Findings Of Fact Respondent, Miami Fitness, Inc. (Miami Fitness), advised Petitioner, the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (Department), by letter dated October 30, 1993, that Miami had purchased the assets of Body Mystique, a health studio, and would honor all of its memberships. Miami Fitness was to begin operations as of November 1, 1994. Miami Fitness registered with the Department as a health studio and posted an irrevocable standby letter of credit for $50,000. The letter of credit was amended on July 26, 1994, to extend the expiration date to October 29, 1995. The purpose of the letter of credit is to protect the members of the health studio. Money would be available to compensate members if Miami Fitness went out of business or the members' contracts were not assigned to a facility of equal quality within a five mile radius of Miami Fitness. Refunds would be made on a pro rata basis. Body Mystique had been a women's only health studio as was it predecessor My Fair Lady. At one time Body Mystique had requested permission from the Department to turn the all women's facility into a coed health studio, but the Department denied the request. When Miami Fitness purchased Body Mystique, it continued to operate the facility as an all women health studio. The facilities occupied by Miami Fitness had been an all women's health studio for 23 years. Miami Fitness advertised and promoted the health studio as the "total fitness studio for women." It also advertised that its weight room was for women by stating: "Our weight training area is unique in that it is specifically designed for women." Miami also promoted its wet area. One advertisement stated: "We have all the amenities that a woman needs: sauna, steamroom, eucalyptus room, showers, dressing area; and great aerobic classes on a suspended wood floor, with a fully equipped weight room and cardiovascular area specifically designed for women." The contracts between Miami Fitness and its members included a provision that the member may cancel and receive a refund if Miami Fitness closes and does not provide the member with "similar facilities of equal quality" within a five mile radius of the closed facility. On February 10, 1995, Joe Alexionok, a consumer services consultant with the Department, was notified that Miami Fitness had closed its doors. By letter dated February 26, 1995, Mr. Alexionok requested Miami Fitness to advise the Department whether Miami Fitness was going to provide services or make pro- rata refunds. By letter dated March 10, 1995, Patty Kinast, President of Miami Fitness, notified the Department that Miami Fitness had made an agreement with U.S. 1 Fitness to assume Miami Fitness memberships. Having determined that U.S. 1 Fitness was not a facility of equal quality, the Department sent certified letters to the bank holding the letter of credit and to Patty Kinast that the Department would make a demand upon the letter of credit to refund members who filed a complaint against Miami Fitness because U.S. 1 Fitness was not of equal quality. A notice was also published in the Miami Post advising that anyone having a claim against Miami Fitness must file the claim with the Department by September 30, 1995. U.S. 1 Fitness is a coed health studio which is located within a five mile radius of Miami Fitness. U.S. 1 Fitness does not have a sauna, steamroom or eucalyptus room. U.S. 1 Fitness has approximately 2,500 members with approximately 900 active members. Miami Fitness had a membership of about 1,000 with approximately 400 members who were active. U.S. 1 Fitness' facility has approximately 11,000 square feet. Miami Fitness' facility had approximately 4,600 square feet. Miami Fitness was open during the following hours: Monday and Tuesday, 7:00 a.m. - 9:30 p.m.; Wednesday-Friday, 7:00 a.m - 9:00 p.m.; Saturday, 9:00 a.m. - 5:00 a.m.; and Sunday 10:00 a.m. - 5:00 p.m. U.S. 1 Fitness is open during the following hours: Monday-Friday, 5:00 a.m. - 11:00 p.m. and Saturday and Sunday, 7:00 a.m. - 8:00 p.m. U.S. 1 Fitness offers 38 exercise-type classes each week, including a yoga class on Tuesday and Thursday mornings. Miami Fitness offered 32 exercise- type classes each week with a yoga class on Tuesday and Thursday mornings and on Wednesday evening. The yoga classes at U.S. 1 Fitness are taught by the same instructor who taught morning yoga classes at Miami Fitness. U.S. 1 Fitness has exercise classes which are equal in quality to those provided by Miami Fitness. As part of the agreement with U.S. 1 Fitness, Miami Fitness transferred some of its equipment to U.S. 1 Fitness. U.S. 1 has equipment which is newer than the Miami Fitness' equipment. U.S. 1 Fitness has as good or better equipment than Miami Fitness did. U.S. 1 Fitness has babysitting services as did Miami Fitness. U.S. 1 Fitness' babysitting services are as good as or better than the babysitting services at Miami Fitness. U.S. 1 Fitness is located in well-lighted shopping center area and has as good or better security as Miami Fitness. After Miami Fitness closed, the Department received 12 written complaints from Miami Fitness members. The majority of the complaints were based on a lack of wet facilities at U.S. 1 Fitness and U.S. 1 Fitness not being an all women's facility. Most of the complainants had joined Miami Fitness because it was a women's only facility. They felt uncomfortable and self conscious exercising in a coed facility. They liked the facility because it was small, not crowded, and had a friendly, intimate atmosphere. At least two of the complainants had visited U.S. 1 Fitness before signing up with Miami Fitness and preferred Miami Fitness over U.S. 1 Fitness. While Miami Fitness was operating, between 25 and 50 members regularly used the wet facilities each week. U.S. Fitness 1 is not a facility of equal quality to Miami Fitness as it relates to the wet area and the membership being exclusively women.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding that Miami Fitness, Inc. did not provide its members with a facility of equal quality and that the twelve written claims made by the members of Miami Fitness, Inc., because it was not a facility of equal quality be certified as valid claims against the irrevocable standby letter of credit given to the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services by Miami Fitness, Inc., and that any written claims filed on or before September 30, 1995 by members on the basis their contracts were not assigned to a facility of equal quality be certified as valid claims against the irrevocable standby letter of credit. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of September, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of September, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-2964 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraphs 1-14: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 15: Rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraphs 16-21: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 22: The first, fifth, sixth, seventh, ninth, and eleventh sentences are accepted in substance. The remaining is rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraph 23: The first, fourth, and sixth sentences are accepted in substance. The remaining is rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraph 24: The first, fourth, fifth and sixth sentences are accepted in substance. The remaining is rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraph 25: The first, second, third, sixth, and eleventh sentences are accepted in substance. The remaining is rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraph 26: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 27: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 28: The first, third, sixth, and seventh sentences are accepted in substance. The eighth sentence is rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. The remaining is rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraph 29: The first, third, fourth, fifth, seventh, eighth, and fourteenth sentences are accepted in substance. The remaining is rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraph 30: The first and third sentences are accepted in substance. The second sentence is rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraph 31: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 32: The first and third sentences are accepted in substance. The remaining is rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraph 33: The last sentence is rejected as unnecessary. The remainder is accepted in substance. Paragraph 34: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 35: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 36: The fourth sentence is accepted in substance. The remaining is rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraphs 37-40: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 41: The third, fourth, eighth, ninth and tenth sentences are accepted in substance. The fifth sentence is accepted in substance as it relates to equipment and number of classes but not as to atmosphere. The remainder is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 42-43: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 44: The fifth sentence is accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 45: The first, fourth, sixth, seventh, eighth, eleventh, and twelfth sentences are accepted in substance. The ninth sentence is rejected as it relates to those women who filed complaints because U.S. 1 Fitness was coed. The remainder is rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraph 46: Rejected that the facilities were comparable. Paragraph 47: Accepted in substance except U.S. 1 Fitness had 38 classes. 26. Paragraph 48: Accepted in substance. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraphs 1-14: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 15: The first sentence is accepted. The second sentence is rejected to the extent that it implies that the wet facility at Miami Fitness was not a reason for choosing Miami Fitness and was not used or enjoyed by it members. Paragraphs 16-17: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 18: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. COPIES FURNISHED: Lawrence J. Davis, Esquire Office of the General Counsel Florida Department of Agriculture & Consumer Services The Capital, Mayo Building, Room 515 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Lloyd B. Silverman, Esquire 2800 West Oakland Park Boulevard, Suite 201 Oakland Park, Florida 33311 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
The Issue Whether Petitioner established “just cause” to discipline Respondent as a teacher.
Findings Of Fact Since 2004, Ms. Gardner has been employed by the Glades County School District as a teacher. During the 2009-2010 school year, she taught language arts to middle school students at West Glades School. During the relevant time period, Ms. Gardner worked under a professional service contract. A teacher's professional service contract automatically renews each year, and the contract can be terminated only by a showing of “just cause” or by performance deficiencies outlined in section 1012.34, Florida Statues. On April 16, 2010, Ms. Gardner was teaching language arts to seventh grade students. The students were supposed to be working on the language arts assignment. However, as Ms. Gardner walked around the class, she found some students working on their math homework. Frustrated by students doing math homework during her language arts class, Ms. Gardner confiscated the students' math work. In one instance, Ms. Gardner tore a student's math homework in half. One of the students whose math work Ms. Gardner confiscated was C.H. C.H. was generally described as a "good student." Ms. Gardner placed C.H.'s math workbook on a table near Gardner's desk at the front of the room, and redirected C.H. to the language arts assignment. At some point in the class, C.H. walked up to the front of the classroom and removed her math workbook from the table without Ms. Gardner's permission. As C.H. turned to walk back with her book, Ms. Gardner forcefully grabbed C.H.'s arm from behind. C.H. credibly testified that Ms. Gardner "grabbed my arm and turned me around and pushed me, and my books fell." C.H. started crying, and walked out of the classroom. As C.H. was leaving the classroom, Ms. Gardner told C.H. to return to her desk. C.H. stated that she was crying because she was "shocked." C.H. walked to the School's office, which is in the same hallway as Ms. Gardner's class. When she arrived at the office, C.H. was crying and visibly upset. The school guidance counselor took C.H. to speak with Principal Davis. Principal Davis found C.H. to be "distraught, crying, [and] shaking." Principal Davis spoke with C.H. to determine why the student was upset. C.H. informed Principal Davis that Ms. Gardner had become angry with C.H., and that Ms. Gardner had snatched C.H.'s books, grabbed her arm and pushed her. Based on the seriousness of the allegation, Principal Davis decided to immediately investigate C.H.'s claims by obtaining statements from C.H.'s classmates. After the language arts class, the next class for C.H. and her classmates was math taught by Ms. Wills. Before the math class began, Ms. Gardner came to Ms. Wills' class and gave her C.H.'s workbook and other students' papers. Ms. Gardner informed Ms. Wills that several of the students had been doing math homework when the students should have been doing their language arts work. Ms. Wills credibly testified that Ms. Gardner was "really upset" with students doing their math homework in her class, and appeared agitated. Shortly after Ms. Wills' class began, Principal Davis came to speak with the students. Principal Davis released Ms. Wills to take an early lunch, and then asked the students to write down anything "bothersome" that has happened in Ms. Gardner's class during the prior period. A majority of the students provided written statements that, in essence, corroborated C.H.'s story. After reviewing the students' statements, Principal Davis decided she needed to investigate further. Principal Davis met with Ms. Gardner and advised her about C.H.'s allegation that Ms. Gardner had inappropriately touched C.H. Because the investigation could result in discipline, Ms. Gardner decided to have a union representative present when she gave her statement. Further, Principal Davis informed Ms. Gardner that Ms. Gardner should go home until the investigation was completed. On April 21, 2010, Ms. Gardner gave her statement to Principal Davis. Ms. Gardner admitted to confiscating C.H.'s math notebook and calculator. Ms. Gardner indicated that later in the class C.H. walked across the room and retrieved her math notebook without permission. Ms. Gardner stated that she merely "touched" C.H.'s arm to redirect the student, and to put the math notebook back on the table. C.H. dropped the math notebook, and left the class. According to Ms. Gardner's interview, she did not forcefully grab C.H.'s arm. Ms. Gardner's testimony that she merely "touched" C.H.'s arm was consistent with the interview given to Principal Davis. The undersigned finds Ms. Gardner's characterization that she only "touched" C.H.'s arm without force not to be credible. Ms. Gardner's testimony concerning the events was often evasive on key points. For example, when asked if she recalled that C.H. was crying when leaving the classroom, Ms. Gardner indicated that she did not. Yet, in her deposition, taken just a week earlier, she testified that C.H. was crying when she left the classroom. Similarly, Ms. Gardner was evasive concerning questions about whether or not she acted in frustration or her understanding that the change in her contract status was the result of her touching C.H. As a result of Ms. Gardner's evasiveness, the undersigned found her credibility damaged. C.H. did not receive any physical injury from the incident on April 16, 2010. After completing her investigation on April 21, 2010, Principal Davis provided Wayne Aldrich, superintendent for Glades County School Board, with the following recommendation: As a result of a battery allegation by a student against Ms. Gardner, I have conducted a thorough investigation and found the allegation to be substantial. Ms. Gardner has been suspended with pay since the incident occurred on Friday, April 16. As a result, I have followed protocol required by the Florida Department of Education Office of Professional Practices and I am recommending the following action: Placement of a narrative of my investigation in her personnel file. Change of her contractual status to fourth year annual for 2010-2011 school year. Recommendation of termination if any further substantiated incidents of intentional physical contact with a student occur. I am requesting that she return to the classroom on Friday, April 23, 2010. Principal Davis testified that she considered the recommended change in Ms. Gardner's contract status from a professional service contract to a "fourth year annual contract" as less severe than termination or suspension. A "fourth year annual contract" would allow Ms. Gardner to return to professional service contract after being on an annual contract for one year. Principal Davis explained that Ms. Gardner had been evaluated as a high-performing teacher in the past, and it was hoped that she would return to that level after this discipline. At the end of the 2009-2010 school year, Principal Davis evaluated Ms. Gardner as "needs improvement." Under the comments section, Principal Davis noted "offer to wait for 2010 FCAT declined." There was no evidence tying this "needs improvement" evaluation to the incident that occurred on April 16, 2010. Superintendent Aldrich reviewed Principal Davis' investigation and recommendation. Based on his review, Superintendent Aldrich recommended that the School Board follow Principal Davis' recommendation, including the change in Ms. Gardner's contract status. Similar to Principal Davis, Superintendent Aldrich believed that the change in Ms. Gardner's contract status was less severe than a suspension. Superintendent Aldrich testified that a teacher should use physical force only "if the student was out of control and would be in a position to do physical harm to another student or themselves." However, no School Board Policy concerning the use of physical force was offered into evidence. The School Board, without notice to Ms. Gardner concerning her rights to an administrative hearing, adopted Principal Davis' recommendations. Ms. Gardner, subsequently, requested a formal administrative hearing and reconsideration of the School Board's decision. The School Board denied her request, finding that Ms. Gardner had waived her right to a hearing. Ms. Gardner filed an appeal. The Second District Court of Appeal found the following: It is undisputed that the Board did not give Ms. Gardner written notice of her right to seek administrative review and the time limits for requesting a hearing. Under these circumstances, the Board failed to provide Ms. Gardner with a point of entry into the administrative process before taking adverse action on her contract status. It follows that Ms. Gardner did not waive her right to request a formal hearing. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the School Board's decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Gardner v. Sch. Bd. of Glades Cnty., 73 So. 3d 314 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011). While Ms. Gardner's appeal was pending before the Second District Court of Appeal, Ms. Gardner worked under the fourth year annual contract for 2010-2011 school year. At the end of the 2010-2011 school year, Ms. Gardner's annual contract was not renewed. On remand, the School Board issued a May 16, 2012, letter, notifying Ms. Gardner of her rights to an administrative hearing. The School Board framed the issue as “to challenge the change in her contract status from a professional service contract for fourth year annual contract.” In the Joint Pre- Hearing Stipulation, the parties identified a factual issue for resolution as “[w]hether Gardner's physical contact with the student, C.H., constitutes “just cause” for discipline.” Further, the parties’ stipulation identified three disputed issues of law: 1) Whether the disciplinary options available to Petitioner included placement of Ms. Gardner on a fourth year annual contract status; 2) whether the placement of Ms. Gardner on fourth-year annual contract status was the appropriate discipline; and 3) whether the School Board's action in denying Ms. Gardner's request for a formal hearing in July 2010 renders the placement of Gardner on a fourth-year annual contract status for the 2010-2011 school year, and the non-renewal of her annual contract at the end of the 2010-2011 school year void ab initio. Before considering the legal issues identified by the parties, it is clear that the factual dispute of whether or not “just cause” exists must be addressed first. If “just cause” does not exist, then the issue of the penalty becomes moot. At the hearing, the parties presented testimony concerning the facts underlying the School Board's action here, and whether or not “just cause” existed to sanction Ms. Gardner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Glades County School Board enter a final order finding: The record contains insufficient evidence of "just cause" in order to discipline Ms. Gardner; and Pursuant to section 1012.33(6)(a), Florida Statutes (2010), immediately reinstate Ms. Gardner under her professional service contract and pay her back salary. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of February, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S THOMAS P. CRAPPS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of February, 2013.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Expression Gym, Inc. (Expression) is a Florida Corporation with its place of business located at 2633 West 76th Street, Hialeah, Dade County, Florida. The business began in approximately 1991. From the time of its inception, Expression has offered some type of fitness equipment for use at its facility. In April, 1994, Fabio Otero began working at Expression. Mr. Otero brought all of his physical fitness equipment to the business for use at the facility. The working relationship between Mr. Otero and Expression ended in late July, 1994. On August 1, 1994, Ms. Gloria Gil, an owner of Expression, bought some fitness equipment for use at Expression. Sometime prior to September, 1994, DACS officials received information from the Hialeah occupational licensing office that Expression had an occupational license for an exercise studio or health studio. A research of the records of DACS did not reveal that Expression had registered with DACS as a health studio. On June 24, 1994, DACS sent a letter to Expression, notifying the business that health studios were required to be registered pursuant to Section 501.015, Florida Statutes, and enclosing a health studio registration form with the letter. Expression did not receive the letter. On July 27, 1994, DACS sent another letter to Expression, stating that DACS had not received a reply to its previous letter and requesting Expression to send in the registration form. Expression did receive the July 27, 1994 letter. DACS did not receive a registration form from Expression in response to the July 27, 1994 letter. On September 2, 1994, James Kelley, an Assistant Division Director of the Division of Consumer Services, which is a part of DACS, made an on-site inspection of Expression's facility. While at Expression's facility, Mr. Kelley talked to Mrs. Gil, who advised him that Expression had two types of memberships. One membership entitled the member to use the weight equipment at the facility and to participate in the aerobics program. The other membership was for a gymnastic program for children. Mrs. Gil advised Mr. Kelley that a three month membership could be purchased for $89, which also included one month free. A six month membership with one month free could be purchased for $129 and a nine month membership could be purchased for $199 which also entitled the member to one free month. By letter dated October 10, 1994, DACS advised Expression that DACS intended to impose an administrative fine for failure to register as a health studio. DACS further advised Expression that it must register before engaging in any further health studio activities. As of the date of the hearing Expression had not submitted a registration form to DACS.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Expression Gym, Inc. violated Sections 501.015(1), (2), (3), Florida Statutes, and assessing a penalty of $1,000.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of February, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of February, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-6447 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraphs 1-3: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 4: Rejected to the extent that it implies that Expression actually received the letter of June 24, 1994. Paragraph 5: Accepted to the extent that Expression received the July 27, 1994 letter but rejected to the extent that it was the second notice that Expression had received. Paragraph 6: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 7: Accepted. Paragraph 8: Rejected as irrelevant to the charges in the Notice of Intent to Impose Administrative Fine. Paragraph 9: Accepted in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Joe Englander, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 515 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Expression Gym C/O Gloria Gil 2633 West 76th Street Hialeah, Florida 33016 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
The Issue Whether Respondent, YouthFit by BodyZone Fitness, conducts activities that constitute "child care," so that it must obtain a child care facility license in order to conduct these activities.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner DCF is the state agency responsible, pursuant to chapter 402, Florida Statutes, for regulating providers of "child care," as that term is defined in section 402.302(1). Respondent YouthFit is a Florida limited liability company. It is located at, and its business address is, 2827 North Roosevelt Boulevard, Key West, Florida. YouthFit is owned and managed by Calvin Paquette. Paquette also owns BodyZone Fitness, LLC ("BodyZone"), a Florida limited liability company that operates a fitness facility located at 2740 North Roosevelt Boulevard, Key West, contiguous to YouthFit. Information Submitted in Questionnaire On July 13, 2018, Paquette submitted a Child Care Licensure Questionnaire ("Questionnaire") to DCF on behalf of YouthFit, requesting a determination whether YouthFit conducts "child care." The Questionnaire was admitted into evidence at the final hearing. The Questionnaire provided information regarding the nature and location of YouthFit's operation; the types of activities that YouthFit provides to children; the ages of the children participating in YouthFit's activities; the type of supervision that YouthFit provides to participants; and the payment/fee arrangements to participate in YouthFit's activities. According to the Questionnaire, YouthFit is a youth fitness program consisting of instructor-led classes offered to children ranging in age from preschool to high school. The classes identified in the Questionnaire were tumbling classes; strength, conditioning, and flexibility classes; and ninja classes. A YouthFit Class Pricing Schedule attached to the Questionnaire showed that, at the time the Questionnaire was submitted, YouthFit also offered "open gym" and "parents' night out" activities. Both of these activities entailed parents dropping children off at, and picking them up from, YouthFit. The Questionnaire stated that YouthFit offered classes from 9:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m., seven days a week. Per the Questionnaire, participation in these classes is limited to one to two hours of class per day for each child. Attendance is not required, and the same children do not necessarily attend YouthFit's classes on a regular basis. The Questionnaire stated that parents are not required to remain on the YouthFit premises at all times, although they are permitted to do so. Parents may drop children off at the YouthFit facility to participate in classes and are expected to pick them up after class is over. The Questionnaire stated that children are not permitted to enter and leave the YouthFit classes or premises unless they have permission pursuant to prior arrangement or have adult supervision. Parents are required to sign their children in and out of the YouthFit classes and premises. According to the Questionnaire YouthFit supervises all children who are participating in its classes, including the children whose parents remain on the premises. Prepackaged snacks and drinks are offered to the participants of each of YouthFit's classes. Payment for participation in YouthFit's activities is made two ways: payment through adult membership at BodyZone Fitness, and payment of a drop-in fee for persons who are not members of BodyZone Fitness. YouthFit is not operated by a public or nonpublic school and is not located on a school site. YouthFit is not affiliated with a national non-profit organization created for the purpose of providing youth service and youth development. Based on the foregoing information, DCF determined that YouthFit provides "child care," as defined in section 402.302(1); therefore, it is required to be licensed as a "child care facility" pursuant to section 402.305, unless it falls within a statutory or rule exemption from the licensure requirement. Based on its review of the Questionnaire, DCF also determined that YouthFit did not qualify for any statutory or rule exemption from licensure as a child care facility. Accordingly, DCF notified Paquette of its decision that YouthFit was required to obtain a child care facility license in order to provide its youth fitness program activities. Facts Stated in YouthFit's Request for Hearing As noted above, Paquette timely requested a hearing challenging DCF's decision that YouthFit must obtain a child care facility license. In the letter requesting a hearing, Paquette provided additional information regarding the YouthFit fitness program. This letter was admitted into evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit C. According to the letter, YouthFit classes will be offered in BodyZone's expanded premises, which accommodate both YouthFit classes and adult fitness activities. Per the letter, children ages two through 18 may take the YouthFit classes. The letter clarified that a parent must be present at all times for children ages four and under, and YouthFit may require a parent to be present for children up to age five. The letter also clarified that each child would be limited to one class per day, which may range from 45 minutes to two hours in duration. The letter stated that YouthFit would not offer "child care" services, but, instead, would "operate no different [sic] than a local gymnastics center (or martial-arts dojo) offering tumbling classes (or ju-jitsu classes)." The letter explained that the "intent is fitness activities, not child care services." Other Evidence Presented at the Final Hearing DCF presented evidence at the final hearing that included screenshots of YouthFit's website, Facebook page, and Twitter account. At the time the screenshots were taken, YouthFit's Facebook page and Twitter account advertised a range of YouthFit classes and activities, including tumbling, Zumba kids, yoga kids, ninja class, boot camp, open gym, parents' night out, and day camps. Paquette testified that the hours associated with YouthFit's program recently have changed, so that classes and activities are now offered from 3:30 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. Additionally, YouthFit no longer offers parents' night out, open gym, or day camps. Paquette also testified that YouthFit no longer advertises its activities on Facebook and Twitter. However, at the time of the final hearing, he had not been able to access these accounts, so the advertisements had not been removed from the internet. Paquette testified that the sole means by which information on YouthFit's classes and activities is disseminated is by "word-of-mouth."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Department of Children and Families, enter a final order finding that Respondent, Youthfit by BodyZone Fitness, LLC, currently provides a program of classes and activities that constitute "child care," so that it is required to obtain a "child care facility" license to provide this program. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of March, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of March, 2019.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Anthony G. Acito, holds and at all times material hereto held, Teacher's Certificate No. 529895 issued by the State of Florida, Department of Education. Petitioner is certified to teach social studies and elementary education. At all times material hereto Mr. Acito was employed as a teacher with the School Board of Palm Beach County. For the 1982-83 school year Mr. Acito was assigned to Crestwood Middle School where he taught social studies. His teacher's evaluation for that school year reflects an above-satisfactory to outstanding performance. For the 1983-84 school year, Mr. Acito was again assigned to Crestwood Middle School to teach social studies. At this time, due to increased enrollment, additional teacher units were mandated at Crestwood, which included additional physical education classes. Mr. Acito requested and was assigned to teach three physical education classes scheduled for the third, fifth, and seventh periods. The four counts lodged against Mr. Acito in this case deal with corporal punishment and/or excessive use of force by Respondent upon the persons of Scott Collins, Danny Urbaniak, Keith Cojocar, and Norman Bishop, then students in Mr. Acito's seventh hour physical education class, and the incidents complained of all occurred on December 1, 1983, during that class period. At the time of the incidents in question Collins, Urbaniak, Cojocar, and Bishop were, respectively, 13, 12, 12, and 13 years of age. By the complainants' own testimony, it is clear that the students in Mr. Acito's seventh hour physical education class, including the four complainants, were not marvels of decorum and that the class as a whole was quite disruptive. On December 1, 1983, as on other school days, the students changed into their physical education clothing and awaited Mr. Acito on the athletic field until he, also, had the opportunity to change. When Mr. Acito exited the locker room and blew his whistle to signify the commencement of class, the students, ideally, were to form into squads and pay attention. On December 1, 1983, as on other occasions when Mr. Acito blew his whistle and asked for their attention, the students did not quiet down or stop talking, but rather, continued "horsing around" and being disruptive. Scott Collins, although directed to get in his squad, left the formation to get a ball from behind Mr. Acito. Mr. Acito grabbed Collins by the arm and put him back in line. Mr. Acito told Collins, and the rest of the class, to sit down. By Collins' own testimony he was not grabbed hard by Mr. Acito or hurt. He was simply "put back in line." Danny Urbaniak, upon Mr. Acito's direction had formed up into his squad but continued talking to the student in front of him even though he admits Mr. Acito was at that very moment blowing his whistle at another squad trying to get them quiet. Mr. Acito grabbed Urbaniak by the arm, pulled him out of line because of his continued talking, and pushed him back behind the line of squads. Mr. Acito then kicked Urbaniak in the shin and pushed him away. Keith Cojocar entered the seventh hour class late and heard r. Acito arguing with Urbaniak. Even at this point the students were still "fooling around." Consequently, because they were "bad," the students were directed to do exercises rather than play soccer. Mr. Acito directed everyone to do push- ups but Cojocar did not do any, he just "lay there." Mr. Acito took Cojocar by the ear and led him away, put a loose neck hold on him from behind, and asked "if he'd ever do it again,"--to which Cojocar replied "No." Mr. Acito did not harm Cojocar. Norman Bishop, at the conclusion of the seventh hour physical education class, was in the locker room changing into his school clothes. At that time Bishop was speaking with a classmate and opined, regarding the events of that day, that "If he would of hit me, I would of hit him back." Unbeknownst to Bishop, Mr. Acito was standing behind him at the time he made his statement. Mr. Acito grabbed Bishop, turned him around, and pushed him against the lockers with his hand at Bishop's throat and advised Bishop not to tell anyone about what had happened that day. Mr. Acito used such force in pushing Bishop against the locker that Bishop experienced pain in his jaw, swelling in his neck, and headaches. Bishop was examined by Drs. Jerry Tankersley and Douglas J. Phillips. Dr. Phillips' initial diagnosis was that Bishop's temporomandibular joints were dislocated and that he would require orthodontic and therapeutic care estimated to cost approximately $5,000. An investigation into the incidents of December 1, 1983, was commenced December 2, 1983, after the parents of Norman Bishop complained to the principal at Crestwood Middle School. The investigation was abruptly terminated when Mr. Acito submitted his letter of resignation dated December 4, 1983. Prior to the events of December 1, 1983, Mr. Acito was well liked and effective as a teacher. As a consequence of the events of that day, however, he was no longer so regarded. As a consequence of his actions toward Collins, Urbaniak, Cojocar, and Bishop, criminal battery charges were filed against Mr. Acito, in the County Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Criminal Division, in and for Palm Beach County, Florida, Case No. 84-699 MMA02. On September 12, 1984, a not guilty verdict was entered.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, respondent, James Mickey, Jr., was an occupational placement specialist at Homestead Senior High School (HSHS) in Homestead, Florida. He has taught there since 1979 and has been an employee of petitioner, School Board of Dade County (Board), since 1970. On April 23, 1987, and as set forth in greater detail on June 1, 1987, petitioner issued proposed agency action alleging that Mickey had (a) wrongfully converted $200 in cash to his own use which belonged to another person, (b) accepted a $715 coaching supplement for services that he did not perform, and (c) falsified or failed to keep adequate records for a Work Study Program of which he was in charge. For this, the Board has proposed to suspend Mickey for ten working days, and if he failed to repay $990, to suspend him for an additional twenty working days. The threat of this disciplinary action prompted Mickey to institute this proceeding. Conversion of Funds - This charge stems from an allegation made by a former student at HSHS who claims she was required to give Mickey $200 of her proceeds derived from working in the Work Study Program in the spring of 1985. As might be expected, the validity of this charge turns on the credibility of the testimony of the "victim" and the accused. The former student, who is now twenty-one years old and will be identified by her initials, L. D., worked part-time in school year 1984-85 in a work study program at the HSHS "slush house," so named because slush drinks and other munchies were sold there during lunch hour, and from 2:30 p.m. to 6:30 p.m. each school day. Profits were used for such laudable purposes as purchasing uniforms for the boys and girls school track teams. Sometime in the spring of 1985, Mickey noticed a shortage of funds at the house and suspected foul play, particularly since only he, L. D. and the custodian had keys to the house. Mickey stated he mentioned this to L. D., who denied any impropriety, but who eventually resigned from her job on May 15. Because of the accusations, Mickey contends permanent animosity between him and L. D. was engendered. Whether another student was hired to replace L. D., and if so whom, is not of record. While employed in the program, L. D. kept track of the hours she worked by recording this information on a piece of paper. This was then given to Mickey who placed the information on a time card to calculate her wages. L. D. could not recall what her hourly rate of pay was, or the amount of wages to which she was entitled. Because of paperwork delays, checks for the work study program participants, such as L. D., were not issued and distributed until August, 1985. L. D.'s proceeds totaled in excess of $200 for the semester but she could not recall the specific amount. According to L. D., Mickey brought her check to her house one day and told her to cash it and give him back $200 for payment due another student who had replaced her. He later telephoned her to remind her about the money. After cashing the check on August 28, L. D. went to the school office looking for Mickey. She carried a bank envelope with an undisclosed amount of cash. She first went to the principal's office and related to his secretary that she was going to give Mickey the cash in the envelope because Mickey had told her it was needed to pay another student. Finding this to be somewhat unusual, the secretary took L. D. to the library where they met the assistant principal (Bernstein). The secretary told Bernstein that the "young lady has money" for Mickey. L. D. repeated her story that she had $200 for Mickey that was to be paid to another student. When Mickey could not be found, L. D. departed. Neither the secretary or Bernstein saw any cash change hands, and neither knew whether the envelope actually contained $200. Later on, L. D. found Mickey in his office and gave him the $200. There is no evidence that Mickey then gave the money to another student, or returned it to the program. Word of this alleged transaction reached the principal who asked L. D. to write a statement. She did so that day although she wrote portions of it at two separate times. The statement generally corroborates L. D.'s testimony given at hearing. Respondent does not deny meeting with L. D. in his office on the morning of August 28 but denies receiving any money. However, L. D.'s testimony is deemed to be the most credible and persuasive, is corroborated by other independent testimony, and is hereby accepted. Coaching Supplement - Mickey has been a coach of various athletic teams at HSHS for a number of years. Under school policy, a coach was given a salary supplement as compensation for the additional hours devoted to coaching a team. Prior to school year 1984-85, Mickey had served as head coach of both the men and women track teams and had received two supplements for his services. However, his request to coach both teams in 1984-85 was eventually turned down since school policy did not permit a person to serve as head coach for two teams at the same time. While the record suggests that Mickey may have actually performed head coaching services for the two teams during the first part of school year 1984-85, he was compensated only as head coach of the boys cross- country track team. Its season began in August, 1984, and required his services until around 7:00 p.m. or later each school day. To Mickey's credit, his team won the state championship that year. For these services, Mickey received a salary supplement. After learning that his request to coach the two track teams (and receive two supplements) had been rejected, Mickey met with the HSHS principal, Percy Oliver, in early January, 1985, to see if he could earn the supplement in another manner. He was told of an opening for an assistant coach on the wrestling team that would pay a $715 supplement. Although the wrestling season had already begun in November, and would end in February, Oliver approved Mickey's request to serve as assistant coach for the wrestling team. To earn the supplement, Oliver stated it was necessary for Mickey to "go out and assist the kids' wrestling coach" and attend practices and meets. In an interview prior to hearing, Mickey acknowledged receiving the $715 even though he failed to attend any practices or meets. The only duty he could recall performing was advising the head coach on unspecified "rules and procedures." He also stated he did not deserve the supplement for wrestling duties, but was entitled to the extra compensation for his other school activities. At hearing, Board witness Gray described what he considered to be the normal duties of an assistant wrestling coach in an effort to show that Mickey did not earn his supplemental pay. However, Gray's testimony was drawn from his own coaching experience in the late 1960s, and is deemed to be too remote to be relevant to this proceeding. Even so, it is found Mickey was not entitled to compensation for serving as an assistant wrestling coach in school year 1984-85 since he did not perform the duties expected of an assistant coach. Recordkeeping - During school years 1983-84 and 1984-85, Mickey was in charge of a "work study program" at HSHS. As such, he had the responsibility of keeping records for the program and authorizing payment to students. This program is designed to provide on-the-job training to students enrolled in vocational educational programs who are otherwise qualified. Students were then compensated at the rate of $3.25 per hour for their services which could not exceed twenty hours per week. Mickey acknowledged he was familiar with the recordkeeping requirements of the program, since he had been involved with work study programs for some fifteen years. To be eligible for the program, a student must have been enrolled in a vocational educational program at HSHS, and be a member of a family meeting certain income criteria. In this regard, the program is funded by a federal grant, and income criteria are published annually by the federal government. As a prerequisite to enrollment students are obliged to fill out a form entitled Vocational Work Study Student Income Determination. The form must be signed by the parent or guardian, and reflect the number of members in the family as well as the annualized family income. The form itself does not require additional income verification by the parents but Mickey stated they sometimes attached additional income verification to the form, such as a W-2 form. Although it was Mickey's responsibility to verify the students' eligibility, he indicated that if the information submitted facially complied with the eligibility requirements, he made no further inquiry. Students enrolled in the program were to be paid every two weeks. Before payment could be made, it was necessary for the supervising teacher (Mickey) to submit paperwork to the Board's county-wide coordinator (Joseph Zaher) where the program payroll was processed. Through testimony from another work-study program supervisor, it was established that preparation of paperwork was sometimes "delayed," but never more than for a few weeks. In Mickey's case, the completed paperwork was not submitted until at least June, 1985, or after the regular school year had ended, and checks were not issued until July or August. Therefore, the students were not paid biweekly as they should have been. It is also noted that the actual paperwork was prepared by a former student, D. M., rather than by Mickey himself. Mickey blamed the delay on the "downtown office," saying one set of paperwork sent in March had been lost, and this forced him to send a second set to Zaher in June or July. Even if this is true, Mickey did not timely supply the first set of paperwork, and he was negligent in not following up on the matter to ensure that the students were promptly paid. The notice of charges alleges that certain students were paid for work not performed. The pertinent program "write-in roster" and attendance cards reflect that student K. M. attended an out of town track meet on May 9 and 10, 1985 but was also paid for working in the work study program on the same days. Even though K. M. was assisting Mickey at the track meet, she was not eligible for payment in the program. In the case of student T. M., Mickey relied upon a time sheet approved by another teacher and cannot be held accountable for that teacher's error. The student was also paid for working for the registrar on March 7, 8 and 20, 1985, even though he was absent from school on those days. This was improper. Mickey gave no explanation for this error except to say that he had no "guidelines" for administering the program. As to student L. D., payroll records reflect she worked after May 15, 1985, when, in fact, she quit on that date. No explanation for this variance was given by Mickey except to say he believes she received pay only for actual work performed. The notice also alleges several students were allowed to enroll in the program even though they were ineligible. At hearing, Mickey stated that although he knew he had an obligation to verify eligibility, he accepted without further checking the information given by the parents on the enrollment form. The pertinent records reflect that students T. M., K. M., L. D., M. W. and T. C. did not provide proof that they were either income eligible or enrolled in a vocational program. They also reflect that one person, D. M., was allowed to work in the program from February through April, 1984, even though she had graduated from HSHS in January, 1984. Although there are a number of mistakes, errors and omissions in the work study program records, and they failed to comply with Board recordkeeping requirements, there is no evidence that Mickey intentionally violated any program rule or regulation, or applicable state recordkeeping requirements. Miscellaneous - The Board investigated the charges against Mickey, and the results of its audit were published in a local newspaper. As a result of such notoriety, it was established that Mickey's effectiveness as a teacher had been impaired.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding respondent guilty of those charges set forth in the conclusions of law, and that he be suspended from his position for ten days without pay. Petitioner should also dispose of the $990 in a manner consistent with paragraph 8 of the conclusions of law. DONE AND ORDERED this 9th day of December, 1987, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of December, 1987.
The Issue The issue in the case is whether Terry Buckely (Petitioner) should be granted a variance or waiver pursuant to Section 120.542, Florida Statutes (2007), from the provisions of Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B17-3.003 which limits the number of times a candidate for licensure as a physical therapist can take a national examination. The cited rule implements Section 486.051, Florida Statutes (2007).
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is an applicant for licensure by endorsement as a physical therapist. The Petitioner graduated in 1994 with a Bachelor's of Science degree from Youngstown State University in Youngstown, Ohio, with a 3.7 grade point average (GPA) on a 4.0 scale. After receiving the bachelor's degree, the Petitioner attended Edison Community College in Fort Myers, Florida, and completed several courses including two in chemistry and two in physics with a GPA of 3.2 on a 4.0 scale. The Petitioner next graduated in 2003 with a master's degree in physical therapy from Florida Gulf Coast University in Fort Myers, Florida, with a GPA of 3.3 on a 4.0 scale. The Petitioner completed his college education without the provision of any special services or accommodations related to any disability or disorder. After receiving the master's degree, the Petitioner sought licensure in Florida as a physical therapist and was approved to sit for the national examination. In August 2003, December 2003, April 2004, and July 2004, the Petitioner took the national examination in Florida and failed on each of the four attempts. The Petitioner subsequently obtained the services of Dr. Stephen P. Schengber, a licensed psychologist and clinical neuropsychologist, whose neuropsychological evaluation was admitted into evidence without objection. Dr. Schengber apparently administered a battery of tests to the Petitioner and, in relevant part, rendered a written report which included the following summary and recommendation: Overall, the current test results are consistent with a mild visual attentional disorder, as well as a severe disorder of reading comprehension. There were also some scattered areas of neuropsychological dysfunction, but the results were quite consistent with the two main areas of dysfunction. In addition, the test results were consistent with a mild dysthymic condition. Due to the patient's history, as well as the current results of the neuropsychological evaluation, it is my professional and clinical opinion that Mr. Buckley should be entitled to special accommodations in the administration of his licensure exam to become a licensed physical therapist. These accommodations should include the opportunity to retake the past four failures on the licensure examination, as well as the provision of extra time to complete the exam. Apparently based on Dr. Schengber's recommendation, the Petitioner took the June 2005 national examination in Florida and was provided with time and a half to complete the exam, but failed on his fifth attempt. The Petitioner subsequently applied to take the national examination in Michigan, which did not impose any limitation on the number of times an applicant could sit for the examination. The Petitioner took the October 2005 examination in Michigan and was provided with time and a half to complete the exam, but failed on this sixth attempt. After failing to pass the national exam in Michigan, the Petitioner applied to take the national examination in Colorado, which also imposed no limitation on the number of times an applicant could sit for the examination. The Petitioner took the May 2006 examination in Colorado and was provided with time and a half to complete the exam, but failed on this seventh attempt. In August 2006, the Petitioner sat for the national exam in Colorado, was provided with time and a half to complete the exam, and passed the test on the eighth attempt. After passing the examination, the Petitioner obtained licensure in Colorado, but has never practiced physical therapy in Colorado; and, shortly after becoming licensed in Colorado, the Petitioner applied for Florida licensure by endorsement. At the hearing, the Respondent presented the testimony of Zohre Bahraymi, Ph.D., accepted as an expert in examination development and testing. Dr. Bahraymi testified that the first score received on an examination is an accurate reflection of an applicant's entry level knowledge of the material being tested, but that "since they might have had a bad day and something happens and they did get a lower score . . . it is fair to let them retake the test once or twice." Dr. Bahraymi stated that the more often a person takes an examination, the higher a score should be as an applicant's exposure to the content of the test increased. Dr. Bahraymi also testified that a person with a disability would be able to receive an accommodation, including additional time, and that she would anticipate scores to increase in the event that a person with previous exposure to the content of the test also received additional time to complete the examination. The Petitioner's test scores increased on each but the fourth attempt at the examination. No evidence was offered contrary to Dr. Bahraymi's testimony, and it is credited.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent enter a final order denying the Petitioner's request for variance from, or waiver of, the provisions of Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B17-3.003. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of January, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of January, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Patrick E. Geraghty, Esquire Geraghty Dougherty & Edwards, P.A. Post Office Box 1605 Fort Myers, Florida 33902-1605 Diane L. Guillemette, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Susie K. Love, Executive Director Board of Physical Therapy Practice Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-05 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Josefina M. Tamayo, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
The Issue Whether Petitioner has just cause to terminate the Respondent's employment as an educational support employee.
Findings Of Fact Respondent was employed as a behavioral interventionist with the Palm Beach County School District during the 2000-2001 school year. A behavioral interventionist is a non- instructional employee who works primarily with students receiving services through Petitioner's Exceptional Student Education (ESE) Programs. In addition to monitoring performance and behavior of ESE students, Respondent supervised regular education students who were serving in-house suspensions, performed bus and cafeteria duty, and helped maintain discipline throughout the campus. Respondent also served as an assistant football coach. Respondent received specialized training in order to perform his duties as a behavioral interventionist. He received child development training and attended approximately 12-13 workshops dealing with physical restraint and conflict resolution issues. Respondent is not a member of a collective bargaining unit. At the times pertinent to this proceeding, Student 1, a male, was 17-years old and a junior at Forest Hill. Student 1 is 5'10" tall and weighs approximately 260 pounds. Respondent is 6'3" tall and weighs approximately 250 pounds. Respondent is a former professional football player who routinely lifts weights. On December 11, 2000, between 4:30 p.m. and 5:00 p.m., Student 1 was in the area of the outdoor basketball court watching a basketball game. Student 1 had permission to be on the campus of Forest Hill, but he should not have been in the area of the outdoor basketball court. Respondent was in the weight room at Forrest Hill that afternoon demonstrating weight lifting techniques to a group of his football players. After he completed his weight lifting workout, Respondent went to the outdoor basketball court to play basketball. Respondent began playing basketball with a group of students, including students who did not play football. Student 1 could have played if he had wanted to do so. Student 1 was not playing when the acts at issue in this proceeding occurred. Shortly after the game began, Student 1 was standing off the basketball court observing the game when the basketball ball was thrown out of bounds near him. Respondent walked up to Student 1 and said, "why don't you get the ball fat boy?" In response, Student 1 used profane language and was disrespectful towards Respondent. Respondent reacted by tapping Student 1 on the cheek with his open hand. Student 1 asked Respondent why he hit him, but received no response. As Student 1 attempted to walk away, Respondent tapped him again on the back of the head and the two exchanged words. Respondent was not justified in making physical contact with Student 1. Student 1 again addressed Respondent using profane language. Respondent reacted by taking Student 1 to the ground using a technique that he had been trained to use to restrain students. There was a conflict in the evidence as to whether Respondent placed Student 1 in a chokehold when he took him to the ground. The greater weight of the credible evidence established that Respondent did not use a chokehold on Student 1. There was also a conflict in the evidence as to whether Student 1 had become aggressive and whether Respondent was merely trying to restrain Student 1. The evidence is clear that Respondent physically restrained Student 1 because Student 1 had been disrespectful towards him, not because Student 1 had become combative. Respondent was not justified in physically restraining Student 1. Student 1 was on the ground when Respondent released him from the restraining hold. As Student 1 was attempting to rise, Respondent hit him with his forearm, which forced Student 1 back to the ground. Witnesses at the basketball court told Student 1 to stay down, but he attempted to rise and saw Respondent in a three-point position typically assumed by football linemen. Almost immediately, Respondent came at Student 1 again and forearmed him back to the ground. Student 1 fell back to the ground, biting his tongue as he went down. He then got up and began cursing. After an interval of a few minutes, Student 1 asked Respondent why he had hit him and began to spit in the general direction of Respondent. Respondent, believing that Student 1 was spitting at him, grabbed him in the area of the neck and forced him against the fence surrounding the basketball court. Respondent told Student 1, "Don't play with me boy, I'm not a kid." Respondent was not justified in that use of force against Student 1. The incident lasted over a period of several minutes. Student 2 was present during the entire incident and Student 3 was present during the latter part of the incident (when Respondent grabbed Student 1 by the neck and forced him against the fence). Both witnesses corroborated Student 1's version of the events. No other student witnesses testified at the final hearing. Student 1 complained that afternoon to a coach named Coleman about what had occurred and he also told his mother later that evening when he got home. Student 1 complained to his mother that his neck hurt and she took him to a hospital, where he was diagnosed with a sprained neck. On December 12, 2000, Student 1 and his mother returned to the school and complained to Assistant Principal Mark Sagovac, about what happened the afternoon before. Mr. Sagovac thereafter spoke with Respondent, who did not deny the incident had occurred. Respondent admitted to Mr. Sagovac that he called Student 1 a "fat boy" and asked him to get the ball, which had rolled out of bounds. Respondent further told Mr. Sagovac that he pushed Student 1 to the ground with his forearm and forced Student 1 up against the fence because he felt Student 1 was threatening him. After speaking with Respondent, Mr. Sagovac interviewed Student 1 again and spoke to other witnesses. Some time thereafter a meeting was held between Student 1, his mother, Respondent, Mr. Sagovac, and Assistant Principal Green, who is also an assistant principal assigned to Forest Hill. The incident was discussed again and at one point, Respondent apologized to Student 1 and his mother. After the meeting concluded, Mr. Sagovac issued to Respondent a verbal reprimand with written notation for the actions he took on December 11, 2000. Prior to serving the Respondent with the verbal reprimand with written notation, Sagovac did not consult with his principal or anyone in the Petitioner 's Personnel Office or Office of Professional Standards to determine if he was complying with policy or if he was following accepted personnel practice concerning the contemplated discipline. Mr. Sagovac was not complying with school policy when he issued the verbal reprimand with written notation. Mr. Sagovac did not have the authority to discipline Respondent. Shortly after the conclusion of the meeting attended by Student 1, his mother, Respondent, and Mr. Sagovac, a complaint was made to the school district's police department concerning the December 11, 2000, incident. Based upon the complaint, a criminal investigation into Respondent's actions was initiated. There was no evidence as to the status of any criminal charges presented at the final hearing. Petitioner's Office of Professional Standards received information concerning the criminal investigation, which caused it to open its own administrative investigation. After the Office of Professional Standards received the police report and the attached documents, the case was assigned to an investigator. During the Petitioner's investigation, Respondent was placed on administrative leave with pay and assigned to duty at his home. This assignment became effective February 1, 2001. After Petitioner's Office of Professional Standards completed its investigation, it prepared a report of the incident and, consistent with its rules, submitted the case for review to a case management committee. Case management review is a process whereby approximately a dozen high level employees working for the district meet at the direction of the Superintendent to review pending personnel cases which may result in the suspension of employment without pay or the termination of employment. Respondent's case management committee determined that probable cause existed to sustain the allegation Respondent used inappropriate physical force on the student in question. Once probable cause was found, it further determined that the level of the force used warranted a recommendation that Respondent's employment be terminated. Based upon the case management committee's recommendation to terminate Respondent for having engaged in inappropriate physical force on a student, Superintendent of Schools Arthur C. Johnson notified Respondent by letter dated May 8, 2001, that he would recommend to the School Board at its meeting to be held May 16, 2001, that Respondent's employment be terminated and that he be suspended without pay pending the completion of the proceedings to terminate his employment. On May 16, 2001, the School Board voted to accept the Superintendent's recommendation. It is the policy of the Petitioner that no employee is to use physical force with a student unless the employee is breaking up a fight, acting in self-defense, or protecting the student from hurting him or herself.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the School Board enter a final order terminating Respondent's employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of February, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of February, 2002.
The Issue Whether Petitioner has just cause to terminate Respondent’s employment based on the determination by a licensed psychologist that Respondent was not fit to perform his duties as a classroom teacher.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Petitioner was the constitutional entity authorized to operate, control, and supervise the public schools in Broward County, Florida. Petitioner has continuously employed Respondent since 1998 as a classroom teacher. At the times material to this proceeding, Respondent has held a professional services contract. The School Board has adopted Policy 4004, which provides for mandatory physical and/or psychological examinations for employees, as follows: AT ANY TIME DURING THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT WHEN IT SHALL BE DEEMED ADVISABLE BY THE SUPERINTENDENT/DESIGNEE, AN EMPLOYEE MAY BE REQUIRED TO TAKE A PHYSICAL OR PSYCHOLOGICAL EXAMINATION. RULES The Board authorizes the Superintendent to establish procedures to carry out the intent of this policy. The affected employee shall select the name of a medical doctor, psychologist or psychiatrist from a list maintained by the Division of Personnel, Policies, Government and Community Relations. Where the employee is found to be unable to function satisfactorily, the Division of Personnel, Policies, Government and Community Relations shall take appropriate action. At all times relevant to this proceeding, the Superintendent of Schools had in effect the following procedures (Policy 4004 procedures) relating to fitness for duty determinations: Fit for Duty Determination Procedures The Executive Director of Professional Standards & Special Investigative Unit (SIU) receives request from a Principal/Administrator (includes District Administrators) or Superintendent/Designee. SIU notifies employee via certified mail that he/she must undergo a physical and/or psychological examination. A reassignment letter is prepared directing employee to remain at home or at an alternate site with pay, depending on circumstances (i.e. active case file/investigation). The affected employee shall select the name of a medical doctor psychologist or psychiatrist from a list maintained by the Executive Director of Professional Standards & Special Investigative Unit, within 24 hours. SIU Administrator schedules within ten working days a medical appointment and follows-up in writing to the doctor’s office and to the employee of appointment confirmation. Letter is sent to the doctor explaining billing instructions, and ‘Fit for Duty Evaluation’ report of findings. The doctor as delineated in the policy will conduct Pre [sic] evaluation at District expense. Note: a 2nd Opinion will be at the employee’s expense if requested, with the employee selecting from the School Board approved list as delineated in the policy. [Emphasis is in the orginal.] A third evaluation will be mandated if previous two (Pre & 2nd Opinion) are contradicting and will be at District expense and will be binding by [sic] all parties. [Emphasis is in the original.] Doctor determines if employee is ‘Fit for Duty’ or [is] not [fit] for duty. Where the employee is found ‘unfit for duty’ the Executive Director of Professional Standards & Special Investigative Unit shall take appropriate action per the recommendation of the doctor, subjecting employee to a Post-evaluation by the same doctor making the initial evaluation. The Post-evaluation ought to occur within 90 days of the initial evaluation. If a doctor determines that the employee is ‘Unfit for Duty’, an administrative reassignment letter is prepared changing the employee’s pay status to ‘at home without pay (PLV)’. The employee is given information to call the Leave Department to apply for any paid leave accrued, and/or any other leave types per SBBC Policies that they are eligible for. Also, a Formal Referral to EAP is prepared for follow-up. Based on the progress and/or compliance with EAP’s recommendations, a Post Evaluation is scheduled within the 90- day reassessment period. If employee is unfit to return to work in the Post Evaluation, then the employee is recommended for termination (School Board Agenda is prepared for the next Board Meeting). Note: 2nd Opinions on the Post evaluation will be at the employee’s expense, if requested. Third evaluation, if required will be at District expense and will be binding by [sic] all parties. [Emphasis is in the original.] Employee and school/work site are notified of doctor’s fit for duty status via certified mail. (Note: Confidential Doctor’s report will only be distributed to the employee). The immediate supervisor is notified as well. However if the doctor has follow-up recommendations, then a Formal Referral to Employee Assistant Program (EAP) is prepared by SIU (i.e. mental health follow-up or other referrals as appropriate. If employee is found Fit for Duty, a certified letter is sent to the employee with instructions to return to work. The immediate supervisor is notified as well. Respondent was employed as a science teacher at Piper High School (Piper High) from 1999 until September of 2003. After two of Respondent’s students alleged in September 2003 that Respondent had battered them, Petitioner’s Professional Standards and Special Investigative Unit (SIU) conducted an investigation of the alleged incident. Petitioner submitted the results of the investigation to a Probable Cause Committee, which, in March of 2004, found probable cause of battery. A Pre-Disciplinary Hearing was held on June 10, 2004. The Committee recommended that Respondent's employment be terminated. Subsequently, in July of 2004, after his review of Respondent’s case, Dr. Frank Till (the Superintendent of Schools), recommended to the School Board that Respondent be reprimanded and returned to his teaching duties. The School Board followed Dr. Till’s recommendation. Respondent was notified of Petitioner’s action and the fact that he would be returned to the classroom by letter dated July 12, 2004. The letter was signed by Dr. Melita. Respondent responded to the July 12, 2004, letter with a letter to Dr. Melita dated July 15, 2004 (Petitioner’s Exhibit 8). This letter was copied to then President Bush, then Governor Bush, then Commissioner of Education Horne, Dr. Till, members of the School Board, and others. The letter consisted of two paragraphs. The first paragraph, which inexplicably contains a complaint by Respondent that he was being returned to the classroom, is set forth below. The second paragraph is not reproduced here because it pertained to an alleged leak of the SIU report to a newspaper reporter. The entire letter should be read if there is a question as to the context of the statements. Due to the fact that the students deliberately deceived in their irrefutably asinine assertion of battery, because they were failing Mr. Black’s science class, indeed, Mr. Black was wrongfully removed from his teacher position at Piper High School in the first place. It is fiercely urgent that you, Dr. Melita, and the School Board of Broward County, Florida, be aware that the students’ sickening battery hoax, which has been wantonly compounded by the draconian intimidating threat to terminate Mr. Black, has unfortunately caused Mr. Black’s family and himself exceptionally grave pain and suffering. This horrific suffering Mr. Black has been unnecessarily forced to go through since October 3, 2003, has rendered him psychologically, emotionally, physically and professionally harmed. Mr. Black immutably practiced the highest professional and ethical standards in his committed teaching duties at Piper High. Now, it is egregiously unfair to negligently dump Mr. Black back in a teacher position after his character clearly has been irreparably defamed by the mendacious students and the unjust Professional Standards Committee. Respondent’s correspondence caused Dr. Melita to be concerned as to Respondent’s emotional and mental stability. Before the commencement of the next school year (2004- 2005), Petitioner transferred Respondent from Piper High to Boyd Anderson High School (Anderson High). Respondent strenuously objected to the transfer. The decision to transfer him was made by the appropriate area office, based on a determination that his return to Piper High might disrupt the instructional program. Respondent made his objections to the transfer known by writing letters to School Board supervisory level employees, and others. Frances Bolden, the area director, communicated with Respondent about his transfer to Anderson High, and explained that she would meet him at the school to help him get acclimated. On Tuesday, August 10, 2004, Respondent reported to Anderson High. He met with Principal Timothy Gadson and Ms. Bolden twice on that day, with a faculty meeting intervening between the two meetings. Ms. Bolden described Respondent as being very anxious and nervous, despite the fact that it was a planning day before the school year commenced and no students were on campus that day. Following their meetings with Respondent on August 10, 2004, Dr. Gadson and Ms. Bolden referred Mr. Black to SIU based on the following statements he made: He was not comfortable in teaching students; He feared for the safety of the students; He had a condition that prevented him from going in the classroom; He had been out of the classroom since October 2003; and If he were forced to go into the classroom, he would leave Boyd Anderson within one week. He could not teach as he was under a doctor's care through EAP; He could not be at this school; His doctor told him that he could not work with students; and He needed help. Based on these concerns, Dr. Melita required Respondent to submit to a fitness for duty assessment pursuant to Policy 4004. Respondent was provided with a copy of the policy and procedures.1 On August 23, 2004, Respondent selected and met with Dr. Mendoza, who was on the School Board approved list. Dr. Mendoza found that Respondent was not fit for duty at that time. Respondent was formally referred to the Employee Assistance Program (EAP) and advised to follow up with Dr. Mendoza within 90 days. Respondent returned for a follow-up evaluation with Dr. Mendoza on November 10, 2004, after which Dr. Mendoza recommended that he be returned to work "in low stress settings while continuing to receive therapeutic treatment." Respondent was returned to work effective November 22, 2004, but Petitioner transferred Respondent from Anderson High to Rickards Middle School, in an attempt to comply with Dr. Mendoza’s recommendation that he be placed in a low stress setting.2 Prior to December 8, 2004, the Florida Department of Education (DOE) started an investigation into the 2003 incident at Piper High. As a consequence of that investigation, Respondent hired certain college students who, along with Respondent and some others, reenacted Respondent’s version of the events that had led to the charges of battery. Respondent videotaped the reenactment and forwarded a copy of the videotape to the DOE investigator. The DOE investigator became concerned that Respondent may have violated the Principles of Professional Conduct for the Education Profession by using high school students as part of the reenactment. On or before December 8, 2004, the DOE investigator made contact with Respondent. Respondent became distraught after that contact. On December 8, 2004, a school based administrator from Rickards Middle School contacted SIU because of concerns about Respondent. Charles Rawls (a SIU supervisor) and Richard Mijon responded to Rickards Middle School and met with Respondent. Respondent admitted that he was concerned about a possible new investigation by DOE. Respondent stated that he was too upset to be at the school and too upset to be around children and he was sent home for the day. The next day, December 9, 2004, Dr. Melita requested a second fitness for duty assessment pursuant to Policy 4004. Again, Petitioner provided Respondent a copy of the pertinent policy and procedures. Of the School Board approved psychologists, Respondent chose Dr. Forman to provide his initial evaluation. On December 15, 2004, Respondent met with Dr. Forman for the initial evaluation. Dr. Forman prepared a report (Petitioner Exhibit 32) which, together with his testimony at the formal hearing, detailed the manner in which he conducted the evaluation, the tests he administered, the reasons he selected the tests he utilized, the results of the tests, and his interpretation of his results. Dr. Forman found that Respondent was not fit for duty. Respondent was again referred to the EAP and advised to follow up with Dr. Forman within 90 days. Respondent objected to Dr. Forman's initial evaluation because, Respondent alleged, Dr. Forman's behavior was inappropriate, and Respondent asked for a new evaluation. Respondent’s objections were made both orally and in writing. On December 15, 2004, Respondent wrote Mr. Mijon the following letter: As instructed by you I did in fact promptly report to my 1:00 p.m. appointment with [Dr. Forman] for the purpose of submitting to a Fit For Duty Psychological Exam. However, I quickly became extremely uncomfortable with Dr. Forman’s deportment when he began articulating extremely graphic and indecent profanity during his evaluation session with me. Dr. Forman even questioned whether or not racism was a motivating factor in my circumstances for being ordered to take the Fit For Duty Psychological Exam. I specifically told Dr. Forman that I did not feel comfortable with his conversation and kindly asked him to please change the subject. Dr. Forman continued the besetting conversation for a while longer. Considering Dr. Forman’s clearly inappropriate conduct unbecoming a psychologist, I understandably, feel highly uncomfortable entrusting the unwavering integrity and irrefutably unbiased interpretation of my Fit For Duty Psychological Exam results in Dr. Forman’s questionable care. Moreover, my vital employment wherewithal depends on the strict accuracy and reliability of the Fit For Duty Psychological Exam, which Dr. Forman administered with suspect. Naturally, due to the immensely inappropriate conditions in which I was unfairly subjected to take the required Fit For Duty Psychological Exam, which in and of it self [sic] in part of a terribly stressful 400-question test, I am certainly poised to vigorously challenge the exam results. As such, I respectfully request that you immediately abrogate Dr. Forman’s exam results and allow me a fair opportunity to select a professional and competent psychologist to properly administer the Fit For Duty Psychological Exam. Pursuant to the School Board's Policy 4004, Respondent was entitled to seek a second opinion by being evaluated by a separate School Board approved psychologist of his choosing, but at Respondent’s expense. Respondent chose psychologist Steven Shiendling, Ph.D., for the second opinion. Dr. Shiendling met with Respondent on March 14 and 15, 2005. His evaluation consisted of face-to-face interviews lasting a total of 2.5 hours. Dr. Shiendling did not administer any standardized testing in his evaluation. Dr. Shiendling found that Respondent was fit for duty. In accordance with Policy 4004, Dr. Hohnecker was selected to provide the third evaluation of Respondent (with Dr. Forman and Dr. Shiendling having provided the first two evaluations) at Petitioner’s expense. This evaluation occurred April 1, 2005. Dr. Hohnecker’s thorough report (Petitioner’s Exhibit 36) and her testimony at the formal hearing established that Respondent was not fit for duty as of the date of the evaluation "by reason of inappropriate outbursts of anger and intense anxiety." As of April 1, 2005, Respondent was not fit for duty as a classroom teacher. Dr. Hohnecker made recommendations that, if satisfied, would warrant Respondent’s return to work. Dr. Hohnecker further recommended that Respondent not be returned to Piper High School, which Respondent still wanted to do, until the students involved in the September 2003 incident had graduated. Respondent was, again, recommended to the Employee Assistance Program and advised to follow up with Dr. Forman. On April 20, 2005, John P. Molinari, a psychotherapist who worked with Respondent through Petitioner’s EAP, sent the following letter to Michelle Moore of Petitioner’s EAP: I met with Mr. Clinton Black today as part of our ongoing treatment. Mr. Black appears much less anxious with a high degree of motivation to return to work. In view of this, I recommend that Mr. Black return to Dr. Forman to be reevaluated for his fit for duty status. Mr. Mijon advised Respondent to report to Dr. Forman on May 12, 2005, for his reevaluation. Respondent objected to returning to Dr. Forman. On April 28, 2005, Mr. Mijon informed Respondent that he would be guilty of insubordination if he did not keep the appointment with Dr. Forman. Dr. Forman was selected to provide the reevaluation pursuant to the Policy 4004 procedures. Between Dr. Forman’s initial evaluation of Respondent and his reevaluation, Mr. Mijon told Dr. Forman that Respondent had lodged complaints about the manner in which the initial evaluation had been conducted. Mr. Mijon told Dr. Forman that Respondent considered the initial evaluation to have been unprofessional and invalid. Mr. Mijon did not go into the specifics of Respondent’s complaints. Mr. Mijon had also told Dr. Melita about the complaints Respondent had as to Dr. Forman’s initial evaluation. At some undetermined point, Respondent lodged complaints against Dr. Forman with the American Psychological Association (APA) and the Florida Department of Health, Board of Psychology (DOH). On May 4, 2005, Respondent hand delivered the following letter to Mr. Mijon with copies to Dr. Till, Dr. Melita, and Michelle Moore: Due to the egregious harassment and verbal abuse Dr. Bruce Forman wrongfully inflicted upon me during my initial fit for duty session, I respectfully urge you to immediately rescind your intimidating treat [sic] to terminate me should I not report to Dr. Forman, due to my resulting genuine fear and discomfort, for the second appointment you have scheduled for me on May 12, 2005. As I previously formally documented to you, Dr. Joe Melita, Mr. Charles Rawls and Ms. Michelle Moore via letter, I factually suffered excruciating and debilitating harassment and verbal abuse while under the care of Dr. Bruce Forman during my initial fit for duty assessment on December 15, 2004. However, my authentic complaint was apparently inappropriately ignored. Furthermore, due to the fact that I have appropriately filed two investigative complaints against Dr. Forman for the abject harassment and verbal abuse he inflicted upon me during my initial fit for duty exam, it clearly would be overwhelmingly inappropriate for me to return to Dr. Forman for a second fit for duty assessment under these brutal circumstances Dr. Forman has inappropriately forced upon me. Naturally, I feel extremely afraid and uncomfortable returning to Dr. Forman for a second fit for duty assessment under his inappropriate care and thus would be incapable of relaxing and focusing for proper testing as I rightfully deserve and should have the fair and equal opportunity to do so during a valid fit for duty exam. Therefore, I unambiguously urge you to withdraw at once your intimidating treat [sic] to terminate me and cancel your scheduled May 12, 2005 appointment for me with Dr. Forman due to the exceptionally grave harassment and verbal abuse Dr. Forman wrongfully inflicted upon me. Mr. Mijon ordered Respondent to be reevaluated by Dr. Forman because he believed that paragraph 12 of the Policy 4004 procedures provided no other option than to require Respondent to be re-evaluated by the same psychologist (Dr. Forman) who performed the initial evaluation. Dr. Melita interprets paragraph 12 more liberally than Mr. Mijon. Dr. Melita testified beginning at page 47 of Volume I of the Transcript as follows: Q. Were you made aware that Mr. Mijon was sending Mr. Black back to see Dr. Forman for re-evaluation? A. Yes. If I remember correctly, because I asked why, from what I understand it was that Mr. Black said it was okay. Q. Now, did you understand that Mr. Black initially refused to go back to see Dr. Forman? Were you made aware of that? A. Yes. Q. Were you aware that Mr. Mijon then told him that if he did not go back to see Dr. Forman that he would be terminated for insubordination? A. That’s not what I was aware of, because I questioned why he was going back to Forman if there was an issue. According to what I believe to be what Mr. Mijon told me was that that was Mr. Black’s decision. Q. So you think it was Mr. Black’s decision to go back to see Dr. Forman? A. Yes, as odd as I thought it was. Q. So if Mr. Black had, in fact, had some problem with Dr. Forman, from your perspective, he should have gone to see a different doctor other than Dr. Forman, correct? A. Yes. If I remember correctly, my normal process is, Why would he go back to somebody who he has an issue with? Mr. Mijon’s response, if I remember correctly, was that Mr. Black said he had no problems going back to Mr. Forman. That’s the best of recollection. Q. So if Mr. Mijon, in fact, threatened Mr. Black with termination if he refused to go back to see Dr. Forman, that would not be consistent with your view of what should happen? A. That’s absolutely correct. I would not like to see anybody threatened. Dr. Forman was unaware of the complaints Respondent had lodged with the APA or the DOH until after Petitioner took action to terminate Respondent’s employment. Consequently, these complaints had no influence on the report Dr. Forman filed following his May 12, 2005, evaluation of the Respondent.3 Respondent agreed, under protest, to be reevaluated by Dr. Forman, but only on the condition that Dr. Forman would allow him to record the session. Dr. Forman agreed to have the session recorded on the condition that Respondent would provide Petitioner with a copy of the taped session. Respondent agreed to that condition. Respondent recorded the reevaluation session of May 12, 2005. Despite numerous requests, no tape was ever provided. Respondent testified that the tape was destroyed during Hurricane Wilma, which, according to the National Hurricane website, hit South Florida in October 2005. Dr. Forman testified at the hearing as to both the evaluation and the reevaluation. Reports as to his evaluation and his reevaluation were admitted into evidence. Dr. Forman again found that Respondent was not fit for duty on his reevaluation. The undersigned finds Dr. Forman’s testimony to be clear, professional, and persuasive. There was insufficient evidence to establish that the complaints Respondent lodged against Dr. Forman to Mr. Mijon had any bearing on Dr. Forman’s reevaluation. There was also insufficient evidence to establish that Dr. Forman should have been disqualified from providing the reevaluation. Dr. Forman’s Reevaluation Report (Petitioner’s Exhibit 43), provides, in relevant part, a recap of Dr. Forman’s findings as follows: . . . As I expressed to you by phone, Mr. Black appears to have deteriorated emotionally over the past five months and I am concerned that Mr. Black may be acutely psychotic. I can say unequivocally that Mr. Black is not ready to return to the classroom at this time. He was not fit to return to teaching duties the first time I evaluated him and given that his current emotional state is worsened, he is less able to function in an instructional capacity. I also believe an effort should be made to get Mr. Black psychiatric care as I am concerned about his wellbeing. . . . Petitioner established by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent was not fit for duty as a classroom teacher as of May 12, 2005. On June 10, 2005, Respondent was notified that he would be recommended for termination from employment based on the finding that he was not fit for duty as a teacher. At its June 21, 2005 meeting, the School Board voted to terminate Respondent's employment pursuant to Policy 4004. The action to terminate Respondent’s employment was part of the consent agenda.4 In accordance with paragraph 12 of Policy 4004 procedures, Respondent could have requested a second opinion, following the reevaluation by Dr. Forman. Respondent did not request another evaluation. He no longer trusted the process, and stated that he could not obtain another evaluation for financial reasons. Subsequent to the School Board’s vote in June 2005, Respondent went off of the School Board approved list, looked in the yellow pages, and retained some other therapists, psychologists and/or psychiatrists to perform evaluations. Those subsequent evaluations were not offered into evidence.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order adopting the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law contained in this Recommended Order. It is further RECOMMENDED that the final order terminate Respondent’s employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of March, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of March, 2009.
The Issue Should Petitioner suspend Respondent without pay for three (3) days for inappropriately physically restraining a student in mid-December, 1996, while Respondent was employed at Tate High School?
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to the inquiry, Respondent was an instructional employee of the Escambia County School Board. In this capacity he served as a physical education teacher. He also coached football and track. Respondent has been in the teaching profession for more than 21 years. The majority of that service has been in the states of Alabama and Georgia. Respondent has been employed in the Escambia County School District for approximately two years. On March 14, 1996, Respondent received a reprimand from Jim May, Principal of Tate High School. Tate High School is in Gonzalez, Florida, and is part of the Escambia County School District. The letter of reprimand stated: I am writing this letter of reprimand in regards to an incident that occurred at Tate High School on March 12, 1996. It is my findings [sic] that you put your hands on a student and physically forced him in a chair by grabbing him by the elbow. You should never put hands on a student unless to prevent bodily harm to himself or to others. These actions were inappropriate and must not reoccur. Any further actions of this sort on your part will result in serious disciplinary action to you, including possible suspension or termination. In the fall term 1996 Mr. May met with coaches, to include Respondent, and reminded the coaches not to put their hands on students for any reason in relation to involvement between the coaches and student athletes. This meeting was occasioned by an incident between another coach and a student. The policy which prohibits a teacher from putting his or her hands on a student except to prevent harm to the teacher or to others, is a policy that has application throughout the Escambia County School District. When Respondent was reprimanded on March 14, 1996, Carolyn Spooner, the present Principal at Tate High School, told the Respondent, that he should have allowed the student whom he forced into a chair to walk out of the classroom, as opposed to forcing the student into the desk chair. It was the student's intention to leave the classroom before Respondent forced the student into the chair. If the student had been allowed to leave, Respondent was advised by Ms. Spooner, that the Respondent could have sent a referral to the Dean or sent for a Dean to offer assistance. The referral practice, as contrasted with physical restraint, is the policy for the Escambia County School District. While the Student Handbook describing rights and responsibilities for students in the School District of Escambia County in the 1996-97 School Year contemplates possible corporal punishment, the school district does not impose corporal punishment for high school students. In any event the imposition of corporal punishment is not conducted ad hoc through the instructional staff. It may only be conducted through means established by guidelines for administering such punishment, which establish the nature of the punishment to be administered, under what conditions, and by whom. Notwithstanding the admonitions to Respondent to refrain from placing his hands on students other than in the limited circumstances described, Respondent violated those instructions and acted contrary to the school district policy. This incident occurred on December 10, 1996, at Tate High School while Respondent was teaching a physical education class. On that date a student was less than cooperative in his participation in the physical education class. Basically, the student was unwilling to participate. There was some question about the student's ability to participate. This circumstance followed a history of the student not participating and having provided written excuses from his mother relieving him of the responsibility to participate in the physical education class. Nonetheless, on this date, Respondent felt that the student should walk, while other students played softball. At some point during this episode the student sat on some bleachers at the athletic field and refused to walk as he had been instructed to do by the Respondent. Respondent took the student by the elbow and "helped" the student down from the bleachers. They then commenced to walk around the practice field with Respondent holding the student by the arm. The student pulled away from the Respondent and stated words to the effect that he was not going to do anything on the field that he did not want to do. Respondent sent the student to the "office" to be punished, but the Respondent did not write a referral as required by school district policy. As a result of the Respondent placing his hands on the student's arm, the student received bruises on the underside of his left arm that left dark spots. That injury was reported by the student's mother. The marks that were left on the underside of the student's arm were still visible the following day. The incident was investigated by Ms. Spooner and Roy Ikner, Assistant Principal at Tate High School. On December 13, 1996 Ms. Spooner, as Principal for Tate High School, gave notice to Respondent that disciplinary action was being considered for "grabbing the student by the arm." Ms. Spooner met with the Respondent on December 16, 1996. In that meeting Respondent did not, and does not now, deny putting his hands on the student. Eventually Jim May, who had been elected superintendent of schools, gave notice to Respondent on January 22, 1997, that the superintendent was recommending the imposition of a three-day suspension without pay for the incident with the student that took place on December 10, 1996. The nature of the alleged misconduct was inappropriate physical restraint of the student. The facts reveal that Respondent inappropriately physically restrained the student on December 10, 1996, in violation of earlier instructions from his supervisor to refrain from that conduct. Other than the letter of reprimand and the incident at issue in this case, no other proof has been offered concerning prior discipline of the Respondent. The Respondent in his defense presented assessment system evaluations for the school years 1995-96 and 1996-97, in which he has been found to be a satisfactory teacher overall and has exceeded expected performance in parts of the performance evaluations.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and the conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered which finds Respondent guilty of misconduct by the inappropriate physical contact with a student on December 10, 1996, and suspends Respondent without pay for three days. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of July, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of July, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: John L. Hammons, Esquire Hammons and Whittaker, P.A. 17 West Cervantes Street Pensacola, Florida 32501 John Benavidez 10141 Vixen Place Pensacola, Florida 32514 Jim May, Superintendent School District of Escambia County 215 West Garden Street Post Office Box 1470 Pensacola, Florida 32597-1470
