Findings Of Fact On August 19, 1986, Petitioner was licensed as a chiropractor in the State of Florida and was issued license number CH0005434. When Petitioner's chiropractic practice subsequently became insolvent, he considered other possibilities for employment whereby he could use his skills and yet occupy a salaried position. One of the possibilities he considered was becoming a rehabilitation service provider. He contacted the Division of Workers' Compensation of the Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security and discussed with Paul Lincolnhol the requirements for such employment. Lincolnhol specifically told Petitioner, and Petitioner fully understood, that Petitioner could not be licensed as a chiropractor since Section 440.49(1)(b)4.c, Florida Statutes, specifically prohibited licensed chiropractors from being employed as rehabilitation service providers. On November 15, 1990, Petitioner personally appeared at the office of the Board of Chiropractic. He advised an employee as to what he wanted and was told to put his request in writing. On a blank sheet of paper Petitioner wrote the following letter: On this day of 11/15/90, I Philip Whitebook am relinquishing my Florida State license #CH 000 5434 to practice Chiropractic. I am asking you to take back this license and revoke all privelages [sic] associated with it. Petitioner signed that letter and gave it to a Board employee. That employee, pursuant to Petitioner's further request, prepared a letter directed to Paul Lincolnhol. That letter contained a copy of Petitioner's license which reflected an expiration date of December 31, 1991. The letter read as follows: This will advise that Dr. Philip Whitebook (CH 0005434) has voluntarily relinquished his Florida State Chiropractic license effective on this day of November 15, 1990. Petitioner was provided with a copy of the letter to Lincolnhol. By letter dated January 25, 1991, Petitioner was approved by the Division of Workers' Compensation, Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security, as a rehabilitation service provider and was assigned provider number XI0003924. In July of 1992, Petitioner renewed his rehabilitation service provider license which extended the expiration date of that license until June 30, 1994. At some point, the information in the computer of the Florida Department of Professional Regulation, now known as the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, was changed to reflect that Petitioner's license had been placed in a category called "involuntary inactive." On April 9, 1992, the Board sent a notice to Petitioner at his last known address informing him that his chiropractic license had not been renewed as of December 31, 1991, and had therefore automatically expired. That notice further advised Petitioner that if he did not complete the steps necessary to reinstate his license by June 30, 1992, his Florida chiropractic license would become null and void. Petitioner did not receive that letter since the address shown in the Board's records was no longer Petitioner's current address. In October of 1992, a friend of Petitioner who was also a chiropractor, moved to Florida. Petitioner and his friend decided that they would open a chiropractic practice together. On November 7, 1992, Petitioner contacted the Board requesting that his "inactive" license be "reinstated." That was the first contact Petitioner had with the Board after November 15, 1990. By letter dated January 20, 1993, the Board advised Petitioner that his license could not be reinstated since it was null and void by operation of law, pursuant to Section 460.407, Florida Statutes. That letter further advised Petitioner that his recourse was to reapply for licensure and pass the examination. By letter dated February 3, 1993, Petitioner wrote to the Division of Workers' Compensation advising that he was no longer employed as a rehabilitation service provider and was attempting to reactivate his license to practice chiropractic. Although the letter does not so indicate, Petitioner testified that he enclosed his rehabilitation service provider license with the letter, thereby returning his license to the Department of Labor and Employment Security at that time.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying Petitioner's request to have his chiropractic license reinstated. DONE and ENTERED this 23rd day of May 1994, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of May 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NO. 93-6556 Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-5 and 7-13 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondent's proposed finding of fact numbered 6 has been rejected as not constituting a finding of fact but rather as constituting a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Philip B. Whitebook, D.C. Post Office Box 15314 Plantation, Florida 33318-5314 Allen R. Grossman, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Office of Attorney General PL-01, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Diane Orcutt, Executive Director Department of Business and Professional Regulation Board of Chiropractic Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0752 Jack McRay, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0752
Findings Of Fact In July, 1988, the Petitioner applied for renewal of dual annual licenses to operate both an alcoholism prevention and treatment program (APT) and a drug abuse treatment and prevention program (DATAP). On July 26, 1988, a representative of the Department, Aixa Reyes-Wajsman, made a site visit to Petitioner's facility to determine whether Petitioner was complying with the provisions of the Florida Administrative Code for the operation of an alcoholism prevention and treatment program (APT) and a drug abuse treatment and prevention program. The Department's representative found that the Petitioner was in violation of several administrative regulations, but the Petitioner took steps to comply with the regulations, and the Department renewed the Petitioner's regular annual DATAP license and regular annual APT license, authorizing the Petitioner to operate those programs through July 30, 1989. On June 27, 1989, a Department representative, Lorenzo Thomas, made a site visit to the Petitioner's facility to determine whether or not Petitioner was complying with regulations for the operation of an APT program. (The Petitioner requested renewal of the APT license only, not the DATAP license.) At the time, the Petitioner, primarily a small human development counseling service, had only two APT clients. By the time Mr. Thomas returned with his supervisor, Gail Potter, for a second site visit on July 27, 1989, the Petitioner had one additional APT client, who had just been accepted as a client. Although the Petitioner's client files included forms which would have allowed for the inclusion of initial and individualized treatment plans which identified target dates for completion of goals identified in the client's plan, the Petitioner did not utilize the forms so as to adequately describe the treatment plan or identify target dates. The Petitioner's client files did include progress notes. But the progress notes were incomplete and disorganized, some consisting of cryptic notes on pieces of scrap paper loose in the files, and did not adequately relate the progress of each client in accordance with the individual treatment plan. The Petitioner took the position that the notes were sketchy so as not to reveal client confidences in the event the records were required to be disclosed pursuant to a subpoena. One of the Petitioner's client files--the file on the new, third client--did not include a psychosocial assessment. The other two client files did include a partially completed psychosocial assessment, but neither was signed, credentialed and dated by the treating counselor. Since there had been no request for the release of client information on the Petitioner's three APT clients, there was no reason for the Petitioner's client files to include a client consent form for the release of confidential information. (The blank forms that the Petitioner had available for use in the event of a request for client information did not include a time limit for the release of such information.) The Petitioner's client files did not include evidence of the development and utilization of admission and discharge criteria or standards. The Petitioner distributed to its APT clients an information sheet upon admission, but the information sheet did not include admission criteria. The Petitioner also had available a questionnaire for new clients to complete. But the questionnaire was not used for the clients the Petitioner had at that time and, besides, did not indicate how the Petitioner would score, or evaluate, the client's answers. Based on the June 27 and July 27, 1989, site visits, HRS issued to the Petitioner an interim APT license from August 1, 1989, to October 29, 1989, instead of a regular annual APT license.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Respondent, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, enter a final order affirming the Department's action in issuing to the Petitioner an interim alcoholism prevention and treatment program license instead of a regular license. DONE and ENTERED this 3rd day of April, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of April, 1990.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Jeffrey Goldpaint, is a disabled individual as determined by the Social Security Administration and has received funds through the Social Security system for his disability, administered by the Respondent's vocational rehabilitation program. His disability is of a psychiatric nature. During and before 1976, he was enrolled in a journalism curriculum, funding for which was provided by the Respondent. In 1976, the Petitioner elected to withdraw from the program, the reason for which withdrawal is not clear, although the Petitioner remonstrated that it was unavoidable, due to illness. In any event, after negotiation with the Respondent, the Petitioner obtained additional funding from the Respondent, as administrator of the federal program for vocational rehabilitation contained in Title 34, Code of Federal Regulations, Section 361, for additional rehabilitation training. Pursuant to this second rehabilitation effort, the Petitioner successfully completed training to be a real estate salesman, passed his examination and was licensed. As a part of that rehabilitation effort, the Respondent made available to the Petitioner employment placement assistance in order to help ensure that the petitioner would obtain employment in the real estate sales field. The Petitioner refused to respond and participate in the Respondent's job placement efforts for him and ultimately sought additional funding for a third course of study from the Respondent in the area of computer science, the denial of which instigated this proceeding. The Petitioner's motivation in seeking entitlement to the subject course of study in computer science lies in his belief that, because be is disabled and because of the moribund state of the real estate market in his geographical area, that he has a right to additional vocational training. The Respondent established, however, that the Petitioner is now employable as a real estate salesman. There is a substantial likelihood of his placement in an employment position in -that field of endeavor. It was not established that his disability is a hindrance or handicap to his employability in view of his past successfully completed vocational rehabilitation training and education. The Petitioner's voluntary decision to ignore the employment placement assistance afforded him by the Respondent was the direct and proximate cause of his lack of employment in his previously chosen career field at the time of the hearing. His request to be paid for enrollment in a course of study in computer science was motivated by a subjective and personal change in his career goals and not because his disability posed any handicap to his employability as a real estate salesman. It was established by the Respondent that the Petitioner could be successfully employed in a real estate career, especially had he availed himself of the employment placement assistance offered by the Respondent.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence in the record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED: That the petition of Jeffrey Goldpaint be DENIED. DONE and ENTERED this 8th day of April, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of April, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Jeffrey Goldpaint 1152 18th Ave., North Apartment #7 Lake Worth, Florida 33460 K. C Collette, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 111 Georgia Avenue West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 David H. Pingree, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The ultimate issue in this case is whether Janna Preissig is eligible for vocational rehabilitation benefits for which she has applied on three separate occasions. 1/ Ms. Preissig contends that she is eligible. The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (hereinafter "the Department" or "DHRS") contends that Ms. Preissig is ineligible on the grounds that vocational rehabilitation services may not reasonably be expected to render Ms. Preissig fit to engage in a gainful occupation.
Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulations of the parties, the exhibits admitted into evidence, and the testimony of the witnesses at hearing, I make the following finds of fact: The Petitioner, Ms. Janna Preissig, most recently applied for vocational rehabilitation services on January 17, 1984. Ms. Preissig applied for such benefits twice before, once in 1982 and once in 1983. Both of her prior applications were denied. Ms. Preissig is a 32-year-old, single, white, female with a long history of unsuccessful efforts at employment corresponding to a long history of mental problems. Her only period of regular employment was a three and one-half year period during which she was in the U.S. Army working as a supply clerk. She has obtained numerous other jobs from time to time, but is always fired after a short period of time due to her mental condition. Since childhood Ms. Preissig has suffered from severe mental problems. As early as age thirteen she was hospitalized for psychiatric problems for approximately one year. During the hospitalization she was subjected to at least 20 electrical shock treatments. She believes that some of her current problems are the result of the electrical shock treatments. Ms. Preissig has a long history of both inpatient and outpatient treatment for psychiatric disorders since her initial hospitalization at age thirteen. In addition to her difficulties in retaining employment, Ms. Preissig also has difficulties with social adjustment. She has a long history of vagrancy. Ms. Preissig has a long history of being uncooperative with treatment plans. She has been discharged from inpatient treatment because of disruptive conduct which interfered with the treatment of other patients. She has been suspended from outpatient treatment programs for breaking rules. She has a poor attendance record at outpatient treatment programs. She also has a negative attitude towards the treatment programs she has been exposed to and does not believe she is likely to receive any benefit from the treatment programs which have been recommended for her. Due to the nature of Ms. Preissig's mental condition and her uncooperative attitude towards the treatment which has been recommended for her and made available to her, the prognosis for significant improvement in her present condition is poor. Her present condition was summarized as follows by Dr. Michael C. Berg: She is at present, and previously, quite unable to hold gainful employment because of the presence of severe mental impairment, paranoia, which is long-standing and with a poor prognosis. Not only is she unemployable, but she lacks the basic living and social skills necessary for an independent life without some supervision, structure, and assistance with accommodation. This condition will not, in my opinion, significantly improve over the next 12 months. As a result of Ms. Preissig's current mental condition, which is not expected to improve over the next twelve months (and which may last much longer if she fails to cooperate with the treatment program), she is not fit to engage in a gainful occupation. Further, because of Ms. Preissig's current mental condition, vocational rehabilitation services would not render her fit to engage in a gainful occupation. The sine qua non to her ability to engage in a gainful occupation is some significant improvement in her current mental condition.
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing, it is recommended that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services issue a Final Order denying Ms. Janna Preissig's application for vocational rehabilitation services. DONE and ORDERED this 18th day of October, 1984, at Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of October, 1984.
The Issue Whether the Agency's denial of Petitioner's request for exemption for employment as a Certified Nursing Assistant in an Assisted Living Facility pursuant to Section 435.07, Florida Statutes, was proper.
Findings Of Fact The Agency for Health Care Administration is responsible for conducting background screenings for employees of health care facilities licensed under Chapter 400, Florida Statutes. At all times material to this case, Petitioner, Nikita Johnson, a licensed certified nursing assistant, was employed by an assisted living facility in Pinellas County, Florida, providing personal services to the residents therein. On or before October 23, 2000, and after a level I background screening by the Assisted Living Facility (AFL) licensing unit, Petitioner requested a hearing on her exemption for employment application. On October 23, 2000, the ALF licensing unit conducted a telephonic hearing on Petitioner's request for an exemption for employment. ALF licensing unit denied Petitioner's request for exemption. The Agency proved that on December 23, 1998, Petitioner was arrested on the felony charge of sexual assault: a sexual offense against a child, and lewd lascivious acts in the presence of a child under the age of 16 years. The felony charges were reduced to misdemeanor charges. Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to each of the two counts of battery, was convicted, and sentenced to one-year probation, plus payment of a fine and court cost. Petitioner completed the terms and conditions of her probation on or about April 4, 2001. The Agency proved that on February 19, 2000, Petitioner was arrested on the misdemeanor charge of disorderly conduct, and on April 4, 2000, entered a plea of nolo contendere to which adjudication was withheld and a fine imposed. Petitioner has committed disqualifying offenses as defined by Chapter 435, Florida Statutes. Additionally, Petitioner is ineligible for exemption based on a failure to demonstrate any rehabilitative efforts and an appreciation of the seriousness of the criminal charges. Petitioner has not met her burden of clear and convincing evidence that she should not be disqualified from employment as required by Section 435.07(3), Florida Statutes. By mail at the last known address, Petitioner was notified of the time, date, and place of the final hearing and chose not to appear.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's request for exemption for employment, pursuant to Section 435, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of May 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon, County, Florida. FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings This 1st day of May, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Nikita Johnson 121 North Mercury Avenue Clearwater, Florida 33765 Christine T. Messana, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building 3, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building 3, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Julie Gallagher, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building 3, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled under Florida’s workers’ compensation laws to payment for professional services to an injured worker for the billings identified by the three notices of disallowance at issue in this consolidated proceeding.
Findings Of Fact The claimant, a male, was born July 21, 1961. On February 17, 1995, the claimant sustained a severe traumatic brain injury (TBI) and other injuries during the course of his employment with the City of Hollywood, Florida. At all times relevant to these proceedings, the claimant has been receiving benefits pursuant to the Florida workers’ compensation laws. At all times relevant to this proceeding, the carrier has been the workers’ compensation carrier for the employer. At all times relevant to this proceeding, the claimant has lived in a home purchased for him by the carrier. The claimant has a life estate in the home and the carrier has the remainder interest. The claimant lives in the home with his mother and has 24-hour attendant services paid for by the carrier. The carrier has purchased a van for the claimant, which his attendant uses to transport the claimant to therapy and other appointments. The claimant has a history of mental illness dating to his teenage years, when he was diagnosed with schizophrenia. As a result of his injury and his illness, the claimant acts out periodically and becomes physically resistive to those trying to care for him. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Petitioner has been a provider of rehabilitation services to various patients, including those with TBI. Dr. Marie DiCowden, a psychologist, is the founder and director of Petitioner. Dr. DiCowden described Petitioner as being a health care community that provides an integrated administration for a long continuum of care post acute rehabilitation through community reintegration using health promotion, prevention, and integrated primary care. Petitioner is accredited by two national accrediting organizations referred to by the acronyms CARF (Commission on Accreditation of Rehabilitation Facilities) and CORF (Commission on Outpatient Rehabilitation Facilities). Petitioner is also certified by the Florida Division of Vocational Rehabilitation (formerly housed in the Department of Labor and now housed in the Department of Education), the Florida Division of Workers’ Compensation, and by the Florida Brain and Spinal Cord Injury Program.4 As a result of his accident, the claimant was in a coma for several weeks. He was hospitalized (first in an acute care facility and subsequently in two different rehabilitation hospitals) until December 28, 1995, when he was placed in Whitehall Nursing Home. Whitehall was not an appropriate placement for the claimant because of his behavior and his need for rehabilitation services. On March 27, 1996, Yvonne Beckman, a rehabilitation nurse consultant employed by the carrier, referred the claimant to Petitioner for an evaluation. Shortly before that referral, the claimant had been evaluated by two neuropsychologists (Dr. Jorge A. Herra and Dr. Lee. H. Bukstel), who had opined that the claimant would benefit from rehabilitation services. Ms. Beckman asked Dr. DiCowden to recommend a neurologist who practiced in South Florida. In response, Dr. DiCowden gave Ms. Beckman the names of three neurologists, one of whom was Dr. Paul Wand. Ms. Beckman authorized Dr. Wand to provide services to the claimant. Dr. Wand prescribed continued rehabilitation services for the claimant at Petitioner’s facility. The services at issue in this proceeding were provided by Petitioner pursuant to prescriptions from Dr. Wand.5 Prior to accepting the claimant, Dr. DiCowden informed a representative of the carrier that Petitioner would accept the claimant as a patient in its brain injury program and estimated the annual costs to be $200,000.00. The claimant began receiving rehabilitation services from Petitioner five days a week beginning August 1, 1996. The claimant received from Petitioner’s staff physical therapy, occupational therapy, cognitive retraining, speech training, language training, psychological services, art therapy, music therapy, and yoga therapy. The claimant continued to receive those rehabilitation services from Petitioner (five days a week) from August 1996 to the date of the hearing (and presumably to date). The authorization for the provision of rehabilitation services to the claimant was periodically reviewed by the carrier. In November 1998, the carrier had the claimant examined by Dr. Richard Bailyn (a neurologist) and by Dr. Kevin Lapinski (a neuropsychologist). Those doctors opined that the claimant was not benefiting from cognitive retraining, occupational therapy, speech therapy, or language therapy at Petitioner’s facility. They further opined that the claimant required an activity program to satisfy his recreational and stimulation needs, but that such a program did not require Petitioner’s facility since the claimant’s aide could be trained to provide those services. Dr. Bailyn was of the opinion that as of November 1998 the various therapies provided by Petitioner’s facility to the claimant were not reasonable and were not medically necessary. Section 440.13(6), Florida Statutes, requires a carrier to review bills by providers of medical services as follows: (6) UTILIZATION REVIEW.--Carriers shall review all bills, invoices, and other claims for payment submitted by health care providers in order to identify overutilization and billing errors, including compliance with practice parameters and protocols of treatment established in accordance with this chapter, and may hire peer review consultants or conduct independent medical evaluations. Such consultants, including peer review organizations, are immune from liability in the execution of their functions under this subsection to the extent provided in s. 766.101. If a carrier finds that overutilization of medical services or a billing error has occurred, or there is a violation of the practice parameters and protocols of treatment established in accordance with this chapter, it must disallow or adjust payment for such services or error without order of a judge of compensation claims or the agency, if the carrier, in making its determination, has complied with this section and rules adopted by the agency. As required by Section 440.13(6), Florida Statutes, the carrier conducted a utilization review of the services provided by Petitioner to the claimant beginning in late 1999. The carrier retained Dr. Thomas G. Hoffman to review the claimant’s medical records and to express opinions pertaining to the services provided to him by Petitioner. On April 10, 2000, Dr. Hoffman submitted a report that included several conclusions, including those that follow. The claimant has severe, residual deficits as a result of his accident. He requires 24-hour attendant care. There is no reasonable expectation for further improvement. The therapy he was receiving at that time (and still receives) was not reasonable or medically necessary. The therapy was excessive in frequency and duration. Dr. Hoffman’s deposition testimony was consistent with his written report. The carrier retained Dr. Victor B. Robert to review the claimant’s medical records and to express opinions pertaining to the services provided to him by Petitioner. On June 19, 2000, Dr. Robert submitted a report that included several conclusions, including those that follow. The treatment rendered by Petitioner was excessive in frequency and duration. The claimant reached an improvement plateau in early 1997 and therapy was thereafter needed only for maintenance reasons. Dr. Robert’s testimony was consistent with his written report. The carrier retained International Assessment Systems, Inc. (IAS), a professional association of various medical practitioners, to conduct an independent neurological, neuropsychological, and psychological examination of the claimant. On September 22, 2000, IAS submitted a report (Intervenors’ Exhibit 8) based on the examinations of claimant and the review of his medical records by Dr. Kenneth C. Fischer, Dr. Alan J. Raphael, and Dr. Charles J. Golden. The report included several observations and conclusions, including those that follow. The testimony of Drs. Fischer, Raphael, and Golden was consistent with the written report they prepared for IAS. Pages 12-13 of the IAS report contain the following: [The claimant] was oriented to person, but not to place or time. He did not know the current day, date, month, or year. His sensorium was significantly impaired. His mood was volatile, ranging from normal to agitated. His affect was similarly labile, at times he was placid, laughing, and able to converse at a basic level, however he was also quite violent. Attention and concentration were significantly impaired. His receptive, expressive and fluency language capabilities were similarly impaired, although, as noted, he was capable of basic/functional [sic] communication. There were no direct indications of hallucinatory or delusional phenomena, however, based on his behavior, it is likely that some hallucinatory or delusional phenomena were present. His reality testing and insight were significantly impaired. During his repeated fits of anger, he often uttered suicidal and homicidal threats, however there was no evidence of actual intent or plan. He showed no ability to monitor his own safety. Page 15 of the IAS report contains the following: From a neuropsychological and psychological perspective, there were gross impairments noted in his cognitive abilities and emotional functioning. . . . He has been afforded considerable time to maximize his cognitive recovery at this point. It is clear that he has plateaued with regard to cognitive improvement. He will not benefit from continued rehabilitation efforts, although he will require continued stimulation to avoid further cognitive decline. His mood and labile affect may also be benefited by continued stimulation in terms of recreational activities to provide appropriate quality of life.6 Page 17 of the IAS report contains the following under the heading “Neurologic Impression”: . . . I [Dr. Fischer] would recommend that he be placed in a supervised residential setting which will give better protection for him and his caregivers than his present home setting. As the patient is four and a half years status post-injury, specific rehabilitative and therapeutic endeavors will have no benefit and are unwarranted. This would relate to hyperbaric oxygen and cognitive rehabilitation was well as any form of physical, occupational, or speech therapies. Page 19 of the IAS report contains the following: [The claimant] was certainly aided by initial removal from the nursing home and receiving cognitive and physical therapies at Biscayne. However, he has long since reached a plateau in his improvement and no further improvement can be expected at this time. Maximum medical improvement should have been reached within 18 to 24 months post-injury. Any treatment after that time would be palliative or maintenance-oriented (sic). Therefore, the treatment prescribed by Dr. Wand became unreasonable and medically unnecessary several years ago. Page 20 of the IAS report reflects the opinion that while the treatments at Petitioner’s facility were excessive in all respects, the claimant does require maintenance rehabilitation services. It is opined that cognitive retraining is no longer appropriate, but that cognitive tasks and games are appropriate in a recreational setting. By letter dated October 27, 2000, the carrier, through its counsel, advised Petitioner that based on its Utilization Review investigation, it had concluded that as to the identified dates of service “. . . there has been overutilization and/or misutilization since the treatment has been excessive and not medically necessary.” This Letter of Disallowance was the first of a series of letters sent by counsel for the carrier to Petitioner, and frames the issues for all of the disallowances at issue in this proceeding. Thereafter, Petitioner timely disputed the carrier’s basis for disallowing its services to the claimant and petitioned the Respondent to resolve the dispute. The total amount disallowed and at issue in this consolidated proceeding is $615,587.00. Respondent employed four Expert Medical Advisors (EMAs) to perform peer review and assist it in resolving the dispute involving the rehabilitation services provided the claimant by Petitioner. Respondent employed Dr. Fernando G. Miranda, Dr. Jorge Villalba, Dr. Gerard P. Garcia, and Dr. David McCraney to serve as EMAs.7 Each of these doctors prepared a report following his review and each sat for deposition. Dr. Miranda’s report, dated September 17, 2001, is attached to his deposition (Intervenors’ Exhibit 17). The report included several conclusions, including those that follow. The referral for intensive multi-disciplinary treatment at Petitioner’s facility is no longer medically necessary. The services provided by Petitioner are excessive in frequency and duration and he will not further improve with speech therapy, cognitive retraining, occupational therapy, or individual psychotherapy. Maintenance physical therapy is recommended. Dr. Miranda testified in his deposition that the recommended physical therapy could be performed by the claimant’s attendant. Dr. Miranda’s deposition testimony was consistent with his written report. Dr. Villalba’s report dated October 15, 2001, is attached to his deposition (Intervenors’ Exhibit 19). The report included several conclusions, including those that follow. The claimant reached maximum medical improvement between February 1996 and October 1997. Dr. Villalba described the services provided by Petitioner to claimant “clearly not medically necessary” after October 1997. He also opined that the claimant will require maintenance physical therapy, occupational therapy, and speech and language therapy on a continuing basis. Dr. Villalba’s deposition testimony was consistent with his written report. Dr. Garcia’s undated report was prepared during the second week of October, 2001, and is attached to his deposition (Intervenors’ Exhibit 16). The report included several conclusions, including those that follow. The claimant should be on a maintenance program and Petitioner’s treatment was excessive. The claimant is unlikely to make further neuropsychological improvement, but he should be treated by a psychiatrist for his schizophrenia. Dr. Garcia’s deposition testimony was consistent with his written report. Dr. McCraney’s report dated November 18, 2001, is attached to his deposition (Intervenors’ Exhibit 18). The report included several conclusions, including those that follow. While the care provided Petitioner appears to be excellent, the claimant is far beyond the point where Petitioner’s therapies would be reasonable or medically necessary. Dr. McCraney’s deposition testimony was consistent with his written report. Dr. DiCowden testified at length about the various services her facility provides the claimant and the records her staff generates as a result of those services. Dr. DiCowden testified that her staff is well-trained in assessing the functional status of rehabilitation patients using nationally recognized assessment methodologies. FIN-FAM, acronyms for “Functional Independence Measures” and “Functional Assessment Measures” is one assessment measure used by Petitioner’s staff. The FIN-FAM measure purports to quantify a patient’s progress or lack thereof and can be used by staff as a tool in developing treatment strategies. Dr. DiCowden presented a chart of the FIN-FAM scores for the claimant for the periods at issue in this proceeding. The chart, prepared for this litigation, reflects steady functional improvement of the claimant. Dr. DiCowden further testified that Petitioner’s staff uses a scale of cognitive functioning developed by a rehabilitation facility known as Rancho Los Amigos Hospital, which measures a patient’s response to stimuli on a scale of Ranch Level I (no response) to Ranch Level VII (appropriate response). She asserts that the measurement of the claimant’s status using the Rancho methodology reflect that the claimant has improved over the years. In support of its position that the claimant steadily progressed while undergoing therapy at its facility, Petitioner presented the testimony of Drs. Antonio Puente, Vernando Batas, and Richard Kishner who observed the claimant at Petitioner’s facility on June 23, 2003, September 13, 2003, and February 24, 2004, respectively. Each of these witnesses had the subjective impression that the claimant was benefiting from therapy at Petitioner’s facility. Petitioner asserts that the FIN-FAM scores, the Rancho Levels, and the testimony of its experts establish that the claimant is benefiting from therapy. That assertion is rejected as being contrary to the greater weight of the credible evidence. The FIN-FAM scoring and the Rancho scale depend on the subjective impressions of the various therapists who treat the claimant at Petitioner’s facility and the record reflects that the scoring was done on an irregular basis.8 Dr. DiCowden adamantly disagreed with the contention that the rehabilitation services provided by her facility is not reasonable or medically necessary. All evidence presented by Petitioner, including Dr. DiCowden’s testimony, has been carefully considered by the undersigned in resolving the conflicts in the evidence. At best, Petitioner established that the claimant made some unquantified amount of progress in the highly structured therapeutic setting at Petitioner’s facility. Intervenors’ experts clearly established that any progress made by the claimant in therapy did not transcend that therapeutic setting to the real world. Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the rehabilitation services it provided the claimant were appropriate and medically necessary. To the contrary, the greater weight of the credible evidence established that at all times relevant to this proceeding the rehabilitation services provided by Petitioner to the claimant have been excessive and that those excessive services have been neither reasonable nor medically necessary.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration issue a final order that sustains the disallowances at issue in this consolidated proceeding. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of June, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of June, 2004.
The Issue The issue is whether petitioner's request for an exemption from disqualification from employment in a position of special trust should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: This case involves a request by petitioner, Alvin V. Walker, for an exemption from disqualification from employment in a position of special trust. If the request is approved, petitioner intends to work in the psychiatric wing of a local hospital with persons suffering from mental illness. Respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, is the state agency charged with the responsibility of approving or denying such requests. Petitioner is now barred from doing such work because of a disqualifying offense which occurred on August 8, 1990. On that date, petitioner was arrested for the offense of "prostitution," a misdemeanor under Chapter 796, Florida Statutes. The circumstances surrounding the incident were not discussed at final hearing. However, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement report stipulated into evidence indicates that on April 30, 1991, adjudication of guilt was withheld by the Duval County Court, and the arrest was sealed. Although the denial of petitioner's request was based solely on his 1990 arrest, at hearing petitioner candidly acknowledged that in 1992 he was invited into the automobile of an undercover police officer in Duval County and was asked what type of sexual things he liked to do. After answering the question, he was given a citation for an undisclosed offense and later pled nolo contendere to the charge. For this, he received one month's probation. Since that time, his record is unblemished. Shortly after the 1992 incident, petitioner began counseling sessions with a mental health counselor. He has continued his therapy since that time. The counselor described petitioner as a "very decent" person with "high morals," and someone who has shown improvement in terms of stability since he began his counseling sessions. From June 1993 until May 1995, petitioner was employed as a rehabilitation counselor with Renaissance Center, Inc. (Renaissance), a residential treatment facility for adults eighteen years of age and older with chronic mental illnesses. In June 1995, Renaissance was acquired by Mental Health Resources and petitioner continued doing the same type of work for the successor firm. He left there in January 1996 for employment with the St. Johns River Hospital as a mental health assistant in the facility's psychiatric unit. In April 1996, however, a background screening disclosed his 1990 arrest, and he was forced to resign pending the outcome of this proceeding. If petitioner's request is approved, the facility will rehire him. Petitioner's former employer at Renaissance established that petitioner was a very conscientious, responsible, and reliable employee who poses no threat to his clients. The employer considered petitioner to be of "good moral character." For the last four or five years, petitioner has been actively involved in the "Outreach" ministry of his church. That program involves providing spiritual support, services and counseling to prisoners in the Duval County Jail each Sunday with follow-up sessions during the week. Members of his church attested to his good moral character. Based on the testimony of witnesses Britt, Toto, Cross and DeWees, as corroborated by petitioner's own testimony, it is found that petitioner has presented sufficient evidence of rehabilitation since his 1990 arrest, he is of "good character," and he poses no threat to the safety or well-being of his clients. The request for an exemption should accordingly be approved.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a final order granting petitioner's request for an exemption from disqualification for employment in a position of special trust. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of September, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675, SunCom 278-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of September, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard, Room 200-X Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Richard E. Doran, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Pauline M. Ingraham-Drayton, Esquire 200 West Forsyth Street, Suite 80 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Roger L. D. Williams, Esquire Post Office Box 2417 Jacksonville, Florida 32231-0083
The Issue Whether the Board of Clinical Social Work, Marriage and Family Therapy, and Mental Health Counseling (Board) erred in issuing an order that denied reinstatement of Irene Acosta's (Ms. Acosta or Petitioner) mental health intern license.
Findings Of Fact The Board is the state agency that licenses mental health interns in the State of Florida. The Board initially licensed Ms. Acosta as a mental health intern on March 19, 1999, when it issued to her license number IMH 1515. This license was issued after Ms. Acosta completed and submitted to the Board an application for the license. Ms. Acosta received her higher education from Newport University in California. It is the Board's position that in 2002, Newport University, located in California, was not a regionally accredited university as defined by the Council on Higher Education and, consequently, degrees from that institution did not meet the Board's credentialing requirements for licensure as a mental health intern. Newport University, located in Virginia, was appropriately accredited, and degrees from that institution met the Board's credentialing requirements. Newport University in California is not affiliated with Newport University in Virginia. Ms. Acosta provided to the Board as part of her application package transcripts and correspondence from Newport University which clearly indicate that the university is in California, not Virginia. Ms. Acosta did not bribe, coerce, use undue influence, make fraudulent misrepresentations, commit any intentional wrongdoing, or unlawfully conceal any information in order to obtain her intern license. Intern licenses are issued for two-year periods. Ms. Acosta's license was last renewed on February 5, 2001. In 2002, the Board realized that Ms. Acosta had obtained her master's degree from Newport University in California. The Board, notwithstanding a diligent search and investigation, is unable to determine how Ms. Acosta's credentialing issue was brought to its attention. That determination could not be made because of the passage of time and the possible destruction of documents. In 2002, Ms. Foster was Executive Director for the Board. Ms. Foster concluded that Ms. Acosta's license had been issued in error because Ms. Acosta lacked required educational credentialing. By letter dated March 18, 2002, Ms. Foster advised Ms. Acosta as follows: As the Executive Director for the Board of Clinical Social Work, Marriage & Family Therapy, and Mental Health Counseling, I am writing concerning your intern registration license which was issued by the Board on March 19, 1999. At the time your application was approved, Newport University was not a regionally accredited university as defined by the Council on Higher Education. As such, the intern registration was issued in error. Section 491.009(1)(a), F.S. provides that: The following acts constitute grounds for denial of a license or disciplinary action as specified in s. 456.072(2): Attempting to obtain, obtaining, or renewing a license, registration, or certificate under this chapter by bribery or fraudulent misrepresentation or through an error of the board or the department. After consulting with Board counsel, I have been instructed to request that you voluntarily relinquish your intern registration licensed [sic] within 15 days of the receipt of this letter. Failure to do so will result in a complaint being filed with the Agency for Health Care Administration. Should you have any questions, please feel free to contact us at our office at . . . . Petitioner contacted Ms. Foster by telephone to discuss the March 18 letter. Petitioner told Ms. Foster that she was going to contact an attorney to advise her. John Schwartz, Petitioner's attorney, contacted Ms. Foster by letter dated April 1, 2002. Among other questions, Mr. Schwartz asked for documentation that Newport University was not regionally accredited. Edward A. Tellechea was, in 2002, an Assistant Attorney General who served as legal counsel for the Board. Mr. Tellechea responded to Mr. Schwartz's letter by letter dated April 16, 2002. Mr. Tellechea's letter identified his status as counsel for the Board and included the following: Chapter 491.005(4)(b)2., Florida Statutes, requires that the education programs for mental health counseling applicants be obtained from institutions that are properly accredited. The relevant statutory language reads as follows: 2. Education and training in mental health counseling must have been received in an institution of higher education which at the time the applicant graduated was fully accredited by a regional accrediting body recognized by the Commission on Recognition of Postsecondary Accreditation. . . . Based upon the publication titled: The Accredited Institutions of Postseconday Education, which is published in consultation with the Council for Higher Education Accreditation, Newport University in Newport Beach, California, is not an institution that is accredited by a regional accrediting body recognized by the Commission on Recognition of Postsecondary Accreditation. It does contain the name of a Newport University, with is located in the Commonwealth of Virginia, but Board staff has verified that the two institutions are not affiliated with each other. If you have any documentation that indicates that Newport University [in California] is accredited by a regional accrediting body recognized by the Commission on the Recognition of Postsecondary Accreditation, please forward it to the Board office by May 2, 2002. Otherwise, this matter will be referred to the Agency for Health Care Administration for appropriate legal action. Mr. Schwartz provided Ms. Acosta with a copy of Mr. Tellechea's letter. On May 7, 2002, Robin McKenzie, a program administrator for the Florida Department of Health, sent a memo to the Bureau of Consumer Protection within the Agency for Health Care Administration (Consumer Protection) that contained the following: Please initiate a complaint against Irene Acosta. An intern registration license was issued to her in error. A letter dated March 18, 2002, was sent to Ms. Acosta requesting that she voluntarily relinquish this license. As of this date, Ms. Acosta has not returned her license to the board office. Petitioner relinquished her license by handwritten letter addressed to Ms. Foster. The letter, dated May 1, 2002, bears Ms. Acosta's signature. The letter, received by Ms. Foster's office on May 7, 2002, provided as follows: As requested by your office, I hereby relinquish my intern registration license. Thank you for all your help. Please note I have destroyed the license. On May 21, 2002, Ms. McKenzie sent a memo to Consumer Protection that enclosed a copy of Ms. Acosta's letter dated May 1, 2002, and asked that the complaint against her be closed. Between the time she was issued the subject license and the time she relinquished the license, Ms. Acosta earned her livelihood working as a mental health counselor. Petitioner never engaged in any unlawful concealment or otherwise intentional wrongdoing in her application process. When she submitted her application, Ms. Acosta was unaware that Newport University (in California) was not accredited for purposes of her licensure application. Petitioner testified that when she relinquished her license, she was unaware that she could have had the Board's intended action reviewed by a probable cause committee or challenge the intended action in an administrative hearing. She further testified that had she known of these rights, she would have challenged the intended action. She further testified that she relinquished her license because she believed that she would be charged with a crime if she did not do so. That testimony has been considered in making the finding as to voluntariness that follows. Also considered is the fact that Ms. Acosta consulted an attorney before deciding to relinquish her license. While it is evident that Petitioner did not want to relinquish her license, and did so only after concluding she had no other choice than to proceed to an administrative hearing, the Board did not coerce her into that action. Ms. Foster's letter and Mr. Tellechea's letter identified the problem with Ms. Acosta's credentials and simply laid out her options - - either relinquish the license or the Board will file an administrative complaint to revoke the license.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health, Board of Clinical Social Work, Marriage and Family Therapy, and Mental Health Counseling enter a Final Order adopting the findings of fact and conclusions of law set forth in this Recommended Order. It is further Recommended that the Final Order deny Irene Acosta's "Amended Emergency Motion to Reinstate Licensed Mental Health Counselor Intern License or for Alternative Relief." DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of November, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of November, 2012. COPIES FURNISHED: Howard J. Hochman, Esquire Law Offices of Howard J. Hochman Suite 210 7695 Southwest 104th Street Miami, Florida 33156 Deborah B. Loucks, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Susan Foster, Executive Director Department of Health Board of (Certified Master Social Worker) Clinical Social Work, Marriage and Family Therapy, and Mental Health Counseling 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3258 Jennifer A. Tschetter, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
The Issue Whether Petitioner has cause to terminate Respondent's professional service contract based on his failure to correct his performance deficiencies during his 90-Day Performance Probation. Whether Respondent’s performance was properly evaluated.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent was a classroom teacher employed by Petitioner pursuant to a professional service contract. At all times material hereto, Petitioner was a duly constituted school board charged with the duty to operate, control and supervise all free public schools within the school district of Miami-Dade County, Florida, pursuant to Article IX, Constitution of the State of Florida, and Section 230.03, Florida Statutes. Petitioner has employed Respondent as a classroom teacher since 1993. He taught at Redland Middle School from 1993 to 1996. He taught at South Miami Senior High School from 1996 to 1999. During the times pertinent to this proceeding (the school years 1999/2000 and 2000/2001) Respondent taught eighth grade math at Palmetto. Between 1984 and the school year 1999/2000 all teachers employed by Petitioner were evaluated under the Teacher Assessment and Development System (TADS). The United Teachers of Dade (UTD) is the collective bargaining unit representing all classroom teachers employed by Petitioner, including Respondent. In 1997, Chapter 231, Florida Statutes, was amended to provide for a 90-day performance probation period for annual and professional service contract teachers who are observed to have unsatisfactory performance. 1/ Petitioner and the UTD collectively bargained a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to implement the 90-day performance probation. The new evaluation system is known as PACES, an acronym for the Professional Assessment and Comprehensive Evaluation System. The MOU amended the collective bargaining agreement between the UTD and Petitioner to authorize the replacement of TADS with PACES. During the 1999/2000 school year, the School Board piloted PACES in selected schools. During the 2000/2001 school year, PACES was utilized throughout the school district. Teacher evaluations at Palmetto were performed pursuant to PACES during the 1999/2000 and the 2000/2001 school years. The evaluations at issue in this proceeding were performed pursuant to PACES. PACES has been approved by the Florida Department of Education. PACES observers must be extensively trained to observe and evaluate teaching performance and student learning. School supervisory personnel perform PACES observations and evaluations. The principal and two assistant principals at Palmetto performed the observations and evaluations at issue in this proceeding. Respondent asserted at the final hearing that certain administrators who participated in observing and evaluating Respondent were insufficiently trained. That assertion is rejected as being contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. PACES was a major district initiative, and both teachers and administrators received extensive training in PACES. The greater weight of the credible evidence established that the principal and the assistant principals at Palmetto who observed and evaluated Respondent were appropriately trained in observing and evaluating teachers in accordance with PACES procedures. 2/ Individual schools across the district, including Palmetto, conducted PACES training for teachers. During the 2000/2001 school year each faculty member at Palmetto had a handbook which contained PACES information, including discussion on each domain, the indicators, the PACES website, and training videos on the website. Several faculty meetings were devoted to discussions of PACES. There were mini-workshops within various departments at Palmetto and all-day workshops for teachers were available in the district. The Palmetto assistant principals divided all six domains between themselves and explained and discussed them with the faculty. A projector was used to show the teachers how to get to the PACES website on the computers. There were 300 computers for teacher use at Palmetto by which Petitioner’s website could be accessed. The faculty meetings at Palmetto were mandatory. If a teacher missed any of the meetings, it was the teacher’s responsibility to come to an administrator to find out what was missed. Teachers who missed meetings were given the handouts that had been utilized at the faculty meetings. At the times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent knew, or should have known, the evaluation criteria of PACES. 3/ Prior to the beginning of the 90-day probation under PACES an appropriately trained administrator must observe the teacher's classroom performance and find that performance to be below articulated standards. This observation is officially referred to as the “initial observation not of record.” Unofficially, this observation is referred to as the “freebie.” The freebie observation triggers the probation process, but it is not used to terminate a teacher’s employment. The same administrator who conducted the freebie observation meets with the teacher, goes over the observation, and notifies the teacher that he or she will be observed in approximately one month. The administrator offers a PGT to the teacher, the use of which by the teacher is voluntary at this point. Next is the “first observation of record,” which is unofficially referred to as the "kickoff observation." If this observation is below performance standards, a Conference-for- the-Record (CFR) is held. Next, a Professional Improvement Plan (PIP) is first given to the teacher, and the 90-day Performance Probation begins the next day. The Performance Probation lasts 90 days, not counting certain specified weekends and school holidays. There must be two official observations within the 90-day period. A PIP is given after any official observation that is below performance standards. If the second official observation is below performance standards, a confirmatory observation takes place after the end of the 90-day period to determine whether the teacher has corrected the deficiencies. The confirmatory observation must be completed within 14 days after the conclusion of the probationary period. The evaluator must thereafter forward to the Superintendent a recommendation whether to terminate the teacher's employment. In PACES, there are six domains. Each domain has components and each component has indicators. It takes only one unacceptable indicator for an observation to be rated below performance standards. If a teacher improves in a particular indicator from one observation to the next, but becomes unacceptable in another indicator, the second observation is rated below performance standards. Mr. Cromer conducted Respondent’s freebie observation on October 24, 2001. The observation did not meet performance standards. Mr. Cromer testified as to his observation of Respondent on October 24, 2001, and stated the reasons Respondent's performance did not meet standards. The following findings are based on Mr. Cromer’s testimony. Respondent did not meet performance standards because he was going over 30 homework problems and simply giving out the answers, not making an effort to know whether the students understood. He did not seek input from the students. The students had no opportunity to participate. There was no interaction between Respondent and the students. There was no introduction to the lesson, thereby failing to establish motivation to learn. Respondent did not tell the students what they should learn from the lesson or why it was important that they understand the material. Respondent failed to provide a logical sequence and pace. He was going much too fast for the students. Respondent only demonstrated one math problem, failing to demonstrate any of the others, although there were six different types of problems for review. Respondent failed to utilize higher order cognition, teaching at only one cognitive level. There was no effort to clarify, using different words or examples. The students were not encouraged to make any association or consider examples from their own experience. The students were not asked questions and were not given an opportunity to answer questions. Respondent did not monitor the engagement or involvement of the students in the learning process. He made no effort to gauge whether the students understood the material. He sought no questions from the students and gave no feedback. Then Respondent sat down for approximately fifteen to twenty minutes. He did not walk around to monitor what the students were doing. Most of the students were not doing their work. Respondent failed to meet performance standards in components of Domain III, Teacher- Learner Relationships; Domain IV, Enhancing and Enabling Learning; Domain V, Enabling Thinking; and Domain VI, Classroom- based Assessment of Learning. Mr. Cromer met with Respondent on November 1, 2001, and went over each item on the observation and explained why Respondent did not meet performance standards. Mr. Cromer made suggestions for improvement. He advised Respondent that he would be coming back to do a follow-up observation and that Respondent was entitled to have a PGT. At first Respondent declined the PGT, but the next day, he accepted it. PGTs are for first year teachers and for any teacher on a PIP. PGTs are made up of seasoned teachers who are trained in PACES and give support and assistance to other teachers. Usually the administration chooses one member of the PGT and the teacher chooses the other. In this case, Respondent was permitted to choose both teachers. He chose Vivian Taylor and Maria Mayo. Both teachers gave appropriate assistance to Respondent. Under PACES, the same administrator who conducted the freebie observation must conduct the kickoff observation. On November 26, 2001, Mr. Cromer conducted Respondent’s kickoff observation. Mr. Cromer testified as to his observation of Respondent on November 26, 2001, and stated the reasons Respondent's performance did not meet standards. The following findings are based on Mr. Cromer’s testimony. Respondent did not meet performance standards because many of the students in his class were excluded from the first twenty minutes while Respondent focused exclusively on two students at the board. One student finished her problem very quickly. The other student was completely confused. Respondent did the problem for him but did not make sure the student understood. The rest of the class was ignored during that time. The students were not given any explanations as to what the two students had done. The remainder of the class talked among themselves, looked around the class, and one student was sleeping. There was no introduction to the lesson and no transition into the second portion of the lesson. The students were not engaged in critical analysis or problem solving. Respondent did not develop any associations between the pie graph he was working on and its relationship to percentages and fractions. Respondent did not provide sufficient “wait time” after questions to encourage the students to think about the answers. Instead, the same few students called out answers. Respondent did not meet performance standards in components of Domain III, Teacher/Learner Relationships; Domain IV, Enhancing and Enabling Learning; and Domain V, Enabling Thinking. On December 5, 2001, Mr. Merker and Mr. Cromer held a CFR with Respondent and Respondent’s union representative to address Respondent’s substandard performance, his Performance Probation, recommendations to improve the specific areas of his unsatisfactory performance, and Respondent’s future employment status with the School Board. Respondent’s input was sought. Those in attendance at the meeting on December 5, 2001, met again the following day. Respondent’s input was again sought. He was given a copy of the summary of the CFR and a PIP at that time. The PIP required Respondent to read and summarize pertinent sections from the PACES manuals. Respondent’s Performance Probation began on December 7, 2001. The time frame was established with the help of OPS. Respondent was provided assistance through his PGT and his PIP to help him correct his deficiencies within the prescribed timeframe. Respondent's deadline to complete his PIP was January 10, 2002. On January 15, 2002, Mr. Merker conducted an official observation of Respondent in his classroom. Mr. Merker testified as to his observation of Respondent on January 15, 2002, and stated the reasons Respondent's performance did not meet standards. The following findings are based on Mr. Merker’s testimony. Respondent did not meet performance standards because the students were not actively engaged in learning. Only six students out of 27 were involved in the lesson. Many of the students did not have the materials and were not able to follow through with the lesson. Respondent did not monitor what the students were doing. Many students were off-task, inattentive, and bored. Respondent did not re-engage the students. Respondent did not re-direct the off-task behavior, which persisted for the entire period. Learning routines were not apparent. Respondent did not give directions for the lesson. Respondent’s explanations were unclear. No adjustments were made. Respondent did not assess the learning progress during the lesson. Respondent solicited only basic knowledge in his questioning. He did not utilize a range of questions to assess student understanding. Respondent did not meet performance standards in components of Domain II, Managing the Learning Environment; Domain IV, Enhancing and Enabling Learning; and Domain VI, Classroom-based Assessments of Learning. Mr. Merker conferred with Respondent on January 24, 2002, made recommendations with respect to the specific areas of unsatisfactory performance, and provided assistance through a PIP and PGT to help Respondent correct his deficiencies. The PIP required Respondent to observe other teachers and to view PACES vignettes. Respondent's deadline to complete his PIP was February 22, 2002. On February 27, 2002, Mr. Meneses conducted the second official formal observation of Respondent in his classroom. Mr. Meneses testified as to his observation of Respondent on February 27, 2002, and stated the reasons Respondent's performance did not meet standards. The following findings are based on Mr. Meneses’ testimony. Respondent did not meet performance standards because the students were not engaged in learning. After wasting 27 minutes copying numbers from the board, only three to four minutes were left for the main part of the lesson. Respondent wasted a lot of time during the lesson going over non-essential information, and the students were only presented with basic knowledge-level tasks. Inaccurate information was given by Respondent and accepted by the students. Students were not given "wait time" after a question to think about the answers. The learners were not given any introduction to the learning outcomes of the lesson. Respondent did not meet performance standards in components of Domain IV, Enhancing and Enabling Learning; and Domain V, Enabling Thinking. Mr. Meneses and Mr. Merker conferred with Respondent on March 5, 2002, made recommendations with respect to the specific areas of unsatisfactory performance and provided assistance through a PIP and PGT to help Respondent correct his deficiencies. Respondent’s PIP required him to complete a self- assessment through the PACES website. Respondent's deadline to complete his PIP was March 22, 2002. Respondent’s Performance Probation ended on March 24, 2002. Respondent completed all of the activities required by all of his PIPs. He never indicated that he had any difficulty understanding them. Because Respondent’s second observation within the Performance Probation was below performance standards, a confirmatory observation was required after the expiration of the 90 days to determine whether or not Respondent had corrected his performance deficiencies. On March 26, 2002, Mr. Merker completed Respondent’s confirmatory observation. Mr. Merker testified as to his observation of Respondent on March 26, 2002, and stated the reasons Respondent's performance did not meet standards. The following findings are based on Mr. Merker’s testimony. Respondent did not meet performance standards in components of Domain IV, Enhancing and Enabling Learning; Domain V, Enabling Thinking; and Domain VI, Classroom-based Assessments of Learning, because the lesson appeared staged. It was a lesson on fractions that had been presented approximately five weeks earlier. Respondent went full steam ahead regardless of what the students were doing. Respondent had not improved his questioning techniques since Mr. Merker’s prior observation. Mr. Merker notified Respondent on March 26, 2002, that Respondent had not satisfactorily corrected his performance deficiencies during his Performance Probation and that Mr. Merker was going to recommend to the Superintendent of Schools that Respondent’s employment be terminated. 4/ Mr. Merker notified the Superintendent of Schools on March 29, 2002, that Respondent had not satisfactorily corrected his performance deficiencies during his Performance Probation and recommended that Respondent's employment be terminated. On April 3, 2002, the Superintendent of Schools notified Respondent that the Superintendent was going to recommend that the School Board terminate Respondent's employment contract because Respondent had failed to satisfactorily correct his performance deficiencies during his Performance Probation. Petitioner established that it met all procedural requirements and time frames set forth by statute, by PACES, and by the MOU. Under the collective bargaining agreement and under PACES, a teacher is entitled to a fair, equitable, and impartial evaluation. Respondent’s evaluations were fair, equitable, and impartial. On April 17, 2002, the School Board acted upon the Superintendent's recommendation and terminated Respondent's employment contract subject to his due process rights.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the School Board of Miami-Dade County, Florida, enter a final order sustaining the termination of Respondent's professional service contract, effective April 17, 2002. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of September, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of September, 2002.
