigned a sheriff's patrol car 24 hours a day. All shift commanders and above were assigned an official vehicle which they were required to use and have available at all times. Although the Leon County Sheriff at the time would have preferred to provide field deputies with patrol cars, field deputies had to furnish their own transportation to and from work due to lack of money. Field deputies would pick up their official vehicles at the Leon County Jail at the commencement of their tour of duty. Sgt. Walker, as deputy shift commander, was required to provide his own transportation to and from work, and at the time of his fatal accident was driving his personal vehicle. At the time of his death and for the preceding several years, Sgt. Walker and other deputies of the Leon County Sheriff's Department had been required by their employer, the sheriff of Leon County, to work many overtime hours in addition to the hours of their regularly scheduled formalized shifts. These additional hours of work were required by the sheriff due to the lack of money in the sheriff's budget to employ additional deputies. Neither Sgt. Walker nor the other deputies of the Leon County Sheriff's Department received regular compensatory pay or compensatory leave for these additional hours of work which they were required to perform. At the time of his death, having been cleared of his regular shift duties, Sgt. Walker was subject to performance of the following duties prescribed and required by his employer the sheriff of Leon County: Walker was required to be available by telephone 24 hours a day except when on leave. If Walker was not at his residence, he was required to advise the Leon County Sheriff's Office of a telephone number in which he could be reached. Sgt. Walker was required to enforce the laws of the State of Florida at all times with the exception established by the sheriff of Leon County that minor infractions which did not constitute a hazard to life or property or constitute a breach of the peace were not to be enforced. This policy was based upon a limited manpower of the sheriff's office and the existence of other law enforcement agencies specifically assigned the duty of traffic law enforcement and the enforcement of laws within the corporate city limits of municipalities within Leon County. In addition, Sgt. Walker was required to render assistance at any accident scene or other emergency situations in which he encountered at any time whether in uniform or in civilian clothes. Walker was required to carry his identification and a weapon at all times. Sgt. Walker was subject to recall to specifically assign duties at any time during the day. From observations of qualified individuals at the scene of the accident in which Sgt. Walker was killed, there was no indication tat the accident and death was the result of the enforcement of any law. At the time of his death, Walker was subject to the performance of all the duties enumerated in the paragraph above.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer RECOMMENDS: That the application of Carolyn W. Walker for death in-line-of duty benefits, based upon the death of he husband, Ronnie D. Walker, be approved and that she receive the death in-line-of-duty benefits payable under the provisions of Chapter 121, Florida Statutes. DONE and ENTERED this 8th day of November, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION DIVISION OF RETIREMENT CAROLYN W. WALKER, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 77-1463 STATE OF FLORIDA, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, Respondent. /
The Issue The primary issue in this case is whether Petitioner is entitled to receive an early retirement benefit pursuant to Sections 121.091(3)(b) and 121.091(7)(b), Florida Statutes, based on an effective retirement date of February 1, 1996.
Findings Of Fact Historical Facts When he passed away on January 26, 1996, at the age of 56, Roy Hoffman, Jr., was a fully vested participant in the Florida Retirement System ("FRS"), having worked as a professor at Florida Atlantic University for nearly 27 years. Professor Hoffman's named beneficiary and joint annuitant was his wife, Petitioner Jeanne Hoffman ("Hoffman"). As such, Hoffman became entitled, upon her husband's death, to receive a lifetime retirement benefit from the FRS. By letter dated March 8, 1996, Respondent Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement ("Division"), which administers the FRS, first notified Hoffman of her eligibility to receive a benefit. The letter provided in pertinent part as follows: As the designated beneficiary and joint annuitant, you are entitled to the Option 3 monthly retirement benefit. The Option 3 monthly benefit is payable for your lifetime and is estimated to be $1,812.58 effective February 1, 1996. To receive this benefit, you need to [submit an application and provide certain information.] If we may be of further assistance, please call us at (904)488-5207. After receiving this letter, Hoffman was uncertain about whether she should accept the benefit immediately or, alternatively, postpone the benefit commencement date until nearer her own retirement, so she called the Division for assistance. Following a telephone conversation with an FRS counselor, Hoffman was left with the impression that she would be better off waiting until she reached the age of 59.5 years to begin receiving the monthly benefit, for the benefit, she believed, would then be higher.1 The Division sent a second letter to Hoffman, which was dated April 26, 1996, and provided: Please refer to our letter dated March 8, 1996. Before we can finalize [your] account, we need [to receive] the following [items and information from you.] Hoffman did not respond to this letter. Four months later, the Division sent a third letter to Hoffman regarding her benefit eligibility. Dated August 28, 1996, this letter provided in relevant part as follows: We have not received a response from our letters dated March 8, 1996 and April 26, 1996. If we have not heard from you within thirty days of the date of this letter, the file will be placed on inactive status. It will then be your responsibility to contact us to apply for a monthly benefit. The benefit will be effective the first of the month following contact from you. By this "warning letter," the Division intended to communicate its decision that, unless Hoffman submitted an application for benefits on or before September 27, 1996, she would forfeit the right to receive an "early retirement-death benefit"2 based on an effective date of retirement ("EDR") closely tied to her husband's date of death and be deemed to have elected a "deferred monthly benefit"3 based on a post-mortem EDR tied to the Division's receipt of her application for benefits. (EDR is a critical date because that is when the benefit accrues. See § 121.021(41), Fla. Stat.4) The parties dispute whether, in fact, the warning letter reasonably notified Hoffman of the Division's decision; the issue will be taken up below. Hoffman did not take the warning letter to mean what the Division had intended to convey. Thus she had no idea that she was in jeopardy of forfeiting the right to an early retirement-death benefit. Further, she did not deliberately elect to forego receipt of an early retirement-death benefit in favor of a deferred monthly benefit. Rather, being unfamiliar with the details regarding benefits payable under the FRS, Hoffman believed that, without any present action on her part, the benefit to which she was entitled had begun upon her husband's death to accrue for her use and benefit and would continue to accumulate until she was ready to begin receiving the benefit in monthly installments. Consequently, Hoffman made no reply to the warning letter, and at some point after September 27, 1996, the Division placed her file on inactive status. For the next eight-and-a-half years, nothing relevant to this case occurred. Then, in January 2005, Hoffman met with a financial planner for advice concerning her retirement. She was 57 at the time and told the planner about the benefit she expected to receive in a couple of years as her late husband's joint annuitant. The financial planner recommended that she contact the Division straightaway. On January 31, 2005, Hoffman called the Division and was informed that, having failed to apply for an early retirement-death benefit by September 27, 1996, in accordance with the warning letter dated August 28, 1996, she had forfeited nine years' worth of retirement income, and that her only remaining option was to request a deferred monthly benefit based on an EDR of February 1, 2005, at the earliest. The Division followed this telephone conversation with a letter dated February 16, 2005, which made clear that the only benefit for which Hoffman could apply would commence no earlier than February 1, 2005. Being given no choice, Hoffman applied as instructed, with the result that the FRS began paying Hoffman approximately $2,011 per month, which it was continuing to do as of the final hearing. Thereafter, by letter dated March 1, 2005, Hoffman petitioned the Division to pay her a retirement benefit "retroactive" to February 1, 1996, the date which, had she applied for an early retirement-death benefit on or before September 27, 1996, would have been her husband's EDR, without controversy.5 The Division denied Hoffman's request, by letter dated March 15, 2005. Relying on Section 121.091, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 60S-4.0035, which will be examined below, the Division determined that it could not "pay benefits retroactive to 1996 because [Hoffman had] not compl[ied] with the Rule requiring that the application be filed timely." Hoffman requested a hearing on this determination, giving rise to DOAH Case No. 05-3200. Hoffman also petitioned the Division, pursuant to Section 120.542, Florida Statutes, to waive——or grant her a variance from——the provisions of Florida Administrative Code Rule 60S-4.0035(3)(c) upon which the Division intended to rely in rejecting her claim for an early retirement-death benefit. The Division denied Hoffman's petition for waiver or variance in an order dated August 15, 2005. Thereafter, Hoffman timely requested a hearing on the matter, which led to the commencement of DOAH Case No. 05-3679. Factual Analysis The parties sharply disagree about whether the Division reasonably notified Hoffman of the important decision (see paragraph 6, supra) that it made in late August 1996 respecting her eligibility to receive a benefit, which decision the Division intended to communicate to Hoffman via the warning letter. To recapitulate, the warning letter told Hoffman that if she failed to contact the Division by September 27, 1996, then (1) her file would become "inactive"; (2) it would be her responsibility to initiate further contact with the Division; and (3) her "benefit" would be "effective" starting the month after she contacted the Division. Yet, in fact, the Division had decided that if Hoffman did not contact the Division by September 27, 1996, then (1) she would forfeit the right to receive an early retirement-death benefit based on an EDR closely proximate to her husband's date of death; (2) the Division would treat her inaction as an affirmative election to receive a deferred monthly benefit; and (3) her benefit would be based on an EDR related to the Division's receipt of her application for benefits. It is striking, in reading the warning letter from the standpoint of a reasonable recipient, that no mention was made therein of the different types of benefits available to a surviving spouse, no explanation regarding the distinction between an early retirement-death benefit and a deferred monthly benefit was given, and no information concerning a beneficiary's right to elect the latter as an alternative to the former——much less why one might do so——was imparted. (The same can also be said of the two letters that preceded the warning letter.) It is striking, too, that neither the warning letter nor the two earlier ones mentioned EDR or its significance. Instead, the warning letter spoke of an effective date of "benefit," which, at least without more information than was contained in the letter, could be understood to refer to the date on which the benefit payments would commence as opposed to when benefits would start to accrue. The undersigned finds, therefore, that, as a matter of fact, the warning letter itself did not reasonably communicate that Hoffman was at risk of forfeiting the early retirement- death benefit and being deemed to have elected a deferred monthly benefit based on a future EDR to be determined. Put another way, although the warning letter clearly established a deadline (September 27, 1996) for making contact with the Division, its description of the consequences of letting the deadline pass without contacting the Division did not fairly match the consequences the Division actually had decided would follow such inaction. Of course, as the Division points out, the warning letter was not the only source of information about retirement benefits available to Hoffman. There were, in addition, the governing statutes and rules. Hoffman did not actually avail herself of these references, but, as the Division argues, she is presumed to know the contents of the applicable laws.6 Perhaps, armed with such knowledge, she would have——and hence should have——understood what the Division was trying to tell her in the warning letter. If Hoffman had consulted the relevant statutes, she would have learned that she was entitled to receive an early retirement benefit pursuant to Section 121.091(3), Florida Statutes, which provides as follows: EARLY RETIREMENT BENEFIT.--Upon retirement on his or her early retirement date, the member shall receive an immediate monthly benefit that shall begin to accrue on the first day of the month of the retirement date and be payable on the last day of that month and each month thereafter during his or her lifetime. Such benefit shall be calculated as follows: * * * (b) If the employment of a member is terminated by reason of death subsequent to the completion of 20 years of creditable service, the monthly benefit payable to the member's beneficiary shall be calculated in accordance with subsection (1), but shall be based on average monthly compensation and creditable service as of the date of death. The benefit so computed shall be reduced by five-twelfths of 1 percent for each complete month by which death precedes the normal retirement date specified above or the date on which the member would have attained 30 years of creditable service had he or she survived and continued his or her employment, whichever provides a higher benefit. There is no dispute that Hoffman was entitled to an early retirement benefit under Section 121.091(3)(b) when her husband's employment was terminated by reason of death after completing nearly 27 years of creditable service. The parties agree as well that, by the clear and unambiguous terms of the statute, the benefit would have been reduced by five percent per year for each of the approximately three years by which Professor Hoffman's death preceded the date on which he would have attained 30 years of creditable service. See also Fla. Admin. Code R. 60S-4.005(2)(c)(describing benefits payable upon early retirement brought about by death). If Hoffman had read Section 121.091(7)(b), Florida Statutes, she would have learned the following: If the employment of an active member who may or may not have applied for retirement is terminated by reason of his or her death subsequent to becoming vested and prior to his or her effective date of retirement, if established, it shall be assumed that the member retired as of the date of death in accordance with subsection (1) if eligible for normal retirement benefits, subsection (2) if eligible for benefits payable for dual normal retirement, or subsection (3) if eligible for early retirement benefits. Benefits payable to the designated beneficiary shall be as follows: 1. For a beneficiary who qualifies as a joint annuitant, the optional form of payment provided in accordance with [option 3] shall be paid for the joint annuitant's lifetime. Clearly, under the plain language of Section 121.091(7)(b), Hoffman was entitled to receive death benefits in the form of an early retirement benefit, for which latter her husband was eligible at the time of his death. As just mentioned, however, Professor Hoffman satisfied the conditions set forth in Section 121.091(3)(b) for an early retirement benefit, payable to his beneficiary, without reference to Section 121.091(7)(b). Moreover, because Professor Hoffman was, at the time of his death, closer to attaining 30 years' service than reaching age 62, Hoffman's early retirement benefit would be highest if calculated under Section 121.091(3)(b). Nevertheless, as Section 121.091(7)(b) is not inconsistent with Section 121.091(3)(b), there is no reason to treat them as mutually exclusive. Thus, bowing to the interrelatedness of these statutes——Section 121.091(3)(b)(early retirement benefits upon termination of employment by death) and Section 121.091(7)(b)(death benefits)——the undersigned has chosen to use the term "early retirement-death benefit" to refer to that benefit, available thereunder, which is based on an EDR in close proximity to the member's death. As an alternative to the early retirement-death benefit, Section 121.091(7) makes available to beneficiaries such as Hoffman another option, namely the "deferred monthly benefit." Had Hoffman studied the statute, she would have discovered that [t]he designated beneficiary who is the surviving spouse or other dependent of a member whose employment is terminated by death subsequent to becoming vested, but prior to actual retirement, may elect to receive a deferred monthly benefit as if the member had lived and had elected a deferred monthly benefit, as provided in paragraph (5)(b), calculated on the basis of the average final compensation and creditable service of the member at his or her death and the age the member would have attained on the commencement date of the deferred benefit elected by the beneficiary, paid in accordance with option 3 of paragraph (6)(a). § 121.091(7)(h); see also Fla. Admin. Code. R. 60S-4.008(2)(b). The deferred monthly benefit allows a surviving spouse to postpone the deceased member's EDR, thereby reducing or eliminating the early retirement penalty of five percent per annum for each year the EDR precedes the member's normal retirement date.7 Postponing the EDR would make sense, most obviously, when, because of the number of years between the member's date of death and his or her normal retirement date, the survivor's early retirement-death benefit would be substantially consumed by the penalty. Because Professor Hoffman met the criteria for an early retirement benefit under Section 121.091(3)(b), however, his wife's benefit was subject to a relatively light penalty. Thus, it is unlikely that Hoffman intentionally would have made an election under Section 121.091(7)(h) for a deferred monthly benefit, had she been aware of the statute. The Division has promulgated a rule that specifies how the EDR will be determined in certain circumstances. Rule 60S- 4.0035(3)(c) was available to inform Hoffman as follows: For a member who dies prior to an effective retirement date established pursuant to paragraph (a) or (b), the effective retirement date shall be the first day of the month following the month in which the member died, provided the joint annuitant makes timely application for benefits; or, for a deferred monthly benefit, the first day of the month following the month in which the Division receives the joint annuitant's application for benefits, or the first day of a later month specified by the joint annuitant. Significantly, the Division has not established by rule a method of determining whether an application is "timely" for purposes of Rule 60S-4.0035(3)(c). Rather, it determines timeliness on a case-by-case basis. Had Hoffman been aware of Rule 60S-4.0035(3)(c), she might have surmised, upon reading the warning letter, that the Division had decided that her application for benefits would be "timely," for purposes of the Rule, only if received on or before September 27, 1996. She might also have reasoned that if her application were untimely, then the applicable EDR might not be February 1, 1996 (i.e. the first day of the month following the month in which her husband had died). At that point, she might have concluded that unless her application were received by September 27, 1996, she would forfeit the early retirement- death benefit, as the Division would deem her delay an election to receive a deferred monthly benefit. Maybe Hoffman would have connected all these dots. The undersigned finds, however, as a matter of fact, that a reasonable person could not have figured out what the Division had decided and what it intended to do, even if armed with the statutes and rules, because ascertaining the true nature of the Division's determination entails more analytical, indeed legal, reasoning than an ordinary layperson should be expected to employ. In fact, it is determined, the warning letter was inadequate to put even a well-informed person, cognizant of the applicable laws, on notice of the Division's decision regarding Hoffman's potential forfeiture of the early-retirement death benefit and "deemed election" of the deferred monthly benefit. While the warning letter was deficient in that it failed reasonably to tell Hoffman what the Division actually had determined with regard to her substantial interests, it was defective in yet another consequential way: the warning letter failed to notify Hoffman of her right to request a hearing to determine the substantial interests affected by the Division's establishment of an application deadline and the consequences of noncompliance therewith. The warning letter, in other words, did not afford Hoffman a clear point of entry into an adversarial proceeding, where the Division would be required to substantiate its determination with competent substantial evidence.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division enter a final order determining that Hoffman shall receive an early retirement-death benefit based on an EDR of February 1, 1996, and establishing the form in which Hoffman shall be paid the benefits that have accrued, but not been paid, from the EDR to the present, as well as the benefit going forward.10 In the event that one or more factual disputes arise over the amount of the unpaid accrued benefits or the method of paying them, the amount or form of the benefit going forward, or some combination of these, then Hoffman should be afforded the right to request a hearing to determine the disputed issue(s).11 DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of January, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of January, 2006.
The Issue The issue is whether the Petitioner, Thelma H. Dampier, is entitled to consideration of her second application for disability retirement benefits based on the submission of new medical information.
Findings Of Fact Thelma H. Dampier was a member of the Florida Retirement System (FRS), Chapter 121, Florida Statutes, and had more than ten years of creditable service. She terminated her employment in August, 1988. In October, 1988, Ms. Dampier applied for in-line-of-duty disability retirement under FRS. By its final action letter received by Ms. Dampier on July 27, 1989, the Division denied her application for disability benefits. Under the applicable procedural rules, Ms. Dampier had 21 days to file a petition for an administrative hearing before the State Retirement Commission. She failed to request a hearing on the denial of benefits and her right to a hearing ceased. On September 8, 1990, Ms. Dampier filed a second application for in- line-of-duty disability retirement benefits. The application included medical records from Doctors Evans, Andrews, Barrow, and Chance. The medical records of Doctors Evans and Andrews had been submitted with and considered in connection to the first application. The medical records of Doctors Chance and Barrow were submitted for the first time with the second application. The report of Dr. Barrow opines that Ms. Dampier is permanently and totally disabled, but it does not reflect her condition at the time she terminated employment or any connection between her condition and her employment. The report of Dr. Chance, a chiropractic physician, relates to neck, shoulder and lower back pain. The report does not state that Ms. Dampier is totally and permanently disabled. Instead, it states that Ms. Dampier suffers only mild degenerative changes. It also does not relate that opinion to the date on which her employment terminated. The Division has a policy set forth in a Memorandum for Record dated July 17, 1990, regarding handling of reapplications for disability benefits. The policy specifies that reapplications will be considered "only when the member presents information of the existence of a medical condition that existed prior to termination of employment--unknown at the time of the initial application." This policy is reasonable and consistent with the Chapter 121.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that The Division of Retirement enter a Final Order denying consideration of Thelma H. Dampier's second application for in-line-of-duty disability benefits. DONE and ENTERED this 11th day of June, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division ofAdministrative Hearings this 11th day of June, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the proposed findings of fact submitted in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner, Division of Retirement Each of the following proposed findings of fact is adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1(1); 2(2); 3(3); and 4(4). Proposed findings of fact 5 and 6 are subordinate to the facts actually found in this Recommended Order. Proposed finding of fact 7 is repetitive and unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Thelma H. Dampier Post Office Box 342 Melrose, FL 32666 Stanley M. Danek Division Attorney Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street Building C Tallahassee, FL 32399 A. J. McMullian III, Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street Building C Tallahassee, FL 32399 John A. Pieno, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner’s husband’s selection of Option 1 for his pension plan benefits could be changed.
Findings Of Fact Mrs. Renaud, who is deaf, was married to Mr. Renaud for approximately 40 years. Mr. Renaud was employed by the State of Florida as a correctional officer at all times relevant hereto. He entered the State retirement program (in the pension plan) in November 1994. Mr. Renaud was in the “special risk” category of retirement class based on his position as a correctional officer. On October 24, 2013, Mr. Renaud signed and submitted a “Florida Retirement System Pension Plan Application for Service Retirement” form to the Department, indicating his intent to retire. The application was signed and notarized; it designated Mrs. Renaud as the sole beneficiary of his retirement benefits. On the same day, Mr. Renaud signed an “Option Selection” form, wherein he designated which of four payment options he wanted to utilize for payment of his retirement income. He selected Option 1, which states: A monthly benefit payable for my lifetime. Upon my death the monthly benefit will stop and my beneficiary will receive only a refund of any contributions I have paid which are in excess of the amount I have received in benefits. This option does not provide a continuing benefit to my beneficiary. The form also contains the following statement: “I understand that I must terminate all employment with FRS employers to receive a retirement benefit under Chapter 121, Florida Statutes. I also understand that I cannot add service, change options or change my type of retirement . . . once my retirement becomes final. My retirement becomes final when any benefit payment is cashed, deposited or when my Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) participation begins.” The option selection form was signed by Mr. Renaud and notarized by a certified notary public. Inasmuch as Mr. Renaud selected Option 1, it was necessary that he and his designated beneficiary (Mrs. Renaud) also fill out form SA-1, the “Spousal Acknowledgement” form. On the acknowledgement form, Mr. Renaud indicated that he was married. Mrs. Renaud then signed the “spousal acknowledgement” portion of the form. The acknowledgement statement included this statement: “I, Vivian Renaud, being the spouse of the above named member [Mr. Renaud], acknowledge that the member has selected either Option 1 or 2.” Option 2 provides for continued benefits during the retiring person’s lifetime. However, benefits to the person’s spouse will continue for only a 10-year period. If the retiring person dies within the first 10 years of retirement, the spouse would only receive benefits for the balance of the 10-year period starting at the retirement date. The benefits under Option 2 are, therefore, limited in nature. The state retirement system requires a person selecting Option 1 or Option 2 to have their spouse acknowledge that selection choice because those benefits have finite ending dates, whereas retirement benefits under the other options continue as long as either the retiree or his/her beneficiary is living. By letter dated October 30, 2013, the Department acknowledged receipt of Mr. Renaud’s retirement application. The letter referenced the date the application was received (October 24, 2013) and the option Mr. Renaud had selected (Option 1). The letter was mailed to Mr. Renaud’s address of record, the same address he listed in his retirement application. The letter was sent to Mr. Renaud some 30 days before the first retirement benefit check was deposited in his account. Mrs. Renaud does not remember seeing the letter, but inasmuch as it was addressed to Mr. Renaud, her recollection of its receipt is not relevant. After Mr. Renaud’s death, his family found numerous un-opened letters in his car; the acknowledgement letter from the Department could well have been in that group. Mr. Renaud retired on November 1, 2013. His first payment of retirement benefits was transferred to his bank by way of electronic fund transfer, commonly referred to as direct deposit, on November 27, 2013. The gross amount of his monthly retirement benefit was $1,987.85; the net amount was $1,937.75 after $30.09 had been deducted for taxes. At that time, Mr. Renaud had not signed form W4P, the form which showed how many dependents the retiree was claiming for tax purposes. After later filling out that form (in which he indicated he would prefer to file as “single” for tax purposes), his monthly net benefit was reduced to about $1,735. Mr. Renaud received a direct deposit of retirement benefits on December 31, 2013; on January 31, 2014; and again on February 28, 2014. Mr. Renaud passed away on March 26, 2014, only five months after commencing his retirement. In accordance with the provisions of Option 1, Mr. Renaud’s retirement benefits ceased at that time. His beneficiary was entitled to payment for the entire month that he expired, but was not to be provided any further retirement benefits. Thus, a final payment was deposited in Mr. Renaud’s account on March 31, 2014. Mrs. Renaud was provided notice of the cessation of retirement benefits due to Mr. Renaud’s death. She timely filed a protest, seeking to have the payment of benefits reinstated. The Department denied her request, resulting in the instant matter. It is clear from the evidence that Mr. Renaud selected Option 1, Mrs. Renaud acknowledged that Mr. Renaud had selected either Option 1 or Option 2, and that retirement benefits were directly deposited to Mr. Renaud’s bank account for several months. Mr. and Mrs. Renaud’s signatures were duly notarized and have a presumption of legitimacy. Mrs. Renaud disagrees as to whether Mr. Renaud’s selection of Option 1 was legitimate, legal, or proper under the circumstances as she views them. First, Mrs. Renaud contends that Mr. Renaud was not mentally well at the time he signed the option selection form. The basis for her contention is that Mr. Renaud had experienced some seizure-related behavior during the year prior to signing the form. He had driven his car north on US Highway 301 one day in July 2012, “heading to work,” but ended up in Georgia without remembering why or how he got there. He later apparently lost his driver’s license because of the seizures (although the testimony on that issue was not clear).1/ Mr. Renaud worked for approximately 15 more months after his inexplicable drive to Georgia. Mrs. Renaud also argued that Mr. Renaud’s signatures on the three different forms he signed on October 24, 2013, were not similar to each other, indicating in her mind that he was having some sort of medical or psychological difficulty at that time. Inasmuch as there could have been any number of reasons the signatures were different (whether he was in a hurry, what base existed under the paperwork, etc.), there is insufficient evidence to determine why the signatures did not match. Mrs. Renaud’s testimony regarding the signatures is not persuasive. Ed Renaud said Mr. Renaud had been forced to retire due to his medical condition, i.e., that he had lost his driver’s license due to having seizures and the Department of Corrections would not let him work if he could not drive. However, Ed Renaud also said Mr. Renaud was able to continue working even when he was “forced” to retire. Again, the testimony on these facts was not clear. Mrs. Renaud said she should have been provided an interpreter on the day she signed the acknowledgement form. She did not state whether she requested an interpreter or whether the agency employee who provided her the form was aware of her disability.2/ Again, no one from Mr. Renaud’s employer, the Department of Corrections, testified at final hearing as to what happened on the day the forms were signed. Mrs. Renaud stated that she could read and write English, so she knew what she was signing.3/ She did claim to be confused as to whether her husband had selected Option 1 or Option 2, but candidly admitted that Mr. Renaud never told her one way or the other which option he had chosen. He only told her that he would “continue to provide for her in the future.” She believed the amount which was to be deposited in their account each month under Option 2 would be approximately $1900. The first check was in that approximate amount (due to the fact that Mr. Renaud had not established the amount of taxes to be deducted from his check at that time). The next five checks were in a lesser amount, approximately $1700. There is no evidence that Mrs. Renaud questioned the amount of the later checks. However, once the first check had been deposited in Mr. Renaud’s bank account, he would not have been allowed to change his option anyway. Lastly, Mrs. Renaud said her husband’s medical and mental condition was not conducive to making the option selection in October 2013. However, there was no competent evidence to support her claim. There was no direct testimony as to Mr. Renaud’s condition on the day he signed, nor as to whether he was or was not capable of understanding what he was signing. The only statement about his condition that day was that he wanted to park the car far enough away from the building that his co-workers could not see that Mrs. Renaud had driven the car. Ed Renaud also pointed out the issue of Mr. Renaud’s three signatures that day looking different from each other, but his lay opinion is not evidence upon which a finding of fact can be made as to Mr. Renaud’s mental condition. On October 24, 2013, Mr. Renaud had not been adjudged mentally incapacitated and no guardian had been appointed. Ed Renaud said that Mr. Renaud still believed he could perform his work assignments at that time and did not want to retire. But, other than his wife, no one provided any evidence that Mr. Renaud did not understand what he was signing. Mrs. Renaud, however, could not say which option he had selected because he never told her. Her subsequent presumption that Mr. Renaud did not intend to choose Option 1 is not persuasive. It should be noted that selection of Option 1 by Mr. Renaud set his average pre-tax monthly benefit at around $1,900.00; had he chosen Option 2, the benefit would have been around $1,700. Thus, there was incentive to “roll the dice” and select Option 1, hoping that he would survive long enough to provide for his wife. In this case, sadly, that gamble did not pay off. The facts of this case are sad in that Mr. Renaud had every intention of providing for his wife financially as long as she lived. However, he either made a mistake when he selected his payment option or he attempted to tempt fate and hope for the best. In either case, once he made his selection and began receiving benefits, the die was cast. Based upon the facts as presented, there is no basis for overturning the Department’s denial of Mrs. Renaud’s requested amendment of the payment option.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Management Services denying Petitioner's request for entitlement to her husband’s retirement benefits following his untimely death. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of June, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of June, 2015.
The Issue Whether Petitioner's retirement benefits should be suspended pursuant to Section 121.091(9)(c) , Florida Statutes. Petitioner appeared at the hearing unaccompanied by counsel or other representative. His rights in administrative proceedings conducted pursuant to Chanter 120, F.S., were explained to him and he elected to represent himself in the matter.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Theron J. Owen was employed by the Department of Transportation, State of Florida, for a period of 13 years, and made contributions under the applicable retirement system during that period. On March 1, 1977, at the age of 56, he retired under the Florida Retirement System, Chapter 121, Florida Statutes, with a monthly benefit of $88.79. (Testimony of Petitioner, Respondent's Exhibit 1) Petitioner was reemployed by the Department of General Services as a security guard at the State Office Building in Winter Park, Florida, on Nay 19, 1978. In December, 1978, Respondent received from Petitioner an executed Form FR23 "Application of Retiree for Suspension of Retirement Benefit and Return to Service" wherein he advised the Director of Retirement of his employment with the Department of General Services and that he had reached 500 hours of reemployment on August 15, 1978. Petitioner previously had provided verbal notice of his reemployment to Respondent in November, 1978. (Respondent's Exhibits 1-2) Petitioner's retirement benefits were suspended by Respondent in November, 1978, pursuant to Section 121.091(9) Statutes. However, December, benefit was inadvertently paid to Petitioner. During the period August- December, 1978, Respondent received $314.70 in retirement benefits. (Respondent's Exhibit 1, Stipulation of Parties) Petitioner elected to take "early" retirement, but obtained reemployment with the state for financial reasons. He acknowledges his indebtedness to the state, but has been unable to obtain a loan to repay the overnayments. He has not received retirement benefits during 1979. He is of the opinion that the statutory provision which limits a retired state employee to state benefits only during the first 500 hours of reemployment with the state shows a punitive intent on the part of the legislature to prevent retired personnel from returning to gainful state employment. During his one-year tenure with the Department of General Services, he has been promoted and received an "above-satisfactory" performance rating. (Testimony of Petitioner, Petitioner's Exhibit 1)
Recommendation That Respondent suspend payment of retirement benefits to Petitioner until restitution has been made of excess benefits paid in the amount of $314.70, plus accrued interest at 10 percent compounded annually from date of receipt of such excess benefits until date of repayment. DONE and ENTERED this 29th day of June, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Theron J. Owen 818 San Juan Boulevard Orlando, Florida 32807 L. Keith Pafford, Esquire Division Attorney Division of Retirement Department of Administration Cedars Executive Center2639 North Monroe Street Suite 207C, Box 81 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
