Findings Of Fact The Applicant and the Department submitted Proposed Findings of Fact pursuant to Rule 3C-9.11, Florida Administrative Code. The Applicant's Proposed Findings are accepted except where they might specifically conflict with the Findings of the Hearing Officer's Report or where they may constitute conclusions of law.
Recommendation In light of the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department issue a final order dismissing Petitioner’s amended petition on the grounds that Petitioner lacks standing to administratively challenge the Department’s decision not to disapprove McLaughlin’s proposed appointment to Sunniland’s board of directors and that the Department, having failed to act within the time frame prescribed by Rule 3C-100.0385, Florida Administrative Code, does not have the authority to reconsider its decision and issue a letter of disapproval, as requested by Petitioner.16 DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of April, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of April 1997.
The Issue In DOAH Case No. 92-2455 the Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Banking (Department) seeks to recover the costs of examination and supervision of Bay Bank and Trust Company (Bay Bank). As reason, Bay Bank is alleged to have engaged in unsafe or unsound practices as discovered in the examination the Department made of Bay Bank on March 31, 1991. In addition, the Department seeks to impose a late payment penalty in the amount of $100.00 per day commencing on November 15, 1991, and an administrative fine of $1000.00 per day commencing on December 16, 1991. See Section 655.045(1), Florida Statutes (1991). In DOAH Case No. 92-3744 the Department seeks entry of a cease and desist order directed to Bay Bank and to John Christo, Jr. (Christo, Jr.) and John Christo, III (Christo, III). See Section 655.033, Florida Statutes (1991). Moreover, the Department seeks to remove Christo, Jr. and Christo, III, as Bay Bank Directors and to prohibit their participation in the affairs of Bay Bank or any other financial institution regulated by the Department. See Section 655.037, Florida Statutes (1991). In particular the Department seeks to impose this discipline based upon alleged unsafe and unsound practices as determined through the Department's March 31, 1991, examination conducted at Bay Bank and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) examination conducted at Bay Bank on November 18, 1991; for alleged breaches of the written agreement entered into between Bay Bank and the Department following the March 31, 1991 examination; for alleged violation of the Federal Reserve Act, 12 C.F.R. s. 215.4, known as Regulation O; for alleged violation of Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. s. 371(c), and for alleged violation of fiduciary duties associated with the previously described acts by Christo, Jr. and Christo, III.
Findings Of Fact Prehearing Stipulations of Fact The following facts were admitted and required no proof at the final hearing: At all times material hereto, Bay Bank and Trust Company ("Bay Bank") has been a state-chartered, federally insured bank operating under Charter No. 188-T, having a principal place of business at 509 Harrison Avenue, Box 1350, Panama City, Florida, 32402. At all times material hereto, Florida Bay Bank, Inc. ("FBB") has been a Florida corporation operating as a one bank holding company. FBB owns 100 percent of Bay Bank. At all times material hereto, John Christo, Jr. has been chairman of the board of FBB, John Christo, III has been president and Irene Christo has been secretary/treasurer. Until November, 1992, John Christo, Jr. was Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of Bay Bank. From November, 1992, John Christo Jr. has been Chairman of the Board of Bay Bank. Until July, 1992, John Christo, III was a Director and President of Bay Bank. From July, 1992 until the present, Christo III has been Vice-Chairman of the Board of Bay Bank. At all times material hereto, JCJ Irrevocable Trust ("JCJ Trust") has been a trust, the managing trustee of which has been John Christo, III. Each of the children of John Christo, Jr. has possessed a beneficial interest in JCJ Trust in at least the following amounts: John Christo, III - 40 percent James Phillip Christo - 30 percent Irene L. Christo - 30 percent FBB has two classes of voting securities outstanding, voting preferred stock and common stock. At all times material hereto, John Christo, Jr. owned approximately 97 percent of the preferred stock and JCJ Trust owned more than 65 percent of the common stock of FBB. John Christo, Jr. was Chairman of the Board and owned approximately 32 percent of the outstanding shares of Bay Savings Bank, a state chartered savings and loan association in West Palm Beach. JCJ Trust owned approximately 37 percent of Bay Savings Bank. FBB owned approximately 5 percent of Bay Savings Bank. Bay Savings Bank failed and was placed in receivership by the Resolution Trust Corporation on September 6, 1992. On April 18, 1986, the Board of Directors of Bay Bank voted to approve two irrevocable standby letters of credit in favor of SouthTrust Bank of Alabama, N.A. ("SouthTrust") for the benefit of John Christo, Jr. (LOC #281) and JCJ Trust (LOC #282) respectively. These letters of credit were unsecured. These loans at SouthTrust were originally obtained by the Christos for the purpose of providing the initial capitalization of Bay Savings Bank in West Palm Beach. These letters of credit were subsequently renewed and approved by the Board of Directors of Bay Bank on April 18, 1989 and again on February 15, 1990. These renewal letters of credit, like #281 and #282, were unsecured. On February 19, 1991, the Board of Directors of Bay Bank voted to again renew the irrevocable letters of credit in favor of SouthTrust for the benefit of and to secure the debts of JCJ Trust and John Christo, Jr. to SouthTrust. Christo, Jr. was present at the board meeting when the board voted to approve LOC #509. Christo, III voted with the Board of Directors of Bay Bank to approve LOC #509. On February 25, 1991, Bay Bank issued the irrevocable letter of credit (LOC #509) in favor of SouthTrust in the aggregate amount of $425,000 for the benefit of and to secure a debt owed by JCJ Trust to SouthTrust. The terms of LOC #509 permitted SouthTrust to draw any amounts of funds due and payable to SouthTrust from JCJ Trust that were at least 30 days past due, up to the limit of LOC #509. On September 23, 1991, SouthTrust sent Bay Bank a letter indicating that SouthTrust would draw on LOC #509 because JCJ Trust owed SouthTrust $433,429.17, which amount was past due for more than 30 days. On October 2, 1991, Bay Bank funded a loan in the amount of $425,000 to JCJ Trust to cover LOC #509 as drawn upon by SouthTrust. The note was signed by Christo, III as trustee of JCJ Trust. The note was unsecured. On February 25, 1991, Bay Bank issued the irrevocable letter of credit (LOC #510) in favor of SouthTrust in the aggregate amount of $425,000 for the benefit of and to secure a debt by Christo, Jr. to SouthTrust. The terms of LOC #510 permitted SouthTrust to draw any amount of funds due and payable to SouthTrust from Christo, Jr. that were at least 30 days past due, up to the limit of LOC #510. Christo, Jr. was present at the board meeting when the board voted to approve LOC #510. John Christo, III voted with the Board of Directors to approve LOC #510. On August 26, 1991, SouthTrust notified Bay Bank that it would draw on LOC #510 because Christo, Jr. owed SouthTrust $425,000, which amount was past due for more than 30 days. On September 3, 1991, Bay Bank funded an unsecured loan in the amount of $425,000 to Christo, Jr. to cover LOC #510 as drawn upon by SouthTrust. The note was signed by Christo, Jr. Although bank documents reflect board approval of LOC #509 and #510, there is no bank document relating to LOC #509 or #510 reflecting approval by the Board of Directors, on or about the time of the issuance of LOC #509 and #510, of the terms of any loan to John Christo, Jr. or JCJ Trust that might be made should the letters of credit be drawn upon by SouthTrust. In December, 1990, Bay Bank exchanged a 1986 Ferrari Testarossa with FBB in exchange for a 1984 Ferrari 4001. The Bank booked the value of the 4001 as $35,954 and FBB booked the value of the Testarossa at $110,793. The Testarossa had a market value in excess of that of the 4001. No security was given by FBB in connection with this transaction. Other Facts The State Examination and Findings Pursuant to Section 120.57(1)(b)15, Florida Statutes (1992 Supp.) (Use of Manuals) Consistent with long-standing practices in examining Bay Bank and other financial institutions over which the Department has had jurisdiction, it performed an examination to assess Bay Bank's financial condition and banking practices. This examination took place on March 31, 1991. In performing the examination it employed the use of a manual produced by the FDIC which the Department has used in conducting examinations beginning in 1977, to include examinations of Bay Bank. The Department also utilized its Examination Procedures Manual. Again, this manual had been referred to in the past when conducting examinations of this and other regulated institutions. As had been its custom the Department also utilized a document known as Management Evaluation Guidelines, derived from information gained from the state of Texas. Prior to the March 31, 1991 examination the Department had used the Management Evaluation Guidelines in performing examinations of Bay Bank. The Department has substantially affected the interest of Bay Bank and the Christos by resort to the three manuals in conducting the March 31, 1991 examination. None of these manuals had been adopted as rules when the March 31, 1991 examination was made; however, on August 6, 1993, Respondent noticed its intent to adopt the manuals as rules through incorporation by reference into an existing chapter within the Florida Administrative Code. The FDIC Manual establishes a rating system known as the Camel rating system. That acronym stands for measurements of a bank's condition related to capital, asset quality, management, earnings and liquidity. Out of component scores assigned to those measurements of the bank's condition, but not through averaging, an aggregate score is assigned which identifies the overall health of the institution. An aggregate score of 1 is the highest rating, with aggregate scores of 4 or 5 considered to be substandard. In March, 1991, as in its general experience with prior examinations, the Department equated the assigned aggregate score of 4 with unsafe and unsound practices by Bay Bank. This opinion was held when taking into account the specific conditions within the bank found at the time of examination and as set forth in the post-examination written report. The Camel rating system had its origin with the Federal Financial Institutions Examinations Council and was designed to identify institutions that needed closer supervisory attention. It is a system that had been used in regulation of banks since the 1970s. The FDIC Manual and the state Examination Procedures Manual include definitions of the numerical ratings found within the Camel rating system. The source material for arriving at the Camel ratings are constituted of the lending institution's records and other information gathered during the examination sessions. In assigning the Camel ratings in the March 31, 1991 examination, the Department followed these approaches. In addition to the Camel rating system, the FDIC Manual sets forth criteria related to determining whether a bank violated federal banking statutes and regulations. On this occasion the Department considered the criteria set forth in the FDIC Manual to determine whether Bay Bank violated federal law. The Department's Examination Procedures Manual explains procedural steps that the examiners took in conducting the March 31, 1991 examination. The state Examination Procedures Manual affords latitude to the examiners to deviate from guidelines set forth in the manual if the deviation can be supported in writing. The right to deviate from the guidelines was available upon the occasion of the March 31, 1991 examination. Over and above the possibility that an examiner, in this case an examiner performing the examination on March 31, 1991, would deviate from the guidelines set forth in the state Examination Procedures Manual, the entire examination process draws upon the experience of the examiner in a somewhat subjective manner and in recognition that the activity of bank examination is one that requires flexibility in thinking. Specific guidance to the examiners contained within the state Examination Procedures Manual includes a statement of expected documentation that a bank should have in support of its loans, instructions concerning how to grade the bank, as well as how to proceed with the examination, to include various operational steps to be taken while conducting the examination. The state Examination Procedures Manual also sets forth personnel duties for the examiners. The state Examination Procedures Manual sets forth the need for bankers to adhere to safe and sound banking practices. The Management Evaluation Guidelines sets forth guidance for the examiners, to include their responsibilities in the March 31, 1991 examination, related to assessing bank management. This guidance is in addition to the guidance set forth in the FDIC Manual and the state Examination Procedures Manual. The Management Evaluation Guidelines sets out instructions about its use and provides worksheets to be executed in the assessment process. The rating system contemplated by the Management Evaluation Guidelines ties in with the Camel rating system. Aside from the legal requirements set forth in Chapter 655, Florida Statutes, the Department has not established formal rules which would further define the term "unsafe and unsound" practices as that term describes the circumstances under which the Department would assess a bank for costs of examination and supervision, seek to order a bank or its directors, officers and employees to cease and desist or seek the removal of a bank's officers and directors and to restrict and prohibit those officers and directors from participating in the affairs of that bank or any other financial institution over which the Petitioner has regulatory authority. Other than information gained during an examination, to include the March 31, 1991 examination, concerning perceptions held by the examiners about the Camel ratings for the bank, as reflected in the examination report provided to the bank and through the aforementioned manuals, the Department has made no attempt to specifically describe its use of the Camel ratings. The explanation of the Camel rating as set forth in the three manuals would become codified requirements of law if the rule enactment process is concluded. The contents of those manuals would be specifically disseminated to affected persons with that eventuality; however, such an arrangement would have only prospective utility as a means to specifically notify a regulated entity concerning the imposition of the regulatory terms set forth in the manuals. When the March 31, 1991 report of examination was prepared there were no formal written rules or other written guidance concerning the occasion upon which the Department would seek a written agreement as opposed to an imposition of a cease and desist order in trying to correct problems with a bank discovered through the examination process. Instead, the Department exercised its discretion consistent with findings made during the examination. The three manuals offer assistance in the proper exercise of regulatory discretion concerning corrective action directed to a given institution and had that part to play in the March 31, 1991 examination process as well as the overall decision to pursue the present cases. As far back as 1984 it has not been the Department's policy to provide copies of the state Examination Procedures Manual to institutions being examined under its terms. It was not the policy to provide a copy of the state Examination Procedures Manual to the Bay Bank at the March 31, 1991 examination. On the other hand, there has never been any prohibition against allowing the members of the banking industry in Florida or others to have access to the state manual. Similarly, the Department does not provide copies of the FDIC Manual to the public, nor did it provide a copy of the FDIC Manual to Bay Bank when the March 31, 1991 examination was conducted. The Department does not deem the failure to provide that manual and the state Examination Procedures Manual as an inappropriate oversight. The Department is not conversant with the opportunities which the public, to include Bay Bank, would have to obtain the FDIC Manual from federal officials. The Department makes the assumption that the FDIC Manual is available from the FDIC. Finally, Respondent does not publish the Management Evaluation Guidelines for the benefit of members of the regulated industry, but it would provide a copy of the Management Evaluation Guidelines on request. In particular, it did not provide a copy of the Management Evaluation Guidelines to Bay Bank associated with the March 31, 1991 examination. None of the three manuals discussed are deemed to be confidential. Ultimately, the decision to take administrative action based upon the findings made in the March 31, 1991 examination must be factually supported and legally correct, whatever contribution was made to the regulatory function when the Department chose to make its customary usage of the three manuals in performing the March 31, 1991 examination. Petitioners Exhibit No. 2 is the report of examination for March 31, 1991. It identifies the aggregate Camel rating of 4 and sets forth the reasons for that finding. As set forth in the report of examination there were numerous unsatisfactory conditions found during the March 31, 1991 examination. In particular, the findings in the report of examination identify a number of unsafe or unsound practices, together with other shortcomings in the performance by Bay Bank, its management, employees and directors. In carrying out the examination of March 31, 1991, the examination team was constituted of 14 examiners to include two Area Financial Managers, two Financial Examiner Analyst Supervisors, and two Financial Specialists. Two members of the examination team were trainees. The work performed by the trainees was supervised and the examination findings made were not constituted of work performed by the trainees that had not been reviewed. In conducting the examination 2,538 hours were devoted to the task. Additionally, the examiner in charge spent 116 hours planning the examination and writing the report of examination, activities conducted away from the bank. The costs of examination and supervision was $67,494.20. Review was made of the examination report through various department employees. This arrangement was in accordance with normal departmental routine for conducting such review. The only notable change to the report prepared by the Examiner in Charge concerned the component Camel rating for assets wherein the Examiner in Charge had failed to offer a written explanation for assigning a component rating of 4 when written guidelines in the state Examination Procedures Manual called for a 5 for that component. Consequently the component rating was changed by the Bureau Chief for the area where Bay Bank conducts its business. This change for the asset component did not modify the overall Camel rating. Among the unsafe and unsound practices discovered in the March 31, 1991 examination was Bay Bank's failure to establish an adequate loan loss reserve. The management and directors had set aside approximately 1.364 million dollars for loan loss reserve. The methodology utilized by the Department to identify an adequate loan loss reserve revealed the need for 4.05 million dollars to be available for that function. That methodology is accepted. Therefore, the deficiency in the loan loss reserve approximated 2.686 million dollars. This shortfall was brought about by the ineffective methods of risk identification which the bank management and its directors had utilized prior to the March 31, 1991 examination. For a substantial period of time prior to the March 31, 1991 examination Bay Bank had maintained a significantly higher percentage of noncurrent loans and leases than its peers, while maintaining a loan loss reserve comparable to its peers. This contributed to the inadequate loan loss reserve. Bay Bank questioned the formula employed by the Department to establish loan loss reserves wherein it is anticipated that 10 percent losses are contemplated for substandard loans. Bay Bank claimed to have a loss experience for substandard loans in the range of 2 to 4 percent. Nonetheless, the Bay Bank internal loan watch-list estimated the loss of approximately 9.14 percent for each loan that it had designated as substandard, which more closely approximates the formula utilized by the Department in establishing a proper loan loss reserve. The deficiency in the loan loss reserve is high and contrary to standards expected of Bay Bank in maintaining a loan loss reserve, so much so that it constitutes an unsafe and unsound practice. Without providing an adequate reserve the financial health of the banking institution is at risk, in that the management has a false picture of the bank's condition when making decisions about banking activities. The deficiency in the loan loss reserve creates the likelihood of abnormal risk or loss, insolvency, or dissipation of assets or other serious prejudice to the interests of the bank and its depositors. During the March 31, 1991 examination, the examiners found numerous instances where the bank management had failed to establish or enforce internal routines and controls. Included within those findings were: Improper recordation of other real estate (ORE) within the bank's books, contrary to bank loan policies, Failure to obtain and maintain current appraisals on ORE and pending ORE, Failure to establish adequate records to allow reconciliation of income and expenses relating to ORE and to maintain adequate documentation thereof, Failure to comply with the bank's loan policies preventing the continued accrual of interest on loans delinquent 90 days or more, Failure to implement credit risk grades established in loan policies more than a year before the examination period, Disorganized and outdated loan file information, Statutory violations associated with loans that were past due for more than a year and Failure to document secured real estate loans as first liens, a requirement by the bank's loan policy and state law. As the examination report states, Bay Bank's Board of Directors had implemented a corrective plan of action dated January 31, 1989, which responded to material deficiencies that had been reported in the June 30, 1988 FDIC report of examination and the November 30, 1987 Department report of examination. The findings within the March 31, 1991 examination show significant violations of the internal plan for corrective action implemented on January 31, 1989, especially in the area of adequate loan policies and the need to insure compliance with the requirements of law. The failure to establish and enforce internal routines and controls and noncompliance with the January 31, 1989 corrective plan of action point to practices and conduct contrary to proper expectations incumbent upon Bay Bank, its management and directors, thereby constituting unsafe and unsound practices that creates the likelihood of abnormal risk or loss, insolvency, or dissipation of assets or otherwise seriously prejudices the interests of Bay Bank or its depositors. The March 31, 1991 examination revealed violations of laws and regulations governing the bank's activities. Taken together these violations point to an unsafe and unsound practice that creates the likelihood of abnormal risk or loss, insolvency or dissipation of assets or otherwise seriously prejudices the interests of the bank or its depositors. On the occasion of the March 31, 1991 examination it was appropriate for the Department to advise Bay Bank to refrain from paying dividends until asset quality, earnings and capital had improved sufficiently to justify dividend payments. Prior to the examination Bay Bank had paid questionably high dividend amounts in a circumstance in which the bank's capital position was tenuous. The excessive levels of adversely classified loans discovered during the March 31, 1991 examination were somewhat the product of conditions in the local economy. However, the outside influences in the economy did not completely explain the deteriorating loan portfolio and offer a defense to imprudent lending practices and the failure to adequately diversify the loan portfolio. The imprudent lending practices were manifested through inadequate risk identification and lack of proper attention to problem loans. In the final analysis the bank management and directors were responsible for the loan portfolio's substandard condition. The circumstances associated with adversely classified loans as commented on in the March 31, 1991 examination report are indicators of unsafe and unsound practices by bank management and the directors, creating the likelihood of abnormal risk or loss, insolvency, or dissipation of assets or otherwise seriously prejudicing the interests of the bank or its depositors. Costs of Examination, Late Payment Penalty and Administrative Fine On July 26, 1991, the Department transmitted a copy of its March 31, 1991 examination report to Bay Bank. Then on July 31, 1991, the Department began a free-form negotiation process to try and get Bay Bank to honor an invoice in the amount of $67,494.20 which constituted the costs associated with examination and supervision for the March 31, 1991 examination. The theory for claiming those costs was pursuant to Section 655.045, Florida Statutes (1991), which indicates that the Department may recover the costs of the examination and supervision against banks engaging in unsafe and unsound practices as defined at Section 655.005(1)(d), Florida Statutes (1991). The correspondence dated July 31, 1991, asked Bay Bank to remit payment within 30 days of receipt of the invoice setting forth the costs of the examination and supervision. The correspondence reminded Bay Bank that a late payment penalty of up to $100.00 a day might be imposed for overdue examination and supervisory fees. This reminder was as contemplated by Section 655.045, Florida Statutes (1991). A dialogue commenced between the Department and Bay Bank through further correspondence in which Bay Bank was unavailing in its attempt to convince the Department that its practices as revealed through the March 31, 1991 examination were not unsafe and unsound, thereby setting aside the right for the Department to assess the costs of examination and supervision. Rather than apprising Bay Bank that it could contest the preliminary agency decision concerning assessment of costs of examination and supervision related to the March 31, 1991 examination, by resort to procedures set forth in Section 120.57, Florida Statutes, the Department sent another free-form notification on October 2, 1991, stating that the Department continued to assert its claim based upon the belief that the practices found in the March 31, 1991 examination constituted unsafe and unsound practices. Again the October 2, 1991 correspondence instructed Bay Bank to remit $67,494.20 within 30 days of receipt of the letter. Having failed to hear from the bank by virtue of its October 2, 1991 communication, the Department again wrote on November 13, 1991, this time telling Bay Bank that the Department had determined to impose a late payment penalty of $100.00 per day commencing November 5, 1991, and of the possibility of imposing a $1,000.00 per day administrative fines if payment were not received. This November 13, 1991, correspondence was free-form. As with prior correspondence it did not advise Bay Bank of its right to seek relief pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes. On February 5, 1992, another free-form communication was provided vying for the cost of the examination and supervision related to the March 31, 1991 examination, reminding Bay Bank that the Department was persuaded that it was entitled to a late payment penalty of $100.00 per day commencing November 5, 1991, and informing Bay Bank that as of December 16, 1991, a date upon which the Department surmised Bay Bank had received an earlier communication, that the Department was imposing an administrative fine of $1,000.00 per day. As was the circumstance of prior occasions the February 5, 1992 correspondence was free- form and failed to advise Bay Bank concerning its right to seek administrative relief from the decision by the agency to seek the costs of examination and supervision for alleged unsafe and unsound practices. Finally, the Department issued an administrative complaint to recover the costs of examination and supervision associated with the March 31, 1991 examination. This complaint was dated March 11, 1992, and advised Bay Bank of its right to contest the determination concerning whether the practices by Bay Bank were unsafe and unsound, thus entitling the Department to collect the costs of examination and supervision associated with the March 31, 1991 examination. The administrative complaint also asserted claims for late penalty and administrative fines dating from November 5, 1991 and December 16, 1991 respectively. Bay Bank contested the administrative complaint leading to the formal hearing which this recommended order addresses. Absent a rule describing the occasion upon which the Department would seek to recover costs of examination and supervision for unsafe and unsound practices, the Department has acted rationally and has been acceptably consistent in exercising its discretion to recover the costs of examination and supervision when comparing the Bay Bank experience to other circumstances where the Department had the opportunity to recover costs of examination and supervision based upon unsafe and unsound practices within an institution. Further Administrative Correction: The Written Agreement Based upon the results of the March 31, 1991 examination the Department deemed it necessary to initiate administrative action against Bay Bank and its directors in accordance with Section 655.033, Florida Statutes (1991). That provision allows the Department to impose cease and desist orders for unsafe and unsound practices, violations of laws relating to the operation of the bank, violation of rules of the Department, violation of orders of the Department or breach of any written agreement with the Department. The law contemplates that a complaint shall be drawn stating the facts that support the action and noticing the accused of the opportunity to seek hearing pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes. The Department did not file the formal administrative complaint. Instead, through negotiations with Bay Bank and its directors it addressed the concerns the Department had about the findings made in the report of examination through entry of a written agreement between the Department and Bay Bank and its directors. In anticipation of the written agreement the directors of Bay Bank passed a resolution in support of the written agreement. The directors took that action on September 17, 1991. Two directors were not immediately available to execute the written agreement as such by signing the document. Their unavailability delayed the submission of the written agreement signed by Bay Bank until October 4, 1991. On that date Bay Bank transmitted the signed written agreement to the Department. In support of the written agreement there was a stipulation between the parties to enter into the written agreement. Given the language of the stipulation to enter the written agreement and the written agreement itself, it was contemplated that both documents be executed simultaneously by the Bay Bank directors and that the Department would sign the stipulation to enter the written agreement at the time that the directors signed the stipulation to enter the written agreement. The signing of the stipulation to enter into the written agreement and the written agreement itself by Bay Bank directors and the signing of the stipulation to enter into the written agreement by the Department would make the written agreement effective upon the date of issuance by the Department subsequent to those activities. The written agreement would be issued after the Comptroller signed it. The stipulation to enter into the written agreement was signed by both parties on October 7, 1991. The language employed with the signing of the stipulation to enter the written agreement stated: WHEREFORE, and it is resolved, that in consideration of the foregoing, the Department and Bay Bank and Trust Co., Panama City, Florida and each of the directors, hereby execute this Stipulation and consent to its terms, this 7th day of October, 1991. The exact language related to the effective date of the written agreement was set forth in the stipulation to enter into the written agreement at Paragraph 6 which stated: Effectiveness. Bay Bank and each of the directors stipulate and agree that the Agreement attached hereto shall be effective on the date of its issuance by the Department. The version of the written agreement upon which the Department has based its actions is dated September 29, 1991, and carries the Comptroller's signature. On October 9, 1991, through correspondence from Department's counsel to counsel for Bay Bank, the Department acknowledged receipt of the written agreement signed by the directors. The October 9, 1991 correspondence from the Department to the bank goes on to describe the notion that when the Comptroller signed the written agreement one of the originals would be forwarded to the bank for its file. This comment makes the meaning of the September 29, 1991, signature by the Comptroller unclear. Further contributing to the confusion, there is a reference in the next paragraph to the October 9, 1991 correspondence, to the effect that some conversation was held between counsel for the Department and a Joel McLamore in the office of counsel for the bank, about an agreement made in the course of that conversation, that the written agreement had an effective date of September 29, 1991. On October 14, 1991 the written agreement was docketed by the Department. On that same date the Department sent the bank a copy of the written agreement as executed by the Comptroller. Again, this correspondences from the Department stated that the written agreement had an effective date of November 29, 1991. On November 12, 1991, further correspondence was directed from the Department to Bay Bank making mention that the Department considered the effective date of the agreement to be September 29, 1991. Before the occasion of the administrative complaint seeking a cease and desist order and removal and prohibition directed to Christo, Jr. and Christo, III there was no dispute concerning the effective date of the written agreement. Now Bay Bank and the Christos assert that the written agreement was effective on October 7, 1991, contrary to the Department's position that the effective date is September 29, 1991. The general purposes which the parties had in mind for entering into the stipulation for entry of the written agreement are set out in Paragraph 1 to that stipulation which states: Consideration. The Department has determined that necessary grounds exist to initiate an administrative proceeding pursuant to Section 655.033, Florida Statutes, against Bay Bank and each of the directors. Bay Bank and each of the directors wish to cooperate with the Department and avoid the initiation of administrative litigation. Accordingly, Bay Bank and each of the directors, hereby stipulate and agree to the following terms in consideration of the Department's forbearance from initiating such administrative litigation through the attached Written Agreement (hereinafter Agreement). This intent by the parties to resolve their differences is brought forth in the written agreement where it states: WHEREAS, in an effort to avoid the consequences of protracted litigation and by virtue of signing the Stipulation, Bay Bank and each of the directors have waived their rights to separately stated Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, such findings and conclusions would be taken from and based upon the most recent State Report of Examination, specifically the State's Report of Examination dated March 31, 1991. By the terms of the stipulation for entry into the written agreement Bay Bank and its directors consented had agreed to the entry of the written agreement and to comply with the provisions, without admitting or denying violations of laws or regulations or rules and without admitting or denying that those entities had engaged in any unsafe and unsound practices. There was a section within the stipulation to enter into the written agreement which spoke to the matter of future administrative action by the Department against Bay Bank or its directors where it stated: 7. Future Action. The Stipulation is being entered into without prejudice to the rights of the Department and to take such further action, joint or severally, against Bay Bank and the directors as the Department deems necessary and appropriate to insure compliance with the terms of the Stipulation and the attached Agreement, any other Agreement or order entered against Bay Bank, and/or to prevent any violation of laws relating to financial institutions. The written agreement did not speak to the opportunity for the Department to seek costs of examination and supervision pursuant to Section 655.045, Florida Statutes (1991), and to pursue removal and prohibition actions against Christo, Jr., and Christo, III, as Bay Bank officers pursuant to Section 655.037, Florida Statutes (1991), based upon findings made in the March 31, 1991 examination. Among requirements of the written agreement was found Paragraph 5 (a) which states: As of the effective date of this Agreement, the Bank shall not extend, directly or indirectly, any additional credit to or for the benefit of any borrower who has a loan or other extension of credit from the Bank which has been charged-off or classified, in whole or in part, "Loss" or "Doubtful" and is uncollected. The prohibition of this paragraph 5(a) shall not prohibit the Bank from renewing or extending the maturity of any credit, provided that the renewal or extension is approved by the full board and that all interest due at the time of such renewal or extension is collected in cash from the borrower. An additional requirement of the written agreement was set forth in Paragraph 7 where it states: As of the effective date of this Agreement, all new loans or lines of credit (including renewals and extensions of existing loans and lines of credit, but excluding additional advances under existing lines of credit) in an amount of $200,000 or more shall require the prior approval of the Bank's board of directors or the directors' committee designated to approve and review loans, and all such loans or lines of credit shall be supported by a written summary that provides the board of directors or directors' committee with the information sufficient for it to make a prudent decision. The Department seeks to impose discipline based upon alleged violations of the written agreement as set forth in the administrative complaint of May 15, 1992. Specifically, that administrative complaint contains allegations of violation of the written agreement associated with Paragraphs 5(a) and 7 directed to Bay Bank and the Christos for cease and desist and as a means of removal and prohibition against the Christos. Concerning Paragraph 5(a), Bay Bank allowed a customer to post over drafts on his checking account, thus maintaining an overdraft position, commencing September 28, 1991, and ending November 18, 1991. The allegations related to Paragraph 7 are discussed under the section in the recommended order detailing events about the letter of credit and a subsequent loan to JCJ Trust said to be made without board approval and proper documentation. Beyond alleged violations of the compromise of the differences between the Department, Bay Bank and its directors embodied by the written agreement, the May 15, 1992 administrative complaint seeks to impose discipline against the Christos for findings made in the course of the March 31, 1991 examination. Those allegations are associated with the manner in which the Christos conducted themselves as officers and directors of Bay Bank based upon findings made through the examination of March 31, 1991 related to the Christos' fiduciary duties. These latter allegations are grounded upon the contention that the Christos were responsible for the unsafe and unsound practices discovered during the March 31, 1991 examination. In response to problems with the payment of dividends Paragraph 2e of the written agreement stated: 2. (e) During the life of this Agreement, the bank shall not pay any dividends at any time it is in noncompliance with the capital and reserve requirement specified in paragraphs 2.(b), 3., 9., or Section 658.37, Florida Statutes. Prior to declaration of dividends, the board of directors will certify the bank's compliance with the cited sections and provide that certification to the Department. Letters of Credit and Loans On April 18, 1986, Bay Bank issued an unconditional/ irrevocable letter of credit to South Trust Bank of Alabama for JCJ Trust and a similar letter of credit to South Trust Bank of Alabama for Christo, Jr. Both letters of credit were in the amount of $425,000.00. The letters of credit expired on February 25, 1989. South Trust had required letters of credit as preconditions to granting the loans described on the stipulated facts herein. At some point in time unsigned notes and security agreements were placed in the files of Bay Bank associated with the Christo, Jr., and JCJ Trust letters of credit. The terms of the notes and security agreements to address the contingency that South Trust Bank would draw upon the letters of credit were not identified. Also missing was an amount of collateral to secure repayment. Nonetheless, there appeared to be a commitment by Bay Bank to meet the contingency where South Trust Bank drew upon the letters of credit by Bay Bank by then offering to loan money to Christo, Jr. and JCJ Trust at an undisclosed rate. The Bay Bank records merely describe the collateral arrangement for such a contingent liability as "open". Further letters of credit were requested by Christo, Jr. and JCJ Trust and issued by Bay Bank in the amount of $425,000.00 each to favor South Trust. The next letters of credit were issued on April 26, 1989. The duration of those letters of credit was until February 25, 1990. The letters of credit of April 26, 1989, had been approved by action of the Bay Bank directors through a common certification for John Christo, Jr., and JCJ Trust in which Christo, Jr. and Christo, III, abstained from voting and other beneficiaries through the JCJ Trust who were directors to Bay Bank were absent. When the letters of credit were issued on April 26, 1989, the loan line presentation for Christo, Jr. and JCJ Trust revealed that no collateral was required when issuing the letters of credit to favor South Trust Bank. Included with the documents under consideration by the directors when they decided to issue these letters of credit was customer profile information for Christo, Jr., a statement of financial condition dated December 31, 1988 for Christo, Jr., a balance sheet for JCJ Trust from December 31, 1988, a February 28, 1989 portfolio investment review for JCJ Trust, and a review of assets of JCJ Trust as of December 31, 1988. On February 15, 1990, the Bay Bank directors again voted to approve lines of credit to favor South Trust Bank in amounts of $425,000.00 each at the request of Christo, Jr. and JCJ Trust. The common certification of approval shows that Christo, Jr. and Christo, III abstained, while Missey Christo and Phillip Christo beneficiaries under JCJ Trust and directors voted to approve the issuance of the letters of credit. Again the loan line presentations for Christo, Jr. and JCJ Trust reveal that collateral was not required in issuing the two letters of credit. The terms of the duration of the letters of credit issued on February 25, 1990, ended on February 25, 1991. The beginning date for the letters of credit was February 25, 1990. The Bay Bank records reveal a customer profile of John Christo, Jr., as associated with the letter of credit approved on February 15, 1990. The information concerning the customer profile is dated February 13, 1990. On February 19, 1991, the Bay Bank directors were requested to and voted to issue letters of credit to favor South Trust Bank related to Christo, Jr. and JCJ Trust in the amount of $425,000.00 each. The common certification of approval shows that Christo, Jr. abstained from voting. Christo, III, voted in favor of the letters of credit as did Phillip Christo and Missey Christo, other directors and beneficiaries under JCJ Trust. In association with the letters of credit on February 19, 1991, the loan line presentations for Christo, Jr. and JCJ Trust revealed that no collateral was provided. The act of approval involved a customer profile for Christo, Jr. from February 12, 1991. Also included was a balance sheet for JCJ Trust dated December 31, 1989, with notes to the financial statement. The duration of the respective letters of credit was February 25, 1991 through February 25, 1992. A draft or drafts drawn on the respective letters of credit would be honored through March 25, 1992. Each time Bay Bank through its directors voted to approve letters of credit to favor South Trust Bank at the request made by Christo, Jr. and JCJ Trust, the directors exercised distinct acts of discretion. The letters of credit issued in 1986, 1989, 1990 and 1991 did not establish terms that would entitle Christo, Jr. and JCJ Trust to an automatic renewal once a prior letter of credit expired. Each letter of credit had its own identifying number. The common features of the respective letters of credit were that they were irrevocable and transferable. Commencing with the series of the letters of credit issued in 1989 and extending through the series in 1990 and 1991, the basis for drawing on the letters of credit was a statement from South Trust Bank that the amount for which the draft was drawn was representative of amounts due and payable by Christo, Jr. or JCJ Trust to South Trust Bank on loans extended from South Trust Bank to Christo, Jr. and JCJ Trust which were a minimum of 30 days past due. The March 31, 1991 examination did not report that the actions by Christo, Jr., Christo, III, and other beneficiaries that the JCJ Trust who were directors had violated any laws or regulations in their conduct around the time the Bay Bank directors' made their February 19, 1991 decision to approve the letters of credit to favor South Trust Bank. Contentions of violations of laws or regulations concerning the conduct by Christo, Jr. and Christo, III first arose in the May 15, 1992 administrative complaint for cease and desist and removal and prohibition. The administrative complaint concerning inappropriate action by Christo, Jr. and Christo, III in their consideration of the extension of the letters of credit to South Trust Bank through the February 19, 1991 meeting of Bay Bank directors and the consequences of that decision is somewhat premised upon findings made by the FDIC in the November 18, 1991 examination as adopted by the Department, in which the FDIC reported violations of the Federal Reserve Act, 12 C.F.R. 215.4 (Regulation O), and Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. s. 371(c). Related allegations about the letters of credit are based upon claims of breaches of fiduciary duties by the Christos. A further discussion of the November 18, 1991, federal examination follows. A notation was made in the March 31, 1991 examination concerning the Christo, Jr. letter of credit issued on February 25, 1991 in the amount of $425,000.00 wherein it is described in the examination report as, "additionally, a contingent liability of an unfunded, unsecured letter of credit to South Trust Bank of Alabama, N.A. to secure a $425,000.00 note there, also exist." As of August 26, 1991, Christo, Jr. was past due on his obligation to South Trust Bank and South Trust Bank drew upon the letter of credit. The draw was in the amount of $425,115.00 which was paid from Bay Bank to South Trust Bank on August 26, 1991. On September 3, 1991, Christo, Jr. signed a term disclosure note and security agreement in the amount of $425,000.00 at an annual interest rate of 10.736 percent. That interest rate was not more favorable than an ordinary customer of Bay Bank could have obtained. No security was required when Bay Bank made its September 3, 1991 loan to Christo, Jr. On September 23, 1991, the JCJ Trust debt to South Trust Bank having been overdue for more than 30 days, South Trust Bank drew upon the letter of credit associated with JCJ Trust. The draw was in the amount of $425,000.00. On October 2, 1991, a loan in the principle amount of $426,479.80 was made from Bay Bank to JCJ Trust, Christo, III as Trustee, to cover the draw that had been made by South Trust Bank against Bay Bank upon the letter of credit. The granting of this loan is alleged to be in violation of paragraph 7 to the written agreement. It is not a violation because the loan predates the effective date of the written agreement. The maturity date on the loan made on October 2, 1991, was October 1, 1992. The annual percentage rate was 10.885, interest terms that were not more favorable to JCJ Trust than would be available to Bay Bank's ordinary customers. In February, 1992, the Bay Bank directors took action to approve the loan that had been made to JCJ Trust on October 2, 1991. No indication is made in the credit file records of Bay Bank concerning the date upon which the Bay Bank directors may have approved the September 3, 1991 loan to Christo, Jr. Prudent lending practices would not have justified the approval of the February 26, 1991, letters of credit requested by Christo, Jr. and JCJ Trust when taking into account credit information made available to the Bay Bank directors, especially when considering that the letters of credit were approved without provision of security from the requesting parties, Christo, Jr. and JCJ Trust. It can be inferred that Christo, Jr., Christo, III, and other directors were aware that the custom and practice within Bay Bank was to not extend letters of credit in excess of $100,000.00 without requiring provision of security in the way of mortgages on real estate, certificates of deposit or a combination of both forms of security. At the time the February 19, 1991 decision was made to approve the letters of credit to South Bay at the request of Christo, Jr. and JCJ Trust, it can be inferred that Christo, Jr. and Christo, III, recognized that terms of credit should not have been granted to those requesting parties because the arrangements did not comport with terms available to other borrowers. This admonition included reference to more beneficial terms to "related interests" and "affiliates." JCJ Trust was a "related interest" and "an affiliate" at the time the decision was reached on February 19, 1991, to approve the letter of credit requested by JCJ Trust through Christo, III. Christo, Jr. and Christo, III, as trustee for JCJ Trust had made no alternative arrangements to make Bay Bank whole in the event South Trust Bank called on the letters of credit issued February 26, 1991. This refers to an arrangement separate and apart from the unsecured notes which were signed by Christo, Jr., and JCJ Trust in the person of Christo, III, following the draws by South Trust against the letters of credit, as a means of protecting Bay Bank at a time when the bank was troubled financially. The February 19, 1991, decision to approve letters of credit requested by Christo, Jr. and JCJ Trust were not adequately supported with an underlying written justification contrary to existing bank policy and prudent banking practice. As with the extension of the line of credit on February 26, 1991, the financial position of Christo, Jr. did not justify the unsecured loan that Bay Bank made to him on September 3, 1991. These arrangements were contrary to prudent banking practice. Moreover, it was violative of the Bay Bank loan policies and constituted more favorable treatment than an ordinary customer would receive. The loan was contrary to the policies in that the unsecured loan was not "supported by satisfactory balance sheet and income statement information with repayment from demonstrated cash flow or reasonably certain conversion of its assets." Similar problems were in evidence concerning the loan made to JCJ trust on October 2, 1991. Prudent bankers would not have extended the credit to JCJ Trust, to include a lack of security, contrary to the credit opportunities a normal customer would have had. The balance sheet available to support the JCJ loan was out of date. Moreover, the availability of funds to repay the loan according to the balance sheet was inadequate. The problems with the Christo, Jr. September 3, 1991 loan concerned heavy debt obligations for notes payable to Bay Bank and South Trust and a questionable position concerning assets that were readily available to meet debt service at the time the decision was being reached to extend the September 3, 1991 credit. These problems were evident in the December 31, 1989 financial statement pertaining to Christo, Jr. The principle asset available to JCJ Trust to meet the debt obligations contemplated by the October 2, 1991 loan were associated with Bay Bank stock. The Bay Savings Bank stock which was shown on the December 31, 1989 balance sheet for JCJ Trust had no value as support for the October 2, 1991 loan in that the savings bank had been declared insolvent by the Department and placed in conservatorship through the Resolution Trust Corporation in September, 1991. The Bay Bank stock was not a liquid asset to meet the loan obligation, there being no apparent market for its disposal as a means to obtain ready cash to meet the debt obligation envisioned by the note issued on October 2, 1991. Nor could dividends be anticipated as a means to meet the debt obligation, Bay Bank having been criticized in the March 31, 1991 examination for paying out dividends in a circumstance in which there was a need to infuse additional capital to bolster the loan loss reserve deficit and in view of the limiting features in the written agreement concerning payment of dividends. In this connection the true value of the Bay Bank stock when considering the methods employed for its valuation is uncertain during the period of time at which the loans were made to JCJ Trust and Christo, Jr., those dates being October 2, 1991 and September 3, 1991 respectively. Although more recent financial statements not found in the credit files associated with the loans made on September 3, 1991, and October 2, 1991, to Christo, Jr. and JCJ Trust respectively was potentially available in making the decisions concerning those loans, those more recent financial statements do not depict a financial position by the borrowers that would justify the loans. Strictly considered, the existence of other financial statements had no pertinence at the time that the loans were made, because the loan and discount committee and the directors made their decisions based upon matters found within the credit file and it is their actions at the moment that warrant criticism. After the letter of credit issued on February 25, 1991 to Christo, Jr. was drawn upon, the September 3, 1991 note for repayment by Christo, Jr., to Bay Bank was one without collateral and for which no payment was due until maturity on September 3, 1992 and about which the source of repayment was questionable. Therefore, it involved more than the normal risk of repayment. After the letter of credit issued on February 25, 1991 to JCJ Trust was drawn upon, the October 2, 1991 note for repayment by JCJ Trust to Bay Bank as one without collateral and for which no payment was due until maturity on October 1, 1992 and about which the source of repayment was questionable. Therefore, it involved more than the normal risk of repayment. Christo, III's claim that when he voted on February 19, 1991 to approve the JCJ Trust letter of credit that he did so through inadvertence is not persuasive. The protocol for considering this letter of credit was the same as had been the case in the past when the directors decided to provide a letter of credit for JCJ Trust. On those prior occasions Christo, III, had abstained from voting on the JCJ Trust on a single voting sheet for JCJ Trust and Christo, Jr. Nothing had changed in the voting sheet format for February 19, 1991. His claim that he was confused and mistakenly voted for the JCJ Trust letter of credit on February 19, 1991, because it also contained a reference to the Christo, Jr. letter of credit is not credible. The idea that his decision was inadvertent based upon some confusion is rejected in favor of the inference that his choice to vote was through negligence or intent. FDIC Examination The circumstances associated with the JCJ Trust February 25, 1991 letter of credit and the ensuing loan of October 2, 1991, that have been described form the basis for the FDIC through the November 18, 1991 report of examination to comment that violations of the Federal Reserve Act, 12 C.F.R., s. 215.4 and Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. 371(c) had occurred. In addition, the FDIC in its November 18, 1991 examination rated Bay Bank through the Camel rating system as an aggregate 4. As with the prior rating by the Department, Bay Bank was observed by the FDIC to be engaged in unsafe and unsound practices through acts of commission or omission by its management team and directors. Although some changes can be seen through the findings made in the state examination performed on March 31, 1991 compared to the report of examination by the FDIC on November 18, 1991, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 6, they do not tend to substantially alter the impression about the persistent problems within the institution. In particular, the FDIC directed criticism to the board of directors concerning the need for the directors to ensure that executive management was cognizant of applicable laws and regulations pertaining to the bank's activities and the need to develop a system to affect and monitor compliance with those laws and regulations. This observation was made notwithstanding the recognition that members of the board of directors for Bay Bank would not necessarily be expected to have personal knowledge of those laws and regulations, but would need to make certain that the laws and regulations received high priority attention by the bank's everyday managers. The FDIC also commented on a problem with maintaining an appropriate internal control system and an adequate means of auditing as evidenced by violations found within the November 18, 1991 report. The board was reminded to evaluate the adequacy of the bank's loan watch-list as that device was calculated to assist in determining the proper allowance for loan losses, and from there establish a sufficient loan loss reserve. The loan loss reserve was criticized. The regulators subsequent adjustment to the loan loss reserve calculation following the November 18, 1991 examination still revealed a deficiency in the loan loss reserve. There was a continuing problem with asset quality showing a further deterioration from the March 31, 1991 state examination. This pertains to adversely classified loans in the categories of loss and doubtful loans, when taking into account the need to comply with the written agreement in charging off 100 percent of loss and 50 percent of doubtful. Among the adversely classified loans which were mentioned in the FDIC examination was the October 2, 1991 loan to JCJ Trust. The November 18, 1991 report reminded Bay Bank to dispose of other real estate at the earliest favorable opportunity. The FDIC examination pointed out the weakness in the bank's capital position due to large loan losses. When the examination was conducted on November 18, 1991, the liquidity ratio was found to be unsatisfactory. Fiduciary Duties Generally, Christo, Jr. and Christo, III, were sufficiently apprised of the practices which are complained of and proven here to be held accountable for their respective actions or inactions as bank officers. More specifically, Christo, Jr., and Christo, III, were knowledgeable concerning the respective financial positions of Christo, Jr., and JCJ Trust associated with the letters of credit approved on February 25, 1991, for Christo, Jr., in his personal capacity and Christo, III, as Trustee for JCJ Trust. The Christos knew or should have known about the Bay Bank loan policies for issuing letters of credit on February 25, 1991. The basis for imputing this knowledge or need for knowledge is premised upon the fact that Christo, Jr., was then CEO and Christo, III, was then president of Bay Bank. Given their positions as officers the Christos knew or should have known that the letters of credit that were issued on February 25, 1991, were by terms dissimilar to those afforded the ordinary bank customer when receiving a letter of credit. Similarly, the Christos knew or should have known that the loans that were made to Christo, Jr., and JCJ Trust on September 3, 1991 and October 2, 1991 respectively were pursuant to arrangements that were not otherwise available to an ordinary bank customer. Another reason for holding the Christos to knowledge of relevant requirements for proper practices and conduct in bank affairs is based upon the fact that Christo, Jr., had been a banker, and for the most part, a chief executive of a bank, for a period approximating 30 years at the time the decisions were made concerning the letters of credit and loans once the letters of credit were drawn upon. In a related capacity Christo, III, has been a national bank examiner and has worked in banking for a period of approximately 25 years to include 10 years service with Bay Bank as an executive officer. Notwithstanding their background and knowledge the Christos allowed conditions to arise in association with the issuance of the two letters of credit and the loans that were made following draws, in contravention of internal loan policies, prudent banking practices and laws and regulations. It is to be expected that the Christos should have reminded the other directors that internal bank policies and laws and regulations would not allow more favorable treatment for Christo, Jr., and JCJ Trust concerning the issuance of letters of credit in February of 1991 and loans in September and October, 1991, to pay back the draws, especially when taking into account that security was not required for the transactions in question. The need for the other directors who voted to issue the letters of credit and to approve loans following the draws, to conform to acceptable banking practices in their respective positions as directors, does not excuse the Christos from their affirmative duty to remind the other directors to conform to internal policies and laws and regulations concerning equal treatment of other persons and bank officials when establishing letters of credit and making loans. The Christos failed to properly exercise their fiduciary duties when action was taken concerning the letters of credit and subsequent loans following the draws. It was not enough for Christo, Jr., to abstain from participating in the decision to approve his letter of credit and that for JCJ Trust. It was even more inappropriate for Christo, III, to affirmatively vote in favor of the letters of credit for JCJ Trust and Christo, Jr. The arrangements made for the benefit of Christo, Jr., and JCJ Trust left Bay Bank exposed for $850,000.00 in disbursements without security should the letters of credit be drawn upon and that arrangement continued following the decision to make loans to Christo, Jr., and JCJ Trust in a related amount after the letters of credit were drawn upon. The Christos as the principal managers of the bank when the examinations were conducted were shown through the findings made in the examination reports to have breached their fiduciary duties. By failing to meet their responsibilities concerning the findings made in the two examinations and related to the Christo, Jr., and JCJ Trust letters of credit and loans, the Christos engaged in unsafe and unsound practices whose consequences created the likelihood of abnormal risk or loss, insolvency or dissipation of assets which seriously prejudice the interests of Bay Bank and its depositors when taking into account the overall condition of Bay Bank at the time at which the letters of credit were issued and the loans made following the draws. History of Regulatory Correction The external history of action by the Department to correct problems within Bay Bank is constituted of the written agreement that has been described. Consistent Agency Practices As alluded to before, the treatment given other institutions which the Department regulates when considering the propriety of assessing the costs of examination and supervision does not point out inconsistent agency practices. Having reviewed the evidence concerning inconsistent agency practice in removal and prohibition of individuals from participating in banking in Florida, while the means to affect removal from an institution may not have always been the same, the outcome anticipated by that process is sufficiently consistent and the factual differences between cases do not lead to a finding that the agency has acted inconsistently when comparing its effort to remove the Christos with other removal actions described at hearing.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of facts and the conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be issued which assesses the cost of examination and supervision for the March 31, 1991 examination in the amount $67,494.20; That denies the imposition of a levy for late payment of $100.00 per day commencing November 5, 1991 and beyond; That denies the imposition of an administrative fine for intentional late payment in the amount of $1,000.00 per day commencing December 16, 1991 and beyond; That orders Bay Bank, its officers, directors, or other persons participating in the conduct of the affairs of Bay Bank, to cease and desist from engaging in practices which would allow Christo, Jr., and Christo, III, to obtain credit from Bay Bank in contravention of laws and regulations, and which breach the October 14, 1991 written agreement and Bay Bank internal policies; That prohibits Christo, Jr., from participating in Bay Bank or any other financial institution regulated by the Department as an officer or in a similar position for Bay Bank or any other financial institution or becoming a director in any other financial institution and that restricts Christo, Jr., in his directorship at Bay Bank from participating in any decision to select or dismiss Bay Bank officers or directors; That prohibits Christo, III, from participating in Bay Bank or any other financial institution regulated by the Department as an officer or in a similar position for Bay Bank or any other financial institution or becoming a director in any other financial institution and that restricts Christo, III, in his directorship at Bay Bank from participating in any decision to select or dismiss Bay Bank officers or directors; DONE and ENTERED this 1st day of February, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of February, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-2455 and 92-3744 The following discussion is given concerning the proposed facts submitted by the parties: Petitioner's Facts: Paragraphs 1 through 26 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraphs 27 and 28 constitute conclusions of law. Paragraphs 29 through 81 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 82 constitutes legal argument. Paragraphs 83 through 85 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 86 is not relevant. Paragraphs 87 through 123 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 124 is rejected. Paragraphs 125 through 136 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 137 constitutes legal argument. Paragraphs 138 through 145 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 146 constitutes a conclusion of law. Paragraph 147 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 148 constitutes a conclusion of law. Paragraphs 149 through 152 constitute legal argument. Paragraph 153 through 170 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraphs 171 through 181 constitute legal argument. Paragraph 182 through 201 are subordinate to facts found. Respondent's Facts: Paragraphs 4 through 7 with the exception of the latter sentences found within subparagraphs 13 through 15 to paragraph 7 are subordinate to facts found. Those latter sentences within the subparagraphs are not relevant. Paragraphs 8 through 10 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 11 is subordinate to facts found with the exception that subparagraph 1 in its suggestion that the Department does not adequately explain its assignment of an aggregate score is rejected, as is the contention at subparagraph 9 that Camel rating may be changed at a "whim" and that a change was made to a component Camel rating in the March 31, 1991 examination without justification for that change. Paragraph 12 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 13 is rejected. Paragraph 14 is not relevant. Paragraphs 15 through 30 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 31 as it attempts to defend the accusations in the administrative complaint is rejected. Paragraph 32 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraphs 33 through 36 are not relevant. Paragraph 37 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 38 is rejected. Paragraph 39 is not relevant. Paragraph 40 is rejected. Paragraph 41 is not relevant. Paragraph 42 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 43 is not relevant. Paragraphs 44 through 48 are subordinate to facts found, except that the subparts to Paragraph 48 constitute legal argument. Paragraph 49 is not relevant. The first sentence to Paragraph 50 is not relevant. The second sentence is rejected. Paragraphs 51 and 52 are rejected. Paragraph 53 constitutes legal argument. Paragraphs 51 and 52 are rejected. Paragraph 53 constitutes legal argument. Paragraphs 54 through 56 are not relevant. Paragraphs 57 and 58 are rejected. Paragraph 59 is not relevant. Paragraph 60 does not form a defense to the accusations. Paragraph 61 and 62 are rejected. COPIES FURNISHED: Alan C. Sundberg, Esquire Robert Pass, Esquire E. Kelley Bittick, Jr., Esquire Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel Smith & Cutler, P.A. 500 Barnett Bank Building 215 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 William G. Reeves, General Counsel Albert T. Gimble, Chief Banking Counsel Department of Banking and Finance Suite 1302, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 William A. Friedlander, Esquire Raymond B. Vickers, Esquire Craig S. Kiser, Esquire 424 West Call Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gerald Lewis, Comptroller Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350
Recommendation In light of the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department issue a final order dismissing Petitioner’s amended petition on the grounds that Petitioner lacks standing to administratively challenge the Department’s decision not to disapprove Hensler’s proposed appointment to Sunniland’s board of directors and that the Department, having failed to act within the time frame prescribed by Rule 3C-100.0385, Florida Administrative Code, does not have the authority to reconsider its decision and issue a letter of disapproval, as requested by Petitioner.16 DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of April, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of April 1997
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Tarpon Financial Corporation is a federal banking corporation engaged in general banking services in the State of Florida, with its principal place of business in Tarpon Springs, Florida. Petitioners are not subsidiaries of, or associated with, either First National Bank of Florida, Inc., or First Florida Banks, Inc. On or about June 16, 1987, Petitioners submitted to and requested approval from Respondent of the name "First National Bank" as a service mark. Respondent denied registration of this service mark on June 29, 1987 by letter stating, "(W)e have a mark registered under the same or similar name and class." On August 6, 1987, Petitioners requested reconsideration citing the Rand McNally Banker's Directory, a nationally issued banking directory, to support its position that the same or similar service mark it seeks to register is not already in use in the State of Florida. The Respondent again denied the request on August 14, 1987 by letter stating, "Our records indicate 'First National Bank of Florida' is an active Florida corporation. We have no record of any name change." Petitioners sought reconsideration again on August 27, 1987, and requested that the matter be reviewed by Respondent's trademark committee. After review by that committee, Petitioners' application was denied for a third time on September 8, 1987. The service mark, "First National Bank of Florida," was registered with Respondent on June 16, 1982, and given mark number 927091. The owner of this mark is First National Bank of Florida, Inc., Tampa, Florida, and annual reports have been filed with Respondent in June of each year, including June 8, 1988, thereby indicating the mark has not been abandoned. The Respondent's records indicate that "First National Bank of Florida" is an actively registered service mark. The fact that it does not appear in the Rand McNally Banker's Directory does not establish that it is not an active mark registered with Respondent. The period of registration for service marks is ten years, and therefore the registration of "First National Bank of Florida" expires June 16, 1992, subject to renewal. The Respondent cannot register marks unless they are distinguishable from service marks already registered. Competent substantial evidence was not presented to support Petitioner's claim that "First National Bank," the mark it seeks to register, is distinguishable from "First National Bank of Florida," which is already registered. The absence of the phrase "of Florida" from the mark Petitioner seeks to register does not distinguish it from the mark already registered
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that Respondent enter a Final Order denying Petitioners' application to register the service mark, "First National Bank." DONE and ENTERED this 1st day of August, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of August, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-1250 Rulings on Petitioners' Proposed Findings of Fact: Adopted in Finding of Fact 3, but otherwise Rejected in Finding of Fact 5 and as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. 3-4. Rejected in Finding of Fact 7 and Rejected as unsupported in the record. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected in Finding of Fact 7. Rejected as irrelevant and unsupported in the record. Rejected as unsupported in the record. Rulings on Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1-2. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. 6-7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. 8-9. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. 10. Rejected as unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Donald R. Hall, Esquire Suite 402, Corporate Square 2900 U.S. Highway 19, North Clearwater, Florida 34621 Henri C. Cawthon, Esquire Department of State The Capitol, Room LL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Honorable Jim Smith Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
The Issue Whether employees of Production Credit Associations and the Federal Land Bank Associations of Florida may be licensed to sell insurance by the Florida Department of Insurance. (a) Whether the affidavit by C. W. S. Horne offered by Intervenors Production Credit Associations of Florida and Federal Land Bank Associations of Florida is relevant and material to the issues. Whether the Production Credit Associations of Florida and the Federal Land Bank Associations of Florida are financial institutions as defined in Section 636.9_8 of the Florida Statutes. Whether the Department of Insurance, in its licensing proceedings, should consider or must consider the Federal laws, rules and regulations.
Findings Of Fact Facts stipulated by the parties on the record: "The Petitioners, the Florida Association of Insurance Agents, representing the Association and its members individually and collectively, is a representative party in interest for these proceedings and any review thereof. And its members will be effected by any decision of the Department of Insurance in licensing insurance agents to be employed by, retained by, or associated with Production Credit Associations in the State of Florida. For the purposes of this proceeding, and any review thereof, no member of the Association may take a position contrary to or in opposition to that taken herein by the Petitioner. "The Production Credit Associations of Florida and the Federal Land Bank Associations of Florida and the Federal Land Bank Associations of Florida have an interest in the decisions of the Department of Insurance with respect to the licensing of insurance agents to sell insurance on their behalf. And the decisions of the Department in licensing of such insurance agents will substantially effect the interest of the Production Credit Associations and the Federal Land Bank Associations of Florida, and they are therefore proper parties to the Administrative Proceedings. "Florida Farm Bureau Federation, L.A.A., (Limited Agricultural Association) is a non-profit voluntary general farm membership organization comprised of approximately 65,000 member families. The Florida Farm Bureau offers comprehensive insurance services to their members, and if the Department licenses insurance agents to be employed by or associated with the Production Credit Associations of Florida, they will be offering similar services that are already offered by the Florida Farm Bureau. "The Department of Insurance has licensed two insurance agents with type 2-20 general lines insurance licenses, which licenses since their issuance have been utilized by the holders thereof. The Production Credit Associations of Florida and the Federal Land Bank Associations of Florida have retained such licensed agents and have entered into the insurance business through the process of having such agents solicit and sell insurance to persons, including those who borrow from either the Production Credit Associations or the Federal Land Bank Associations of Florida. "The Intervenors, Production Credit Associations of Florida, may offer into evidence an affidavit concerning the operations of the Associations and their affiliates in Florida. The other parties hereto will not object to the form of the evidence, but reserve the right to object to its introduction on the grounds that it is irrelevant and immaterial. ". . .there are Federal rules and regulations under the Farm Credit Administration Act. The Hearing Officer may take judicial knowledge of such rules and regulations and any amendments thereto. ". . .it is stipulated that Mr. Field has witnesses that would testify to these items, and the other parties waive cross examination of such witnesses and agree to these facts without necessarily stipulating that such facts are true. ". . .Mr. Bob Taylor, Vice President for Underwriting of Farm Bureau Insurance Companies, would testify that Farm Bureau, through its related insurance companies and other competitive companies are currently offering cost, qualitatively and availability, similar insurance services to those being sought in rural communities. ". . .Mr. Doug Oswald, President of Sun Bank, Ocala, would testify as to the availability of farm loans during the last 24 years in the Ocala, Marion County, Florida area. He would testify that such loans are currently available through current commercial sources and have been available, and such loans, including both mortgage and production type loans, are presently available in Marion County. And that insurance related services in connection with the farm type loans in his community have been available through the Farm Bureau and other companies during this period of time. ". . .Mr. Bob Taylor, Vice President of Underwriting, Farm Bureau Insurance Companies, would also testify that similar insurance services proposed to be offered to the Production Credit Association and the Land Bank are presently being and have been offered by the Farm Bureau Insurance Companies in the rural communities on a competitive form from both cost, qualitatively and availability. The Hearing Officer further finds: The Production Credit Associations of Florida and the Federal Land Bank Associations of Florida are chartered by the Farm Credit Administration [a federal agency in the executive branch of the government subject to regulation and supervision by the Farm Credit Administration, Title 12, Chapter IV, United States Code] upon application of local persons eligible to borrow money from the Farm Credit System. There are nine (9) Production Credit Associations and seven (7) Federal Land Bank Associations in Florida. Two licenses have been approved by the Respondent for two employees or associates of the Production Credit Association. The following affidavit of C. W. S. Horne, Executive Vice President of Federal Land Banks of Columbia and the Federal Land Bank of Columbia, is admissible for the purpose of describing the operations and functions of the associations and their affiliates in Florida: "PERSONALLY APPEARED BEFORE ME C. W. S. Horne, being duly sworn deposes and says that he is the Executive Vice President of the Federal Land Bank of Columbia, and the Federal Credit Bank of Columbia, and that if called upon to testify in the above captioned matter he would state that according to his knowledge and belief the Farm Credit Act of 1971 does in fact provide in Section 1.4(11) as follows: "Accept deposits of securities or of current funds"; and that neither the Federal Land Bank nor the Federal Intermediate Credit Bank accepts any deposits from members of the general public in any form such as is common with commercial banks and that it accepts no deposits either for time or checking accounts or issue certificates of deposit or other similar evidences of indebtedness; and that pursuant to Section 1.4(11) of the Farm Credit Act of 1971, the Federal Land Bank of Columbia does retain certain funds belonging to Federal land bank Associations and that it issues an advice of indebtedness to the associations and pays interest thereon based upon the cost of money to the Federal Land Bank of Columbia and that in practice these transactions amount to loans by certain associations to the Federal Land Bank of Columbia. Further the deponent sayeth not." The Florida Farm Bureau Federation, a limited agricultural association is a non-profit, voluntary general farm membership organization. Members may, and many do, borrow from the Production Credit Associations and the Federal Land Bank Associations, associations which are a part of the Farm credit Systems. The Florida Farm Bureau offers comprehensive insurance to its members through individual agents licensed by the Respondent Department of Insurance.
Recommendation Deny applications for licensure from the Production credit Associations of Florida and for the federal Land Bank Associations of Florida and revoke any licenses that have been issued. DONE and ORDERED this 16th day of December, 1976 in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of December, 1976. COPIES FURNISHED: Fred B. Karl, Esquire Post Office Drawer 229 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Edward L. Kutter, Esquire Room 268 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 E. Harper Field, Esquire Post Office Box 1879 Tallahassee, Florida Joseph C. Jacobs, Esquire Post Office Box 1170 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 J. R. Lowry, Esquire Bevin Ritch, Esquire Post Office Box 1025 Gainesville, Florida
The Issue The purpose of the mandatory public hearing is to afford the public an opportunity to comment on the application from a foreign national for authority to organize Union Credit Bank, a proposed new bank to be located in Miami, Dade County, Florida.
Findings Of Fact On October 18, 1999, the Department received an application (Application) from a foreign national to organize a new bank, Union Credit. The proposed location of Union Credit was Miami, Dade County, Florida. The Department published a notice of receipt of the Application in the October 29, 1999, publication of the Florida Administrative Weekly. The Department has satisfied the notice requirements of Subsection 120.80(3)(a)1.a., Florida Statutes, and Rule 3C-105.103, Florida Administrative Code. By letter dated November 8, 1999, the Department made a timely request for additional information, including additional information from Union Credit's proposed officers and directors (Applicants). The Department did not receive all of the additional information that it had requested from the Applicants until March 1, 2000. On April 3, 2000, the Applicants, as required by federal law, filed a separate application with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"). Identified on the Application are three individuals associated with Union Credit, Oddie Rishmague (O. Rishmague) , Miguel Rishmague (M. Rishmague), and Jorge Luis del Rosal, who are foreign nationals. Mr. O. Rishmague is a proposed director and the proposed sole owner. Mr. M. Rishmague is a proposed director, the proposed chairman of the board of directors, and a proposed officer. Mr. del Rosal is a proposed director. All other proposed officers and directors identified on the Application are citizens of the United States. The other proposed officers and directors are: John H. Blake, Alexander J. Evans, Robert Tamayo, Milton H. Lehr, and Grace V. McGuire. Mr. O. Rishmague, a proposed director and the proposed sole owner of Union Credit has more than 12 years of international banking experience. From 1988 to 1995, he served as Vice-Chairman of Banco Osorno. During his tenure, Banco Osorno grew from a small bank to the second largest bank in Chile. For the past five years, Mr. O. Rishmague has been a member of the board of directors of Corpbanca. In addition to his banking experience, Mr. O. Rishmague served as a director of Provida, a private company that manages $12 billion dollars of pension fund assets. Mr. Tamayo is the proposed president and chief executive officer for Union Credit. He has over 38 years of banking experience in the areas of international and domestic banking. From 1984 to July of 1993, Mr. Tamayo served as a Senior Vice President for Espirito Santos Bank of Florida, a state chartered domestic bank. From July of 1993 to 1999, he served as a Senior Vice President and General Manager of Banco Boliviano Americano’s Miami agency office. Mr. Lehr, a proposed director, has substantial banking experience. From 1976 to 1999 he served as a member of the board of directors of Republic National Bank of Miami. Mr. Blake, a proposed director, has over 13 years of banking experience. From 1986 to 1999 Mr. Blake served as a member of the board of directors of Republic National Bank of Miami. Mr. M. Rishmague, the proposed chairman of the board of directors, served two years as a member of the board of directors of Corpbanca. Ms. McGuire, a proposed director, is a self-employed bank consultant who has worked with numerous domestic and international banks on a variety of complex banking issues. Mr. del Rosal is a retired corporate executive. Mr. Evans is a certified public accountant. No evidence was presented and there is nothing in the record to indicate that the presently identified proposed officers do not have sufficient financial institution experience, ability, standing, and reputation to indicate reasonable promise of successful operation. No evidence was presented and there is nothing in the record to indicate that the proposed directors do not have sufficient business experience, ability, standing, and reputation to indicate reasonable promise of successful operation. None of the proposed officers or directors have been convicted of, or pled guilty or nolo contendere to, any violation of Section 655.50, Florida Statutes, relating to the Florida Control of Money Laundering in Financial Institutions Act; Chapter 896, Florida Statutes, relating to offenses related to financial institutions; or any similar state or federal law. Mr. Blake and Mr. Lehr, proposed directors who are not proposed officers, have had at least one year of direct experience as a director of a financial institution within three years of the date of the Application. Mr. Tamayo, the proposed president and chief executive officer, has had at least one year of direct experience as an executive officer of a financial institution within the last three years. The Applicants seek to organize Union Credit to provide a variety of competitive deposit products and other related banking services, including residential and commercial lending, within the Miami area. Union Credit’s target customers include individual consumers, professionals, and both small and large businesses. The initial gross capital for Union Credit will be $10,000,000.00, and will be classified as follows: $5,000,000.00 of paid-in capital; $4,750,000.00 of paid-in surplus; and $250,000.00 designated as undivided profits. Union Credit is authorized to issue, at opening, 1,000,000 shares of common stock at $10.00 per share. The initial capitalization of Union Credit is adequate in relation to its proposed business activities. However, should Union Credit’s capital fall below $10,000,000.00 within its first three years of operation, Mr. O. Rishmague will immediately contribute, from his own personal assets, the funds necessary to maintain Union Credit’s capital at the level of $10,000,000.00, thus ensuring that Union Credit’s gross capital remains, at a minimum, at $10,000,000.00. Thereafter, Mr. O. Rishmague has committed to infuse additional capital, as may be appropriate, as Union Credit grows in asset size. The local conditions in Miami are favorable to Union Credit’s business plan. Union Credit’s financial plan also appears reasonable and attainable. The Department and Applicants recognize that the corporate name of Union Credit is not, and cannot, be reserved with the Department of State. The Department of State no longer reserves corporate names. Union Credit will have suitable quarters. It will be located at 1150 South Miami Avenue, Miami, Florida. No member of the public appeared at the public hearing or spoke in opposition to the Application. No one testified in opposition to the Application. The Applicants cause notice of the public hearing to be published in the Miami Herald on May 4, 2000. The notice complied with the requirements of Rule 3C-105.106(1), Florida Administrative Code. The Applicants satisfied the notice requirements of Subsection 120.80(3)(a)4, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of July, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of July, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Alcides I. Avila, Esquire Patricia M. Hernandez, Esquire Holland & Knight, LLP 701 Brickell Avenue, Suite 3000 Miami, Florida 33131 Robert Alan Fox, Esquire Department of Banking and Finance 101 East Gaines Street Fletcher Building, Suite 526 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Honorable Robert F. Milligan Office of the Comptroller Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol, Plaza Level 09 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Harry L. Hooper, General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance Fletcher Building, Suite 526 101 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350
Findings Of Fact The Applicant, Protestant, and Department submitted Proposed Findings of Fact pursuant to Rule 3C-9.11, Florida Administrative Code. The Applicant's Proposed Findings of Fact are accepted except where they might specifically conflict with the Findings stated in the Hearing Officer's Report or where they may constitute conclusions of law, with the following exceptions: The last sentence of Proposed Finding Number 8 is rejected to the extent that it constitutes a legal argument as opposed to a finding of ultimate fact. Proposed Finding Number 11 is rejected in that it constitutes legal argument as opposed to a finding of ultimate fact. Proposed Finding Number 15 is rejected in that it constitutes a conclusion of law. The Protestant's Proposed Findings of Fact are accepted except where they might specifically conflict with the Findings stated in the Hearing Officer's Report or where they may constitute conclusions of law, with the following exceptions: The first sentence of Proposed Finding Number 6 is rejected in that it is speculative, constitutes legal argument, and is not supported by competent substantial evidence. The last sentence of Proposed Finding Number 6 is rejected in that it constitutes a conclusion of law as to the reason why the Protestant's bank charter was granted. The first, third, fourth and fifth sentences of Proposed Finding Number 10 are rejected, as they constitute legal arguments based upon restatement of testimony, as opposed to findings of ultimate fact. The second sentence of Proposed Finding Number 11 is rejected in that it constitutes a conclusion of law. Proposed Finding Number 14 is rejected in that it consists of argumentative references to testimony and not findings of ultimate fact. Proposed Finding Number 24 is rejected in that it constitutes legal argument and conclusions of law rather than findings of ultimate fact. The first sentence of Proposed Finding Number 26 is rejected in that it constitutes a conclusion of law. The second sentence of Proposed Finding Number 26 is rejected in that it is repetitious and constitutes a conclusion of law. The Fourth sentence of Proposed Finding Number 26 is rejected in that it constitutes a conclusion of law. Proposed Finding Number 27 is rejected in that it constitutes a conclusion of law. Proposed Finding Number 28 is rejected in that it constitutes legal argument rather than a finding of ultimate fact. The last sentence of Proposed Finding Number 31 is rejected in that it constitutes legal argument and a conclusion of law. The Department's Proposed Findings of Fact are accepted except where they might specifically conflict with the Findings of the Hearing Officer's Report or where they may constitute conclusions of law.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioners have filed an application with the Respondent to organize a new bank in Ocala, Marion County, Florida. The name of the proposed bank would be the Citizens First Bank of Ocala. The Petitioners are the organizers and proposed directors of the bank. Each of the Petitioners is of good moral character, and each enjoys an outstanding reputation. None of the Petitioners have been convicted of any crimes involving breach of trust, and none have filed for bankruptcy, or have any history of being bad credit risks. Together the Petitioners constitute a diverse group with very broad and successful business experiences. The Petitioner William R. Kidd is a registered professional engineer and realtor who has lived and worked in Ocala since 1950. Mr. Kidd has broad experience in evaluating various aspects of real estate transactions, and he has extensive experience in arranging financing of construction projects. Mr. Kidd owns a pollution control company which has a net worth of approximately $25,000 and a real estate business with sales since 1975 in excess of $10,000,000. He also manages and operates a successful consulting engineering firm. Mr. Kidd plans to invest $40,000 in the new bank, and he has sufficient funds readily availably to make that investment. Mr. Kidd is willing to invest more money in the enterprise if additional capitalization is required. Mr. Kidd is interested in working with the bank, particularly in relation to financing of real estate transactions, and construction projects. The Petitioner Ralph Murphy was born in Marion County and has spent most of his life there. Mr. Murphy owns a linen service company which does approximately $18,500 to $19,000 in business weekly. The linen service, which Mr. Murphy has managed since it was a small entity doing less than $2,500 in business weekly, has a net worth of approximately $900,000. Mr. Murphy serves on the Boards of Directors of several other corporations. Mr. Murphy intends to purchase $40,000 of stock in the proposed new bank, and he has funds readily available with which he can do that. Mr. Murphy is willing to devote as much time as is necessary to organize the bank. The Petitioner Milton L. Copeland manages an insurance firm which writes commercial insurance policies for businesses in Florida and in Georgia. His company has offices in Ocala and Jacksonville. The Ocala office writes approximately $2,000,000 in insurance policies annually. The Jacksonville office writes approximately $15,000 in policies weekly. Mr. Copeland has a personal net worth of approximately $800,000. Mr. Copeland intends to buy $40,000 worth of stock in the proposed new bank, and he has funds readily available for that purpose. Mr. Copeland wishes to take an active part in soliciting new accounts for the bank, and he could devote as much as two full days per week to bank activities. If further capitalization of the proposed bank were considered necessary, Mr. Copeland is willing to increase his investment in the bank. The Petitioner James Cunningham owns and operates a funeral home business in Ocala. He has lived in Ocala most of his life. The dollar volume of Mr. Cunningham's business during 1976 was approximately $250,000. Mr. Cunningham is a City Councilman in Ocala. He is a black man. It has only been in recent years that blacks have even been employed at local banks, and no blacks presently serve on the Boards of Directors of any banks operating in Ocala or Marion County. Mr. Cunningham intends to purchase $40,000 worth of stock in the new bank. He will need to borrow no more than 25 percent of that amount in order to make the investment. Mr. Cunningham desires to take an active part in soliciting accounts and customers for the new bank, and he is willing to devote whatever time would be required for that purpose. The Petitioner Marjorie Renfroe owns and operates a boat, motor and trailer sales and service business in Marion County. Her business had gross sales during 1976 of approximately $350,000. Ms. Renfroe serves on the Board of Directors of the United Way in Marion County, and on the Board of Directors of the Central Florida Community College. Ms. Renfroe plans to buy $40,000 worth of stock in the new bank, and if further capitalization were found necessary, she is willing to increase her investment, and is able to do so. Ms. Renfroe is willing to devote as much time as necessary to managing the new bank, and she is particularly interested in providing services to employees and students of the local community college, especially instructional sorts of courses for students. No women presently serve on the Boards of Directors of any banks in Marion County. One woman serves on the Board of Directors of a savings and loan institution in Marion County. The Petitioner Van G. Staton manages a Belk-Lindsey Department Store in Ocala, Florida. He has lived in Ocala and managed the department store since 1956. The store employs 48 persons and had gross sales during 1976 of approximately $3,000,000. The annual payroll of the store is $400,000 to $500,000. The Petitioner serves on the Board of Directors of a local automobile sales and service corporation, and from 1970 through 1975 he served on the Marion County School Board. Mr. Staton plans to purchase $40,000 of stock in the new bank, and he would not need to borrow more than 50 percent of that amount. Mr. Staton would favor additional capitalization, and would be willing to increase his investment. Mr. Staton is particularly interested in having extended business hours in the new bank beyond the hours presently served by banks operating in Marion County, and Saturday openings. He is willing to spend as much time as is necessary with banking activities. The Petitioner Owen C. Shelton owns and manages two corporations which operate fifteen convenience stores. The total sales for the two corporations was approximately $17,000,000 during 1976. Mr. Shelton has lived in Ocala for 15 years. His personal net worth is in excess of $1,000,000. Mr. Shelton has been in the grocery business for twenty-five years. He started with one small store. His corporations employ approximately 185 persons. Mr. Shelton plans to purchase $40,000 worth of stock in the new bank, and he is willing to increase his investment if further capitalization is required. The Petitioner Terry Trexler is President and Chairman of the Board of Nobility Homes, a mobile home manufacturing business. The company does business in 29 states, and does from 5.1 to 5.2 million dollars worth of business on a quarterly basis. Mr. Trexler has lived in Ocala for 15 years. Mr. Trexler plans to invest $40,000 in purchasing stock in the new bank, and he intends to be active in soliciting new accounts and customers for the bank. The Petitioner Sam Kinlaw is a resident of Orlando, Florida. He has a Bachelor's Degree in Business Administration from the University of Florida, and attended the Banking School of the South at Louisiana State University. Mr. Kinlaw has been active in the banking business, or in similar financial businesses since approximately 1958. He has served as the head of installment loan departments and commercial lending departments of banks in Florida. Beginning in 1972, he became the Chief Executive Officer of the Semoran Bank, which was a new Federally chartered bank. He was responsible for setting up the bank, hiring personnel, establishing policies, and carrying on the day-to-day operations of the bank. He served in that capacity from near the end of 1972 until September, 1975. He has not been involved in the banking business since then. Mr. Kinlaw intends to purchase a "qualifying share" of stock in the bank. He intends to serve on the Board of Directors during the time that the bank is being organized, until other persons with direct banking experience are named to the Board of Directors. The Petitioner Braxton Jones owns and operates several convenience stores and two supermarkets. He has lived in Ocala nearly all of his life. He is prepared to purchase between $20,000 and $30,000 of stock in the new bank, and he is willing to devote whatever time would be necessary to organize and operate the bank. The Petitioner Clarence Woodrow Hicks has lived in Marion County for approximately 30 years. He formerly owned and operated Hicks News Agency, which was involved in the wholesale distribution of magazines, books, postcards and sundry items. He also owned two retail book stores. Mr. Hicks has sold his business and is now semi-retired. He serves as a consultant to the new owners of his business. During the time that he operated the businesses, they did approximately three million dollars of business per year. Mr. Hicks' net worth is in excess of one million dollars. Mr. Hicks has time available to devote to the new bank. The proposed Citizens First Bank of Ocala would, if the instant application were granted, be located at the northwest corner of the intersection of State Road 200 and Southwest 16th Avenue in Ocala. The location is approximately one mile west of Pine Street (Federal Highways 441, 27, and 301), which is the primary north/south artery through Ocala. The proposed bank would be located just over three miles east of Interstate Highway 75. State Road 200 is presently a four lane highway which serves as one of the primary routes from the Interstate Highway into Ocala. Southwest 16th Avenue is presently two- laned, but all right of ways have been acquired and construction will shortly commence to four-lane the road. All of the banks and the savings and loans associations which presently operate in the Ocala area are located east of Pine Street. There are no banking facilities in the Ocala area which are located to the west of Pine Street. Location of a banking facility to the west of Pine Street would serve the convenience of persons in Ocala who live or work on the west side of Pine Street. Pine Street is a very busy highway, which has not been properly designed so that it can be easily crossed. Furthermore, a railroad track runs parallel to Pine Street to the West, and presents an additional barrier. While it is not impossible for persons who live or work on the west side of Pine Street to bank on the east side, the testimony is unrebutted that it is inconvenient to do so due to traffic congestion, and the railroad. There are many persons who reside on the west side, of Pine Street. The area to the north of the proposed bank site is a residential area. There are many low income residences, and trailer park type residential facilities in that area. There are also many moderate income residences to the south and the west of the proposed site all on the west side of Pine Street. The total population of the primary service area, which is designated to be west of Pine Street, is estimated to be 14,300, as of July, 1977. This represents more than a 35 percent increase from 1970 population figures. Many more residences are planned in the area. Over 1,200 new homes have recently been completed, and more than 500 are under construction. Larger residential developments are in the planning stages. There is considerable commercial activity in the areas surrounding the proposed site. The Ocala Industrial Park is located immediately across State Road 200 from the proposed site, and the South 40 Industrial Park is also nearby. Thirty-eight firms presently occupy space in the Ocala Industrial Park, employing more than 1,500 persons and occupying more than one million square feet of building space. Fourteen firms are presently located at the South 40 Industrial Park, employing nearly 350 persons and utilizing more than 300,000 square feet of building space. Both Industrial Parks have experienced steady growth. Many businesses, including several automobile sales and service businesses, have located on State Road 200. Construction is scheduled to begin on a major shopping mall in January, 1978, by the Edward J. DeBartolo Corporation. The mall will be located on State Road 200 just east of Interstate Highway 75. Construction will take approximately 12 months. More than 900 persons will be employed at the mall. In addition, most of the horse farms which surround the Ocala area are located west of Pine Street. There are six banking institutions located in Marion County. The two banks located out of the Ocala area have no particular relevance to this matter. Four banks are located in Ocala. Only one of these banks is an independent bank. The others are parts of larger bank holding companies which are not centered in Ocala. Total bank deposits in Marion County have increased steadily from a total of $176,586,000 in 1973 to $236,336,000 in June, 1977. Although estimates vary, it is evident that the population of Marion County has increased from a 1970 total of approximately 69,000 to a 1977 total of from 104,000 to 127,000. It appears that existing banks in Marion County are in a healthy financial position and are experiencing steady growth. There are many interlocking relationships on the Boards of Directors of the existing banks. None of the Petitioners presently serve on the Boards of any of the existing banks, and this can only promote more lively competition among the banks. Petitioners have proposed to keep their bank open for longer hours than existing banks, and for additional banking days. Petitioners propose to provide specialized counselling for new business people, and education courses for students who attend the nearby Central Florida Community College. It appears that local banks have frequently acted adversely on loan applications from local developers, who have been able to borrow money at favorable rates outside of Marion County. The presently existing banks have not adequately served the very large and active horse farming industry that is located in Ocala, and several horse farmers have needed to go to Gainesville to obtain adequate farm businesses. Banks in Marion County have shown a deposit gain of nearly sixteen percent during the year 1976, as compared to a State of Florida average of approximately 7.4 percent. Of the sixteen counties in which new bank charters were granted in the period from January, 1975, through March, 1977, only two counties had a total deposit growth greater than was experienced in Marion County. A savings and loan association was chartered and opened in Marion County in January, 1975. The association has achieved very good success, and has not proved harmful to other financial institutions, which have also shown steady growth during this same period. Petitioners have projected a net profit at the end of the third year of their operation of $163,300 based on deposits of $10,000,000. A more conservative estimate of a net profit of $61,350, based on $8,000,000 in deposits after three years was estimated by Examiner Howze, a bank examiner who conducted an investigation of the instant application for the Respondent. George Lewis, II, the former Director of the Division of Banking, prepared a proposed budget which showed that the bank would be operating at a loss after three years. George Lewis' estimates are not credible. He estimated that the return on commercial loans would be at a rate of from 7 and 1/4 to 8 percent during the first, second and third years. Nine percent is a more realistic figure, and is itself conservative. The Respondent approved the charter of the Shores Bank of Lake Wier in Marion County which indicated a nine percent return on loans. George Lewis furthermore showed a three percent cost on all demand deposits. This cost is not justified by any factors currently accepted in the banking business. George Lewis apparently based the additional cost on his feeling that the legislature may pass a law requiring banks to pay such a return on all demand deposits. Such speculation has not been shown to be justifiable, and cannot serve as a reasonable factor to be used in predicting a proposed bank's profits. Petitioners propose to issue capital stock in the amount of $1,000,000, and thus to capitalize the new bank in that amount. This is adequate capital to serve the needs of the proposed bank during the first three years of its operation. George Lewis, II, testified that additional, capitalization would be required, but he gave no reason for his opinion. To the extent that additional capital is required, the Petitioners are in a position to raise it, and are willing to do so. Only one of the Petitioners who would serve on the first Board of Directors of the proposed bank has any direct banking experience. All of the Petitioners have engaged in considerable banking activities, but only Sam Kinlaw has served in an active capacity with a bank. The Petitioners propose to hire experienced persons to serve as the bank's Chief Executive Officer and Chief Operations Officer. These persons would also serve on the Board of Directors. The Petitioners do represent a good cross-section of successful business people. Their varied business experiences within Marion County would be very helpful to the new bank. In order to properly operate the bank, however, they will require experienced officers. Consistent with the Respondent's policy, the Petitioners have not yet named their officers. To do so, the Petitioners would place the persons they propose to hire in an untenable position in their present capacities. The Respondent has, in the past, approved bank charter applications for further processing under similar circumstances, so as to allow applicants an opportunity to recruit acceptable, experienced individuals to serve as officers. The Board of the proposed bank, as presently constituted, does not have adequate banking experience so as to assure a reasonable prospect of success. If, however, experienced, competent officers, who will also serve on the Board, are hired, the Board would be such as to assure a reasonable promise of success. The parties have stipulated that the name of the proposed bank, the Citizens First Bank of Ocala, is not so similar to any existing bank as to cause confusion with the name of the existing bank. The property which the Petitioners have obtained for the proposed bank is an excellent location. Petitioners plan to utilize a structure which is already on the land to commence operations. The structure has approximately 3,000 square feet of floor space, is aesthetically appropriate, and can be fairly easily modified to serve as a banking facility. The structure, when modified to increase the size of the lobby and to provide appropriate security measures, should prove adequate during the first three years of the bank's operation. There is sufficient land for additions to be made, and the structure is physically sound so that a second floor could be added. The Petitioners are prepared to increase the size of the facility as required.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED: That the Petitioners' application for authority to organize and operate the Citizens First Bank of Ocala be approved for further processing, and that the application be finally approved when the Petitioners have satisfied the Respondent that they have retained appropriate individuals to serve as the bank's principal officers, and that these persons will also serve on the Board of Directors. RECOMMENDED this 30th day of December, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. G. STEVEN PFEIFFER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of December, 1977. COPIES FURNISHED: C. Gary Williams, Esquire AUSLEY, McMULLEN, McGEHEE, CAROTHERS & PROCTOR Post Office Box 391 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 S. Craig Kiser, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Office of the Comptroller Legal Annex Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Joseph C. Jacobs, Esquire Post Office Box 1170 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Willard Ayres, Esquire Post Office Box 1148 Ocala, Florida 32670 Appendix
Findings Of Fact The Department rules on the Proposed Findings of Facts submitted by the parties as follows: APPLICANT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS Applicant's proposed finding as to the net profit to asset ratio is accepted. Applicant's proposed finding as to the adjusted capital to asset ratio is accepted. Applicant's proposed finding as to the boundaries of the PSA are accepted. Applicant's proposed findings as to the population estimates of the PSA and the communities located within the PSA are accepted to the extent they are not inconsistent with the Department's findings adopted herein. Applicant's proposed finding as to net migration into Pinellas County and the age distribution characteristics of Pinellas County are accepted to the extent they are not inconsistent with the Department's findings adopted herein. Applicant's proposed finding that the Bank of Indian Rocks is the only full service bank with its main office operating in the PSA is accepted. Applicant's proposed finding that the Bank of Indian Rocks experienced a 23.3 percent rate of growth for loans and a relatively modest rate of growth for deposits during the last reporting year is accepted. Applicant's proposed findings as to the nature of the proposed branch site are accepted. Applicant's proposed finding as to the banks servicing the PSA is accepted to the extent that said banks have branch offices located in the PSA, but is rejected to the extent that said finding excludes other banks which may service customers in the PSA. Applicant's proposed finding that the PSA community is heavily dominated in terms of bank operations by the Bank of Indian Rocks is rejected as being unsupported by competent substantive evidence in the record. The record indicates that based on a telephone sample survey of 399 persons, 49 percent of the households in the PSA have their primary checking account at the Bank of Indian Rocks. The Applicant's proposed finding does not necessarily follow from the survey. Applicant's proposed finding as to the percentage of people located in the PSA that have a primary checking account in the PSA and bank with the Bank of Indian Rocks is rejected for the reasons previously stated in paragraph 10. Applicant's proposed finding as to the need for an additional full service bank based on the statistical data presented is rejected as constituting a conclusion of law. Applicant's proposed finding as to the savings and loan associations serving the PSA is accepted to the extent that said savings and loan associations have offices located in the PSA, but is rejected to the extent that said finding excludes other savings and loan association offices which may serve customers in the PSA. Applicant's proposed findings as to the nature of the primary service area is accepted, with the exception of the finding as to the amount of land available for future development which is rejected as being unsupported by competent substantial evidence in the record. Applicant's proposed findings that the Applicant's economic capacity will be enhanced by the branch; that the Applicant can support the proposed branch and statements with regard thereto, are rejected as constituting conclusions of law and legal argument, rather than findings of fact. Applicant's proposed findings as to the range of services that will be offered at the proposed branch are accepted. Applicant's proposed finding as to the need for additional banking facilities and the convenience of the proposed bank are rejected as constituting conclusions of law. Applicant's proposed findings as to the substantial experience of the bank staff, and significant assets are accepted; however, Applicant's proposed findings to the capability of the bank to support the branch facilities is rejected as constituting a conclusion of law. Applicant's proposed findings as to the Applicant's return on assets on 1977, 19978 and year to date are accepted. Applicant's proposed findings as to the liquid assets as a percent of total liabilities; condition of assets; classified assets and loan loss ratio are accepted. Applicant's proposed findings as to increased earnings, increased average balances and reduced chargeoffs are accepted. Applicant's proposed finding that there has been no cash operating loss of the Applicant is rejected as being unsupported by competent substantial evidence in the record. Applicant's other statements with regard thereto are rejected as constituting legal argument rather than findings of facts. Applicant's proposed finding that the review of the branch by management of the Applicant and the Atlantic Bancorporation is significant is accepted; however, Applicant's proposed finding as to the judgment of the management as to the success of the proposed branch constitutes a conclusion of law. Applicant's proposed finding that there was no insider transaction involved in the purchase of the land is rejected as being irrelevant and immaterial. Applicant's proposed finding that there was no showing that the lease transaction constitutes an insider transaction is rejected as being unsupported by competent substantial evidence in the record. Applicant's proposed finding that the lease sum represents approximately a 12 percent return on assets is accepted; however, the Applicant's proposed finding that the lease arrangement was not controverted as being unfair or unreasonable is rejected as being irrelevant and immaterial. Applicant's proposed finding that the depth of management is sufficient to operate the branch is rejected as constituting a conclusion of law. Applicant's proposed findings as to the number of years of experience of various officers of the bank is accepted. Applicant's proposed finding as to whether the name of the proposed branch was confusing is rejected as constituting a conclusion of law. Applicant's proposed finding that the Applicant does not have more than four pending branch applications is accepted. Applicant's proposed findings that there was no evidence presented which would indicate that the bank was not in compliance with federal and state regulations and statements of bank offices thereto are accepted. PROTESTANT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS Protestant's proposed findings in Section 1 are accepted, with the exception of the last sentence which is rejected as being a conclusory statement not supported by competent substantial evidence in the record. Protestant's proposed findings in Section 2 are accepted. Protestant's proposed findings in Section 3 are accepted, with the exception that the record reflects that the proposed site is located in the vicinity of the northwest quadrant of the intersection of Indian Rocks Road and Walsingham, and does not specify the number of fees west of the intersection. Protestant's proposed findings as to the PSA's boundaries as delineated by the Applicant in Section 4 are accepted. The second and third sentences in Section 4 are rejected as being unsupported by competent substantial evidence in the record. The first sentence in the second paragraph of Section 4 is accepted. The second sentence in the second paragraph of Section 4 is rejected as constituting legal argument rather than a finding of fact. The remaining proposed findings in Section 4 relating to the boundaries of the PSA of the First Bank of Treasure Island are irrelevant for the reason that said PSA is not necessarily applicable to subsequent applications. Protestant's proposed finding in Section 4 as to the population of the PSA is accepted and the proposed findings relating to the population of First Bank of Treasure Island's PSA is rejected as being irrelevant. Protestant's proposed finding in Section 4 as to the residential nature of the PSA is accepted. Protestant's proposed finding as to the limited nature of commercial activity is rejected as being unsupported by competent substantial evidence. The record reflects that although commercial activity in the PSA is in the form of small retail, professional, and service type establishments, these establishments are numerous in number. Protestant's proposed finding as to the considerable greenbelt lands which cannot be used for development is rejected as being unsupported by competent substantial evidence. The record reflects that there are greenbelt areas which cannot be used for development, but does not reflect that the amount of these lands is considerable. Protestant's proposed findings in the first and second sentences in Section 5 are accepted. The third sentence in Section 5 is accepted to the extent that traffic coming from west to east cannot enter the proposed site directly. The remaining findings in the first paragraph of Section 5 are accepted, with the exception of the last phrase of the last sentence which is rejected as speculation and not supported by competent substantial evidence in the record. Protestant's proposed finding in the second paragraph of Section 5 as to the number of Applicant's existing customers in the PSA is accepted, however, the remaining findings in that paragraph are rejected as unsupported by competent substantial evidence in the record. Protestant's proposed finding in the last paragraph of Section 5 is rejected as constituting a conclusion of law. Protestant's proposed finding in the first paragraph of Section 6 are accepted to the extent that said finding represents the number of offices of financial institutions serving the PSA and not the number of financial institutions. Protestant's proposed finding in the first sentence of the second paragraph of Section 6 is rejected as being unsupported by competent substantial evidence in the record. The record reflects that the Applicant offers automatic transfer from savings to checking and not that they contend this service is unique. Protestant's proposed finding in the second sentence of the second paragraph of Section 6 is accepted with the exception that the record does not support the finding that the Bank of Indian Rocks offers automatic transfer accounts. The finding in the last sentence of the second paragraph of Section 6 is rejected as being irrelevant. Protestant's proposed finding in the third paragraph of Section 6 is rejected as being unsupported by competent substantial evidence in the record. The record reflects that some of the questions asked in the Burke survey may have been based on the assumption that automatic transfer accounts were not presently offered in the PSA, however, the entire survey was not based on that assumption. Protestant's proposed finding in the fourth paragraph of Section 6 is accepted. Protestant's proposed finding in the fifth paragraph of Section 6 is rejected as being unsupported by competent substantial evidence in the record, said finding is based on hearsay evidence which is uncorroborated. Protestant's proposed finding in the sixth paragraph as to the number of businesses that the Applicant listed in its application which were not in its PSA is accepted, however, the remaining finding in that paragraph is rejected as irrelevant. Protestant's proposed finding in the last paragraph of Section 6 is rejected as constituting a conclusion of law. Protestant's proposed finding as to the provisions of Rule 3C- 13.041(2)(a), F.A.C. in the first paragraph of Section 7 are accepted. Protestant's proposed finding as to the Applicant's capital to asset ratio in the second paragraph of Section 7 is accepted. Protestant's remaining finding in that paragraph is rejected as constituting legal argument and opinion, rather than a finding of fact. Protestant's proposed findings in the first paragraph of Section 7 are accepted. Protestant's proposed finding in the fourth paragraph of Section 7 is rejected as being unsupported by competent substantial evidence in the record. The record reflects that Mr. Maurer stated that the Applicant probably would not be able to add to capital through earnings based on the projected losses of the unopened branches. Protestant's proposed findings as to the projected deposits of the Applicant's branches in the fifth paragraph of Section 7 are accepted, however, Protestant's proposed finding as to the need for additional capital is rejected as constituting a conclusion of law, opinion and legal argument. The remaining findings in that paragraph and the first sentence of the sixth paragraph are rejected as being legal argument rather than findings of facts based on competent substantial evidence in the record. The finding in the second sentence of the sixth paragraph is accepted. Protestant's proposed finding in the seventh paragraph of Section 7 that the applicant does not have sufficient personnel to staff and manage its new branches is accepted. Protestant's proposed finding that no manager for the proposed branch has been selected is rejected as being unsupported by competent substantial evidence in the record. Although there appears to be conflicting testimony as to this fact, the application contained in the record states that James Arntz had been selected as the branch manager, in addition to testimony on direct examination that Mr. Arntz had been selected as the branch manager and the record supports said finding. Protestant's proposed finding as to the managerial capacity of the Applicant and its impact on the adequacy of capital to asset ratio is rejected as constituting a conclusion of law. Protestant's proposed findings contained in the first two sentences of the eighth paragraph of Section 7 are accepted. Protestant's proposed finding contained in the last sentence is rejected as constituting a conclusion of law. Protestant's proposed finding in the last paragraph of Section 7 is rejected as constituting a conclusion of law. Protestant's proposed finding in the first sentence of the first paragraph of Section 8 is accepted. The remaining findings in that paragraph are rejected as constituting conclusions of law. Protestant's proposed finding in the first sentence of the second paragraph of Section 8 is accepted, and the remaining finding in that paragraph is rejected as constituting a conclusion of law. Protestant's proposed findings in Section 9 are accepted. Protestant's proposed findings in Section 10 are accepted. Protestant's proposed findings in the first two paragraphs and the first, second and fourth sentence of the third paragraph of Section 11 are accepted. The proposed findings in the third and fifth sentences of the third paragraph are rejected as constituting conclusions of law. Protestant's proposed findings in the first two sentences of the fourth paragraph of Section 11 are accepted, the remaining sentence in that paragraph is rejected as constituting a conclusion of law. Protestant's proposed findings in Section 12 are accepted, with the exception that (1) 9 percent represents an average cost of time deposits and to a minimum and (2) the proposed finding in the last sentence constitutes a conclusion of law. Protestant's proposed findings in the first two paragraphs of Section 13 are accepted. The remaining findings of the last paragraph are rejected as constituting conclusions of law. Protestant's proposed findings in the first paragraph of Section 14 are accepted, with the exception that the record reflects that the purchase price of the proposed site was $240,000 and not $200,000. Protestant's proposed findings in the first two sentences of the second paragraph of Section 14 are rejected as being irrelevant. The proposed findings in the third sentence is accepted. The proposed findings in the remaining sentences of that paragraph are rejected as constituting legal argument and conclusions of law. Protestant's proposed findings in Section 15 as to the provisions of Rule 3C-13.041(3) are accepted. The remaining proposed findings are rejected as being irrelevant. Protestant's proposed findings in Section 16 as to the provisions of rule 3c-13.041(2)(c) are accepted. The proposed finding in the second sentence of that section is accepted. The proposed finding in the third sentence is rejected as being unsupported by competent substantial evidence in the record for the reasons stated above in paragraph 53 of this Order. The proposed finding in the last sentence is rejected as constituting a conclusion of law. DEPARTMENT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS The Department's proposed findings contained in paragraph 1, 3, 4 through 10, 12 through 19,22 and 23 are accepted. The Department's proposed findings contained in paragraph 2 are accepted with the exception of the third sentence which is rejected as being unsupported by competent substantial evidence in record for the reasons stated above in paragraph 53 of this Order. The Department's proposed findings contained in paragraph 11 are accepted, with the exception of the figure for the projected deposits for the first year based on 2.2 persons per household which is rejected as being unsupported by competent substantial evidence in the record. The record reflects that this figure is $2,487,000 and not $2,700,000. The Department's proposed findings contained in paragraph 20 are accepted, with the exception of the number of deposit and loan customers residing in the PSA which is rejected as being unsupported by competent substantial evidence. The record reflects that there was conflicting testimony as to the number of existing deposit customers, however, the hearing officer found the number to be 140, and 65 loan customers. The Department's proposed findings contained in paragraph 21 are accepted, with the exception of the amount of square feet of the building to house the proposed branch, which is rejected as being unsupported by competent substantial evidence. Although the application contained in the record stated that the building would contain 3,640 square feet (including the drive-in canopy), the hearing officer found that the building would contain 2,000 square feet. PROTESTANT'S EXCEPTIONS TO THE REPORT AND FINDINGS OF FACT OF HEARING OFFICER The Protestant's exception contained in Section 1, with regard to the Hearing Officer's ruling's on the proposed findings, is accepted to the extent that the better practice would be for the Hearing Officer to specify which proposed findings are rejected as not supported by the evidence, which are irrelevant and which constitute conclusions of law. However, it has been recognized that the hearing officer is not required to make explicit rulings on subordinate. commulative, immaterial or unnecessary proposed facts. Forrester v. Career Service Commission, 361 So.2d 220 (1st DCA Fla. 1978). Notwithstanding, the Department has expressly ruled on each proposed finding and stated the reasons therefore. Protestant's exception contained in Section 2 is rejected for the reason that some of the proposed findings contained in Protestant's Proposed Findings of Fact were not based on competent substantial evidence, were irrelevant or constituted conclusions of law, as more fully set forth above in paragraphs 31 through 70. Therefore, it would be improper for either the Hearing Officer or the Department to adopt each and every proposed finding contained in Protestant's Proposed Findings of Fact as requested in the exception. Protestant's exception contained in Section 3 is rejected for the reason that the Hearing Officer's finding that the proposed branch manager is James Arntz is supported by competent substantial evidence in the record. The testimony contained in pages 497 and 498 of the transcript, cited by Protestant in its exception, refers to the Applicant's application for a branch office in northeast St. Petersburg. Although there was conflicting testimony as to this fact (see TR-465 and TR-540), the application contained in the record also identified James Arntz as the proposed branch manager. As such, there was competent substantial evidence in the record to support the Hearing Officer's finding. Protestant's exception contained in Section 4 is accepted for the reason that the Hearing Officer found that the "the greater weight of the evidence indicates that average number of persons per household in Pinellas County is 2.2". As such, Applicant's revised figures based on 2.2 percent per household are accepted which indicate that the proposed branch will not show a profit until the fourth year. The Department's findings of fact have modified the Hearing Officer's findings accordingly. Protestant's exception contained in Section 5 is rejected for the reason that the Hearing Officer's finding is supported by competent substantial evidence in the record. The testimony contained on pages 511 and 512 of the transcript, which is cited by the Protestant, merely states that the Applicant probably would not be able to add to capital through earnings based on the assumption of the projected losses of the Applicant's new branches. As such, the Hearing Officer's finding is accurate. Protestant's exception contained in Section 6 is accepted for the reason that the record reflects that the Applicant's president stated that the branch will probably have Saturday banking hours, but that the exact hours had not been determined. The Department's Findings of Facts have modified the Hearing Officer's findings accordingly. Protestant's exception contained in Section 7 is rejected for the reason that the Hearing Officer's finding is supported by competent substantial evidence in the record. On pages 328 and 329 of the transcript, the witness for the Applicant testified that there was a stacking lane which functionally is in front of the site for traffic hearing west. Protestant's exception contained in Section 8 is rejected for the reasons that the Hearing Officer's finding based on the study was limited and for a limited purpose, and the questions asked in the survey and the procedure appear reasonable. In addition, the Hearing Officer's and Department's reliance on the study is minimal, if at all. Protestant's exception contained in Section 9 is rejected for the reason that the adverse impact of the establishment of a branch on other banks is irrelevant, because it is not a consideration under the statutory and regulatory criteria applicable to branch bank applications. Protestant's exceptions contained in Sections 10 and 19, 21 and 23 are rejected for the reasons that the requested findings are conclusions of law which are not properly included in the Hearing Officer's report pursuant to Section 120.60(3), Florida Statutes. Protestant's exception contained in Section 20 is rejected for the reason that the requested finding as to an appraisal of land and improvements is irrelevant where, as in this case, there is no insider transaction involved in the purchase of the land. Protestant's exception contained in Section 22 is rejected for the reason that the revisions referred to by the Protestant were updated figures based on data unavailable at the time of the application and figures relating to the lease arrangement. Although at the time of the application, the Applicant intended to purchase the proposed site, it later decided to lease the proposed site. The Department does not view this as a material change in the application and fails to see how the Protestant was prejudiced by this change. As to the updated figures, in McDonald v. Department of Banking and Finance, 346 So.2d 569, 584 (Fla. 1st DCA), the court stated that the hearing officer may freely consider relevant evidence of changing economic conditions and other current circumstances external to the application. It should also be noted that the revisions referred to by the Protestant were testified to at the hearing in June, thus giving the Protestant a month's notice to make any changes necessary in the preparation of its case which was later presented at the continuation of the hearing in July. Protestant's exception contained in Section 24 is rejected for the reason that the requested findings are not material to the statutory and regulatory criteria applicable to branch applications.
