The Issue Whether Petitioner demonstrated entitlement to a Florida educator’s certificate.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Pam Stewart, as Commissioner of Education, is authorized to issue Florida educator’s certificates to persons seeking certification to become school teachers in the state of Florida. Petitioner, Robert Grimsley, is a high school teacher who teaches liberal arts and algebra. He is in his first year of teaching and currently teaches at Washington High School in Pensacola, Florida. He seeks to obtain an educator’s certificate to continue teaching. On June 6, 2016, Petitioner submitted an on-line application for a Florida Educator’s Certificate in mathematics (grades 6-12). The application included a section for “Criminal offense record(s) (Report any record other than sealed or expunged in this section.)” Under that section, was the following question: “Have you ever entered into a pretrial diversion program or deferred prosecution program related to a criminal offense?” In his application, Petitioner answered affirmatively that he had entered into a pretrial diversion program related to a criminal offense. Based on the fields provided in the application, he disclosed the following criminal offense as indicated below: City Where Arrested State Date of Arrest Charge(s) Disposition Tallahassee FL 1/2015 Less Than 20 Grams Community Service Petitioner did not disclose any other offenses in the application. There was no definition of “arrest date” provided in the application. Mr. Kossec, program director of Professional Practices Services, testified that Petitioner could have included the dates for his Notice to Appear. However, the application did not indicate that such an option was available to applicants. On August 3, 2016, Professional Practices Services sent Petitioner a letter requesting additional information regarding his criminal offenses so it could conduct an investigation of his criminal history. He submitted documents reflecting two offenses for which he completed a pretrial diversion program. The submissions included the “No Information” for each offense, which disclosed the following: Case No. 14-000004MMA (related to January 31, 2013 offense); Disposition: No Information due to completed Misdemeanor Diversion Program (filed on February 24, 2014). Case No. 15MM00158 (related to January 20, 2015 offense); Disposition: No Information due to completed Diversion Program (filed on March 6, 2015). The parties stipulated to the following facts regarding Petitioner’s criminal history and application: On or about December 31, 2013, Applicant illegally possessed marijuana, as a result of the aforementioned conduct, the Applicant was issued a Notice to Appear by law enforcement for a criminal violation. Applicant was charged with Possession of Marijuana and entered into a pre-trial [sic] diversionary program. On or about January 20, 2015, Applicant illegally possessed marijuana, as a result of the aforementioned conduct, law enforcement arrested Applicant for possessing marijuana. Applicant was charged with Possession of Marijuana and entered into a pre-trial [sic] diversionary program. On or about June 6, 2016, Applicant submitted an application for an educator’s certificate. In said application, Applicant was asked the following question: “Have you ever entered into a pretrial diversion program or deferred prosecution program related to a criminal offense?” Applicant failed to disclose the fact that he entered into a pre-trial [sic] diversionary program for the December 31, 2013--Marijuana Possession arrest. There is no dispute that Petitioner had two criminal offenses for which he participated in a pretrial diversion program. At hearing, Petitioner testified that he did not list the December 2013 offense on the application because he received a Notice to Appear for that offense. Petitioner testified that he did not understand that being released with a Notice to Appear1/ was an arrest because he was not physically arrested. The two officers involved in the respective arrests testified at hearing and described their detainment of Petitioner. On December 31, 2013, Lt. King stopped Petitioner’s vehicle for driving in excess of the posted speed limit. He ultimately found marijuana in the vehicle. Lt. King read Petitioner his rights, issued him a Notice to Appear, and released him. Lt. King did not handcuff Petitioner at any point during the traffic stop. Lt. King testified that he explained to Petitioner that although he was not being physically handcuffed and transported to the local jail, he was placed under arrest. Petitioner did not recall any explanation that a Notice to Appear is still an arrest. Lt. King’s offense report, completed on the same date as the incident, did not reference any explanation to Petitioner that the Notice to Appear was an actual arrest. Petitioner’s testimony is found to be credible. The detainment for the second incident was different from the first. On January 20, 2015, Officer Andre Buckley, a FSU police officer, responded to a complaint of the smell of burnt marijuana coming from a restroom on the campus of FSU. Officer Buckley arrived at the suspected restroom and confirmed the smell of burnt marijuana. After discovering Petitioner in the restroom and in possession of marijuana, Officer Buckley placed Petitioner in handcuffs. Another officer transported Petitioner to the Leon County jail for booking. Despite Petitioner’s mistaken belief regarding the December 2013 arrest, he was indeed arrested. The facts here demonstrate that Petitioner did not understand that he was arrested for the December 2013 offense and, as a result, was confused regarding whether he should include the offense in the application. There was no effort to conceal his participation in the pretrial diversion program for the December 2013 offense because he submitted documents reflecting the information upon request. The undersigned finds that he simply made an error when completing the application. Both misdemeanor criminal offenses occurred while Petitioner was a college student. Since completing the diversion programs, he has earned his Bachelor of Science degree in Statistics. In his letter to the Professional Practice Services dated July 20, 2016, he indicated that he has discontinued using drugs. Further, he has taught for approximately one year without incident. Petitioner’s actions demonstrate that Petitioner had no intent to conceal his record, engaged in no fraudulent conduct in completing the application, and did not fail to maintain honesty in the submission of the application so as to warrant denial of an educator’s certificate.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Education Practices Commission enter a final order granting Petitioner, Robert Eugene Grimsley’s, application for a Florida educator’s certificate. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of April, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S YOLONDA Y. GREEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of April, 2017.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent violated Section 231.28(1)(i), Florida Statutes (2000), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 6B-1.006(3)(a) and (e), by using unauthorized methods of disciplining a student before allowing the student to visit the school nurse. (All chapter and section references are to Florida Statutes (2000) unless otherwise stated. Unless otherwise stated, all references to rules are to rules promulgated in the Florida Administrative Code in effect on the date of this Recommended Order.)
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for regulating certified teachers in the state. Respondent holds Florida Educator's Certificate Number 416888. Respondent's Florida teaching certificate is valid through June 30, 2003. Respondent is employed as a Special Education Teacher at Moore Haven Junior High School (the "school") in the Glades County School District (the "District"). Respondent has a long-standing practice in his classroom of disciplining male students by making them do push-ups and hold books while their arms are extended in front of them. Both practices violate rules and policies of the school and the District. Respondent had actual or constructive knowledge that discipline by push-ups and holding books violated the policies of the school and the District. The student handbook distributed to each teacher, including Respondent, prescribed the authorized methods of discipline. None of the authorized methods included pushups or holding books. Respondent submitted some evidence that administrators in the school deviated from officially stated policies and rules by condoning unauthorized methods of discipline such as pushups or holding books. However, the evidence submitted by Respondent was less than a preponderance of the evidence and was adequately refuted by evidence submitted by Petitioner. All of the students in Respondent's class are exceptional education students. Each student has an identified disability. Any method of discipline other than that authorized by applicable policies and rules must be clearly stated and authorized in each student's individual education plan ("IEP"). C.W. was an exceptional education student in Respondent's class on February 9, 2000. The IEP for C.W. did not authorize any alternative methods of discipline. During class on February 9, 2000, Respondent approached C.W. because C.W. had his head on his desk during class. Respondent instructed C.W. to do his assignment. C.W. complained that he felt sick and requested to see the school nurse. Respondent and C.W. exchanged brief repartees. The evidence is less than clear and convincing that during the exchange Respondent prevented C.W. from going to the nurse's office. Some witnesses testified that Respondent refused C.W.'s request to go to the nurse's office. Other witnesses in the classroom during the exchange testified that Respondent initially instructed C.W. to go to the nurse's office but that C.W. refused either to go to the nurse's office or to do his assignment. The testimony of all of those witnesses was credible. Because C.W. refused to do his assignment in class, Respondent instructed C.W. to stand at the back of the class with his arms extended in front of him. C.W. complied with Respondent's instruction. Respondent successfully completed the alternative method of discipline that required C.W. to stand at the back of the class. However, Respondent failed to effectuate other unauthorized methods of discipline that Respondent attempted. When Respondent placed books in C.W.'s arms, C.W. did not hold the books in his arms. Rather, C.W. dropped his arms, and the books fell to the floor. When Respondent instructed C.W. to do push-ups, C.W. refused Respondent's instruction. C.W. left Respondent's classroom under his own volition and went to the office of the school nurse. The evidence does not reveal the amount of time that transpired between Respondent's initial instruction for C.W. to stand at the back of the class and the time when C.W. left for the nurse's office. Therefore, there is no evidentiary basis to quantify the delay in medical attention. When C.W. arrived at the nurse's office, the school nurse determined that C.W. was feverish, suffered chills, and that his complexion was "splotchy." The nurse telephoned C.W.'s parents. The parents took C.W. home and subsequently to the hospital. The examining physician at the hospital diagnosed C.W. as suffering from mastoiditis. The physician admitted C.W. to the hospital for two days and successfully treated the medical condition. The medical condition represented an exigent threat of harm to C.W.'s physical safety within the meaning of Rule 6B-1.006(3)(a). As previously found, however, the evidence is less than clear and convincing that Respondent violated Rule 6B-1.006(3)(a) by failing to make a reasonable effort to protect the student from a medical condition that was harmful to the student's physical safety. Conflicting evidence was less than clear and convincing evidence that Respondent delayed C.W.'s attempt to see the school nurse or the length of any delay allegedly caused by Respondent. C.W. left Respondent's class under his own volition and went directly to the nurse's office. The conflicting evidence was less than clear and convincing that any delay between Respondent's initial contact with the student and the student's departure to the school nurse was significant enough that Respondent failed to make a reasonable effort to protect C.W. from conditions harmful to the student's physical safety. The evidence is clear and convincing that Respondent violated Rule 6B-1.006(3)(a) by failing to make a reasonable effort to protect C.W. from conditions harmful to learning. The methods of discipline attempted by Respondent were harmful to C.W.'s ability to learn, violated C.W.'s IEP, and violated school policy. For the same reasons, Respondent violated Rule 6B-1.006(3)(e) by intentionally exposing a student to unnecessary embarrassment and disparagement. Administrative staff at the school conducted a full investigation of the matter. Upon conclusion of the investigation, the District issued a written letter of reprimand to Respondent. The letter of reprimand issued by the District is disciplinary action by Respondent's employer. The judicial doctrine of double jeopardy does not preclude disciplinary action by Petitioner against Respondent's license. No evidence shows that Respondent has any prior disciplinary history by either Petitioner or the District. Petitioner seeks to have Respondent's teaching certificate suspended for 12 months. However, Petitioner's proposed penalty is based on the premise that Respondent committed all of the allegations in the Administrative Complaint.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating Section 231.28(1)(i) and Rule 6B-1.006(3)(a) and (e), and suspending Respondent's teaching certificate in Florida for six months. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of February, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of February, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Ron Weaver, Esquire Ron Weaver & Associates 528 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1518 Kathleen M. Richards, Executive Director Educational Practices Commission Department of Education 224-E Florida Education Center 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Jerry W. Whitmore, Program Director Professional Practices Commission Department of Education 325 West Gaines Street, Suite 224-E Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 James A. Robinson, General Counsel Department of Education The Capitol, Suite 1701 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Carl Zahner, Esquire Department of Education The Capitol, Suite 1701 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Moses N. Mwaura 214 Tenth Street Post Office Box 856 Moore Haven, Florida 33471
The Issue Did Respondent Siebelts commit the offenses set forth in the petition for dismissal (Case No. 88-4697) and the amended administrative complaint (Case No. 89-0189) filed against her? If so, what discipline should she receive?
Findings Of Fact Based on the record evidence, the Hearing Officer makes the following Findings of Fact: Karen Siebelts has held a State of Florida teaching certificate since 1976. Her current certificate was issued May 1, 1986, and covers the areas of elementary education, elementary and secondary reading, and secondary social studies and psychology. For the past thirteen years Siebelts has been employed by the School Board of Broward County as a classroom teacher. During the early stages of her employment, she taught at Melrose Park Middle School. She then moved to Perry Middle School, where she taught a class of emotionally disturbed sixth graders. Her performance at these two schools was rated as acceptable. In November, 1979, Siebelts was assigned to teach at Charles Drew Elementary School, a neighborhood school located in the predominantly black Collier city area of Pompano Beach. The charges lodged against Siebelts are based on specific acts she allegedly committed while she was a Chapter I Reading/Math and Computer teacher at Charles Drew providing remedial instruction to students whose test scores reflected a need for such special assistance. On January 22, 1985, while seated with her fifth grade students at a table during a reading lesson, Siebelts inadvertently kicked one of the students in the shin. The incident occurred as Siebelts was moving her legs to a more comfortable position. The force involved was minimal and produced no visible injuries. The student immediately demanded an apology from Siebelts. Siebelts responded to this demand with silence. She neither apologized nor said anything to suggest that she had intended to kick the student. Earlier in the lesson, Siebelts had directed the student to stop talking. The student had defied the directive and continued to talk. It was not until approximately three minutes after the student's initial defiance of the directive, however, that the kicking incident occurred. Nonetheless, the student suspected that Siebelts had intentionally kicked her because of her failure to obey Siebelts' order that she not talk. When the student came home from school that day she told her mother that Siebelts had intentionally kicked her during class. The mother immediately reported the incident to the principal of the school, Hubert Lee. The matter was referred to the School Board's Internal Affairs Unit for investigation. The requested investigation was conducted. Following the completion of the investigation, a written report of the investigator's findings was submitted to the administration. No further action was taken regarding this incident until approximately three and a half years later when the instant petition for dismissal was issued. Siebelts was annoyed when she learned that the student and her mother had accused her of wrongdoing in connection with the January 22, 1985, kicking incident. On February 19, 1985, she expressed her annoyance in front of her fifth grade class and in their presence threatened to take legal action against those students and parents who had made libelous or slanderous statements about her or had otherwise verbally abused her. She told the students that they and their parents would be subpoenaed to court and if they did not appear they would be incarcerated. The principal of the school was informed of these remarks shortly after they were made, but it was not until the instant petition for dismissal was issued on August 22, 1988, that Siebelts was first formally charged with having made the remarks. Before coming to work on January 28 1986, Siebelts took a codeine pain medication that her physician had prescribed. When classes started that morning she was still under the influence of the medication. She was listless and drowsy. Her speech was slurred and she appeared incoherent at times. She also had difficulty maintaining her balance when she walked. Because Siebelts had been taking this medication "on and off" since 1979, she had been aware of these potential side effects of the medication when ingesting it on this particular occasion. A teacher's aide in Siebelts' classroom concerned about Siebelts' condition summoned the principal, Hubert Lee, to the classroom. When he arrived, Lee observed Siebelts seated at her desk. She was just staring and seemed "to be almost falling asleep." The students were out of control. They were laughing and making fun of Siebelts. After questioning Siebelts and receiving an answer that was not at all responsive to the question he had asked, Lee instructed Siebelts to come to his office. Siebelts complied, displaying an unsteady gait as she walked to Lee's office. In Lee's office, Siebelts insisted that she was fine, but conceded that she was "on" prescribed pain medication. Throughout their conversation, Siebelts continued to slur her words and it was difficult for Lee to understand her. Pursuant to Lee's request, Dr. Lorette David, Lee's immediate supervisor, and Nat Stokes, a School Board investigator, came to Lee's office to observe and assess Siebelts' condition. A determination was thereafter made that Siebelts was not capable of performing her instructional duties that day, which was an accurate assessment. She therefore was sent home for the day. Because of her impaired condition, rather than driving herself home, she was driven to her residence by Dr. David. Although she believed that she was not suffering from any impairment, Siebelts did not protest the decision to relieve her of her duties because she felt that any such protest would have fallen on deaf ears. Following this incident, Siebelts was issued a letter of reprimand by Lee. She also was referred to the School Board's Employee Assistance Program because it was felt that she might have a substance abuse problem. Siebelts agreed to participate in the program and received counselling. At no time subsequent to January 28, 1986, did Siebelts report to work under the influence of her pain medication or any other drug. During the 1987-1988 school year, Siebelts and two other Chapter I teachers, Rosa Moses and Mary Cooper, occupied space in Charles Drew's Chapter I reading and math laboratory. Their classrooms were located in the same large room and were separated by makeshift partitions. Siebelts is white. Moses and Cooper, as well as the aides who were assigned to the laboratory during that school year, are black. In October, 1987, Moses complained to Principal Lee that Siebelts was not teaching her students, but rather was constantly engaging in loud verbal confrontations with them that disrupted Moses' lessons. Lee had received similar complaints about Siebelts from others. He therefore asked Moses to advise him in writing of any future classroom misconduct on Siebelts' part. Siebelts continued to engage in conduct in her classroom which Moses deemed inappropriate and disruptive. On November 4, 1987, for the last five minutes of one of her classes, she loudly exchanged verbal barbs with her students. Her yelling made it difficult for Moses and Cooper to teach their lessons. On November 5, 1987, throughout an entire 45-minute class period, Siebelts was embroiled in a verbal battle with a student during which she made derogatory remarks about the student's size. She called the student "fat" and told her that she "shake[d] like jelly." The student, in turn, called Siebelts "fruity" and likened her to a "scarecrow." On that same day during a later class period, Siebelts took a student by the arm and, following a tussle with the student, placed him in his seat. Thereafter, she made belittling remarks to the other students in the class. She said that they were "stupid" and "belonged in a freak show." She also referred to them as "imbeciles." Siebelts further told her students that their "mothers eat dog food." On November 25, 1987, Siebelts commented to the students in one of her classes that they would be able to move around the classroom with greater ease if they were not so fat. As she had been asked to do, Moses provided Lee with a written account of these November, 1987, encounters between Siebelts and her students, but Lee did not take any immediate action to initiate disciplinary action against Siebelts. Although she did not so indicate in her report, Moses believed that the unflattering remarks that Siebelts had made to the students on these occasions constituted racial slurs inasmuch as all of the students to whom the remarks had been addressed were black and in addressing these remarks to the students as a group she had referred to them as "you people." Moses thought that "you people" had meant black people in general, whereas Siebelts had intended the phrase to refer to just the students in the classroom. At no time during any of these reported incidents did Siebelts make specific reference to the students' race, nor did she specifically attack black people in general. The target of her demeaning and insulting remarks were those of her students whose unruly and disrespectful behavior she was unable to control. Her efforts to maintain discipline and promote learning in the classroom had failed. She had become frustrated with the situation and verbally lashed out at her students. Unfortunately, these outbursts only served to further reduce her effectiveness as a teacher. On March 1, 1988, Siebelts was involved in an incident similar to the one which had occurred more than three years earlier on January 22, 1985. As on the prior occasion, Siebelts was sitting at a classroom table with her students. Her legs were crossed. When she repositioned her legs, her foot inadvertently came in contact with the top of the head of a student who was crawling under the table to retrieve a pencil the student had dropped. The student had been told by Siebelts not to go under the table but had disobeyed the instruction. She had been under the table for approximately a minute and a half before being struck by Siebelts foot. The blow to the student's head was a light one and produced only a slight bump. Nonetheless, after getting up from under the table, the student, a brash fourth grader who had had confrontations with Siebelts in the past, threatened to physically retaliate against Siebelts. Siebelts did not say anything to the student and the class ended without the student following through on her threat. Following this incident, Siebelts telephoned the student's mother at home to discuss the student's classroom behavior. The call was placed sometime before 9:00 p.m. The conversation between Siebelts and the mother soon degenerated into an argument. They terminated the discussion without settling their differences. Lee subsequently met with the mother. He suggested that a meeting with Siebelts at the school be arranged. The mother indicated to Lee that she would not attend such a meeting unless school security was present. She explained that she was so angry at Siebelts that she was afraid that she would lose her composure and physically attack Siebelts if they were in the same room together.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Education Practices Commission issue a final order suspending Karen Siebelts' teaching certificate for two years and that the School Board of Broward County issue a final order suspending Siebelts until the reinstatement of her teaching certificate. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 29th day of June, 1989. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of June, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NOS. 88-4687 AND 89-0189 The following are the Hearing Officer's specific rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties: Commisioner of Education's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted and incorporated in substance in the Findings of Fact portion of this Recommended Order. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Rejected as beyond the scope of the charges. Siebelts was not charged with having made threatening remarks the day after the January 22, 1985, kicking incident. These threats were allegedly made, according to the charging documents, on February 19, 1985. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as outside the scope of the charges. Insofar as it asserts that Siebelts engaged in name-calling on dates other than those specfied in the petition for dismissal and amended administrative complaint otherwise, it is accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as outside the scope of the charges. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Furthermore, the witness whose testimony is recited in this proposed finding later clarified her testimony and conceded that Siebelts did not use the precise words quoted in this proposed finding. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence to the extent that it suggests that Siebelts made "racial comments" on the dates specified in the petition for dismissal and amended administrative complaint. Insofar as it states that such comments were made on other occasions, it is rejected as beyond the scope of the charges. Rejected as beyond the scope of the charges. According to the petition for dismissal and amended administrative complaint, Siebelts threatened her students with legal action on February 19, 1985. This proposed finding, however, relates to alleged threats of legal action made by Siebelts during the 1987-1988 school year. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as outside the scope of the charges. Rejected as outside the scope of the charges. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as irrelevant and immaterial. Rejected as irrelevant and immaterial. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Siebelts' Proposed Findings of Fact First unnumbered paragraph, first sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; second sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; third sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; fourth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; fifth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; sixth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance. Second unnumbered paragraph, first sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; second sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; third sentence: Rejected as irrelevant and immaterial; fourth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; fifth sentence: Accepted and :incorporated in substance; sixth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; seventh sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; eighth sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; ninth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance. Third unnumbered paragraph, first sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; second sentence: Rejected as subordinate; third sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; fourth sentence: Rejected as unnecessary; fifth sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; sixth sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; seventh sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; eighth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; ninth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance. Fourth unnumbered paragraph: Rejected as more in the nature of a statement of opposing parties' position than a finding of fact; second sentence: Rejected as subordinate; third sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; fourth sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; fifth sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; sixth sentence: Rejected as subordinate; seventh sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; eighth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance. Fifth unnumbered paragraph, first sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; second sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; third sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; fourth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; fifth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; sixth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; seventh sentence: Rejected as subordinate; eighth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; ninth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; tenth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; eleventh sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; twelfth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance. Sixth unnumbered paragraph, first sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; second sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; third sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; fourth sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; fifth sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; sixth sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; seventh sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; eighth sentence: rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Seventh unnumbered paragraph, first sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; second sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; third sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony (The exculpatory testimony of Siebelts which is summarized in the first three sentences of this paragraph has not been credited because it is contrary to the more credible testimony of other witnesses) fourth sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Eighth unnumbered paragraph, first sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; second sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; third sentence: Rejected as subordinate; fourth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; fifth sentence: Rejected as subordinate; sixth sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; seventh sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; eighth sentence: Rejected as subordinate; ninth sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Ninth unnumbered paragraph, first sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; second sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; third sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; fourth sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; fifth sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Tenth unnumbered paragraph, first sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; second sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; third sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; fourth sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Superintendent of School's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted and incorporated in substance, except for the fourth sentence, which has been rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Accepted and incorporated in substance except to the extent that it asserts that Siebelts "advised the students that they and their parents would be placed in jail because of the lies and the slander." The preponderance of the evidence reveals that she actually told them that they and their parents would be incarcerated if they did not appear in court when summoned. First sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; second sentence: Rejected as subordinate. Accepted and incorporated in substance. First sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; Second and third sentences: Rejected as more in the nature of argument concerning relatively insignificant matters than findings of fact addressing necessary and vital issues. Accepted and incorporated in substance, except to the extent that it suggests that Siebelts had alcohol on her breath. Any such suggestion has been rejected because it is contrary to the testimony of Investigator Stokes. Stokes, who has been employed by the School Board as an investigator for the past 20 years, testified that he was standing one or two feet away from Siebelts and did not detect the odor of alcohol on her breath. In view of his experience regarding the investigation of these matters, his testimony has been credited. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Accepted and incorporated in substance. To the extent that this proposed finding states that Siebelts made inappropriate remarks regarding the students' clothing or other matters on dates other than those specified in the petition for dismissal and amended administrative complaint, it has been rejected as outside the scope of the charges. Insofar as it asserts that Siebelts made derogatory remarks about black people in general on the dates specified in these charging documents, it has been rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. To the extent that this proposed finding indicates that Siebelts otherwise insulted the students in her class on the dates specified in the charging documents, it has been accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected as beyond the scope of the charges. The "disparaging remarks" which are the subject of this proposed finding were purportedly made during the 1984-1985 school year. The "disparaging remarks" referenced in the petition for dismissal and amended administrative complaint were allegedly made, according to these charging documents, during the 1987-1988 school year, more specifically, on November 4, 5, and 25, 1987. Rejected as beyond the scope of the charges. The "critical" remarks referred to in this proposed finding were allegedly made prior to the 1987-1988 school year. First sentence: Rejected as irrelevant and immaterial to the extent it references reactions to "disparaging" and "critical" remarks that were purportedly made prior to the 1987-1988 school year. Otherwise, it has been accepted and incorporated in substance; second sentence: Rejected as a summary of the testimony of Siebelts' former students and colleagues rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. First sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; second sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance, except to the extent that it reflects that Moses actively monitored Siebelts classroom conduct "through December of 1987." The preponderance of the evidence establishes that such active monitoring actually ceased November 25, 1987; third sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance, except to the extent it indicates that Noses heard Siebelts tell her students that they "were dirty and needed baths." This comment was purportedly overheard, not by Moses, but by Margaret Cameron, a teacher's aide who had left Charles Drew prior to the commencement of the 1987- 1988 school year; fourth and fifth sentences: Rejected as beyond the scope of the charges. These proposed findings are based on Cameron's testimony regarding offensive comments she had allegedly overheard while an aide in Siebelts' classroom. These pre-1987-1988 school year comments, however, are not mentioned in either the petition for dismissal or the amended administrative complaint. First sentence: As this proposed finding correctly points out, Siebelts' insulting comments only served to heighten the students' hostility and anger toward her. There is no persuasive competent substantial evidence, though, to support the further finding that these comments "resulted in several physical altercations between the students;" second sentence: Rejected inasmuch as there no persuasive competent substantial evidence that there was any "heated verbal exchange" on November 5, 1987, between Siebelts and the student which preceded their "altercation." The preponderance of the evidence establishes that the verbal battle with her students occurred immediately after this incident; third sentence: Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Although she may used physical force during her encounter with this student, it is unlikely that she actually "tossed" him into his seat. Rejected as beyond the scope of the charges. Rejected as beyond the scope of the charges. Rejected as beyond the scope of the charges. Rejected as beyond the scope of the charges. Rejected as beyond the scope of the charges. Rejected inasmuch as there is no persuasive competent substantial evidence to support a finding that Siebelts telephoned the student's mother as a result of the incident near the air-conditioner. The preponderance of the evidence does establish that Siebelts did telephone the mother on a subsequent occasion, but there is no indication that Siebelts threatened the mother or otherwise acted inappropriately during this telephone conversation. Although the mother asked to have security personnel present during a parent-teacher conference with Siebelts, the preponderance of the evidence reveals that this request was not the product of any threats that Siebelts had made against the mother. First sentence: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Siebelts' testimony that the contact was unintentional is plausible and has been credited. The circumstantial evidence presented by Petitioners (including evidence of prior confrontations between Siebelts and the student) raises some questions regarding the veracity of Siebelts' testimony on this point, but such evidence is not sufficiently compelling to warrant the discrediting this testimony. Given her penchant for verbalizing to her students her thoughts about them, had Siebelts intended to kick the student as a disciplinary measure, she undoubtedly would have made this known to the student, rather than remain silent as she did; second sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; third sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance, except to the extent that it suggests that immediately after kicking the student, Siebelts had a "smirk on her face." To this limited extent, this proposed finding is not supported by any persuasive competent substantial evidence; fourth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance. First sentence: Rejected as not supported by any persuasive competent substantial evidence; second, third, fourth and fifth sentences: Rejected as more in the nature of argument and a summary of testimony than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as more in the nature of argument and a summary of testimony than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as more in the nature of argument and a summary of testimony than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as more in the nature of argument and a summary of testimony than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as more in the nature of argument and a summary of testimony than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as more in the nature of argument and a summary of testimony than a finding of fact based on such testimony. To the extent that this proposed finding suggests that Siebelts' behavior at school on January 28, 1986, and her verbal attack of her students on November 4, 5, and 25, 198', reduced her effectiveness as a teacher, it has been accepted and incorporated in substance. Insofar as it indicates that other conduct in which she engaged resulted in a reduction or loss of effectiveness, it has been rejected as either contrary to the greater weight of the evidence (other conduct specified in charging documents) or beyond the scope of the charges (other conduct not specified in charging documents). COPIES FURNISHED: Charles Whitelock, Esquire 1311 S.E. 2nd Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316 Edward J. Marko, Esquire Suite 322, Bayview Building 4,1040 Bayview Drive Post Office Box 4369 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33338 Virgil L. Morgan, Superintendent Broward County School Board 1320 Southwest Fourth Street Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33312 Thomas P. Johnson, Ed.D. Associate Superintendent Human Resources Broward County School Board 1320 Southwest Fourth Street Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33312 Craig R. Wilson, Esquire Suite 315 1201 U.S. Highway One North Palm Beach, Florida 33408-3581 Karen B. Wilde Robert F. McRee, Esquire Executive Director Post Office Box 75638 Education Practices Commission Tampa, Florida 33675-0638 125 Knott Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399
