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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs RAYMOND MANGICAPRA AND FIRST UNION GROUP, INC., 92-007080 (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Nov. 30, 1992 Number: 92-007080 Latest Update: Apr. 06, 1994

The Issue Whether Respondents committed the offenses described in the Administrative Complaint? If so, what disciplinary action should be taken against them?

Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: The Parties The Department is a state government licensing and regulatory agency. Raymond Mangicapra is now, and has been at all times material to the instant case, a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida. He holds license number 0326800. FUGI is now, and has been at all times material to the instant case, a corporation registered as a real estate broker in the State of Florida. It holds registration number 0245691. At all times material to the instant case prior to March 5, 1992, Mangicapra was the broker of record for FUGI. On March 5, 1992, he resigned as FUGI's broker of record and its president. Approximately five months later he returned to FUGI in the capacity of a licensed broker-salesman The Angulo Transaction On or about April 26 1991, Jose Angulo, his wife Martha Salazar Angulo, and their son Carlos Angulo, signed a written contract (hereinafter referred to as the "Angulo contract") to purchase from Lofts Development Corp. (hereinafter referred to as "LDC"), for $98,300.00, real property located in the Willow Wood subdivision in Palm Beach County upon which a residence was to be constructed. FUGI, through its then broker of record, Mangicapra, negotiated the sale for LDC. Mangicapra was also a part-owner of LDC and its qualifying agent. His partner was Vincent Ferri. Ferri, on behalf of LDC, signed the Angulo contract on May 2, 1991. Article II, Section C. of the Angulo contract provided, in part, as follows: Use of Mortgage Loan: Time to Make Application: Purchaser intends to pay for a portion of the Purchase Price by obtaining a permanent mortgage loan ("Mortgage Loan"). Purchaser agrees to make application(s) for such Mortgage Loan from a bona fide lending institution approved by Seller ("Mortgagee") in the amount of [$96,050.00], at applicable interest rates. Purchaser agrees to make application for such Mortgage Loan within five (5) days from execution of this Contract by Purchaser. Purchaser agrees to promptly execute all necessary documents, disclose all information within fourteen (14) days of request and pay all costs as and when requested of it by Mortgagee and/or Seller in conjunction with such application and take all other measures to aid in being approved for a Mortgage Loan, including the making of further applications for a Mortgage Loan. Failure to Obtain Mortgage Loan: Purchaser agrees that in the event Purchaser fails to qualify for such Mortgage Loan or fails to qualify for a Mortgage Loan sufficient in an amount to enable Purchaser to close after duly and promptly complying with all requests of the Mortgagee and/or Seller, Purchaser shall notify Seller of this fact, in writing, whereupon Seller may request that Purchaser make further applications for a Mortgage Loan. In the event that Purchaser fails to qualify for a Mortgage Loan with any Mortgagee after duly and promptly complying with all requests of the Mortgagee and/or the Seller, as provided above, then Seller shall, at its sole discretion, either (a) give a Mortgage Loan to Purchaser at applicable interest rates at the time such Mortgage Loan is closed for the Full Amount; or (b) transfer or otherwise assign a Mortgage Loan obtained by Seller at applicable interest rates at the time such Mortgage Loan is obtained for the Full Amount which Purchaser agrees to assume at closing in lieu of any other Mortgage Loan and for which Purchaser shall reimburse Seller for all loan closing costs, title insurance premiums and escrow balances existing at closing relative to such assumed Mortgage Loan; (c) in the instance where Purchaser is approved for a Mortgage Loan in an amount less than the Full Amount, unless otherwise prohibited by reason of government or lender regulations, take a purchase money second mortgage from Purchaser at applicable interest rates for a term not to exceed five (5) years and Purchaser shall pay all closing costs in connection with such purchase money second mortgage; or (d) return any monies paid hereunder less a sum for engineering and other expenses reasonably incurred in effecting and processing this Contract whereupon this Contract shall be terminated and the parties hereto shall be relieved of all further rights and obligations hereunder. Default by Purchaser: In the event Seller ascertains that Purchaser has failed to qualify for a Mortgage Loan due to Purchaser's failure to duly or promptly comply with all requests of the Mortgagee and/or Seller or due to failure on the part of Purchaser to supply accurate information, then any such event shall constitute default by Purchaser hereunder, entitling Seller to retain all sums paid hereunder as set forth in accordance with Article VI hereof. Notwithstanding anything contained in this Article II to the contrary or notwithstanding a subsequent mortgage disapproval by a Mortgagee, Purchaser specifically agrees that once a mortgage approval is obtained by Purchaser from one Mortgagee, the deposit monies paid by the Purchaser to Seller shall no longer be refundable. . . . Article III, Section D. of the Angulo contract provided, in part, as follows: Subject to the following provisions of this Paragraph, the estimated date of completion for the residence shall be on or about 120 days from mtg approv. . . . . In the event said Residence shall not be completed two (2) years from the date of this Contract as aforesaid, Purchaser shall have the option to cancel this Contract by giving written notice to Seller ("Cancellation Notice") within 5 days after two (2) years from the date of this Contract ("Cancellation Period") and upon such cancellation Seller shall refund to Purchaser his deposit made hereunder. Upon such Refund, all parties to this Contract shall be fully discharged and relieved from the terms and obligations hereof. Liability of Seller is limited to the Refund and in no event shall Seller be liable to Purchaser for any damages which Purchaser may sustain. In the event Purchaser does not send the Cancellation Notice within the Cancellation Period, this Contract shall remain in full force and effect and Purchaser shall not have the right to cancel this Contract unless Seller is otherwise in default of this Contract. Seller shall not be obliged to make, provide or compensate for any accommodations to Purchaser as a result of delayed completion nor shall Seller be liable for any expenses or inconveniences to Purchaser which may directly or indirectly arise from delay of delivery of possession. Article VI, Section A. of the Angulo contract addressed the subject of "Purchaser's Default." It provided, in part, as follows: If Purchaser shall fail to cure such default within such seven (7) day period, Seller shall, and does hereby have the unrestricted option to (1) consider Purchaser in default under this Contract, (2) retain all sums paid to it, whether held in escrow or otherwise, hereunder as agreed upon and liqu[id]ated damages and in full settlement of any claim for damages, and (3) terminate all rights of Purchaser under this Contract. . . . Article VII of the Angulo contract addressed the subject of "Deposit Money." It provided as follows: Seller shall at its option have the right to use the deposit money for any purposes as it deems necessary. Article VIII, Section B. of the Angulo contract provided as follows: Purchaser represents and warrants that this sale of the Property pursuant to this Contract was made by Seller's personnel and Purchaser agrees to indemnify and hold harmless Seller against any claims of real estate brokers for commissions relating to this sale. Article VIII, Section C. of the Angulo contract provided as follows: This Contract may not be assigned, sold or transferred by Purchaser without the prior written consent thereto by Seller, which consent may be withheld in Seller's sole discretion. There was no comparable provision in the contract restricting LDC's right to assign. Article VIII, Section E. of the Angulo contract provided as follows: This Contract shall be binding upon the parties hereto and their respective heirs, executors, legal representatives, successors and, as permitted hereunder, assigns. Addendum E to the Angulo contract, which was signed by the Angulos on April 26, 1991, and by Ferri on May 2, 1991, provided, in part, as follows: The purchaser(s) of a one or two family residential dwelling unit has the right to have all deposit fund[s] (up to 10 percent of the purchase price) deposited in an interest bearing escrow account. This right may be waived in writing by the purchaser(s). Purchaser(s) hereby waive their right to have all deposit funds (up to 10 percent of purchase price) deposited in an interest bearing escrow account. . . . First Union Group, Inc., is the agent for the Seller(s) and will be paid for his services by the Seller(s). . . . The Angulos' initial deposit was a check, which they gave to Mangicapra, made out to FUGI in the amount of $500.00. In conjunction with making this payment, they signed a Reservation Deposit/Contract Deposit Transfer Agreement, which provided, in part, as follows: It is specifically understood that this Earnest Money deposit is to be held in First Union Group, Inc's (hereinafter First Union Group) trust account. Upon acceptance of said reservation/contract between [the Angulos] (buyer) and Lofts Development Corp. (seller), and upon clearance of said deposit, buyer agrees that First Union Group may automatically transfer to seller said Earnest Money and said Earnest Money shall be treated as purchasers['] initial investment deposit. Purchaser agrees that once said reservation/contract between buyer and seller named above is accepted by seller, and there is in effect a purchase agreement, any and all future deposits due per said purchase agreement shall be made payable directly [to] seller. If any future deposits are inadvertently made payable to First Union Group, buyer hereby gives First Union Group the right and authorization to transfer said deposit money to seller. Any deviation to the above must be in writing from buyer at the time of the reservation/contract. . . . The "automatic transfer" of deposit monies from the real estate broker holding these monies to the seller/builder, like that authorized by this signed Reservation Deposit/Contract Deposit Transfer Agreement, was the accepted practice in the area. Mangicapra deposited the $500.00 check he had been given by the Angulos in FUGI's interest-bearing money market escrow account at Capital Bank in Delray Beach, Florida. The deposit was noted on the Angulos's ledger card. Respondents did not have the written permission of all interested parties to place the Angulos' deposit monies in such an interest-bearing account. Respondents received three other earnest money deposits from the Angulos: a check, dated May 30, 1991, payable to FUGI in the amount of $700.00 (hereinafter referred to as the "May 30 check"); a check, dated June 30, 1991, payable to FUGI in the amount of $700.00 (hereinafter referred to as the "June 30 check"); and a check, dated July 30, 1991, payable to FUGI in the amount of $600.00 (hereinafter referred to as the "July 30 check"). The June 30 and July 30 checks were deposited in FUGI's interest- bearing money market escrow account at Capital Bank and the deposits were noted on the Angulos' ledger card. The May 30 check, however, was inadvertently deposited in FUGI's general operating account at Capital Bank, instead of its escrow account, as a result of a bookkeeping error. On or about August 8, 1991, Respondents wrote a check (hereinafter referred to as "check #1395") transferring $4,800.00 from its Capital Bank escrow account to LDC. The $4,800.00 represented escrow funds being held by Respondents in connection with six different transactions. It included $1,800.00 of the $2,500.00 in earnest money deposits that Respondents had received from the Angulos. The transfer of this $1,800.00 to LDC was in accordance with the Reservation Deposit/Contract Deposit Transfer Agreement signed by the Angulos. Upon receiving check #1395, Ferri endorsed it back to FUGI to compensate FUGI for services it had provided LDC and for expenses FUGI had incurred in conjunction with the performance of these services. The endorsed check was deposited in FUGI's interest-bearing money market account at Capital Bank. On or about November 1, 1991, Donna Archer, who was then an employee of FUGI, sent a Verification of Escrow Deposit to Paragon Mortgage Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "PMC"), from whom the Angulos were attempting to obtain a mortgage loan. Archer provided the following erroneous information in this Verification of Escrow Deposit: As Escrow Agent in the [Angulo] transaction, we are now holding the following amount in our escrow account for the above captioned transaction: $2,500.00------- total held in escrow. On or about December 26, 1991, PMC sent the Angulos the following letter advising them that their application for a mortgage loan had been conditionally approved: We are please[d] to inform you that your application for a FHA mortgage in the amount of 95,750.00 has been approved. The following items are contingencies on the loan and must be met prior to closing. Provide independent documentation of YTD income for Martha (i.e. copy of ledger signed by accountant of employer) Amendment of contract to reflect the following, contract to remain current through closing Hazard insurance policy for at least the loan amount Survey with flood certification [C]lear soil treatment guaranty Clear final inspection Proof of 10 year HOW warranty or 2/10 [h]ome buyers warranty At the time this conditional loan commitment was made, the master appraisal of the property was about to expire. Accordingly, an extension of the deadline was sought by PMC. By written agreement, dated April 26, 1992, and signed by Ferri and Jules Minker, the president of Contemporary Community Concepts Corp. (hereinafter referred to as "Contemporary"), LDC, which no longer wished to construct homes in the Willow Wood subdivision, assigned the Angulo contract to Contemporary: In consideration of the sum of $10.00 Ten Dollars lawful money of the United States, I, Vincent A. Ferri, President of Lofts Development Corporation, hereby assign without reservation or limitation and free of encumbrance, the purchase contract between Jose Antonio and Martha Salazar Angulo, his wife and Lofts Development Corporation, dated April 26, 1991 to Contemporary Community Concepts Corporation. The deposit monies indicated and due under the contract in the approximate amount of $1800.00 Eighteen Hundred Dollars, are not transferred by this agreement and remain with Lofts Development Corporation. In fact, the "deposit monies indicated and due under the contract," amounted to $2,500.00, although only $1,800.00 of that amount had been transferred to LDC. In May of 1992, upon attempting to contact Mangicapra to find out why LDC had not yet begun to work on their house, the Angulos discovered that FUGI had closed the office out of which it had been conducting its business. The Angulos brought the matter to the attention of Sharon Couglin of PMC. Couglin wrote a letter to an official at HUD to apprise the agency of the situation. A copy of the letter was sent to the Florida Real Estate Commission. Notwithstanding the Angulos' beliefs to the contrary, FUGI was still in business. It had simply moved to another location in Boynton Beach. (Mangicapra was not at this time, however, associated with FUGI in any way.) Minker contacted FUGI and the Angulos and advised them that the Angulo contract had been assigned to Contemporary. In his discussions with the Angulos, Minker told them that they would be given credit for the earnest money deposits that they had made. The Angulos, in turn, indicated that they wanted Contemporary to proceed with the construction of the house LDC had agreed to build for them. In accordance with the Angulos' stated desires, Contemporary proceeded with the construction of the house. As the house neared completion, the Angulos learned that the conditional mortgage loan commitment they had received was no longer valid because the master appraisal had expired. They thereupon tried to contact FUGI to explore their options. This time they were successful in their efforts to get in touch with a FUGI representative. They spoke with Denise Preziosi, who had replaced Mangicapra as FUGI's broker of record. The Angulos asked Preziosi if they could obtain a refund of their deposit monies in the event they decided that they did not want to go through with their purchase of the house. Preziosi indicated that she did not know the answer to the question and that, in any event, FUGI no longer held any of the Angulos' deposit monies. At the time she made this statement, Preziosi was under the mistaken impression that FUGI had transferred all of these monies to LDC. On or about November 25, 1992, Preziosi sent a letter to Minker, the body of which read, in part, as follows: I am in receipt of a copy of the "Agreement" between Contemporary Community Concepts Corporation and Lofts Development Corporation which Patti faxed to me yesterday. In reading this Agreement, I noticed that the amount stated as a credit to the Angulos is $1800 rather than the $2500 they did in fact pay to Lofts. I understand that you did not nor will not receive any money from Lofts but that you agreed to accept the assignment of the contract and would give them credit for their deposit. In this regard, please amend your records to reflect a credit of $2,500 as deposit monies rather than $1,800. The Angulos made their final color selections for the house in mid- December, 1992. Thereafter Minker obtained a certificate of occupancy for the house. Although Carlos Angulo, in Minker's office, signed a document prepared by Minker agreeing "to complete loan processing for a new loan and to close on [the house] when funds are made available as a result of this application, but not to exceed 60 days," 1/ when Carlos took this document home and presented it to his parents for their signature, they refused to sign it. The Angulos did not "complete loan processing for a new loan." The Angulos have not been refunded any of the $2,500.00 in earnest money deposits they have made, nor have they received any of the interest earned on these deposits. It has not been shown, however, that the Angulos are now, or were at any time previous hereto, entitled to such a refund under the provisions of their contract with LDC. The White-Hunt Transaction On or about May 3, 1990, Stacey White-Hunt signed a written contract (hereinafter referred to as the "White-Hunt contract") to purchase from LDC, for $97,000.00, real property located in the Delray Garden Estates subdivision in Palm Beach County upon which a residence was to be constructed. FUGI, through its then broker of record, Mangicapra, negotiated the sale for LDC. Ferri, on behalf of LDC, signed the White-Hunt contract on May 9, 1990. The White-Hunt contract contained provisions identical in all material respects to Article II, Section C., Article III, Section D., Article VI, Section A., Article VII, and Article VIII, Sections B., C. 2/ and E. of the Angulo contract, as well as Addendum E to the Angulo contract. (These contractual provisions are set out above.) White-Hunt's initial deposit was a check, which she gave to Mangicapra, made out to FUGI in the amount of $500.00. In conjunction with making this payment, she signed a Reservation Deposit/Contract Deposit Transfer Agreement, which was identical in all material respects to the Reservation Deposit/Contract Deposit Transfer Agreement signed by the Angulos. Respondents received one other earnest money deposit from White-Hunt. It was a check payable to FUGI in the amount of $1,000.00. The $500.00 check and the $1,000.00 check were deposited in FUGI's interest-bearing money market escrow account at Capital Bank and the deposits were noted on White-Hunt's ledger card. Respondents did not have the written permission of all interested parties to place White-Hunt's deposit monies in such an interest-bearing account. On or about May 23, 1990, Respondents wrote a check transferring $6,500.00 from its Capital Bank escrow account to LDC. The $6,500.00 represented escrow funds being held by Respondents in connection with various transactions. It included the $1,500.00 in earnest money deposits that Respondents had received from White-Hunt. The transfer of this $1,500.00 to LDC was in accordance with the Reservation Deposit/Contract Deposit Transfer Agreement signed by White-Hunt. White-Hunt sought, but failed to qualify for, a conventional mortgage loan. Thereafter she applied for an FHA mortgage loan. By notice dated October 10, 1991, she was advised that her application had been denied. On February 7, 1992, the law firm representing White-Hunt sent a letter to Respondents, the body of which read as follows: Please be advised that I have been retained by Stacey Hunt with regard to the above- referenced Contract in order to secure a return of her deposit. I have enclosed herein copies of the deposit checks made payable to ERA First Union Group in the total sum of $1,500.00 which were provided to you on April 17, 1990 and May 8, 1990. Since Ms. Hunt has failed to qualify for a mortgage, in accordance with Paragraph (b)(2) of the Contract, this letter shall serve as formal demand for a return of any and all deposits placed with your company and any and all interest accrued thereon. In the event I am not in receipt of a check payable to Ms. Hunt on or before February 14, 1992, I will presume that you have converted these funds and proceed to undertake . . . any and all efforts to have the funds returned including, without limitation, contacting the Florida Real Estate Commission. Preziosi, on behalf of FUGI, responded by letter to the law firm. The body of her letter read as follows: In response to your letter of even date enclosed please find a copy of a Reservation Deposit/Contract Deposit Transfer which was signed on April 17, 1990 by Stacey Hunt. You will note that this agreement states that once a contract between buyer and seller is in effect, any deposit money given to First Union Group, Inc. will be transferred to the seller and treated as the initial investment deposit. Further, all future deposits are to be made payable to the seller. If an additional deposit was received by First Union Group, Inc., it too would be transferred to the seller. In this regard, be advised that on May 23, 1990, $1,500 that was being held by First Union Group, Inc. on behalf of Ms. Hunt was transferred to Lofts Development Corp. as per this agreement. Also enclosed is a copy of the check together with a copy of the escrow cards which represented all deposits transferred via this check. Respondents have not returned any deposit monies to White-Hunt; however, as Preziosi pointed out in her letter, well before White-Hunt had requested a refund from them, Respondents had transferred these monies to LDC in accordance with the Reservation Deposit/Contract Deposit Transfer Agreement White-Hunt had signed.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is hereby recommended that the Commission enter a final order finding Mangicapra guilty of the violations alleged in Counts I, III, IV, V, and XV of the Amended Administrative Complaint to the extent indicated above, suspending Mangicapra's license for a period of 120 days and fining him $3,000.00 for having committed these violations, finding FUGI guilty of the violations alleged in Counts VI, VIII, IX, X, and XX of the Amended Administrative Complaint to the extent indicated above, suspending FUGI's registration for a period of 120 days and fining it $3,000.00 for having committed these violations, and dismissing the remaining allegations set forth in the Amended Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 30th day of June, 1993. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of April, 1993.

Florida Laws (2) 455.225475.25
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. E. TED GILES, 76-001119 (1976)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 76-001119 Latest Update: Aug. 24, 1992

Findings Of Fact By contract dated March 13, 1974 Frederick W. and Judith P. Shaw placed $500 as earnest money to purchase property from Comfort Builders, Inc. represented by Giles Realty. The $500 was duly placed in escrow. The contract provided that seller would furnish title insurance and buyer could take posession on April 1, 1974. Buyer occupied the house as per the contract and delayed the initially intended closing to require the builder (seller) to correct defects. Shortly after the contract was executed buyer paid seller an additional $3,000 of the purchase money. This payment did not go through Giles. At the first closing session on May 15, 1974 a subcontractor's lien was discovered and the closing did not occur. At a second scheduled closing additional liens against the property were discovered. The $500 check representing buyers' deposit that had been forwarded by Giles to First Federal Savings and Loan Association, who was to loan the mortgage money, was returned to Giles by letter of October 10, 1974 advising that they were unable to make the mortgage. Subsequently the bank, which had also provided the construction mortgage money, foreclosed on the mortgage and took title to the property. Thereafter on March 21, 1975 the bank sold the property to Shaw who had occupied the premises since April, 1974. After the property had been conveyed by the bank to Shaw, Giles prepared a Release of Deposit Receipt which was executed by Comfort Builders, Inc., the original seller, to allow the $500 deposit to be retained by Giles. When asked to execute this release Shaw declined. Whether Giles told Shaw that she had asked the FREC for an advisory opinion respecting the $500 as Shaw testified or only that she would ask for an advisory opinion as testified to by Giles is immaterial as no advisory opinion was requested by Giles. Thereafter Shaw filed a complaint with FREC which led to the charges here under consideration. When this complaint was being investigated by Kimmig, Giles asked Kimmig for an advisory opinion and she was told she would have to request same from the Commission. Several years earlier Giles had obtained an advisory opinion by submitting a written request to the Commission, but no such request was submitted by Giles respecting the disposition of the $500 deposit of Shaw. The $500 has not been disbursed from the escrow account. Mrs. Giles has been registered with the FREC for some 20 years and these are the first disciplinary proceedings ever brought against her. Exhibit 10 contains numerous achievements and recognitions received by Mrs. Giles showing an excellent reputation in the community.

Florida Laws (2) 120.60475.25
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. NORMAN N. ZIPKIN, T/A SUN UP REALTY, 75-002043 (1975)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 75-002043 Latest Update: Mar. 21, 1977

Findings Of Fact In early July, 1972, Donald R. and Pamela S. Leininger (buyer) entered into a contract to purchase a residence through Sun Up Realty with its salesman, Bernard Zapel. The real property involved and Sun Up Realty were owned by Defendant, Norman N. Zipkin either as sole proprietor or as sole shareholder of the corporation in whose name the property was held. Disclosure of the role of Defendant as owner-seller was not an issue in these proceedings. Buyer executed two contracts for the purchase of the property both dated July 9, 1972. The first contract acknowledged receipt of $100 as a deposit with a down payment to be made of $1750 with the buyer obtaining a mortgage of $33,250. Noted on this contract are two additional payments of $650 and $1,000. All of these deposits were payable to and deposited in Sun Up Realty's Escrow Account. The second deposit receipt contract was also dated July 9, 1972 and receipt of $1750 was thereon acknowledged by seller. The sale price of $35,000 applied to both contracts. The second contract provided as terms and conditions of sale that the buyer would make an additional deposit of $1700 before closing and that buyer was to apply for, qualify, and obtain a mortgage insured by FHA. Papers to so qualify were sent to the bank but buyer never qualified for the loan. The Administrative Complaint indicates that the first document executed by the buyer provided for an FHA insured mortgage; the evidence presented was as noted above. Apparently to allow buyer additional time to qualify for the loan Defendant leased the premises to buyer pursuant to lease agreement (Exhibit 5). Although Defendant testified buyer paid him nothing while he occupied the house pursuant to this lease agreement, in his deposition (Exhibit 1) buyer presented a receipt for one month's rent paid to the seller for the premises. Buyer never qualified for the mortgage because the lending agency was never satisfied from whence the additional $1700 down payment was to come. Although no evidence was presented on this point it appears that this additional deposit was required for buyer to reach a 10 percent down payment on the price of the residence. The July 9, 1972 deposit receipt contract that was in effect with respect to this transaction provides in pertinent part: "2. An additional sum of seventeen hundred dollars ($1700) shall be deposited with Escrow Agent before closing. In the event such sum is not so deposited, Seller at his option may cancel and terminate this agreement." "3. Buyer to apply for, qualify for, and obtain a Mortgage insured by the FHA Section in an amount not less than $31,550. In the event the Buyer fails to qualify for said mortgage, all said deposit shall be returned immediately, less the cost of the credit report. "14. It is mutually agreed that the trans action shall be closed and the Buyer shall pay the balance of the first payment and execute any and all papers necessary to be executed by him for the completion of this purchase within days from the aforementioned abstract of title, or such time as shall reasonably be required by seller to make such title good, otherwise the herein named Escrow Agent is hereby directed by both Seller and Buyer to divide the monies being held by said Escrow Agent, under the terms under this Contract between the Seller and Broker herein named as hereinafter provided." "It is further agreed that in case of default by the Buyers, the Seller may at his option take legal action at law and/or in equity to enforce this Contract, in which event, the Buyer shall pay reasonable attorney fees and court costs; or else the Seller may at his option retain one half of the deposit herein paid as considera tion for the release of the Buyer by the Seller from any and all further obligations under this Contract to the Seller, which release shall be implied from such act of retention by the Seller." Buyer quit the premises in October, 1972 and thereafter demanded return of his deposit from seller. By letter from buyer's attorney (Exhibit 6) dated March 19, 1973 demand was made for return of the deposit. By letter dated March 23, 1973 (Exhibit 7) Seller denied the refund of the deposit on grounds that the buyer had breached the contract as the Buyer had qualified for and been approved for a mortgage by the Collateral Mortgage Co. The money was withdrawn from the escrow account and paid to the seller. Defendant is an attorney, mortgage broker, general contractor, developer and real estate broker. For the past decade he has devoted most of his energies toward real estate development. This is the first time charges have been preferred against him by the Florida Real Estate Commission.

Florida Laws (1) 475.25
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BOBBY WILLIAMS, D/B/A BOBBY WILLIAMS FARMS vs DAL DON PRODUCE, INC.; AND FIDELITY AND DEPOSIT COMPANY OF MARYLAND, 04-002881 (2004)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Sebring, Florida Aug. 17, 2004 Number: 04-002881 Latest Update: Dec. 09, 2004

The Issue The issue for determination in this proceeding is whether Respondent, Dal Don Produce, Inc. (Dal Don), owes Petitioner $5,956 for watermelons for the reasons stated in the Producer Complaint filed with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (Department) on December 26, 2003.

Findings Of Fact Pursuant to an agreement between Petitioner and Dal Don, Petitioner delivered seven loads of watermelons to Dal Don between November 11 and 24, 2003. The watermelons weighed approximately 291,016 pounds. Dal Don agreed to pay Petitioner $21,956.60 for the watermelons. Dal Don paid Petitioner only $16,000. Dal Don owes Petitioner $5,956.60. Dal Don did not provide Petitioner with an accounting or explanation for the unpaid amount. Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland (Fidelity) is the surety for Dal Don and provided bond for Dal Don pursuant to Surety Bond Number 08374953 (the bond). The conditions and provisions of the bond are to assure proper accounting and payment to producers, including Petitioner. In the absence of payment from Dal Don, responsibility for payment evolves to Fidelity.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order adopting the findings and conclusions in this Recommended Order and requiring Respondents to pay Petitioner the sum of $5,956.60. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of November, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of November, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Brenda D. Hyatt, Bureau Chief Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Bureau of License and Bond 407 South Calhoun Street, Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Bobby Williams Bobby Williams Farms 5005 Placid View Drive Lake Placid, Florida 33582 C. Catherine Bloebaum Dal Don Produce, Inc. Post Office Box 120036 Clermont, Florida 34712-0036 Kathy Alves Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland Post Office Box 87 Baltimore, Maryland 21203 Honorable Charles H. Bronson Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard D. Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810

Florida Laws (5) 120.57601.03601.65601.66601.69
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DIVISION OF HOTELS AND RESTAURANTS vs. CAROLINA ROSENBERG, T/A EASTVIEW APARTMENTS, 79-000324 (1979)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 79-000324 Latest Update: May 23, 1980

The Issue Whether a civil penalty should be assessed against the Respondent, or whether the license held by Respondent should be suspended or revoked.

Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Carolina Rosenberg, trading as Eastview Apartments, is licensed by the Petitioner, the Division of Hotels and Restaurants, Department of Business Regulation, and is in business at 1530 Washington Avenue in Miami Beach, Florida. A Notice to Show Cause was issued by Petitioner on September 1, 1978, notifying Respondent that certain evidence, which, if true, is good and sufficient cause pursuant to Section 509.261, Florida Statutes, to assess a civil penalty against the Respondent, or to suspend or revoke her License #23- 5830H for failure to return a security deposit of $175.00 to Paul C. Kent and failure to provide a written notice making a claim against said security deposit. Paul C. Kent was a tenant in Eastview Apartments, Unit #518, from September of 1977, through June, 1978. As a condition of renting such unit, Mr. Kent was required to and did pay a security deposit in the amount of $175.00. Mr. Kent was not required to and did not sign a written lease, and at no time during his tenancy was he furnished with a copy of Section 83.49, Florida Statutes. He was not furnished with any specific address for Respondent Rosenberg, the owner, or for a person authorized to receive written notices on her behalf. Mr. Kent said that he gave the manager of Eastview Apartments thirty (30) days' oral notice of his intent to terminate his tenancy. Respondent Rosenberg was notified personally of his intention to terminate his tenancy two (2) weeks before the end of the last month for which he paid rent. No written notice was furnished to Mr. Kent of the Respondent's intention to impose a claim upon his security deposit, and such monies were not returned to him. Respondent Rosenberg testified that the tenant, Mr. Kent, had moved out in the middle of the month, that she felt she had the right to retain the security deposit for the expense of getting the apartment ready to lease again, and that Mr. Kent never came back to ask for the security deposit. Submitted into evidence without objection was a receipt for rental payments dated August 30, 1977, on which it was stated "Received from Paul C. Kent $50.00 for security deposit on 518," and "Balance due $125.00." Said receipt was signed by Kay Kukla, who was the manager of Eastview Apartments at that time. A receipt for $25.00, signed by said manager, was marked "Balance of security paid in full." The Petitioner Division submitted a memorandum of law. This instrument was considered in the writing of this order. To the extent the proposed memorandum has not been adopted in, or is inconsistent with, factual findings in this order it has been specifically rejected as being irrelevant or not having been supported by the evidence.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Respondent, Carolina Rosenberg, be assessed a fine of $200.00. DONE and ORDERED this 21st day of December, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mary Jo. M. Gallay, Esquire Department oil Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ms. Carolina Rosenberg c/o Eastview Apartments 1530 East Washington Avenue Miami Beach, Florida

Florida Laws (4) 120.57509.26183.4383.49
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. ROBERT WATSON, JR., 81-001496 (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-001496 Latest Update: Feb. 02, 1982

Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Robert Watson, Jr., is a real estate broker-salesman, having been issued license Number 0093690. He resides and has his business in Jacksonville, Florida. On or about September 1, 1978, the Respondent negotiated and drafted a contract for sale of a certain piece of residential real estate, the purchaser for which was one Mr. Lacy Cole. The Respondent was Mr. Cole's broker in that transaction. The Respondent informed Mr. Cole that he would have to pay a two- hundred-dollar deposit as prospective buyer pursuant to the deposit receipt, sales contract agreement drafted by the Respondent. Mr. Cole did not pay the entire two-hundred-dollar deposit, but he did pay the Respondent sixty-five dollars. The closing was held October 20, 1978, at which time Mr. Cole's attorney directed the Respondent to pay Mr. Cole a two-hundred-dollar refund as the contract for sale provided that financing would be through the Veterans Administration and that in such a Veterans Administration sponsored transaction the buyer is precluded from paying closing costs. Mr. Cole cashed the two- hundred-dollar check in good faith and later was informed that the Respondent had stopped payment on it, which resulted in Mr. Cole having to make the check good. The Respondent has failed to recompense Lacy Cole for the sixty-five- dollar deposit he had already paid pursuant to the contract for sale drafted by the Respondent. Mr. Watson has also never repaid the two hundred dollars which Mr. Cole had to expend in order to provide payment on the two-hundred-dollar check on which the Respondent had stopped payment. In response to the Petitioner's demonstration that the Respondent had obligated Mr. Cole for a two-hundred-dollar "binder or closing costs" which he was not obligated to pay under Veterans Administration policy, the Respondent stated that he wrote the contract with the two-hundred-dollar binder with the understanding that Cole would pay a portion of it at the first of each month until it was paid and that he only received a total of sixty-five dollars from Cole. The seller agreed to sell the property to Mr. Cole anyway. The Respondent maintained that he merely told Mr. Cole at the closing that he would write him a two-hundred-dollar check and deliver it to him at closing with the understanding that Cole would deliver it back to him immediately afterward to keep from confusing the attorney." The Respondent, however, failed to refute the showing by the Petitioner that the Respondent attempted to obligate that purchaser to pay two hundred dollars in "closing costs" which he was not legally obligated to pay and for which the seller of the property was responsible in the first place. The Respondent adduced no evidence contrary to that of Petitioner which established that, after being informed by the attorney that Mr. Cole was not responsible for any deposit or closing costs, the Respondent still retained the sixty-five dollars paid him as earnest money by Mr. Cole and, further, that after stopping payment on Cole's refund check, causing Mr. Cole to incur two hundred dollars additional expense for which he was not obligated, the Respondent failed to recompense Cole. There is thus no question that the Respondent misrepresented to his client, Mr. Cole, the obligations and expenses Mr. Cole would have to incur in order to purchase the property and thus, in effect, wrongfully obtained two hundred sixty-five dollars from Mr. Cole. On or about September 16, 1978, Mrs. Joanne Wesley deposited a ten- dollar check with the Respondent as a partial deposit for a down payment on a home. On or about September 20, 1978, she deposited an additional one-hundred- dollar check with the Respondent as further deposit on the same contract for sale and purchase which the Respondent had at that time not yet drafted. The Respondent never made an appropriate deposit of the above referenced checks in his escrow account, but, instead, cashed them for his personal use. On or about October 25, 1978, the contract for sale and purchase was finally drafted by the Respondent. On approximately December 4, 1978, Mrs. Wesley deposited with the Respondent an additional check for eight hundred fifty dollars as the final installment of her deposit money with regard to the proposed purchase of the home. On December 29, 1978, Mrs. Wesley learned that she had failed to qualify for FHA financing with regard to the above-referenced contract and, after looking at another home which was not to her liking offered to her by the Respondent as a "replacement dwelling," finally requested the refund of her total deposit of nine hundred sixty dollars. The Respondent then requested Mrs. Wesley to wait until January 2, 1979, for that refund and on January 2, 1979, tendered to her four hundred dollars cash as partial reimbursement. On January 3, 1979, the Respondent tendered to her an additional three hundred dollars cash and drew and delivered to her his escrow check, post-dated to January 10, 1979, in the amount of two hundred fifty dollars. That escrow account check was returned for insufficient funds. On February 1, 1979, Mrs. Wesley's attorney made demand on the Respondent for payment of the two hundred fifty dollars outstanding, represented by the invalid check. On approximately February 3, 1979, the Respondent ultimately paid the two hundred fifty dollars due Mrs. Wesley. Thus, at that point the Respondent had refunded nine hundred fifty dollars of the nine hundred sixty dollars in deposit money due Mrs. Wesley. The entire refund had become due on December 29, 1978, when it was learned that she could not qualify for FHA financing with regard to the proposed purchase, which qualification for financing was a condition precedent to performance of the contract. In his defense the Respondent stated that he attempted to arrange the purchase of another dwelling for Mrs. Wesley upon learning that she could not qualify for financing on the subject property and that he retained her deposit money in his escrow account for that reason and ultimately repaid it to her, although after over a month's delay. The Respondent contended that he had opened the subject account as a business account when he was doing appraisal work and had not considered it to be an escrow account and "did not know when they switched it over to escrow." The Respondent did acknowledge that he had used this escrow account as his business account and commingled personal and business operating funds in it and made withdrawals from time to time for business and personal reasons. With further regard to the Cole transaction, the Respondent contended that he felt it was customary for a veteran to pay two hundred dollars closing costs and even when he learned the veteran was not obligated to pay closing costs in such a transaction, that he still felt it was "customary as earnest money" even though the seller obviously was obligated to pay closing costs. The Respondent also testified that as of the time of the hearing and for an indeterminant period of tinge before the hearing, he had terminated active practice of real estate brokerage and was mostly performing appraisal work. There is thus no question that the Respondent informed Mr. Cole that he was obligated to pay two hundred dollars "earnest money" or "closing costs" and that his actions forced Mr. Cole to incur the two-hundred-sixty-five dollar expense described above, even after the Respondent was informed by the closing attorney that the purchaser was not obligated for those expenses. There is no question with regard to the Wesley transaction that he delayed an inordinate amount of time in refunding her deposit money after the condition of financial qualification for the purchase did not occur, and, further, that he commingled these purchaser deposit funds in his escrow account with personal and business funds and used a portion of them for personal purposes.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is RECOMMENDED that the license of Robert Watson, Jr., as a real estate broker in the State of Florida be REVOKED. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of February, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of February 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Barry S. Sinoff, Esquire 2400 Independent Square One Independent Drive Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Robert Watson, Jr. 9527 Abedare Avenue Jacksonville, Florida 32208 Frederick B. Wilsen, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Samuel Shorstein, Secretary Department of professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 C. B. Stafford, Executive Director Board of Real Estate Department of Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802

Florida Laws (4) 120.57455.227475.25475.42
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. ROBERT JIMENEZ, 82-002934 (1982)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 82-002934 Latest Update: May 17, 1984

Findings Of Fact At all times material here to, Respondent has been a licensed real estate broker under the laws of the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0044295. On or about June 4, 1981, Respondent, representing himself to Doris Colon as the duly appointed, qualified and acting broker for Alvin Katz if, and representing that Alvin Katzif was the owner of certain real property located at 636-638 Southwest Eighth Avenue, Miami, Florida, accepted from Colon a written offer to purchase said property. Colon's offer was accompanied by a deposit of $5,000, receipt of which was acknowledged by Respondent on or about June 6, 1981. That deposit was delivered to the Respondent, as broker, to be held by him in escrow under the terms of the Deposit Receipt. The vendor named in the Deposit Receipt Agreement Alvin Katzif, was unable to sell the property in accordance with the terms expressed in that Deposit Receipt Agreement. Therefore, the sale was never consummated. Approximately one month after signing the Deposit Receipt Agreement, Alvin Katzif advised Respondent that he did not hold title to the property and that there were numerous and diverse claims to the property. Respondent never placed Colon's $5,000 deposit in an escrow account but rather placed the deposit in a personal account. Colon, through counsel, made a demand for the $5,000 earnest money deposit. Respondent failed to provide Colon with an accounting or delivery of her deposit until such time as she obtained a civil judgment against him. At no time did Respondent request an escrow disbursement order or submit the matter to arbitration or seek interpleader. Respondent converted Colon's $5,000 earnest money deposit to his own use. On or about the same day that Colon gave Respondent her $5,000 deposit made payable to him, Respondent gave Colon a check for $10,000 made payable to her. The $10,000 paid to Colon was not a loan to her and had no relation to the Katzif/Colon transaction. Rather, the $10,000 was a deposit toward the purchase of a duplex owned by Colon in which Respondent was then living as a tenant and which he desired to purchase from Colon. That transaction was completed, and the closing took place on August 12, 1981. The closing statement reflects credit given to Respondent of $10,000 toward the purchase price of the duplex he bought from Colon. The duplex Colon sold to Respondent is located at 2931-41 Southwest Sixth Street, Miami, Florida. When Respondent gave Colon his $10,000 deposit toward the purchase price of the duplex which he bought from her, he took her to friends of his at Intercontinental Bank, where she opened an account. She then wrote the $5,000 check out of that account, which check was the deposit which accompanied her offer on the property she wished to purchase from Katzif. In other words, the only relationship between the $10,000 check given to Colon by Respondent and the $5,000 check given to Respondent by Colon is that the fact that Respondent gave Colon a $10,000 down payment on the duplex he was purchasing from her gave Colon the opportunity to make an offer on the Katzif property using $5,000 of the $10,000 as a deposit on the offer to Katzif.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint and revoking his real estate broker license number 0044295. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 10th day of August, 1983, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of August, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce D. Lamb, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Martin I. Carlin, Esquire 3000 Biscayne Boulevard, Suite 402 Miami, Florida 33137 Frederick Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Harold Huff, Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 William M. Furlow, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802

Florida Laws (2) 120.57475.25
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DIVISION OF HOTELS AND RESTAURANTS vs. ROBERT A. RINEHAR, T/A 629 APARTMENTS, 79-000535 (1979)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 79-000535 Latest Update: May 23, 1980

The Issue Whether the license #16-7170-H of Robert A. Rinehart should be suspended or revoked, or whether a civil penalty should be assessed.

Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Robert A. Rinehart, trading as 629 Apartments, was at all times pertinent to this cause licensed as a public lodging establishment, holding license control #16-7170-H. A notice to show cause and notice of hearing' was served upon Respondent Rinehart, notifying him that certain evidence had been presented which, if true, was good and sufficient reason to cause his license to be suspended or revoked or to have a fine assessed against him. The Notice to Show Cause indicated also that an administrative hearing would be held to which the Respondent would receive notice, and was dated December 5, 1978. No answer was filed to the Notice to Show Cause. The Notice of Hearing was mailed April 26, 1979, and was returned. The Respondent did not appear at the administrative hearing or send a representative to testify in his behalf. It is found that the address to which the Notice of Hearing was sent was the same address as provided on the existing license held by Respondent, which is active until December 1, 1980. This address is the same address as indicated on the standard form apartment lease entered into evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 2. The Respondent is under obligation to keep the Petitioner Division advised of his current address to be shown on his official records in the Division of Hotels and Restaurants, Department of Business Regulation, State of Florida. In December of 1976, Respondent Rinehart rented, or permitted his agent to rent, an apartment in 629 Apartments to Carol Miller. Ms. Miller was required to pay a security deposit in the sum of $100.00 shortly after renting the apartment, and later paid an additional security deposit of $35.00 upon acquiring a pet. Subsequently Ms. Miller moved from the apartment after personally notifying Respondent Rinehart of her intent to vacate the rented premises at a time in excess of thirty (30) days before the intended date of her departure. Ms. Miller then again informed Respondent of her intent to move and requested that he give her an address where he could be contacted and to also return her security deposits, however Respondent did not do so. Ms. Miller moved from the licensed premises in September of 1978, and has not received her security deposits, nor has there been a claim submitted by Respondent Rinehart for the deposit. Entered into evidence was a typed rental agreement and a receipt for various sums of monies growing out of the rental agreement with Respondent Rinehart. The testimony of Carol Miller, together with the evidence submitted, is sufficient to show that Respondent Rinehart in fact received security deposits from Ms. Miller as a tenant and failed to return said security deposits to her or to make a claim against them. A proposed recommended order was submitted by the Petitioner Division, and this instrument was considered in the writing of this Order. To the extent the proposed findings of fact have not been adopted in, or are inconsistent with, factual findings in this Order they have been specifically rejected as being irrelevant or not having been supported by the evidence.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that a civil penalty be assessed in the amount of $250.00 to be imposed upon the Respondent, Robert A. Rinehart t/a 629 Apartments. DONE and ORDERED this 31st day of August, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mary Jo M. Gallay, Esquire Robert A. Rinehart t/a Department of Business 629 Apartments Regulation 629 NE 5th Avenue 725 South Bronough Street Fort Lauderdale, Florida Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (4) 120.57509.241509.26183.49
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DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs VICTORIA D. WIEDLE AND ESCAROSA REALTY, INC., 01-002076PL (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Pensacola, Florida May 25, 2001 Number: 01-002076PL Latest Update: Nov. 08, 2004

The Issue Is Respondent, Victoria D. Wiedle, guilty of failure to account for and deliver funds, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(d)1, Florida Statutes, and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to Section 20.165 and Chapters 120, 455, and 475, Florida Statutes. At all times material hereto, Respondent Wiedle was a licensed real estate broker, having been issued license number BK-0646846, and was principal broker of Escarosa Realty. Respondent's license is still active. Janice Marlene Christian is a realtor associate. She was an independent contractor with Escarosa Realty from December 1998 until April 1999. Accordingly, Respondent Wiedle was Ms. Christian's registered broker during this time. Ms. Beverly Lewis is the mother-in-law of Ms. Christian's brother. Ms. Lewis came to Ms. Christian in February 1999 because she was interested in looking for and purchasing a house. On February 16, 1999, Ms. Christian facilitated an Exclusive Buyer Brokerage Agreement (the Agreement) on behalf of Escarosa Realty with Ms. Lewis. The Agreement was on a form created by Formulator, a software company. "Florida Association of Realtors" appears on the face of the document. Paragraph 6 of the Agreement reads in pertinent part: RETAINER: Upon final execution of this agreement, Buyer will pay to Broker a non- refundable retainer fee of $0 for Broker's services ("Retainer"). Accordingly, Respondent was not entitled to any money as a retainer fee for broker services pursuant to this agreement. The agreement was signed by Ms. Lewis, Ms. Christian, and Ms. Wiedle and became effective on February 16, 1999. The specified termination date of the agreement was August 17, 1999. On or about February 27, 1999, Ms. Christian tendered an offer to sellers on behalf of Ms. Lewis, for property located at 107 Poi Avenue in Santa Rosa County (subject property). Pursuant to this offer, Ms. Lewis gave a $500.00 check dated February 27, 1999, to Ms. Christian as earnest money. The check is made out as follows: "Escarosa Realty Inc. Escrow". Ms. Lewis wrote in the memo section of the check that the check was escrow money for 107 Poi Terrace. The $500.00 check was deposited in Escarosa Realty's escrow account on March 1, 1999. Respondent accounted for the $500.00 check on the March 1999 monthly reconciliation statement for Escarosa Realty. The seller of the subject property made a counter- offer for a higher price which Ms. Lewis rejected. The testimony differs as to what happened next. According to Ms. Christian, Ms. Christian spoke to Respondent sometime after Ms. Lewis rejected the counter-offer about refunding the escrow money to Ms. Lewis. According to Ms. Christian, Respondent informed her that she did not have to give the escrow money back to Ms. Lewis yet because she had the buyer broker agreement. Ms. Christian further asserts that she filled out a written request on March 16, 1999, on a form entitled "EMD Request," which means earnest money deposit request, and gave it to Respondent who again asserted that the $500.00 did not need to be returned at that time because of the buyer brokerage agreement. Ms. Christian's testimony is consistent with Ms. Lewis's. According to Ms. Lewis, she talked to Ms. Christian about getting a refund of the $500.00 shortly after she rejected the counter-offer. She and Ms. Christian discussed the EMD form. She initially agreed that Respondent could temporarily maintain the escrow funds. However, when Ms. Lewis discovered that the financing she was seeking through the rural development program would take several months, she decided she wanted the money returned. Ms. Christian ended her contract with Escarosa Realty effective April 14, 1999. Because Ms. Christian was no longer at Escarosa, Ms. Lewis contacted Respondent by telephone on or about April 21, 1999. Ms. Lewis informed Respondent about the purchase offer and rejection of the counter-offer for the subject property. According to Ms. Lewis, Respondent initially told her she would return the money to her in the mail. When she did not receive it, Ms. Lewis again called Respondent and was told that the $500.00 would not be returned because of the buyer brokerage agreement was still in place. Ms. Lewis asserts that Respondent never told her any request for a refund of the $500.00 had to be in writing. Ms. Lewis then went to the Escarosa Realty office. Ms. Weidle was not there but Elnora Alexander was there. Ms. Alexander was also a realtor associate who was an independent contractor with Escarosa Realty. Ms. Lewis explained to Ms. Alexander about the circumstances of the subject property and that she wanted her earnest money back. Ms. Alexander gave a copy of the buyer broker agreement to Ms. Lewis. After going to Escarosa Realty, Ms. Lewis had numerous other telephone conversations with Respondent about the money. Respondent denies any knowledge of the Poi Terrace failed transaction until she spoke to Ms. Lewis on the phone. She also denied ever receiving the EMD request from Ms. Christian. Respondent asserts that she repeatedly told Ms. Lewis that she would return the $500.00 if Ms. Lewis would only make a request in writing, but that Ms. Lewis refused. This assertion is not credible. It is inconceivable that after all of the efforts made by Ms. Lewis to get her $500.00 returned to her, that she would refuse to make a written request for the money. In any event, there is no dispute that Ms. Lewis made verbal requests to Respondent for the return of the escrow monies. Respondent Wiedle admits that Ms. Lewis requested the money over the telephone. Further, in an April 2, 2001 letter from Respondent to the Division of Real Estate, Respondent acknowledged that Ms. Lewis asked for a refund of the money in the beginning of May and again in early June of 1999. Clearly, if Respondent Wiedle had not previously been aware of the failed Poi Terrace transaction, she was made aware of it during the telephone conversations with Ms. Lewis. Notwithstanding Respondent's assertion that the reason she did not refund the $500.00 to Ms. Lewis was that the request was not in writing, it is clear from Respondent's testimony and from a letter she wrote to Mr. Clanton, Petitioner's investigator, that she believed the $500.00 was connected to the buyer brokerage agreement, not to any offer for purchase of property. In an undated letter from Respondent Wiedle to Mr. Clanton, Respondent wrote: Dear Mr. Clanton, This is in response to your letter dated August 17th, 1999. First Beverly A. Lewis was refunded her money on August 20, 1999 check #111. Second I would like to respond to her complaint. Beverly A. Lewis signed a Exclusive Buyer Brokerage Agreement with EscaRosa Realty, Inc. on February 16th, 1999 with it to terminate on August 17th 1999. Beverly A. Lewis knew that her deposit was a refundable deposit after the agreement is expired not before. As the Broker of this company I had no contact with Beverly Lewis until the agent Marlene Christian was asked to leave the company. If there ever was a contract for her to purchase a house then her agent Marlene Christian never informed me of nor did she ever provide any such contract. The deposit was given to me with the Exclusive Buyer Brokerage Agreement only. Nor did her agent Marlene ever fill out the EMD refund request form requesting a refund to be given to Beverly A. Lewis. However, The result would have been the same. I asked Beverly Lewis If she had changed her mind on purchasing a house she said no she was still going to buy a house but that she knew if she didn't buy her house through Marlene at her new company that Marlene would make life very hard on her. I told her I was sorry but that is the whole purpose in the contract was to secure your buyers from just going all over the place. . . .(emphasis supplied) Respondent refunded the $500.00 to Ms. Lewis on August 10, 1999. At hearing, Respondent volunteered that there was a previous complaint against her for failing to return money she held under a buyer brokerage agreement with a former client. In that instance, the Probable Cause Panel of the Florida Real Estate Commission found no probable cause but issued a letter of guidance to Respondent.1

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, the evidence of record and the demeanor of the witnesses, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Florida Real Estate Commission finding the Respondent, Victoria D. Wiedle, guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes, in that she failed to deliver escrow money upon demand, imposing a fine of $1,000.00, and placing Respondent Wiedle on probation for a period of two years. As conditions of probation, Respondent should be required to attend a continuing education course which addresses appropriate handling of escrow funds and be subject to periodic inspections and interviews by a Department of Business and Professional Regulation investigator. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of June, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of June, 2002.

Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.5720.165455.225475.01475.25
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